THE
BRAHMASŪTRAS
AND
THEIR PRINCIPAL COMMENTARIES

(A CRITICAL EXPOSITION)

VOLUME III

With Foreword by
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By
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समर्पणम्

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गुरुर्गुरूणां प्रभवः शास्त्राणां बादरायणः ।
चक्रे निर्णायकं शास्त्रं परविद्येति विश्रुतम् ।।
तस्मै सूत्रकृते वेदव्यासरूपाय विष्णवे ।
श्रीमध्वमुनये चापि सूत्रभाष्यकृते नमः ।।
आनन्दतीर्थभाष्यादेर्गूढभावं निजाक्षरैः ।
स्पष्टयामास यः श्लक्ष्णैर्जयतीर्थं नमामि तम् ।।
"भो भो मत्सरकुत्सितान् शुभधियो दुर्वैदुषीगर्वितान्
आकाशादवतारभागिन इवाहंयून् समाहौवय किम् ?
श्लाघाकम्पनमेकमेव शिरसः श्रीव्यासयोगीशितुः
मेरूणां शतमर्हति क्षितितले विद्यासु विद्यावताम् ।।"
तं नौमि रामचन्द्राख्यभिक्षुमक्षोभ्यवैष्णवम् ।
दत्त्वा नो विष्णुदीक्षां यः स्वरूपोद्धारमातनोत् ।।
तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकाशेषं पूरयामास यः कृती ।
सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रं तं रघुनाथयतिं श्रये ।।
अन्ये च बहवष्टीकाटिप्पण्यादिविभूषणैः ।
मध्वतन्त्रमलंचक्रुस्तान् नमस्ये गुरूनपि ।।
भाष्यटीकादिकान् ग्रन्थान् सर्वान् संगृह्य मेधया ।
यो भाष्यदीपिकां तेने जगन्नाथमुनिं भजे ।।
व्यासराजसुपीठस्थो वेदविद्याविशारदः ।
विद्यापयोनिधिर्धीमान् राजतां स्वे पदे चिरम् ।।
वंशावतंसं तं कोच्चोरङ्गप्पाचार्यनामकम् ।
विश्वप्रियगुरोरौपसदं प्राञ्चं नमाम्यहम् ।।
येनाहं शुकवद् बाल्याच्छिक्षितोऽस्मि कृपालुना ।
तं वन्दे मध्वरायार्यं स्निग्धं मातामहं मम ।।
मदन्तर्यामिणा योऽयं ज्ञानयज्ञोऽद्य कारितः ।
प्राप्तेन पूर्णतां तेन श्रीकृष्णः प्रीयतां मम ।।

श्रीमतां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तिस्रो व्याख्यानपद्धतीः ।
विवृणोमि यथाप्रज्ञमधीतस्य शुशुत्सया ॥

EDITORIAL PREFACE

We are happy to bring out the third volume of Dr B N K Sharma's vigorous and animated study of the Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries of the three famous schools of Vedānta with the full complement of their respective commentarial literature, *in depth* It places before the world of scholars here and abroad the most detailed and penetrating study of the subject that has been carried out since George Thibaut's first analysis and comparison of topics and their interpretation *in the Bhāṣyas of Śamkara and Rāmānuja in 1890, followed* three decades later by the Indian scholar Dr V S Ghate, widening the area of inquiry to include the outlines of the Bhāṣyas of Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabha

After a gap of more than half a century, Dr B N K. Sharma, who is an eminent Professor of Sanskrit brought up in the best traditions of ancient and modern scholarship and is the most renowned contemporary scholar and writer of the Madhva Sampradāya, has entered the field and has enlivened the study of the Sūtras and their commentaries with his *magnum opus*

Dr Sharma has not only plumbed the depths of several standard commentaries of the three schools of Vedānta in addition to their original Bhāsyas, *for the first time, in a study of such magnitude,* but has given us an adhikarana-wise study of the entire Brahmasūtras according to each of these traditions of interpretation. In this he has indeed broken new ground *It deserves to be noted with special grati*fication from the point of view of the scholarly tradition of India that while doing so Dr Sharma, with his close study of the subject in the

intensive method of traditional Pandits, has brought to bear on his exposition the entire repertoire of the critical and exegetical apparatus of traditional analysis of the Sūtras in terms of their Śāstra, Adhyāya, Pāda, Adhikarana and Ānantarya Sangatis which reveals the morphology of the Sūtrakāra's system and makes clear the working of its internal dynamics in all its bearings

There is no doubt that Dr Sharma's work ushers in a new genre of creative and critical literature in lively English on the fascinating yet the most difficult subject of the Brahmasūtras and their famous commentaries by the renowned Acharyas and their eminent followers. His work has gone beyond all the earlier ones on the subject in any modern Indian or foreign language including English in its scope, range and depth and attention to significant details It is bound to remain a standard work of study and reference and an indispensable guide and aid to higher studies in Vedānta for several decades to come

I congratulate Dr Sharma heartily on his brilliant achievement and compliment the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan for bringing out this important treatise on the Brahmasūtras and their principal commentaries in the prestigious Bharatiya Vidya Series where it rightly belongs The greatest importance of Dr Sharma's three Volumes lies in the fact that they are indispensable for a comparative study of the views of the various Acharyas

J H. DAVE
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FOREWORD

It is a pleasure to join the esteemed company of Gerhard Oberhammer and Ninian Smart in recommending Dr. B. N. K. Sharma's monumental work on the Brahmasūtras and their principal commentaries. These volumes, as their readers know by now, explore in depth the critical literature on the Brahmasūtras, especially emphasizing the commentaries of Madhva which have not received as much attention as others, as well as for the first time exposing to general view the comments of great sub-commentators such as Vācaspati, Vyāsatīrtha, and many more. *The result is an analysis of the Brahmasūtra literature which goes far beyond previous works, such as those by Ghate and Radhakrishnan, in scope and detail.*

The present, third, volume of the work covers the last two adhyāyas in which matters of crucial relevance to the understanding of religious thought and behavior are addressed. These chapters are far less often studied than the philosophical material of the first two chapters. Furthermore, it is over matters of practical approaches to the highest states of human aspiration, dealt with here, that some of the most important divergences among the several Vedānta schools are to be found. The following pages are therefore of particular interest and importance to students of religion as well as of philosophy.

Being myself involved in organizing and conducting a project of summarizing classical Indian philosophical works, for the 'Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies', I am especially interested in the method of summarizing as a means of getting at the essence of such materials as these. My experience suggests that the method of summary places

especially severe requirements on the summarizer, who must be thoroughly acquainted with the text as well as fully awake to the nuances of his material and its place in the whole of which it is a critical part. Professor Sharma is the ideal summarizer: his long life of scholarship in Indian philosophy, his active participation in the unravelling of thorny analytic issues, and his leadership in promoting interest in and knowledge of the Dvaita interpretation of Vedānta make his every choice of words, of authority appealed to and line of analysis followed, of tremendous value to students and scholars of the subjects he treats.

I am sure this work will take its proper place as a classic. My felicitations to its author.

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December 16, 1977.

PREFACE

This third Volume of study of the Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries of the schools of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva completes the massive research project on the subject begun in March 1969. The first volume of study was published in 1971 and the second in 1974. The present volume covers the portion from Adhy. III Pāda 2 to the end of Adhy. IV. and completes the project.

There is apparently a wide area of agreement between S. and other commentators before and after him down to R in respect of the Viṣayavākyas, the topics to be discussed and the pattern of interpretation, notwithstanding his parenthetical innovations, additions and correctives to the Sūtrakāra, in terms of his Vivartavāda, the 'mithyātva' of the world, the two-tier theory of B. as Saguṇa and Nirguṇa and the difference between Jīva and B. being due to the operation of an indescribable beginningless ignorance (Avidyā).

In contrast to these, M 's commentaries on the Sūtras introduce us to an entirely new line of thought and interpretation of the Sūtras which is distinctive in method and outlook and which has not much in common with any of the other commentaries. This is because M. derives the sanction for his new line of interpretation directly from the internal dynamics of the Sūtras themselves so far as it could be ascertained from their language, wording and cross-references and adherence to their Adhyāya and Pāda saṅgatis and from a substantial body of collateral sources collected by him which was much closer to the period of the Sūtras in thought and composition than the commentaries which have come down to us. The *raison d'étre* of originality and inde-

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pendence of M's pattern of interpretation of the Sūtras has not yet come to be correctly appreciated as the approach of modern scholars in general and of some of the traditional Pandits also of other schools to his commentaries is still warped by a baseless assumption of his having broken away from the "received tradition" and "consensus" of other commentators The observations of Pandit Uttamur Viraraghavacharya in the Preface to his edition of R's *Śrībhāṣya* with the c of Sudarsana Sūri (Madras 1976) are typical of this attitude that "M's departures from the general pattern of thought and interpretation of earlier commentators on the Sūtras are due to his antipathy to S's Advaita interpretations which changed the whole tenor of the Sūtras by its interruptions This drove M. to the other extreme of discarding S's Viṣayavākyas altogether, with a vengeance, instead of accommodating them with more suitable explanations—and going in for brand new Viṣayavākyas and elucidating the purport of the Sūtras on their basis from an entirely novel line of approach and assigning to them meanings far removed from what most of us would think of giving them. Another reason for this was his difficulty in accommodating his novel way of interpreting the Sūtras within the framework of their earlier pattern of interpretation followed by other commentators which ran more or less parallel to one another Authorities like the *Brahmatarka* relied on by him in support of such interpretations are for the most part nonexistent today and have never even been mentioned by any of the early writers of other schools and happen to be exclusively in favor of his views" (*Op cit* pp 9,15)

It is an exaggeration to say that M's interpretations rely mainly on his non-extant sources He has drawn as much as the others on extant sources while bringing to light other forgotten sources, which had fallen into oblivion, by his endeavor, enterprise and intensive spiritual vision and focussing the attention of his contemporaries upon them. The authenticity of his other sources does not seem to have been called into question by any of his erstwhile adversaries like Trivikrama Paṇḍita and Padmanābha Tirtha who accepted his Siddhānta after prolonged disputations with him Nor does the circumstance of many of his sources not being known to others seem to have stood in the way of his system being given an honored place alongside of R's system as "Pūrṇaprajña Darśana" in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasangraha* A close and serious study of M's original works and cc bears out the truth of his statement in his Mbh T N (ii 3-6) that he had collected a plethora of ancient source materials for his system thro' patient search for manuscripts from different parts of the country where the vast literary treasures of mediaeval Hindu centres of learning, private and public, had passed and were passing thro' the horrors of wanton destruction in the name of religious

conquest by a crusading faith. These fresh corroborative sources were intended to strengthen the faith of those who had already accepted the correctness of his system on its own merits and on the authority of extant sources, rather than to compel agreement from antagonists who were free to refuse to be bound by their authority and ask for more acceptable forms of proof. The *Bodhāyana-Vṛtti*. the Dramiḍa Bhāṣya and Taṅka's c. on the Sūtras (relied upon by the Rāmānujīya tradition) do not seem to have been extant even in the days of R. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why no complete copies of any of them have been preserved by his followers. If R. had access to the *Bodhāyana Vṛtti* in Kashmir on which he based his c. on the Sūtras, why should one be asked to disbelieve M's claim that he discovered Vyāsa's *Brahmatarka* from which he has quoted more than five hundred verses in his works but which curiously enough has not been quoted by him in his first work, the Gīta bhāṣya? The Ekāyana Srutis forming part of the Pañcarātra corpus are now lost to us. Their authenticity is accepted by the Rāmānujīyas, tho' they are not so frequently quoted in their works. M. has quoted often from the Ekāyana both in prose and in verse, from Caturvedaśikhā, Paramaśruti, Mahopaniṣad, Nārāyaṇaśruti and others. The same Ekāyana Śruti cited by M in the Pāśupatādhi. has been cited by Vedānta Deśika also in his *Nyāyasiddhāntasiddhāñjana.* The non-extant *Vyāsasmṛti* quoted by M. in his *GB.*, is known to the later S who wrote the c. on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma.* The two closing Sūtras of the non-extant, *Daīvī Mīmāmsā* quoted by M in his *AV* have been accepted by Deśika. The metrical non-extant *Bhāllaveya Śruti* from which M. has quoted was independently known to Sureśvara author of the *Bṛhadvārtika.* If a modern Vedic scholar of repute like Daivarata could have 'visioned' a whole of body of Vedic Sūktas in perfect Ṛg Vedic rhythm, grammar and accentuation (*Chandodarśana,* B.V. Bhavan, 1968) why should it be impossible for the founder of a philosophical system of M's calibre who lived 700 years back to have reclaimed from oblivion and restored to posterity numerous Vedic texts from many forgotten Śākhas?

M's rejection of Māyăvāda is strictly impersonal having its *raison d'etre* in its philosophical untenability and it excites his pity:

अनन्तदोषदुष्टं च हेयं मायामतं शुभैः (*AV*)
ते अतिसाहसिकत्वात् सुशोच्या एव (*GT*)

It is highly deceptive to talk of "consensus" among Pre-Madhva commentators in the general pattern of interpretation of the Sūtras, notwithstanding S's parenthetical additions and correctives. The apt-

nivartante' "aśabdam arūpam', 'avacanenaiva provāca" poses a serious threat to the proposed textual Samanvaya of Śrutis in B This is certainly entitled to priority of consideration and refutation over the need to refute the causality of Prakrti which, in point of fact, can arise only after this obstacle to Samanvaya as such and in principle has been surmounted M is thus fully justified in breaking away from the beaten track of "consensus" which, in this case, is utterly misplaced and assigning to the adhi a *more urgent and appropriate topic* of Vācyatvasamarthana as against the contention of B's avācyatva This makes it possible to treat the first five adhi's, instead of the first four, as a unit laying the foundations of the Śāstra and preparing the ground for the systematic working out of the details of Samanvaya in the succeeding adhi-s beginning with the Ānandamayādhi

There is blind agreement between S Bhāskara and some others in the interpretation of the Ekādhi (iii,3,53-54) as a refutation of the Cārvāka theory of there being no soul other than the body,—a topic which is utterly out of place in the Gunopasamhārapāda There is a similar thoughtless 'consensus' between S B and R in interpreting the Karmānusmṛtyadhi (iii,2,9) as establishing that the soul waking from sleep is the same as went to sleep The topic needs no serious discussion after all that has been said about the Soul's peregrinations after death and return to the mother's womb for rebirth, in the Vairāgyapāda Such is the misplaced consensus and blind conformity to a 'received common pattern' of interpretation of the Sūtras and adhi s, that we find among the Pre-Madhva commentators In refusing to tow their line and follow their beaten track blindly, M has rightly exercised his judgment as an independent commentator and system-builder to think for himself in the light of the wording, plan and purpose of the Sūtras and relevance of topics as to what to accept and what to reject in the received interpretations of earlier commentators and explore fresh lines of thought and more consistent interpretations in systematizing the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra As for the concept of Viśeṣas and Gunagunyabheda to which Pandit Viraraghavacharya has taken objection, he should know that these have been argumentatively established by M. and his commentators as original contributions to the ontological problem of substance and attributes in philosophy and the concept is also traceable to Pañcarātra doctrine, as pointed out in Vol. II, pp 115-116 If the doctrine of 'Jñāna' as a 'substance' and of 'dharmibhūtajñāna' and 'dharmabhutajñāna' of R. can pass muster philosophically, the doctrines of Viśeṣas and Guṇaguṇyabeda can give a better account of themselves as worthy of being accepted as 'Sarvatantrasiddhāntas' in place of all rival theories on the subject.

The vicissitudes of Jīvas in their life after death, including possible sojourn in hells before returning to the mothers' womb for rebirth, described *in the Vairāgya Pāda prepare the ground, in the following* Pāda, for the cultivation of Bhakti or grateful devotion to the Supreme Being which is the cause of their worldly existence, their bondage and their release from them, as taught in Sūtras i,1,2, iii,2,5

Accordingly, the first seven adhikaranas of the opening Pāda of this volume elucidate how every one of the Jīvātman's states of embodied life, such as dream, waking life, deep sleep and waking from it, is under the agency and control of the Supreme

The remaining thirteen adhi s introduce us to several important facets of the Divine Personality to enable the Jīvas to realize the true nature and extent of its majesty and strive for the attainment of the highest form of devotion to the Lord

The entire second Pāda has therefore been designated by M as "Bhakti-Pāda", *for the first time in the history of Brahmasūtra-interpretation and consistently interpreted as such* He has clearly shown how each one of its adhi s highlights one aspect of Divine majesty, converges on the theme of "Bhakti" and justifies it This is one of M's most significant departures from the beaten track of earlier commentators on the Sūtras, including the Theistic Rāmānuja The theme of "Bhakti" finds no place in the scheme of Sādhanas in the Sādhana-Adhyāya of the Sūtras as interpreted by S, Bhāskara and many others R sees but a faint allusion to 'Bhakti' in one of the Sūtras here (iii,2,23) *in the term 'samrādhana' But he does not avail of the opportunity* given by the *exaltation of Paramātman as being the author of the* wonderful creation in dreams and the resting place of selves in deep sleep in adhis 1 and 2 and of *His fulness of perfections and freedom* from the imperfections of the Jīvas from adhi 5 onwards, to unfold the multiple nature of the majesty of God in such a manner as would emblazon the entire Pāda as a full-fledged Bhaktipāda In making good this omission, M has shown sound judgment and true vision in restoring Bhakti to its rightful place in the Sūtrakāra's system as a major Sādhana in realizing B By adhering strictly to the contextual perspective, in the same way, in respect of each Adhy and Pāda, he has given us many new insights into the richness, beauty and depth of the Theistic contents of the Bādarāyana Sūtras For this reason, he is to be acknowledged as the *foremost* Theistic commentator on the Vedānta Sūtras

Pāda 2 of Adhy *III begins with an inquiry into the status of dream* phenomena and their experience by the Jiva The reality of objects

ness and justifiability of Viṣayavākyas and topics of adhi s of different commentators have to be judged on their merits of contextual propriety, schematic relevance, homologous approximation to the wording of the Sūtras and such other objective criteria Sufficient materials in this direction have been placed before the readers in these volumes to enable them to judge for themselves which of the cc fulfils them best, without bartering its own judgment It is not as if M does not agree with other commentators on some broad outlines of division of topics and subject matter of the Adhyāyas and Pādas While doing so, he has also realigned many adhi s giving them more purposive and meaningful topics as can be seen from our survey of the different interpretations On closer examination, the supposed consensus among the early commentators turns out to be deceptive, misleading and superficial The Abhinnanimittopādāna interpretation of B's causality sponsored by the Vrttikāra, Bhāskara and Brahmanandi has been substantially altered by R in terms of his Cidacidviśiṣṭa-Brahmanimittopādānavāda Bhāskara's and Vṛttikāra's real Brahmapariṇāmavāda has been replaced by S with his Brahma-Vivartavāda The doctrine of the Jīvātman's aṇutva held by R is a departure from the position of Bhāskara and other earlier commentators including S These differences are fundamental and not merely technical or terminological M's view of B's (Kevala)-nimittakāranatva in creation has deeper nuances of thought and philosophical implications than the Nyāya-Vaiśesika view of the matter with which it is often confounded The 'aśabdatva' of Prakṛti so stubbornly maintained by *all the commentators* except M is a rebuff to the acceptance of Prakṛti as the material stuff of the universe in the Epics, the Purāṇas (V P i 2 29) and Śvet Up (v 5b, vi 10) M is right in holding that the suppposed establishment of the 'aśabdatva' of Prakṛti in the last Pāda of the first Adhy of the Sūtras should have logically and textually preceded the refutation of Prakṛti's Jagatkāranatva in the Īkṣatyadhi, if the Sūtrakāra was really against the upādānatva of Prakṛti as other commentators have held. The thoughtless way in which almost all these early and later commentators here have followed one another in limiting the interpretation of the expression 'janmādi' in i,1,2 to the three acts of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world by B is in open conflict with the internal evidence of the Sūtras i,3,11-12 and iii,2,5, bringing niyamana, knowledge and bondage of Souls from Samsāra and their release, within the scope of B's definition

There is consensus among S Bhāskara and R that the fifth adh. of Adhy I refutes the causality of Prakṛti This tradition of interpretation cannot be sustained as has been shown in Vol I, pp 88-91. The 'aśabdatva' of Prakṛti on which the interpretation of S Bhāskara and

presented within the dreams and the Jīva's experience of them as creations of Paramātman emerge first in the Rāmānuja tradition (probably as a corollary of its 'Yathārthakhyāti') R regards them as external creations tho' open only to the perception of the dreamer It is to M. however that we have to turn for a more satisfactory exposition of the reality of objects perceived in the dreams as products of the subconscious impressions (vāsanās) of the mind and as such having an inner reality and space-time setting of their own. M. is also the first to open our eyes to the profound bearing of the establishment of the reality and dependence of the dreams and other states of the Jīva discussed in the first seven adhi.s on the central theme of the Pāda viz "Bhakti". His interpretation of the key word 'māyāmātram', in the Sūtra, applied to dreams as containing an encapsuled reference to both the efficient and the material causes of dream creations, with the Jīvatman as their experiencing self and Paramātman as their author, enables us to visualize the majesty of God as the author, sustainer and withdrawer of these internal creations and their experience *much more vividly* than R's rendering of 'māyāmātram' as 'wonderful creation' (āścaryarūpam) For, acceptance of the reality of dream objects as creations of God calls for an identification of their precise 'nimitta' and 'upādāna' kāranas and of their space-time setting within the dreams, in the interests of formulating an intelligible realistic theory of dreams R's interpretation of 'māyāmātram' as "āścaryarūpam' does nothing to meet these requirements or to dispel the imposing array of arguments with which Gauḍapāda and S have attempted to dismiss dream-creations as illusory M's interpretation of 'māyāmātram' (See Pages 13-15) meets all these requirements fully and effectively and deserves to be most carefully considered in formulating a sound realistic theory and explanation of dreams

S's view that the investigation of the states of the self beginning with dreams is for the purpose of bringing into relief the self-luminous character of Atman goes against the parallelism drawn by the Sūtrakāra himself in 'Tanvabhāve sandhyavadupapatteḥ' (iv,4,13) between the Jīvātman's enjoyments in the state of Mokṣa *which must be real* and his enjoyments in his dreams, here and now, *both without the assistance of a physical body* This parallelism would lose its point if the objects presented in dreams are to be deprived of their reality as proposed by S There is, at the same time, no need to invest these creations with an 'external reality' as proposed by R. M's stand on the issue avoids both the extremes and presents the most reasonable realistic theory of dream-creations.

It follows as a corollary from the Sūtrakāra's clear pronouncement in iii,2,5, that both the Jīvātman's states of bondage and release are due to the Supreme B., that every *other* state of the Jīva lying between them is equally under the same Divine agency and control. The realization of this truth is bound to inspire in the heart of every good soul the highest expression of devotion to the supreme Being as "Sarvāvasthāprerakam".

The last thirteen adhis. of this Pāda have been explained by M. as throwing light on some of the sublime aspects of the Divine personality, communion with which is the goal of Bhakti. Among these are (i) the transempirical character of Divine attributes; (ii) the parity of perfections and blessedness among all the manifestations of the Divine Form (as would be necessary even in the case of the Arcā, Vibhava, Vyūha, Para and Antaryāmi forms in R's philosophy); (iii) the identity of the Divine essence with its attributes which must nevertheless admit of a colorful distinction of reference without necessitating a distinction of essence, by virtue of the concept of 'Viśeṣa' or specific nuances of being; (iv) B's transcendence of all our mental constructs and representations for purposes of Upāsanā or meditative contemplation and (v) its distinction from the individual self.

The third Pāda has the largest number of adhikaraṇas according to all schools of interpretation. It is generally known as "Guṇopasamhāra Pāda",—a description which points to the fact that it deals with the combination, coordination and correlation of the numerous attributes of B. taught in the different Śākhās and Vidyās of the Śrutis, for purposes of Upāsanā. Guṇopasamhāra presupposes the acceptance of B. as a being which is Saguṇa and Saviśeṣa. There can be no Guṇopasamhāra in what is Nirguṇa.

There are two significant points connected with the interpretation of this Pāda on which M.'s views differ completely from those of the other commentators. The first is that all the Vidyās considered in this Pāda for purposes of upasamhāra or anupasamhāra are Brahmavidyās. This renders irrelevant to the Pāda consideration of topics such as the unity of Prāṇa-Vidyās (iii.3.6, 8) whether rinsing of the mouth is enjoined in Prāṇavidyā or only meditation on the water used for rinsing as the dress of Prāṇa (18), whether Prāṇāgnihotra is to be observed on fast-days also (40-41), whether upāsanās mentioned with certain sacrifices are parts of them and hence are inseparably connected with them (42), whether meditation on Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be kept separate in spite of the essential oneness of the two deities (43), whether the fires of Agnirahasya of Bṛhadāraṇyaka are part of the sacrificial

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act or constitute a separate Vidyā (44-52), *whether the self is a separate entity from the body* (53-54), whether Udgīthopāsanā connected with sacrificial acts are valid for all Śākhās (55-56)—as we have them in the interpretations of S (R and others where they agree with him)

It also renders uncalled for the monotonous discussion by S R and others in the majority of adhis of this Pāda of cases to which the same decision whether the cognitions of B which form the subject of different Vedāntic texts are separate or not is to be applied

M's commentary shows, instead, how the upasamhāra or anupasamhāra of the different attributes of B taught in various Śākhās or Vidyās is governed by other criteria of Yogyatā and Adhikārabheda of different orders of Upāsakas like Devas, Ṛṣis and men and does not depend on our having to decide whether the cognitions themselves are different or non-different, for all Vedānta is one Brahmavidyā—'Sarvavedāntapratyayam brahma' His treatment of the subject of upāsāna proceeds on a threefold classification of Brahmopāsakas into Sarvagunopāsakas, Bahugunopāsakas and Caturgunopāsakas—human beings belonging mostly to the last class The four principal attributes of B open to upāsanā by ordinary mortals are identified in the Ānandādhi (iii 3-12) as sat, cit, ānanda and ātmatva The possibility of subsuming all other attributes of B within the connotation of 'ātmatva' or Its being one's ruler, depending on the contemplative calibre of higher Adhikārins, in the spirit of the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' is also provided for in one adhi (iii 3 17) There are special adhis describing other forms of upāsanā open to higher Adhikārins like Devas, Ṛṣis and ascetics The continuance of upāsanā by Mukta-Jivas as an expression of their blissful nature and the spontaneous character of upāsanā of B carried on by the Śrītattva in spite of her not belonging to the category of "Adhikārins' (being 'nityamuktā', by Divine will) receive incidental attention in this Pāda, according to M's interpretation

Upāsanā of B thro' Gunopasamhāra is thus the principal theme of this Pāda It differs according to the gradation of Adhikārins depending on the range and intensity of their insights Some adhis deal with the 'itikartavyatā' or the procedure to be followed in regard to the twofold nature of Upāsanā—viz Śāstrābhyāsa and Dhyāna—such as the acquirement of the Guru's grace for spiritual illumination, the cultivation of śama, dama and other virtues, Bimbopāsanā, meditation on members of the Divine hierarchy, the contemplation of the attributes of B as being identical with its essence and of the infinitude of their range

It will be conceded that topics like these are intimately connected with the doctrine of Upāsanā of B with special reference to its ramifications of Adhikāra, Yogyatā, itikartavyatā and the qualitative and quantitative differences in the nature of upāsanās *Their discussion in this* Pāda would thus be in the nature of a study of the doctrine of Brahmopāsanā *in depth* No wonder if, on the other hand, the mere multiplication of instances bearing on the same question—to which the same decisions are to be applied, whether the numerous Vidyās scattered thro' the Upanisads constitute one or different cognitions to which we are introduced in the interpretations of S, R and others in the bulk of this Pāda should have been found to be "rather trivial and of no philosophic importance to us" (Ghate *Op cit* p 124) How close to the Pādārtha of Brahmopāsanā, its premises, postulates and presuppositions M has kept his *interpretations of the adhi s here can be seen even from* a random comparison of his handling of the Ekādhikarana (iii 3 55-56) and the Karmānusmrtyadhi (iii, 2, 9) with S's

The fourth Pāda of Adhy, III must naturally be connected with the outcome of upāsanā—viz Brahmāparoksa and its wide range of power —in destroying accumulated karma and mitigating the rigor of partly requited Prārabdhakarmas It is not, therefore, doing justice to this Pāda to dismiss it as dealing with "miscellaneous questions regarding Brahmavidyā and its auxiliaries" All other Puruṣārthas attained by the Aparoksajñānin like Svarga are also due to the power of knowledge alone This is because other Sādhanas like karma act as subsidiaries (*sesa*) to Jñāna by contributing a measure of excellence to the fruits earned by Jñāna itself This keeps the door open for accredited Aparoksajñānins to engage in intensive works in the true spirit of Kārmayoga and reap their fruit thro' future enhancement or welling up of the joys of Moksa

M's bhāsya focuses attention on the latent powers of Aparoksajnāna He quotes a memorable passage from the Svargārohanaparva of the *Mahābhārata* in which Yudhisthira and his brothers are invited to reap the *enhanced fruits* of the Rājasūya, Aśvamedha and other works performed by them in the fulness of their enlightenment (aparokṣa) and now waiting to be enjoyed by them

राजसूयार्जितान् लोकानश्वमेधाभिवर्धितान् ।
प्राप्नुहि त्वं महाभाग तपसश्च महाफलम् ॥ (*Mbh* XVIII 3 23)

This places works performed by Aparoksajñānins in the special category of Jñānottarakarma It is this Jñānottarakarma that is found idealized in the Upanisads 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti tadeva vīryavattaram

bhavatı' (*Chān Up* ı 1 10), ın the *Gītā* (ııı 20) and ın other sources as 'Nıṣkāmam' and 'Jñānapūrvam', associated with the lives of great Yogıns of repute like Janaka and Prıyavrata, who are stated to have attaıned Samsıddhı (mokṣa) by such works This dispels S's narrow ınterpretatıon ın Sūtra ııı 4 10 that the principle that 'knowledge enhances the fruits of works' does *not* apply to all knowledge of B but *only* to the udgītha which ıs discussed ın that passage

M's ınterpretatıon of the fourth adhı here takes a firm stand on the question of the alleged absolute ethical freedom of the Aparokṣajnānın to live as he likes (*kāmakāra*) He recognizes unhesitatingly that moral standards do not cease to be applicable to the Jnānın, however eminent he may be Allowing absolute freedom to the Jnānın to live as he likes, transcending the moral law and do as ıt pleases him, would set him on a pedestal of equality with God who alone ıs above the sphere of mandates M. suggests that while accepting the categorical imperative of the Jnānın to abide by the moral and ethical standards, the freedom given to him to choose what he likes to do and leave out the rest 'Kena syād yena syāt tena īdrsa eva" (Bṛh) *ıs restricted to what falls within the description of what ought to be done* This neatly overcomes the pitfalls which face the problem Tho' the Aparokṣajnānın ıs assured of Mokṣa, transgression of the moral law and standards by the Jñānın ıs bound to affect and retard the full manifestation of Svarūpānanda ın Mokṣa

अतीतानागतज्ञानी त्रैलोक्योद्धरणक्षम ।
एतादृशोऽपि नाचार श्रौत स्मार्त परित्यजेत् ।
आलस्यो हसतेऽप्यर्थान् * * * * ॥ (M. BSB ııı 4 30, 33)

This is by far the most outspoken and uncompromising stand on the much debated question whether the Jnānın ıs beyond ethics The continuance of bodily life for Aparokṣajnānıns till they exhaust the remaining part of their Prārabdhakarmas implies the acceptance of the class of Jıvanmuktas or God s men who serve as beacon lights to humanity and act as a source of hope, guidance, and inspiration to others But unless Jıvanmuktı ıs given full recognition as *a real state of the Aparokṣajnānın*, it can serve no useful social or humanistic purpose From an Advaitic point of view, ıt ıs difficult to conceive of Jıvanmuktı as the fruit of Saguna-sākṣātkāra, ın which case ıt will have to be looked upon with utter disfavor by any true aspirant as he would upon the fruits of Udgīthopāsanā and others Nor can ıt be regarded as the fruit of Nırgunasākṣātkāra which, when ıt arises, will dissolve

and extinguish the entire world-appearance of which the Jīvanmukti state will be a part.

In a Theistic system of Vedānta like the Sūtrakāra's, one would expect a distinctive place to be given to the direct vision of the Supreme Being (*brahmasākṣātkāra*) as the final means of deliverance:

Cf. ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च (*Gītā* xi.54)

The Rāmānujīya interpretation of the Sādhanādhyāya *suffers from* a deficiency *in not recognizing* and *giving a distinctive place among* Sādhanas *to the direct vision of* B. *as the crowning point of* Dhyāna. It *stops with* Parokṣajnāna *in the form of a mental* Vṛtti—*holding that meditation means steady remembrance or a continuity of remembrance like the flow of oil.* Such *remembrance is the nearest approximation to "seeing" or intuition*: सा च स्मृतिः दर्शनसमानाकारा (*Śrībhāṣya* i.1.1). M.'s *Theism makes good this deficiency by making room for a direct vision of the* Lord *by the* Upāsaka *over and above the perception of the mental construct of the object of meditation in* Dhyāna. *This is* known as Bimbāparokṣa or the envisioning of one's Bimba-Form of the Lord (BS. iii.3.53)—not by the power of the Upāsaka's own effort but solely by the grace of God:—

परमात्मापरोक्ष्यं च तत्प्रसादादेव, न जीवशक्त्या इति वक्तुमुच्यते–'तदव्यक्तमाह हि' इति (M. *BSB.* iii.2.23)

The deep Theistic overtones of this stand deserve to be noted.

M. rejects the negative conception of meditation as an emptying of the mind of all images and objects of thought and as the attainment of a pure state of consciousness in which the self emerges as identical with universal consciousness—as in *non-dualism or as* an individual in isolation, as in the scholastic Yoga. Two points stand out in M.'s doctrine of meditation. (i) That God or B. *with its sovereign attributes is and should be the sole object of meditation* and (ii) that there is no place in such meditation for any superimposition (*āropa*) of attributes on the object of meditation. He is resolutely opposed to all forms of Asadupāsana (wrong meditations) under which he brings meditations which are lacking in a positive content, or are based on a superimposed content and meditation on the Supreme B. as (identical with) one's own self (Ātman). He *also* shows how Śāstrābhyāsa or study *and reflection of* Śāstra *carried on as a form of meditation by* itself is ultimately to be sublimated into Dhyāna leading to Aparokṣa.

The fourth Adhyāya is that of Phala The distinction between Sādhana and Phala cannot have a rightful place in a monistic philosophy in which Aparokṣajnāna or Sākṣātkāra of Nirguna B is in itself the fruit There is no other enjoyment of fruits such as of Svarūpānanda in Nirgunamukti, over and above the realization of B as Nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam, which may be conceived as the Sādhya of Jnāna There is thus no justification to have a Phalādhyāya as distinct from the Sādhanādhyāya from the point of view of Nirviśeṣabrahmavāda It cannot be said that the mediate realization of B known as Upāsanā is the means, as distinguished from the *immediate* realization of B which may be regarded as its fruit Since Upāsanā in Advaita philosophy is essentially a matter of superimposition of attributes, it may perhaps be regarded as a Sādhana of Saguna-realization but never of the experience of Nirguna-B It is only that which is to be accomplished or brought into existence by means of Sādhanas that can meaningfully be called the fruit The Nirguna-B of Jijñāsā cannot at all be treated as the 'Sādhya' and, therefore, as the fruit of Jnāna A Phalādhyāya is thus without *ratio essendi* in a monistic metaphysics Its presence in the Sūtras shows that Monism is not and cannot be the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra

S has claimed the Sutra Ātmeti tūpagacchanti (iv 1 3) carries decisive internal evidence of the identity of Jiva and B (see Ānandagiri on i 3 19) An examination of the Sūtra with reference to its Viṣayavākyas fails to substantiate this claim The leading Viṣayavākyas quoted by S in this connection are 'Tvam vā aham asmi devate aham vai tvam asi (Jābāla *Sruti*) and 'Aham brahmāsmi,' neither of which contains the keyword 'ātmā' The discrepancy may, of course, be set right by accepting the text 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī amṛtah (*Bṛh Up* iii 7 3-22) as additional Viṣayavākya, as has been done by S But the difficulty is that this text does not lend itself to the interpretation which S seeks to put upon it The same thing applies to the text 'Tattvam asi (See Vol II, pp 217-220) The text Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi' proclaims that the Supreme B who indwells (*antaryāmī*) in all things from the Pṛthvītattva to Vijñānatattva or the individual self and *controls* them all from within ' is *your Ātman*" The syntactic relation in which the words "te ātmā" are placed in the Upaniṣadic text is against the identification of the antecedent of 'te' with the predicate Ātma' The expression 'antaryāmī' used in apposition with 'ātmā' is clear indication that the Upaniṣad wishes this term 'Ātmā', here, to be understood in the sense of the 'Antaryāmi' or inner ruler of the individual self (which is the antecedent of 'te') and not in its ordinary conventional sense of the individual self itself For 'antaryāmi' means the

inner ruler or one who controls *another* from within (*antas sthitvā yamayati*)

That the Sūtrakāra is himself decidedly against this text being understood in terms of the identity of Jīva and B is clear from his own earlier pronouncement in i 2 20 that the Antaryāmin referred to in *Brh Up* (iii 7 3-22) is certainly *not* the individual soul because "both the Kānvas and the Mādhyandinas *proclaim it to be different from the individual Soul*" It passes understanding how in the face of this clear statement of the Sūtrakāra, S or any one else can get away with the sweeping assertion that the text 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī amrtah' as the Visayavākya of the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' (iv 1 3) acknowledges and makes us comprehend the Lord (Antaryāmī) *as one's own self*! The syntactical apposition between Ātmā and Antaryāmī in the Śruti leaves no room for doubt that 'Ātmā' is to be understood in its radical sense of one's inner Ruler

आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मा हि परमो हरि
(Q by Sridhara Svāmin C on *Bhāg* xi, 2 22)

There is yet another internal evidence to show in what sense the term 'Ātman' used in the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' (iv 1 3) has to be understood—whether as one's own self (svātmā) or as 'Paramātman' It is to be found in the ruling given by the Sūtrakāra himself in his Dyubhvādyadhi (i 3 1-4), that the term 'Ātman' eliminates both the Prakrti and the Jīvātman from its primary connotation S too in his *c on the* same observes that the term *Ātman* "becomes thoroughly appropriate only if we understand by it the Supreme B and not anything else"—the 'anything else', in this context, being the Prakrti and Jiva (prānabhrt) It is a matter of simple logic that the Sūtrakāra could not eliminate the individual self from being identified as the Dyubhvādyāyatanam on the ground of "the use of the term Ātman in referring to such a being," if the *same* term should be capable of denoting the individual self also in its primary sense! Judged in the light of all these facts, the Sūtra Ātmeti tupagacchanti cannot be harnessed to the teaching of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme B Such identity would also be inconsistent with the further pronouncement of the Sūtrakāra in Jagadvyāpāravarjam (iv 1 17) denying to the released Soul the powers of creation etc which are the prerogatives of B For the same reason, the Sūtra 'Ata eva ca ananyādhipatih' (iv 4 9) has to bow to the limitations imposed in Sūtra iv 1 17 and has to be explained consistently with it (as has been done by M) Similarly, the terms of reference in the Avibhāgādhi (iv 4 4) in the Bhogapāda can only be

whether the enjoyments of the Mukta Jīva lie outside the gamut of those of the Supreme B, or fall within it It cannot, therefore, be taken to discuss the question whether the Mukta Jīva remains separate from B or becomes one with it—as S has done If in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra it should become one with B, his subsequent ruling about Jagadvyāpāravarjam (iv 4 17) will make no sense The analogy of the confluence of waters given in the Viṣayavākya cited by S does not go beyond the point of likeness and commit us to any identity of being R here brings up the question whether the Mukta Jīva *experiences* B as different from himself or as non separate But he is irrevocably committed to the 'body and soul' relation and Śeṣaśeṣibhāva between Jīva and B *for all time* It would indeed require *such a relation to be experienced* in the state of Mokṣa In the circumstances, it will be no more than a pure fancy or a verbal exaggeration to talk of the Jīva's experiencing an identity of being with B in defiance of this basic fact of Śeṣaśeṣibhāva and śarīrasarīribhāva There cannot be any Svarūpaikya in Śeṣaśeṣibhāva or Śarīrasarīribhāva

The presumption of modern scholars that S's two-tier theory of higher (nirguna) and lower (saguna) Vidyās has its origin in the famous statement of Muṇḍ. Up (i 1 4)'Dve vidye veditavye parā caiva aparā ca' is a baseless one The Aparavidyā of Muṇḍaka is associated with the thought-content of the Ṛg and other Vedas and their angas and other literature while Paravidyā according to S, and others is confined to the Upaniṣads But the irony of it is that S's Aparavidyā as discussed by him in his works is the science of the lower B taught *within the Upaniṣads themselves* In other words, the distinction between Para and Apara Vidyās of S is based on a dichotomy of the thought-content of the Upaniṣads themselves If the Upaniṣads, as distinguished from the earlier literature before them, are to be recognized as Para-vidyā, they should be treated as Paravidyā in their entirety and ought not to be subjected to a further vivisection in terms of Para and Apara as S has done As a matter of fact, the concept of Para and Apara Vidyās of the Muṇḍaka has nothing to do with any division of the source-books in bulk but rests upon a difference of perspective in regard to *the same sources* This point has been made clear in the Introduction to Vol I

The responsibility for introducing the bifurcation of the teachings of the Upaniṣads into higher and lower knowledge into the body of the Sutras rests on S., who inherited the inspiration to it from Gauḍapāda's 'Adhyāropāpavādanyāya'. The application of Adhyaropāpavādaprakriyā to the interpretation of the thought-content of the Upaniṣads has

been outlined by S. in his preamble to the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa as follows:—
"B. is apprehended under two forms in the Vedānta texts, firstly as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiplicity of the evolution of name and form and secondly as being the opposite of this—i.e. free from all limiting adjuncts. All these passages declare B. to possess a double nature according as it is the object of either knowledge or of nescience. As long as it is the object of nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion and the like. The different modes of devotion lead to different results,—some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works".

But then, as the Upaniṣads are accepted by S. as the source-books of Vedānta—its "Nirṇeyagranthas" cf. his statement: "Vedāntavākyāni hi sūtrair udāhṛtya vicāryante" (*B.S.B.* i, 1.2) the application of the technique of Adhyāropāpavāda to evolve a coordinated system of their thought has to be authenticated by some Nirṇāyakagrantha or interpretive canon, if it is to be binding on all. By consensus, the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa have that status of being the Nirṇāyaka Śāstra. The acceptance of S.'s interpretation of the Sūtras on the basis of Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā has, therefore, to depend on how far these Nirṇāyaka Sūtras can be shown to recognize and follow the pattern of thought set by the Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā, *in their systematization of* the thought of their sources.

Gauḍapāda avoided a confrontation with the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. S.'s is the earliest Māyāvāda commentary on the Sūtras that has come down to us. But the evidence of the Sūtras, shorn of all S.'s parenthetical comments and special pleading, shows that Bādarāyaṇa's system is not at all constructed on the lines of Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā. They begin with the affirmation of faith in the reality of the world of matter and souls as the creation of B. and *conclude* with an equally clear affirmation of the dependence of the souls on B., *even in their released state* where they remain barred from exercising the powers of creation, sustenance etc. of the world which are held to be the prerogatives of Brahman.

Having made it clear in III.2.5, that bondage and release of souls are dependent on B., the Sūtrakāra has sketched the progressive realization of Mokṣa thro' the four stages of Karmakṣaya, utkrānti, Mārga and Bhoga, in the four Pādas of the Phalādhyāya. But finding that Utkrānti, Mārga and Bhoga will be incompatible with true release as conceived by him, S. relegates them to the sphere of Saguṇamukti of lower knowledge. What strikes the detached observer here is the com-

plete disregard of the technique of Adhyāropāpavāda with which the Sūtrakāra *concludes* his work, with a glowing account of 'Saguna-mukti' in which the freed soul finds himself enjoying whatever bhogas he chooses at will, but is still placed under an irrevocable limitation as regards Jagad-vyāpāra, the prerogative of B In S's idiom, then, the Sūtrakāra's work *concludes with āropa instead of with apavāda!* It makes Saguṇamukti the 'finale' of Brahmajijñāsā

As the Adhyāropāpavādaprakriyā is thus out of tune with the Upasamhāra of the Brahmasūtras, it cannot be relied upon as the proper guide to our understanding of the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra We have, therefore, to look for a different pattern of thought in place of S's to help us in understanding the true nature of Bādarāyana's teaching

I thank Prof Karl Potter for the honor he has done me by introducing these Volumes to the scholarly world with his perspective Foreword to this Volume I am grateful to the former Prime Minister and the Government of India for providing a liberal publication grant

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14th January 1978.

KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

ā	आ	t	त
ī	ई	th	थ
ū	ऊ	d	द
ṛ	ऋ	dh	ध
ḷ	लृ	n	न
k	क	p	प
kh	ख	ph	फ
g	ग	b	ब
gh	घ	bh	भ
ṅ	ङ	m	म
c	च	y	य
ch	छ	r	र
j	ज	l	ल
jh	झ	v	व
ñ	ञ	ś	श
ṭ	ट	ṣ	ष
ṭh	ठ	s	स
ḍ	ड	h	ह
ḍh	ढ	jña	ज्ञ
ṇ	ण		

ABBREVIATIONS

A Ā	Aitareya Āranyaka
AC	Abhinavacandrikā (Satyanātha Tīrtha)
adhi	adhikarana
Ait Up	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV	Anuvyākhyāna (Madhva)
B	Brahman
BD	Bhāṣyadīpikā (Jagannātha Tīrtha)
BG	Bhagavad Gītā
B S	Brahmasūtras
B T	Bhāgavata-Tātparya (Madhva)
Bhāg	Bhāgavata
Bṛh. Up	Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad
BSB	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
C	Commentary
Chān Up	Chāndogya Upanisad
GB	Gītā Bhāṣya
G K.	Gauḍapāda Kārikās
G T	Gitā Tātparyanirnaya (Madhva)
J	Jayatīrtha
Kauṣ Up	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
M	Madhva
Mah N Up	Mahānārayana-Upaniṣad
Mahop	Mahopaniṣad

Mbh	Mahābhārata
Mbh T N	Mahābhārata Tātparyanırnaya (Madhva)
Mānḍ Up	Mānḍūkya Upanıṣad
Mund Up	Munḍaka Upanısad
NS	Nyāya Sudhā (Jayatīrtha)
Ny Muktāvalı	Nyāya-Muktāvalı (Rāghavendra)
NV	Nyāya-Vıvarana (Madhva)
NVB	Nyāyavıvarana-Bhāvabodha (Raghūttama)
Nym	Nyāyāmrta (Vyāsatīrtha)
Pan	Pānını (Sūtras)
Q	quoted
R	Rāmānuja
Raghu TPB	Raghūttama's Tattvaprakāśıkā-Bhāvabodha
Ragh TPB	Rāghavendra, Tattvaprakāśıkā-Bhāvadıpa
RV	Rg Veda
S	Śamkara
STC	Śeṣa-Tātparya-Candrıkā (Raghunātha Tīrtha)
Śvet. Up	Śvetāśvatara Upanıṣad
T A.	Taıttırīya Āraṇyaka
Taıtt Up	Taıttırīya Upanıṣad
TC	Tātparya-Candrıkā (Vyāsatīrtha)
TS	Tattvasankhyāna (Madhva)
TD	Tattvapradıpa (Trıvıkrama Paṇdıta)
TDP	Tantradıpıkā (Rāghavendra)
TP.	Tattvaprakāśıkā (Jayatırtha)
TPG	Tattvaprakāśıkā-Gurvarthadıpıkā (Vādırāja)
Up	Upanıṣad
VTN	Vıṣṇutattvanırnaya (Madhva)
VTNt	Vıṣnutattvanırṇaya-tīkā (Jayatırtha)

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तृतीयाध्यायद्वितीयपादमारभ्य सूत्रपाठः

द्वितीयः पादः

ॐ

१. सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि
    निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश्च
    मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्
    सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः

२. *पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ*

३. देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि

४. तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च

५. अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात्

६. स एव च कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः

७. मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात्

८. न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि
    न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्
    अपि चैवमेके

९. अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्
    प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यम्
    आह च तन्मात्रम्
    दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते

१०. अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्

११. अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम्

१२. वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामंजस्यादेवम्
दर्शनाच्च

१३. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः

१४. तदव्यक्तमाह हि
अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्
प्रकाशवच्चावैशेष्यम्
प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात्
अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिंगम्

१५. उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्
प्रकाशाश्रयवद् वा तेजस्त्वात्
पूर्ववद् वा
प्रतिषेधाच्च

१६. परमतः सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः
दर्शनात्
बुद्धयर्थः पादवत्

१७. स्थानविशेषात् प्रकाशादिवत्
उपपत्तेश्च

१८. तथान्यत् प्रतिषेधात्

१९. अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः

२०. फलमत उपपत्तेः
धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव
पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्

तृतीयः पादः

१. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात्
भेदान्नेति चेदेकस्यामपि
स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च
सलिलवच्च तन्नियमः
दर्शयति च

२. उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद् विधिशेषवत् समाने च
अन्यथात्वं च शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्

ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तृतीयाध्यायद्वितीयपादमारभ्य सूत्रपाठः

न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्

संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि

३. प्राप्तेश्च समंजसम्

४. सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे

५. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य

६. प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे

७. इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्

८. आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्

आत्मशब्दाच्च

९. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्

१०. अन्वयादिति चेत् स्यादवधारणात्

११. कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्

१२. समान एवं चाभेदात्

सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि

१३. न वा विशेषात्

दर्शयति च

१४. संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः

१५. पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात्

१६. वेधाद्यर्थभेदात्

१७. हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत् तदुक्तम्

साम्पराये तर्तव्याभावात् तथा ह्यन्ये

१८. छन्दत उभयाविरोधात्

गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा अन्यथा हि विरोधः

उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेर्लोकवत्

१९. अनियमः सर्वेषामविरोधाच्छब्दानुमानाभ्याम्

२०. यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम्

अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत् तदुक्तम्

२१. इयदामननात्

अन्तरा भूतग्रामवदिति चेत्तदुक्तम्

अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशवत्

२२. व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत्

२३. सैव हि सत्यादयः

२४. कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः

आदरादलोपः

उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात्

२५. तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्

२६. प्रदानवदेव हि तदुक्तम्

२७. लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि

२८. पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात् स्यात् क्रियामानसवत्

अतिदेशाच्च

२९. विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात्

दर्शनाच्च

३०. श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः

३१. अनुबन्धादिभ्यः

३२. प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद् दृष्टिश्च तदुक्तम्

३३. न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः

३४. परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः

३५. एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्

व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत्

३६. अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्

मन्त्रादिवद् वा अविरोधः

३७. भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथा च दर्शयति

३८. नाना शब्दादिभेदात्

३९. विकल्पो विशिष्टफलत्वात्

४०. काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन् न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्

४१. अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः

शिष्टेश्च

समाहारात्

गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च

४२. न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः

दर्शनाच्च

चतुर्थः पादः

१. पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दादिति बादरायणः
शेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्विति जैमिनिः
आचारदर्शनात्
तच्छ्रुतेः
समन्वारम्भणात्
तद्वतो विधानात्
नियमाच्च
अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्
तुल्यं तु दर्शनम्

२. असार्वत्रिकी
विभागः शतवत्
अध्ययनमात्रवतः

३. नाविशेषात्

४. स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा
कामकारेण चैके
उपमर्दं च
ऊर्ध्वरेतस्सु च शब्दे हि
परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि
अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः
विधिर्वा धारणवत्
स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात्
भावशब्दाच्च
पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात्
तथा चैकवाक्योपबन्धात्
अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा
सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्
शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात् तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदंगतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात्
सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्
अबाधाच्च
अपि स्मर्यते
शब्दश्चातोऽकामचारे
विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि
सहकारित्वेन च

५. सर्वथापि तु त एवोभयलिंगात्
अनभिभवं च दर्शयति
अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः
अपि स्मर्यते
विशेषानुग्रहः च
अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिंगाच्च
तद्भूतस्य तु तद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमातद्रूपाभावेभ्यः

६. न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात्
उपपूर्वमपीत्येके भावशमनवत्तदुक्तम्
बहिस्तूभयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च

७. स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः
आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिः तस्मै हि परिक्रीयते
सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्

८. कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः
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९. अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात्

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चतुर्थाध्याये

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इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु

अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः

अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्

अतोऽन्यदपीत्येकेषामुभयोः

यदेव विद्ययेति हि

भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाथ संपत्स्यते

द्वितीयः पादः

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६. समना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य

तदपीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात्

सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धे.

नोपमर्देनातः

अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरूष्मा

प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात्

स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्

स्मर्यते च

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रश्म्यनुसारी

निशि नेति चेन्न सबन्धात्

यावद्देहभावित्वात् दर्शयति च

अतश्चायनेऽपि हि दक्षिणे

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CHAPTER I

III. SĀDHANA-ADHYĀYA

II BHAKTI-PADA

INTRODUCTION

Vairāgya is the necessary first step in spiritual Sādhanas. It prepares the soul for the awakening of Bhakti. We are, therefore, entitled to ask what place the Sūtrakāra has given in his work to Bhakti among the recognized Sādhanas for attaining B. This question is bound to arise even if we admit with the modern scholars that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are a systematization of the teachings of the *Upaniṣads alone*—to the exclusion of other source-materials (*nirṇeyagranthas*). For, pronouncements like:

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः	(*Kaṭha*. i.2.23)
यस्य देवे परा भक्तिः	(*Śvet. Up.* vi.23)
संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः	(*Op. cit.* vi.16)
देवप्रसादेन	(*Op. cit.* vi.18)
मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये	(*Op. cit.* vi.21)

in the *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣads clearly show that the philosophy of the Upanisads had before the close of its classical period become a well-articulated Theism laying special stress on Bhakti and the doctrine of Grace.

To this important question there is no straight answer from S. Bhāskara or R. as they have not been able to find any Sūtra, *adhi.* or

Pada wherein Bādarāyaṇa has defined the place and importance of Bhakti in his system or expatiated on it It would be very curious and disappointing to hold that he did not think it fit to assign a significant position to Bhakti among Sādhanas—to which subject he has devoted an entire Adhyāya of four Pādas in his work For a thinker like Bādarāyana who believes in One Supreme Being to be the source of existence, activity, knowability of all finite reality and of the origination sustenance and dissolution of the cosmos, the indwelling controlling spirit (*Antaryāmi*)[1] of matter and souls, and who regards Mokṣa as communion of the soul with such a Being[2] and who has expressly ascribed both the bondage and the release of Jivas, in the last analysis, to Divine Will[3] could hardly have been oblivious of the claims of Bhakti to its rightful place in such a system

There can be no two opinions on the point that the only rightful place for him to go into this question of Bhakti would be in Adhy. III which is acknowledgedly a Sādhana-Adhyāya And it is *here* in Pāda II which comes after the treatment of Vairāgya, that M finds it ensconced He has abundantly shown in his C how this Pāda exhibits so many facets of Divine glory and beneficience in order to light the lamp of Bhakti in the heart of the Jivas and make it glow with increasing knowledge and understanding of Divine majesty and beneficience and make them respond with a whole hearted surrender to the Deity[4] No wonder M calls this "Bhakti-Pāda"[5]—a title which it richly deserves The interpretation of this Pāda is one of his seminal contributions to our understanding of the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa

Bhakti is supreme regard and reverence for the Deity mellowed by loving devotion These two profound feelings for the Supreme Being cannot be awakened in the hearts of those who have not adequately realized the true nature of the glory and beneficience of the Lord It is, therefore, with a view to planting the seed of Bhakti in the hearts of Adhikārins that the present Pāda brings out the glory of God in a vivid and impressive manner thro' various *adhis* God's beneficience to His creatures is made known to us here thro' such acts of the Deity as the presentation and withdrawal of the states and experiences of dreams, waking, dreamless sleep etc.,—in short thro' the very states of

1 B S i 1 2 i 3 22.

2. अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति । मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् (*BS* i 1 19, 3 2)

3. पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ (III. 2 5)

4 The following is the definition of Bhakti given by J in his *NS*.—
[illegible] निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणत्वज्ञानपूर्वकः स्वात्मात्मीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽनेकगुणोऽन्तरायसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाहः (p 17)

5. भक्तिपादमिमं पाद उच्यते । भक्त्यर्थं भगवन्महिमोक्तिः (M. BSB iii 2 1)

the bondage and release of Jīvas which are here in one of the *adhis* clearly spelt out to be due to the Supreme Being[6]

परामिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ (*B S* iii 2.5)

As the majesty of God is boundless, created beings can expect to realize it according to the measure of their capacity, only when the true nature and extent of their dependence on Him for every one of their various states of experience is brought home to them, vividly It is to bring about such an understanding that the Sūtrakāra begins the Pāda with the elucidation of the Souls' complete dependence on God for their experience of dreams and for their termination This is followed by other *adhis* and Sūtras bringing out similar dependence of Jivas on B for their other experiences of the waking state, Susupti, bondage and release

It may be recalled that in initiating the inquiry into B's infinite perfections, the Sūtrakāra had in i 1 2, defined B as *'Janmādyasya yatah'* so as to bring out its fullness of perfections The full force and significance of that succint definition of B cannot, however, be adequately understood without an elucidation of its terms *Janmādi, asya* and *yatah* Accordingly, he had set himself to make clear the overall importance of B as the author of Cosmic dispensations, in the course of the entire second Adhyāya by first concentrating attention on the last term in the definitive-clause (*yatah*)—showing how the definition given is not overpervasive elsewhere or inapplicable to B[7]

In the present Pāda, he shows how the expression *asya* in the definition embraces not only the world of external reality—as most of his commentators have been content with assuming—but reaches down to the unfathomed depths of the inner world of man—his varied experiences in the states of dreaming, waking life, *Susupti, mūrchā,* etc—nay, the entire history of man's bondage and release from Samsāra—his '*bandha and bandha-viparyaya*' to quote Bādarāyana's own words[8]

As such elucidation of the connotative significance of *'asya'* is bound to be helpful in deepening the springs of our devotion to God and enlarging our understanding of the measure of His Glory, it comes most naturally within the scope of the present (Sādhana)-Adhyāya

6 भक्तिर्नाम सस्नेहा बहुमतिः सा चोपकारकत्वं महत्त्वं च विशेषादजानतो न समीचीना सङ्गच्छते । उपकारकत्वं च स्वप्नाद्यवस्थाविष्कारतिरस्कारमोचकत्वादिलक्षणं महिम्न्येवान्तर्भूतम् (*TD* iii 2 1)

7 प्रथमसूत्रस्थब्रह्मपदोपात्तानन्तकल्याणगुणोपपादनाय लक्षणमभिधातुं द्वितीयसूत्रम् । तत्तु यावत् तदन्तर्गतपदानि न विव्रियन्ते न तावदुपपादकतामश्नुत इति, चरममपि सृष्ट्यवतं प्राधान्यात् तत्परतमिन्तं यत्पदमतिव्याप्त्यसंभवनिरसनेन द्वितीयाध्यायेन विवृतम् (*STC* iii 2 1)

8 अस्येति कर्मंममपक्षं जगत्पदं न मायिमत इव बाह्यप्रपञ्चमात्रपरं किन्तु आन्तरप्रपञ्चपरमपीति निरूप्यते (*STC ibid*)

It may possibly be argued that by the same token, the *Ākāśādhi* (i, 1 22) and others will have to be brought under the scope of this Adhyāya and Pāda as they too help in elucidating the glory of God and awakening devotion to Him While this is true enough in a broad sense, there is this difference that the *Ākāśādhi* and others in the Samanvayādhyāya deal with the glory of God with reference to the Samanvaya of particular names, marks and contexts of passages of the Srūtis in B, in their *plenary sense* The *adhi*s in this Pāda on the other hand, are specially intended to highlight the glory of God and His beneficience to the Jīva in such a way as would effectively awaken boundless and unexcelled personal devotion to such a Being[9] This should dispose of the objection that as the indispensability of Sādhanas has already been brought out in the previous Pāda and as Bhakti is also one of the Sādhanas no separate Pāda for Bhakti is called for. The main purpose and emphasis of the previous Pāda has been on the cultivation of Vairāgya in its intensive form and it was in keeping with that purpose that it was repeatedly affirmed in each of the *adhi*s *there*, that death in its commonly accepted sense is not equivalent to the complete emancipation of the Jīva from association with the Prākṛtic elements which envelop him—which is what Mokṣa stands for It was to drive home this point that the miseries of peregrinations to and from the other worlds had been dealt with there But as Bhakti in its exclusive aspect had not been dealt with in the previous Pāda, there is sufficient reason to do so here[10] It may be seen how, accordingly, M is able to show that each one of the *adhi.s* in this Pāda converges upon the topic of Bhakti and emphasizes the need for it in no uncertain terms For the first time in the history of interpretation of the Sūtras of Badarāyaṇa *he* has also successfully shown to us that the *locus classicus* of the definition of Bhakti in the Sūtras is to be found in one of the most important *adhi*—Sūtras here *Ambuvad-agrahanāt* * * * (iii 2 19).

Peṭikas and Disposition of Adhikaranas

There are twenty *adhi.s* in this Pāda They fall into two broad divisions (*peṭikās*) The first seven *adhi.s* are in the nature of an elucidation of the glory of God as expressed in the terms of the definition of B in BS i 1 2,—as pointed out earlier and form one unit The remaining thirteen *adhi.s* are in the nature of further substantiation of

9 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 1)

10 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 1)

particular aspects of Divine glory as set forth in the Janmādi Sūtra as well as in the other distinctive *adhi.s* of the first Adhyāya, so as to subserve the awakening of Bhakti. This has been pointed out by J:

सर्वस्यापि माहात्म्यस्य प्रथमाध्याय एवोक्तत्वात् किमत्रोच्यत इति ? सत्यम्; तदेव क्वचित् विविच्योच्यते, क्वचित् समर्थ्यत इत्यदोषः (*TP*. iii.2.1)

The TPB of Raghūttama explains how this has been done. For example, the opening *adhi.* which ascribes the creation and withdrawal of dream objects and their presentation to the Jīvas to the agency of B. is in its essence an elucidation of B.'s attributes of being the author of the creation and dissolution of objects and experiences pertaining to the world of internal realities. *Adhi.* 2 clearly ascribes to B. the cosmic attributes of conferring enlightenment, obscuration of knowledge, bondage and release on the Jīvas. This is an elucidation of the relevant terms in the definition of B. implicit in the wording of the second Sūtra. *Adhi.s* 3-7 which represent B. as bringing about for the benefit of Jīvas (i) the state of their waking life attended with intensive attachment to the physical body and its needs (ii) the refreshing state of dreamless sleep; (iii) the awakening of the Jīvas from Suṣupti and (iv) restoring them to conscious life from the state of swoon similarly elucidate B.'s cosmic attributes of *sthiti* and *niyamana*. *Adhi.* 8 amplifies the position taken in the *Ānandamayādhi* and others that there is no essential difference among the manifestations of B. due to difference of time or place, as regards its powers and qualities. *Adhi.* 9 supports the conception of B. taught in *Anyabhāvavyāvṛtteśca* (i.3.12) and other Sūtras that B. is without material form or body. *Adhi.* 10 confirms the rejection of identity between Jīva and B. as established in the opening Sūtra i.1.1. and elsewhere. *Adhi.* 11 justifies the position summed up by the expression *ataḥ* in the opening Sūtra that Bhakti is the indispensable means of realizing one's intimate personal relation with B. as its Pratibimba and *adhi.* 12 is a further elaboration of the same topic. *Adhi.* 13 explains the position of Sūtra i.1.2 that the Lord's powers of creation, preservation, dissolution, etc. are not restricted to particular individuals but have universal application to the entire world of matter and souls. *Adhi.* 14 expounds B.'s unmanifest nature taught earlier in the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (i, 2.21-23) etc. *Adhi.s* 15 and 16 clarify the points that the attributes of B. described in the Samanvayādhyāya are trans-empirical in their nature and that the bliss of B. stands in the relation of archetype to the bliss of highly evolved souls like the four-faced Brahmā. *Adhi.* 18 reinforces the concept of B.'s unmanifest nature as taught in the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (i.2.21-23) from a fresh angle and confirms the position of the second Sūtra that B. is the sole universal source of all creation, sustenance, etc. at all

times and places The last *adhi* substantiates the point implied by *atah* in Sūtra i 1 1 that tho' the dispensation of fruits is regulated by Karma, it should not be supposed on that account that Karma itself bestows the fruits It is only B that dispenses the fruits of actions

Thus, every *adhi* of this Pada converges upon the theme of Bhakti by illuminating or enlivening some aspect of Divine majesty which, when properly understood, is sure to kindle, inspire and sustain feelings of supreme reverence, gratitude, love, awe, wonder and self-surrender to the Supreme Being in the human heart, which in due time will develop into Pakva bhakti or ripe devotion

Justification for Opening the Pāda with a Discussion on Dream-state.

The *TPB* of Rāghavendra has a cogent and convincing explanation of the propriety of (the Sūtrakāra's) giving priority to the discussion of the Dream state in this Pāda He recalls that the closing *adhi* of the previous Pāda has referred to the Jīva's taking birth thro' Yonipravesa The different states of their embodied life are now due for review in order to be shown as being completely dependent on the Lord.[11] Human beings share in common the three states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti It is a matter of common experience that they are apt to entertain a sense of their 'independence' (of Divine control) in carrying on their waking life—however mistaken the idea may be in philosophical truth The truth about their absolute dependence on B even in the waking state and the experiences they go thro' in that state cannot, therefore, be so easily brought home to them, at the very outset As the other state of Suṣupti is generally subsequent to the dream-state, the latter offers the most suitable and appropriate starting point for discussing the issue with a view to establishing the truth of the Jīvātmans' complete dependence on B in and thro' every one of their conscious, sub-conscious and super-conscious states The dream-state is also susceptible to a general misconception about its being illusory It is, therefore, necessary to clear this misconception and vindicate its claim to reality before it can be made the starting point of the postulate that the Supreme Being is the ultimate source of all origination, control, susteanance and impulsion and the guardian of all states and conditions of existence and experiences of the souls in the life here and in the hereafter

सर्वावस्थाप्रेरकस्य * * * *
सर्वदेशेषु कालेषु स एव परमेश्वरः ।

11 'भोगे कर्तृत्वम्' इति जाग्रतो [illegible] (Op cit iii 2 1)

This alone can provide the incentive for the development of Bhakti in the human breast Hence, the priority given to the discourse on the dream-state in this Pāda.[12]

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12 तत्र तावत्, जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थाना मध्ये जाग्रति जीवाना स्वातन्त्र्याभिमानभावेन, ईशाद्यधीनत्वस्यादावेव बुद्ध्यनारोहात्, सुषुप्तिप्राप्ते स्वप्नदशाप्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वनियमात्, स्वाप्नस्य सत्यत्वे सर्ववादिविप्रतिपत्ते, वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् इत्युक्त्या प्रसक्तस्य सर्वस्वाप्नासत्यत्वस्यावश्यमादौ निरस्यत्वात्

(*Op cit* iii 2 1)

CHAPTER II

OBJECTS PRESENTED IN DREAMS ARE CREATED BY GOD AND ARE THEREFORE REAL AND DEPENDENT ON HIM

1. *Sandhyādhikaraṇam*[1] (iii.2.1-4)

The objects presented in our dreams and their cognition are the subject-matter of this *adhi.* The question is whether these are created and sustained by B. or not. To be created by B. they should be real and to be real they should have a creator and appropriate material and efficient causes. And these should be borne out by evidence.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that they are *not* dependent on God or B. for the simple reason that they have no real existence.[2] They are mere appearances. If objects presented in our dreams are real, they should belong either to the category of those which exist without a beginning and an end or to the non-eternal. In the former case, they should be open to perception both before and after the dreams. For it cannot be that tho' really existing without a beginning and an end they remain

1. *Sandhyam* is the intermediate state between waking and deep sleep. The *adhi.* is, therefore, called सन्ध्याधिकरणम् The designation सन्ध्यधिकरणम् found freely used in the Edn. of Raghu.'s *TPB.* (Madras G O S. 1956) is grammatically incorrect.

2 Ragh.'s *TPB.* explains that tho' metaphysically the non-existent (*asat*) is also held to be dependent on B. (*See* Vol. I, p. 315) what is meant here is that dream-objects are not dependent on B. for their essence, reality and perceivability in the manner of objects of the gross external world:

[illegible] (*Op. cit.* iii 1.1)

unperceived before and after the dreams, when instruments of perception such as the mind and the senses are functioning and that they become perceived only when these instruments are *not* at work![3] It cannot be that before and after the dream they have gone elsewhere. In that case, they should be perceived by others elsewhere. But they are not.[4] The fact that they are presented in dreams as possessed of *madhyamaparimāṇa* (i.e. neither *aṇu* nor *paramamahat*)' is also sufficient to disprove the possibility of their being *anādinitya*.[5]

Nor does it stand to reason to hold that they are created and destroyed then and there, during the dream-state. For in that case we should be able to perceive some of their constituents before their production and remnants after their destruction. But we see nothing of the kind.[6]

Coming to the question of their creator and of their material and efficient causes, the difficulties are no less. The Jīvātman himself cannot be the creator (*kartā*) of the dream-objects; for they are perceived by him without any conscious effort on his part and he has no foreknowledge of their material causes.[7] Nor can God be made their creator; for He will not create anything which is devoid of causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāri*) such as the objects appearing in dreams. It is difficult to determine the material cause of which the dream-objects may be said to be products. If it is Prakṛti or its evolutes such constituents should be open to perception both before the production of those objects and after their destruction at the end of the dreams[8] But we see nothing of the sort. There is difficulty in making the Jīva the perceiver of the dream-objects. For in the dream-state, his instruments of cognition are at rest and the mind has no competence to cognize objects which have form and color such as the objects presented in dreams[9]

There are also other incompatibilities If dream-objects do really exist, the question will have to be answered whether the self perceives them (from) within the body or by going out of the body for the

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3 न तावदिमे अनादिनित्या, स्वप्नावस्थात प्रागूर्ध्वं चोपलब्धिप्रसगात्। नहि विद्यमाना अप्युपलब्धिसाधनेषु चक्षुरादिष्वनुपरतेषु नोपलयभ्न्ते, उपलभ्यन्ते चोपरतेष्विति सभवति (Raghu *NVB* iii 2 *adhi*. 1)

4 न चान्यत्र गता, अन्यैरप्यनुपलभात् (*ibid*)

5 स्वाप्ना पदार्था नानादिनित्या', मध्यमपरिमाणोपेततया दृश्यमानत्वात्, घटादिवदित्यनुमानविरोधाच्च (*ibid*)

6 नाप्युत्पत्तिविनाशवन्त। तथात्वेऽपि घटादिवत् प्रागूर्ध्वमुपलभप्रसक्ते। नापि विद्युदादिवत् तदैवोत्पत्तिविनाशवन्त। इत्थभावे प्रमाणाभावात् प्राङ मृदादीनामूर्ध्वं कपालादीनामुपलभापानाच्च (Raghu *NVB* iii 2 *adhi*.1)

7. न तावज्जीव कर्ता, तद्व्यापारमन्तरेणापि प्रतीते. तदुपादानार्थानभिज्ञत्वाच्च (*STC* iii 2 *adhi* 1)

8. उपादानं चास्य दुलभम्; प्रकृते प्राकृतस्य वा पुरस्तात् पश्चाच्चोपलभापत्ते (*ibid*)

9. नापि तस्य जीवो द्रष्टा, उपरतकरणत्वात् मनसश्च रूपादिमत्त्वसामर्थ्यात् (*STC*. iii 2 *adhi* 1)

time being. In the former case, how is it possible for huge mountains and rivers, elephants and crowds of people perceived in the dream to be accommodated inside one's own body?[10] In the latter case, how is one to account for a person who goes to sleep in Bombay but perceives himself in the dream to be in London and awakens in Bombay while the dream is terminated when he is still walking in his dream near the British Museum?[11] A person entering into a dream on a winter night perceives the Sun shining brightly on a summer day. How can there be a summer noon on a winter night?[12] If the objects perceived in the dream are different from the perceiver they should be open to perception by other persons nearby.[13] If they are not different from the perceiver, it is as good as admitting that they are merely imaginary; for the perceiver is not at all identical with the elephants, chariots and horses appearing in the dream.[14]

For all these reasons,[15] we have to conclude that the objects presented in our dreams are illusory appearances like a mirage. They cannot be taken to be created by God and, therefore, dependent on Him. To that extent, then the glory of God (as claimed by the Siddhāntin) is curtailed and the need for Bhakti diminished.[16]

Siddhānta

The opening Sūtra: *Sandhye sṛṣṭir āha hi* rejects this contention and affirms the Siddhānta that objects presented to the Jīvas in their

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10 किं स्वाप्नविषयं विषयं शरीरे स्थित्वैव पश्यति ? निर्गत्य वा ? नाद्य , मेरुमन्दरादिदर्शनस्यायोगात् (*TP.* iii 2.1)

11. Cf. न द्वितीयः । क्षणेन सुप्तस्य पाताळान् पश्यतः तत्रैव प्रबोधे शरीरस्यैवेतोऽस्य पश्चादेवेति प्राप्ते. (*ibid*)

12. किं हेमन्ते सुप्तस्य, वसन्तप्रतीतिस्तावदस्ति, न च वसन्तः तदास्ति

13 यदि चैते विषयाः द्रष्टुर्भिन्नाः तदा समीपस्थैः दृश्येरन्, बाह्यार्थत्वात्

14. अथ न द्रष्टुरतिरिक्ता तर्हि तत् कल्पितत्वमेव, परमार्थतोऽस्य करितुरगादिभावाभावात्

15 The *STC.* (pp. 213-14) has masterfully shown how each of the grounds of the adhikarana-Pūrvapakṣas—as many as seven—elucidated by J. in his *TP.* are comprehended by one single statement in M.'s *NV: Paścād adṛṣṭeḥ*. The grounds for the unreality of dream-creations have been summed up by Gauḍapāda in his Kārikās:—

वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वप्न आहुर्मनीषिणः ।
अन्तःस्थानात्तु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना ॥
अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देशान्न पश्यति ।
प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वः तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ॥
अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् ।
वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं * * * * ॥ (*G K.* II: 1-3)

These have been embellished by Śaṃkara in his *C.* on BS. iii.2.3:—
नहि सुप्तस्य जन्तोः क्षणमात्रेण योजनशतान्तरितं देशं पर्येतुं विपर्येतुं वा सामर्थ्यं संभाव्यते । कालविसंवादोऽपि च स्वप्ने—रजन्यां सुप्तो वासरं भारते वर्षे मन्यते । निमित्तानि च स्वप्ने न बुद्धये कर्मणे वोचितानि । करणोपसंहाराद्धि नास्य रथादिग्रहणाय चक्षुरादीनि सन्ति । तस्मान्मायामात्रं स्वप्नदर्शनम्

16. अतः प्रातीतिकत्वात् मरुमरीचिकाजलादिवत् न स्वप्नविषयस्य ईश्वराधीनत्वमिति न तस्य महामहिमत्वम् (*TP.* iii.2 1)

dreams are created by the Supreme Being, then and there and withdrawn after a while and are, therefore, real and dependent on the Supreme Being like the other objects of the external world. This is established by the Śruti: "There were no chariots, horses or roads there (before). *He* brings them into existence. For *He* is the creator" (*Bṛh. Up.* IV.3.10). That the "He" referred to in the Upaniṣad here is the Supreme B. and *not* the Jīvātman will be clear from the description (of attributes) following under Sūtra iii.2.2. In view of the concluding statement in the Śruti proclaiming the Supreme Being to be the Creator of the objects presented in the dream, the opening statement there that there were no chariots, horses etc. *before* has naturally to be extended to allude to their being *withdrawn after presentation* by the same Supreme Being. This is necessary to silence one of the main grounds of the Pūrvapakṣa that if real these objects should be open to perception *afterwards also*.[17] It may be argued that having regard to the statement in the first part of the Śruti that the objects seen in the dream were not there "before", one may make the act of their withdrawal from cognition allude to their creation instead of the other way about. But then there is sufficient reason in adopting this way of upalakṣaṇa from creation to withdrawal. For the Pūrvapakṣa against the thesis of the reality of dream-objects and their cognition has first of all to be grounded in the contention that these objects have no material and efficient causes to account for their coming into being. The question of withdrawal from presentation can arise only after their 'creation' has been established.[18]

The second Sūtra: *Nirmātāram caike putrādayaśca* overthrows the objection that dream-creations and their presentation are not real as it is not possible to find for them a creator or agent who can be accepted as really bringing them into being and withdrawing them from presentation soon after.

The objection is knocked down on the authority of two Śruti texts referred to in terms of (i) *Nirmātāram caike* and (ii) *Putrādayaśca.* The Sūtra points out that even tho' Jīvātman *himself—not being in full* possession and command of his faculties in the dream-state—*is not and*

17 स्वाप्नपदार्थाना सन्ध्य एव सृष्टत्वेन, पूर्वकालीनादृष्टेरबाधकत्वेऽपि पश्चाददृष्टि बाधिका भवेदेवेत्यत सौत्र सृष्टिपद निरोधस्याप्युपलक्षकमिति (Raghu *TPB.* p 357)
This point has been brought out still more clearly by the STC:
यद्यप्यत्र सृष्टिपदमात्र श्रूयते, तथापि श्रुतौ 'न तत्र रथा . भवन्ति' इति पूर्ववाक्य न पूर्वकालमात्ररथाद्यभावपरं किंतूत्तरकालेऽपि। ततश्च श्रुत्यनुसाराय, दोषपरिहाराय च निरोधोपलक्षकम्
Cf. पश्चाददृष्टेः स्वप्नविषयस्यासत्व न वाच्यम् (*NV.* iii 2 1)

18. यद्यपि श्रुत्यनुसाराय प्रथमोद्दिष्टनिरोधेनैव सृष्ट्युपलक्षण न्याय्यम्, तथाप्युपादानाद्यभावशङ्कोदयाय सृष्टेः कीर्तनमिति ज्ञातव्यम (*STC.* p. 208)

cannot be the creator of the objects of his dream-experiences or capable of withdrawing them from presentation at his own will, there is the Supreme B which is competent to do both and the Śrutis do tell us that "He (the Supreme B) *who is awake when the creatures are asleep* goes on shaping the desired objects (*kāmam*) according to His own will (*kāmam*)—*Katha Up* (ii 2 8)[19] This is corroborated by another text from the *Gaupavana Śruti* "From this Lord, indeed, the son is born—the brother, the wife, when He subjects the Jivatman to dreaming" It is not inconceivable that the all-powerful Lord who is competent to accomplish what is impossible of achievement for others should be in a position to bring into existence various dream-objects then and there for presentation to the Jīvātman

The *STC* explains how Sūtra iii 2 2 is not rendered superfluous by what has been conveyed in Sūtra 1 that the Supreme B creates all that is presented in the dream The purpose of the opening Sūtra is to adduce evidence to the effect that a real creation does take place in the dream-state The question as to *who* this creator of dream-objects is arises only after the first point has been settled The second Sūtra is concerned with making two more points (i) that such creation is not barred for want of a competent creator and (ii) that the acceptance of such a creator means that His creations are not on a level with things imagined to be there in illusory appearances produced by nescience as of silver in the shell The verb *jāyate* occurring in the second Śruti quoted as *Viṣayavākya* under iii 2 2 by M and the use of the ablative

19 In his C on BS iii 2 4 S attempts to explain away this text as referring to the Jīvātman saying that it carries no marks of reference to Isvara Thus eliminating Isvara he argues that as it is out of the question to think of Jīvatman as 'creating' dream-objects in the same sense in which a potter creates his wares, the supposed creation of dream-objects by the Jiva turns out to be similar to illusory projections appearing as tho' real J in his TP (iii 2 2) refutes these contentions He points out that the second half of the verse from *Katha* clearly refers to the author of the dreams as the immortal B free from all misery" (*Tad eva sukram tad Brahma tad eva amrtam ucyate*) and we read further that in that Being all the worlds are rooted (*Tasmin lokās śritas sarve*) S naturally tries to harmonize these statements with the Jīvatman by resorting to his theory of identity of Jivatman with B This is a tall order Apart from that as J points out B described in this context of the *Katha* is obviously the qualified one (*viśiṣṭa*) and there can be no identity between two qualified beings in Advaita theory The resort to rarefied identity (*cinmātraikya*) is only a desparate bid That a real creation of dream-objects is initiated by B who is wide awake when the Jīva is almost asleep follows from the very situation described in Katha ii 2 8 just as when it is said that one who is eating shall not speak the prohibition is understood to apply to the time when he is *actually at his meal* The difference between the embodied selves subject to dreaming and other states and the Supreme who puts them to sleep and dreams is again clearly affirmed in *Svapnena śārīram abhiprahatya asuptas suptan abhicākaśiti* * * (*Brh Up* iv 3 11) There again S tries to avoid the natural sense of 'Śarira which means the self residing in the body by arbitrarily rendering 'Śarira as sarira (body) See his C on *Brh Up* iv 3 11)

case *etasmāt* therein are both hostile to the theory of illusory creation. There is thus complete justification for having the two Śutras *Sandhye sṛṣṭir āha hi* and *Nirmātāram caike putrādayaśca* dealing directly with *two distinctive issues.*[20]

The third Sūtra: *Māyāmātram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* deals with the question of the efficient and the material causes. In his Bhāṣya M. brings both the points under a single query: *Kena sādhanena?*—with what means does the Supreme B. create these objects? For it has been established in the two preceding Sūtras that the Supreme B. is the author of the dreams and the creator of the objects presented to the Jīvas therein. If this governing idea of the *adhi.* is kept in mind, there will be no difficulty whatsoever in appreciating M.'s *raison d'etre* in explaining the term *māyāmātram* used by the Sutrakāra in describing the presentation of objects in the dream in a sense so completely different from what is mythical or *mithyābhūta* given to it by S. It has already been pointed out that if the discussion of dreams is to have any relevance to the Sādhana Adhyāya, it can only be because they are a real tho' short-lived experience for which the Jīvātman is indebted to the Supreme B. and which reveal to him a measure of Divine power and beneficience. The common sense view that, dreams are a fictitious experience without any substance of reality in them is widely known. In the circumstances, it needs no philosophical restatement or demonstration in the Sūtras.[21] On grounds of contextual plausibility itself, it should thus be evident to anyone that there must be more than what meets the eye in the serious consideration of dreams in the Sādhana Adhyāya immediately after the Vairāgya Pāda. In other words, its purpose must needs be to inspire Bhakti—the next step in spiritual Sādhana *after* Vairāgya. And it is only by interpreting the Jīvas' experience of dreams in a manner that will bring into bold relief the majesty of God as their author and exhibitor (Pradarśaka), that such a purpose can be said to be successfully accomplished.

It is in keeping with this schematic purpose of this *adhi.* (and of others) in this Pāda that M. understands *'mayāmātram'* applied to dreams as *"what is brought about by the will"* (*icchā*) of the Supreme

20. सन्ध्यसृष्टौ प्रमाणेनावगतायामेव निर्मात्रादिशङ्केति प्रमाणशंका पूर्वं वृत्ता। तत्परिहाराय प्रवृत्तमाद्यं ह्यन्येतत् सामान्यप्रमाणविषयम्। अवगतापि सृष्टिर्नोपपद्यते, निर्मात्रभावादिति तावन्मात्रस्य शङ्कनात् द्वितीयस्य प्रथमांशो निर्मातृश्रुतिमात्रपरः। अन्यथानाकाङ्क्षाभिधानेनाधिक्यं स्यात्। निर्मातृसद्भावः कल्पितत्वस्यैव साधकः पुरुषस्याज्ञानादिद्वारा शुक्तिरजतनिर्मातृत्ववत् उपपत्तिरित्यत 'एतस्मात् जायते' इति विशेषश्रुति द्वितीयांशेनोपात्ता। देवदत्तात् यज्ञदत्तो जायत इतिवत् उपादानभागविश्लेषावधित्वस्य पञ्चम्यर्थत्वेनात्रापि कल्पकत्वशंकानवकाशः (*STC.* iii.2 2)

21 S.'s view that the dream state is taken up for discussion to show that the soul is self-luminous will be considered in its proper context.

Being The compound is accordingly dissolved by him as *māyayā mātam*—meaning what is created by the will of God, "*mātram*" being derived from √*mān* to fashion (4th conj) with the unādi-suffix *tra* (*n*) added to the root in the sense of *karma* (object)[22] as in '*mantrah*'. The term 'māyā' is understood in the sense of "will" on good authority including the *Vedic Nighanṭu* which reads *māyā* as synonymous with *prajñā* (intelligence) *vayunam* (knowledge), *abhikhyā* (will) etc[23]

This lends necessary support to interpreting Māyā as the intelligence and will of God (*aisvari prajñā*) in the present context It is this which operates as the efficient cause in the creation of objects presented in the dream

Coming to the question of their material cause, M points out in his *AV* that the minds of Jivas are the repositories of countless layers of subtle impressions known as Vāsanās left by the experiences of the past *Bṛh Up* i 5 3 speaks of intelligence, cognition, thought, desire, etc , as fulgurations of the mind[24] Vasanas too are derived from the mind Thro' their common link with the mind thro' Prajñā, the Vāsanās are here referred to thro secondary signification by the term māyā as the material cause or stuff of which the dream objects are created.[25]

वासना सर्वसत्त्वानामनाद्यनुभवागता ।
सत्येवाशेषजीवानामनादिमनसि स्थिता ॥
संस्कारैर्भगवानेव सृष्ट्वा नानाविधं जगत् ।
स्वप्नकाले दर्शयति * * * * (*AV* iii 2 3)

J points out how with an eye for economy of expression, consistent with clarity, the Sūtrakara has, in the manner already indicated, resorted to Lakṣaṇā in part so as to combine the statement of the *nimitta* and *upādana—kāranas* of the presentation of dream phenomena within the capsulated term *Māya*[26] This resort to 'Tantra'-device is natural in a Sūtra-work. Its advantages in the present context are obvious. If express mention had been made of Vāsanās alone then the reference to God's will as the efficient cause would have been left out

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22. माङ् मान इति धातोः कर्मणि त्रन् प्रत्यय इति निष्पन्नोऽयं शब्दः । एवं च मायया निमित्तभूतभगवदिच्छया, मायया उपादानभूतवासनाख्यमायया च मात्रं निर्मितमित्यर्थः सूचितः (Vadiraja *TPG* p 131)
23. 'माया वयुनं ज्ञानम्' इति ज्ञानपर्यायोऽपि मायाशब्दः नैघण्टुकैः पठ्यते (*Śribhaṣya*, i 1 21)
Cf also महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तवेच्छानन्त कथ्यते ॥ (Q M. *BSB* i 4 25)
24. कामः संकल्पो * * * धीर्ह्रीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव (*Bṛh Up* i,5,3)
25 [illegible] (*NS* p 498-99b)
26. [illegible] (*NS* p 538)

If both Iśvara-prajñā and Jaivi prajñā (i e Vāsanās) had been separately *mentioned in the Sūtra, there will be an infringement of economy* in the use of words The choice of a single term Māyā which by 'Tantra' is capable of denoting the will of God as the efficient cause of dreams, in the primary signification of the word *māyā* and Vāsanās as their material cause thro' its link with prajña (*māyā*) in its derivative sense is a tribute to the Sūtrakāra's judgment in the selection of words[27]

He also points out that it is for this reason that the compound *Māyāmātram* has *not* been rendered as *Māyaiva māyāmatram* (identical with the will of God), for God's Will is only the efficient cause of dreams and is *not* the material cause in the production of the objects presented there and does not therefore stand in the relation of identity towards them[28]

M has made it equally clear in his BSB that Vasanās or Samskāras constitute the material cause of dream creations and God's Will operates as the efficient cause

अनादिमनोगतान् सस्कारान्, स्वेच्छामात्रेण प्रदर्शयति। नान्येन साधनेन (iii 2 3)

It is a complete misunderstanding and misrepresentation of M's position for Ghate to state that to M dream is caused by God's will alone '*being otherwise without a material cause*' (Op cit p 112) *It is this very misunderstanding against which J has warned us by pointing out why the cpd māyamātram has not been resolved by M in his AV as māyaiva māyāmātram but as mayaya matam Ghate is guilty of mis-*quoting M's words *Svecchāmātrena pradarsayati* as *Svecchāmātram pradarsayati* (*Op cit* p 112) leaving out the first part A look into J's *TP* on the *Bhāsya* on iii 2 3 would have put Ghate wise as to the true and correct position of M regarding the material cause of dreams[29] As usual M's terseness of expression has been too much for Ghate

Dreams are thus real and valid experiences to M They blaze the power and beneficience *of their creator—the Supreme Being* This reality can be impugned only on the ground that they do not fulfil the conditions of place and time, that they are contradicted by the waking state and that there do not exist in the state of dreaming the requisite effi-

27 यदि च वासनामात्रम इति मुख्य एव प्रयोग क्रियते तदा ईश्वरप्रज्ञा न सगृहीता स्यात। यद्युभयग्रहण गौरव स्यात। अतो मुख्यामुख्यविवक्षयोभयस्य लाघवेन ग्रहणाय 'मायामात्रम इत्युक्तम (*NS* p 499b)

28 अत एव मायैव मायामात्रम इति न व्याख्यातम। स्वप्नस्य निमित्तकारणभूतेश्वरप्रज्ञया तादात्म्याभावात (*NS* p 499b)

29 मनोगतान पूर्वानुभूतसस्कारान उपादानीकृत्य निमित्तभूतया स्वेच्छयैव ईश्वरेण निर्मितमित्यर्थ (*TP* iii 2 3)

cient causes for producing the objects and the materials for their production But with the acceptance of Vāsanās as the stuff of which they are created[30] and the agency is Isvara in their creation and presentation most of these objections fall to the ground [31] Indeed, the closing words of the Sūtra *Kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* are, in M 's interpretation, intended specially to drive home the point that tho' real they are not to be looked upon as constituted of external material substances by which the things perceived by us in our waking life are made Being products of Vāsanās which are subtle internal modifications of the mind-stuff the dream-creations are often indistinct and are not competent to serve our practical ends like the objects of waking life made of gross material substances Hence, they are not incommoded by the objections based on incompatibility of place, time, size, etc [32] The real is no doubt connected with space and time, but not necessarily with time and space in their gross sense Otherwise, there will be no spatial fulfilment for the Soul conceived, either as all-pervasive or as atomic, when it tenants the body of an ant or an elephant Time and space are accepted as real substances But time and space cannot, however, be said to exist in time and space other than and outside of themselves, in order to be real.[33]

The contradiction of dreams in the waking state is only partial—in respect of the dreamer's notion that the objects and persons seen by him in his dream are the very same as those seen by him in the waking state[34] and/or made of material substances like the things experienced in the wakeful life and, therefore, capable of satisfying external ends

> * * * * भ्रान्तिर्जाग्रत्त्वमेव हि (*AV* ii 2 3)
>
> जाग्रत्त्व जाग्रदनुभूतपदार्थैरैक्यम् । यद्वा, घटादीना मृदाद्युपादानकत्व बाह्यार्थक्रियाक्षमत्वमित्यादि ग्राह्यम् (*NS* p 461b)

It is only these aspects which are contradicted on waking [35]

30 It should be noted that as modifications of the mind-stuff the Vasanas are conceived as substances in essence and not as qualities Hence, there is no difficulty in their functioning as material causes in producing the dream-objects. (Ragh TPB p 272b)

31 [illegible] एवेति भाव । [illegible] प्रयुक्ता (*TP* iii 2 3)

32 यस्मात् स्वप्नविषया मनोवृत्त्या वासनाविकारा अत एव ते बाह्यवत् स्थूला [illegible] न भवन्ति (*NS* p 499b)

33 [illegible] । [illegible] (*STC* p 246)

34 Which is obviously impossible as the dream objects are in fact created out of Vasanās then and there and presented to the Jivātman by God

35 [illegible] भ्रान्ति, न [illegible] । [illegible] इति बाधाभावात (Raghu *NVB* iii 2 3)

The objects presented in the dreams are thus products of Vāsanās They are directly cognized by the mind which is admittedly still functioning in the dream state Their cognition is a direct experience It cannot be dismissed as an act of remembrance, for memory involves the configuration of its datum in terms of a "that" and its reaching out to something absent or far away in time and place In the present case, the dream objects are cognized as "this is X" Nor can dreams be treated as a remembrance distorted into a direct cognition, for the question of distortion will arise only after it has been shown on evidence that it is a case of memory.

As the dream objects have thus been shown to be produced by Vāsanās, there is no difficulty in treating them as being directly perceived by the mind in the dream state instead of being remembered The fact that they are produced by "samskāras" does not make their perception an act of recollection, for the Samskāras become a spent force after bringing the objects into existence They cannot therefore be given a further lease of life to bring about a recollection of them also[36]

J therefore observes that it must be accepted that in dreams we do cognize the objects produced by Vāsanās thro' the instrumentality of the mind,[37] as we do in our meditation or in intense wishful thinking The only difference is that in these other cases, the desired objects are created with the help of Vāsanās by our own deliberate effort—whereas in dreams the objects are created by the will of God and presented to the dreamer, without his effort at producing them[38]

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36 न केवलमवमर्थाना सत्यत्वम्, अपि तु नज्ज्ञानस्यापि। दर्शनसाधन च मन एव। दर्शन चानुभवो विवक्षित। तन स्मरणमवतदिति मत निरस्त भवति। स्मरणत्व खलु अस्य तच्चिन्हस्य तदित्युल्लेखस्य सद्भावाद्वा कल्प्यते, असन्निहितगोचरत्वाद वा? सस्कारप्रभवत्वात् वा? नाद्य इदमित्युल्लेखन तदनुभवात्। अत एव स्मृति विपर्यासोऽयमिति चन्न। स्मृतित्वस्यैवासिद्धे। न द्वितीय। विषयसान्निध्यस्योपपादितत्वात्। न तृतीय पदार्थजनने सस्कारस्योपक्षीणत्वेनासिद्धे। (*NS* p 460 61b)

37 Raghuttama (*TPB* p 358) points out that tho' the Vāsanas are themselves supersensible, their products—viz the dream objects can be sensed—just as it is admitted by Logicians that tho' binary atoms are supersensible their effects the tenaries are fit for perception Raghavendra (*TPB* iii 2 3) points out that tho' Vasanas are without form etc the objects produced by them in dreams can afford to possess them—even as fire which in the Vedanta cosmology is a product of Vayu possesses form tho its cause is without form The *STC* points out that tho' the external sense organs are not functioning in the dream state, the dreamer is able to see the objecs presented there with the help of the mind itself It explains that tho' as a rule the mind is not competent to sense properties like color, odor, taste etc of objects that is so only in respect of properties of gross material objects The objects presented in dreams being constituted of Vasanas are not of gross matter Hence, there is no difficulty in the mind being able to sense these properties

चक्षुरादीनामुपरतत्वेऽपि मनस एव रूपादिग्राहकत्वसभवात। न च तत्रासामर्थ्यं प्राकृतरूपादिष्वेव हि तत, न तु मवत्र (*Op cit.* iii 2 p 245)

38 तस्माद्यथा मनोरथे ध्याने वा सस्कारयोनीनर्थान् मनसानुभवत्येव स्वप्नेऽपि किमनुपपन्नम्? इयास्तु विशेष – मनोरथादौ प्रयत्नपूर्विका पदार्थसृष्टि, स्वप्ने पुनरीश्वरेच्छाधीनेति (*NS* p 461b)

In this connection, J enters into the further ramifications of the problem of dreams He rejects the Vaiseṣika view that tho' the presentation of the objects in the dream and their perception by the mind are a direct experience it is so only because the objects presented are those experienced earlier in the waking state which are therefore fit to be remembered[39]

J asks if this experience within this set-up as conceived by the Vaiseṣika is to be treated as a valid one or not It cannot be a valid experience as the data of the original waking experience are now far removed in time and place and are not actually present before the dreamer If it is to be treated as an invalid experience, is it because what is not a horse or an elephant comes to be presented as one, or because it comprehends a far away object as if it is existing just in front of the dreamer? In the former case, we should have the correcting cognition after waking from the dream that what was presented as a horse is not so in reality, but something else In the latter case the stultifying cognition should take the form 'this object seen by me as being present near me in the dream is really far away and at a different place" But such a cognition does not take place

It is not therefore correct to identify the dream objects with the objects of waking life and assume that the same objects are being called up thro' an act of memory and experienced by the mind in the course of the dream The only correct position therefore is to hold that the objects are solely and entirely the outcome of Vāsanās and are created brand—new then and there by the will of God (and formed out of samskāras) and presented to the dreaming self and perceived by him with the mind. They are not at all a transplantation of objects from the waking life thro' the agency of memory (true or disorted)[40] The point of contradiction is to be restricted to that particular aspect of the experience which has already been defined in terms of भ्रान्तिजत्वमेव हि

The last Sutra is necessary to dispose of an objection in the form of a counter inference that if objects presented in dreams are created then and there and have no other material cause than Vāsanās, they would forfeit their reality like silver perceived (in illusions) in

39 [illegible] (ibid)

40 [illegible] (NS p 461b)

the shell.[41] The Sūtra dismisses this contention by referring to the prophetic power of dreams to indicate good and bad fortune which shows that the dream objects to which the Śruti ascribes such power are real. In worldly experience also certain things are considered to be good or bad omens. They are so because they do exist,[42] and are, therefore, credited with such powers. The Sūtra refers to certain Śrutis and Smṛtis where such prophetic qualities are ascribed to certain persons and things presented in dreams. J. explains that even in the case of the statement of an omen like—'the Sun appearing like the moon' the prophetic power is ascribed only to the substratum which has been apprehended otherwise. This substratum is indeed a reality. It should not, therefore, be supposed that even illusory things *per se* have such power.

Summing up the result of the discourse on Dreams in the opening *adhi.*, J. writes: As it is thus established that dreams are real and dependent on the Supreme Lord, great indeed is His majesty. Bhakti towards such a Being is, therefore, fully justified.

अतः स्वप्नस्य भगवदधीनत्वसिद्धेः महामाहात्म्यं तस्येति युक्ता तत्र भक्तिरिति सिद्धम्

(*TP*. iii.2.4)

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41. तृतीयसूत्रेण 'अनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् इति बाह्योपादानकत्वाभावोक्तावेव प्रतिपक्षानुमानोत्थानात् चतुर्थ तस्य बाधाप्रयोजकत्वोक्तिरिति सूत्रत्रम' Raghu. *TPB*. p. 360. The daṇḍa-punctuation mark after "प्रतिपक्षानुमानोत्थानात्" in the *M.GOS*. Edn. of the text, is a misuse.

42. न ह्यविद्यमानं शाकुनं कस्यचित् सूचकम् (*TP*. iii 2 4) Vādirāja (*TPG*. p. 132) mentions the sighting of a Garuḍa in the sky as illustraticn of a good omen.

CHAPTER III

BRAHMAN IS THE WITHDRAWER OF DREAMS

2. *Parābhidhyānādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.5)

This *adhi.* deals with another aspect of Divine majesty that besides being the creator of our dream experiences B. possesses the power of withdrawing the presentation of dreams to the Jīvas by its own Will and does so independently of any other factor. It is very necessary to stress this aspect of its majesty in the interest of evoking unexcelled devotion to B.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as we have dreams only when there is no knowledge of external objects, it is to be presumed that they are terminated by the emergence of knowledge of the external world. God has therefore nothing to do with the melting away of our dreams.[1] For it is within the competence of knowledge of a given thing to put an end to ignorance of the same thing.[2] It stands to reason then that just as darkness is automatically banished when light is brought in, the absence of knowledge of the external world during dreams is terminated by knowledge of external reality itself. There is thus no need to bring God into the picture as the withdrawer of dreams and invest Him with a special majesty on that account in order to evoke[3] gratitude and devo-

1. अविज्ञानमात्रेण स्वप्नवर्तित्वात्, ज्ञानशक्त्यैव स्वप्ननिरोधात्, नेशेन (M. NV. iii 2 5)
2. शक्तिरेषा ज्ञानस्य यत् समानविषयाज्ञान नाशकत्वमिति (TP iii 2 5)
3. अतो, आलोकेन तमोवत् ज्ञानेनैवाज्ञानस्य निवृत्त्या तन्निमित्तस्वप्नस्याप्युपरमे, किमीश्वरेणेति न तत्रापि माहात्म्यम् (TP. iii 2 5)

tion on the part of the Jīvas for His restoring to them the knowledge of external reality. The *TPB* of Raghūttama points out that tho' it has been shown in the previous *adhi.* that dreams are created by God, the *premise of the present adhi. starts by questioning it* on the basis of anvayavyatirekapramāṇa (that they arise only when there is no knowledge of external objects and cease when such knowledge is there) which goes to show that they are caused only by absence of knowledge of external reality and are, therefore, terminable by knowledge of external reality and not by Divine agency.[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta shows that termination of dreams cannot be ascribed *solely to the power of knowledge (of external reality)*; *for it is on* record how helpless the Jīvātman is in the matter of waking from his own sleep, as cases are known of persons dying in their sleep notwithstanding their looking forward to waking up as usual the next morning. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that the termination of dreams *is caused solely by the power of knowledge of external reality on waking* up from dreams, *without the regulating agency of God.*[5]

The *NV.* of M. brings out the truth of this point by putting a searching question whether this knowledge and ignorance (of external reality) *which are claimed by the Pūrvapakṣin to be capable, by themselves*, of accounting for the termination and onset of dreams are to be regarded as (i) other than the essence of the Jīvā; or (ii) one with it; or (iii) of the nature of both; or (iv) neither. The first position, if accepted, would automatically reduce Jñāna and Ajnāna to inanimate principles by their being avowedly different from the nature of the Jīva, as accepted by the Pūrvapakṣin. If they are to be identical with Jīvāsvarūpa, they too will have to be accepted as inanimate seeing that the Jīva himself has no power to shake off his dreams and get back to the waking state. If they are both different from and one with the Jīvasvarūpa they will be exposed to the defects of both the positions. To make them neither different nor identical with Jīvasvarūpa is to invite a self-contradiction; for what is not identical with Jīvasvarūpa must be different from it and what is different from it must

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4 पूर्वाधिकरणे भगवतः स्वप्नप्रदर्शकत्वमुक्तम् अतोऽसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेन्न। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विज्ञानस्यैव स्वप्नप्रतीतिं प्रति हेतुत्वसिद्धेः, तदप्यमप्रतिपन्नमिति तदाक्षेपेण प्रवृत्तेरिति भावः. (*Op. cit.* p. 361)

5. बोधे जीवस्यास्वातन्त्र्यात् (*NV*). The STC. envisages two more Pūrvapakṣas for this adhi. (*Op. cit.* p. 222). One of them based on holding the Jīvā himself to be capable of terminating his dream. This is negatived by the above statement in the *NV*:— बोध इत्यनेन स्वप्नप्रतीति. तत्तिरोधायक ज्ञान च विवक्षितम्। तथा च, ज्ञानाज्ञानयोः जीवस्यास्वातन्त्र्यादिति फलितम्

be identical with it. It cannot fall outside the scope of both.[6] This should suffice to show that the capacity of knowledge of external reality to terminate dreams and of ignorance of external objects to usher in dreams is not unqualified and absolute. The proper conclusion to draw from all these facts taken together is that the termination of our dreams and their onset are not *only* or *entirely* due to the circumstances of knowledge of external reality or its ignorance. They are only indirect causes—the true and unfettered cause being the will of the Supreme B. who is the cause of everything that happens anywhere in the world and of every state and condition in which the Jīva is placed.[7]

Sūtrārtha

The first part of the Sūtra is, therefore, interpreted by M. as follows:

स एव स्वप्नतिरस्कर्ता (M. *BSB.* iii.2.5)

"He is the withdrawer of dreams". This follows the wording of the Sūtra: The withdrawal (*tirohitam*)[8] of dream-experience (*sandhyasya*) is only (tu)[9] by the Lord's will (*parābhidhyānāt*).[10]

The second part of the Sūtra embodies an illustrative argument confirming the main proposition that God Himself is the withdrawer of the presentation of dream experiences to the Jīvā. The argument couched in the following words of M.'s *BSBi*

बन्धमोक्षप्रदत्वात् स एव स्वप्नतिरस्कर्ता

"Because of being the author of bondage and release from transmigratory career of Souls, the Lord is the withdrawer of dreams"—has been elucidated by J. as follows: "It is wellknown and well-recognized that the bondage of Jīvas is due to beginningless ignorance and release from

6. ज्ञानाज्ञानयोस्तदन्यत्वे जडत्वात् कैमर्थ्येनास्वातंत्र्यात्, सन्मात्रत्वे तेनैव व्याप्यत्वात्, उभयात्मत्वे दोषद्वयापातात् अनुपपन्नत्वे स्वप्नाहते. (*NV.* iii 2.5)
Read:—ईश्वरस्तु स्वच्छेन त्वया नांगीक्रियत एवेति, जीवान्यत्वे जडत्वापत्ति सभावितवृत्तिमति जीवे यदा अस्वातंत्र्य तदा स्वप्न· प्रवृत्त्यभावे जडे किमु वक्तव्यमिति। तत्स्वरूपत्व इति जीवस्य कारणत्वनिराकरणेनैव तदभिन्नयोर्ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरपि कारणत्वस्य निराकृतत्वादित्यर्थं (*STC.* p 225)
7. तावन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे मानाभावात्, सर्वस्येश्वरकार्यत्वे मानाच्च (*NV.* iii 2 5)
ज्ञानाज्ञाननिमित्ततया प्रतीतयोरपि स्वप्नाविर्भावतिरोधानयो परमात्माधीनत्वमेव। ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरस्वातन्त्र्यात्। ते तु निमित्तमात्रमिति भाव (*TP.* iii 2 5)
8. तिरोहितं, तिरोधानं। भावे क्त. (*STC.* p 223)
9 Ragh. *TPB.* and *BD.* explain it as an emphatic particle ruling out the Pūrvapakṣa contention on behalf of *Jñānājnāna*. The STC. prefers to explain it in an illustrative sense तुरप्यर्थे। अत एव नयेति सम्पदे (p 223)—the illustration being embodied in the second part of the Sutra· ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ
10 Tho' the Sūtra refers to Parābhidhyāna or God's will as withdrawing the dreams, the Bhāṣyakāra speaks of God Himself as their withdrawer to drive home the point that God and His will are indistinguishable (*saviśeṣābhinna*). See *Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa* (BS iii 2 28-31) for this concept

it is due to knowledge (of truth). All the same, it has got to be acknowledged *on further reflection* that bondage and release cannot be attributed *solely* to them, for this reason that they are both dependent on an "other",—being insentient principles in themselves. The subjection of Jīvas to ignorance and the lifting of the veil of ignorance and bondage have, in the last analysis, to be ascribed to a sentient Being who is independent (*svatantra*). That is why scripture declares:

संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः (*Śvet. Up.* vi.16)
बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।
कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म * * * * * * ॥
(*Skānda Purāṇa* Q.M.)

In the same way, we have to acknowledge that dreams and their termination tho' generally known to be due to ignorance and knowledge (of external reality) must, in the final analysis, be accepted as being brought about in the true sense of the term, only by the Supreme Being. For after all, knowledge and ignorance are in themselves dependent principles. They are only indirect causes. The ultimate and independent cause is God's will.[11] The *TD.* of Trivikrama explains the point thro' a *Kaimutyanyāya:* Seeing that *even the beginningless bondage* of Souls from time immemorial and its termination *for ever afterwards* are due to His will, need it be said that He has the power to (create and to) terminate our dreams? Undoubtedly, He is the One who draws the curtain over our dreams after showing them.[12]

11 The *STC.* has another interpretation of the second part of the Sūtra: Just as (*tu=yathā) bondage and release of souls are taught in the Śrutis to be due to* the Supreme B. as the other reputed causes thereof viz. ignorance and knowledge are dependent on God even so because the experiences of dreams and their disapparance are subsumable under bondage and release, in a larger sense, the discontinuation of dreams is to be ascribed to Divine will.

12. यदभिध्याननिबन्धनोऽनादिबन्धः तद्विमोक्षश्चातिदुरापोऽनन्तकालीनः, स्वप्नतिरोधानशक्ति किं तस्य वर्णनीया ? अतः स एव स्वप्नतिरस्कर्ता (*TD.* iii 2 5)

CHAPTER IV

CONSCIOUS LIVING IN WAKING STATE IS ALSO DEPENDENT ON GOD

3 *Dehayogādhikaraṇam* (iii 2 6)

This *adhi* shows that the state of the Jiva's conscious living with deep personal attachment to his body, senses, family and possessions known as the 'waking state' (*jāgradavasthā*) is equally dependent on the will of the Supreme B and is brought about and sustained by it [1]

Tho' agreeable dreams are eagerly wished for in expectation of indirect fulfilment of long felt desires, they do not oblige us by coming to us whenever wanted This shows dreams are not under our control In contrast to this we are aware in the waking state of our own independence of initiative over many of our undertakings and our ability to realize them It may, therefore, be objected with good reason that the expression '*asya*' in B S i 1 2, excludes our waking life from the purview of the definition of B as the cause of all[2]

The *adhi* thus arises by way of an *adhikāśaṅkā* over the conclusion reached in the previous *adhis* Even tho' the apparent agency of the Jiva or of ignorance and knowledge of external objects in respect of the emergence of dreams and their termination have been set aside on the evidence of Śrutis ascribing them to the Divine Will there is no

1 [illegible] (TD iii 2 5)

2 [illegible] (STC iii 2 6)

possibility of similarly disputing the evidence of our own vivid experience that the waking state is governed and sustained by our own initiative. The pleonasm: *Dehayogād vāsaḥ*[3] in the Sūtra for the shorter: *Jāgrat* is intended to emphasize this very point that it is only in this state that the Jīva reacts with full personal attachment to his body and possessions.[4] This goes to support the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the Jīva's independence of initiative in this state cannot be dismissed as a mistaken notion.[5]

We have two lines of Pūrvapaksa in this *adhi.*, one that the waking state is due to the Jīva's own free will and initiative and another attributing it to the natural effect of the order of time. The former has been refuted by implication in the Siddhāntanyāya:

चेतनान्तरस्याप्यस्वातंत्र्यात् in the *NV*.

The latter has been explicitly set forth in M.'s *NV* and *AV* and elucidated in the *TP* as follows: The waking state is obviously dependent on the time-factor. This cannot be negatived on the ground of the insentiency or dependence of Time; for it is a fact of our experience that the whole commerce of our conscious life and its activities are governed and regulated by Time. The waking state is only a part of this larger life of conscious living and it must, therefore, be equally dependent on time. Notwithstanding its insentient character, Time must. therefore, be recognized as the primary cause of the waking state.

There is equally good reason to hold that such conscious life is due to the Jīva's own initiative. As a sentient being he is not under any disability such as are associated with Jñāna, Ajñāna or Time. Whatever may be his limitations in accomplishing formidable tasks, it is quite within his competence to order and carry on his own conscious life and its activities in the waking state Judgments like "I am indeed the doer", "This body and other possession are mine" confirm such competence.[6]

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3 S and R. read *Vā sah.*

4 सहजदेहबाह्यदेहाभिमानाख्ययोगोऽस्ति जाग्रदवस्थायाम् । स्वप्ने तु नासाविति तयोर्विशेषं सूचयितुं देहयोगात् वासोऽपीत्याहेति (*TPG.* p. 134)

5 भवत्ववस्थान्तराणां भगवदधीनत्वं; न जाग्रदवस्थायाः । किंतु जीवाधीनैव सा; तत्र जीवस्य देहादिकं ममैवेति स्वातन्त्र्यप्रतीतिदर्शनात् । न चेयं भ्रान्तिः । जीवस्य चेतनत्वेन पूर्वोक्तन्यायस्याबाधकत्वात्, बाधकान्तराभावाच्च ' इति पूर्वपक्षोत्थानान्नैतदारम्भवैयर्थ्यम् । अत एव सूत्रे 'जाग्रत्' इत्येव वक्तव्ये 'देहयोगाद् वास' इत्युक्तम्
(Raghu. *TPB,* p 362)

6 चेतनस्याप्यस्वातन्त्र्योपपादनान्नैव पूर्वपक्ष इति न वाच्यम्, महत्तरकार्ये तस्यास्वातन्त्र्येऽपि जागरणे तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यसम्भवादिति, प्रमेयाश्रितया, अहमेव करोमि, देहादिकं ममैव इत्यादिस्वातन्त्र्यप्रतीत्या निर्बाधया तदुपपत्तेरिति प्रमाणाश्रितया चाप्याधिकाशङ्कया पूर्वपक्षसम्भवात् (*STC.* p 230)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that conscious life attended with vigorous personal attachment to the body, senses and other possessions is as much dependent on God's will as the dream state and its termination This is established by the Śruti "The Lord alone brings the Soul into the state of wakefulness" (*Kaunṭharavya Śruti*) [7] The Pūrvapakṣas on behalf of Time and the Jīvas are unsustainable The analogy of the magnet moving a piece of iron affords no decisive support to Time being an independent factor in sustaining waking life, for even the power of the magnet is ultimately to be traced to Divine Will The belief that Time does everything is overruled by the Śruti and has, therefore, to be understood in the sense of its operating as the indirect cause of various events taking place subject to Divine agency [8]

Śaṃkara's Interpretation
(*Sandhyādhikaraṇam* iii 2 1-6)

S makes the soul's different states of waking, dreaming, etc, the theme of this Pāda [9] We read in *Chān Up* (iv 3 9, 10) "when he falls asleep * * * there are no chariots, horses or roads But He himself creates them" Here, the doubt arises if, as in the waking state, this creation of horses etc in the dream is real (*pāramārthika*) or is illusory The *Bhāmatī* presents S's Pūrvapakṣa with some reorientation

Pūrvapakṣa

In the interest of establishing the reality of dream-creations, the Pūrvapakṣa seeks to deny the very possibility of erroneous knowledge in our experience [10] Dreams have, however, been made the subject of discussion in the Sūtra in order to bring into relief self-luminousness of Ātman in the Siddhānta, by laying bare the unreality of the creations in dreams [11]

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7 Cf also मर्ते स्वत् क्रियते वियनारे (*RV* x 112 9) The *STC* shows that the complete dependence of Jīva for his conscious living with attachment to the body follows as a corollary from the text सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः (*T Ā* iii 12 17) इति देहयोगस्य भगवदधीनत्वश्रुतेः सम्यग्ध्यानव्यापारस्यापि तदधीनत्वसिद्धया तदनन्तरं जागरस्य सुतरां तदधीनत्वमिति (*Op cit* p 232)

8 कालस्यैव जागरस्वप्नादिकर्तृत्वे श्रुतिविरोधात्। निमित्तमात्रविषयं प्रत्यक्षमिति भावः (*TP* iii 2 6)

9 अतिक्रान्ते पादे जीवस्य संसारगतिप्रभेदः प्रपञ्चितः। इदानीं तु तस्यैवावस्थाभेदः प्रपञ्च्यते (S *BSB* iii 2 1)

10 इह हि सर्वस्यैव मिथ्याज्ञानस्योदाहरणम्। अतः सत्यत्वं प्रतिपादन (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 1)

11 आत्मज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्धये तु स्वप्नज्ञानमुदाहृतम् (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 1)

All knowledge has to be admitted as true in the sense that what is asserted by knowledge with reference to a given datum must be accepted as correct, for the suchness of its object enters into the composition of that knowledge In the circumstances, a character contrary to the one presented by the knowledge in question can never be ascribed to the object There is no substance in the contention that a contrary character has to be ascribed to the object when the earlier knowledge of it comes to be *contradicted* by a subsequent one The subsequent knowledge has no claim to be called a correcting or contradicting knowledge *It is only when knowledge with reference to the same object tends to give two different versions of it that it can be called contradictory* In such cases, the more powerful one is adjudged to be the correcting knowledge and the less powerful one as open to correction[12]

But judgements like "This is silver", "This is *not* silver" cannot be considered as contradictory in this sense, *for they do not pertain to the same (given) datum* Each can be held to be true in its own sphere with reference to its own distinctive temporal setting There is nothing strange in this explanation Milk seen in the morning becomes curd in the night *Silver seen at a given time may become shell at a different time Or, the thing in question may be multiform* Whoever perceives it with his eyes flushed by the hot rays of the Sun grasps its silvery form Whoever sees it in ordinary light perceives its shell-form The lotus with its reddish blue color, when revealed in the sunlight, is seen to be of bluish hue The same perceived under lamp light in the night is seen to be reddish[13] In the same way, one who is not asleep is unable to perceive the chariots horses, etc, which are nevertheless there The same person when asleep is able to see them (in his dream state) The difference can thus be explained on the basis of difference in accessories or difference of time without involving any 'contradiction' We cannot, therefore, say that of the two different perceptions ("this is silver" and "this is *not* silver") one of them is stronger and the other weaker Each of them has reference to its own datum within its own setting and therefore, *on a par with the other* There is no-

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12 ज्ञानं यमर्थमवबोधयति स तथैवेति युक्तम्। तथाभावस्य ज्ञानारोहात्। अतथात्वस्य त्वप्रतीयमानस्य तथाभावप्रमेयविरोधित्वेन कल्पनानास्पदत्वात्। बाधकप्रत्ययादतथात्वमिति चेन्न। तस्य बाधकत्वासिद्धेः। समानगोचरे हि विरुद्धार्थोपसंहारिणी ज्ञाने विरुध्येते बलवदबलवत्त्वनिश्चयाच्च बाध्यबाधकभावं प्रतिपद्येते

(*Bhāmati* iii 2 1)

13 न चेह समानविषयत्वम् कालभेदेन व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। यथा हि क्षीरं दृष्टं कालान्तरे दधि भवति। एवं रजतं दृष्टं कालान्तरे शुक्तिर्भवेत्। नानारूपं वा तद्वस्तु। तद्यस्य तीव्रातपक्लान्तिसहितं चक्षुः स तस्य रजतरूपतां गृह्णाति। यस्य तु केवलमालोकमात्रोपकृतं स तस्यैव शुक्तिरूपतां गृह्णाति। एवमुत्पलमपि नीललोहितं दिवा सौरीभिर्भाभिरभिव्यक्तं नीलतया गृह्यते प्रदीपाभिव्यक्तं तु नक्तं लोहिततया (*Bhāmati* iii 2 1)

thing to justify any preference to be shown to the one at the expense of the other.[14]

This makes it clear that all perceptive judgments are true because they are judgments like those about pillars, pots and pans made in the waking state.[15] This is conveyed by the Śruti text: He creates chariots horses etc. The predication "He creates" cannot be dismissed as a figurative one because of the supposed conflict with the other Śruti—"There were no chariots etc." It is the other text that has to be explained figuratively as meaning that these are not fit to be perceived in the waking state—not that there were no chariots, horses, etc. as such. They are creations of Prājña—the Supreme Being. So, they are to be accepted as real creations like that of ether, etc.[16]

Siddhānta

The Siddānta knocks down the pivot of the Pūrvapakṣa contention that all knowledge is to be accepted as *ipso facto* true and that there are no illusory cognitions as such. That is too tall an order. In the familiar instance of illusory perception of shell, it cannot be contended seriously that the silver later changes into shell or that both *'idam rajatam'* and *'nedam rajatam'* are correct cognitions with reference to different times For even while A is under the misapprehension of silver (in shell) B. whose vision is good and not distorted by flaws is able to perceive the same object as 'shell'. It cannot be that the object in question is of the nature of both shell and silver. If it were so, it should be in a position to manifest the effects of being both, in turn. When the shell-element therein is burnt, it should exhibit alkaline properties and when heat is applied it should melt into liquid silver. As for the contention that there is no way of deciding the relative strength of these cognitions, it is *not so.* We know from experience that the subsequent cognition corrects the earlier one. (Where the shell comes to be misapprehended as 'silver'), within the sphere of the illusory experience, there is no chance of the shell as such coming to be first perceived prior to the apprehension of silver. We cannot, therefore, make the cognition of 'silver' sublate the cognition of shell.[17] It is only the apprehension of silver which is given by the first act of know-

14 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 1)

15 [illegible] (ibid)

16 [illegible] * * * [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 1-2)

17. [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 3)

ledge that can be set right by the subsequent cognition of shell.[18] Tho' each cognition may be confined to its own content, there cannot but be a self-contradiction when shellness and silverness come to be referred *to the same substratum. This knocks down the Pūrvapakṣin's attempt* to banish all illusory perceptions from the field of knowledge. Correcting cognitions have a place in experience from which they cannot be dislodged. Dream-cognitions come under the same category of illusory experience.[19] The objects appearing in dreams are sublated by the waking knowledge. The Śruti *'there were no chariots....' is to be* viewed as citing "He creates chariots...." for purposes of *anuvāda* with intent to suggest the Ātman's self-luminous character in the dream-state.

Criticism

It is difficult to accept the position that the theme of the Pāda is the consideration of the states of the Jīva. This being the Sādhana-Adhyāya, the theme of this Pāda—following as it does the "Vairāgya-Pāda"[20]—must be the next higher step or grade of Sādhana (after Vairāgya) which is "Bhakti". Consideration of the states of the Jīva has nothing to do with Sādhanas as such. Following S., the *Bhāmatī* has suggested that the different states of the Jīva are being set forth (in the first four *adhi.s*) to facilitate the discrimination of the self's self-luminousness.[21] But such a discrimination is not the main theme of Brahmamīmāṁsāśāstra and is not, therefore, called for. The *Kalpataru* comes to the rescue with the suggestion that Vairāgya has been stressed in the previous Pāda by showing that the fruits of Karma involve an endless moving up and down to and from this world and the other. The present Pāda launches the aspirant *on the high seas of* Tattvampadārthaviveka or the discrimination of sense of 'Tat' and 'Tvam' for purposes of determining the import of the Mahāvākya (*Tattvamasi*).[22]

This is also wide of the mark. The discrimination of sense of *Tat* and *Tvam by itself* serves no useful purpose in Brahma Mīmāṁsā. It would be inadmissible to argue that such discrimination is necessary for intuiting the identity of Pratyagātman and B. For 'viveka' or 'discrimination' would have to be grounded in difference or *knowledge of*

18 पूर्वज्ञानप्राप्त तु रजत शुक्तिज्ञानमपबाधितुमर्हति (*ibid*)

19 एतेन स्वप्नप्रत्ययो मिथ्यात्वेन व्याख्यात: (*ibid*)

20 Cf. कर्मफलस्य यानायानरूपत्वेन पूर्वं वैराग्य निरूपितम् (*Kalpataru* iii 2.1)

21. इदानी तु, तस्यैव जीवस्यावस्थाभेदः स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रपच्यते . (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 1)

22 कर्मफलस्य यातायातरूपत्वेन पूर्वं वैराग्य निरूपितम् । इदानीं विरक्तस्य तत्त्वंपदविवेकार्थं द्वितीय. पाद आरभ्यते । तत्रापि 'न स्थानतोऽपि' इत्यत प्राक् त्वंपदार्थो विवेचित । तत आरभ्य तत्पदार्थः (*Kalpataru* iii 2.1)

difference between two given things That would stand in the way of realization of identity (*aikyāparokṣa*)

It may be argued, however, that discrimination of *nitya* and *anitya* has been recognized as the first step in Sādhanas towards realisation of B in i 1.1. The discrimination intended is obviously the one embracing the *Tat* and *Tvam* principles or its outcome For this reason, it is necessary to go thro' *Tattvampadārthaviveka* at this stage

But what precisely is meant by '*discrimination* of the senses of *Tat* and *Tvam*?' If it is to be in these terms that 'Tat' denotes a being endowed with omniscience, all-powerfulness, etc and 'Tvam' a being whose characteristics are contrary to this, then as both these qualified beings will be impermanent ones, their discrimination can hardly be described as a discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal. A discrimination referring to pure being (*cinmātram*) indicated *per accidence* thro' *Tat* and *Tvam* would yet be a discrimination pertaining only to the eternal and cannot be deemed to be one embracing the *nitya* and *anitya*[23] Furthermore, it appears from the Śruti परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायात् (*Mund Up* i 2 12) that Nityānityavastuviveka is to be *followed by Vairāgya* Accordingly, we may have to reverse the order of the first and the second Pādas here, if we are to accept the plea that Pāda 2 is concerned with *Tattvampadārthaviveka*

The explanation that "Tattvampadārthaviveka' is carried on here so as to prepare the ground for the sifting of Saguṇa and Nirguna texts by discussion in the coming Pada so that the former may lead to the contemplation of the Nirguṇa by preparing the necessary climate for it thro' mental purification cannot be accepted as the clear statement in the *Kalpataru* at the commencement of Pada I speaks of Jñāna and its ancillaries for attaining B as the theme of the Sādhana Adhyāya[24] The sifting of Tattvampadārtha and of Saguṇa texts being based on their ingrained distinction and determinations will be repugnant to the interests of Aikyāparokṣa and cannot, therefore, be admitted to be the theme of this Pāda[25]

There is no necessary relation between the Ātman's self-luminousness to be established thro' sifting of Tvampadārtha and the unreality (*mithyātva*) of dreams Can not the former be established much more

23 [illegible]

24 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 1-6)
[illegible] (*Op cit.*)

25 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 1)

impressively by showing the waking state itself, which is of wider range, to be unreal instead of lavishing attention on dreams whose unreality is a *matter of common knowledge*?

Here S's Bhāṣya comes forward with an explanation The dreaming state has been selected for the exposition of the Ātman's self-luminousness because in the waking state owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and the interference of the light of the Sun etc the self-luminousness of the Ātman is difficult for the beholder to discriminate[26] In the circumstances, if dream creations also were to be real, the Soul's self-luminosity could never be ascertained[27]

But then, if *self-luminousness of the self should* mean possessing and enjoying lumination with reference to one's own being, it can remain *unaffected even when it is surrounded by a thousand other real* things If it is to be defined in terms of *avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam* or *what is fit to be referred to as "immediate" tho'* not being an object of any cognition or cognizing activity, the futility *of trying to make knowable to oneself what is* by *hypothesis* unknowable will remain for ever,—irrespective of dreams being proved to be real or unreal

One may still contend that the dream state is the ideal one where the Ātman's self-luminousness in the sense of not being dependent on any consciousness other than itself for empirical usage in respect of itself

स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तापेक्षानियतत्वाभावरूपम्

is realized For, in this state, the instruments of cognition like the eye, spatial location and objects perceived are all unreal and, therefore, wanting in causal efficiency Hence, the Ātman is not under any necessity to depend on them for knowing himself as self-luminous But in the waking state it is impossible[28] to intuit one's self-luminosity, owing to the impinging reality of time, place and objects and the senses aided by the Sun's light all of them causally efficient Hence the choice of the dream-state to clarify the Ātman's self luminosity[29]

This conveniently overlooks the fact that in no other state except Suṣupti (dreamless sleep) is there this intuitive awareness or refer-

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26 जागरिते विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगात् आदित्यादिज्योतिर्व्यतिकराच्चात्मनः स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वं दुर्विवेचमिति तद्विवेचनाय स्वप्न उपन्यस्तः (S BSB iii 2 4)

27 तत्र यदि स्वप्नोऽपि सत्यः स्यात् तदवस्थं दुर्विवेचत्वमिति तन्मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते (*Kalpataru* iii 2 1)

28 स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तापेक्षानियतत्वाभावरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वं स्वप्ने सुग्रहम् । चक्षुरादेः करणस्य, सर्वादिदेशस्य गजादेः प्रमेयस्य च मिथ्यात्वेनामत्कल्पतयार्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावेन तज्ज्ञाने तदपेक्षाभावनियतत्वात् * * * (*STC* p 237-38)

29 जाग्रति तु अर्थक्रियाकारिणामवादित्यादिमहिम्नचक्षुरादीनां सत्त्वात् दुर्ग्रहमिति चेत् (*STC* p 238)

ence to one's own bare self-shiningness The choice of the dream state for this laudable purpose of clarifying it is thus far from convincing[30]

Moreover, the mind is admittedly still at work in dreams and has not been put down as *mithyā* as yet therein The dependence on this organ for any kind of self-reference to the Ātman in the dream state is, therefore, unavoidable[31] If the mind in dreams matters not and offers no resistance to the Ātman's self-reference to himself as Svayamjyotis, the presence of luminaries like the Sun, the objects and places in the waking state can likewise be deemed to be equally harmless and interposing no barrier. For even while they are deemed to be existing, the Sun, time and place and objects of waking life are, *in point of fact, mithyā* and on a par with dream phenomena[32] *As the Advaita* school accepts causal efficiency for unreals also, the dream-elephants etc will have to be reckoned as causally efficient and that would still jeopardize the Ātman's self-luminousness being known, in that state[33] Thus, it serves no tangible purpose to set about trying to establish the unreality of dreams in this opening *adhi* of this Pāda

The doubt arises in this *adhi*, says S, if the creation in dreams is real (*pāramārthika*) as in the waking state or is illusory[34] This is not correct, for, no pāramārthya is recognized by S for any creation—be it of the waking state or any other The *Bhāmatī* hastens to explain that what is intended to be settled is wheher the dream-creation also has a continuous existence till the time of direct perception of the self's identity of being with B and is then sublated or whether it is sublated every day[35] However, being sublated every day cannot be the meaning of '*māyāmātram* predicated of dream-creation *in the Sūtra* If it is taken in that sense, the reason *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatva* with which the Sūtra seeks to justify such a predication and whose plain meaning is "not being manifested in all the fullness of its nature" will be equally applicable to things seen in the external world, in the waking state, for they too are *not* manifested to our knowledge

30 स्वप्नमात्रव्यवहारस्य [illegible] (*ibid*)

31 स्वप्ने मनसा मिथ्यात्वाभावेन [illegible] (ibid)

32 अ यथा, जाग्रत्सूर्यादीनामपि [illegible] स्यात् । दृश्यत्वस्यादि [illegible] । (*ibid*)

33 अपरमार्थस्य [illegible] । [illegible] (*STC* p 238)

34 स्वप्ने हि पारमार्थिकी सृष्टिराहोस्वित् मायामयीति [illegible] (S *BSB* iii 2 1)

35 यथैव हि ब्रह्मात्मभावसाक्षात्कारात् प्रागनुवर्तते ब्रह्मात्मभावसाक्षात्कारात् निवर्तते । तथा किं स्वप्नसृष्टिः आहोस्वित् प्रतिदिनं निवर्तत इति विमर्शः (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 3)

in all the fullness of their natures. But then, they are not sublated every day!

This disposes of the explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the point of the doubt it whether dream creations have Vyāvahāric reality or not.[36] For, it is clear from the Sūtra *Sūcakaśca hi śruter ācakṣate ca tadvidaḥ* (iii.2.4) which attributes prophetic qualities to objects seen in dreams that they possess reality in the sense of being able to fulfil certain definite functions (*arthakriyākāri*) viz. of bringing about future happiness or calamity. Such dream creations at least must be real in the sense of being "Sūcaka". If some of them are real, the others also can be so, irrespective of their having prophetic qualities.

The *Bhāmatī* pitches the Pūrvapakṣa in a much higher key than is warranted by the point at issue in the Sūtra and its actual wording *Sandhye sṛṣṭiḥ.* If the Pūrvapakṣa is made while conceding at the same time that the cognition of nacre in shell is an erroneous one, its contention that all knowledge is correct knowledge will fall to the ground. Even to repudiate that there is any erroneous knowledge one must concede hypothetically that there are some instances of erroneous knowledge. Otherwise, the repudiation will be meaningless. If such a repudiation is made on the presumption that erroneous knowledge arises thro' verbal misapprehension, one may ask what prevents the acceptance of their arising from visual misapprehension also? If the latter are accepted, the Pūrvapakṣa that all knowledge is true knowledge of its datum has to be given up.

S.'s assumption that the statement in *Bṛh. Up.* (iv.3.10) regarding the non-existence of horses, chariots, etc. *before* the commencement of the dream shows that these are products of the Jīvātman's own nescience and are, therefore, unreal is not well-founded. This statement that these objects did not exist before cannot be made to deny the reality of their subsequent creation. Otherwise, we should be prepared to say that even the external realities like Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc. whose orderly creation by B. is the subject of many Upaniṣadic passages, are false because a passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* (i.2.1) says: There was nothing here *in the beginning.*[37]

The fact that it is the Supreme B. and not the Jīvātman or his Avidyā that creates the dream objects comes out clearly from the very next passage following "Na tatra rathā....". This (next) passage says:

36. स्वप्नस्य व्यवहारिकत्वमस्ति न वेति चिन्त्यत इत्यर्थः (*Kalpataru* iii.2.1)

37. 'न तत्र रथा' इति श्रुतिस्तु नात्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्राया किंतु, ईश्वरसृष्टेः पूर्वमसत्त्वाभिप्राया, अजाग्रत्त्वाभिप्राया वा । अन्यथा, 'इदं वा अग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्' इति श्रुत्या वियादादीनामपि सत्वनिषेधादसत्त्वं स्यात (*STC.* p. 241)

"Having put the embodied self (Śarīra) to sleep, the unsleeping One surveys the sleeping selves" This shows the Śārīra Ātman is to be distinguished from the unsleeping Being[38] It is the latter that creates and presents the dream objects to the dreaming Jiva This is corroborated by the following passage from the *Katha Up* (ii 2 8ab) which speaks of that Purusa who keeps awake when the creatures are asleep and who goes on creating desired objects at His will" That this "Puruṣa" is the Supreme B and *not* the Jīvātman can be seen from the further description of Him as

(i) He who is beyond merit and demerit,
(ii) The B who is without misery, the immortal,
and (iii) The One in whom all the worlds subsist

(*Kaṭha Up* ii.2 8 cd)

This description leaves no room for doubt that the sleepless Puruṣa who creates the dream objects is the Supreme B[39] and *not the Jīvātman who succumbs to sleep*[40]

If in the opening Sūtra, the Pūrvapakṣa seeks to establish this that there is "creation" in the dream state, it will be merely establishing the established, for the Siddhāntin too concedes that there is some kind of a nescience-wrought creation in the dream state If it is "creation" qualified by the property of being 'real' that is sought to be established, such a predicate will suffer from a non-established qualification (*aprasiddhaviśeṣana*), for there is mention only of 'creation' of some things in the dream, in the Śruti but no averment of their 'reality' as such We cannot enlist the services of the statement "He is the creator" in the Śruti for construing it as an *Upasamhārapramāna* in establishing that the said creation is real For, the actual wording of the Sūtra contains nothing more than a bare statement that there is creation in dreams It does not commit itself to saying anything more about its being a real

38 S avoids this natural drift of the passage by construing Śariram in the sense of "Śariram" (body) स्वप्नेन शारीरं शरीरं निश्चेष्टमापाद्य (S *Brh Up Com* iv 3 11) This is against all rules of grammar

39 S tries to avoid this conclusion by resorting to his usual explanation that these complementary statements (in the *vākyaśeṣa*) are intended to convey that the notion that the Jivatman is different from the Supreme B is to be discarded in favor of their identity We have already seen J s refutation of this explanation (*Page* 12.fn.19)

40 We cannot, therefore attach any importance to R. D Ranade s off hand remark that "the Upaniṣadic passages really ascribe dream creations to *the individual* soul * * We cannot deny that the creation of the dream world is ascribed in the Upanisads to the individual self" (*Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought* p 33)

creation.[41] *Nor can the words Sa hi kartā in the Śruti* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.10) *be construed as an Upasamhāra establishing the reality of that creation while introducing the next Sutra: Nirmātāram caike...* For the expression 'Eke' used therein shows that the second Sūtra is being introduced only by way of adducing a 'Samākhyā' or concurrent testimony from some *other* Vedic Śākhā and nothing more. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to overstep its function and act as an *Upasamhāra-vākya* (concluding statement) with reference to something which has been stated in an *entirely different Śākhā*. The principle of Upakrama-Upasamhara in interpretation operates only in respect of one and the same given textual unit and not between two different texts drawn from two separate sources, as in this case. For according to S. the reference in '*Nirmātāram caike...*' is to be *Kaṭha.-Śākhā* (ii.2.8) while *āha hi* in Sūtra iii.2.1 refers to *Brh. Up.* (iv.3.10). It is not permissible to think of an Upakramopasamhāra relationship between these passages.[42]

S. enlists the Śruti: "He himself destroys and shapes the dreams. With his own splendor and light he goes to sleep" (*Brh. Up.* iv.3.9) in support of his Siddhānta that it is not the Prājña (Īśvara) who shapes the dreams *but the Jīvātman himself*.[43] There is, however, an insurmountable difficulty here which he does not seem to have realized. Sleep is a condition in which nescience creeps over the Jīvātman.[44] It would be both bathetic and pathetic to say that the self-luminous Ātman falls into such a condition by the power of his own inner light and splendor.

S.'s interpretation of the first two Sūtras as Pūrvapakṣa leads to various difficulties. If 'Māyā' in the third Sūtra stands for Ajñāna in S.'s sense, it would be out of tune with the Viṣayavākya which refers to the creation (*sṛjate*) of chariots, horses, etc., in the dream. No one speaks of the illusory appearances of silver in the shell or of the snake in the rope as a 'creation'. The statement in the Śruti "He creates chariots etc." cannot be explained as an *anuvāda* (restatement) as it serves no purpose.

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41. Cf. 'सहि कर्ता' इति चोपसहारादेवमवगम्यते' इति च न सूत्रारुढ भाष्यम । तर्हि द्वितीयसूत्रस्यायमवतारो भविष्यतीति चेन्न (*STC.* 111 2, p. 242)

42 एके शाखिन इति श्रवणात् समाख्याप्रमाणोपन्यासरूपतावगमात । नहि शाखान्तरस्य शाखान्तरस्थं वाक्यमुपसहारो भवति (*STC.* p 242)

43 यदप्युक्तम– प्राज्ञमेन निर्मातारमामनन्ति इति। तदप्यसत्। श्रुत्यत्तरे 'स्वय विहत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति' इति जीवव्यापारश्रवणात् (S. *BSB.* iii 2 4)

44 प्रस्वापो ह्यज्ञानकार्यम्। न च तत् प्रकाशादिना भवति (*STC.* p. 251)
See also: अनादिमायया सुप्त (*G K.* i 16)
अभावप्रत्ययालम्वना वृत्तिर्निद्रा (*Yogasūtra* i 10)
This shows that *svayam* in this context refers to the independent role of Paramātman in steering the Jīvatman thro' the vicissitudes of dream, suṣupti etc. *vide*, Vol I, pp. 255-56 and f n. 1 and 2 therein.

The negation of chariots etc can be understood from the negative statement itself *Na tatra rathā* " at the beginning There is thus no need for an *anuvāda* to facilitate the negation An *anuvāda*, moreover, is entitled to precedence over the negation But we have here the negation first (*na tatra rathāh*) and the *anuvāda* (*rathān pathas srjate*) afterwards A topsyturvy procedure!

Following the order of the Upaniṣadic statements as it is—"When he falls asleep there are no chariots, horses, etc , there He then creates them", it stands to reason that after referring to the absence of these things at the beginning of the dream state, the Śruti proclaims their *actual creation* by the Prājña (Isvara) who keeps awake when the Jīvātman is slowly being led into the land of dreams and sleep

This should naturally open our eyes to the fact that the first two Sūtras can very well remain as part of the Siddhānta itself without being dismissed as Pūrvapakṣas The relevant Pūrvapakṣa can as well be put up from outside the Sūtras

As the Pūrvapakṣa regarding the reality of dreams can be effectively repulsed by the significant use of the suffix '*mātram*' itself affixed to '*Māyā*' in S's sense, the use of the particle '*tu*' in the Sūtra, for this purpose, becomes superfluous [45]

The term *kārtsnyam* in '*Kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*' has been rendered by S as the fulfilment of the "conditions of time, place and non-sublation". This is not the authorized sense of the word *kārtsnyam*. Conceding that it may be so, there is no reason why the Sūtrakāra should have gone in for such a longwinded phrase as *kārtsyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* when the desired meaning as required by S could have been conveyed by the much shorter and more compact expression *akārtsnyāt* This shows that the Sūtrakāra means by that phrase something different from what S wishes to understand

Leaving aside S's own special interpretation of *kārtsnyam*, it will be seen that even real objects in the external world such as trees and plants on a hill top, seen from below are apt to be only dimly and not fully, clearly and adequately perceived in all the fulness of their features In that sense, they will also be *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpa* But that will not warrant their being dismissed as unreal (*mithyā*) Such a *hetu* is, therefore, open to the fallacy of *Viruddhatva* We cannot, therefore, make it a decisive ground for rejecting dream creation as unreal.

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45 Contrast [illegible] (TP iii 2 3)

It is possible to connect this *hetu* (*kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*) with the reality of the objects presented in the dreams, provided these objects are recognized to be created out of the subtle stuff of Vāsanās, by the will of Prājña (Īśvara) and presented exclusively to the dreaming Jīva, for the nonce[46] and cut off. In this sense, these objects can possess a reality of their own in a different set-up which is purely internal. The error of the dreamer, as he discovers later, will be in his having taken it that they are being seen by him in his waking state itself. We have already seen how the objections regarding the non-fulfilment of the conditions of time and place, of efficient and material causes etc., put forward by Gauḍapāda and S. in this connection have been fully and satisfactorily met from the point of view of the realistic theory of dreams propounded by M. on the basis of Vāsanās and the agency of God. There is no need to recapitulate those details here.

The fourth Sūtra has been introduced by S. as answering a query: As dreams are all illusory, should it be assumed that they have not even a particle of reality in them? The answer is—No. They are prophetic of the future. What they indicate is real. The indicating perceptions themselves are unreal.[47]

Having been told in the third Sūtra that dreams are devoid of Vyāvahāric reality, we should expect this one either to adduce additional proofs in its support or to combat objections against it. To establish their prophetic nature, instead, is incongruous. Doing so and recognizing to that extent that they have a particle of reality is to prevent the realization of the self-luminousness of Ātman and defeat the purpose for which the investigation into the dream state has been entered into. If some dreams have a particle of reality why not let all of them have it, irrespective of their being in a position to forecast good or evil. As this Sūtra does not adduce any additional argument in support of dreams being *māyāmātram* but opens a fresh line of thought, the use of the conjunctive *ca* here after *Sūcakaḥ* becomes unnecessary in S.'s interpretation.

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46 The objection that objects presented in dreams are found to change their nature completely and quickly (raised by S.) is by no means a serious one to warrant the assumption of their unreality. God being (taken to be) their creator, His deftness in replacing one set of Vāsanā-creations by another in a trice is more a tribute to His mysterious powers than an evidence of their falsity.

47 S. and Vācaspati have taken different attitudes on the question as to which of the two *Sūcaka* (*darśana*) or the *Sūcya* (*dṛśya*) is to be regarded as real in this connection. S. writes: सूच्यमानस्य सत्यत्त्वम; सूचकस्य तु वैतथ्यम This sets the wording of the Sūtra at defiance

According to him the fifth Sūtra anticipates and answers an objection to the unreality of dream-creations as projections of the Jīva's own nescience. The objection is—as the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of the Supreme B. he must share the power of knowledge and rulership of the Lord even as a spark and fire have alike the power of burning things. The Jīva too like the Lord must, therefore, be able to create real chariots, horses, etc., by the power of his knowledge and desire. The dream-creations must therefore, be real and true.[48]

The Sūtra "*Parābhidhyānāttu....*" refutes this by showing that tho' the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. yet it is manifest to perception that his attributes are of a different nature from the Lord's. This does not, however, mean that the Jīva has no parity of attributes with B. He has. But it is hidden by the veil of Avidyā. This Avidyā has to be dispelled by meditation on the Lord. Till then the Jīva cannot create anything real. His bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord's true nature. Release is due to the presence of such knowledge in him.[49]

This explanation that in spite of his being *aṁśa* of the Lord, the Jīva's knowledge and powers are hidden by Avidyā and will be made manifest by meditation on the Lord is not in any way relevant to the question whether dream creations are real or not. For this Sūtra, as interpreted by S. has no direct bearing on dreams being *māyāmātram* or their possessing prophetic qualities as made out in the two preceding Sūtras. It is to be noted that the objection raised by S. that as an *aṁśa* of the Lord, it should be possible for the Jīva to create real objects in his dreams thro' his Lordly power and intelligence has no direct rebuttal *in the wording of the Sūtra.* The rebuttal is provided by S. *outside the Sūtra and in his own words* to the effect that notwithstanding his being an *aṁśa* of B. the Jīva's attributes are borne out by Pratyakṣa to be contrary to the Lord's. As this will suffice to answer the objection, the discussion ought to have been closed there. Where then is the need for the commentator to go off at a tangent and enter into the question of the veiling of the Jīva's sovereign attributes by Avidyā and their manifestation later by meditation on the Lord? As the Lord himself is admittedly not under any such disability, will S. agree that dreams are real creations of the Lord?

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48. यद्यपि स्यात्—परस्यैव तावदंशो जीवः अग्नेरिव विस्फुलिङ्गः. समाने दहनप्रकाशनशक्ती एवं जीवेश्वरयोरपि ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्ती। ततश्च जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यवशात् सांकल्पिकी स्वप्ने रथादिसृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति
(S. BSB. iii 2 5)

49. सत्यपि जीवेश्वरयोरंशांशिभावे प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवस्येश्वरविपरीतधर्मत्वम्। किं पुनर्जीवस्येश्वरसमानधर्मत्वं नास्त्येव? न नास्त्येव। विद्यमानमपि तत् तिरोहितमविद्यादिव्यवधानात्। तत्पुनस्तिरोहितं सत् परमेश्वरमभिध्यायतो ... ईश्वरप्रसादात् बन्धविपर्ययौ भवतः, न स्वभावत एव सर्वेषां जन्तूनाम् (S. BSB. iii 2 5)

To say that the Jīva's attributes are contrary to the Lord's is to admit that their attributes *are not equal* (for whatever reason). In the circumstances, there is no possibility at all of any doubt arising as to why the Jīvātman himself cannot be accepted as the creator of real objects in the dream by his own powers—like the Lord Himself. *If it should still arise, the answer should be forthright and in the negative that the Jīva's attributes are not the same or equal to the Lord's and that, therefore, there is no possibility of the dream-creation being real.* Instead of such a straight answer to the question it is very tortuous to be treated by S. to a theoretical admission of equality of their attributes, followed by a question as to why this equality is not now in evidence and in full play and answering it by saying that it lies concealed by Avidyā and will be made manifest only by prolonged meditation on the Lord. If it is true that the Jīva has equality of attributes with the Lord nothing can stand in the way of his creations in the dream being real. Even conceding that his equality of attributes with the Lord is obscured in the waking state, it may as well be manifested in the dream-state—just as his blissful nature which is dormant in the waking state becomes manifest in Suṣupti. If his power and knowledge are manifested *only thro' meditation on B. even manifestation of the bliss of the Suṣupti state may have to be subjected to the same condition.*

The talk of equality of attributes between Jīva and Īśvara is itself unsustainable. If we are to understand by "Jīva" and "Īśvara" the sentient beings qualified by 'Avidyā' and 'Māyā' respectively the claim of equality of attributes between them will stand barred by Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa. If it is pure consciousness only remotely and temporarily qualified by those attributes, both being essentially attributeless, it makes *no sense to talk of the equality of their attributes (samānadharmatva)*[50a] Moreover, as disparity of attributes between Jīva and Īśvara *qua* duly qualified beings has been made the basis of controverting the possibility of dream creations being real, it may be admissible in a way to try to establish equality of attributes between two such (qualified) beings. But it will not help in any way to try to establish equality of attributes between them in their rarefied form as pure consciousness remotely connected with such attributes.

If "Para" in "Parābhidhyāna" should refer to pure consciousness (*cinmātram*), its awareness being implicit in the Jīva as a self-luminous being, there will be no point in the Sūtrakāra making the attainment of release from bondage depend on Parābhidhyāna. On the other hand, if it should denote a being duly qualified by the attributes of

50 (a). यद्यविद्यामायोपलक्षितचेतनौ, तदापि निर्धर्मकत्वेन समानधर्मत्वसाधनं सुतरामगमनम् (*STC.* p. 261)

omniscience, unlimited power etc, as the knowledge of such a qualified being can only be regarded as *mithyājñāna* (false knowledge) in strict Advaita theory, it can hardly help in bringing about the Jīvātman's release from bondage While some sort of Gauṇamukti may be possible thro' the grace of such an Isvara, the manifestation of the true nature of the Jīva hidden by *beginningless Avidyā* will certainly be beyond the reach of such secondary release and the Sūtrakāra's statement *Tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau will be belied*

The Sūtra 'Parābhidhyānāt * * * makes two distinctive statements (i) the covering (of the Jivasvarūpa) is on account of Parābhidhyāna and (ii) that bondage and release are due to 'it' (*tatah*) The natural antecedent of 'it' will be 'Parābhidhyāna' This places S completely at a disadvantage in respect of the Sūtrakāra's stand, as it follows from assertion '*Parābhidhyānāt tirohitam*' that the covering of Jīvasvarūpa and bondage *are both due* to Parābhidhyāna This renders S's interpretation of Parābhidhyāna, as "meditation on the Lord", *incongruous,* so far as the first proposition is concerned, for it will be preposterous to hold that the *obscuration of Jīvasvarūpa* (or Jiva's equality of attributes with the Lord) *is due to meditation on the Lord! S is, therefore, forced to reverse the natural and the given order of syntactical relation between*—(i) *Parābhidhyāna* and (ii) '*tirohitam*' as it stands in the Sūtra To maintain his reverse order of syntactic relation between 'Parābhidhyāna' and 'tirohitam', he has to *interpolate 'Samānadharmatvam'* after '*tirohitam*' and '*āvirbhavati*' after *Parābhidhyānāt* the whole proposition emerging as तिरोहित (समानधर्मत्व) पराभिध्यानात् (आविर्भवति) (S *BSB*) "The equality of attributes which is hidden (in Samsāra) by Avidyā becomes manifest by meditation on the Lord"

But this way of interpreting the Sautra proposition *Parābhidhyānāt tirohitam* takes a liberty with the order of the words and has to resort to importation of other words (*adhyāhāra*) such as 'Avidyayā, before 'tirohitam' and *Samānadharmatvam* and *āvirbhavati* to be connected with 'Parābhidhyānāt' neither of which is permissible *where on can do without them.* It is in this respect that R. and M have the vantage over S., for they are in a position to adhere to the actually given order of the words *Parābhidhyānāt tirohitam* tho' differing in their views regarding the theme of the Sūtra

Prof Ranade has tried to put forward a novel interpretation of this Sutra which is at variance with those of all the three principal commentators in one respect or another He is under a strange delusion that 'Śamkara understands by the word Para (here) the objective world and

says that the nature of the individual soul is hidden on account of contemplation of the objective world" (*Op. cit.* p. 33). *S. has done nothing of the kind.* It is because he understands the term Para here in the sense of the Supreme Lord that he resorts to *anvaya* in the reverse order between *'Parābhidhyānam'* and *'tirohitam'* and resorts to *adhyāhāra* in establishing that bondage is due to Avidyā and release to 'Parābhidhyāna'. However, Ranade finds a 'clue' to what he imagines to be the correct interpretation of the present Sūtra, in the preceding one *Sūcakaśca hi* * * * which refers to the prophetic quality of dreams. He answers his own question—"how is the prophetic quality of dreams to be accounted for" by saying that "it is on account of the right meditation on the highest (*Parābhidhyāna*)". Proceeding further, he writes, "In fact, *we split the Sūtra* iii.2.5 into two Sūtras (i) *Parābhidhyānāt tu* and (ii) *Tirohitam* etc. It is by the meditation on the true nature of God that the soul reaches reality. And to the extent to which the soul shares in this divine contemplation to that extent *the dreams turn out real*" (p. 33-34).

This interpretation that our dreams turn out to be real by contemplation of the highest is far-fetched and unsustainable. *For, there is surely no 'meditation' on the Highest in the dream state for any of us in our dreams*! The Taijasa self experiences only the mental states dependently on the predispositions left by the (unreal) waking experiences, according to authorities like Gauḍapāda.[50] Stretching Prof. Ranade's argument to the released state, it may be conceded that there is real contemplation of the Highest in that state (Cf. *Asmin asya ca tadyogam śāsti* B.S. i.1.19). But curiously enough, the Sūtrakāra denies to the released soul, which must be in constant contemplation of the Highest, any right of creation: *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* (iv.4.17)! Dr. Radhakrishnan says here "So long as the soul is subject to ignorance, it cannot create anything real" (*The Brahmasutra*, p. 446). Would it not follow from this that as God is not subject to ignorance, His creations are real and that therefore the Soul's bondage and release at the hands of God are both of them realities in the system of Bādarāyaṇa?

The last Sūtra *Dehayogād vā so'pi* explains, according to S., why the Soul's knowledge and lordship should come to be hidden in Samsāra, if it were really a part (*svarūpāmśa*) of B.; for, in that case we should expect these attributes to be fully manifested like the light and the heat of a spark of fire.[51]

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50. असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः (*G K.* iv.39)
51. कस्मात्पुनर्जीवः परमात्मांश एव सन्तिरस्कृतज्ञानैश्वर्यो भवति? युक्त तु ज्ञानैश्वर्ययोरतिरस्कृतत्व विस्फुलिगस्येव दहनप्रकाशनयोरिति (S. *BSB.* iii 2 6)

The concealment, we are told, is due to its connection with the body (*dehayagād*) the mind, buddhi, sense-objects and sensations[52]

But an inquiry into the *reasons* for the concealment of the Jīva's powers *serves no useful pupose at this stage,* when we have been told categorically that the dream-creations are *not real.* The explanation offered by S is, however, unsustainable on its merits For, as the Jīva is an *āmsa* of B it is not possible to conceive of his being forced into association with the body etc, even as the brightness of the lamp cannot be forced into accommodating darkness within its bosom Such contact thro' the medium of Upādhis is also out of the question in the case of the self which is intrinsically 'Asanga' (unattached to everything) His illustration that heat and the light of fire lie hidden as long as the fire is hidden in the wood from which it is produced is not to the point[53] Fire is a finite substance and it can lie hidden in the wood. But the self which is pure consciousness unlimited cannot be obscured by ignorance To the question why the Jīva's lordly powers come to be hidden or suppressed, the relevant answer would be "on account of his connection with the body (*dehayogād*) The information given in terms of *Parābhidhyānāttu tirohitam tatohyasya bandhaviparyayau* is, therefore, *not to the point* It is not also wholly true that it is the contact with the body mind and senses that is ultimately responsible for what stands in the way of the manifestation of the soul's true nature If it were so, it should be possible for the soul to regain its full nature in the state of Suṣupti or Pralaya itself, where the bodily contact is not felt or is absent That is why R tries to improve on S's interpretation by utilizing '*vā*' for the purpose If it is to be suggested that this expression Deha*yoga* should be understood in an extended sense meaning association with Avidyā, Kāma, Karma, etc, we are bound to ask and wonder why the Sūtrakāra should not have explicitly referred to Avidyāyoga etc,[54] instead of committing an error of judgment thro' understatement (*nyūnokti*)

There is difficulty for S in giving a correct antecedent in Sūtra 5 for the relative pronoun *Sah* in Sūtra 6 It cannot be '*tirohitam*' which he has taken as the predicate of *samānadharmatvam* And there is no masculine noun in Sūtra 5 to which the *Sah* in Sūtra 6 can automatically refer As 'Dehayoga' itself is the outcome and *not the root cause*

52 सतोऽपि तु ज्ञानैश्वर्यतिरोभावो देहयोगात् देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनादियोगात् (S BSB iii 2 6)

53 अग्नि दृष्टान्त—यथाग्नेर्दहनप्रकाशनसम्पन्नस्यापि अरणिगतस्य दहनप्रकाशने तिरोहिते यथा वा भस्मच्छन्नस्य (S *BSB* iii 2 6)

54 देहयोगस्य निरोधहेतुत्वे तदा मुक्तिरस्याधिकार स्यात्। अविद्याद्युपाध्यागमनादिति चेत्, तथ तर्थैव किं नोक्तमित्यास्तां विस्तरः (*NS* p 493)

of *bondage*, the inadequacy of interpretation of Sūtra 6 cannot be remedied

As the intended sense is fully conveyed by 'Dehayogāt' the rest of the words (*vā so'pi*) become superfluous in S's interpretation His explanation that the 'or' (*vā*) in the Sūtra is to reject the notion of difference between Jīva and Īśvara,[55] takes away all the seriousness and force of the Sūtrakāra's effort to establish in the Siddhānta Sūtra that the creator of dreams referred to in the Śruti is *not Īśvara,* lest the dream creations should become real creations, but only the Jivātman and strikes at the root of consistency of thought and interpretation *even within an adhikaraṇa* The reading *Dehayogād vāsah,* instead, adopted by M has none of these difficulties and places the Sūtra in an altogether different perspective

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R prefaces the *Sandhyādhikaranam* (iii 2 1-6) saying that after having shown in the previous Pāda how the Jīva in the waking state suffers affliction in accordance with his deeds in having to go up and down the different worlds and taking birth, the inquiry now opens into the condition of the dream state[56] The problem for R here is whether the individual soul or God is the creator of dreams and not whether the said creation is real or unreal, as for S, Bhāskara and M

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that dreams are the creations of Jivātman, as it is *he* that has been referred to in the Śruti *Brh Up* iv 3 10, as the author (*kartā*) of his dreams And we know that the Jīva is capable of realizing his wishes (*satyasankalpa*) from his description as such in *Chān Up.* viii 7 1

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is the Jīva who is in a state of sin owing to endless chain of karma has his essential nature as Satyasankalpa hidden in the transmigratory state owing to the will of God, which is responsible for his bondage and release Dreams are thus the wonderful creation of God and not of the Jīvātman

Criticism

After depicting the sufferings of Jīvas in their peregrinations in the various worlds and thus awakening the spirit of Vairāgya in the

55 वा शब्दो जीवेश्वरयोरन्यत्वाशवाव्यावृत्यर्थं (S *BSB* iii 2 6)

56 कर्मानुरूपगमनागमनजन्मादियोगेन जीवस्य दु खित्व ख्यापितम । इदानीमस्य स्वप्नावस्था परीक्ष्यते। तत्र संशय * * * किं युक्तम ? सृष्टिर्जीवेनेति (*Sribhasya* iii.2 1)

aspirant, in the preceding Pāda, it would be proper here to go to the next step in God-realization viz., Bhakti An inquiry into the dream state has no relevance at this stage, unless it is shown to be thematically connected with Bhakti

It cannot be argued on R.'s behalf that as the inquiry into the dream state and the establishment of God as the author of that wonderful creation will highlight His majesty, it will give rise to the desire to meditate on Him as the giver of all fruits[57] For, as creations of God, there is no difference in R.'s view between the world of dreams and the waking one This will be clear from the way in which R. has explained the term *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* without attempting to show that dream objects are purely internal and are therefore not manifested in all the fulness of their natures as in the case of objects of the waking world Of course, he has argued that there is this difference between dream objects and those of the waking world that the former are restricted to the perception of the dreamer and are not open to others' perception and are terminated then and there So they constitute a distinctive and wonderful phenomenon and thus deserve special attention *Hence the inquiry into dreams*[58]

But this is not a satisfactory explanation. For, our experiences of pleasure and pain also partake of this exclusiveness and privacy For the same reason then, we should expect them also to be treated in this Pāda But they have not been One will have, therefore, to go beyond these considerations and justify the inquiry into dreams on the ground that as they are tainted by the suspicion of unreality in the estimation of the common folk and as it seems absurd to speak of the factual creation of objects therein or attribute such creations to God, the question deserves to be gone into But then such a basis for opening the adhikarana here will be open to R only if his Pūrvapakṣa is based on the unreality of dreams But we have seen that he has based it on a different gound that their author is the individual soul

Consistent with his Siddhānta view in iii 2 3 that dreams are a wonderful creation (*māyāmātram*), the doubt ought to have been couched by R. in the following terms whether dreams are a wonderful creation or not If the Sūtrakāra had intended to raise a Pūrva-

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57 [illegible] (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 1) But meditation needs Bhakti to feed it.

58 Even this is far below the level of that absorbing sense of Bhakti for the Lord as Sarvāvasthāpreraka etc., which the investigation of the different states of the Jīvā and other topics of the entire second Pāda is intended to inspire in M.'s way of interpreting it

pakṣa as envisaged by R, he would certainly have worded it and the Siddhānta-Sūtra in accordance with the requirements of the case But the first Sūtra, as it stands worded, makes no mention of the Jīvātman Nor is there any direct reference to God in Sūtra 3 (*Siddhānta*) As a matter of fact, R is obliged to supply the word "Jīva" as the predicate in the Pūrvapakṣasūtra *Sandhye sṛṣṭir āha hi* (*Jivena*) Consistent with this, we should expect the Siddhānta Sūtra too be worded *explicitly in terms of Īśvara's creatorship* But it is *not*

The Pūrvapakṣa raised by R is open to question It has to be clarified if it is made by holding the Jīva to be the creator of the dream objects independently of God or by freely conceding his dependence In the former case, there will be conflict with the Sūtra *Hitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktih* (ii 2 21) Even if this Sūtra is interpreted differently, it is a matter of common knowledge that the Jīvātman is much more helpless and dependent in the dream state than in the waking Hence, the possibility of his being a creator, independently of God, in *that state* is decidedly remote In the latter case, it cannot be denied that the Jīva's creatorship in dreams is exercised under the control of God Himself Where then is the point in raising a Pūrvapaksa making the Jīva the creator of his dreams as if he were exclusively and independently their creator? It is difficult to believe that the individual soul out of his own free will, will create in his dreams things like a monkey or a man with black teeth which bode ill and get himself terrorized ! The Pūrvapaksa making the Jīva the creator of his dreams has thus no force A Pūrvapaksa that stigmatizes dreams as unreal would be more to the point by placing them outside the range of Divine control By establishing their reality they can be brought under Divine control like every other state of man That will underline the majesty of God and give a fillip to Bhakti R's reference to the *Katha. Up* (ii 2 8) passage *Ya eṣa suptesu jāgarti* * * * in support of the Pūrvapakṣa is also unsustainable, as that very text draws a clear distinction between the One (God) who remains wakeful while the creatures are asleep That would stifle the Pūrvapakṣa before it is born

Another ground of Pūrvapakṣa according to R is the soul's *satyasamkalpatva* or being endowed with the capacity to realize his wishes This is not a sufficient reason. *Nor has it been embodied in the Sūtra* Even an ordinary potmaker is able to create things without being a Satyasankalpa It cannot be argued that satyasankalpatva has been brought up in support of the Pūrvapakṣa in order to maintain the fact that things are created by the Jīva in his dreams without the need of accessories[59] The presumption itself is incorrect that there is any ab-

59 जीवस्य च सत्यसकल्पत्व प्रजापतिवाक्ये श्रुतम । अत उपकरणाद्यभावेऽपि सृष्टिरुपपद्यते (*Sribhāṣya* iii.2.2)

sence of accessories in the dream creations We have seen that Vāsanās provide the necessary accessories The mere fact of Satyasamkalpatva will not, therefore, be able to contain the objection based on absence of accessories in respect of the creation of things Even B notwithstanding its Satyasankalpatva, makes use of Prakrti (acit) in its creative activities The denial of creatorship of dreams to Jiva in the Siddhānta on the ground of absence of Satyasankalpatva is not, therefore, sustainable

R renders the term *māyamātram* as "being of wonderful essence" (*āscaryarūpam*)[60] Because dream creation is a wonderful phenomenon not perceived by any other person but the draming one and ceasing to be then and there, it cannot be the work of the individual soul Such a creation is possible only for the Supreme B which has the capacity to realize its wishes unthwarted[61] Tho' a Satyasankalpa, ultimately, the Jivātman's Satyasankalpatva lies obscured in the state of Samsāra by the will of God Hence his incapacity to produce wonderful creations such as those seen in dreams[62] Such in brief is R's interpretation of Sūtra iii, 2, 3

The interpretation is very circuitous and not very much to the point. *There is a cumbrous importation (adhyāhāra) of whole sentences to make good the ellipses of the missing predicate*

स्वाप्नमर्थजातं [न जीवसृष्टम्, किन्तु] मायामात्रं आश्चर्यरूपम् [एवंविधाश्चर्यरूपा सृष्टिः सत्यसंकल्पस्य परमपुरुषस्यैव युज्यते, न जीवस्य । तस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वादियुक्तस्यापि संसारदशायां] कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ।

The clauses and sentences in brackets have to be supplied to complete the sense of the propositions as R would have it Such an excessive amount of adhyāhāras is a defect in interpretation. The *real predicate in R's interpretation of Sūtra 3, is "īsvarasrṣṭam'*[63]—the subject being dream objects What the Sūtra predicates is that dream objects are the creations of God Himself This sense has got to—*be extracted* with much beating about the bush. In the first place *māyāmātram* cannot be construed or translated as—created by God' Such is not its literal sense R himself translates it as "what is of wonderful nature" (*āscaryarūpam*) The transition of thought from what is wonderful to what must be deemed to be wholly the creation of God, in R.'s inter-

60 मायामात्रं परमपुरुषसृष्टमित्यर्थः । मायाशब्दो ह्याश्चर्यवाची (Op cit iii.2.3)

61 [illegible] । एवंविधाश्चर्यरूपा सृष्टिः सत्यसंकल्पस्य परमपुरुषस्यैव युज्यते न जीवस्य (Op cit iii.2.3)

62 तस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वादियुक्तस्यापि संसारदशायां कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् न जीवस्य तथाविधाश्चर्यसृष्टि- [illegible] (ibid)

63 स्वाप्नमर्थजातं मायामात्रं परमपुरुषसृष्टमित्यर्थः (Op cit iii.2.3)

pretation, is fairly roundabout—viz. that as such a wonderful creation can be brought about only by God, He alone must be accepted as the Creator of dreams and not the Jīva. All this is due to starting the Pūrvapakṣa with the idea of Jīva's creatorship. It cannot be argued that instead of a bare predicate, we have in the Sūtra a significant predicate (*hetugarbha*) which embodies the reason why the Jīva cannot be the creator of dream objects and why they should be treated as God-made. The argument that because the experiences of the dream state are wonderful and personal they could not be created by any save God is liable to the defect of over-pervasion of the reason in cases where the Jīva himself happens to be the author of his own thoughts, desires, efforts and so on which are also strictly private and of a wonderful nature and short-lived.

If *māyāmātram* is to be explained in the way R. has done it, the (other) reason given in the Sūtra: *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* will become *redundant.* The latter means, according to R., "as the Jivatman's true nature (*svabhāva*) as one who is able to realize his wishes is not fully manifested (*anabhivyakta*) in Samsāra". This furnishes the precise reason why the individual self cannot be accepted as the creator of the dream objects. *Where then is the need for another reason to support the same conclusion?* We may remember that *māyāmātram* has been treated as the predicate with an in-built reason (*hetugarbha*) so to say.

It cannot be held that the first term *māyāmātram* establishes directly that God is the creator of the dreams while the second term (*kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt*) does so *indirectly* by showing *why* the Jīva is not and cannot be their creator and that in this way neither of the two terms is redundant. Such an explanation would violate established principles of interpretation. A phrase like *kārtsnyena anabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt* which carries the distinct mark of a reason (in the form of an ablative case termination) cannot be relegated to the position of an *indirect reason* and a phrase like *māyāmātram* which has *no ablative termination at all* to indicate that it is intended to be taken as a reason cannot be given the place of honor as the *direct reason.* That would be strange and a devious way of interpretation.[64]

All this will suffice to show that the problem before the Sutrakara was not so much whether the Jīva is the creator of his dreams as whe-

64 मायामात्रत्वमीश्वरसृष्टत्वे साक्षात् हेतुः। कार्त्स्न्येन इति पञ्चम्यन्तं तु जीवकर्तृत्वाभावसाधनद्वारा न साक्षादित्युभयार्थवत्त्वमिति चेन्न। हेतुत्वव्यापकपञ्चमीवतः पारम्पर्येण हेतुसमर्पकत्वं, तद्रहितस्य साक्षादेवेति व्याख्यानकौशलमायुष्मताम्! (*STC.* p. 237)

ther the experiences of the dream and the objects presented there are purely fictitious and unreal or whether they are real (and *therefore* dependent on God) The Sūtra Sūcakaśca hı * * * followıng Māyāmātram * * * augments the realıty of dreams R shıfts thıs Sūtra to the taıl end of the *adhı* and reads 'Parābhıdhyānāt * * * as the fourth Sūtra, Thıbaut and Ghate are ınclıned to thınk that thıs connects Parābhıdhyānāt * * * * wıth Māyāmātram * * * more naturally and logıcally than ıs possıble ın S 's ınterpretatıon *But thıs assumes that all the sıx Sūtras do form one adhı We are not bound to accept thıs* It ıs not unnatural to expect the Sūtrakāra who raıses the questıon of the *creatıon* of dreams to go ınto the questıon of who *termınates* them, ın a separate adhı Moreover, there ıs hardly any possıbılıty of a doubt arısıng as to *why* the Jīva's abılıty to realıze hıs wıshes ıs *not* manıfested ın Samsāra, when ıt has been made clear ın Sūtra 3, that he cannot be the Creator of hıs dreams because hıs true nature as Satyasankalpa ıs not fully manıfested ın Samsāra Hence, the logıcal connectıon between Sūtras 3 and 4 as R wıshes to have ıt ıs rather remote and tenuous On the contrary, ıt would be ımperatıve to remove the stıgma of unrealıty (*māyāmātratvam*) attached to dreams once for all and confırm theır realıty wıth a clınchıng argument If Sūtra 4 seeks to pınpoınt the reason for the non-manıfestatıon of the Soul's true nature ın Samsāra, the answer beıng complete wıth *Parābhīdhyānattu tırohıtam tatohyasya bandhah*, the further reference to Mokṣa (*vıparyaya*) will be superfluous All thıs poınts to the fact that such ıs not the true purpose of the Sūtra

The last Sūtra has been understood by R. as explaınıng *the manner of obscuratıon* of the Soul's true nature ın Samsāra as takıng place (1) eıther thro' ıts assocıatıon wıth the gross physıcal body and ıts organs ın the transmıgratory career or (ıı) thro' ıts connectıon wıth the power of Matter ın ıts undıvıded subtle form ın the state of dıssolutıon The alternatıves are to be understood wıth specıfıc reference to theır own tıme and place[65]

But there ıs lıttle proprıety ın goıng ınto the *manner* of the soul's obscuratıon, when more ımportant ıssues remaın to be consıdered. Apart from that, the explanatıon of "vā" as markıng off the dıvergent scope of the alteratıves named ıs not sustaınable For the Jīvātman contınues to be assocıated wıth a body (dehayoga) ın both states of

65 तिरोधानप्रकारमाह– देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि तिरोधानमस्य देहयोगात् भवति । वाशब्दो विकल्पार्थः । व्यवस्थितश्च विकल्पः । देवमनुष्यादिरूपकार्यावस्थापन्नाचिद्योगात् सृष्टिवेलायां नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नाचिद्योगेन प्रलयवेलायां (*Vedāntadīpa* III.2.5)

creation and dissolution—with the "*lingadeha*" in Pralaya.[66] The supposition that such is the subject matter of this Sūtra is itself due to a wrong way of splitting its wording 'vāsaḥ' into 'vā' and 'saḥ'. If, as R. holds, the Sūtrakāra is here concerned with elucidating the *manner* of obscuration of the Soul's true nature in Samsāra, he would not have failed to use the grammatically correct and commensurate expression *dehayogena* in lieu of Dehayogāt,[67] to convey the idea and follow it up with the neuter form *tad* (api) in agreement with the neuter form '*tirohitam*' in the preceding Sūtra.[68] That he has *not* done so, leaves the door open to adopting the other way of Padaccheda (Dehayogād vāsaḥ api) and a different theme for the Sūtra.

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66 सृष्टिप्रलययो. देहसद्भावेन व्यवस्थितविकल्पव्याख्यानस्यायुक्तत्वात् (*STC.* p. 274)

67. प्रकार निरूपणपरत्वे तृतीयाया एव सगतत्वेन पचम्या अयोगात् (*ibid*)

68 तिरोहितमिति पूर्वसूत्रानुसारात् नपुसकतच्छब्दस्यैव युक्तत्वेन पुन्लिमतच्छब्दस्य त्वदीयपदविभागेऽयोगात् (*ibid*)

CHAPTER V

JIVA RESTS IN SUṢUPTI IN BRAHMAN PRESENT IN SUṢUMNĀNĀDI

4 *Tadabhāvādhikaraṇam* (iii 2 7)

With a view to fostering Bhakti as the indispensable means of Mokṣa, this *adhi* establishes the majesty of B in terms of Its being attained by the Jīvas[1] in their dreamless sleep[2] Thus state of Suṣupti has been referred to by the term 'Tadabhāva' in the Sūtra as both the dream life and the waking one stand obliterated there for the time This significant negative way of referring to Suṣupti brings into relief the important fact about Suṣupti that in that condition, notwithstanding the obscuration by Bhāvarūpājñāna and the complete suspension of activities of the internal and the external sense organs, the Jīvātman is in a position to enjoy part of his own essential blissful nature with his intuitive self-consciousness[4] This he is able to do by virtue of his association with the Lord's Prājña-Form in Suṣupti[5]

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1 [illegible] (TDP)

2 [illegible] (TP iii 2 7)

3 [illegible] (TDP)

4 [illegible] (TDP iii 2 7)

5 Thus holds true of Sattvika Jivas only The rest enjoy bliss *generated* by the presence of the Prājna Form of the Lord in Suṣupti The Tāmasa Jīvas mistake this for 'essential bliss' in keeping with their tainted nature The *STC*, explains that tho' the mind as the internal organ is at rest in Suṣupti it derives the power to act as the material cause in producing *such* bliss by virtue of the proximity of the Prājna form. Such bliss is then experienced by the Sākṣi of the Tāmasa-Jivas Read also J s C on M's *Ṣatprasna Up Bhāṣya* (iv)

It has been shown earlier that Time, nescience and other factors are all of them dependent on B[6] The souls' dependence on B in Susupti can also be made out by the force of "api" used in *Sūtra* 6 after '*Dehayogāt*' referring to the waking state In the circumstances, there is no possibility of any supervening doubt as to the Soul's dependence on B in the state of Susupti The only possible doubt that can, therefore, arise in connection with the state of Susupti is whether the Jīvatman goes to sleep in that state, straight into B or in the arteries (*nāḍis*)[7] This is because there is support for both the views in different passages of the *Chān Up* —

(i) "There, the Jīva, asleep in B and ceasing from all sensory activity, and being in the enjoyment of intrinsic bliss fails to see dream objects and objects of waking life and reaches the *Suṣumnānāḍi*[8] (viii 6 3)

(ii) In deep sleep the self is united with the Sat (Paramātman)— (*Chān Up*. vi.8 1)

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that the Jīva goes to sleep only in the Supreme B and not in the *nāḍi* For susupti is a state of unalloyed bliss and the Jīva would be liable to suffering if he were to rest elsewhere than in B as he does in the dream state or in the waking state[9] The evidence of the recollection of the happy repose of sleep immediately on waking attests the fact that the Jīva experiences nothing but pure bliss in Susupti This recollection presupposes an actual and direct experience of bliss in Susupti For one cannot recollect what one has not experienced[10] It cannot be explained away as a recollection of mere absence of sorrow[11] For there is no reason to reject the *a priori* evidence of our judgment that it is a positive experience of bliss and try

6 Vide the Siddhantayuktis in connection with *adhi.s* 2 and 3 *ante*

7 सुप्तिर्विषय । भगवदधीनत्वे विवादाभावात् किं परमात्मनि नाडीषु वेति सन्देह (*TP* iii 2 7)

8 According to some commentators the plural *nadiṣu* in the Upaniṣadic text is collectively used with reference to the many individuals in question. Ragh. (*TPB*) says that according to others the plural refers to the five shoots of the *Suṣumnanadi* viz *Vajrika arya prakasini*, *Vaidyuta* and *Brahmanaḍī* referred to in M's *Tantrasara* (iv 63)

9 परमात्मन्येव सुप्तिर्न नाडीष्विति पूर्व पक्ष । परमात्मनोऽन्यत्रावस्थाने सुप्तस्य दु खित्वप्रसङ्गात् जाग्रत्स्वप्नादरिव (*TP* iii 2 7)

The STC develops with great skill, the adhikarana Purvapakṣa from four different angles of giving preference to a single alternative, recognizing both optionally or coordinating them or leaving the question open and refutes each with cogent arguments. For details see *STC* iii.2.7, pp 279-84

10 न च मुक्तवत् सुप्तस्य दु खमस्ति । तदा सुखमात्रानुभवात । न च तत्र प्रमाणाभाव सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्युत्तरकालानस्मृते । न ह्यननुभूत स्मयते (*TP* iii 2 7)

11 न च साम्यम्–दु खाभाव स्मयते, न सुखमिति (*TP*)

to explain it away as a recollection of the experience of mere absence of sorrow.[12]

We cannot also dismiss this recollective judgment as a pure inference to the effect that in Suṣupti there is only an absence of all sorrow.[13] For, the inference itself cannot operate unless the state of Suṣupti itself is remembered as the subject of the predication to be made of it thro' inference This remembrance of the state of Suṣupti will have to go back upon a direct experience of it and that experience as such will be sufficient to belie the contention that there has been no positive experience of pure bliss therein but only of an absence of sorrow [14] Even if the inference should operate by making the self implicated in Suṣupti the subject of the proposition, instead of the state of Suṣupti as such, the recollection of the state of Suṣupti will have to be given as a necessary *adjunct*[15] to the proposition.[16]

Thus in whatever manner or capacity the state of Suṣupti is brought in to sustain the inference, it would ultimately establish on *a priori* grounds that Suṣupti is a direct experience of pure bliss This will oblige us to conclude that in such a state as that the Jīvātman will have to go to sleep only in Paramātman and not in the nāḍis where there is possibility of undergoing pain and suffering This will naturally invalidate the other Śruti referring to the Jīva's going to sleep in the nāḍi(s) That would affect the validity of the other Śrutis emphasizing the need for Bhakti (the theme of the Pāda)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Jīva goes to sleep in the Suṣumnānāḍi This will not make him liable to pain and suffering as it is also accepted in the same breath that he goes to sleep in Paramātman The question as to how one can possibly go to sleep *in both* is answered by the Sūtrakāra by stating that what is meant thereby is that the Jīva finds sleep in the Paramāman who is present in the Suṣumnānāḍi This harmonizes both the statements made in the Śrutis quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa and upholds their equal validity [17]

12. तदनुभवाभ्युपगमे किमपराद्धं सुखेन ? (*TP*)
13 See f.n 11 (*TP* iii 2 7)
14 परामृष्टावस्थास्मरणाभावेन तदनुदयात् (*TP*)
15 आत्मधर्मीकारेऽपि प्रतिज्ञाविशेषणतया अवस्थास्मरणस्यावश्यंभावित्वात्
16. See न च देवदत्तमात्रधर्मीकारेणावस्थास्मरणाभावो न दोषायेति वाच्यम् । तथापि जाग्रदाद्यवस्थाविशिष्टस्य देवदत्तस्य दुःखवत्त्वेन तदभावसाधने बाधप्रसंगात् । सौषुप्तिकदुःखाभावसिद्ध्या अर्थान्तरत्वाच्च (*TP*)
17 सुप्तिर्जीवस्य नाडीषु भवति । न चैवं दुःखप्राप्तिः, परमात्मनि सुप्त्यङ्गीकारात् । नाडीस्थपरमात्मनि सुप्त्यङ्गीकारेणाभयपरत्वे । परमात्मन्येव किं न स्यात् सुप्तिः किं नाडीस्थविशेषणेनेति चेत् । उभयविधश्रुत्यनुसरणे । एवं गतिं तदुपपत्ते । न चैकस्योभयत्र सुप्तिर्विरुद्धा । एवं साम्यपरत्वनाशप्रसंगेन प्रमाणभूतश्रुतिद्वयव्यवस्थोपपत्तौ, तदनभ्युपगमे सर्वत्राप्यप्रामाण्यप्रसंग इति भाव (Raghu. *TPB*. iii 2 7) (*TP* iii 2 7)

It should be noted in this connection that the locatives *nāḍīṣu* and *ātmani* are not to be taken either as placed in direct apposition involving an identity relation or meant to be severally construed with the subject (*tadabhāvah*). The correct way of construing is to supply the expression *sthite* (in the locative) after *nāḍīṣu* and construing *nāḍiṣu sthite* in apposition with *ātmani*. The meaning of the Sūtra as a whole would thus be that the Jīvas have their Suṣupti (*tadabhāva*) in the Supreme B. (*ātmani*) who is present (*sthita*) in the *suṣumnānāḍi*.[18]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नाभावः सुप्तिः, नाडीस्थे परमात्मनि

(M. *BSB.* iii.2.7)

just as one would say that the necklace is *in the jewel case in the shop.*[19]

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18 अत्र सूत्रे न श्रुतपदार्थयोरेवाभेदेनान्वय , नापि प्रत्येकमन्वय. । किंतु, स्थित इति पदाध्याहारेण सामानाधिकरण्ये नान्वय: (*BD.* iii 2 7)

19 मन्दिरे मञ्जूषाया मणिमालेत्यत्रेवाधाराधेयभावो वाभिप्रेत इति सूचितम् (*BD.* ibid.)

CHAPTER VI

JIVA WAKES FROM SUṢUPTI ONLY THRO' BRAHMAN'S IMPULSION

5 *Prabodhādhikaraṇam* (iii 2 8)

This *adhi* reveals another aspect of Divine majesty—viz that it is Divine impulsion that brings about the awakening of the Jīvas from their Suṣupti It is already on record that God gathers the souls into Suṣupti in Himself and keeps them there It should be obvious from this that the Jīvas' coming out of that condition can hardly be due to any other agency Still, a doubt may arise for want of explicit testimony to the effect

It may perhaps be felt that 'waking from Suṣupti' is not something which can be placed outside the scope of one or the other of the three conditions of waking, dreaming or the withdrawal of dreams which have all been discussed earlier and shown to be due to the agency of God alone How then is this *adhi* relevant or justified?

The *STC* gives pertinent answer to this query Suṣupti is the Jīva's association with the special Form of the Lord known as Prājña present in the Suṣumnānāḍi Waking from Suṣupti is getting loosened from this association This has not been the point at issue in the earlier *adhi*s relating to Jāgrat, Svapna and Tirodhāna The presentation of conscious life, of dreams and their withdrawal are connected with the agency of particular forms of the Lord present in the tip of the right eye, in the mind etc[2] These forms have nothing to do with

1 [illegible] (TP iii 2 8)

2 Cf दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः ।
आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥ (Mānd Up i 2)

the dissociation of the Jīva from the Prājna-Form seated at the tip of pericarp of heart-lotus (*hradayākāśa*) which is the distinctive feature of the condition of waking from Suṣupti. As this has *not* been the subject matter of discourse earlier, there is full scope for the present adhi.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: Awakening of the sleeping Self is due to factors like the impact of disturbing sounds like the loud beating of drums. It cannot be that God also may be considered to be one of the agencies that brings about such awakening. For, we do not find awakening delayed where the other factors are present in spite of the absence of Divine agency. It would be cumbersome to admit Divine agency also where the other factors are sufficient to account for the awakening from sleep. It cannot be argued that the other factors are only secondary in the light of what has been established in the Jāgradadhi (iii.2.6) etc. For in respect of waking life there is express evidence of Divine agency being responsible for bringing it about. In view of such evidence, we are justified in rejecting the claims of Time, Nescience and other factors based on the grounds of their positive and negative concomitance in bringing about the waking state and dreams and dismissing the evidence of our perception based on such grounds as insufficient. But so far as awakening from sleep is concerned, no such conclusive evidence has yet been produced to show that it is brought about by Divine agency *alone*. In any case, even if Divine agency is to be admitted in awakening the Jīva from sleep in cases where the other factors are not at work, it cannot be deemed to be invariably so even where the other factors are effectively present.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is Divine agency that *everywhere* and *invariably* awakens the Jīvas from their Susupti. For, there is express evidence of the Śruti to that effect:

"The Lord alone awakens the Soul from deep sleep. From Him the soul rises. The Supreme is the giver of (waking) consciousness". (*Kauṇḍinya Śruti*).

This goes to show that our belief and the commonly accepted evidence of perception attributing such agency to the beating of drums, etc. is misplaced. Moreover, if awakening from deep sleep which consists in the loosening of the association with the Prājña Form of the Lord, as established by the Srutis, were to be brought about by factors other

than Divine agency then, by the same token, the association with the Prājña Form may also be deemed to be brought about by other factors But that is absolutely out of the question In the same way, the Jīva who has been gathered into His arms by the Supreme Being in deep sleep[3] *cannot also be disengaged from His arms without His will by any amount of effort or by other factors*[4] *A truly sublime conception indeed* The present Sūtra shows how the definition of B in 1 1 2 admits of further elucidation in these directions also[5]

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

Reading *'nāḍīṣu ca'*[6] instead of *'nāḍīṣu* ha' as in M, S and R interpret Sūtras 7 and 8 as constituting one *adhi* Sūtra 7 according to them teaches that the Jīvātman's Suṣupti takes place in the *nāḍis and in B* The passages cited as Viṣayavākyas are from the *Chān Up* (vii 6 3), *Bṛh. Up* (ii 1 17, ii 1 19, iv 3 21) and *Kauṣ Up* (iv 19) which mention the nāḍis, either in the heart and Prājña-Ātman (B) as the abodes where the sleeping soul finds rest

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as these different places are mentioned as serving the same purpose of being the places of rest, they are all of them to be accepted, as such, independently of one another and not as standing in some progressive relation among themselves leading to one final place of rest.[7] The Purvapakṣa takes its stand on the use of the *locatives, uniformly* in the various passages quoted, referring to the nāḍis, the Puritat and Sat (B)[8] and concludes that in the state of deep sleep, the Soul optionally finds rest in any one of the places mentioned in the Śrutis

Siddhānta

This is rejected in favor of the *Samuccaya-pakṣa* The Siddhānta holds that in Suṣupti the soul goes into B and into the *nāḍis together*

3 एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् (*Bṛh Up* iv 3 21)

4 ईश्वरस्य स्वातन्त्र्यनिरतिशयत्वात् साधनान्तरसहकृतानामपि तदिच्छामन्तरेण विनिवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात् (*STC* iii 2 8)

5 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 8)

6 The 'ca' is intended to support the 'Samuccayapakṣa

7 किमेतानि नाड्यादीनि परस्परनिरपेक्षाणि भिन्नानि सुषुप्तिस्थानानि आहोस्वित् परस्परापेक्षयैकं सुषुप्तिस्थानमिति । किं तावत् प्राप्तम्? भिन्नानीति (S *BSB* iii 2 7)

8 [illegible] सप्तमीनिर्देशस्य तुल्यत्वात् (S *BSB* iii 2 7)
[illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 2 7)

and not optionally into either For, the Śrutis describe all those places as places of deep sleep and these statements must be combined into a whole as the contrary view of option would entail the usual eight flaws in interpretation The mere fact of two or more things being given in the same case does not necessarily mean that they serve one and the same purpose and are coordinate and, therefore, alternatives and that we have to choose between them[9] We have examples of usage of the same case even where different things serving different purposes are to be combined in one sentence as in "He sleeps *in* (on) the couch in the palace"[10] By admitting that the Soul goes to B for rest thro' the nāḍis, the latter will be treated as the channel (*dvāra* or *karanam*) and not as the abode (like B)—thus setting aside the possibility of both serving the same purpose, independently The locative case "into the nāḍī" can also be taken to mean that when the Soul enters into B thro' the nāḍis, it is in a sense and at the time *in the nāḍīs* also, just as a person who descends to the ocean thro' the Gangā is also *in* the river[11]

Clarifying the nature of Samuccaya S tells us that strictly speaking the Jīva goes to sleep only in B and not in the perecardium or the nāḍis The passages about the nāḍis and the perecardium are merely laudatory[12] For tho' all the three appear to have been mentioned as mutually independent places of sleep, still no *ādhārādheyabhāva* (abode and abider) can be made out for the nāḍis or the perecardium with reference to the self It is not possible for the Soul to abide anywhere as it rests in its own glory—being non-different from B[13] The locative in *Nādisu supto bhavati* (*Chān Up* viii 6 3) is to be understood in the sense that they are the abode of the self's limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) such as the *antahkarana*.[14] The other statement that the Jiva abides *in* B in deep sleep is, however, to be understood in the sense of an identity-relation[15]

Thus, the nāḍis are but the conduits to B and only B is *the* place of rest[16] Moreover it will not be possible to account for the Soul's

9 नाडीष्वात्मनि चेति समुच्चयेनैतानि नाड्यादीनि स्वापायोपैति न विकल्पेनत्यथ (S *BSB* iii 2 7)

10 न ह्येकविभक्तिनिर्देशमात्रर्णैकार्यत्व विकल्पश्चापतति । नानार्थत्वसमुच्चययोरप्येकविभक्तिनिर्देशदर्शनात् प्रासादे शते पर्यंके शते इत्यवमादिषु (*ibid*)

11 नाडीद्वारापि ब्रह्मोपसपन सुप्त एव नाडीषु भवति । यो हि गगया सागर गच्छति गत एव स गगाया भवति (S *BSB* iii 2 7)

12 मार्गोपदेशोपयुक्ताना नाडीना स्तु यथमत्र नाडीसकीर्तनम (*Bhamati* iii 2 7)

13 न ह्युपाधिसब धमन्तरेण स्वत एव जीवस्याधार कश्चित सभवति । ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकेण स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठ वात (S *BSB* iii 2 7)

14 अपि च नाड्य पुरीतद्वा जीवस्योपाध्याधार एव भवति तत्रास्य करणानि वतन्त इति (S *BSB* iii 2 7)

15 ब्रह्माधारत्वमप्यस्य सुषुप्ते नैवाधाराधेयभेदाभिप्रायण किं तर्हि तादात्म्याभिप्रायण (*ibid*)

16 तत्रापि द्वारमात्र नाड्य पुरीतच्च । ब्रह्मैवत्वेकमनपायि सुषुप्तिस्थानम (*ibid*)

ceasing to have any (empirical) consciousness while he is in the nāḍis or the perecardium, as it would still continue to be in the realm and atmosphere of duality.[17] The Nāḍi-texts are also purposeless. For nothing is gained by knowing that the nāḍīs serve as a place of rest as it does not contribute to the realization of identity with B. or of the true nature of the Jīva as being entirely unconnected with the world of waking and dreams.[18] Hence, the correct position is that the self alone is the place of Suṣupti.[19]

S. thus makes it clear, in the end, that he is not keen on maintaining that the nāḍīs and the perecardium are to be looked upon as being equally the places of deep sleep. As the *Bhāmatī* sums up, the Samuccaya is not on the basis of their equal importance. Nor is any option conceded. What is accepted is coordination thro' subservience to an ultimate purpose.[20]

Criticism

The acceptance of Samuccaya-Pakṣa fails to highlight the Supreme majesty of B. as being present in the nāḍī during the Jīva's Suṣupti and as being so attained by him.[21] It is also susceptible to conferring equal status to the nāḍīs and B. as places of Suṣupti, like the one given to the Prayāja and other rites in the Darśapūrṇamāsa.

The syntactical juxtaposition between nāḍīṣu and ātmani in the text of the Sūtra is significant enough to suggest their being spontaneously construed in terms of: *Nāḍīṣu sthite ātmani* which is also hinted at by the reading *'ha'* after *ātmani* (as in M). If this is accepted, the unnecessary entanglements with the Samuccayapakṣa can easily be got rid of and a far better solution found.

The other reading *'Ca'* adopted by S. and others is far from helpful to them. For, Sanskrit grammar prescribes the use of the conjunctive *ca* in four different senses of *samuccaya, anvācaya, itaretara* and *samāhāra*. The jurisdiction of Samuccaya is governed by cases like

17. नाडीषु पुरीतति वा गतानस्य न किंचिद्विज्ञानं कारणं गमय विज्ञातुम्, भेदविषयत्वात् (*ibid*)

18. नहि नाडय सुषुप्तिस्थानं पुरीतच्चेत्यनेन विज्ञानेन किंचित् प्रयोजनम् ब्रह्म त्वपि सुषुप्तिस्थानमित्येतत्त प्रति-पादयाम तेन प्रयोजनमस्ति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वावधारणं स्वप्नजागरितव्यवहारविमुक्तत्वावधारणं च (*ibid*)

19. तस्मादात्मैव सुषुप्तिस्थानम् (S. *BSB.* iii 2 7)
न वयमिह तुल्यवन्नाड्यादिसमुच्चयं प्रतिपादयाम (*ibid*)

20. तस्मान्न समप्रधानभावेन समुच्चयो, नापि विकल्प इति (*Bhāmatī* ii 2 7-8)
It will be shown, in due course, that such a position is not consistent with the requirements of true Samuccaya.

21. नाड्यन्तर्यामित्वेनात्मत्वेन, न पुनः समुच्चयाशे नाड्यादिभि ब्रह्मण समप्राधान्यस्यावगत्या, अस्याभिन्नाया वैरूप्याभिन्नयोरसंग्रहात् (*STC.* iii 2 8)

Īśvaram gurum ca vandasva where one is at liberty to pay his respects to both the Guru and God simultaneously in any order that he chooses without being committed to observe any strict and inviolable order of precedence between them while doing so[22] But in S's and the others' Siddhānta, the reposing in the *nāḍīs*, the *purītat* and B is not placed on an equal footing and does not take place *without* observing a definite order of precedence[23]

The *Bhāmatī* explains the necessity for going into the present topic viz, whether the *nāḍīs* or B. is the true place of sleep as follows:

If the nāḍīs or the pericardium were to be the place of Susupti, it would mean that the Jīva will not be in a position to attain Brahmanhood even when his empirical misapprehensions (*viparītagrahaṇa*) cease to be, as in Suṣupti. This would lead to the position that even after the cessation of Avidyā, the realization of oneness with B will be dependent on some other cause or factor. It would then follow further that that other cause or factor is Karma (and not Jnāna) as may be held on the authority of texts like·

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः ।

(*Gītā* iii, 20)

On the other hand, if it is recognized that B alone is the real place of Suṣupti thro' the gateways of *nāḍīs* and *purītat,* then the cessation of wrong knowledge and misapprehension in terms of duality, in the state of Suṣupti, will have at least a modicum of practical bearing on the realization of Brahmanhood For, the Jīva is enabled to remain in B to the extent his false knowledge gets nipped off in Susupti But in so far as his Avidyā has not been destroyed root and branch for want of the dawn of real and true knowledge, the Jīva is forced to come out of the condition of Suṣupti and stumble again into the world of waking and dreams Hence the purposiveness of the present inquiry[24]

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22 अनियतक्रमयौगपद्यानां तुल्यबलानामनेकेषां साधनानामेकक्रियासंबन्ध समुच्चयो यथा ईश्वरं गुरुं च भजस्वेति

(*STC* iii 2 7, 8)

23 तत्र नाडीपुरीतद्ब्रह्मणां मध्ये नाडीप्रवेश प्राथमिक पुरीतत्प्रवेशो द्वितीय ततो ब्रह्मप्रवेश इति क्रमस्य नियतत्वात्, नाडीपुरीततो परंपरया सुप्त्याधारत्वेन, ब्रह्मण साक्षादेव तदाधारत्वेन तुल्यबलत्वाभावाच्च न समुच्चय संभवति

(*STC* iii 2 7, 8)

24 यदा नाड्यो वा, पुरीतद्वा, सुषुप्तस्थान तदा विपरीत ग्रहणनिवृत्तावपि न जीवस्य परमात्मभाव इति अविद्यानिवृत्तावपि जीवस्य परमात्मभावाय कारणान्तरमपेक्षितव्य, तच्च कर्मैव, न तु तत्त्वज्ञानम् । विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तिमात्रेण तस्याप्रयोगात् । विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्च विनापि तत्त्वज्ञान सुषुप्तावपि संभवात् ततश्च कर्मणैवापवर्गो न ज्ञानेन यथाहु 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिम्' इति । अथतु, परमात्मैव नाडीपुरीतत्सुप्तिद्वारा सुषुप्तिस्थान ततो विपरीतज्ञाननिवृत्तेरस्ति मात्रया परमात्मभाव उपयोग । तथा हि तावदेष जीव स्तदवस्थानो भवति केवलम् । तत्त्वज्ञानाभावेन समूलकाषमविद्याया अकाषात् जाग्रत्स्वप्नलक्षण जीवस्य व्युत्थान भवति तस्मात प्रयोजनवत्येषा विचारणा

(*Bhāmatī* iii 2 7-8)

But this is far from convincing The inadequacy of Karma to be the independent means of achieving Mokṣa deserves to be discussed as a major topic in the Sūtras

It cannot be raised and disposed of in this casual manner And there are separate *adhis* showing the inadequacy of karma as an independent means of attaining Mokṣa (*See* B S iii 1.7 and iii 3 48 49). There is no need then to link the inquiry into Suṣupti with the question of the role of karma in respect of Mokṣa

Secondly, granting that Suṣupti takes place in B alone, it does not follow that it consists in attaining 'Brahmabhāva' or identity with B For, the concept of Suṣupti in B is based on *ādhārādheyabhāva* between the two which is rooted in the difference between them. S's attempt to construe the locative in *Sati sampadya* (*Chān Up* vi.9.2) in terms of their identity-relation, instead,[25] is against all rules of language and grammar

तादात्म्ये सप्तम्या अननुशासनात् । औपश्लेषिकसामीपिकवैषयिकाभिव्यापकानामाधारोऽधिकरणमिति सूत्रे आधारशब्दार्थत्वेन व्याख्यातानां मध्ये तादात्म्यस्याप्रवेशाच्च ।

(*STC*, iii.2.8)

It is also opposed to the Sūtrakāra's clear verdict pronounced earlier in the Sūtra

सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन । (i.3.42)

The concept of *ādhāra* has been defined in terms of *upasleṣa, sāmīpya, viṣaya and abhivyāpti*. And *tādātmya or identity is not one of them* As S is for identity between Jīvātman and B in Suṣupti there can be no question of B being the *aupasleṣika-ādhāra* of Jīva in that state, as the mattress is for Devadatta For the same reason, the Sāmīpika type of *ādhāra* as in *Nadyām āste ghoṣah* ('the hamlet is on the Gaṅgā') is also out of the question, as nearness is a relation between *two things* The Jīvātman being *nirviṣaya*, by hypothesis, B cannot be regarded as its *vaiṣayika-ādhāra*[26] As Jīvātman is limited and B is unlimited, there

25 ब्रह्माधारत्वमप्यस्य सुषुप्ते नैवाधाराधेयभेदाभिप्रायेणोच्यते, कथं तर्हि, तादात्म्याभिप्रायेण यत आह सता सौम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति । स्वशब्देनात्माभिलप्यते, स्वरूपमापन्नः सुप्तो भवतीत्यर्थः

(S *BSB* iii 2 7)

26 न च सुषुप्तिदशायां [illegible] ब्रह्म औपश्लेषिक आधारः [illegible] । सुषुप्तिकाले तादात्म्याङ्गीकारेण [illegible] । अत एव न सामीपिक आधारः, भेदघटितमूर्तिमत्त्वात् । जीवस्य निर्विषयत्वेन न वैषयिकाधारः । [illegible] ब्रह्मणा व्यापकत्वेन जीवस्य [illegible] । [illegible] इति चेत्र । [illegible] जीव [illegible] । [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 8)

is no possibility of a coextensive relation between them as between oil and seed (*tileṣu tailam*) It will not help to understand by "Jīvā" pure consciousness For it is the empirical ego that is described as going to sleep in B in Suṣupti and not pure consciousness The latter being B itself is not the one seeking shelter—the *ādheya,* but the giver of shelter *(ādhāra).*

S 's Pūrvapakṣa also *in support of* the Vikalpa *view is not* sustainable Vikalpa is justified in the case of rice and barley as they are prescribed for the same purpose of making the sacrificial cake But the attainment of identity with B is not brought about by the Soul's resting in the *nāḍis* or the pericardium Hence, they cannot be regarded as alternatives[27] Sensing this difficulty, Vācaspati has tried to make out that they are alternatives in the sense that the locatives refer to the same act of the soul's resting in the different places independently of each other[28] This is beside the point For, from S 's point of view, only the attainment of Brahmabhāva by coming to rest in B can legitimately be regarded as the objective of Suṣupti From this point of view, the resting in other places than B is not the same as attaining the objective of Brahmabhāva They cannot, then, be entitled to be placed on a par with resting in B as alternatives The prescriptions of rice and barley are entitled to be regarded as alternatives only because they fulfil the same all-important purpose The affinity in respect of subsidiary purposes fulfilled by the soul's coming to rest in the other two places cannot, therefore, be made the basis of supporting the Vikalpapaksa Otherwise, one may go to the extent of saying that as there may be conceivable differences in the hardness, or softness of touch, color and composition of cakes made of rice and barley the two prescriptions *Vrihibhir yajeta* and *Yavair yajeta,* forefeit their right of being accepted as alternatives

S interprets the next Sūtra as follows

B is the only place of Susupti For that same reason, scriptural statements invariably teach that the awakening from sleep takes place from B in answer to the question—whence does the soul come back? (*Brh Up* ii 1 16) If the places of Susupti were different such as B the nadis and the pericardium, the Śrutis would have stated in reply that sometimes the soul awakes from the *nādis, sometimes from the pericardium* and sometimes from B"

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27 पूर्वपक्षोऽप्ययुक्त । तथाहि—युक्तो व्रीहियवादौ पुरोडाशनिर्वर्तनरूपप्रयोजनैकत्वात् विकल्प । ब्रह्मभावरूप-प्रयोजनस्य नाडीपुरीतदभ्यामनिर्वर्तनात् सोऽनुपपन्न (*STC* iii 2 8)

28 एव सप्तमीश्रुत्या वा आयतनश्रुत्या वैकनिलयनार्था परस्परानपेक्षा नाड्यादयो विकल्पमर्हन्ति—

(*Bhāmati* iii 2 8)

It would, however, be unsustainable from the point of view of Samuccaya accepted by S. that B. is the *only place of Suṣupti.* For Samuccaya, as has already been shown, will be committed to equality of status among the places of Suṣupti. Anyway, if the purpose of this Sūtra is merely to endorse the point that Suṣupti takes place only in B. that can as well be served by the words *Tacchruteḥ* in the preceding Sūtra itself (referring to the awakenıng also)—thus dispensing with the need for this additional Sūtra. If this Sūtra is to be retained, its subject matter must be something more than confirming what has been established in Sūtra 7. This purpose is fulfilled in M.'s interpretation where this Sūtra constitutes a fresh *adhi.* based on a fresh objection

CHAPTER VII

ALL STATES OF ALL JĪVAS DEPEND ON BRAHMAN FOR ALL TIME

6. *Karmānusmṛtyadhikaraṇam* (iii.2.9)

After having shown in the previous adhikaraṇas that every one of the Jiva's states of dreaming, waking and suṣupti is dependent on B., the Sūtrakāra passes on to the establishment of another equally important truth conducive to the growth of Bhakti towards that Supreme B. that this dependence of these states of the Jīvas on B. is true for all time and of all created beings. It is not confined to some states, at certain times or to some beings only.

The doubt arises on this point because it is possible that granting that these states of dreaming, waking and suṣupti of Jivas are dependent on God, it may not be true of all beings and for all time but for some time and of some beings only.[1] The Pūrvapakṣa is that what has been said about this dependence of these states on B. is true only in a limited sense, like the sovereignty of kings of different countries and times. The plea that as God transcends worldly standards of sovereignty, He can hold sway over these states of all created beings, for all time cannot be pressed too far. Otherwise, He may even dispense with the accessories of Time, nescience and others in creating the world. True, He can unite in Himself what appear to be contradictory attributes (as stated in the *Akṣarādhi.* (i,3,10-12); but there is not sufficient evidence on

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1 सन्ध्ये सृष्टिरित्यारभ्योक्ताः अवस्था किं कस्यचित् कदाचित् काश्चिदेव भगवदधीना. उत सर्वेषां सर्वदा सर्वा अपि । तदर्थं लोकोपमा आदर्तव्या उत न । तदर्थं निरवकाशप्रमाणानि सन्ति उत न सन्तीति सन्देह. (*STC.* iii.2.9)

the point at issue here that He controls all the states of all beings for all time

Siddhānta

This objection is met by the Sutra *Sa eva ca karmānusmṛtiśabda-vidhibhyaḥ*—which means God alone (sa eva) is the impeller of all the states of life for all beings for all time This rests on the authority of (i) Śrutis like *Eṣa hyeva sādhu karma kārayati*[2] (*Kaus. Up* iii 8) which carries an emphatic declaration (*avadhāraṇa*) that God alone causes (eṣa hyeva kārayati), whomsoever he chooses, to perform his actions righteously or otherwise, according to his deserts This includes the Jivas' going thro' the conditions of dreaming, waking and Suṣupti also as pointed out by J

एष ह्येवेति सर्वकर्मणा भगवदधीनत्वस्य श्रुतत्वात् स्वप्नादिप्राप्तेश्च तदन्तर्भावात् ।
(*TP* iii 2 9)

It is interesting to note that the *Bhāmati* fully agrees (with M) that the *Kauṣ Up* iii 8 proclaims that the Jivas are absolutely dependent on B in and for every one of their activities,

'एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति' इत्यादय श्रुतय सर्वव्यापारेषु जन्तूनामीश्वरतन्त्रतामाहु ।
(*Bhāmatī* ii 3 42)

We may also refer to a more pointedly worded Śruti in this connection

नर्ते त्वत्क्रियते किंचनारे । (*RV* x 112 9)

cited by M. elsewhere

(ii) This in its turn, is borne out by the Smṛti text conforming to the above Śruti (*anu-smṛti*)

प्रदर्शकस्तु सर्वेषां स्वप्नादेरेष एव तु ।
परम पुरुषो विष्णुस्ततोऽन्यो नास्ति कश्चन ॥

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2 Raghunatha Tirtha (*STC* iii 2 9) explains that according to M.'s interpretation the expression Karma" in this Sūtra refers to its occurrence in the *Kauṣ Up* containing the emphatic declaration that every one of the acts and conditions of all Jivas at all times and places are controlled by God This is understood thro crystallized Lakṣaṇa (*nirudhalakṣaṇā*) as in the case of terms like 'Vartraghnī', Vṛdhanvatī' and 'Praṇabhṛt which refer to respective Vedic texts which contain the distinctive characteristics justifying the appellations Vārtraghnī etc given to them.

and (iii) other Śrutis (śabda)[3] which give supporting reason for it and (iv) the injunctions in the Śrutis to meditate on the Supreme B. *only* as the abode and the light:

आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत। (*Bṛh. Up.* i.4.5)

The propriety of referring to this Śruti here is that if there should however be anyone else other than B. who enjoys the prerogative of controlling all the states of all the Jīvas for all time, our being called upon to meditate *exclusively on B.* will not be justifiable.

आत्मानमेवेति परमात्मन एवोपास्यत्वविधानाच्च। अन्यस्यापि प्रेरकस्य सद्भावेऽवधारणानुपपत्तेरिति भावः। (*TP.* iii.2.9)

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

According to S., R. and others, this *adhi.* discusses the question whether the same soul returns from B. after deep sleep or a different one. The *Kalpataru* explains the relation to the preceding *adhi.* thro' an *apavādasaṅgati* as well as an *ākṣepasaṅgati.* The first one may be set down as follows. It has been shown that the soul's destiny is complete attainment of B. which occurs in Mokṣa. But in the preceding *adhi.*, it was shown that there is attainment of B. in deep sleep also. As such attainment appears to be absolute, it will have to be conceded that the soul which wakes from Suṣupti must be different from the one which went into sleep. This *ākṣepa* is refuted in the present *adhi.* by bringing out the nature of the limitations involved.[4]

The *ākṣepasaṅgati* may be presented as follows. If Suṣupti is the merger of the soul in B. it must follow that the waking soul is different from the one which had entered into B. in Suṣupti. If it is neces-

3 The need for the Sūtra referring over again to "Śabda" as authority, after the preceding reference to *Kaus. Up.* on the same point is explained as follows in the *STC*: "It may be objected that even the purport of Śrutis has got to be understood in conformity with human experience. It is against observed facts that one Person, however great should be able to impel and regulate every detail of the activities and states of life of all beings in the cosmos for all time. The Śruti *Esa svapnān darśayati esa prabodhayati eṣa eva parama ānandah* elaborating what is meant by the reference to Śabda again, embodies a convincing reason to accept the position however impossible it may seem, judging from ordinary experience and standards, that one person viz. the Lord should have such absolute and universal jurisdiction for all time over all created beings. The reason adduced is that but for such an absolute power and jurisdiction, God's bliss will also be a limited one. If His control over the beings is only of a limited range, His bliss would not be the unlimited one and the highest as we know it from the Śrutis". In this connection see *Taitt. Up.* (ii.7.) and also Vol. I, pp. 171-72.

4 ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरौत्पत्तिकीति तावदुत्सृष्टा मुक्तौ औत्सर्गिकत्वेनावधारितेति, सुषुप्तावपि सत्सपत्तिः पूर्वाधिकरणे वर्णिता। तस्या आत्यन्तिकत्वप्राप्तावविद्याशेषत्वसमर्थनेनापवादोऽस्मिन्नधिकरणे वर्ण्यत इत्यर्थः

(*Kalpataru-Parimala* iii.2.9)

sary to hold that the same self awakes from sleep as otherwise Karmic injunctions, recollection of identity of self etc cannot be properly explained, then one will have to reject the conclusion established in the preceding *adhi* that in deep sleep the Jiva attains B. This objection is given a suitable answer in Sūtra 9

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is not possible to be sure if the same self as attained oneness with B in Suṣupti emerges from it afterwards or an altogether different one—just as one cannot be sure of getting back the identical drop of water from the sea after it has been dropped into it. It is practically impossible to assert that the same self emerges from Suṣupti, for it has been said in the preceding *adhi* that the Jīva attains oneness with B in Suṣupti by entering into B This is impossible without the liquidation of these conditioning factors of Jīvahood (*Jivopādhis*). There can be no Jiva as such after the dissolution of his upādhis How then can be same Jiva emerge from sleep? The waking self must, therefore, be a different one [5]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra *Sa eva tu karmānusmṛtiśabdavidhibhyaḥ* that it is the same self as went into Suṣupti that wakes up from it Such a conclusion is necessary in view of the fact that (i) the person after he wakes from sleep is seen to complete whatever work he had left half-done before going to sleep,[6] (ii) There is the recollection of his own personal identity after awaking[7] The passage in the *Chān Up.* (vi 1 3) confirms the emergence of the same self from sleep when it refers to the one who has gone to sleep in the body of a tiger or a lion acquiring the same condition after getting up from sleep If a different being from the one who had gone to sleep should emerge from it, the injunctions regarding the sacrificial works and acquisition of philosophical knowledge will lose their point, as these are intended for the realization of Mokṣa, and one should be able

5. तस्मात् पुनः सम्पत्तेः प्रतिबुध्यमानः किं स एव प्रतिबुध्यते, उत स वान्यो वेति चिन्त्यते। तत्र प्राप्तं न स एवेति नियम इति। यदि हि जलराशौ कश्चिज्जलबिन्दुः प्रक्षिप्येत जलराशिरेव स तदा भवति। पुनरुद्धरणे च स एव जलबिन्दुर्भवतीति दुःसम्पादम्। तद्वत् सुप्तः परेणैकत्वमापन्नः सम्प्रसीदति, न स एव पुनरुत्थातुमर्हति। तस्मात् स एवेश्वरो वान्यो वा जीवः प्रतिबुध्यत इत्येवं प्राप्ते इदमाह— (S BSB iii 2 9)

6. [illegible] (S BSB iii 2 9)

7. [illegible] (S BSB iii 2 9)

to attain Mokṣa just by going to sleep[8] For all these reasons, it is certain that the same Jiva as had gone to sleep emerges from it afterwards Consistent with this, we have to recognize that even in Susupti beginningless Avidyā continues to exist as the Jivopādhi in its seed form It is only the grosser adjuncts of Jīvahood such as the mind and the superimposition of the body on the self that are merged in deep sleep The continued existence of Bija (or Mūla) Avidyā in Suṣupti is borne out by the Śruti

सर्वा प्रजा सति सपद्य न विदु सति सपत्स्यामह इति । (*Chān Up* vi 9 2)

R adopts more or less a similar line of Pūrvapaksa and its refutation with this difference that he does not make use of the concept of Bhāvarūpājñāna which is not *recognized in his system*[9] *He speaks*, instead, of the Jīva laying aside for the time all instruments of knowledge and action and being incapable of knowing and enjoying, and repairing to the place of complete rest in the highest B and having refreshed himself rising again and coming back to his former environment He also contrasts the condition of sleep where the self is not able to know itself as he is whereas in Mokṣa it gains exhuberance of spirit, omniscience and other characteristics The criticisms against S 's interpretation are applicable to R 's *mutatis mutandis*

Criticism

The *apavāda-sangati* made out is not sustainable For in the Sūtra *Tadabhāvo nādīsu* * * (iii 2 7) there is no reference to the Jīva attaining *oneness with B but only of finding rest and shelter in B*[10] S has been tirelessly emphasizing in many an *adhi* of the B S so far that the eradication of Avidyā is possible only thro' Brahmāparoksa and it is only after the complete destruction of Avidyā that one can attain Moksa consisting in complete oneness with B After all, Suṣupti is a condition which is attained almost every day by every Tom, Dick or Harry That one does not have a positive knowledge of B in this condition should be plain to the meanest intelligence How then can one talk of there being complete oneness with B in that state either

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8 शब्देभ्यश्च तस्यैवोत्थानमवगम्यते । कर्मविद्याविधिभ्यश्चैवमेवावगम्यते । अन्यथा हि कर्मविद्याविधयोऽनर्थकाः स्यु । अयोत्थानपक्षे हि सुप्तमात्रो मुच्यत इत्यापद्यत (*ibid*)

9 किं सुषुप्त एव प्रबोधकाले उत्तिष्ठति स एव वान्यो वेत्यनियम इति संशय । सुषुप्तस्य सर्वोपाधिविनिर्मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मणि सपन्नस्य मुक्तादविलक्षणत्वेन प्राचीनशरीरसबन्धाभावात स एवेति नियमो न सभवतीति पूर्व पक्ष । सुप्तस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानाभावादेव पूर्वकृतस्य कर्मण तेनैव भोक्तव्यत्वात सोऽहमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात 'त इह व्याघ्रो वे त्यारभ्य यद्यद भवन्ति तथाभवन्ति' इति शब्दात मोक्षसाधनविध्यानर्थक्याच्च स एवोत्तिष्ठतीति राद्धान्त । (R *Vedantadipa* iii 2 9)

10 This point has been made clear in discussing the interpretation of iii 2 7

in substance or in principle?[11] Otherwise, as the efficiency of sacrifices taught in the Vedas to produce their results is implicitly established it would naturally follow that their results will be realized in the future so that one may discard the assumption of Apūrva in the interval. Moreover, the passage referring to the waking condition in the Up.: *Sata āgamya na viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti* (*Chān. Up.* vi.10.2) it is the same Jīvas who had gone to sleep that are being referred to as "not knowing that they are returning from the Sat". This is sufficient to rule out the possibility of the person waking from sleep being other than the one who had gone to sleep. That bars the ākṣepa made out by the *Kalpataru* in support of S.'s Pūrvapakṣa.[12]

S. springs a surprise on us by bringing in Īśvara too within the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here whether it is Īśvara or the same or some other Jīva who emerges after sleep,[13] He dismisses it in summing up the Siddhānta, on the ground that Īśvara is ever free from Avidyā.[14] Consistent with the terms of the Pūrvapakṣa he should have included Īśvara also in spelling out the doubt.

The *Bhāmatī* comes to the rescue with the explanation that the reference to Īśvara is only by way of a possibility suggested by his being another sentient being like the Jīva. The *Bhāmatī* however explains that there is absolutely no possibility of Īśvara who is Śuddhabuddha-muktasvabhāva rising from Avidyā after sleep. That is why Īśvara has been left out in the examination of the doubt.[15]

The argument can be turned against the Jīva as well. For in S.'s system, the Jīva is in reality pervasive. He too cannot, therefore, be really emerging from some place after Suṣupti. Thus even as regards the Jīva, the Pūrvapakṣa would rest on no more than a supposition.[16] Further, if "Īśvara" should stand for the qualified consciousness limited

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11. किं च, न तावज्जीवस्वरूपकः स्थूलशरीराध्यास इन्द्रियसंपर्क अन्तःकरण चेत्येवमादय एवागन्तुका उपाधयः। भावरूपाज्ञानस्याप्यनादेः परमवृत्त्यैव नाश्यत्वमस्माभिः साधितम्। तेन जीवोपाधीनां विनाशाज्जीवस्यापि विनाश इति पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः। न ह्यनादेर्भावरूपाज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारैकनिवर्त्यस्य सुषुप्तिः शरीराध्यासादेरिव निवर्तिका संभवति (STC. iii 2.9)

12. अत एव च प्रमातिरिक्तभावरूपाज्ञानं नास्तीति मत्वास्य पूर्वपक्ष इति अमलानन्दाद्युक्तमयुक्तम् (STC. iii 2 9)

13 तस्मात् स एवेश्वरो वान्यो वा जीवः प्रतिबुध्यत इति (S. *BSB.* iii 2 9)

14 एतेनेश्वरोत्थानं प्रत्युक्तम् नित्यनिवृत्ताविद्यत्वात् (*ibid*)

15 स एवेति दुःखादमिति स वान्यो वेतीश्वरो वेति संभावनामात्रेणोक्तम्। नहि तस्य शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्याविद्यातः उत्थानसंभवः अत एव विमर्शावसरेऽस्यानुपन्यासः (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 9)

16 जीवस्यापि स्वमते व्यापकतया इतस्ततः आकाशादिवत् कस्माच्चित् प्रदेशादुत्थानायोगेन जीवेऽपि संभवनामात्रत्वात्। यदीश्वरशब्देन मायावच्छिन्नं विशिष्टं चैतन्यमुच्यते तदा नित्यशुद्धत्वाद्यभावेनाविद्यातः उत्थाननिश्चय एव (STC. iii 2.9)

by Māyā, such a being can very well afford to emerge from Avidyā as it is other than the *Śuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva*. Not being subject to disruption of personal consciousness like the Jīva, in Suṣupti, Īśvara can afford to emerge from the Suṣupti state of the Jīva by his own power. The difficulty of emerging again will be the greatest only in the case of the Jīva as of a man drowned in the ocean coming up again. There is thus far greater likelihood of the same Jīva's rising from his Suṣupti remaining an uncertainty and a bare possibility than being a certainty.[17] If by "Īśvara" S. means the pure consciousness the conflict with the opening part of his commentary will be there as there is no possibility of the emergence of pure consciousness from sleep.[18]

S. has established the doctrine of oneness of the conscious principle by refuting the Anekāntavāda in the Tadananyatvādhi and other places. It is not, therefore, open to him to raise the present Pūrvapakṣa by assuming different conscious principles such as the one which goes into Suṣupti and the one which emerges from it afterwards.[19]

It is also preposterous at this stage of the Brahmasūtras to seriously raise the question whether the soul that wakes up from Suṣupti is the same as the one that went into it—after the manner in which a whole Pāda has been devoted by the Sūtrakāra in III.1 to giving an exhaustive account of the travels of the Jīva to different regions of heaven and hell and its return to the womb with his residual karma, to take rebirth (iii.1.8). If the Jīva can return from the other worlds to continue his life on earth and work for his betterment, he should be in a position to wake up from his own slumber, every day *without loss of being. This is too obvious to require any special effort to establish it.* This simple point has eluded the commentators because they have missed the clue to the correct and flawless interpretation of the *adhi.* by not recognizing that the real antecedent of the pronoun *tat* in "*Sa eva*" in the Sutra, intended by the Sūtrakāra, is *not* the individual soul but the Supreme B. (*ātmā*) which has been expressly referred to Sūtra 7 as *the Being in whom the Jīva finds his rest in Suṣupti.* It is a pity that S. who is tempted to think of introducing Īśvara into the picture, however tenuously, should not have thought of Him in a more robust capacity as the antecedent of "*Saḥ*" and thereby placed the interpretation of the whole *adhi.* in a different perspective with an impeccable topic.

17. जीववत् विलुप्त ज्ञानाद्यभावेन स्वसामर्थ्येनैव व्युत्थानात् । महोदधिमग्नस्येव जीवस्य तदयोगात् जीव एव संभावनामात्र न निश्चय इत्यापाताच्च (*STC.* iii 2 9)

18 यदि शुद्ध ब्रह्मोच्यते तत्र व्युत्थानसंभावनापि नेति दुर्वारोऽग्रिमभाष्यविरोधः (*ibid*)

19. तदनन्यत्वाद्यधिकरणेषु, चैतन्यैक्यस्यासकृदुक्तत्वेन तद्विरुद्धभेदमाश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षासंभवाच्च (*ibid*)

There are many rifts in S's Pūrvapakṣa itself If it is put forward by assuming the complete eradication of all Jivopādhis in Suṣupti, these Upādhis being no longer there (afterwards), the Pūrvapakṣa can hardly be raised partly in respect of the same self returning from sleep, by indenting on *aupādhikabheda* again If it is made *without* admitting the complete dissolution of Jivopādhis, the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that as these Upādhis have been dissolved in Suṣupti, the Jiva who has as a result merged in B cannot return will have no legs to stand upon.[20]

In this connection, it is necessary to get a clarification as to what S wants us to understand by the word "Jiva" If it is consciousness limited by Avidyā, *antahkarana* and other adjuncts, such a being cannot afford to have complete merger with B in Suṣupti[21] If it denotes pure consciousness without adjuncts, the contention in the Pūrvapakṣa that the Jiva will cease to be (after entering into the Sat) will not be sustainable The drop of water which has fallen into the sea does not indeed cease to be (there)[22] If it ceases to be, the argument of the Pūrvapakṣa that its restoration will become impossible will lose its point As no reasonable person will be prepared to court self-annihilation by going to sleep, the Pūrvapakṣin will be cutting his nose to spite the face Such a Pūrvapakṣa will be otiose[23]

Moreover, there is beginningless positive ignorance (*bhāvarūpājñāna*) recognized by S as the determinant of Jivahood besides the *adhyāsa* of the body, contact with the sense-organs and the antahkarana It is recognized that this Bhāvarūpājñāna is destroyed only by Caramavṛtti at the dawn of Brahmāparokṣa This will make the Pūrvapakṣa's contention that the Jīva will be destroyed on account of the dissolution of the Jivopādhis in Suṣupti (and that, therefore, a different Jīva must be presumed to arise from Suṣupti) unsustainable[24] For, it is not possible to hold that Suṣupti destroys the beginningless

20 किमत्र सुप्तौ यावदुपाधिविनाशाङ्गीकारेण पूर्वपक्ष उत तदनङ्गीकारेण? आद्य, त्वौपाधिकभेदविवक्षया पूर्वपक्षायोग । द्वितीये तु, विनष्टोपाधित्वात् तदानीं सत्सम्पन्नो जीवो नास्त्येवेत्यादि पूर्वपक्षायोग

(*STC* iii 2 9)

This objection is quite different in its scope from the one raised by Bhaskara against S.'s interpretation which the *Bhāmati* and *Kalpataru* have refuted.

21 किं च, यद्यत्र जीवशब्देनाविद्यान्तःकरणाद्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमुच्यते तदा तस्य ब्रह्मणा एकीभावानुपपत्ति

(*ibid*)

22 यदा तु चैतन्यमात्रं तदा नास्त्येवेत्यनुपपत्ति । दृष्टान्तासम्प्रतिपत्तेश्च । न ह्यब्धौ पतन् उदबिन्दुर्नास्त्येव

(*STC* iii 2 9)

23 यदा नास्ति पुनरुद्धारे स एव जलबिन्दुर्भवतीति दुःसाधमिति पूर्वपक्षभाष्यविरोधात् । सुषुप्तौ जीवनाशे, स्वात्मविनाशाय सुप्तायोगेन पूर्वपक्षमात्रायोगश्च (*ibid*)

24 See f.n. 11

ignorance also, as it does the bodily *adhyāsa* and other outer *upādhis*[25] According to Advaita theory, the former can only be liquidated by direct vison of B This disposes of Appayya Dikṣita's plea that the Pūrvapakṣa here is made from the point of view of one who maintains that there is no beginningless positive ignorance other than the erroneous identification of body and soul[26] The concept of Bhāvarūpājñāna is indispensable to account for bondage in the last analysis as the Karma theory itself begs the question and offers no ultimate explanation The doctrine of Bhāvarūpājñāna is too well established in the Śāstras to be suppressed

The Siddhānta too that without acceptance of the identity of the self it will not be possible to account for the resumption of works left half done before going to sleep and the recollection of past experiences and the purposefulness of injunctions regarding the performance of sacrifices etc leading to definite results will not necessarily follow from S's point of view For these can be explained in the light of Advaita metaphysics by appealing to the power of Ajñāna to accomplish the unaccomplishables and by not going beyond the identity of the physical body connected with the states of Suṣupti and Jāgrat

Further, if the Siddhānta is put forward by accepting the complete dissolution of the conditioning factors of Jivahood such as the antahkarana and superimposition of the body on the Ātman, it would be doing violence to our own experience[27] For, we know from experience that in Suṣupti there is no such complete dissolution of the external *upādhis* This is proved by the instantaneous waking up of a person who is set upon in his Suṣupti by an assailant attempting to thrust a knife thro' him The real fact, therefore, is that the external *upadhis* of Jīvahood happen to be overpowered in Suṣupti and remain inactive due to association with the Prājña-Form of B But there is no reason to believe that they are completely dissolved

Objecting to the view that some other Jiva wakes up from sleep in the body wherefrom another one had gone to sleep S writes that it will cut short the practical existence carried on by means of that body However, as the Jiva is pervasive in dimension according to him, there

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25 न ह्यानादेर्भावरूपाज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारैकनिवर्त्यस्य सुषुप्ति शरीराध्यासादेरिव निवर्तिका भवति (*STC* iii 2 9)

26 एतेन मिथ्याज्ञानातिरिक्तामविद्यामपहृत्य मिथ्याज्ञानवदविद्याया अपि निवर्त्ति चापाद्य पूर्वपक्ष प्रवर्तत इति दर्शितम । अन्यथा पूर्वपक्षानुत्थानात (Appayya *Parimala* iii 2 9)

27 यदन्त करणस्थूलशरीराध्यासादेर्जीवकल्पकस्य सुप्तावात्यन्तिकनिवृत्तिमपेक्ष्य सिद्धान्त प्रवर्तते तदानुभवविरोध (*STC* iii 2 9)

is no reason to apprehend that the practical commerce of life in the other body will be cut short by the Jīva not returning to the body it had left for Suṣupti If it is contended that the Upadhis which determine the Jiva's association with a particular body in the Vyāvahārika state are non-pervasive, the reply will be that in conformity with the theory of pervasiveness of the Jiva those *Upādhis* too will have to be conceived as pervasive Otherwise, there is no need for S to have made an all-out effort in the thirteenth adhikarana of Pāda 2 of the second Adhyāya of the Sūtras to establish that the Jīva is in reality pervasive and not atomic Or, just as thro' their Yogic powers sages like Saubhari are reputed to have carried on the commerce of life in different bodies at the same time, the uninterrupted commerce of life in different bodies may be explained in the Siddhānta thro' the agency of Ajñāna itself

Another objection raised by S is that if another soul should rise in the body where another had gone to sleep, there will be the adverse consequence of souls having to reap the fruits of deeds not performed by them and of not being requitted for those done by themselves This contingency also can be obviated without accepting the identity of the Soul before and after Suṣupti and by explaining that the new Soul which wakes up in the old body (of the other) reaps the fruits of the acts of the predecessor soul performed with the same body which is now its own and is requitted for its own deeds also, in the new body,— just as a child to be born with a new body reaps the benefits of the Vaiśvānareṣṭi performed by its father with his own body When this is possible where the two bodies are themselves different, it should by no means be difficult to believe that so long as the new soul comes to occupy the body left by the other, it can reasonably be expected to discharge the responsibilities which now devolve upon it for whatever had been done in and thro' that body which is now its own This can go on till that body perishes with the exit of the last occupant[29]

S has argued that whereas a drop of water which has fallen into a mass of water cannot be taken out as there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops, the souls are distinguishable by their works and knowledge Their cases are not analogous But then if distinction (*viveka*) means difference as such there is distinction due to Māyā between the drops of water quite as much as there is distinction based on karma and avidyā between souls The difference be-

[29] तत्र–[illegible] इति निरस्तम् । सुप्त प्राज्ञ [illegible] वैश्वानरेष्ट्या [illegible] । तत्र यदि [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 9)

tween two drops of water may be difficult to be detected. But it is nevertheless not without a basis. Otherwise, the example of the swan separating milk from water given by S. himself will be incongruous.

If S. means by distinction not its mere presence but a clear awareness of it one can say without any fear of contradiction that as Suṣupti induces a temporary suspension of all knowledge of one's antecedents there is every possibility of one Jīva coming out from Satsampatti and awaking in the body of another who has gone into Suṣupti. In any case, the Pūrvapakṣin who holds the soul to be lost in Suṣupti is not under any obligation to accept that there is any basis of distinction between two sleeping souls or any means of knowing it.

S. perorates: "The socalled individual self is not really different from B. to be distinguished from it like a drop of water which has been poured into a mass of water. We have shown times without number that B. itself on account of its connection with limiting adjuncts comes to be designated as the individual soul metaphorically. In this sense, the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts and the existence of another lasts likewise as long as it continues to be bound by another set of Upādhis. Each set of adjuncts continues thro' the states of Suṣupti and waking. In Suṣupti it is like a seed and in the waking life it is like a fully developed plant. Thus it comes about that the same soul awaks from sleep".

Rhetorics apart, if the association of the Jīva with the upādhis in the form of ignorance and Samskāras is admitted in deep sleep, it cannot be true that the soul in Suṣupti attains oneness with B.—as S. would have us believe.[29] Otherwise, it should be open to us to attain oneness with B. in the waking state also notwithstanding the existence of the upādhis. It cannot be said that there is a great difference between Suṣupti and the Jāgrat states in this that in the former the upādhis are unmanifest while in the latter they are manifest. For oneness with B. is incompatible with the presence of Upādhis even if they are in an unmanifested form. Otherwise, there should be the attainment of oneness with B. in the state of swoon where the superimposition of the body on the self is not in evidence. The radical Upādhi of Bhāvarūpājñāna is there as much in Suṣupti, unimpounded as in the waking state. This is confirmed by the recollective judgment: "I did not know anything in Suṣupti" and the Śruti: *Sati sampadya na viduḥ*

29 The Sūtrakāra has already made it clear in सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन (I.3 42) that he does *not* hold such a view. This is another proof if any is wanted that S.'s reading between the lines of Sūtra iii.2.7 is *'utsūtra'*.

(Chān Up vi 9 2) It cannot be said that there is a larger measure of Bhāvarūpājñāna in the waking state than in Suṣupti as Ajñāna is without parts In any case, our experience shows that its influence is deep and profound in Suṣupti while it sits lightly on us in waking life

Śamkara's Sutrārtha Examined

According to S the expression 'Karma' in the Sūtra refers to the performance of uncompleted part of one's duties and obligations after waking from Suṣupti In addition to the recollection of personal identity after waking from sleep, in terms of So' ham asmi', '*anusmṛti*' refers to the recollection (and completion) of such acts as are statutorily to be carried over two or more days and performed by one and the same person—the '*anu*' being an indication of this sort of recollection [30] This way of interpreting 'karma' involves Lakṣaṇā which cannot be regarded as *nirūḍha* (crystallized) However, as both the points raised by S can be covered by the shorter form "*Karmasmṛti*" the use of *anu* becomes superfluous for this purpose

'Śabda' in the Sūtra has been rendered by S as referring to certain passages in the Śruti where the same Jīva is spoken of as hurrying back again, the way he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake and some others like "whoever they were—tigers and lions those they become again' (Chān Up vi 9 3)

The first passage will not be hostile to the Pūrvapakṣa position For, in S's philosophy also the Jiva who has gone to sleep and the one rising from it are both sharers in the essence of the same pure consciousness Hence both can be said to be hurrying back again [31] The text referring to lions and tigers is in reality a censure (*nindārthavāda*) on those who lay claim to identity with B instead of recognizing the dependence of all finite reality on B alluding to the dire consequences of their attitude It cannot be construed in the manner of S, as the discourse of Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu where this passage occurs, is intended primarily to serve as a source of enlightenment to him and other thinking persons It would therefore be going outside the bounds of the subject to expatiate on what happens in Suṣupti to animals worms and gnats instead of to full fledged human beings!

30 यदि [illegible] पुनरुत्थाने कर्म तस्य पूर्वेद्युरनुष्ठितस्यापरेद्युः स्मृतिरिति वक्तव्यम् [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 2 9)
31 [illegible] पुनः पुनरागच्छता युक्ति [illegible] (STC iii.2.9)

S. has argued that if the same soul does not return from Suṣupti, the injunctions regarding knowledge and works will become futile as anyone can attain Mokṣa by simply going to sleep. But then, as his philosophy recognizes that B.'s Jīvahood[32] is liquidated only partially by the passing out of one Jīva from Samsāra into Brahmanhood and that Samsāra goes on in respect of the other Jīvas, the injunctions regarding works and knowledge may still be meaningful with reference to those unliquidated Jīvas. The Karmavidhis also will be purposeful with regard to these other souls on the ground that merger in Sat in Suṣupti is not complete Mokṣa.[33] Like prescription of Nirguṇopāsanā to obtain complete Mokṣa, Karmic injunctions also may be considered useful and necessary for facilitating Mokṣa. Thus, S.'s refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa and the justification of his Siddhānta and the particular line of interpretation he has given to this *adhi.* are far from sustainable and are often inconsistent with the dogmas and presuppositions of his own philosophy.

जीव इति शारीरकार्थः इत्यर्थं (*Ratnaprabhā* i 3 19)

32. Cf. ब्रह्मैवाविद्यया ससरति न ततोऽन्यो जीव इति शारीरकार्थः इत्यर्थं विधिसार्थक्यसभवात् । सति सपन्नस्य मुक्ति.

33. त्वन्मते ब्रह्मण: एकजीवभावापगमेऽपि जीवान्तरत्वानपगमात् निर्गुणोपास्तिविधेरिव कर्मविधेरपि सार्थक्योपपत्तेश्च (*STC.* iii 2 9)
सम्यङ्नेति, सयङ्मुक्तिसिद्ध्यर्थं

CHAPTER VIII

BRAHMAN IS ATTAINED BY JIVA IN PART IN THE STATE OF SWOON.

7. *Mugdhaprāpyatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.10)

The three distinct and principal states of dreaming, wakefulness and Suṣupti are normal and common to all. They have been shown to be primarily dependent on the Lord in every respect. The remaining state of swoon (*Moha*)[1] which is not of so common or regular occurrence and which has some similarity to Suṣupti is now taken into account.[2] Like the others it is also known to be entirely dependent on the Lord for its occurrence and for its termination. What distinguishes this state from Suṣupti is that here the Jīvātman enters into the Lord only partly—with a half of his being Even so, the *adhi.* helps to highlight a remarkable aspect of God's power in that it enables the Jīvas who are atomic in size and without *bhinnāṁśas* (see Vol. I, pp. 383-85 and Vol. II, pp. 210-12, *BS.* ii.3 27) to enter into Him with one half of their being and remain outside Him with the other half—an unthinkable feat but for His inscrutable power. In this way, the conclusion established in this *adhi.* can be seen to have a direct bearing on fostering Bhakti to a Being of such wonderful power—which is the theme of the Pāda.[3] It will be seen that the above interpretation of the Sūtra given by M.

1. [illegible] (*TDP.* iii 2 10)
2. [illegible] (Rāgh. *TPB.* iii 2 10)
3. This point has been ably brought out in the *STC*:
[illegible] (iii 2 10)

receives natural support from the wording of the Sūtra Mugdhe'rdha sampattiḥ syntactically read together with 'asya' (meaning 'for the Jīvātman) and 'ātmani' (in the Paramātman) following by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtras iii.2.5 and 7 respectively.

However as Moha is a composite state, unlike the other three, its consideration has been deferred till it has been shown in the preceding *adhi.* (no. 6) that all the principal states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti for all Jīvas at all times and places are dependent on the Lord.[4]

Pūrvapakṣa

The *TP* outlines the Pūrvapakṣa so as to render the inquiry into the state of swoon unnecessary. In swoon the Jīvātman cannot be held to find lodgment anywhere else than in B. For swoon is essentially different from the other two states of dreaming and waking where the soul does not admittedly find lodgment in B. Were it not so, the state of swoon will get mixed up with them. The lodgment of the Jīva in B. in the state of swoon will not however make the overlapping between the states of swoon and Suṣupti a flaw. For these two states have the common property of not disclosing anything more than the self as their content of experience.[5] The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in the state of swoon the Jīva is in B.[6] As this places it entirely within the domain of Suṣupti, it is not in any way competent to bring to light any fresh aspect of God's glory over and above what the inquiry into the state of Suṣupti has done in the Tadabhāvādhi (iii.2.7).[7] The present *adhi.* is, therefore, a superfluity. Vādirāja in his *TPG* explains the motive behind the Pūrvapakṣa in an altogether different light. As the condition of swoon is one of unrelieved suffering for the Jīva it will only take away from the glory of God instead of highlighting it and act as a deterrent to Bhakti for the Jīva to know that in swoon he is in the Lord. For this reason the *adhi.* will defeat the purpose of the present Pāda.[8]

The *STC* shows that the Pūrvapakṣa can also be put forward in other ways by equating the state of swoon with the waking and the

(Rāgh. *TPB.* iii 2.10)
4 प्रधानावस्थाविचारानन्तरमेवावान्तरावस्थाविचार इति भाव.
5 न मोहो भगवदितरत्र जीवस्येति पूर्वः पक्ष. । जाग्रत्स्वप्नयो पृथगवस्थात्वात् । अन्यथा,तत्सङ्कीर्णतापातात् । न
चैव सुप्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्गो दोष', समानधर्मतया तत्सङ्करस्य गुणत्वात (*TP.* iii 2 10)
6 अत: परमात्मन्येव मोहो जीवस्येति (*ibid*)
7. Cf. मोहावस्थाया: ईश्वराधीनत्वस्य पूर्वन्यायसिद्धत्वेनाविचार्यत्वात् । अनिश्चितस्वरूपायाश्च तदधीनत्वज्ञाना-
योगात् (*BD.* iii.2 10)
मोहो जीवस्येति वदत
8 प्राप्यत्वमर्धप्राप्यत्वम् । अतो न पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तयो: ऐक्यम् । अत परमात्मन्येव
पयपक्षिण: परमात्मप्रवेशेऽपि दु.खस्य पष्ठलग्नत्वात् न तस्य महामाहात्म्यमिति दुराशा
(*TPG.* iii.2.10)

dream state Firstly, it may be argued that this state is not the dream state as one experiences sorrow and unhappiness in it as in the waking state Similarly it may be differentiated from Suṣupti as there is no experience of bliss in it Thus by excluding both in turn it may be held to be only the waking state[9] Or, it may be affirmed that it is not the waking state as there is no awareness of external reality in swoons At the same time it cannot also be considered as Suṣupti as there is no experience of joy in it By exclusion it may be equated with the dream state[10] This way of developing the Pūrvapakṣa may be seen to be implicit in the wording of the passage in M.'s *NV*.

मोहे ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरेव पृथगवस्थात्वात् ।

which serves not only as the basis of the Pūrvapakṣa as developed by J in the *TP* but can also be read with an elision of the negative as मोहेऽब्रह्मप्राप्तिरेव to accommodate the above Pūrvapakṣas

The third way of presenting the Pūrvapakṣa is by putting together the foregoing points and arguing that as the state of swoon cannot be considered to be other than the three states accepted by all, it cannot be deemed to throw any new light on God's majesty by the Jīva's being shown to be lodged in Him in that state For this reason it cannot give any impetus to Bhakti The discussion is thus of no value

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the state of Moha cannot be subsumed under dreaming or waking as its content is limited to the awareness of the self, of time and the sensation of unrelieved misery[11] There is difficulty in bringing it wholly under Suṣupti also which is a condition of unalloyed bliss[12] But there is one point where the state of swoon intersects Suṣupti In both there is no awareness of other objects The two important facts connected with the condition of swoon viz. the experience of misery therein and the non-perception of other things can be explained only by recognizing that in this condition the Jīvatman enters into B with one half of his being and remains outside with the other half—by the power of God A person who is half asleep has some knowledge of what goes on both inside and outside him.[13]

9 मोहो न स्वप्नः जाग्रद्वत् दुःखानुभवात् । नापि सुषुप्तिः, सुखाननुभवात् । [illegible] परिशेषात् जाग्रदवस्थैव [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 10)

10 [illegible] बाह्यपदार्थज्ञानाभावात् जाग्रदवस्था । नापि सुषुप्तिः सुखाननुभवात् । [illegible] (*STC* iii.2.10)

11 [illegible] दुःख[illegible] (*TP* iii.2.10)

12 [illegible] दुःखानुभव[illegible] (*TP* iii 2 10)

13 [illegible] (*STC* iii.2.10)

The hypothesis of 'Ardhasampatti' thus offers adequate scope for the Jīvātman to enter into the Lord without making the condition of swoon identical with the condition of supreme felicity of Suṣupti, for the condition of Moha still carries with it its badge of suffering[14]

In the concluding part of his Bhāsya M. makes it clear that a sudden mental shock or the physical impact of a heavy blow etc. which bring about the condition of swoon are only secondary causes[15] It is the Supreme Lord who causes the condition of Moha and it is He that awakens the Soul from it·

मूर्च्छा प्रबोधनं चैव यत एव प्रवर्तते ।
स ईशः परमो ज्ञेयः परमानन्दलक्षणः ॥ (M BSB. iii.2.10)

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S this *adhi* considers the question whether swoon is one of the four wellknown states of dreaming, wakefulness, Suṣuptī and death or is a fifth state

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that it must be admitted to be one of the four as no fifth state is taught in the Śrutis and Smrtis That being so, it has got to be considered as one among the four[16] It is of course distinct from the waking state and dream as there is no specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon[17] It also differs from death The man who has fallen into a swoon recovers and rises up again But not the dead man.[18] There is no difficulty however in regarding it as Suṣupti itself as it shares with it the same characteristic of absence of specific knowledge of any particular object[19] The other characteristics of swoon such as delayed breathing, trembling of the body, etc, are to be regarded as selective variations of the main state of Suṣupti itself Such variations are familiar enough. Where one person who has slept soundly feels happy and contented and his limbs light another who has slept badly feels fretful, heavy of limbs and unable to concentrate his mind on anything But the fact remains that both had slept The other

14 न चैतावता सुप्त्यत्यन्तामेद तद्विरुद्धाना दु खमात्रप्रतिस्मृत्यादीना धर्मान्तराणा सत्वात (*ibid*)
15 बाह्यकारणदर्शन निमित्तविषयम् (*TP* iii 2 10)
16 तिस्रस्तावदवस्था शरीरस्थस्य जीवस्य प्रसिद्धा जागरित स्वप्न सुषुप्तिरिति, चतुर्थी शरीरादपसृप्ति । न तु पचमी काचिदवस्था जीवस्य श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा प्रसिद्धा । तस्मात् चतसृणामेवावस्थानामन्यतमावस्था मूर्च्छेति (S BSB iii 2 10)
17 विशेषविज्ञानाभावा मूर्च्छा जागरस्वप्नावस्थाभ्या भिद्यत (*Bhāmati* iii 2 10)
18 पुनरुत्थानाच्च मरणावस्थाया (*ibid*)
19 अत सुप्तिरेव मूर्छा विशेषविज्ञानाभावाविशेषात (*ibid*)

divergences between the swoon and Suṣupti should also be similarly explained without upsetting the former's identity with the latter. There is thus no justification to regard the swoon as a fifth state.[20]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is: Tho' there is absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon as well as in Suṣupti that by itself is not sufficient criterion to hold that the two states must be the same. There is specific knowledge of some particular objects in the waking state and in dreams as well. The two are not the same on that account. Their distinction rests on the presence or absence of the operation of the external sense organs. In the same way, there are clear differences based on difference of purpose, causes and characteristics between the states of swoon and Suṣupti. In the latter there is union with B. with a view to refreshing oneself after fatigue. In the former the union with B. is for abandoning the physical body once for all.[21] Swooning is caused by a fall or a severe blow or other injury while Suṣupti is due to fatigue. A contorted face, eyes staring blankly and irregular breathing are the marks of swoon. There is a happy expression and regulated breathing in Suṣupti and the eyes are closed.

Even where there are certain variations of conditions among sleepers there is an underlying unity of cause, purpose and characteristics behind them.[22] We have, therefore, to conclude that notwithstanding the attainment of B. in swoons and Suṣupti there is only a part or half-attainment of B. in swoon. This is not to be understood literally,[23] but only in the sense that there is not the same kind of attainment of B. in swoon as there is in Suṣupti but something very much less, for the condition of swoon shows a parity with Suṣupti in one respect viz. of absence of external knowledge and disparity with Suṣupti in other respects of irregular breathing, trembling of body, frightfulness of expression, etc.[24]

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20 विगानुच्छ्वासवेपथुप्रभृतयस्तु सुषुप्तस्यावान्तरभेदा तद्यथा कश्चित् सुखोत्थित आह सुखमहमस्वाप्सं, लघूनि मे गात्राणि प्रसन्नं मन इति । कश्चित्तु दुःखमस्वाप्सं गुरूणि मे गात्राणि भ्रमत्यनवस्थितं मन इति । न चैतावता सुषुप्तिः भिद्यते । तथा विकारान्तरैरपि मूर्च्छा न सुषुप्ते भिद्यते । तस्माल्लोकप्रसिद्धयभावादेव पञ्चम्यवस्थेति प्राप्तम् (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 10)

21. यद्यपि विशेषविज्ञानोपशमेन मोहसुप्तयो साम्यम्, तथापि नैक्यम् । नहि विशेषविज्ञानसद्भावसाम्यमात्रेण स्वप्नजागरयोरभेदः बाह्येन्द्रियव्यापारभावाभावाभ्यां तु भेदोऽनयो. । सुषुप्तिमोहयोरपि प्रयोजनभेदात्, कारणभेदात् लक्षणभेदाच्च भेदः । श्रमापनुत्त्यै हि ब्रह्मणा सम्पद्यते सुषुप्तः । शरीरत्यागाय तु ब्रह्मणा सम्पद्यते मोहः. (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 10)

22. सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नान्तरभेदेऽपि निमित्तप्रयोजनलक्षणाभेदादेकत्वम् (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 10)

23. न ब्रूमो मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणा भवतीति । किं तर्हि, अर्धेन सुषुप्तपक्षस्य भवति मुग्धत्वमर्धेनावस्थान्तरपक्षस्येति (S. *BSB.* iii 2 10)

24 मोहस्यावस्था ब्रह्मणा सम्पत्तावपि सुषुप्ते यादृशी सम्पत्तिर्न तादृशी मोह इत्यर्धसम्पत्तिरुक्ता । साम्यवैषम्याभ्यामर्धत्वम् (*Bhāmatī* iii.2 10)

Criticism

As swoon is a separate mixed state in S's opinion,[25] this *adhi.* should have been placed immediately after those dealing with the two other major states of dreams and Suṣupti and before Sūtra 9 For there is equal possibility of the doubt arising as in the case of Suṣupti whether it is the name Jīva who awakens from swoon or a different one[26] One can understand the separation of this *adhi* from the discussion of the major states of dream and Suṣupti if it were intended to show by the interposition of another dealing with the question whether the self-same Jīva arises from Suṣupti, if it were intended to show by such interposition the subordinate character of the state of swoon But such an explanation is not available for S[27]

Sensing this difficulty, the *Kalpataru* has come out with the following explanation In *adhi* 3, the identity of the Jīva who has risen from sleep with the one who had gone to sleep has been established on the strength of the recollection of the experience of identity of personality before, in and after sleep in terms of "Soham asmi" (I am the same person) There is every possibility of an objection arising in regard to swoon that it is the same state as Suṣupti because there is the similar recollection of the experience of there having been no specific knowledge of any particular object in the swoon as in the case of Susupti It is for this reason that the topic of swoon is taken up after disposing of the doubt in regard to Susupti[28]

This explanation cannot be accepted as it would altogether miss the opportunity to establish the equally necessary identity of the Jiva before, during and after the swoon[29] That apart, while the judgment '*So 'ham asmi*' can be recognized as a recollective judgment in regard to Susupti, the memory of there having been no specific knowledge of any particular object (*viśesavijnānābhāva*) in swoon is not entitled to be accepted as a recollective judgment For, Pratyabhijñā presupposes the predication of identity in terms of the third and the first person as in *So'ham* or its variation in terms of '*So 'yam*' The memory of the absence

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25 यदुक्त न पचमी काचिदवस्था प्रसिद्धास्तीति। नैष दोष, कादाचित्कीयमसत्स्यति न प्रसिद्धा स्यात्। प्रसिद्धा चैषा लोकायुर्वेदयो। अधसपरत्यभ्युपगमाच्च न पचमी गण्यते इत्यनवद्यम (S BSB iii 2 10)

26 यदि मूर्छावस्था तरम तर्हीदमधिकरण अवस्थाद्वयविचारानन्तर सगतम्। स एव तु कर्मेत्यत प्राकृतन उता य इति सशयस्य सुपुप्तपुम्प इव मूर्छितेऽपि समवेन स एवेत्यस्य तृतीय स्यात। मूर्छित एव पुनरुत्तिष्ठति एतदानन्तयमेव च युक्तम् (STC iii 2 10)

27 त्व मते मूर्च्छाया म मत इवावान्तरावस्थात्वाभावेन प्रधानावस्थात्वव्यावृत्तय व्यवधानस्यायोगाच्च (ibid)

28 पूर्वत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स एवोत्तिष्ठतीत्युक्तम तर्हि विशेषविज्ञानाभावविशेषणंत्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानात सुपुप्तिरेव मुग्धिरिति पूवपक्षमाह (*Kalpataru* iii 2 10)

29 अवश्यवक्तव्यस्य मुग्धप्रतिबुद्धैक्यस्यावचनापत्ते (*STC* iii 2 10)

of specific knowledge of any particular object in swoon does not fit into this pattern[30] Moreover both S and Vācaspati have raised the Pūrvapakṣa that swoon is the same as Suṣupti only on the basis of absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in both. There is, therefore, no reason for the *Kalpataru* to go beyond them as far as Pratyabhijñā[31]

Further, if the Purvapaksa contends that swoon is the same as Suṣupti as there is absence of knowledge of any particular object therein, it will apply to the condition of death also If it holds that it is so because there is a coming back to the waking life in both, it would apply to the dream state as well[32] If coming to have knowledge of particular objects qualified by an earlier absence of such knowledge is the basis of the Pūrvapakṣa contention in favor of the state of swoon being the same as Suṣupti, there will yet be an overpervasion with respect to the analogy of the arrow-maker cited by S himself For, the arrow maker, working at an arrow, is so intent on it that tho' wide awake, he sees nothing else[33] The reply that he is all the same very much aware of the arrow all the while, can easily be countered by the fact that the man in a swoon is also conscious of his being[34] The further contention that this person having gone into B which is of the form of pure knowledge has no particularised knowledge of anything then, will not be correct For immediately on recovering from the swoon the man remembers and recalls his experience of time, of positive ignorance and the utter darkness into which he had been thrown in the swoon[35]

The Siddhānta is likewise defective It has to be clarified if it is made out by recognizing swoon to be an intermediate state or a separate and independent one The former will be against the position taken by S and Vācaspati The latter will render the resort to Pariseṣa (elimination) in the Sūtra in trying to put it outside the known major

30 साऽस्मरणीयस्यानुभवस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानवर्जितं न किंचिदवेदिषमिति विशेषज्ञानाभावसमुत्थ प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभावाच्च (*STC* iii 2 10)

31 भाष्यभामत्यो विशेषज्ञानाभावस्य च पूर्वपक्षहेतुत्वाभिधानात प्रत्यभिज्ञापर्यन्तधावनमप्रयोजनम् (*ibid*)

32 किं चात्र यदि मूर्च्छा सुषुप्तिरेव विशेषज्ञानाभावादिति पूर्वपक्ष तदा मृतौ व्यभिचार यदि च पुनरुत्थानवत्त्वादिति तदा स्वप्ने व्यभिचार (*ibid*)

33 विशेषज्ञानहीनस्य सति पुनरुत्थानवत्त्वादिति विशिष्टो हेतुरित्यप्ययुक्तम् । इषुकारावस्थाया व्यभिचारात (*STC* iii 2 10)

34 इष्वन्यविषयविशेषज्ञानाभाववत्त्वेऽपि इषुविषयकविशेषज्ञानमस्तीति चेन्न । मुग्धोऽप्यहमिति विशेषज्ञानसंभावनेन हेत्वसिद्धतापातात् (*ibid*)

35 तदा ब्रह्मरूपमात्मनः ज्ञानरूपस्य विशेषज्ञानवत्त्वं नास्तीति चेन्न । कालाज्ञानगाढान्धकारतिरोहितानुस्मृतिसिद्धस्य विशेषज्ञानस्याप्यवश्यंभावात यथाह [illegible] — मुग्धोऽस्मि [illegible] तमसि [illegible] प्रक्षिप्तोऽभवं न किंचिन्मया विज्ञातमिति (*ibid*)

states pointless. For it can as well be subsumed under Suṣupti without resort to Pariśeṣa.[36]

However opposing *the subsumption of swoon in* Suṣupti the *Bhāmatī* has argued that the two are different states on account of their difference of purpose, cause and symptoms. If they should be equated with each other because of the absence of specific knowledge of any particular object in them, there will arise a similar contingency of having to equate the dreaming and wakeful state as there is knowledge of particular objects in both.[37]

The argument is clearly misplaced. The dream and the wakeful states stand distinguished from each other by the application of the intimate criterion which determines their distinction—viz. the complete cessation and continuation of external activities. In the case of swoon, *on the other hand, the complete absence of specific knowledge of* any object of external reality therein being the most intimate factor that helps the manifestation of Jīva's Brahmanhood to the extent possible therein (as Advaita theory would have it) and as this is equally the intimate factor that helps the manifestation of Jīva's Brahmanhood in Suṣupti, *the former should most readily admit of being subsumed in the* latter.[38] Otherwise, as divergences in the nature and quality of sleep, accompanied by feelings of repose or weariness are well-known, the condition of Suṣupti also will have to be split up into different states.[39]

The *Bhāmatī puts in that notwithstanding such differences, in the* nature and quality of sleep there is a basic identity of purpose, cause and symptoms among them all which show they belong to one and the same state.[40] This is belied by our own experience of having had a good sleep or a bad one whose reactions are diametrically opposed to each other. After a good sleep one feels refreshed and rewarded by complete disappearance of fatigue. A bad sleep leaves one fretful and dissatisfied and suffering. There can be no unity of fruit, causes and symptoms

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36 सिद्धान्तोऽप्ययुक्त.। स यदि मूर्च्छाया अवान्तरावस्थामभ्युपेत्य प्रवर्तते तदा भाष्यभामत्यादिविरोध.। यदि च स्वतन्त्रावस्थात्वाभ्युपगमेन तदा सौत्र परिशेपोऽसिद्ध , सुपुप्तावन्तर्भावसभवात् (*STC.* iii 2 10)

37 नहि विशेपविज्ञानसद्भावसाम्यमात्रेण स्वप्नजागरयोरभेद बाह्येन्द्रियव्यापारभावाभावाभ्या तु भेदोऽनयो.। सुपुप्तमोहयोरपि प्रयोजनभेदात् कारणभेदाल्लक्षणभेदाच्च भेद. (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 10)

38. तन्न। बाह्यव्यापारोपरमानुपरमाभ्या प्रसिद्धाभ्यामवस्थान्तरत्वेऽन्तरगप्रयोजकाभ्या स्वप्नजागरितयोर्भेदेऽपीह ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वेनान्तरगभूतेन विशेपज्ञानाभावेन सुप्त्यन्तर्भावस्यैव न्याय्यत्वात् (*STC.* iii 2 10)

39 अन्यथा सुप्तेष्वेव सुखानुभवदु:खानुभवयोर्विरुद्धयोरनुभवस्य त्वयैवागीकारेण सुप्तिरपि भिद्येत. (*ibid*)

40. सुपुप्तस्य त्ववान्तरभेदेऽपि निमित्तप्रयोजनलक्षणाभेदादेकत्वम् (मोहसुपुप्त्योस्तु तद्भेदात् भेद: (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 10)

between these two, when experience proves the contrary.[41] We have to admit therefore that despite the variations of causes, fruit and symptoms the state of sleep is one. For the same reason the state of Moha too cannot be differentiated from sleep so long as it shares with it its essential and distinctive character of absence of all knowledge of any external reality.[42]

But this would not make them parallel states. The sameness of the intimate characteristic leads to the subsumption of the one in the other. Otherwise ascetics cannot be brought under the category of Brahmins, the Paṇḍavas under the clan of Kurus, darkness under absence of light and so on. For even in these cases it may not be difficult to unearth grounds of distinction amongst them such as having a tuft or being shaven-headed. This disposes of the objection that if absence of specific knowledge of external objects is to be the basis of subsuming swoon in Suṣupti, it would lead to the subsumption of death itself under Suṣupti. For the intimate characteristic of death is extinction of life followed by the body getting cold. These are not the characteristics of Suṣupti. Hence there is no overpervasion of the essential character of the one in the other. This serves to keep them apart.

Vācaspati holds that as death does not occur in the absence of swoon tho' every time there is a swoon death does not supervene, it may be looked upon as partaking of the character of death in part and partly of Suṣupti where there is union with B.[43] In this sense, swoon may, therefore, be regarded as half-union with B. But then, in many cases death is also seen to occur without one's passing thro' a swoon.[44] It is not, therefore, proper to lean too heavily on negative concomitance in the absence of invariable positive concomitance. As the self has no *aṁśas* in S. 's philosophy, it is not possible for him to accept its Ardhasampatti with B. in swoon as taught by the Sūtrakāra. He is, therefore, forced to reduce the Sūtrakāra's concept of the Jīva's Ardhasampatti with B. in the state of swoon to a verbal fiction.

S.'s argument that swoon is to be treated as Ardhasampatti as it coincides with Suṣupti (in one respect) and diverges from it (in another)

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41. तन्न । सुप्तेर्निमित्तप्रयोजनलक्षणानामभेदादिह । दुःखमहमस्वाप्सम्, गुरूणि मे गात्राणि इत्यादिविपदानुभवस्यैवापरोक्षात् । यस्तु सुखमस्वाप्सम् इत्याद्यनुस्मरति तदीयसुप्ते श्रमापनुत्ति, यस्तु दुःखमनुस्मरति तदीयसुप्तेः धर्मोत्पत्तिः प्रयोजनम् (*STC.* iii 2 10)
42. तथा च, सत्त्वादिभेदेऽपि सुप्तत्वस्य सुप्तावस्थान इवाविशेषात् मोहस्यापि भेदो न स्यात् (*STC.* iii 2 10)
43. यद्यपि सत्यपि मोहे न मरणम् तथाप्यसति मोहे न मरणमिति मरणार्थो मोह (*Bhāmati* iii 2 10)
44. 'न देहं बुबुधे गतम्' इत्यादौ मोहेन विनापि मरणदर्शनात्, वनादावपि मृतानां तदभावाच्च । तत्रापि किञ्चित्कालेन प्रमाणशून्यम् (*STC.* iii 2 10)

is to say the least, fallacious[45] Such partial coincidence and divergence are to be found in the presence of specific knowledge of particular objects and absence of knowledge of external reality as between the waking state and dreams as well, which does not entitle us to treat the dream state as part of the waking one[46]

The manner in which this *adhi.* has been explained by S so as to find out of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a Swoon places it outside the scope of the first four *adhi* s of this Pāda, which according to the *Kalpataru* is the sifting of "Tvam padārtha"—the "Thou" principle (*Op cit* iii 2 1)

Bhāratī Tīrtha in his *Nyāyamālā* has, however, tried to explain the thematic connection of this *adhi* with the three earlier *adhi* s as follows The true nature of the self as an unattached being has been demonstrated in the opening adhi by showing that the dream state wherein the Jivātman appears as a doer, an enjoyer and a sufferer is unreal[47] The evidence of direct experience of Jīva's oneness with B has been brought out in the next *adhi* in favor of his unattachedness[48] By showing that it is the same self that wakes from Susupti the continuity and permanence of the Jiva has been established in the third *adhi*[49] All lurking fears that this self may perish at death on account of the cessation of all psychophysical activities are now set at rest in this *adhi* by showing that even in the *state of swoon the self remains in a state of semi union with* B[50]

This is not sustainable We have seen that the establishment of the unreality of *dream experiences has no logical or thematic connection* with the establishment of the Ātman's asangatva[51] It would be much more to the point and purpose to have spotlighted the asangatva of Ātman by establishing, instead, the unreality of the entire gamut of man's waking life with its wider sweep of aims and objects and more pronounced and well-planned programme of life's activities and enjoyments The soul's survival after death has been dinned into the ears of the Sādhaka throughout the Vairāgyapāda He is not, therefore, likely to succumb

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45 See *f n* 24

46 त्वन्मते विशेषलेशशून्येन ब्रह्मणा संपत्तिर्नाभिधातुं शक्यते । साम्यवैषम्याभ्यामर्धत्वं संभवतीति चेन्न । पारिभाषिकत्वापातात । जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरपि विशेषज्ञानबाह्याज्ञानाभ्यां साम्यवैषम्ययोः सद्भावेन तयोरप्यर्धप्राप्त्यापत्तेश्च (*STC* iii 2 10)

47 तदेवमधिकरणचतुष्टयेन त्वंपदार्थः शोधितः । तत्र स्वप्नसृष्टिमिथ्यात्वेन सुखदुःखकर्तृत्वाद्यवभासेऽपि जीवोऽसङ्ग एवेति शोधितम्

48 सुषुप्तौ ब्रह्मैक्येन तदेवासङ्गत्वमनुभावितम्

49 तस्यैव पुनः प्रतिबोधनान्नित्यत्वशङ्का निराकृता

50 मूर्च्छाविचारेण श्वासादिसर्वव्यवहारलोपेऽपि मरणं जीवविनाशो नाशङ्कनीय इति दर्शितम्

51 See Pages 31 32 *ante*

now to any fear that his soul may not survive bodily death or need his faith to be buttressed by being taken thro' the esoterics of the state of swoon

There is no substance in the contention that the second *adhi* has helped to sift only the true nature of Ātman's asangatva by adducing the evidence of direct experience of such asangatva in Suṣupti but not also of the nature of Tvam-padārtha except indirectly

If this is accepted, the entire Śāstra would have to be harnessed to the task of sifting Tvam-padārtha alone In that case, Tvam-padārtha will turn out to be the chief purport of the whole Śāstra and the claim that all Vedānta has B for its theme and purport will have to be given up

Granting that the second *adhi* establishes the oneness of Jīva with B in Suṣupti, how is that *adhi* proof of the Jiva's having any direct experience of his asangatva? For, unless it is acknowledged by S that the Jivātman directly experiences his oneness with B in Suṣupti, he cannot be said to experience his asangatva as part of that experience But the difficulty is that this oneness is by hypothesis, the very essence of B In order that such oneness may become directly experienced in Suṣupti it must become the object of the said experience Neither B nor Jivātman can afford to nave such an experience in Advaita theory[52] It is to avoid such a contingency of the subject becoming the object of its own experience that Advaita theory has held that there is absence of any specific consciousness in Suṣupti In the circumstances, the self cannot expect to have any actual experience of its own asangatva in Suṣupti[53]

The explanation that Sutra 9 is intended to remove the doubt regarding impermanence cannot stand scrutiny We must know if the doubt concerns the Jivātman or B What is called Jivātman in Advaita philosophy is consciousness enveloped by impermanent principles such as *ahamkāra* With the dissolution of these Upādhis, there is bound to be the cessation of the qualified entity There can be no point in refuting it[54] The other alternative is out of the question. Sleep is something that affects the Jivātman While a doubt regarding the impermanence of the Jiva may arise on its account, it cannot arise with re-

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52 किञ्च सुषुप्तौ [illegible] ? [illegible] । [illegible] (STC iii 2 10)

53 अत एव [illegible] । [illegible] ? (STC iii 2 10)

54 [illegible] ? [illegible] (ibid)

ference to B[55] If it should, the inquiry would amount to a sitting of nature of "Tatpadārtha" and as such it cannot be brought within the scope of the first four *adhi* s here For similar reasons the subject matter of the Mugdhādhi also will be out of court On the whole, the sequence of thought in S's interpretation of these four *adhi* s is far from satisfactory

आद्येऽधिकरणे स्वप्नमिथ्यात्व प्रतिपादितम् ।
द्वितीये ब्रह्मणि लयस्तृतीये चोत्थिति पुन ॥
चतुर्थे चार्धसपत्तिरिति किं केन सगतम् ?
तस्मात् सूत्रकृतो नैतद्व्याख्याने सगत मन ॥ (*STC* iii 2 10)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R puts up his Pūrvapaksa that the state of swoon is the same as death as there is complete cessation of the activity of the senses and breath in the swoon[57] This overshoots the mark by suppressing the fact that breath and bodily warmth can still be felt by careful examination in that condition R holds that swoon is ardhasampatti (in B) in the sense of its being a half way house to death.[58] If this means that swoon is half-union with B with a view to giving up the body, it is *not true in all cases* Persons who have swooned are also found to recover from it and in these cases their union with B in the swoon cannot be said to have served the purpose of relinquishing the body[59]

All this difficulty arises because these commentators are fighting shy of accepting the Ardhasampatti of the Jīva in B in the state of swoon expressly taught by the Sutrakāra, in its literal sense and are trying to find ways and means of explaining it away as it suits their fancy. We have seen how by remaining faithful to its primary sense the concept of Ardhasampatti in B can be understood in its proper perspective *as throwing light on the inscrutable power of B in enabling the Jīva, part-*less as he is, to have a partial union with Itself and be grateful for it

55 न द्वितीय । सुप्तेर्जीवधर्मत्वेन तन्निवर्तनानित्यत्वशकाया जीवे उचितत्वेऽपि अतद्धर्मे ब्रह्मण्यनौचित्यात (*ibid*)

56 किं चैव सति इद तत्पदार्थशोधनमेवेति चतुरधिकरण्या बहिरेव स्यात' अत एव मूर्च्छाधिकरणप्रमेयसग्रहोऽप्यनुपपन्न (*STC* iii 2 10)

57 किं मूर्च्छा मरणादर्थान्तर, उत मरणमेवेति सशय । सर्वेन्द्रियप्राणव्यापारोपरते मरणमेवेति पूर्व पक्ष (*Vedantadipa* iii 2 10)

58 मूर्छिते पुरुषे या अवस्था सा मरणायार्धसपत्ति (*ibid*)

59 तत्र, मरणायेति चतुर्थ्या शरीरत्यागार्था ब्रह्मणा सपत्तिर्मोह इत्युक्त स्यात तच्चायुक्तम् मूर्च्छितस्यापि पुनरुज्जीवनदर्शनात तदा ब्रह्मसपत्त शरीरत्यागार्थत्वाभावात (*STC* iii 2 10)

CHAPTER IX

BRAHMAN IS EQUALLY PERFECT IN ALL ITS FORMS EVERYWHERE

8 *Sthānabhedādhikaraṇam* (iii 2 11-13)

We have seen that the first seven *adhi* s of this Pāda have served their purpose of amplifying the glory of B by unfolding the philosophical significance of the deeper layers of thought embedded in the definition of B as the author of the eightfold determinations of the life of beings As the connotation of the term "Brahman" as a being of infinite perfections and free from all blemishes is self-explanatory, there is no need to amplify it But there is need to justify such a concept of B as it is unique and without a parallel in our experience For it *may be difficult to accept it without reserve or misgivings when it is* confronted by other philosophical views questioning its validity The next thirteen *adhi* s are, therefore, designed to offer such a justification of the unitary concept of B as *Nirdoṣāśeṣasadguṇam* and help the seeker of truth to stand firm in his conviction[1]

Thus while the first seven *adhi* s call forth the spirit of ecstatic devotion to B born of the vivid knowledge of the immensity of God's benefactions to man as the impelling force behind all his states of conscious, semi-conscious and super-conscious life (*sarvavasthāpreraka*),[2]

1 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 11 13)

2 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 11 13)

the next thirteen *adhi.s* provide the philosophical justification of the essential elements of a sound Theistic doctrine of Divine Personality, communion with which is the goal of Bhakti The acceptance of the complete equality and identity of perfections and blemishlessness among all manifestations of the Divine presence irrespective of place or time, the transempirical character of the Divine personality, its transcending all our mental constructs of it even thro' Dhyāna[2a] and its absolute distinction from the individual self are some of its salient features These constitute the subject matter of the following *adhi.s*[3]

The present (eighth) *adhi* establishes the conclusion that the Divine personality is for ever identical in its infinite perfections and absolute blemishlessness in all places of its presence and manifestations.

The *adhi* arises by way of a supervening objection to the conclusion reached in the *Karmānusmṛtyadhi* (iii 2 9) It has been shown that the Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña forms the Lord operate from different loci in the body of the Jīvas[4] This is bound to impose some kind of a gradation in status among them as between a benefactor and a beneficiary How then can it be asserted on the basis of Sutra iii 2 9 that one and the same Being controls and regulates all the states of all the Jīvas for all time[5]?

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is The Lord present in the different loci of the waking, dreaming and Susupti states as Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña is different in each case like a pot which is found in more than one place at a given time The explanation given in B S i 2 7 that God being all-pervasive can be present like ether in more than one place at a time will not be to the point here For, ether is conceived as having integral parts (amśas) thro' which it pervades different places and things at a time But the Śrutis have it that unlike Ākāśa, the Supreme B is present with the entirety of its being, and lineaments in each of the loci of waking, dream and Suṣupti states of the Jīvas This can be seen from the description of both the Visva and Taijasa forms of B as

2a ध्यानजन्यस्य तु ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपधात प्रतिबिम्बाक्नेश्च भेद एव (*Anandamala* iii 2 14)

3 अस्या पेटिकाया भक्त्युत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकधर्मनिरास फलम । तथाहि—दोपस्य तावत भक्तिप्रतिबन्धकत्व सिद्धम । न हि दोपिणि भक्तिरुत्पद्यमाना दृष्टा । अतश्च न स्याननये भदद्वारानुग्राह्यत्वादिनिरासायाभदप्रतिपादन-द्वारा दोपसामान्य निराकृतम (*ibid*)

4 दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजस ।
आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थित ॥ (*Mandukya* i 2)

5 युगपदभिन्नस्यानत्वेन परमात्मनोऽपि भेदे भिन्नाना च तारतम्यमनुग्राह्यानुग्राहकभावश्चापलब्ध इति तत्प्रसंगोऽस्तीति 'स एव च' इत्युक्त इति सुधोक्तरीत्या 'स एव च' इत्याद्याक्षेपादनन्तरसंगति

(Raghu *TPB* iii 2 11)

having seven limbs and nineteen mouths[6] The *Māṇḍūkya Up* assigns to the Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña different properties of being conditioned by cause and effect (Viśva and Taijasa), conditioned by cause alone (Prājña) and not being conditioned by either (Turya)[7] and as enjoying the gross forms of nourishment (Viśva) the subtle ones (Taijasa) and pure joy Prājña).[8] As these forms of the Lord are sentient beings and as mutual difference among sentient beings is as a rule concomitant with difference and gradation in their intrinsic nature, the conclusion is inevitable that these forms are different from one another and subject to some gradational relationship as superior and inferior or as benefactor and benefited This subjects the Supreme Lord to flaws and limitations He cannot, therefore, be absolutely perfect Such a

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6 न च भिन्नस्थानवत्त्व भेदरूपसाध्य विना व्योमवदित्यत्राक्तदिशोपपन्नमिति वाच्यम्। व्योम्नोंऽशतोऽनेकस्थानत्वसम्भवेऽपि हरेरनेकस्थानस्थितविश्वादिरूपाणा 'सप्ताग एकोनविंशतिमुख' इत्यादिना प्रत्येक समग्ररूपश्रवणेन व्योमवैधर्म्येण भेदसाध्यन विना ह्यनारनवकाशात् (Ragh *Ny Muk* iii 2 11-13)

7 कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ।
प्राज्ञ कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्ये न सिद्ध्यत ॥ (*Maṇḍ Up* i 11)

It should be noted that these Karikās connected with the prose passages in the *Manḍukya Up* are treated as part of the Up itself by M Kūranarayana and others There is evidence to show that S, Suresvara, Ramanuja, Sudarsana Suri, Anandagiri and Appayya Dīkṣita were also of this opinion. For details see my papers on the Upaniṣadic Theory of the Karikas of the Āgama Prakarana in the *Rev of Phil and Reli*, the *Poona Orientalist* and *Bharatiya Vidya*, quoted in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, Vol. I,
The terms *Karya* and *Karaṇa* according to M.'s interpretation signify the illusion of independence of initiative in the Jagrat state and the notion of dream objects being of the waking state itself

अविद्यातत्कार्यभ्रमरूपजाग्रद्बद्धो विश्व।
अविद्यातत्कार्यजाग्रत्कालीनभ्रमरूपोमयकार्यभ्रमलक्षणस्वप्नबद्ध तैजस इति

(Raghu *TPB* iii 2 11-13)

The expression "Baddhah" (bound or conditioned) in the above Śruti as applied to the Visva, Taijasa and Prajña Forms of B are to be understood *according to M.'s interpretation on the basis of the principle of Tadadhinatvad arthavat* (BS i 4 3) see Vol. I, pp 263-64) as one on whom the bound or conditioned existence of the Jiva in these states depends *Bandhayati iti baddhah* Vadiraja in his TPG (pp 136-37) has very well brought out the whole idea —

बद्धस्य च 'ग्रामान् इ'त्यत्रेव त स्वामित्वनापि घटते। अतो जीवाधिकरणकस्य कार्यबन्धस्य स्वामित्वात् भगवानपि बद्ध इत्युच्यते। एव जाग्रदवस्थाकारणरूप स्वप्नावस्थाया गुणत्रुटयादिरूपा या जीवाधिकरणको बन्ध, तत्स्वामित्वात् कारणबद्ध' इत्युच्यते 'प्राज्ञ कारणबद्ध' इत्यत्र स्वप्नकारणभूत सुप्त्यवस्थाया सर्वेन्द्रियाणामुपरमाख्यो जीवाधिकरणको यो बन्ध तत्स्वामित्वात् प्राज्ञोऽपि कारणबद्ध इत्युच्यते। इमौ द्वावपि बन्धौ केवल मायादानरि तुरीये न सिद्ध्यत तात्त्विकत्वयापि न विद्यत इत्यर्थ। एते विश्वादय तथाऽवस्था जीवस्य ससारबन्धहेतव तुरीयस्तु केवल बन्धमोचक इति

8. विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ् नित्य तैजस प्रविविक्तभुक्
आनन्दभुक् तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोग निबोधत (*Māṇḍukya* 1.3)

As the Prājña has been clearly identified in the *Brh Up* (iv 3 21) and in *B S* (i 3 42) with the Supreme B, the Visva and Taijasa have similarly to be understood as presiding over waking and dream states and *not* as Jivatman implicated in those states, as S. has done in his C on the *Māṇḍukya Up* and elsewhere

Being cannot be the object of our unexcelled devotion The theme of the Pāda viz Bhakti is thus frustrated[9]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta Sūtra declares *Na sthānato' pi Parasyobhayalingam*[10] *sarvatra hi* "In spite of difference of places,[11] there is no difference[12] of essential character[13] (whatsoever) in B as the Perfect Being For, the Śruti says "The wise ones proclaim that everywhere (in the world of matter and) among the living creatures (as well as in the different loci of their bodies) It has the identical character of infinite perfections"[14]

As the shorter form *Nobhayatvam* would give the impression that like Ākāśa B is only collectively identical with its several loci, all

9 Ragh *TPB* shows how the present *adhi* is not rendered superfluous by the earlier ones *BS* II.3, 43, 46-47 He also shows that the inference in the Purva pakṣa that the Lord must be subject to difference on account of His being present in different places at the same time, is not barred by the stand taken in BS i 1 3 and ii 1 28, etc as the datum of such inference is derived from the Śruti itself (Ragh *TPB* iii 2 11-13, p 280)

10 स्थानापेक्षयापि परमात्मनो न भिन्न रूपम् (M *BSB* iii 2 11)

11 स्थानत इति तद्भेदो लक्ष्यते। आद्यादित्वात् सप्तम्यर्थे तसि (Ragh *TPB* iii 2 11)

12 *Ubhaya* in the Sutra is understood by M in the sense of 'different' (suggested by the idea of twoness or *dvitvam*) Ragh *TPB* quotes the authority of Vṛttis on Panini (v 2 44) in support of assigning such a meaning to *ubhaya*

उभशब्दपर्याय उभयशब्द । उभशब्दश्च सख्यातदन्यार्थवाचक । 'उभादुदात्त' इति सूत्रे द्वयर्थत्वस्य वृत्यादौ दर्शनात् **इह भिन्नपरत्व न विरुध्यते (*Op cit* iii 2 11)

13 Lingam' is understood in the sense of *svarupam* or essential character on the authority of the Kosa लिग स्वरूपमुद्दिष्ट लिग ज्ञापकमेव च quoted in M s BT (VII 2 46) Even if we understand it in the other sense of mark or proof the explanation would be the same in that difference of place is not a sufficient proof that the Forms of the Lord present in different places must be of different character

नहि स्थानभेद तस्य (परमात्मन) उभयलिगत्वस्य लिग कारण वा भवति। स्थानभेदेऽपि तद्गतस्यैकत्वोपपत्ते (*BD* iii 2 11)

The TD of Trivikrama and the *Anandamala* adopt this way of explaining the wording of the Sutra by pointing out that tho' states of dreaming and waking are different, the same individual is the enjoyer in both

14 The Śruti cited in the Sutra thro "Sarvatra hi' is the well known one from *AĀ* cited earlier under BS i 2 1

एत ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमामन्ते **एतमग्नौ एत दिवि, एतमाकाशे **सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते (*AĀ* iii 2 3)

The words *bhūteṣu etam* and *iti* after *brahma* in this text are regarded by M. as specially significant in this context *Bhutesu* is extended by *upalakṣaṇa* to apply to the three 'sthanas' of the Supreme referred to earlier in

स एतमेव सीमान विदार्यैतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत ** तस्य त्रय आवसथा त्रय स्वप्ना (*AA* ii 4 3)

The repetition of the singular *etam* indicates the oneness (*ekatvam*) of all the Forms in all the different loci The particle *iti* after 'Brahma" (in ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते) signifies the manner (प्रकार) in which B is to be realized as a Being possessed of infinite perfections which is the radical sense of "Brahma' (See Ragh *TPB* iii 2 11)

taken together, with all its particular lineaments, the Sūtrakāra has preferred to use the expression *Na ubhayalingam* (in the sense of the words already explained viz *na bhinnasvarūpam*) to make it clear that unlike Ākāśa the Supreme B manifests itself in toto and in the entirety of its being, perfections and lineaments in every locus and that these forms are severally pervasive and identical in character and lineaments, in each case The principle of interpretation adhered to here is the well known one of सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसंक्रामतः ।

M's bhāṣya cites the analogy of the Sun who is present as the Abhimānidevatā in the eyes of each and every individual, in all the fulness of his lineaments without difference of essential character [15]

प्रतिदृशमिव नैकधार्कमेकं समधिगतोऽस्मि विधूतभेदमोहः । (*Bhāg* i 9 49)

The second Sūtra refutes an objection against the identity of the forms The *Māndukya Up* depicts the Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turiya as having divergent characteristics—as already pointed out [16] The latter half of the Sūtra dispels this objection by pointing out how numerous Srutis[17] bear witness to the fact that the Supreme B is severally identical, wholly and with all its perfections and lineaments with one another (i) as present in the earth, waters, fire and the individual self[18] (ii) how each of these forms is in its turn identical with one another and with the Mūlarūpa[19] and (iii) and how the identity of the Supreme with the Viśva, Taijasa and other Forms is also clearly enunciated in the same Sruti itself

अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च । (*Manḍūkya* 1 29)

The language of difference used in the Srutis with reference to these forms is, therefore, to be figuratively understood as indicative of the inconceivable majesty of the Supreme The description of Viśva, Tai-

15 Explaining the point of the analogy here the *BD* writes
स्वस्वरूपाणामैक्यमात्रस्य दृष्टान्त । ननु, द्रव्यपूर्तिभेदेऽपि । सूर्यस्यचक्षुरादिवत् चक्षुरादिषु द्रव्यपूर्त्या स्थित्य भावादिति ध्येयम् (*Op cit* iii 2 11)

16 See fn. 7 *ante*

17 The Śrutis cited by M in this connection are
एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृत (*Bṛh Up* iii 7 3)
अयमेव स योऽयमात्मा इदममृतं ब्रह्मेदम् (*Bṛ Up* ii 5 1)
अयं वै हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि च बहूनि चानन्तानि च तदेतद् ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरम्
(*Bṛh Up* ii 5 19)

18 एष त आत्मान्तर्यामी इति पृथिव्यन्तर्यामिजीवान्तर्यामिणोरभेदोक्तिः (*STC* iii 2 11 13)

19 यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां पुरुषः यश्चायमध्यात्मम् अयमेव स (*Bṛh.* ii 5 1) इत्यादिना पृथिवीजीवान्तर्यामिणो मूलरूपस्य 'अयं वै हरय' इत्यादिना भगवद्रूपाणां परस्पर मूलरूपेण चाभेदोक्तिः
(*Op cit* iii 2 11 13)

jasa, etc as associated with certain attributes which are incompatible with Divine nature (as bound by cause and effect etc) has been shown to admit of a different explanation consistent with Divine majesty[20]

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20 This explanation cannot be extended to the difference between Jīva and B also For identity with its Forms is a mark of Divine majesty whereas Jīvas are established on the evidence of Sakṣi as intrinsically different from B We cannot misuse the mysterious power (*acintyasakti*) of B to put the Jīvas on a par with its own manifestations of Visva, etc and explain away their intrinsic difference from B as due to this very mysterious power of B., for the simple reason that the mysterious power of B cannot put up with anything which will reduce it to a mockery A mediating factor will not permit its own annulment in the bargain, for B to reduce itself to Jīvahood by the exercise of its mysterious power is to relinquish or be deprived of such power

CHAPTER X

BRAHMAN'S FORM IS TRANSEMPIRICAL

9 *Arūpādhikaranam* (iii 2 14-17)

This *adhi* establishes that B possesses a transempirical form, color and lineaments of its own It arises by way of an objection against the conclusion established in the preceding *adhi* The objection is that to admit form, color and lineaments in B is to reduce it to impermanence Tho' the fact of B's possessing non-material form, color, etc has been established in some of the earlier adhi s (such as i,2,23, 26, 3,12, ii, 1,32)[1] it is being fully justified as to how it is described as formless in some Śrutis, while it has a transempirical form and by showing how the Śrutis which depict B as devoid of form, color and lineaments are to be understood without violating the conception of B has having a transempirical form. This removes one of the obstacles to Bhakti, for there can be no lasting devotion towards a B whose form is perishable

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that if B should have form and lineaments of its own, it will be exposed to impermanence[2] It will also invalidate Srutis like *Arūpam avyayam* (Kaṭha i 3 15) which deny form, color and lineaments to B On the other hand, if we are to conceive of B as devoid of any form there will be no beauty or excellence in the Divine Being to sustain the spontaneous devotion of the seeker Such a position will also be against the spirit of the Sruti *Rugmavarnam*

1 This point is raised by Ragh. *TPB* iii.2.14 and answered
[illegible] प्रमाणविरोधकथनं च तस्यैवात्र समर्थनादिति ॥

2 रूपवत्त्वेऽनित्यत्वमित्यतो भक्ति– अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् (M BSB iii 2 14)

kartāram (*Mund Up* III 1 9) The two conceptions cannot, therefore be reconciled by holding that the ascription of form and lineaments is made in a transempirical sense and the negation of form etc from the point of view of forms and lineaments of a material character and essence Either way, there is no scope for Bhakti [3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that B is without form or color For, having a body will make it impermanent This leaves full scope for Bhakti The reason why B is to be bodiless is 'Tatpradhānatvāt' The full force and philosophical significance of this capsulated term is brought out by M with a penetrating observation

प्रकृत्यादिप्रवर्तकत्वेन तदुत्तमत्वात् नैव रूपवत् ब्रह्म (M BSB III 2 14)

"B is without a body as it transcends Prakrti and its evolutes—being the source of impulsion in their transformation' This is supported by an apt quotation from the *Matsya Purāna*

भौतिकानि हि रूपाणि भूतेभ्योऽसौ परो मत ।
अरूपवानत प्रोक्त एव तदव्यक्तत परे [4] ।। (M BSB III 2 14)

The agrument is self-sufficient " For, all forms known to us in finite reality are constituted of the five elements The Supreme B transcends not only the elements but what lies beyond them—viz the Avyaktatattva or Mūla-Prakrti itself How then is it possible to attribute physical (Prākrtic) form, color or lineaments to such a Being[5]?

The next Sūtra says the denial of form to B is not to be understood in its absolute sense It only means that B's form is constituted differently from the other forms familiar to us in the world of matter. When we say that there is no light in a dark room where we may be sitting, we do not mean to deny the presence of the light of the eye or of the mind The same is the case here

यथा चक्षुरादिप्रकाशे विद्यमानेऽपि वैलक्षण्यादप्रकाशादिव्यवहार । (M BSB III 2 15)

The third Sutra refutes the objection that without a body or form B will be without beauty, grace splendor and other characteristics that fill the heart of the devotee and make it glow with Bhakti The Sūtra says B's from is constituted of the very essence of supreme knowledge and bliss The words *Āha ca* in the Sutra refer to Śrutis like

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3 तदेवमुभयथापि भक्तेरनुपपन्नत्वात व्यर्थोऽय पाद इति । (*TP* III 2 14)

4 तदिति ततम् । व्यस्त समस्त च । तत् प्रस्तुत ब्रह्म अरूपवदेव । प्राकृतदेहादिरहितमेव । कुत ? तत्प्रधानत्वात । तस्य ब्रह्मण तेभ्य प्रकृतिभूतेभ्य उत्तमत्वात् । (*TDP* III 2 14)

5 भूतेभ्य परे महदहकारादावपि भौतिकरूपत्व नास्तीति मतमूलाव्यक्तत परे तद भौतिक क्व ! नास्तीति किमु वक्तव्यमित्यय सूचित (Vadiraja *TPG* p 137)

ऐकात्म्यप्रत्ययसारम् । (*Mandukya* 7)

in support The words of this Śruti and others cited in the Bhāṣya convey that B's form is of the essence of *jnāna* and *ānanda*

The predicate '*Tanmatram* connected with the term 'rūpam' (of B) taken over with necessary adjustment from *arupavat*[7] gives the meaning that B's body or form is of the essence of its attributes of pure knowledge and bliss That these constitute the essence of B has already been recognized in the Sutra *Tadgunasāratvattu tadvyapadesah* (ii 3 29)[8] Tho' the shorter form *arupam* would have sufficed, the Sutrakāra has used the longer one with the additional possesive suffix (*matup*) after the '*bahuvrīhi* (*arupam*) This according to M's commentators gives a broad hint that the Sūtrakārā does not favor any absolute distinction between the form and the possessor of it so far as the Supreme B is concerned[9] This makes it possible for us to hold that both B and its form or body are equally of the essence of knowledge and bliss The *Ānandamalā* is the earliest commentary to press this point to its full advantage

अत एव रूपिणि सिद्ध शुद्धज्ञानानन्दमात्रत्व लक्षण तस्य रूपेऽप्यपीति राद्धान्त श्रुतिहृदयनिर्लोडित । (Op. cit p 107)

The last Sutra answers another objection that the Srutis cited in support of the Siddhānta under Sutra 16 merely show that B is of the essence of knowledge and bliss They *do not show* that knowledge and bliss *constitute the form or body of B* The Sutra points out how Śrutis and Smṛtis do expressly speak of the wise ones who by the power of their knowledge perceive B which shines everywhere and consists of bliss both in essence and in form

तद्विज्ञानेन परिपश्यन्ति धीरा
आनन्दरूपममृत यद्विभाति ।[10] (*Mund Up* ii 2 7)

6. प्रधानात्ममात्र एव स्वरूप यस्य तदैकात्म्यम् । प्रत्ययसार ज्ञानरूपम् । (*TP* iii 2 16)
एकात्म्य प्रत्ययचतुष्टय सार स्वरूप यस्य तत् । (*BD*)
Cf शुद्धानन्दात्मविज्ञानघनत्वहृद्गीतार्थवाक्यान्विदम् । (*TP*)
7 रूपमिति प्रकृतमनुवर्ति । रूप तन्मात्रम् । ज्ञानानन्दमात्रम् । (*TDP* iii 2 16)
8. तद्गुणसारत्वादिति प्रकृतौ ज्ञानानन्दौ तच्छब्देन गृह्यते । (*TP* iii 2 16)
9 अरूपमिति वाच्ये मतुप् रूपरूपिणोरत्यन्तभेदनिवृत्त्यर्थमिति राद्धान्त । (TDP iii 2 14)
10 Vādiraja makes a pertinent point here The words of the above Śruti leave no room for doubt that it is the *form* of B that is said to be perceived" by the sages as consisting of essence of bliss Perception is a visual act and has reference to the form of the object The bare essence (*svarupam*) of B on the other hand is open to perception by the *mind alone* Read
ब्रह्मण स्वरूपमपरोक्ष्यत न तु मनसा[illegible] धन । विद्वांस परिपश्यन्ति इत्युक्त्वात चाक्षुषज्ञान[illegible] [illegible] तस्य हि [illegible] आनन्दरूपमिति वचनात् । [illegible] स्वरूपम् । तस्य मनोमात्रग्राह्यत्वस्य[illegible]मनुपपन्नत्वात् । (*TPG* p 137-38)

CHAPTER XI

BHEDABHEDAVĀDA REFUTED IN THE INTEREST OF BHAKTI

10. *Upamādhikaraṇam* (ii.2.18)

This *adhi.* removes another obstacle to Bhakti by refuting the possibility of a relation of Bhedābheda between Jīva and B. The reason is that like identity, Bhedābheda relation is equally uncogenial to Bhakti in its true sense.[1] The argument in favor of Bhedābheda draws support form the consideration of the fact that the Jīvas are also sentient beings like B. and are its *aṁśas* like the Matsya and other forms.[2] Tho' difference between Jīva and B. has already been established in the Sutras, there is still scope for the combined relation of identity and difference *(bhedābheda)* between them. For, in the bhedābheda relation also the Jīvas remain as *aṁśas* of B. but only in their totality. Individually and severally, however, they are both different from and identical with B. The acceptance of this relation is not in any way antagonistic to their difference.[3]

The argument to Bhedābheda may be stated as follows. B. is the only self-established reality. It becomes Īśvara by contact with Māyā which is not real. Īśvara is the all-knowing ruler and creator of the world. He assumes many forms like Matsya and others for the benefit of the world. The lordly attributes of Īśvara remain unobstructed in these other forms. The Jīvas are *aṁśas* of B.

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1. इह परमेश्वरे जीवस्यात्यन्तिकभक्तिसिद्धये भेदाभेदमत निराक्रियते। (*NS.* iii 2 18)

2 जीव परमात्मनो न भिद्यते, चेतनत्वात्, तदशत्वात् मत्स्यादिवत् इत्यनुमानसिद्धत्वात्। (*TP.* iii 2 18)

3 न च वाच्यम्-भेदस्य समर्थितत्वात् नाभेदो युक्त इति। सर्वचेतनसमुदायस्य ईशाशत्वेन जीवस्य परमात्मना भेदाभेदात् अभेदेऽपि भेदाविरोधात्। (*TP.* iii 2-18)

thro' the contact with unreal Avidyā They are of the nature of Cit like sparks of fire In this sense, they are both different from and one with B They are, however, different from one another and from B and Īśvara B is the totality of selves and other than they The forms of B like Matsya differ from B as sportively assumed forms for the benefit of the world. The lordly powers of Jivas are, however, obscured due to their separation from B by the adjuncts of body, senses, etc. due to the operation of beginningless Avidyā, Kāma, Karma, etc They therefore, suffer in Samsāra. Since their difference from B is, however, due to the upādhis, they attain equal status with the forms of B once these upādhis are liquidated by the combined effects of Jñāna and Karma Just as the forms after having finished their work of doing good to the world attain Brahmanhood, the Jīvas also after successfully completing the programme of Jñānakarmasamuccaya and being freed from the upādhis of body, senses etc thro' the destrcution of their Prārabdhakarmas, attain their natural state of B The only plausible relation which the Jīvas can bear to B is thus as units in that totality of beings called "B". This allows them to stand in a relation of Bhedābheda to B

But even this relation of Bhedābheda is bound to cut at the root of Bhakti in so far as the Jīvas have a natural identity with B[4] The present *adhi*, therefore, refutes this relation so as to provide full and unfettered scope for Bhakti, with the aid of the concept of Bimbapratibimbabhāva in place of Aupādhikabheda It is the relation of Pratibimbatva that is elucidated by the simile of the Sun's reflected image (sūryakopamā) This simile is used to draw out the true connotation and implications of the figure of Pratibimba applied to the Jīvas' relation to B

This adhi. is not rendered superfluous by the *Pṛthagupadeśādhi* (ii 3.28-29) It may also be viewed as refuting the objection that just as it had been shown that difference of place makes no difference to the identity of B and its forms, the Jivas also may be accepted as identical with B because of their standing in the relation of *amśas* to B in the Bhedābheda theory[5] It may also be taken to arise on the basis of another objection that tho' the other forms of B such as Matsya, do not have a material form or body, still in so far as B is the totality of Jivas and as the latter do have material bodies, the same may be true

4 औपाधिकभेदे सत्यपि स्वाभाविकस्याभेदस्य स्वीकृतत्वेन भक्तिरयुक्ता ।
(Ragh. Ny Muktāvali iii 2 18)

5 न स्थानतः [illegible] (Ragh. TPB iii 2 18)

of B—the Samudāya, too.[6] Since, on the Bhedābheda view, reality of difference is also admitted, it will pose a direct challenge to the position taken in the *Sthānabhedādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.11-13) that there is no difference in the svarūpa of B.[7]

The philosophy of Bhedābheda explains the relation between Jīva and B in the states of Samsāra and Mokṣa in different ways One view is that the Jīvas are different from B in Samsāra because of the evidence of texts like 'Dvā suparṇā (*Muṇḍ. Up* iii.1.1) and that they became identical with B in Mokṣa as is seen from texts like *Yatra tvasya* (*Bṛh Up* iv.5 15) Another view is that even in Samsāra the Jivas are different-cum-identical with B but in Mokṣa they become absolutely identical with B[8] A third view is that they are different-cum-identical with B both in Samsāra and in Moksa

The first view gets over the difficulty of the Jīvas' not being in a position to intuit the blessedness of Brahmic state as their own, here and now, by appealing to Bhedābheda. It accounts for Samsāra in view of the fact that there is no identity of the two in Samsāra The second type of Bhedābheda holds that the presence of difference in Samsāra explains why the Jīvas are not in a position to intuit the blessedness of B as their own in that state.[9] The third brand of Bhedābheda claims that tho' difference between Jīva and B continues to be in Mokṣa, it offers no serious impediment to the Jiva's intuiting the blessedness of B as his own as it exists only in a rarefied form in the state of Mokṣa and is as good as non-existent, like a burnt piece of cloth or like the antahkaraṇa in the case of the Jīvanmukta[10]

Tho' the refutation of Bhedābhedavāda is pertinent to the second Adhyāya, it is also necessary to refute it in this Adhyāya and Pāda in the *interests* of clearing the way for *Bhakti* However, one may *still* raise another objection here It may be justifiable to refute the relation of pure identity between Jīva and B in the interests of Bhakti. But what justification can there be in seeking to refute Bhedābheda in so far as it concedes Bheda? Moreover, as the reality of difference be-

6 मत्स्यादिरूपेषु प्राकृतादिरूपराहित्येऽपि जीवसमुदायस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वेन जीवरूपस्वरूपांशेषु प्राकृतादिरूपवत्वेन 'अरूपवत्' इत्युक्तम्। (Ragh *TPB* iii 2 18)

7 भेदस्यापि सत्त्वेन 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिंगम्' इत्ययुक्तमिति शङ्कनात वा सगतिश्चेति बोध्यम। (Ragh *TPB* iii 2 18)

8 Cf आ मुक्तेर्भेद एव स्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च।
मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदहेतोरभावत ॥

9 द्वितीयमतेऽभेदकार्यस्यानुसंधानस्य भेद प्रतिबन्धक। (*STC* iii 2 18)

10 तृतीये मुक्तौ भेदसद्भावेऽपि नानुसंधानप्रतिबन्ध, तदानी भेदस्य दग्धपटायमानत्वेन जीवन्मुक्तावन्तःकरणस्येवासत्कल्पत्वात। (*STC* iii 2 18)

tween Jīva and B has already been established in the *Pṛthagadhi* (ii 3 28-29) where is the need to rebut Bheda over again as part of Bhedābheda?

The answer to this is that this *adhi* directly refutes only the relation of identity of Jiva and B as it is the one which is directly opposed to Bhakti The refutation of identity in effect amounts to a refutation of Bhedābheda

It is also possible to maintain that this *adhi* refutes the relation of Bhedābheda For tho' the relation of difference as such is acceptable to the Siddhāntin, difference integrated with identity is as repugnant to him as the waters of Gangā stored in a bag of dog's skin The refutation of identity relation prominently is meant to draw attention to the fact that it is most hostile to Bhakti But if the Bhedābheda view which in its triple form is equally hostile to Bhakti is ignored or left unrefuted, the interests of Bhakti will not be properly served in this Pāda However, as the conflict of interest between the Pūrvapaksa and the Siddhānta is chiefly in respect of the identity relation, the Sūtrakāra is mainly directing his attention to it[12]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Jīva is not absolutely different from B because he is a Cetana and an *amsa* of B like the Matsya and other incarnations of the Lord This is not in any way invalidated by the Śrutis affirming difference between Jiva and B quoted in the *Pṛthagadhi* For those Śrutis can be taken as refuting the relation of absolute identity at all times, without taking into account the reality of diffeence Or, the Pūrvapakṣa may be spelt out in this way —The Jīva is identical with B because he is a sentient being and an *amśa* of the Lord like the Matsya and other forms This cannot be rejected as establishing something other than what is contemplated For it is only the relation of Bhedābheda that is sought to be established by this kind of argument Or the Pūrvapakṣa may be put up as follows that the Jiva is both different from and identical with B because he is a sentient being and an *amsa* of B like the Matsya and other forms It cannot be objected that this is tantamount to partially establish-

11 यद्वा, भेदाभेदनिराकरणमेवाधिकरणस्य प्रतिपाद्यमस्तु । केवलभेदस्योपादेयत्वेऽपि श्वदृतिगतदुग्धस्य तदभाववत् केवलभेदस्यानुकूलत्वेऽपि अभेदसहितस्य तदभावात् । टीकायामभेदनिराकरणोक्तिस्तु साक्षात्प्रतिबन्धकतया न तु केवलाभेदाभिप्राया । (*STC* iii 2 18)

12. अन्यथा, उक्तरीत्या भेदाभेदस्य भक्तिप्रतिबन्धकत्वानिरासेन तत्पूर्वपक्षत्वंपदस्थापकता निरर्थका स्यात् । अत एवाभेदांश एव विवादस्य प्राधान्याद् इति सूत्रकारीयाभेदांशनिराकरणस्य टीकायां व्युक्तिरपि सङ्गता । (*ibid*)

ing the already established as the existence of difference is not disputed by the Siddhāntin. For, Siddhasādhana in part is a fault in argument only where the predicate consists of more than one determinant. In the present case, identity integrated with difference is treated as the predicate and its determinant (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*). Nor is the inference of Bhedābheda barred by the absence of the predicate in the illustration. It has been shown in the *Na sthānādhi.* that there is identity between B. and its manifestation like Matsya. It can easily be shown by the use of Tarka mode of argument that there can be no talk of *aṁśatva* in the absence of Bhedābheda relation.[13]

It cannot also be objected that the kind of *aṁśatva* contemplated in respect of B. and its manifestations is different from the one applicable to the Jīvas who are not Svarūpāṁśas and that, therefore, the latter can only be put down as Pratibimbas of B. like the reflected image of the Sun in the water and that, therefore, only the relation of difference can be true of Pratibimbāmśas. The Pūrvapakṣa rejects this objection as baseless. The relation of Pratibimba is consistent only with the presence of limiting adjuncts or *upādhis*. This can be seen in the case of the Sun's reflection in the water. But we cannot talk of the Jīva being a Pratibimba of B. in the absence of such upādhis. If we should, therefore, think of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of B., we should admit some limiting adjuncts in bringing about such a relation or reflection. In that case, the Jīvas would be dependent on those Upādhis and will cease to be some day when these Upādhis fall off. To prevent this consequence, we have to accept the Jīvas also to be Svarūpāmśas of B. like the Matsya and others but *susceptible to the relation of Bhedābheda to accommodate the fact of their difference also from B. in the state of* Samsāra (and even in Mokṣa, according to one school of Bhedābheda).[14]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Jīvas are *not and cannot be* Svarūpāṁśas of B. like Matsya and other forms as otherwise they should be in a position to be completely rid of sorrow and suffering. But we know from the Śrutis and Smṛtis that whereas B. is conscious of its lordly attributes and freedom from suffering, the Jīvas are not conscious of any identity with B. or of the lordly atttributes and freedom from sorrow as inhering in themselves. It cannot be said that the fact of their difference from B. prevents the Jīvas from being conscious of the lordly attri-

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13 अत एव भेदाभेदाभावे तदंशत्वमेव न स्यादिति तर्कसभवान्नाप्रयोजको हेतु । (*STC*. iii 2 18)

14 प्रतिबिंबत्व ह्युपाधिव्याप्त सूर्यकादौ दृष्टम । न ह्युपाधेरभावे प्रतिबिंबत्वं नाम समवति । ततश्च जीवस्य भगवत्प्रतिबिंबत्वे उपाधिरवश्यमन्वेष्टव्य इति तदायत्तत्वे च सूर्यकादिवदेवानित्यत्वप्राप्त्या, कृतहानाकृताभ्यागमप्रसंगात् ततश्च मत्स्यादिवत् स्वरूपांशत्वमेवेष्टव्यमिति दुरुद्धरा प्रतिबन्दीति । (*STC*. iii 2 18)

butes of B as inhering in themselves[15] There is no proof that it does any such thing Otherwise, it should be equally open to the identity relation to retard the relation of difference and render it ineffective and make it possible for the Jiva to intuit his oneness with B even now[16] It cannot be said that tho' such an awareness is available in Mokṣa, it is retarded in the state of Samsāra by the power of Ajnāna But then, as B itself is *not* under any such disability of Ajnāna, it should be open to it to intuit as its own the sufferings and limitations of the Jīvas But the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell us that this is not the case at any time[17]

The words *Ata eva copamā sūryakādivat* focus attention on one of the crucial points of distinction between the concept of Pratibimba as applied to ordinary reflections such as of the Sun in the waters and as applied to the ontological relation between Jiva and B This distinction is summed up in the words *Ata eva* "on these grounds alone". The emphatic particle *eva* added to *atah* naturally implies—"but" not on any other grounds" M. identifies the precise reasons upon which the Sūtrakāra rests the concept of Jiva as a Pratibimba of B on the three grounds of (i) difference of the Jivātman from B (ii) his dependence on B and (iii) his similarity in some respects to B[18] The grounds on which the conception of Jīva as a Pratibimba of B are *ruled out* by the force of *ata eva* are also identified by M and his commentator as dependence on upādhis liability to destruction with the destruction of the upādhis and insentiency[19]

The latter hold true of the Sun's reflection in the water As the Jiva's relation to B as its Pratibimba is not at all due to the interposition of any Upādhis such as Avidyā, but is grounded in a certain measure of similarity he bears to it in respect of his essential attributes of knowledge and bliss, there is no fear of his ceasing to exist with the disappearance of *Upādhis*

The philosophy of Bhedabheda is mainly interested in establishing an identity relation between Jiva and B which it believes to be their true and natural relation while conceding the reality of their difference but confining it to the phenomenal state The chief ground on which

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15. न च भेदस्यापि स्वकार्यानुगुणप्रतिबन्ध इति वाच्यम् । (ibid)

16 तत्र प्रमाणाभावात् । अन्यथा अभेदस्यापि स्वकार्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वापत्तेः (STC iii 2 18)

17 न च मुक्तावनुसंधानसम्भवात् संसारे तु, अज्ञानप्रभेदस्याश्रयस्याभावात्तथाविधया प्रतिबद्धमनुसंधानं * * * इति वाच्यम् । तथापि ब्रह्मणः उक्तविधाज्ञानाभावेन जीवगतदुःखानुसंधानस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् (ibid)

18. अत एव भिन्नत्वतदधीनत्वतत्सादृश्यैरेव सूर्यकाद्युपमा न तूपाध्यधीनत्वादिना । (M. BSB iii 2 18)
These three grounds have been made clear earlier in the Sutras (ii 3 28 iii.1.1 ii.3.29)

19 उपाध्यधीनत्वनाशित्वजडत्वादयोऽपि भावः । (NS p 50 b)

Bhedābhedavāda takes its stand in support of the identity relation is that the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. It may be recalled that the Sūtrakāra has already made it clear that in his opinion the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. only in the sense of being an Ābhāsa or a Pratibimba. The ontological sense in which the Sūtrakāra intends this term "Ābhāsa" to be understood has already been made clear under the Sūtra *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50). Very naturally then, he uses this concept of Ābhāsa to refute the position of the Bhedābhedavādin and links it with the illus*tration of the Sun's reflected image in the waters.*

जीवो न ब्रह्माभिन्नः, तदाभासत्वात्, यो यदाभासः स तेनाभिन्नो न भवति, यथा सूर्यकादिः

(Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali* iii.2.18)

As the Sūtrakāra has already given *ābhāsatva* as the ground of inference in establishing the Jīva to be an *aṁśa* of B. (in *BS*. ii.3.50), he *restricts himself in the present Sūtra to supplying the illustration* which would establish the conclusion. Lest the illustration itself should be stretched beyond its point, he has emphasised the words *ata eva* which by referring us *back* to what has been said by him on the subject of the Jīva's relation to B. in the *Aṁśādhikaraṇa* in the Sūtra *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50) to make it clear in what sense he wishes the present illustration of the Sun's reflected image should be understood and in what sense he does *not* wish it to be.[20]

20. Read: स्यादेतत्–सूत्रकारेण दृष्टान्तमात्रमुक्तम् । तद्बलात् कश्चित् हेतुरध्याहर्तव्य. । न चाभासत्वमेव इत्यस्ति नियमः । नाप्याभासपदोपादाने नियामकमस्ति, तस्मादसंगतमेतत् ।

मैवम्–'आभास एव च' इति सूत्रकारोक्तस्य ब्रह्माभासत्वस्यात्र हेतुत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात् । ब्रह्मांशत्वेनाक्षेपे तदधिकरणगतार्थस्यैव बुद्धिसन्निधानात् । तत्र कर्तव्यैवेय चर्चात्र कृतेति न कश्चिद् दोष । (*NS*. p. 506 b)

CHAPTER XII

ONLY CLINGING LOVE OF GOD CAN MANIFEST THE BLISS OF SELFHOOD

11 *Ambuvadadhikaranam* (iii 2 19)

This *adhi* establishes that the complete manifestation of the innate blissful nature of the Jiva as a Pratibimba of B is the fruit of Bhakti and is brought about by it and that therefore, Bhakti is worth practising[1] It rules out the objection that the Jiva's intrinsic difference from B and his everlasting dependence on It will stand in the way of the complete manifestation of his blissful nature in Mokṣa as his difference and dependence will continue to exist in Mokṣa too

The subject matter of this *adhi* may also be deemed to arise in another way In the preceding *adhi* it was established that the Jiva is a Pratibimba of B on account of his similarity to B in respect of his essential attributes of knowledge and bliss Mokṣa is the realization of this similarity of essential nature As this similarity is ingrained in the very nature of the Jiva by virtue of his being a Pratibimba of B, there seems to be no necessity at all to go thro' the arduous Sādhana of Bhakti to realize what is after all part of one's own being In other words, this *adhi* raises the question of the *raison d'etre* of Bhakti and answers it

Purvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Bhakti serves no useful purpose It cannot bring about the realization of the Jiva's similarity of nature to B

1 [illegible] । (Ragh *TDP* iii 2 19)

For, the Jıva's difference from B and his eternal dependence on B will be permanent obstacles to the realization of his similarity of essence to B The capacity of fire to burn anything placed before it is known to be arrested by the presence of the mythical stone or the utterance of a spell Moreover, the Siddhäntin holds that the Jīva's difference from B and his dependence on it persist in the state of Mokṣa also How then, will it be possible for Bhakti to manifest his similarity of nature to B? A prisoner in a jail who is different from the king and is dependent on him is not in a position to experience any sort of affinity of nature with the king[2]

It is no use arguing that Bhakti leads to knowledge of B That again serves no purpose by itself *If it is said that knowledge of B leads to earning its grace,* and that Bhakti is useful to that end it may be rejoined that there is nothing to be gained by earning the grace of B either! It cannot be that B's grace leads to Mokṣa. For, Mokṣa is but the possession of eternal knowledge and bliss by the Jīva These are his intrinsic properties as Pratibimba of B Where, then, is the need for Bhakti?

It cannot be that it is necessary to make manifest what is ingrained in the nature of the Jīva For, what is in the core of the Jiva is bound to emerge and manifest itself, sooner or later, of its own accord without any outside help or intervention, just as the blissfulness of the Jiva comes to be realized of its own accord, in the state of deep sleep There is thus no conceivable justification for Bhakti The explication of the glory of B undertaken in this Pāda to foster Bhakti is not, therefore, called for[3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Bhakti is indispensable for the realization of the Jiva's 'suchness' (*tathātva*)[4]—i e his intrinsic affinity of nature with God as 'Jñānānandādyātmaka' His difference from and dependence on B are not in themselves obstacles to such realization They are the conditions *of his existence as a Pratibimba of God and provide the*

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2 साधनाना शतमपि न कार्यं साधयेत क्वचित ।
उपसर्गहता वह्निः न दाह कर्तुमिच्छति ॥ (*STC* iii 2 19)

3 न भगवदभक्ति कर्तव्या प्रयोजनाभावात । न च भगवज्ज्ञान प्रयोजनम् तेनापि प्रयोजनाभावात । न च तत्प्रसाद प्रयोजनम तेनापि प्रयोजनाभावात । न च मोक्ष प्रयोजनम नित्यान दज्ञानादिमत्त्व हि मोक्ष तस्य च नित्य सिद्धत्वात् । कुत ? भगवत्सादृश्यस्य जीवे नित्यसिद्धत्वात । (*TP* iii 2 19)
नित्य विद्यमानस्याभिव्यक्त्यर्थं भक्त्याद्युक्तमिति चेन्न । विद्यमानस्य कदाचित स्वयमेवाभिव्यक्तिसंभवात । सुप्ताविवेति निष्फलत्वान्न भक्ति कर्तव्या । अतो व्यर्थं माहात्म्यवर्णनमिति । (*TP* iii 2 19)

4 तथा त्वमित्यनेन पूर्वत्र प्रकृत तद्गुणसारत्वरूप सादृश्य परामृश्यते । (*TDP* iii 2 19

proper soil for the planting of the seed of Bhakti and its gradual growth and development in all good souls

The Jīva's affinity of nature with God lies hidden in the depths of his being by Bhāvarūpājñāna[5] This veil will not fall off of its own accord Neither can the Jiva rend it by his own efforts or by the power of knowledge alone,—unless God Himself extends to him His helping hand[6] in answer to his earnest and prayerful devotion The essential quality of Bhakti is the melting of the heart with love of God According to M. the Sūtrakāra likens such love of God to the natural property of viscocity in water[7] The Sūtrakāra's pronouncement 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम्' (iii 2 19) is accordingly understood by M to say that this essential characteristic of the Jiva's affinity of nature with B (*tathātvam*) is not (*na*) fully manifested (*samyagabhivyajyate*) in the absence of the understanding of Divine majesty and beneficence, saturated with love of God

अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन, ग्रहण ज्ञान विना न तत्सादृश्य सम्यगभिव्यज्यते। (M *BSB* iii 2 19)

The *STC* explains that instead of affirming directly that Mokṣa is attained by Bhakti, the Sūtrakāra has adopted the negative way of phrasing his idea in order to show that there is no absence of concomitance of Bhakti even in Mokṣa and to make clear the true nature of Bhakti and Mokṣa by an implied refutation of the views of some other schools on the point[8]

Rāghavendra (*TDP*), however, explains that the negative form of predication in the Sūtra is to dispose of the objection that there is manifestation of the bliss of selfhood in Suṣupti in the absence of Bhakti, by making it understood that in Suṣupti there is only a very slight manifestation of the bliss of selfhood and that, therefore, there is no possibility of its complete manifestation without Bhakti. He also refers to the explanation some other commentators on M who take the expression *tathātvam* in the Sūtra to mean the complete manifestation

5 This has been dealt with in the *Pumstvādhikaranam* (ii, 331 32) See Vol. II, pp 224-27

6 This has been made clear by M. under BS i 1 1 in his *AV*
• • • कृपान्तहृदि विना। ज्ञानस्वभावत्वादपि स्वामुक्ति कस्यापि हि क्वचित्। See Vol. I, p 59

7 अम्बुवदिति गाढ्यार्थे वति, न मतुप् (*TDP*) स्नेहगम्यत्वादम्बुन। तत्र मानस स्नेह गमयति।
(*TD* iii 2 19)
अम्बुना तुल्य वर्तत इति अम्बुवत्। अम्बु यथा स्नेहवत् तथा मानसस्नेहयुक्तग्रहणाभावात् इति।
(Ragh *TPB* iii 2 19)

8. भक्त्या मोक्षो भवतीत्यन्वयमुखेन स्पष्ट वक्तव्य यत् व्यतिरेकमुखेन विरोधीति आह तत् भक्त्या मोक्षे व्यभिचार भावप्रदर्शनाय, विप्रतिपत्ति, भक्तेर्मोक्षस्य च स्वरूपप्रदर्शनाय चेति। (*STC* iii 2 19)

of bliss in Moksa,[9] as has been established in Sūtra ii.3.31 This explanation seems to be better placed to meet the objection

We have thus in the two keywords of the Sūtra: *Ambuvad agrahaṇāt* nothing short of a succint definition of Bhakti as such. In M's view Bhakti is a blending of the intellectual and the emotional approaches to the Deity.[10] Jayatīrtha in his NS has given the classical definition of Bhakti, based on the above, in which the religious, emotional and philosophical aspects of devotion are happily integrated He calls it "the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to the Lord, impregnable by any amount of impediments, unruffled by any disappointments in life, transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin and other cherished belongings and fortified by a firm knowledge and conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon Him"[11]

The use of the figurative (*laksanā*) expression 'ambuvat' (in the manner of water) is thus intended to refer to the emotional content of Bhakti with a view to making it clear that like viscosity in water, love of God (*sneha*) is the intrinsic property of Bhakti.[12]

Vādirāja in his *TPG* adds that man's love of God should have this quality of clinging firmly to God at all costs It is only such love that is capable of revealing to the soul its true relation to God as His Pratibimba. It is to convey such deep meaning that the Sūtrakāra, who is a master of language and thought, has used a telling metaphor of water here to bring out the greatness of the quality of Bhakti and its place among Sādhanas.[13]

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9 भक्त्या तयात्त्व व्यज्यत इत्यन्वयमुखेन वाच्ये व्यतिरेकमुखोक्ति भक्त्यभावेऽपि सुप्तौ सुखव्यक्तिरस्ति, कि भक्त्येति शकिते, भक्त्यभावे न सम्यगभिव्यज्यते इति समाधानमुक्तम्। एके तु पुस्त्वादीत्यत्रोक्त सादृश्यस्याभिव्यक्तत्व तयात्त्वमिति परामृश्यत इत्याहु । (*TDP* iii 2 19)

10 Cf माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वस्तु सुदृढ सर्वतोऽधिक ।
स्नेहो भक्तिरिति प्रोक्तस्तया मुक्तिर्नचान्यथा ॥ (*Mbh TN* i 86)

11 परमेश्वरभक्तिर्नाम निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणत्वज्ञानपूर्वक स्वात्मात्मीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽप्यनन्तगुणाधिकोऽन्तरायसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाह । (*NS* p 17)

12 स्नेहपूर्वकज्ञानाभावादिति वाच्ये, अम्बिवत्युक्ति अम्बुगतस्नेहस्येव भक्त्येकदेशस्नेहस्य सहजत्व द्योतयितुम्।
(Ragh *TDP*)

13 अल्पाक्षरत्वलाभाय 'भक्त्यभावात्' इति वक्तव्ये, यत् 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्' इति सूत्र, तत् भक्त स्वरूपनिरूपणार्थमिति भावेनोक्तम्। अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन, ग्रहण ज्ञानमिति।
माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वक स्नेहो हि भक्ति । तर्हि, स्नेहेनाज्ञानादिति कुतो नोक्तमिति चेत्, सत्यम्। अम्बुनि चिक्कणनाख्य स्नेहो यथाज्ञानजत्वात् अतिसुदृढ तथातिसुदृढत्वलाभायाम्बुवदित्युक्तम्। गण्हाति कदापि न मुचनीति ज्ञानेऽपि दार्ढ्यसूचनाय' ग्रहणमित्युक्तम्। अत प्रौढशिरोमणि सूत्रकार इति ज्ञेयम्।
(*Op cit.* p 139)

The *STC* refers to another interpretation of the words *ambuvad agrahanāt* which shows how the Lord Himself gathers the Jīva closer to Himself as the object of His love (*ambuvat*) and gracious selection (*grahanam*) [14] The peculiarity of this explanation is that it sees in the words *ambuvat* and *grahanam* the appropriate acts of God Himself by way of condescending response to the Bhakti of the Jīva

We cannot expect critics like V. S Ghate who have no place to give to Bhakti in Bādarāyana's system, to be able to appreciate the contextual propriety or suggestiveness of M's interpretation of '*ambuvad agrahanam*' No wonder, Ghate has dismissed it with his usual remark that it is "fantastic" (p 117 *Op Cit*)

14 यथा जलस्य स्नेहाख्यविलक्षणतागुणेन पांस्वादिग्रहणं, एवं भगवतोऽपि स्वकीयजीवाश्रितस्नेहाख्यभक्त्या स्वीयत्वेन जीवग्रहणम्। तथा चाम्बुवत् भगवतोऽपि विना स्नेहमननुग्रहणात् इतरस्मात् व्यावृत्तातिस्नेहस्य च सर्वोत्कर्ष-ज्ञानमन्तरेणासिद्धेः अतो ज्ञानं भक्तिं च विना ज्ञानानन्दादिरूपमादृश्य न सम्यगभिव्यज्यत * * * * *
इति सूत्रार्थं इति केचित्। (*STC* iii 2 19)

CHAPTER XIII

WELL-DEFINED GRADATION OF BHAKTI AMONG THE GODS AND HUMAN SOULS IS NECESSARY

12. *Vṛddhihrāsādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.20-21)

This *adhi.* establishes the truth that there is a well-defined gradation in the nature of Bhakti as practised by different orders of Adhikārins (seekers) of Mokṣa.[1] Want of correlation between efforts and results in this case will be as much of a damper and an obstruction to Bhakti as its futility, considered and set aside in the previous *adhi.*[2]

It is, therefore, necessary to establish the principle that the fruits of Bhakti are properly correlated to the quality, intensity, duration and other intimate factors connected with the practise of Bhakti by different orders of Adhikārins. The present *adhi.*, therefore, establishes the presence of such a necessary correlation by recognizing the existence of a natural gradation in Bhakti and its fruit of manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa at all levels, embracing the gods and human beings alike. It is accordingly shown that as Bhakti has got to be practised for the manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa (See *adhi.* 11) it will have to be done to the fullest possible extent according to each one's spiritual fitness and capacity and that the fruit of such Bhakti will likewise be subject to the principle of parity between Sādhana and Sādhya.

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1. अत्र प्राक् फलहेतुत्वेनोक्तभक्तेः तदुपलक्षितत्वेन साधनजातस्य तरतमभावनिरूपणात् सगतिः ।
(Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali* iii 2,20-21)
2. यथा भक्तौ विफलत्व प्रतिबन्धक. एव फलस्य भक्त्यननुसारित्वमपि । (*STC.* iii 2 20-21)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Bhakti is of the same order and kind for all seekers as its fruit—viz Mokṣa, which is the realization of the summum bonum of bliss, is the same for all Where the result attained by all is the same, excess of effort beyond the *quantum sufficit* put forth by some will be a waste or it may mean that some get only imperfectly released[2a]

The STC develops a three-pronged Pūrvapakṣa The first one excludes the Devas and other superhuman beings from the class of Bhaktas and confines the term to the human level—arguing that all human beings have to practise a uniform level of Bhakti as there is no proof of there being any variation in the *quantum sufficit* It will create a complication if we admit any variation in the norm For then we will have to say if this results in a corresponding difference in the nature of the fruit So far as we know, Mokṣa is the same for all Bhaktas consisting as it does of riddance of Samsāra and being happy for ever afterwards[3] If there should be differences in this, one will have to answer another question if the final result of Mokṣa is attained by putting forth the greater measure of Bhakti or of less of it In the former case, it would mean that the lesser measure of Bhakti, being incompetent to achieve the Mokṣa which can be attained only by a greater measure of Bhakti, has been undertaken in vain If it is attained by a less measure of Bhakti, the greater measure of it would be a waste of energy as the same result can be attained by much less Bhakti The explanation that as we find gradation of Bhakti commensurate with each one's fitness among the gods like Brahmā, the principle has to be extended to our cases also can cut both ways[4] For, if we are to establish gradation of Bhakti at the human level on the analogy of Bhakti among the gods who do not fall within the class of Bhaktas, as we understand the term, it should be open to us human beings to attain the position of these gods or their measure of bliss in Mokṣa by putting forth the requisite effort. But that is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin We have, therefore, to exclue the gods from the class of Bhaktas[5]

2(a) भक्तिर्विषये त्रि भक्तेष्वेकप्रकारा वृद्धिह्रासवती वेति सन्देहः । एकप्रकारैवेति पूर्वः पक्षः । अन्यथा, फलसाम्येऽपि साधनातिशयस्य वैयर्थ्यं केषांचिदसम्यङ्मुक्तिर्वा स्यात् । (*TP* iii 2 20)

3 तत्राद्य पूर्वपक्षः मनुष्यैरेकरूपैव भक्तिः संपादनीया, भक्तौ वृद्धिह्रासत्वे मानाभावात् । यदि भक्तिर्मनुष्येषु वृद्धिह्रासवती, तदा वक्तव्यम् फले वृद्धिह्रासौ स्तो न वेति । नाद्य प्रमाणाभावात् । संसारनिवृत्तेरानन्दित्वस्य च सर्वेष्वेकप्रकारत्वानुभवाच्च । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

4 न द्वितीय । तत्र किं वृद्धभक्त्या साध्यते चेत् अल्पा भक्तिः वृद्धभक्तिसाध्यमोक्षाजनने सामर्थ्याभावान्निष्फला स्यात् । ह्रसितभक्तिसाध्यत्वे च वृद्धभक्तिः तत्फलस्याल्पभक्त्यैव सिद्धे वृथायासकरा स्यात् । न च ब्रह्मादिदेवेषु स्वयोग्यतानुसारेण भक्तितारतम्यदर्शनात् मनुष्येष्वपि तथा स्यादिति वाच्यम् । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

5 मनुष्येषु भक्तेषु भक्तितारतम्यस्य भक्तेष्वनन्तर्गतब्रह्मादिभक्तितारतम्यदृष्टान्तीकरणेन साधने ब्रह्मादिपदस्य तदीयमोक्षानन्दस्य साधनापातात् । अतो वक्तव्यमनन्तर् ब्रह्मादीनां मुख्यतया भजनीयत्वेन भक्तेष्वनन्तर्भावात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन न किंचिदपि साधनीयमिति । (*Op cit* iii.2 20)

The second Pūrvapakṣa is—Granting that the gods also are Bhaktas, we cannot allow any gradation of Bhakti among them. The gradation of results in terms of variation in Svarūpānanda in their case may be due to their other assets like differences in their *jñāna*. This leaves us free to hold that irrespective of their being gods or men, only a uniform measure of Bhakti is sufficient for the attainment of Mokṣa.[6]

The third Pūrvapakṣa is that as a matter of fact, there can be no gradation at all in the fruits of Bhakti which is attaining the blissful state of Mokṣa. This can be elicited by asking a few simple questions. Is the lesser measure of Bhakti of the human souls, as compared with the greater Bhakti of the gods, competent to bring them (the human souls) the bliss of Mokṣa or not? If it is *not* competent, human souls will for ever be shut out of Mokṣa! If it is competent to do so, the gods will be the foolish ones for all the extra trouble they take in putting forth a surplussage of Bhakti and attain Mokṣa which they could do by putting forth the same measure of Bhakti as the humans.[7]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is as follows: If we do not admit gradation of Bhakti among human beings we cannot have it among the gods.[8] The contention that the gods are not Bhaktas and have no need to practise Bhakti because they are adorable (*bhajanīya*) by us and have as such no need to practise Bhakti cannot be sustained. Adorable as they may be by us, they are nevertheless Bhaktas of God. Otherwise, they will not be entitled to our adoration; for the Śāstra forbids adoration to be paid to any of the Devas except as members of His retinue and, therefore, subject to Him.[9]

As for the objection that if there is gradation of Bhakti among human beings, the putting forth of lesser Bhakti will be futile while putting forth a greater measure of Bhakti will be a waste and so on it will apply with equal force to the situation where gradation is admitted among the gods also. If the futility or wastefulness of Bhakti is pre-

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6 अस्तु वा ब्रह्मादीना भक्तेष्वन्तर्भाव । तथापि तेष्वपि न भक्तितारतम्यमुरारीक्रियते । फलतारतम्य तु भक्त्यादीतज्ज्ञानादितारतम्येन भविष्यति । तथा च भक्तेशु देवेषु मनुष्येषु वा भक्तिरेकप्रकारैव न वृद्धिह्रासवतीति । (*STC.* iii 2 20 21)

7 साधने वा फले वापि तारतम्य न विद्यते ।
देवेषु वा मनुष्येषु युक्तिबाधादमानत. ॥ (*STC.* iii 2 20 21)

युक्तिश्च–देवापेक्षया मनुष्येषु न्यूना भक्ति मौक्तिकानन्द साधयति न वा ? नेति पक्षे, मनुष्याणा मुक्त्यभावप्रसग । आद्ये, देवेष्वपि तत्समयैव भक्त्या मोक्षसिद्धेरुत्कृष्टभक्तिसपादना विफला स्यादित्यादि । (*ibid*)

8 यदि मनुष्यमात्रे भक्तितारतम्य नेष्यते, ब्रह्मादावपि तन्न स्यात् । (*ibid*)

9 न च भजनीयत्वेन तेषा भक्त्यभाव । अस्मदादिभजनीयत्वेऽपि भगवद्भक्तत्वसभवात् । अन्यथा भजनीयत्वाभावप्रसग 'पूजयेन्नान्यदेवता' इत्यादे. । (*ibid*)

vented in their case by admitting proportionate gradation in the fruits of Bhakti among gods, the same principle should be extended to the human level also This knocks off the bottom of the first Pūrvapakṣa [10]

The second Pūrvapakṣa is met by pointing out that gradation in the results cannot be justified without accepting gradation of means Otherwise it will involve God, who dispenses the reward of Mokṣa to Bhaktas, indiscriminately, in partiality and cruelty God's susceptibility to these charges cannot be overcome by attributing the variation in the results to some other items of Sādhanas than Bhakti, such as difference in the orders of meditation (See Pāda 3, *adhi s* 25, 26 etc) For the Śāstra clearly recognizes the existence of gradation in Bhakti [11]

> यथा भक्तिविशेषोऽत्र दृश्यते पुरुषोत्तमे ।
> तथा मुक्तिविशेषोऽपि ज्ञानिनां लिंगभेदने ॥ (Q M *GB* ii 52)

It cannot be said that as Bhakti is only an aid to Upāsanāa, it is only difference in the nature of Aparokṣajñāna that determines the gradation of bliss in Mokṣa and that gradation in Bhakti has nothing to do with it The evidence of Śāstra shows that Aparokṣajñāna is an integral and intimate constituent of Pakvabhakti and that, therefore, gradation in Aparokṣajñāna presupposes gradation in Bhakti This will be clear from the text

> महत्त्वबुद्धिर्भक्तिस्तु स्नेहपूर्वाभिधीयते ।
> तयैव व्यज्यते सम्यग्जीवरूप सुखादिकम् ॥

which understands by Bhakti spiritual illumination, founded on the realization of Divine majesty, of which love of God is a necessary constituent [12]

The second Pūrvapakṣa is thus untenable as it cannot save God from liability to partiality and cruelty in bestowing the reward of Mokṣa

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10 यथात्र मनुष्येषु भक्तितारतम्ये न्यूनभक्ते निष्फलत्वमधिकभक्ते वैयर्थ्यं बाधकं तत् ब्रह्मादिदेवेषु तारतम्यांगीकारेऽपि समम् । यदि फलतारतम्यांगीकारेण बाधकोद्धरणं तत् मनुष्येऽपि समम् इत्याद्य पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः । (*STC* iii 2 20 21)

11 नापि द्वितीयः पूर्वपक्षो युक्तः । साधनतारतम्याभावे फलतारतम्यं न स्यात् । तथा फलदातुरीश्वरस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यापत्तेश्च न च प्रणानन्तरत्वमिदाक्रमनादितारतम्येन तत्प्रतीकारः । यथा भक्तिविशेषोऽत्र इति वचनविरोधात् । (*STC* iii 2 20 21)

12 ननु भक्तेरुपासनाङ्गत्वेन तदङ्गापरोक्षज्ञानतारतम्येनैव मोक्षतारतम्यं युक्तम् । अन्तरङ्गत्वात् । ततश्च मुक्तिविरुद्धं वचनमप्रमाणमिति चेदुच्यते । अपरोक्षज्ञानघटितमूर्तिमत्त्वात् भक्तिरप्यन्तरङ्गैव । 'भक्त्यर्थान्यखिलान्येव भक्तिर्मोक्षाय केवला' इति स्मरणात् । अत एव 'महत्त्वबुद्धि' इति स्नेहविशेषबुद्धिरेव भक्तित्वेनोक्ता । अन्यथा भक्तिर्मोक्षाय केवला इत्यस्य न 'नान्यः पन्था' इति श्रुतिविरोधः । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)
Read 'ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभागत्वात् भक्तिर्ज्ञानं मितीयते' (*AV* iii 4 adh 5 6)
ज्ञानं स्नेहश्च भक्तेरंशौ । तत्रैकतरांगनाशात् तरस्यान्तरत्वम् । तथा चाजहल्लक्षणया भक्तिरेव सिद्ध्यति । (*NS* p 605 b)

without regard to gradation of Bhakti among the two orders of Bhaktas, the gods and men

The third Pūrvapakṣa overlooks the fact that tho' there is no room for gradation in the condition of Moksa in terms of dissolution of bondage and termination of sufferings, there is still scope for gradation in the positive aspect of Mokṣa as the manifestation of the Svarūpānanda of the released souls which, by definition, is *sui generis* and not related to the presence or enjoyment of any external objects of sense (visaya).[13]

The presence of natural gradation of Svarūpānanda among released Souls is taught in the *Taitt Up* (ii 8) and in *Brh Up* (iv 3 33)[14] *These texts cannot be explained away as referring only to gradations of* happiness of different orders of beings, gods and men, in the empirical sphere[14a] For it is pointless for the Śruti to dwell on empirical happiness at such length It cannot be said that the Śruti is trying to inculcate the spirit of Vairāgya or distaste for empirical happiness which is marred by such distinctions and limitations and evoke the aspiration for the attainment of unlimited and unconditioned bliss of the state of Mokṣa

That will be overshooting the mark If it is open to all Jīvas to attain such unlimited bliss, there will be no distinction left between them and the Supreme Being in Moksa[15] It cannot be that this is as it should be For the Śrutis recognize that God is the ruler of the released souls also[16] *Utāmrtatvasyeśānah* (R V x 90, 2c)

The contention that *Muṇḍ Up* recognizes complete equality of bliss as between God and the released Jīvas in Moksa in view of the Śruti *Paramam sāmyam upaiti* (iii 1 3) is not also sustainable It can hardly be the true meaning and intention of this Śruti to abolish all distinctions between the Supreme B and the individual *self in* Mokṣa *For,* the former is ever-free and possessed of infinite perfections, majesty and excellence, while the Jīvas are subject to bondage and are obliged to

13 तृतीयस्तु मुक्तौ फलतारतम्यप्रतिपादकेन 'अथात आनन्दस्य मीमासा भवति इत्यादिकेन विरुद्ध । ससारनिवृत्ति-रूपमुक्तित्वे तारतम्यायोगेऽपि विपयानधीनेऽपि स्वरूपानन्दे श्रुत्यैव तारतम्यप्रतिपादनेन युक्तेराभासत्वात् । (*STC* iii 2 20 21)

14 The interpretation of these Śrutis has been fully discussed by M in his *AV* (iii 4 adh 4 NS pp 572-76) criticising other interpretations of the Advaita and other schools on syntactic and exegetical grounds such as that the terms 'aka mahata' and avrjina used in the Up are not applicable to any one who has not attained Mukti and is still in the empirical state

15 न च श्रुति सासारिकानन्दविपयिणी व्यर्थत्वात । नन ससारिब्रह्मणोऽप्यानन्द पूर्वोक्तात् शतगुण एव । अत परिमित । अत एव सत्र विरक्तेनापरिमितानन्दो मौक्तिक एव साधनीय इत्यत्र तात्पर्यान्न वैयर्थ्यमिति चेन्न। भगवत्साम्यापत्ते । (*STC*)

16 न च परम साम्यमुपैतीति श्रुत्या तदिष्टमिति वाच्यम । अपसिद्धान्तापातात । (*ibid*)

work for its riddance and attain Mokṣa with God's help and grace How can such beings who are constrained to remain, even in the state of Mokṣa dependent on B as Its "Śeṣas" expect to have equal measure of Svarūpānanda with B ? The suggestion is on the face of it absurd and repugnant to Theism [17]

The Sutrakāra too disallows the released souls the right of Jagad-vyāpāra (*B S.* iv 4 17) which according to him is the prerogative of the Supreme If 'Paramasāmya' is, therefore, to be restricted in deference to the ruling of the Sūtrakāra to some other respects than Jagad-vyāpāra, the Svarūpānanda of Jivas and B can likewise be excluded from the purview of the Paramasāmya Śruti

Sūtrārtha

According to M's Bhāsya the Sūtra makes two distinct predications[18] —

(i) that Bhakti[19] is subject to gradation (*vrddhihrāsabhāktvam*) among the different orders of aspirants, because the highest class of Adhikārins like Brahmā and the other gods and all the rest comprising the inferiors (*adhama*) like human souls and the middle ones—the Ṛṣis etc fall under the category (antarbhavanti) of Bhaktas,[20] and (ii) that it is only in this way[21] (*evam*) there will be evenness (*sāmañjasyam*) for B in respect of both the classes of Bhaktas— the gods and men (*ubhaya*) —

(१) तस्य भक्तिज्ञानादे वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्व विद्यते, ब्रह्मादीनामुत्तमाना सर्वेषा भक्तत्वेऽन्तर्भावात् ।

(२) एव भक्त्यादिविशेषाभोकारादेव ईश्वरस्य ब्रह्मादीनन्यान् प्रति च सामजस्य भवति ।
(M *BSB* iii 2 20)

17 The subject of Anandataratamya among Jivas in the state of Mokṣa has been very exhaustively dealt with by Vyasatirtha in his *Nyayāmṛta* (iv 5) dealing inter alia with the objections of Visiṣṭadvaita school For summary see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya* pp 344 360

18 Read अस्ति भक्तेर्वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वम् । कुत ? ब्रह्मादीनामस्मदादीना च भक्तत्वेऽन्तर्भावात । एव भक्तितारतम्याङ्गीकार एव ईश्वरस्य उभयान् प्रति सामञ्जस्यमवतिष्ठते । (*NS* p 512)

19 Bhakti defined as Ambuvadgrahanam' in Sutra 19, is understood here as the subject of the proposition with necessary syntactic change into the genitive case

20 'धन्ता प्रकाशा बहि प्रकाशा नवप्रकाशा । देवा वाव नवप्रकाशा ऋषयोऽन्त प्रकाशा मनुष्या एव बहि प्रकाशा
(*Caturvedaśikhā* Q M *BSB* iv 3 16)

21 i e by admitting gradation (*tāratamya*) in Bhakti and corresponding *tāratamya* in the manifestation of their Svarupānanda

Śaṁkara's Ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇam iii.2.11-21

According to S. the eleven Sūtras from *Na sthānatopi* * * * constitute the Ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇa (iii.2.11-21).[22] The question discussed is—We come across Śrutis like "He to whom belong all works, all desires, odors and tastes" (*Chān. Up.* iii.14.2). These have for their subject B. which is characterized by attributes. There are others like "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long" (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.8.8). Here the subject is B. without characteristics. The question arises then if we are to assume that B. is of both these natures or of either; and if of one of the two, whether it is characterised by attributes or is devoid of all characteristics.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues: In conformity with Śrutis which in different contexts describe B. as having both these natures, it should be adjudged to be *ubhayalinga* i.e. double-natured. However, as the texts which describe B. as Saviśeṣa (having certain characteristics) and others which deny all characteristics to it are mutually contradictory, one of the two natures has to be accepted as being natural to B. and the other as engendered by upādhis. However, it does not make the characteristics engendered by Upādhis any the less real as belonging to B. or give us the right to say that B. has only one uniform nature throughout, to the exclusion of the character predicated of it in virtue of its being Jagatkāraṇa etc. When the sense organs are vitiated by flaws their self-validating capacity is arrested and they deliver judgments which are invalid and these lead to erroneous knowledge and misdirected activity. But neither the wrong knowledge[23] nor the activity following it are unreal. In the case of B. we have to respect the Śruti texts which ascribe the different natures and sets of attributes to B. representing it as both Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa and recognizing both of them on an equal footing. B. then is in truth *'ubhayalingam'* i.e. has both the characters.[24]

22 He refutes some earlier commentators who treat Sūtras 11-14 as one *adhi.* establishing B. as an absolutely uniform being in which all plurality of the apparent world vanishes and Sūtras 15-21 *as another adhi. which discusses whether* the said B. is of the nature of pure existence or thought or of both—the final view being that it is of the essence of thought which is the same as 'being' (*tanmātram*).

23. अत्रोभयलिंगश्रवणादुभयरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्राप्तम्। तत्रापि सविशेषत्वनिर्विशेषत्वयोर्विरोधात् स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेरेकं स्वतोऽपरं तु परतः। न च यत्परतः तदपरमार्थिकम्। नहि चक्षुरादीना स्वतः प्रमाणभूतानां दोषतोऽप्रामाण्यमपारमार्थिकम्।

24. विपर्ययज्ञानलक्षणकार्यानुत्पादप्रसंगात्। तस्मादुभयलिंगकशास्त्रप्रामाण्यादुभयरूपता ब्रह्मणः पारमार्थिकीति प्राप्त उच्यते। (*Bhāmatī* iii.2.11)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is We cannot predicate two self-contradictory natures to B as Saviśesa and Nirviśeṣa—not even by ascribing the Saviseṣa to the exigencies of upādhis One of the two natures will have to be accepted as natural to B and the other will have to be treated as super-imposed If the character engendered by associated media is accepted as natural to B it would expose B to transformation of nature which has been repudiated in the Sūtras earlier.[25] We have, therefore, to agree that the character of "having all odors" etc due to upādhis are all of them superimposed like the redness created in the crystal beads when dipped in lac dye For the aim of Śrutis is to represent B as purely Nirvisesa (characterless) The Saviśesa Śrutis like "this shining immortal person in the earth" (*Brh Up* ii 5 1) are intended to convey the unitary nature of B Since unity and duality of natures will be incompatible with one and the same being, all such duality of natures described in the Śrutis should be subordinated to the interests of unity of nature and made to find their fulfilment only in the sense that being "given" as they are by other Pramānas like Pratyaksa, they are intended merely to be mentioned by way of restatement[26] to be reduced to unity thro' volatalization (*vilaya*) The Śrutis predicating Nirviśeṣatva are taken in their own sense as establishing something not known by any other source of knowledge and fit to be predicated and because the Śrutis themselves decry the perception of duality while some Śrutis which predicate attributes and forms to B are meant only for purposes of meditation and not to be taken at face value Thus B as taught in the Śrutis is featureless, of the essence of pure thought and being. All features and characteristics posited of it such as of having all odors, all actions, being the Vāmani (who brings all desirable things) are merely superimposed on account of limiting adjuncts[27]

Criticism

S introduces the *adhi* as purporting to define the true nature of B in which the Jiva has been stated to become united in the state of

25 न स्थानत उपाधितोऽपि ब्रह्मण उभयचिन्हत्वसभव । एक हि पारमार्थिकमयदध्यारोपितम् । परमार्थिकत्वे ह्युपाधिनिमित्तस्य रूपस्य ब्रह्मण परिणामो भवेत् । स च प्राक् प्रतिषिद्ध । (*Bhamati* iii 2 11)

26. तत्परिशेषात् स्फटिकमणेरिव स्वभावधवलस्य लाक्षारसावसेकोपाधिरक्तिमा सर्वगन्धत्वादिरौपाधिको ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्त इति पश्यामो निर्विशेषताप्रतिपादनार्थत्वात् श्रुतीनाम् । सविशेषतायामपि यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां तेजोमय इत्यादीनां ब्रह्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनपरत्वादेकत्वनानात्वयोश्च एकस्मिन्नसंभवादेकत्वेनैव नानात्वप्रतिपादनपर्यवसानात् नानात्वस्य प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धतयानुवादत्वात् ।

27 एकत्वस्य चाधिगते विधेयत्वापत्ते, भेददर्शननिन्दयाच साक्षात् भूयसीभि श्रुतिभिरभेदप्रतिपादनात्, आकारवद्ब्रह्मविषयाणां च कासाञ्चित् श्रुतीनामुपासनापरत्वम् । सन्ति चात्र साक्षात् द्वैतापवादेनाद्वैतप्रतिपादनपरा शतश श्रुतय । कासाञ्चिच्च द्वैताभिधायिनीनां तत्प्रविलयपरत्वम् । तस्मान्निर्विशेषमेकं चैतन्यैकरस सद्ब्रह्म परमार्थत । विशेषाश्च सर्वगन्धत्वसामनीत्वादय उपाधिवशात् अध्यस्ता इति सिद्धम् ।

(Bhamati iii 2 11 21)

deep sleep and so on consequent on the cessation of the limiting adjuncts[28] But the fact remains that B.'s nature as the residual reality of world negation has been established in the *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇam* (ii.1.14) and it is needless to revert to the same topic, here again The *Bhāmatī* comes forward with a justification. Still there are several Śrutis to be met with which associate B. with the world So the doubt arises if there is really any world of names and forms with which B comes to be associated. It is, therefore, necessary to set it at rest The present inquiry is, therefore, relevant as the knowledge of B completely abstracted from the world of name and form is the requisite of attaining Kaivalya.[29]

In that case, the Sūtras beginning with *Prakāśavaccāvaiyarthyāt* (iii.2.15) which explain how the formless B appears to have names and forms when it comes to be limited by adjuncts like the earth so that worship of such an illusory Being may be helpful in attaining the world of Brahmā etc. would have been sufficient for the purpose and the four earlier Śutras *Na sthānatopi* * * * etc would be unnecessary. Moreover, when it has been established once for all on the authority of 'ārambhanaśabda' etc (*Chan Up* vi, 1, 1) in the *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa* that everything other than B is unreal, there is no possibility of any doubt rearing its head, even if there be a thousand other texts to the contrary,—if there is really a world of name and form with which B is associated Moreover, the difficulty would be that in the case of the knowledge of B to be attained, everything connected with it in terms of the activity of the knower, the knowledge and its relation to the knower will be superimpositions whereas the result to be achieved (Moksa) must *needs* be of a higher order of reality than one of superimposition[30]

If relations all along the line are superimposed, the result to be attained cannot be anything better. S.'s *theory of knowledge forbids the* acceptance of a subject-object relation between the knowledge in question and B Allowing that somehow B which is an established reality (*siddhavastu*) becomes amenable to achievement thro' Jñāna, it will be necessary to define if this true knowledge of B to be attained by the inquiry is B itself or is something different from it If it is the same

28 येन ब्रह्मणा सुषुप्त्यादिषु जीव उपाध्युपशमात् संपद्यते तस्येदानीं स्वरूप श्रुतिवशेन निर्धार्यते ।

(S *BSB.* iii 2 11)

29 यद्यपि 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इत्यादावेव निष्प्रपञ्चमेव ब्रह्मोपपादितम्, तथापि प्रपञ्चलिंगाना बहूनां श्रुतीनां दर्शनात् भवति पुनर्विचिकित्सा । अतस्तन्निवारणायारम्भ । तस्य च तत्त्वज्ञानमपवर्गोपयोगीति प्रयोजनवानय विचार । (*Bhāmatī* iii 2 11)

30 कर्तृव्यापारस्य द्वारभूतज्ञानस्य तत्सम्बन्धस्य चाध्यस्तत्वेन तद्विषमसत्ताकपारमार्थिकसाध्यत्वानुपपत्ते ।

(*STC* iii 2 20 21)

as B the difficulty of subject-object relationship will again crop up. Whereas it is possible in the case of a piece of shell which is first comprehended in its aspect of "thisness' that it may come to be more intimately known in its aspect of "shellness" later or of the sacrifice which is "given" as the means of achievement of heaven becoming the object of accomplishment by passing thro' the prescribed process of carrying it out, B tho' given as an established reality in its aspect as "B" cannot be held to be attained thro' knowledge in the sense of its passing thro' the state of becoming the object of spiritual knowledge We can speak of the shellness of shell becoming specifically known But it is not possible for B to accommodate within its being manifold aspects of being first vaguely known and later more intimately known in a fuller sense, for by definition it is Nirviseṣa (aspectless) If the knowledge to be attained by the proposed inquiry is different from B, such knowledge will forfeit its title to knowledge as nothing but B can partake of the essence of knowledge to S Such knowledge as results from the proposed inquiry will, therefore, have to fall in line with the world of duality and unreality which can hardly help in achieving Apavarga

It is not possible to sustain the Pūrvapakṣa that B must be deemed to be 'Ubhayalingam' because the evidence of Śrutis points that way For, the texts which have been cited in support of B's 'Nirviseṣatva' predicate merely the absence of certain specific attributes pertaining to the empirical sphere in B *Neti neti>iti na, iti na.* In other words, they predicate negative attributes also in B That is not the same as representing B as 'Nirviseṣa" absolutely without *any* attributes (transempirical) whatsoever

Nor can the position be improved by arguing that Nirvisesa means absence of any positive attributes in B—if not a total absence of all attributes. The only reason for suggesting this modification will be that it would involve a patent self-contradiction to indulge in an absolute denial of all attributes in B in the face of the specific denial of certain (kinds of) attributes. By adhering to the same logic, we should in deference to other Śrutis which ascribe "all activities, all desires and all odors" to B agree to interpret the denial of grossness etc. to mean denial of such attributes in their empirical connotation (*prākṛtasthaulyādiniṣedha*)

It must be accepted in principle that whatever attributes positive or negative have been predicated of B in the Śrutis are all of them integral to its being and partaking of its essential nature The negative attributes will be negative only in contradistinction to and as counter correlatives of their opposites but otherwise they will constitute the

essence of B and will not be pure negations[31] It would be preposterous to hold that B has no positive character also For the Śruti *Asti ityevopalabdhavyah* (*Katha Up* ii, 3, 13) makes it certain that it has at least one positive characteristic of "being" The fact also that *it is presented to thought independently of the knowledge of any counter*-correlative proves its positive content

The Siddhānta view that only Nirviseṣatva can be true of and natural to B is too sweeping It is possible to hold that both are true of B from the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view—Nirvisesatva as its natural character and Saviseṣatva as resting on upādhis The argument of the *Bhāmatī* that if Saviseṣatva were to be true of B tho' due to upādhis it would expose B to transformation is not necessarily true The connection of Avidyā and Cit in S's philosophy, tho' in the nature of a transformation of Avidyā, still exists in Cit which is non-transforming In the same way, the specific attributes of form, color, etc given in the Śrutis, tho' due to Avidyā or upādhis may still pertain to B without causing transformation of its being[32] However, granting for argument's sake that B is Nirvisesa why should it not be open to transformation? If it is because Nirviseṣatva being negation of essence does not need to undergo transformation, it can be held with equal force that Savisesatva in an eternal reality like B, being an eternally existing characteristic of it like the color, taste, smell and other qualities of eternal atoms, needs no transformation[33]

Vācaspati's stand that the Savisesa-Śrutis should be interpreted so as to play the role of *angas* (subordinates) to the Nirvisesa-Śrutis for reasons given by him such as their being intended to be merely restatements of facts otherwise made known by other Pramānas is not tenable An '*angāngibhāva*' is permissible only in cases where there is no mutual conflict or incompatibility between two given things Where there is clear opposition between them as between heat and cold there can be no *angāngibhāva* Between oneness and duality, Nirvisesa and Savisesa there is clear opposition How then can the Saviseṣa be subordinated to the interests of Nirvisesa as its *anga*? Moreover, B is open to knowledge solely thro' Śrutis Its attributes like oneness and many-

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31 स्थौल्याद्यभावस्यापि तद्धर्मिस्वरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मगतस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वावश्यभावेनाभावत्वासिद्धश्च ।
(*STC* iii 2 20 21)

32 अविद्याचित्सबन्धो यथाविद्यापरिणामोऽप्यपरिणामस्वभावे वर्तते सत्य एव, तथा रूपादिविशेषोऽविद्याधीनो ब्रह्मणि वर्तताम् । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

33 निर्विशेषत्वे ब्रह्मण परिणामापत्ति कुतो न स्यात् ? निर्विशेषत्वमभावरूप न परिणाममपेक्षत इति यदा तदा सविशेषत्वमपि रूपरसगन्धादिधर्मजातमिव नित्यगत परमाणुरूपादिवत् अनादिनित्यमेव न परिणाममपेक्षत इति समम् । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

ness nirviśeṣatva and saviśeṣatva are, therefore, *ex hypothesi* not open to the senses How then can preference be shown to Nirviśeṣatva and Saviśesatva subordinated to it? Why can it not be the other way about? Just as it can be shown that all these many forms are of one it can also be shown that the one form manifests itself as many In this way oneness too can be represented as the *anga* of the many· *Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva*.

The alleged depreciation of duality in the Śrutis (*bhedadarśana-nindā*) is the outcome of a misunderstanding of the spirit of the Śrutis. We may ask—Do such Śrutis as *'Nehanānāsti kincana'* decry all difference *as such* or difference *of* B? If it is the former, such a depreciation will apply to the differentiation between the conceptions of identity and difference also Consequently the depreciation of difference will be tantamount to a depreciation of identity also and conversely the eulogy of identity will be a eulogy of difference in its turn. The depreciation of all difference as such would thus lead to a hopeless self-contradiction of thought.[34] If then depreciation of difference is restricted to difference *"of"* B its province will be B's difference in respect of its own nature, and attributes. Any amount of such depreciation of the difference of B from its own attributes will not affect the differences in the world of space and time and the world's difference from B[35] B's Nirviśeṣatva cannot be deduced from such deprecation.

S's explanation that the Saviśeṣa-Śrutis are meant only for purposes of Upāsanā and are not to be taken as representing the true nature of B is opposed to the censure of distorted Upāsanās uttered in the Śāstras

न यत्र रमन्त्यृषयो असदुपासनयात्महन । (*Bhāg* x 87.22)

The reference to the lump of salt as having one and the same taste inside and out and having no place for any other taste (*Brh Up* iv. 5 13) while it rules out any other taste opposed to saltishness in the lump of salt, does *not* rule out the presence of its form, color (hardness of) touch etc. Even so, B which is of the essence or form of pure intelligence while it rules out of its being such attributes as ignorance and limitation which are opposed to its nature can very well accommodate within its being other complementary attributes in its nature

34 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

35 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

such as omniscience, unlimited power and so on, so that it can *afford to be* "Saviśeṣa" all the same.

Śrutis like *Neti neti* have already been shown to contemplate absence in B of empirical attributes rather than utter absence of all attributes including even the transempirical ones which B as a transempirical Being can well afford to have A true philosopher who is detached *in his outlook living in the heart of a village amidst all its factions,* passions and prejudices is said to be *not* in the village (while yet in it) in the sense he keeps himself above their prejudices [36] The correct interpretation of the other Śrutis cited by S under Sūtra17 such as *Anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditāt*[37] (*Kena.* i 3) *Yato vāco nivartante* (*Taitt Up* ii, 4) *Brūmah khalu vayam tvam tu na vijānāsi* (Q S *BSB.* iii 2 17) have been set forth in earlier contexts If the main point at issue in the *adhi.* is B's *nirviśeṣatva* the Sūtrakāra's analogy of the Sun and its reflection would be out of place as neither of them is *nirvisesa*

Śamkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

According to S the opening Sūtra establishes that not even on account of upādhis can B be admitted to have a double-nature—the Savisesa and the Nirviśeṣa, for in all passages in the Śruti whose aim is to represent the nature of B such as *'Aśabdam asparśam'* (*Katha Up* i 3, 15) it is taught to be free from all differences [38]

It contradicts the thesis of B's nirviśeṣatva to say that it has no dual nature *but has only one uniform nature of being nirviśesa*—tho' the contradiction is not apparent [39] For nirviśesatva will be the characteristic possessed by B When one categorically denies that A does not possess two characteristics in question, the denial is naturally intended to cover both of them and it would be putting a very forced and artificial construction on it to make out that the denial means that tho' one of them is present there is absence of both put together In the present case, if we understand by the expression *ubhayalingam* in the

36 नेति नेतीति श्रुतौ लोकविलक्षणस्वरूपाद्यभिप्रायेणव तथोपदेशो न सवधर्माभावाभिप्रायण। यथा ग्रामस्थोऽप्यय न ग्रामस्थ'इत्युक्ति मूखजनवदय न तत्र प्रविष्ट इत्यभिप्रायेण, नतु सवथा ग्रामसबन्धो नास्तीति।

(*STC* iii 2 20 21)

37 Here if we should interpret *'aviditad anyat'* to mean different from the unknown too, it would clash with the acceptance of B's *avedyatvam* incorporated in the Advaitic definition of 'Svaprakasatvam'

38 न तावत्स्वत एव परस्योभयलिगत्वमुपपद्यते अस्तु तर्हि स्थानत पथिव्याद्युपाधियोगात इति तदपि नोपपद्यते। न ह्युपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यादृश स्वभाव सभवति। सवत्र हि अपास्तसमस्तविशेषमेव ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते। (S *BSB* iii.2 11)

39 ब्रह्मण उभयलिगत्व नास्ति किं तु निर्विशपत्वाख्यमेकमेव लिगमित्यर्थपर्यवसाने निर्विशपत्वसिद्धा तव्याधातात्।

(*STC* iii 2 20-21)

Sūtra the characteristics of Saviseṣatva and Nirviseṣatva, the denial of both of them in the Sautra proposition *as it stands worded* cannot possibly be interpreted to affirm the presence of Nirviśeṣatva and deny Saviśeṣatva *alone*[40] Does it make sense to say B does not possess a double-nature because the Śrutis predicate of it one characteristic viz of being absolutely without any characteristic? The fact of B's having many characteristics is not in any way inconsistent with its being stated in the Śrutis to have one character (which may conceivably be one among its many others)-[41]

If the wording of the Sūtra as it stands is to be expanded to mean that it is not possible to invest B with a double nature as one and the same reality cannot naturally have differences and absence of differentiation in itself as it would be self-contradictory to do so, nor can it be conceived to be without differences *naturally* but having differences thro' association with upādhis, for even the association with upādhis cannot confer on a given thing a nature that is quite differet from what truly belongs to it, such an interpretation will not answer to the wording of the Sūtra as we have it If this meaning is to be eked out of it thro' liberal importation of more words, it will be a liberty taken with the wording of the Sūtra which for aught we know may be having something else in mind in wording it as it is

The expression *sarvatra hi* in the Sūtra is a misfit is S's interpretation. For, he concedes that there are references in the Srutis to both the natures of B.—the Saviseṣa and the Nirviśeṣa—which, by some schematic device, he proposes to show converge on establishing that nirseṣatva is the only natural characteristic of B If everywhere (*sarvatra hi*) nirviśeṣatva is taught, there is no possibility of any doubt arising for the Sūtrakāra to attempt to dislodge it!

We cannot accept the explanation that the expression *sarvatra hi* has been introduced to anticipate and answer the doubt as to wherefore even if one of the two natures should be accepted as natural to B preference should be given to *nirviśeṣatva* by pointing out that it is because in all passages whose aim is to to represent the nature of B only the Nirviseṣatva it taught For, what the Sautra proposition *Na sthānatopi parasya ubhayalingam* needs in the first place is a forthright reason to prove it and *not* an explanation that would dispose of an incidental doubt about preferences in regard to either of the two lingas which can arise only

40 [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

41 [illegible] (*STC* ibid)

after the main proposition itself has been fully established with sufficient reason

Moreover acording to S's own showing the Sūtra *Arūpavad eva*** (iii 2.14) *concerns itself with this very doubt and answers it.*[42] Does not the latter become redundant if *sarvatra hi* should also be concerned with the same point?

The claim that everywhere in the Śrutis B is represented as Nirviśeṣa is clearly unsustainable as there are obviously hundreds of Saviśeṣa-Śrutis to be reckoned with.

Even if by *sarvatra hi* we are to take into account only such Śrutis as *Aśabdam asparsam* there is bound to be rough weather In the first place, the texts *aśabdam asparsam* * * * predicate B's being qualified by the special characteristics of being without sound touch etc Secondly, the predicate aśabdam does not say "aśabdam—only" If an emphatic particle is to be understood after *aśabdam* so as to rule out others it would render the following predicates *asparśam* etc superfluous S has taken *sthānatah* in the opening Sūtra to mean "on account of *upādhis*"[43] The references in *Māṇḍūkya* to Suṣuptisthāna, Svapnasthāna and Jāgaritasthāna *and the discussion of dreams and Susupti in the earlier* sections would seem to point to the fact that the Sūtrakārā is specially thinking here of these loci of the Ātman His own use of the term *sthāna* in i, 2.24 and iii.4 24 also confirms this If sthāna is understood in the other sense of the Ātman's loci in the body in the different states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Susupti, the theme of the *adhi* may turn *out to be different from the one envisaged by S*

According to S the next Sūtra (iii 2 12) answers the objection how B can deemed to be only Nirviśeṣa and not of a twofold character either *by nature;* or *nirviśesa* by nature and Saviśeṣa thro' *upādhis,* in the face of texts which describe it as having four feet, sixteen kalās etc which *show that it is also recognized in the Śrutis to be Saviśeṣa,* by pointing out that with reference to all such differences produced by adjuncts the Śruti says there is no difference in B (*Brh Up* ii 5 1)[44] This doubt has already figured in the previous Sutra and has been set at rest there and it cannot rear its head again Even if it should do so, the explanatory reason *sarvatra hi* in iii 2 11 should be sufficient to

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42 कथ पुनराकारवदुपदेशिनीष्वनाकारोपदेशिनीषु च ब्रह्मविषयासु श्रुतिषु सतीष्वनाकारमेव ब्रह्मावधार्यते, न पुनर्विपरीतमिति ? अत उत्तर पठति–अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात । (S BSB iii 2 14)

43 अस्तु तर्हि स्थानत पृथिव्याद्युपाधियोगादिति । (S BSB iii 2 11)
न स्थानत उपाधितोऽपि परस्योभयचिन्हत्वसभव । (*Bhāmati* iii 2 11)

44 प्रत्युपाधिभेद ह्यभेदमेव ब्रह्मण श्रावयति शास्त्रम् । (S BSB iii 2 12)

stifle it without resorting to the luxury of introducing one more Sūtra to dispose of it If the doubt in question cannot be convincingly answered by what has been so loudly and categorically proclaimed under *sarvatra hi*, the uncertainly is not likely to vanish even after the explanation in iii 2 12

Moreover the *Śruti Yascāyam asyām pṛthivyām* (*Bṛh. Up* ii 5 1) is not antagonistic to the acceptance of differences in B due to *upādhis* It will, therefore, be begging the question to put in that such texts show only non-difference as being natural to B Sūtra 12 as interpreted by S dislodges an objection to the main thesis One would expect in an orderly treatment a connected exposition of the *pros* before coming to the *cons* and refuting them

Sutra 13 according to S embodies a censure of those who see difference in B We have already shown that the censuring of difference in general is open to self-contradiction and, therefore, untenable Even supposing it is relevant, the Sūtra or the Bhāṣya should have more pointedly referred to the express strictures on ascribing or perceiving Saviseṣatva in B The term *bheda* actually used in the Sūtra cannot bear the sense Saviseṣatva which is the point at issue If such a meaning is to be read into it, the effort would be superfluous as the substance of Sūtra 11 which has gone before and of Sūtra 14 which follows is also the same S seems inclined to construe *atadvacana* as '*abhedavacana*[45] If this tends to purport *Nirviśeṣatva* of B he should have referred us to *Asabdam asparsam* as authority instead of to *Brh Up* II 5 1 If the reference to *abheda* has the purport of *Nirvisesatva*, this Sutra will be superfluous in view of *sarvatra hi* (iii 2 11)

The Sutra *Arupavad eva* * * * (iii 2 14) is equally redundant as the absence of Viseṣas connoted by the term *arūpa* in iii 2 14 has already been established with proper authority in the opening Sūtra itself The explanation that Sūtra 14 specially furnishes a sufficient reason in support of the preference to be given to the Nirviśeṣa texts being competent to represent the true nature of B (vide *tatpradhānatvāt*) is not sustainable For, the expression *sarvatra hi* has already been introduced as justifying the preference to be given to the Nirviseṣa Śrutis in deciding the true nature of B It cannot be said that such an explanation of *sarvatra hi* has come from Bhāṣyakāra out of consideration for the pupils to help their understanding and not from the Sutrakāra himself For in furnishing his explanation, the Bhāṣyakāra purports it to be conveyed by the words of the Sūtra *sarvatra hi* on which he takes his stand, to offer his explanation.

45. अभेदमतद्वचनात् अभ्युपाधिमद ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मण श्रावयति । (S *BSB* iii 2 12)

It is difficult to accept S's interpretation of the phrase *tatpradhāna* as "having B for its main purport" in Śrutis like *Aśabdam asparśam*. *For in other Śrutis also like* 'Sarvakarmā, Sarvakāmah' B. *is* the purport and subject of discourse We cannot accept the other contention that Tatpradhāna means having the Nirviśeṣa as purport, as it is a matter open to question and a counter-proposition that the Śrutis have the Saviśeṣa-B as their main purport can also be put forward

The way in which S has reduced this Sūtra to the position of a guna sūtra by somehow trying to get away from the difficulty of the redundancy in its interpretation with reference to his own interpretation of Sūtra 11 compares unfavorably with the place of honor which this Sūtra receives in M's interpretation where it constitutes a fresh *adhi* establishing that B is without empirical form and attributes, so that one of the vulnerable points *against* the worthwhileness of Bhakti on the ground of B's having an empirical form and attributes can be laid to rest once for all

S's interpretation of Sūtra 15 as showing that B appears to have name and form thro' upādhis which makes the Saviśesa-texts purposeful is unsustainable as the recognition given to differences caused in B thro' *upādhis* (in S's interpretation) violates the position taken under iii 2 11 where the predication of attributes caused by upādhis has been condemned We cannot accept the explanation that in Sūtra 11 it was stated that the attributes of B caused by adjuncts cannot be regarded as *natural* to its being, whereas in Sūtra 15 it is said that such attributes are found in B This will expose the Sūtrakāra's words to invalidity

The Sun and its reflected image mentioned in Sūtra 18 as illustration fail to support the main thesis of B's Nirviśesatva The illustration on the other hand points to the wide gulf of difference of natures that separates the Jiva and B Like the Sun in the sky B remains unruffled while Jivas as Pratibimbas undergo changes and the vicissitudes of life

S's interpretation of Sūtra 19 as answering the objection that the identity of Jīva and B established on the analogy of the Sun and its reflection is inappropriate because there is no parallelism between the two as no substance comparable to the water is to be found in respect of B is irrelevant For according to his own interpretation of Sūtra 19 the Jīva's relation to B as its Pratibimba[46] is supported by the illustration of the Sun's reflected image The only natural and pertinent objection that can be expected to be taken here is that there is no parallel-

46 दर्शयति च श्रुति परस्यैव ब्रह्मण देहादिषूपाधिष्वन्तरनुप्रवेशम्– पुरश्चक्रे द्विपद ,' 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य,' इति च । (S BSB iii.2 21)

ism between that which has been given in the Sūtra as illustration (viz sūryaka) and Jīva and not between water and something answering to it in the case of B The explanation offered in Sūtra 20 (according to S) that the parallelism is in respect of B's participation in the attributes and states of the body and other adjuncts in which it abides, growing with them and decreasing with them is inappropriate For according to S's own system there is really no participation of B in the states of the body Nor can any such participation be attributed to B on the basis of the identity of the Bimba and Pratibimba as they are *not* identical. The use of *ubhaya* in the Sūtra turns out to be superfluous in S's interpretation The establishment of the appropriateness of either the *dṛṣṭānta* or the *dārṣṭāntika* will suffice to automatically establish the appropriateness of the other This is an indication that evidently the Sutrakāra is pursuing a different line of thought from S's This impression is strengthened by the way in which—in trying to align Sūtras 11 and 21 within a single *adhi* he has been forced to treat Sūtra 18 as a Guna sutra, Sūtra 19 as embodying an objection to it and Sūtra 20 as *a Guna-sūtra to the earlier Guna sūtra*!

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R makes this adhi consist of Sūtras 11 to 25 He raises the doubt whether as in the case of the Jīvātman B indwelling in him is also subject to the limitations and sufferings caused to the Jīva in his states of waking, dream, death etc[47] The Purvapakṣa is that because B is present in the Jīvātman as his indwelling spirit, the imperfections and troubles which cling to the individual must affect the B also—including the immersion in blood and purulent matter even when B voluntarily enters into the bodies of the Jīvas to rule over them. The siddhānta is that as the Śrutis and Smṛtis declare the Supreme B to be free from all imperfections, evil, old age, grief, death, hunger and thirst it is not in the least affected by any imperfections on account of place such as the earth, soul, etc[48]

Criticism

It has been shown in numerous contexts in the course of the Samanvayādhyāya that B possesses the unique character of being absolutely free from sin suffering and imperfections of all kinds It will,

47 किं जीववत् अन्तर्यामिणः परस्य ब्रह्मणोऽपि जाग्रदादिस्थानप्रयुक्ता दोषाः सन्ति उत नेति संशयः ।

(*Vedāntadīpa* iii.2.11)

48 न पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् न आत्मनि तिष्ठन् [illegible] ।

(*Vedāntadīpa* iii.2.11)

therefore, follow as a corollary from it that at all times and in all conditions and states of the life of Jīvas, B. as their indwelling spirit and Ruler will remain the same untarnished Being. There is no likelihood of any doubt or Pūrvapakṣa arising on this point. In fact the question has already been disposed of in 1, 2.8. R. has of course tried to show that suffering would be inevitable even for a Ruler who voluntarily enters into the bodies of Jīvas to rule over them, no less than to be immersed in impurities and that, therefore, it is reasonable to raise the issue here.[49]

Even then, the objection could be set at rest by referring to the unfathomable powers of the Supreme B. as set forth in the Sūtra *Ātmani caivam victitrāśca hi (ii.1.28) etc. Otherwise, as this particular doubt* about sufferings being inevitable for B. even as a Ruler who enters voluntarily into the bodies of Jīvas no less than to be immersed in their impurities has not been expressly mentioned and set at rest in this *adhi.* also, it will have to remain unanswered. It is, therefore, proper to raise an adhikaraṇa only on a Pūrvapakṣa that has been expressed or implied in the Sūtra.[50]

R. interprets the opening Sūtra as follows: "The Supreme B. is not open to defects on account of place, like the Jīvas. For everywhere in the Śrutis it is defined as having the twofold characteristic of being untouched by all defects and full of auspicious qualities". However, as the gravamen of the Pūrvapakṣa is B.'s vulnerability to pollution, it should be sufficient and to the point for the Sūtra to reject it by referring to B.'s absolute freedom from all imperfections. The reference to its twofold characteristics is unnecessary and out of place. The interpretation suffers also from the defect of having to import the predicate "defects" (*doṣaḥ*).[51]

His interpretation of the next Sūtra is: "If it is said that like the Jīva B. is also vulnerable to defects connected with the variety of states and conditions of the bodies where it is present as inner Ruler we say no for in each statement in the Śrutis referring to B.'s presence

49 ननु 'संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्' 'स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च' इत्यादिषु परस्याकर्मवश्यत्वेन दोषाभाव उक्त । तत्कथमकर्मवश्यस्य ब्रह्मण तत्तत्स्थानसबन्धदोष इत्यमुच्यते–**अतस्तन्नियमनार्थं स्वेच्छया तत्प्रवेशेऽप्यपुरुषार्थसबन्धोऽवर्जनीय पूयशोणितादिमज्जन हि स्वेच्छाकारितमप्यपुरुषार्थं एव । **** (*Srībhāṣya* iii.2.11)

50 लीलया पूयशोणितमज्जनमनिष्टसाधन दृष्टमेवेति विशेषाशङ्कया पूर्वपक्षो युक्त इति चेत् 'आत्मनि चैव विचित्राश्च हि' इति सूत्रोक्तविचित्रशक्त्यादिना तस्या परिहारसभवात् । अन्यथा अस्याश्च शङ्काया इह परिहारादर्शनात् अनुच्छित्तिरेव स्यात् । सूत्रोक्तपूर्वपक्षेणाधिकरणरचनसभवे, तदनुक्तेन तदयोगात् । (*STC.* iii 2 20-21)

51. दोषाभावे निर्दोषताश्रवणस्यैव हेतुत्वसभवे उभयलिङ्गश्रवणस्य व्यर्थविशेषणत्वेन हेतुत्वायोगात । सौत्रोभयपदस्वारस्यायोगाच्च । लिङ्गशब्दस्य लक्षणे प्रयोगाभावाच्च । दोषपदाध्याहारदोषाच्च । (*STC.* iii.2.20-21)

as Ruler (such as *Brh. Up.* iii, 8, 3-22) there is mention of its not being touched by defects".[52]

The doubt regarding B.'s vulnerability to pollution on account of place has been raised in Sūtra 11 and rejected with adequate reason embodied in the words *sarvatra hi* there. We cannot reasonably expect it to rear its head over again in Sūtra 12. If it should, we cannot expect it to be so easily silenced by quoting at the most a few references like Brh. Up. (iii, 8, 3). This Sūtra as interpreted by R. *makes no new point* and is superfluous. Its interpretation obliges us to understand the terms "*bheda*" and "*atad*" in the unusual senses of "defect" and "absence of defect".[53]

Sūtra 13 according to R. shows how in spite of tenanting the same body with the Jīva, B. as the ruler remains in its own glory looking on without suffering the fruits of Jīva-Karma (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.1.1). This is objected to on the ground that as the Jīva-Ātman entering into the elements to divide name and form (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.2) the Supreme B. as the self of the individual must have definite shapes divine and human and be denominated by corresponding names and, therefore, be subject to Karma and defilement.[54] This objection is answered in the next Sūtra *Arūpavad eva hi tat pradhānatvāt* (Sūtra 14). The Sutra means: Tho' embodied as present in the human and other bodies B. is without form; for its presence in the Jīva's body is only as the principal agent (*pradhāna*) to enable the Jīva to undergo the fruits of his Karma.

We may point out, however, that the possibility of B.'s being drawn into the vortex of "name and form" and be enslaved by karma has been set at rest once for all by the pronouncement *Pratyekamatadvacanāt* in Sūtra 12. No such doubt can, therefore, keep raising its head off and on. Should it do so, there is equal possibility of the conclusion established here that "B. is that which is without name and form" (*Chān. Up.* viii.14.1) quoted by R. under Sūtra iii.2.14, itself being challenged on the ground of B.'s having a body as stated in *Yasya pṛthvī śarīram*

52. यथा जीवस्य देवादिशरीरसम्बन्धितयावस्थाभेदात् उक्तदोषसम्बन्ध एव परस्यापि यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमिति शरीरसम्बन्धित्वावस्थासम्भवात् ते दोषाः स्युरिति चेन्न प्रत्येकं प्रतिपर्यायं अतद्वचनात् दोषासम्बन्धित्ववचनात् ।

(*Vedāntadīpa* iii.2.12)

53. न स्थानतोऽपीति सूत्रस्थानस्थितया प्राप्तदोषशङ्कायाः 'सर्वत्र हीति' हेतूपन्यासपूर्वकं परिहृतत्वेन पुनस्तस्यैव शङ्कानुदयात् । उदये वा, प्रत्येकमतद्वचनादिति वचनेन परिहारायोगात् । सर्वत्र निर्दोषत्वोक्त्यानन्तरगतशङ्काया एकदेशे तदुक्त्या परिहारस्य दुर्घटत्वात्, आनुपूर्व्यवैपर्यात्, भेदादिशब्दस्य दोषादौ प्रयोगाभावाच्च ।

(*STC.* iii 2 20-21)

54. अथ स्यात्-अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि इति ब्रह्मात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशपूर्वकं नामरूपव्याकरणमिति ब्रह्मणोऽपि तदात्मभूतस्य देवमनुष्यादिरूपत्वं तन्नामभाक्त्वं चास्ति, ततश्च कर्मवश्यत्वमवर्जनीयमिति ।

(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2.14)

(*Brh. Up* iii 7 3) At this rate, one can go on reviving such doubts without end[55] There is no reason why overriding the Śrauta order of 'nāmarūpa', the *Sūtrakāra* should have shown a preference to "form" (rūpa) over "name" (nāma) in wording Sūtra 14 if its purpose, as R would have it, is to show that B is not entangled by name and form This curious fact which does not accord with his own adherence to the accepted order of usage as may be seen from B S ii 4 17 (in R) should raise a serious misgiving in our minds about the correctness of R's judgment about the real topic of discussion in this Sutra

Sūtra 15 is introduced by R as answering an objection that B cannot really have the twofold characteristics of being free from all imperfections and having all perfections because its nature has been defined as consisting only of light (intelligence) in *Satyam jñānam anantam* (*Taitt Up* ii 1)[56]

This is answered by saying that just as it has to be admitted that intelligence is the essential nature of B to uphold the meaningfulness of the text "*Satyam jñānam*", it is equally necessary to uphold the meaningfulness of other texts like "He who is all-knowing, omniscient" (*Muṇḍ Up* i 1 9) "vast are His natural powers, knowledge, strength and activity" (*Śvet Up* vi 8) We have, therefore, to accept that B is 'ubhayalinga'—has both these characteristics[57]

It does not appear from the Taittirīya text Satyam jñānam that B is of the nature of intelligence *only* (*prakāsaikasvarūpam*) as R puts it That seems to be a tame submission to the Śāmkarite position. In any case, the text speaks of two other attributes besides intelligence as constitutive of B's nature Moreover,, the adjunct of jñānam will rule out ignorance and other shortcomings which are incompatible with B's intelligent nature It will *not* rule out other auspicious attributes like omniscience which are compatible with intelligence To give an analogy, the Śruti text 'Yadi rathantarasāmā somah syāt' rules out only 'Brhatsāma' and not the Gāyatrasāma and others compatible with Rathantara To be of the nature of intelligence is not, therefore, in any way inconsistent with having the twofold characteristic of perfection

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55 प्रयकमतद्वचनात इत्यननैव कमवश्यताप्रयोजकरूपमात्वादिदोषाणामपि परिहृतत्वादिह पुन शकानुदयात। उदय तु ते यद तरा तत ब्रह्म इति श्रुत नामरूपराहित्यमेवानुपपन्नम्। यस्य पृथिवी शरीरमि यादौ श्रुतशरीरत्वात् इत्यादिशकोदयसभवेन अपयवसानापत्ति ।

56 ननु सत्य ज्ञानमन त ब्रह्मत्यादिभिर्निर्विशषप्रकाशैकस्वरूप ब्रह्मावगम्यते। तत्कथ कल्याणगुणाकरत्वनिरस्तनिखिलदोषत्वरूपोभयलिंगत्वम ? (*Śrībhaṣya* iii 2 15)

57 यथा सत्य ज्ञानमित्यादिवाक्यावैयर्थ्यात प्रकाशस्वरूप ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते तथा सत्यसकल्पत्वसर्वज्ञत्वजगत्कारणत्व सर्वात्मकत्वनिरस्तनिखिलाविद्यादिदोषत्वाद्यभिधायिवाक्यावैयर्थ्यात उभयलिंगमेव ब्रह्म।
(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2 15)

and absence of all defects The objection is, therefore, spurious and does not deserve any notice[58] It cannot be modified to suggest that in so far as it appears from the text 'Satyam jñānam ' that B's nature consists only of reality, knowledge and infinitude the other characteristic of being without imperfections does not come within the purview of the said definition and that in this sense it will be open to question to conceive of Ubhayalingatva as its nature For the term *anantam* in the said definition, which means what is endless or undecaying, is competent to denote absence of all defects and limitations

Tho' the objection against such attributes as in *Niraniṣṭo niravadyah* becoming devoid of meaning can be disposed of by R's interpretation of Sūtra 15, the acceptance of Arūpatva of B in Sūtra 14 will throw down the gauntlet at texts like *Rugmavarnam kartāram* (*Mund* Up iii 1 3) It will be much more imperative to meet that challenge That could be done only by agreeing to a slight change in the reading of Sūtra 15, of the ablative 'avaiyarthyāt' to the nominative (as in M)

Continuing the train of thought from Sūtra 15 in support of B's 'ubhayalingatva' (as he understands the term) R interprets Sūtra 16 as emphasizing that the text *Satyam jnanam* merely predicates that intelligence is the essence of B It does not negate the presence of auspicious qualities like Satyasankalpatvam in B[59]

One would expect the Sutrakāra to adhere to the order of attributes in the Śruti and R too to adhere to his own interpretation in Sutra 11 where in explaining 'ubhayalingam' he has given precedence to the attribute of freedom from all imperfections Following the same order R should have held that the text *Satyam jñanam* states that "reality is the essence of B" and that it does not negate B's being free from all defects

It cannot be explained on R's behalf that the predication that B is of essence of intelligence and other attributes will be equivalent to a negation of all difference between substance and attribute in B In consequence of this an objection will raise its head that B cannot be conceived as possessing numerous auspicious attributes *differing* from its being By giving priority to Jñāna in the explanation of 'Tanmātram' this objection is intended to be overcome[60]

58. सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्य प्रकाशस्वरूपताया अवगतेः । तत्प्रतीतावपि ज्ञानादिविशेषणस्यापि स्वविरोध्यज्ञानाद- [illegible] [illegible] । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

59 किं च सत्यं ज्ञानमिति वाक्यं ब्रह्मणः प्रकाशस्वरूपतामात्रं प्रतिपादयति नापरं गुणगणसम्बन्धं निषेधति । (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2 16)

60 ज्ञानादिगुण[illegible] [illegible] निषेधकत्वात् तदर्थं कल्याणगुणाकरत्वं [illegible] इति भावः । (*STC* iii 2 20-21)

This is not convincing So long as there is no actual establishment of the difference between B and its attributes here, the said objection will remain uncontroverted If no difference between B and its attributes is to be admitted, at least the substitute of difference viz 'Viśesa' will have to be there to sustain the relation of substance and attribute (*dharmadharmibhāva*) If difference between B and its attributes is admitted, it cannot coexist with their identity recognized (by R) in stating that B is of the essence of knowledge (i e *dharmibhūta jñānam*) Śrutis *anando brahma* show that *ānanda* is likewise *dharmi-(svarūpa) bhūta* in R's terminology If the difference between substance and attributes is in its turn different from its relata and that again different from its relata and so on it will lead to an endless regress If it is identical with them why not give the same concession to the attributes themselves and regard them as identical with B? In that case the apprehended objection to get over which the precedence given to Jñāna is sought to be justified will lose its point[61]

Sūtras 18, 19 and 20 have been explained by R as follows As B is without defects and full of auspicious attributes, the Śāstras elucidate this twofold characteristic with suitable illustrations of the Sun and Ākāsa -

आकाशमेक हि यथा घटादिषु पृथग्भवेत् ।
तथात्मैकोऽनेकस्थो जलधारेष्विवांशुमान् ॥[62]

This point established in Sūtra 18, is objected to in the next one on the ground that the illustrations are incongruous For, *the Sun does not actually exist in the water unlike B which according to the Siddhāntin* is actually present in all the places such as the earth, the souls and their bodies—thereby becoming liable to contamination[63]

This objection is answered in the next Sutra The Sūtra means *It is only B's liability to becoming affected by various imperfections* such as subjection to increase and decrease or getting ruffled and so on by being present in different places as in respect of the Sun's reflected image in the water that is *repudiated in this illustration* The

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61 भेदसाधनाभावेन शङ्काया असमाहितत्वात् । भेदानङ्गीकारेण समाधाने भेदप्रतिनिधिविशेषानङ्गीकारेणोपायाभावाच्च । भेदाङ्गीकारे तु भेदाभेदयोरेकत्र विरोध सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्ये ज्ञानाद्यात्मकत्वोक्तिविरोध गुणगुणिनो र्भेद भेदिभ्या गुणगुणिभ्या भिन्नश्चेत सोऽप्येव सोऽप्येवमित्यनवस्था । अभिन्नश्चेत किमपराद्ध गुणैः ? (*STC* iii 2 20 21)

62 स्थानेषु स्थितस्यापि ब्रह्मणो न तत्प्रयुक्तदोषभाक्त्व अत एव जलदर्पणादिप्रतिबिम्बितसूर्यादिवत परमात्मा निर्दोष इति शास्त्रेषूपमा क्रियते—आकाशमेक हि*** (*Śribhaṣya* iii 2 18)

63 तुशब्दश्चोद्य द्योतयति—यथाम्बुनि सूर्य तत्रानवस्थित एव भ्रान्त्या तत्र स्थित इति गृह्यते न तथा परमात्मा । अतो न तथात्वम् । (*Vedantadīpa* iii 2 19)

illustration of Ākāśa present in pots etc. points similarly to B's remaining unaffected by changes of place Thus both the illustrations of Ākāśa and the sun find complete congruity.[64]

We have, however, to ask whether in Sūtra 18 it is the Sun himself as the original (bimba) that is being introduced as the illustration or only his reflection (pratibimba) If it is the Sun as such there will be no point in the illustration as the Sun is *not* actually present in the water unlike B which is actually present in all the places in the earth the souls and their bodies The question of B's remaining uncontaminated due to difference of places cannot, therefore, be illustrated by the Sun's actual presence in difference places, as it is not true. The suffix "ka" in "sūryaka" in the Sūtra would also be unhappy if the Sun as the original is intended as illustration. In this case a different illustration such as of a person who has mastered Agniṣṭambha vidyā, who remains unharmed even when caught in the midst of a raging fire should have been thought of instead of the Sun or Akasa which have nothing to do with the question of personal defilement Otherwise, even a pot which remains unaffected when shifted to different places may serve as illustration If it is the reflected image of the Sun that is intended as the illustration it would surely be incongrous as the reflection is very much subject to increase and decrease and it would defeat the very purpose of the illustration.

Vireswarananda (*Brahmasūtras*, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1970 Introduction, pp xxxviii) has criticized R here for "ignoring so important a subject as to whether B is with or without attributes, in a work meant to systematize the teachings of the Upaniṣads" and making Ubhayaliṅgādhikaranam discuss instead "a less important subject whether B has the twofold characteristic of freedom from imperfections and possessing all blessed qualities"

We have seen how the entire Samanvayādhyāya is itself the most eloquent commentary on an exhaustive exposition of B's cosmic attributes of transcendence, immanence, blissfulness, universal sovereignty, freedom from imperfections, being the author of the eight dispensations of the world of matter and Souls etc , The Sūtrakāra has also made it clear in the course of the first Adhyāya itself that besides having attributes of a positive character such as *ānandamayatva*, *antaryāmitva*, *bhūmatva* etc , of the highest philosophical importance, its trans-empirical nature

61 [illegible] (*Vedāntadīpa* iii 2 19)

is such as to admit of an equally countless number of negative attributes also such as *asthūlatvam, ananutvam, ahrasvatvam* referred to in the Srutis, to be integrated with its being[65] This has been pinpointed by the Sūtrakāra in *Adṛsyatvādigunako dharmokteh* (B S 1,2,21) The logic of this Sūtra should be literally foolproof The author of the Sūtras who has thus expressly predicated of his B these negative attributes and given them the status and title of *"gunas"* or characteristics, can hardly be believed to withhold assent to its possessing positive attributes, as such The very large number of cosmic attributes whose Samanvaya in B has been so systematically expounded by the Sūtrakāra, taken together with his unqualified acceptance of negative attributes also in B, should thus be sufficient to rule out any further need to go into the question whether B is with or without attributes, *at this stage* What is required at this stage is a methodical justification of the two concepts together with an elucidation of the relation between B and its attributes (*See Ahikundalādhi*) and *not* an affirmation of the fact of its having the twofold characteristic Such justification is part of the plan of the Avirodhādhyāya, especially of its Yuktipāda and incidentally of the Bhaktipāda (III 2) How this has been carried out in the Yuktipāda and is being carried out in the Vivarana and Samarthana Petikās of the present Pāda has been brought out in the introductory remarks in the *TP* and the *STC* and their further elucidation there[66] It is doing very poor justice to the Sutra *Na sthānatopi Parasyobhayalingam* * * * to construe it as going into the question *for the first time whether B is with or without attributes or whether in being admitted as being full of perfection it is also to be admitted as being without imperfections and defilement*

The principle underlying the predication of 'adṛsyatvādigunas' of B and the points brought out under the Sūtra *Anyabhāvavyāvṛtteh* 1 3 12) and the *'Sarvadharmopapattyadhi'* (ii 1 38 in Vol I pp 413-414) should suffice to put the lid on all controversy over the question whether B is Savisesa or Nirviseṣa—with or without attributes In the same way, B's freedom from defilement on account of association with Prakṛti and its modifications has also been established in several *adhis* in the first Adhyāya

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65 न विधिरूप एव धम कि नामेत्यभावमात्र प्रकृतम् । नन्वस्माभि भावरूपा एव धर्मा ब्रह्मणो नाङ्गीक्रियन्ते अभावात्मकास्तु स्वीक्रियन्त एव । अतो न सूत्रविरोध इत्यत आह-यदीति । यथा अभावात्मका अदृश्यत्वाद्या प्रमाणावगतास्तथा सर्वज्ञत्वादयो भावरूपा अपि श्रुतिसिद्धा अङ्गीकार्या एव * * विषयत धा यपेक्षत्व प्रतियोगितयान्यापेक्षत्वमिति तु वैधर्म्यमात्रम । (*NS* p 482)

66 अत्रश्वरप्राप्तिसाधनभक्त्यर्थं तस्य सर्वत्र निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणत्वसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसगति । (*TP* iii 2 11) See also Chapter IX, fn 1

The concept of B's Savıśeṣatva naturally ımplıes ıts 'Gunapūrnatva Its Gunapūrnatva and ıts Nırdoṣatva are the twın aspects of one unıtary concept of B as 'Nırdoṣāśeṣasadgunam' It ıs the content of thıs definıtıon of B that has been expounded by the Sūtrakāra ın the Samanvaya and Avırodhādhyāyas

There ıs thus no questıon of the Sūtrakāra's havıng ıgnored thıs ımportant ıssue whether B ıs wıth or wıthout attrıbutes The conceptıon of B as Gunapūrna may even be challenged on the ground that ıt may be tınged wıth some defects also as the good and the bad are always ınterrelated and coexıstent We have seen how ın affirmıng B to be Svarvadharmopapannam (ıı 1 38) the Sutrakāra made ıt clear that B whıle remaınıng Gunapūrnam utterly defies all evıl and defilement The subject matter of '*Na sthānato*' pı * * * need *not* therefore be taken to deal wıth thıs partıcular ıssue whether B ıs wıth or wıthout attrı butes to make good ıts supposed omıssıon We have also seem that denıal of 'ubhayalıngatvam' wıll not necessarıly make B 'Nırvıśeṣa' as ıt wıll not spare Nırvıśeṣatva as both the alternatıves have to stand abrogated ın the act of denyıng 'ubhayalıngatva'

Commentıng on thıs adhı Prof Ranade says ıt dıscusses the questıon whether God ıs personal or ımpersonal (*Op. cıt* p 74) It ıs the commonest fallacy of loose thınkıng commıtted by many modern wrıters on Vedānta that the paırs 'Saguna and Nırguna' 'Savıśeṣa and Nırvıśeṣa' are synonymous wıth 'personal and ımpersonal' Savısesa and Saguna ın Vedāntıc thought and tradıtıon have nothıng to do wıth beıng a Person ın any physıcal sense Ranade betrays another mısconceptıon when he talks of 'Sarvakarmā, Satyasankalpah etc, as "masculıne attrıbutes" and 'asabdam, asparsam etc, as "neuter attrıbutes (*op cıt* p 74) the former goıng wıth the personal and the latter wıth the ımpersonal In the first place, Sarvakarmā, Sarvagandhah etc, are *not* "attrıbutes" but 'substantıves' They happen to be used as 'masculıne nouns Sımılarly, aśabdam etc are also Bahuvrıhı-substantıves referrıng to B Ranade's statement ın thıs context that "to Madhava God ıs personal and to Rāmānuja, He ıs both personal and ımpersonal" (*op cıt* p 75) ıs ıncorrect. We have seen that to M also B ıs trans-personal (*arūpavat*) ın the sense that ıt has no Prākṛtıc form, body or lıneaments There ıs agreement between R and M on thıs poınt that God or B has no Prākṛtıc form and that Hıs form ıs aprākṛta or 'Lakavılakṣaṇam'[67] Ranade hımself recognızes that *arūpam mıght also mean 'atırūpa' or transcendental form or ıneffable

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67 न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिर्मांसमेदोऽस्थिसम्भवा (*Varāha* Purva khanda xiv 40) Q M. *GB* ii 72 Desika *GB C* introd

lustre. To such an ineffable form of Viṣṇu, Kālidāsa compared the grandeur of the ocean any limit to which is incomprehensible "(*Op. cit.* p. 75). Does this not come close to M.'s position that the description of B. as 'Arūpavat" is to be understood in the sense of its form being transempirical (*lokavilakṣaṇam*) which is the precise translation of 'transempirical' in Sanskrit? The suffix '*vat*' after 'arūpa". otherwise superfluous, has been explained by M. and his commentators as repudiating any absolute distinction of the transcendental form from that which possess it. This establishes the complete integration of form and attributes with B.,—a fact which is sufficient to distinguish once for all B.'s "form" from the physical forms of persons (which are of course different from them).

CHAPTER XIV

BRAHMAN IS PROTECTOR AND NOURISHER OF ALL BEINGS

13 *Pālakatvādhikaranam* (iii 2 22)

This *adhi.* justifies God's attributes of being the protector (*pālaka*) and nourisher (*posaka*) of the world of matter and souls,—attributes which are implicit in the definition of B as Sṛṣtyādyaṣṭakartṛ[1] Knowledge of B as protector and nourisher of beings helps to instil and intensify one's devotion to the Lord For, one is naturally grateful and devoted to one's Protector Hence the relevance of this topic in this context of the Sādhana-Adhyāya[2]

The Pūrvapakṣa opposes pālaktva (and poṣakava) being reckoned as distinctive and separate attributes of B,[3] coming within the purport of the Viṣayavākya of the Sūtra i 1 2 The act of protection cannot be defined either as presupposing in respect of the world the prior non-existence of its dissolution or as a forestalling of the destruction of what exists or as the prevention of the troubles and tribulations to which created beings may be exposed in their lifetime[4]

Antecedent negation being beginningless cannot be regarded as *depending* on an 'other' Even if it should depend on God, *pālakatva*

1 [illegible] । (*TDP* iii 2 22)

2 [illegible] । (*TDP* iii 2 22)
[illegible] । (Ragh. *TPB* iii 2 22)

3 Vadiraja (*TPG* p 139) explains the propriety of dealing with this objection at this stage instead of before the Tadabhidhyanadhi (ii 3 13)
[illegible] तस्मिन् [illegible] भवति । [illegible] ।

4 [illegible] । [illegible] वा ? (*STC* iii 2 22)

cannot be conceived as presupposing a separate activity on His part, like His creating or dissolving the universe As a matter of fact, it cannot be meaningfully contradistinguished from absence of dissolution (*samhārābhāva*) of the world. As long as the world is not dissolved or destroyed by its creator, it will continue *to be and flourish,* without looking up to His favor to be able to do so[5] If *pālakatvam* is to be distinguished from prevention of dissolution, such dissolution will have to be traced to some agency other than of the one who brings about its prevention For dissolution of the world and prevention of such dissolution cannot both emanate from the same source[6] Nor can *pālakatva* be conceived as preclusion of injuries or troubles arising in the course of the world's existence For God Himself is taken to be the sole cause and author of whatever happens to the world of matter and souls, at all times and places It is hardly possible, therefore, to attribute the troubles and tribulations of life to any other agency but God's It would be manifestly illogical to make God busy Himself with the prevention of the troubles and tribulations which He Himself visits upon the creatures[7] We have, therefore, to come to the conclusion that once the world has been created and set on its feet, it is bound to go on flourishing, till it is dissolved No separate activity for its protection needs to be assumed in the Creator[8] Its absence will thus act as a deterrent to Bhakti The Pūrvapaksa thus makes a point of this, in contesting the need for Bhatki

ततश्च पालकत्वाभावेन महामहिमत्वाभावान्न तत्र भक्तिरिति। (*AC* iii 2 *adhi* 13)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta takes its stand on the Śruti

नैतावदेनाऽतोऽन्यदस्ति उक्षा स[9] द्यावापृथिवी बिभर्ति। (*RV* x 31, 8 ab)

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5 ईश्वर एव हि विश्वस्य सृष्टिसंहारयो कर्ता नान्य इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम। तथा च स्रष्टा यावन्न संहरेत तावत स्थिति स्वभावसिद्धैवेति न परव्यापारमपेक्षते। (*NS* p 513)

6 यदि खलु सृष्टिसंहारयो कर्तान्य स्यात तदोदासीनस्य तस्य सष्टौ प्ररणार्थं संहारे प्रवृत्तस्य च निवारणाय च स्थितावीश्वरापेक्षा संभवेत। न च तदस्ति। (*NS* p 513)
स्वकर्तृकसंहारे स्वस्यैव निवारकत्वानुपपत्त। (*STC*)

7 अवान्तरोपद्रवस्यापि स्वकर्तृत्वश्रुत्या भगवदधीनत्वेन स्वस्यैव तत्र निवारकत्वानुपपत्त। (*STC* iii 2 22)

8 तथा च सत्या सष्टौ यावत्संहारं जगत स्वत एव स्थितिसंभवात तदथ भगवत पालकत्वरूपधर्मान्तरस्याप्यभावात। (*STC* iii 2 22)

9 Raghuttama (*TPB* p 383) reads here सद द्यावापृथ्वी against the Pada patha and writes सदित्यस्य भवदिति कार्यमिति चाथद्वयम This requires a doubling of the dental consonant in the text of the Śruti The *TP* seems to retain स as the reading This may be seen from its separately para phrasing स and उक्षा as स पर भक्ताभिमतपिनसेचक The words अनन्श्वरेण भवत्कार्यम in the *TP* merely draw out the meaning of नैतावदेनाऽतोऽन्यदस्ति and need not be taken to accept the reading सत before द्यावपृथिवी See *BD* iii 2 13 Also *read* अननत्ति एतेन यस्यार्थोऽयम। भवत्कार्यमिति शेष। यद्वा एना एनदित्यय। तस्य व्याख्या अनन्श्वरेण भवत्कार्यमिति। उक्षा स इत्यत्र स इत्यनवादनायमाह—स पर इति। (*Ragh* *TPB* iii 2 22)

"Not of this extent only, there is much more The showerer of all that is desired by the devotees (*ukṣā*) supports and nourishes heaven and earth" It shows that Pālakatva consisting of supporting and nourishing the creatures is something different from and over and above the non-termination of the continued existence of the world after its creation. The earlier ṛcas of the same Śruti (*RV.* x 31, 6-7) speak of the Supreme Being's (ukṣan) other creative activities and of its dissolution of beings It follows then from RV X 31, 8 that pālakatva (*bibharti*)[10] denotes various ways in which the Supreme B helps and nourishes the world and that it stands for very much more than the mere non-dissolution of the created world or prevention of troubles in the course of its life[11]

The gist of this *adhi* read along with that of the previous one is that the Supreme B bestows not only their meed of bliss upon the released souls of different categories but also forms of mundane prosperity and advantages by way of active protection and nourishment upon those in Samsāra, in accordance with their deserts and devotion. (*Gita* ix 22) This brings out the need for Bhakti[12]

10 [illegible] । (*AC* iii 2 22)
11 [illegible] । (Raghu. *NVB*)
12. [illegible] । (*AC* iii 2 22)

CHAPTER XV

BRAHMAN'S NATURE IS ESSENTIALLY UNMANIFEST

14. *Avyaktādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.23-27)

This *adhi.* establishes the truth that B.'s nature remains always and uniformly subtle, and unmanifest and that *it is, therefore, impossible for the Jīvātman to attain direct vision of it by the power of his own effort without Bhakti and without the grace of B.:*

परमात्मापरोक्ष्यं च तत्प्रसादादेव, न जीवशक्त्या इति वक्तुमुच्यते—अव्यक्तमेव तत् ब्रह्म स्वत इति। (M. *BSB.* iii.2.23)

The *adhi.* thus arises by way of an *ākṣepasaṅgati.*[1] Rāghavendra (*Ny. Muktāvali* iii.2.adh. 14) explains the sequence of thought differently, that after bringing out the significance of B.'s attribute of pālakatva in the preceding *adhi.* the Sūtrakāra here turns to highlight B.'s majesty as bestower of direct knowledge and vision of its own unmanifested nature and essence (*avyaktasvabhāva*) on the Jīvatmān, out of its own sheer grace, being pleased with his Bhakti.[2]

The question to be decided here is whether the direct vision of B. which is held to be the fruit of Bhakti can or cannot be attained by the Jīvātman by his own effort, in other ways,—without having to cultivate Bhakti. To decide the issue it has to be settled whether B. is so constituted as to be both unmanifest and manifest like a spirit

1. अतीताधिकरणे महिमनिरूपणादिना भक्ते. कर्तव्यत्वसप्रयोजनत्वयोरुक्तयोरेव, भक्तिप्रयोजनत्वेनाभिमतज्ञानादे पुरुषप्रयत्नेनैव सिद्धेर्व्यर्था भक्ति. न कार्येति शकोदये तत्परिहारादनन्तरसंगतिरिति भाव ।
(Raghu. *TPB.* iii 2 23)

2. पूर्वत्र जन्मादिसूत्रोक्तसृष्ट्याद्यष्टके पालकत्व प्रसाध्य स्वज्ञानदत्वमहिमा साध्यत इति संगति । (*Op. cit.*)

which manifests itself to others when propitiated and remains unseeable at other times, or has a dual nature of being manifest in one of its aspects and unmanifest in another, like fire, earth and water remaining unmanifest in their tanmātrā forms and becoming manifest in their gross forms, or else whether it is *wholly, uniformly and always unmanifest in its essence* We have further to probe if B becomes an object of knowledge to the Jivātman by its own grace attained by him thro' Bhakti and meditative contemplation, without prejudice to its being unmanifest in essence To settle this last point, we have to find out if there is any solution of the apparent contradiction between B 's being recognized to be unmanifest in essence and its becoming manifest at the same time, as an object of direct knowledge and vision to the Jivātman This is the problem to which the Sūtrakāra addresses himself in this *adhi*[3]

It will, therefore, be seen that if there should be no way of resolving the contradiction involved in having a direct vision of what is *ex hypothesi* unmanifest in its essential nature, there can be no hope of attaining direct vision of B thro' upāsanā and other means However, since the Śrutis recognize the fact of Aparokṣajnāna (direct vision of B), it means that B 's nature cannot be essentially unmanifest For what is essentially unmanifest can never be made manifest as the object of a direct perception by any amount of exertion In the interest of the fact of such a direct perception accepted in the Śrutis, the Pūrvapakṣin argues that B has to be conceived as having a dual nature of being both manifest and unmanifest in the manner of a spirit or like the elements of fire, water and earth in their gross and subtle forms This, if conceded, would give the vantage to the Pūrvapakṣa and do away with the need for Bhakti in as much as Aparokṣajnāna could be attained by one's own effort in other ways[4] The Siddhānta, on the other hand, finds the solution of the conflict in the mysterious power (*acintyaśakti*) of B to accomplish the unaccomplishable (*aghaṭitaghaṭanā*) and holds that on account of such a power of B there is no contradiction involved in holding that B which is essentially unmanifest in its nature (*svataḥ avyaktam* or *avyaktaikasvabhāvam*) becomes an object

3 अत्र भक्तिः किं न वक्तव्या उत वक्तव्येति चिन्ता । तत्र तत्प्रयोजनं येनाभिमतं ब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञानं पुरुषप्रयत्नसाध्यं भवत्युत नेति । तत्र ब्रह्म तिरोभाविताविर्भावाभ्यां वा अग्न्यादिवत् स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपाभ्यां वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वभावमव्यक्तैकस्वभावं वेति । तत्राव्यक्तैकस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मण उपासनादिसाध्यप्रसाद अपरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वं न सम्भवत्युत सम्भवतीति । तत्राव्यक्तत्वापरोक्षत्वयोः विरोधशामकं नास्त्युतास्तीति । (Raghu. TPB iii 2 adh 14)

4 एवं चाव्यक्तत्वापरोक्षत्वयोः विरोधशामकत्वाभावे उपासनादिसाध्यप्रसादापरोक्षज्ञानासम्भवेन अव्यक्तैकस्वभावत्वानुपपत्त्या अपरोक्षज्ञानसिद्धये च तिरोभाविताविर्भाविता अग्न्यादिवत् व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वभावत्वं वा अपरोक्षज्ञानस्य (the reading परोक्षज्ञानस्य in the printed text is erroneous) पुरुषप्रयत्नैकसाध्यत्वसिद्धेः न तत्र भक्तिः वक्तव्येति पूर्वपक्षः । (Raghu. TPB)

of Aparokṣajnāna to the Jīvātman out of its own grace (*prasāda*), earned by Jīvātman thro' upāsanā, Bhakti and other means. In this position, as Aparokṣajnāna is not achieved *exclusively* by individual effort *without* sincere Bhakti, (and grace) the place and importance of Bhakti remain unimpaired in the Siddhānta.[5]

Gatārthatāsaṅkā Refuted

The STC points out how the present *adhi.* is not rendered superfluous by the Adṛśyatvādhi. (i, 2.21-23). In the latter, B. is established as the invisible, ungraspable Being referred to in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.6) after disposing of the adverse evidence of *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.2) viz. of the Akṣara being placed at the starting point of a gradational series, brought up by the Pūrvapakṣa there against equating the Akṣara proclaimed as the invisible source of the world there, with B. (See Vol. I, pp. 181; 183). In the present *adhi.*, on the other hand, B. is shown to be the ever unmanifest principle, on the strength of direct supporting evidence. There are also other points of distinction between the two *adhis.* In the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa is grounded in a mark of inference and the Siddhānta is arrived at with the help of a more powerful mark. In the *Avyaktādhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa rests on texts such as *Muṇḍ Up.* v.3, referring to B. as an object of perception by the self and this is met on the authority of the Śruti itself. In the Adṛśyatvādhi., the Siddhānta is concerned with the establishment of *adṛśyatva*, *anātmyatva* and other marks, as pertaining to B. In the Avyaktādhi. we are concerned with the establishment of B.'s avyakatva *only*. Again in the *Adrśyatvādhi* the identity of the "Akṣara" endowed with the attributes of unperceivability and others is established with B. whereas in the *Avyaktādhi.* the theme is the direct establishment of B.'s unperceivability as such. The purpose of the Adrśyatvādhi is to secure the samanvaya of the marks of adrśyatva, anātmyatva, etc. in B. or even the samanvaya of the name 'Akṣara' along with the other marks while in the present *adhi.* the purpose is the *justification of Bhakti.* The two *adhi.s* are thus widely divergent in their scope, aim and topical significance. So there is no question of overlapping between them and no fear of the Avyaktādhi. being *rendered superfluous by the* Adrśyatvādhi.

Nor is it rendered superfluous by the Ambvadhi. (iii.2.19). For, in the latter, preference is given to dispelling the objection that in so far as the Jiva's similarity of attributes in respect of knowledge, bliss etc.

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5 विरोधशामकाचिन्त्यशक्तिसद्भावे ब्रह्मण उपासनादिजन्यप्रसादसाध्यापरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वेऽप्यव्यक्तस्वभावत्वोपपत्तौ तदपरोक्षज्ञानस्य पुरुषप्रयत्नसाध्यत्वासंभवात्, तदर्थं भक्तिरवश्यं कर्तव्येति सिद्धान्ते च फलफलिभावः ।

(Raghu. *TPB*)

as Pratibimba of B is intrinsic to his nature, this similarity lying obscured in the state of bondage is bound to become fully manifested in Mokṣa *of its own accord without the need for Bhakti* In this way, the *Ambvadhi* is designed to set aside an objection relating to Bhakti's role in bringing about the consummation of the primary goal of spiritual life viz Mokṣa The *Avyaktādhi*, on the other hand, is concerned with the subsidiary role of Bhakti in the consummation of Aparokṣajnāna as such. There is thus a clear difference in the scope and purpose of the two *adhi*s There is, therefore no overlapping between them[6]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that Bhakti is quite unnecessary for the direct perception (aparokṣa) of B For if B is open to direct knowledge as it appears from Śruti texts such as *Draṣṭavyah* (*Brh Up* iv 5 6) *Yadā pasyah paśyate* (*Mund Up* v 3) it must be deemed to be a concrete being (vyakta) manifest to the soul's direct perception In that case, there can be no justification to insist upon Bhakti as a prerequisite for illumination On the other hand, if B is not to be open to direct vision of the Jīvātman, on account of its subtlety of essence and attributes, it can never be brought within the range of his direct knowledge at any time by any amount of exertion It would thus be pointless to insist upon the cultivation of Bhakti for purposes of its comprehension and spiritual illumination[7] The Pūrvapakṣa thus confronts the Siddhānta with a dilemma that, either way, Bhakti is purposeless

व्यक्तत्वे भक्तिवैयर्थ्यमव्यक्तत्वे वृथा कृति ।
एव चोभयत पाशा रज्जु स्यादनिवारिता ॥

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta resolves the apparent contradiction in the only way in which both the facts given by the Śrutis that without Aparokṣajnāna (direct knowledge of B) there is no hope of Mokṣa and that B is always unmanifest in its essence,—are to be reconciled This is done by laying down the possibility of having direct knowledge of B in spite of its

6 न चाम्बुनय सम्यक् [illegible] प्रयोजन साधनामिति वाच्यम् तद्धि न साक्षात् प्रयोजन भक्त 'द्रष्टव्य' इत्यादिवाक्यविरोधात् । [illegible] । अपवर्ग च भक्ति दुःसाधम् । तथाहि– (*STC* iii 2 23 27)

7 भक्तिनकार्यदि पूर्वस्य प्रयोजनाभावात । [illegible] प्रयोजनमिति यत्र तत् भक्तिप्रयोजनम । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] (*TP* iii 2 23)

avyaktatva, with the help of the unique and mysterious power of B. (*acintyādbhutaśakti*) to accomplish what appears to be unaccomplishable (*aghatitaghaṭanā*) to empirical logic The reason for appealing to this power of B *in this case is the equal respect due to the facts or truths* about B made known to us by the Śruti

उभयत्र प्रमाणभावात्, तत्प्रसादादेव प्रकाशो भवति। (M *BSB* iii 2 27)[8]

Bhakti is the channel thro' which the Jīva establishes contact with B and receives its grace upon himself Without its grace, B which is ever unmanifest in essence can never be visualized B's grace is amenable only to Bhakti and not to any other form of propitiation that is *devoid of Bhakti*[9]

The words *Aha hi* in the Sūtra refer to the testimony of the Śruti to this effect. M.'s bhāsya quotes the Kauntharavya Śruti in this connection

अरूपमक्षर ब्रह्म सदाव्यक्त च निष्कलम्।
यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरानन्दश्चाक्षयो भवेत्॥

"As B is imperishable in all respects, it is without material form, color, etc Being devoid of such form and color it is unperceivable at all times *and is without the sixteen* kalās[10] *The Jiva attains freedom* from misery by knowing this B and enjoys inexhaustible bliss"

The words of the Śruti *Sadā avyaktam* rule out the alternatives that B may be manifest in certain of its forms and unmanifest in some other forms of its being on account of its being 'Vyaktavyakta' (*manifest* and unmanifest with reference to different forms) Such a compromise is not acceptable to the Sutrakara who has taken the definite stand that B is in essence and at all times 'avyakta' In the face of this categorical statement[11] the only way in which B's *'nityavyaktasvabhāva'* can be reconciled with the spiritual fact of the possibility of Aparokṣa of *such a being* is by laying down that it is *only by its own graciousness, that the unmanifest B condescends to manifest itself to the Jīvātman,* when pleased and propitiated by his own unalloyed devotion and that

8 अव्यक्तत्वे प्रत्यक्षत्वे च प्रमाणसद्भावात तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या पुरुषप्रयत्ननाप्रक्षत्व स्वप्रसादात प्रत्यक्षत्व च ज्ञायत इति भाव। (*TP* iii 2 27)

9 न भक्तिरहिताराधननापि ब्रह्म व्यक्तीकर्त शक्यते। (*TP* iii 2 25)

10 निष्कलत्वमक्षरत्वे हेतुतयोक्तम् (*BD*)

11 Cf अव्यक्तमेव तत ब्रह्म स्वत (*M BSB* iii 2 23) अव्यक्तमेवेत्यनन सूत्र पूर्वस्मात एवावक-षकारानुवृत्ति सूचिता (*BD*) The principle of सव वाक्य सावधारणम will also do

never, by his own power or by other forms of propitiation, devoid of Bhakti, can the Jīvātman hope to know B directly [12]

जीवो ज्ञानयोग्योऽपि, श्रवणादिमानपि, न स्वशक्त्या भगवन्त पश्यति; किंतु, तत्प्रसादादेव इति वक्तु तस्य स्वभावविशेषमाह—'तदव्यक्तमाह हि' इति (*TD* iii 2 23)

This finding of M brings out the unique place and power of Divine grace in the attainment of illumination

Sūtrārtha

The opening Sūtra proclaims B to be essentially unmanifest The second Sūtra disposes of the contention that tho' essentially unmanifest, B can be brought within the range of perceivability by some special process of propitiation (*samrādhana*) just as a spirit which remains unseen is brought within range of perception by special rituals, offerings or other forms of propitiation. The contention is met by pointing out that in spite of all other forms of propitiation (*samrādhana*) B remains unmanifest (*avyaktam eva*) without Bhakti That this is so is gathered from the report of their perception by great Jñānins and it is inferable also by others from the premise of the extreme subtlety of the Divine Form.

ज्ञानिना प्रत्यक्षेण, इतरेषामतिसूक्ष्मत्वलिंगादनुमानेन, आराधनेऽप्यव्यक्तमेव ।

(M. *BSB* iii 2 24)

Only the *AC* has raised and answered the question which is sure to be asked in this connection. There is no difference in essence between B's *mūla* (original) and Avatāra (incarnate) forms The latter, like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, celebrated in the Purānas, were seen by hundreds of men and women of their times including many confirmed Abhaktas like Duryodhana The perception of these Avatār Forms by any of these persons could never have required the help of any special or extraordinary means of perception other than those required for the perception of any other person or physical object like a pot How then can it be contended that B's forms are always and in essence unmani-

12 [illegible] । साधनसामर्थ्येन [illegible] । [illegible] ? [illegible] । [illegible] इति भाव । (*TP* iii 2 27)

The full point after [illegible] deserves to be carefully noted to avoid the misconception that may arise by reading साधनसामर्थ्येन as part of the opening sentence

13 The *BD* says the possibility of overlapping between the reason and the predicate in such an inference is to be avoided by defining *avyaktatva* and *sūkṣmatva* in suitable ways.

fest, never gross and, therefore, not open to perception without Bhakti and grace?[14]

The *AC* answers the question as follows
"*We do not mean to deny that B can at all be an object of ordinary* perception What we deny is that without melting devotion to it and its own grace there can be no perception by the senses of any form of B *as composed of the essence of transempirical attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc* The hundreds and thousands of ordinary persons who may have seen Rāma or Kṛṣna in their life time, without the quantum and quality of Bhakti and grace of B requisite for the perception of those Divine forms in their true essence of jnāna and ānanda could not have perceived them *as B composed of the essence of jnana and ananda and without any Prākrtic constituents* This explains why those who may have seen those Forms of B in the ordinary way of looking at persons and things as composed of physical matter and seen them without Bhakti and grace, did *not* attain Moksa.[15]

The perceivability of spirits (without Bhakti) under certain conditions does not upset the Siddhānta position For the spirits do have an ethereal body and lineaments of their own, which they are able to withdraw from other's sight by their occult power But B has no physical body The analogy of spirits making themselves manifest to others or withdrawing their forms from other's sight cannot be applied to B For B is ever and uniformly unmanifest[16] For the same reason, the analogy of Tejas, Prthvi and Āpah, tho' remaining unmanifest and imperceptible in their 'tanmātrā' forms becoming manifest and open to perception in their developed forms is also inapplicable to B This is conveyed by the third Sutra *Prakāsavacca avaiseṣyam* (iii 2 25) 'In B there are no attributes (*visesāh*) which admit of variation of states or conditions as subtle and gross—such as we find, in fire, water and earth"[17] The expression 'prakāsa' which *signifies* the *quality* is used for the *substance possessing the quality*—i e to say the element of fire (agni)[18] By upalakṣana *this is* extented to the other

14 ननु कथ ब्रह्मण स्थूलत्व नास्ति ? रामकृष्णादिरूपाणा स्थूलत्वात । नहि घटादिदर्शनादधिकसाधनसाध्यत्व तत्कालभवाना रामकृष्णादिदर्शनस्य यन तस्य स्थूलत्व नास्तीति प्रतीम इति चेत। (*AC* iii 2 adhi 14)

15 न वय ब्रह्मण सर्वथा प्रत्यक्षविषयत्व व्यासेधाम । किं नाम भक्त्यभावे स्वस्वरूपभूतेन ज्ञानानन्दाद्यात्मना इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्व व्यासेधाम । अस्ति च तेन रूपेण रामकृष्णादीनामपीन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वम। अत एव तद्दर्शिनां मुक्त्यभावोऽपि। (*AC* iii 2 adh 14)

16 यक्षादीना त्वस्मदादिवत दर्शनयोग्यस्थूलदेहानामेवा तर्धानशक्त्या अदर्शनम। भगवास्तु कालाकाशादिवत दर्शनायोग्यसूक्ष्मदेह इति। (Vadiraja *TPG* p 140)

17 अग्न्यादिवत स्थूलसूक्ष्म दविशयाभावात। (*M BSB* iii 2 25)
आदिशब्देन जलपृथिव्यो ग्रहणम। विशषो धम। ब्रह्मणीति शप। (*BD*)

18 अग्न्यादिवत् इत्यनन गुणवाचकप्रकाशशब्दो अग्न्यादिगुणिवाचकतया व्याख्यात।

two elements of water and earth.[19] These three elements have both a subtle state of (*tanmātrā*) in which they are unmanifest and a developed state in which they are manifest and perceptible. Tho' Ākāśa and Vāyu are also elements, they have been left out of consideration here by the Sūtrakāra as they are both of them imperceptible in their gross forms also.[20] The Sūtra thus establishes that B.'s attributes do not admit of such divergence of condition or state as fire, water and earth. They are uniform in their essence at all times and places. The analogy of prakāśa (i.e. of agni and the other two elements) is used by the Sūtrakāra by way of contrast:

व्यतिरेकश्च दृष्टान्तः । (*STC*)

The *TDP* of Rāghavendra, however, assigns the sense of negation to the particle 'ca' following 'Prakāśavat' in the Sūtra:

चो नञर्थः । तत् ब्रह्म प्रकाशवत् न

"The particle *ca* has the sense of negation. The Sūtra means: "(It) B. is *not* like Fire (and others)". But no authority has been quoted in support of this sense.

The expression *avaiśeṣyam* in the Sūtra clarifies the point that unlike in the case of Tejas, waters and earth which admit of gross and subtle states by the agglutination or contraction of parts we cannot speak of subtle and gross in the forms of B. in this sense. This is supported by the Māṇḍavya Śruti: "He is *not* the subtle (undeveloped) *nor* the gross (developed)—as understood in the common sense of these words—but far different (*paramaḥ*)". The double negation is to be noted as excluding the possibility of the "subtle" form not being gross at the same time and vice-versa. For the Śruti has it that He is minuter than the minute and greater than the great".[21] What is meant is that its being gross or subtle in any Form does not take away from its remaining unmanifest to others *except as provided for—viz. thro' its own grace and the Bhakti of the aspirant.*

It will be seen that while the second Sūtra extricates the Siddhānta position from the effects of a Pratibandī-argument deriving support

19 एवं जलभूम्योरुपलक्षणं न्यायसाम्यात् । (*STC.* iii 2 25)

20 आकाशवाय्वोर्द्वयोरपि स्थूलरूपेणाप्यदृश्यत्वमेवेति सूचितम् । अन्यथा सौक्ष्म्यप्रकाशनदशायामुपलक्षणत्वेनाभ्युपादि- त्सयोक्तिर्न स्यादित्याहुः । (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 2 25)

21. असौ केनचिद्रूपेण सूक्ष्मः केनचित् स्थूल इति न, किन्तु सर्वरूपेषु परमसूक्ष्म एव, न त्वनेवम्भूतः । एवं केनचित् रूपेण स्थूलः केनचित् सूक्ष्म इति न । किन्तु सर्वत्र परः परमस्थूल एवेत्यर्थः । अत एव नञ्द्वयप्रयोगः । महतो महीयानिति श्रुत्यविरोधश्च । स्थूलात् स्थूलतमत्व हि तदर्थः । न चैव व्यक्तत्वापत्तिः । तद्विरोधिपरमसूक्ष्मत्वेन दुर्ज्ञेयत्वात् । (*BD.* iii 2 25)

from a worldly analogy of spirits and their powers of visibility and invisibility, the third Sūtra does so as against an analogy drawn from the characteristics of cosmic tattvas like fire and water known from the scriptures[22]

The last two Sūtras deal with B's presentability to Aparokṣajñāna. The first of these establishes how Bhakti and other Sādhanas do help in realizing B thro' Aparoksa The next one resolves the contradiction pointed out by the Pūrvapakṣa between B's becoming an object of the Jivātman's Aparoksajnāna and its essentially unmanifest essense. The solution is pronounced on the basis of B's *acintyādbhutaśakti*[23]

The first of these reads : *Prakāśaca karmaṇyabhyāsāt* (iii 2.26) 'Ca' here gives an indication of the refutation of the Pūrvapakṣin's objection as well as of the possibility of B's direct presentation in Aparokṣajnāna[24] The Sūtra is construed by repeating the expression *karmaṇi*[25] It would thus stand expanded into *karmaṇi abhyasāt karmaṇi prakāśo* (bhavati) The first "karmani" is *to be understood in the usual sense of* "in the act of" Sādhanās like *śravana, manana and nidhidhyāsana.* 'Abhyāsa' refers to their repeated and continuous performance as recommended in the Śaśtras[26] The second '*karmani*' (derived by *āvṛtti*) refers to B in terms of the special relation in which It stands to the Jīvātman's Aparokṣajñāna—viz as its objective content (*karmakāraka*).[27] The expression 'tat' following from the opening Sūtra (iii.2 23)[28] standing for B can be easily read in syntactic apposition with the second "karmani" —the locative being understood as a "viṣayasaptamī" The final form of the Sautra proposition would thus read·

श्रवणादिरूपे कर्मण्यभ्यासात् शास्त्रजन्यापरोक्षज्ञानविषये तस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि प्रकाशः (भवति)[29]

"By the repeated performance of Śravana, manana and other Sādhanas there arises the illumination (in respect) of B which is the objective content of Aparokṣajnāna produced by the Śāstra"

22 द्वितीये लौकिकयक्षादिप्रतिबन्दीमोचनम् । तृतीये वैदिकाग्न्यादि प्रतिबन्दीनिवारणम् । (Raghu. *TPB*) The printed edn of Raghu's *TPB* misreads यक्ष as पक्ष in the first sentence above

23 पञ्चमे तदुभयं विरुद्धमिति शङ्कापरिहाराय विरोधशामकानन्तशक्तित्वाद्युक्ति । (Raghu. *TPB*)

24 चतुर्थसूत्रे चशब्द पूर्ववच्छङ्काव्यावर्तक प्रमाणसूचकोऽपि । (*STC* iii 2 26)

25 कर्मणीत्यावर्तते । (*STC.* iii 2 26)

26 श्रुतौ श्रवणादिविधिमात्रप्रतीतावपि तदभ्यासेनैव तद्विधिपर्यवसानस्य आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशादित्यत्र वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति भाव । (Raghu. *TPB* iii 2 26)

27 कर्मणीति कर्मकारकमुच्यते, न क्रिया । कर्मणि कर्मकारके विषयभूते तस्मिन् ब्रह्मण्यभ्यासात । (*TDP.* iii 2 26)

28 तदिति सप्तम्यन्ततयानुवर्तते । (*ibid*)

29 *STC* iii 2 26

It will be recalled that the Sūtrakāra has already demonstrated in the Īkṣatyadhi (i 1 5-11) that B is the objective content of Aparokṣajñāna, after refuting the Monistic view that B is outside all connodenotative relationship and, therefore, not expressible or knowable thro' Śruti It is established as a result of this refutation that B is directly presented in the Jivātman's Aparokṣajnāna and realized by him

Drawing special attention M.'s resort to *āvṛtti* of 'karmani' in the interpretation of this Sūtra and the significance of his words विषयभूते तस्मिन्नेव (प्रकाशो भवति) in commenting on "कर्मणि". Trivikrama Pandita observes that by resorting to āvṛtti of the term in this Sūtra, the Sutrakāra wishes to allude to the position already taken by him in the Ikṣatyadhi on the question of B's direct presentation in the Jivātman's Aparokṣajñāna The reason for doing so is to strike down any doubt which may again rear its head *in this context* at the sight of his characterization of B as "avyaktam" (unmanifest) [30]

The opening words of the last Sūtra अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिंगम्

(iii 2 27)

are to be read with *"prakāśah"* following by *anuvṛtti* from Sutra 26 The term atah is, with advantage, repeated (*āvartate*) [31] This would give us the following proposition

अत अत अनन्तेन प्रकाशो (भवति) तथाहि लिंगम् ।

"In as much as (*yatah*) there is proof of both the facts viz. of (i) B's becoming an object of our Aparokṣajñāna and (ii) of its remaining always essentially unmanifest in its essence, therefore, (*atah*) the fact of illumination (*prakāsah*) is to be explained by appealing to two facets of the same principle that tho' B cannot be made the object of direct perception solely by the power of the Jīva or by the power of any amount of Sadhanas, still by the abundant grace of B (*atah*) it is possible to have such perception and illumination of the essentially unmanifest B Otherwise, the truth of B's becoming an object of Aparokṣa and its essentially unmanifest nature, both borne out by unimpeachable evidence of Śruti, will be belied.[33] This is the essence of Arthāpatti

30 [illegible] विषयभूते तस्मिन्नेवत्युक्तम् ।

31 प्रकाश इत्यनुवर्तते । (STC iii 2 27) (TD iii 2 26)

32 अत इत्यावर्तते । (ibid)

33 [illegible] अत एव [illegible] । [illegible] स्यात् ।

(STC iii 2 27)

argument indicated by the word *ataḥ* in the Sūtra and fully explained in M.'s bhāṣya:

उभयत्र प्रमाणभावात् तत्प्रसादादेव प्रकाशो भवति ।

(M. *BSB*. iii.2.27)

The closing words of the Sūtra: Ato'anantena' answer the difficult question posed by the Pūrvapakṣa as to how a Being like B. which is by hypothesis "*nityāvyakta*", *essentially unmanifest at all times, can* ever become manifest and an object of Aparokṣajñāna *even thro' grace.*[34] The answer is provided by the pregnant (*hetugarbha*) expression: "anantena" pointing to B.'s unlimited *acintyādbhutaśakti*. This word *anantena* is to be construed as an abstract noun (*bhāvapradhāna*) and the instrumental termination construed ablatively as 'anantatvat'.[35] *This is to be properly* expanded to signify *anantaśakitvāt bhagavataḥ*—as B. possesses unlimited power to accomplish the otherwise unaccomplishable. *STC* has put forward another way of construing *ato anantena* according to which *ataḥ* and *anantena* may be viewed as placed in apposition—the suffix *taḥ* (in a-*taḥ*) being *understood in the instrumental sense so as to agree with anantena.* The latter is to be treated as carrying within itself (*hetugarbha*) the explanation as to how it is possible to have direct perception of B. which is essentially unmanifest *even thro' grace*[36]—the explanation being B.'s unlimited power and ability to accomplish what is otherwise unaccomplishable, thro' its *acintyādbhutaśakti.*[37]

नित्याव्यक्तोऽपि भगवानीक्ष्यते निजशक्तितः ।
तमृते परमात्मानं कः पश्येतामितं प्रभुम् ?

(M. *BSB*. iii.2.27)

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34. नन्वव्यक्तस्वभावस्य प्रसादेनापि प्रत्यक्षता न युज्यते । नहि प्रसन्नोऽपि नरो वानरो भवितुमीष्ट इत्यत आह– युज्यते चेति । (*TP.* iii 2 27)

35. प्रसादादपि कथ नित्याव्यक्तस्य दर्शनमित्यत उक्तम्–अनन्तेनेति । भावप्रधानो निर्देश । तृतीया च पचम्यर्थे । (*STC.* iii 2 27)

36. यद्वा अत इत्यनन्तेनेति सामानाधिकरण्यम् । अत एव तृतीयार्थे तसि. । हेतुगर्भमिद विशेषणम् । अनन्तशक्तिनानेन भगवता प्रकाशो विततो भवतीति योजना द्रष्टव्या । (*STC.* iii 2 27)

37. अव्यक्तस्वभावस्य साधनसामर्थ्येन ग्रहणासभवेऽपि तत्प्रसादेनापरोक्ष्याङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावात् ईशस्याघटितघटकत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तम्– 'यद्वि युक्त्या विरुद्धयेत तदीशकृतमेव हि' इति । (*AC.* iii 2 27)

CHAPTER XVI

BRAHMAN IS BOTH THE POSSESSOR OF ATTRIBUTES AND OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF THOSE ATTRIBUTES

15. *Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.28-31)

In the preceding *adhi.* it was established that there is no contradiction between B.'s being essentially unmanifest in its nature and its becoming at the same time the object of Aparokṣa to the Jīvātman by its own grace,—as both these facts are supported by Pramāṇas. Following the same principle, the present *adhi.* shows that there is no contradiction between B.'s being of the very essence of bliss, knowledge, power, desire, will, activity and other attributes and possessing these attributes as its properties—as both these facts are borne out by the testimony of Śrutis. This explains the sequence of thought between this *adhi.* and the preceding *adhi.*[1]

Tho' this *adhi.* lends equal support to the position that the attributes of bliss etc. are of the essence of B. still the rejection of Samavāya relation in II.2.13 and the pronouncement in *Āha ca tanmātram* (iii.2.16) that B.'s form and color are only the essence of its own being, leave no room for difference of opinion on the point of the identity of B.'s attributes with its own being. Moreover, tho' the affirmation that the attributes are the essence of B.'s nature is also necessary to rebut the

1. [illegible] (Raghu. TPB. iii 2 28)
[illegible] (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*, iii 2 adh 15)

contention that if B should have bliss, knowledge, power, etc as its adjuncts, it cannot, in the same breath, be said to have them as the essence of its being, still the principal interest of the present *adhi* lies in upholding, in the interests of Bhakti, the position that B is the possessor and enjoyer of *sovereign attributes* like bliss, knowledge, power, activity, etc[2] Hence, the prominence given in the Bhāṣya[3] and Tīkā[4] to the question as to how B can be called the blissful (*ānandī*), the wise, the powerful, etc if it is essentially of bliss, knowledge, power, etc.

The *adhi* may also be deemed to arise by way of an *ākṣepasangati* (objection) as follows B has been described in iii 2 16 as of the very nature and essence of bliss, knowledge, etc It is inconsistent to attribute to that which is of the very essence of knowledge, bliss, etc qualities like bliss, knowledge, unlimited powers (*anantaśakti*) and so forth, as has been done in iii 2 27 *For, it is logically incompatible that a* quality can be conceived as of the *nature and essence* of a given thing (*dharmi*)

गुणाना गुणिस्वरूपत्व विरुद्धम्[5]

Qualities as such must stand outside the essence of the thing they qualify They can never be identical with the substance

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa, therefore, argues that there is no need to practise Bhakti For, Bhakti can be meaningfully directed towards a being that possesses majestic and adorable qualities like bliss, knowledge, beauty, power, etc But then it is logically impossible to accept that B possesses such qualities and enjoys having them For, by hypothesis, it has been held to be '*tanmātram*' (iii 2 16) i e just of the nature and essence of the said qualities and not their possessor in so far as these qualities do not have an existence *as distinct from B's being* If bliss and other qualities are the *essence of* B they cannot be termed its '*qualities*'[6] It would be as incongruous to do so as it would be to regard one's own self as

2 यद्यपि गुणात्मकत्वसमर्थनमपि प्रतीयते तथापि समवायनिरासेन आह च तन्मात्रमित्यादिना गुणगुणिनोरभेदे विवादाभावत गुणित्वे गुणरूपत्व विरुद्धमिति प्रसक्तचोद्यनिरासाय गुणात्मकत्वस्योक्तावपि भक्त्यर्थं गुणित्वसमर्थन एव तात्पर्यात गुणित्वे युक्तम (Raghu *TPB* iii 2 28)

3 स्वरूपेणानन्दादिना कथमानन्दित्वादिरिति (M *BSB* iii 2 28)

4 अत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधानभक्त्यर्थं तस्य गुणित्वसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रसगति (*TP* iii 2 28)

5 एतेन * * * तस्याभिध्यानादिति प्रागुक्तमयुक्तम । इच्छादिरूपस्य तस्याभिध्यानादिति तस्यानन्तशक्तित्वादिति च निर्देशायोगात इत्याक्षपाद्वा पूर्वसगति (Raghu *TPB* iii 2 28)

6 न भगवति भक्ति कर्तव्या । तस्यानन्दि त्वाद्यभावात । न ह्यगुणिनि भक्तिरुपपन्ना । न चानन्दित्वादिरङ्गीकर्तुं शक्यम् । ब्रह्मण आनदादीना तत्स्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमात् । स्वरूपेण च आनदादिना आनन्दित्वादे युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात । गुणत्वाङ्गीकारे गुणाना तत्स्वरूपत्व त्याज्यम् । गुणाना गुणिस्वरूपत्वस्य युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात (*TP* iii 2 28)

possessing its own self as its property[7] If the attributes of bliss knowledge, power and creative activity of B are different from its being, there will be no point in rejecting the relation of Samavāya, as has been done by the Sūtrakāra in II 2 13 For, in the absence of Samavāya, the qualities cannot rationally be shown to be intimately related to B as its inherent attributes[8] If the attributes are, however, to be treated as identical with B's being or essence, B can neither be said to possess them nor enjoy the satisfaction of having such attributes as bliss for its essence[9] For, without having any scope for the enjoyment of one's possessions, it is very much doubtful if the mere fact of B's having them for its essence of being will contribute meaningfully to its majesty in any way and evoke Bhakti in the human breast There is glory and meaning in possessing and enjoying one's fame or wealth There can be none in oneself becoming wealth or fame! This difficulty posed by this question cannot be got over by appealing to the solution adopted in respect of B's becoming manifest, the' it is essentially unmanifest For, while there is nothing unreasonable in holding that while B remains unmanifest so far as the power of the Jiva is concerned, to make it manifest by his own efforts—it involves no logical inconstitency to admit that it condescends to become manifest by its own grace But *there is logical inconsistency* in holding that B possesses the attributes of bliss, knowledge, etc and *also* that it is of the essence of these attributes[11] It can be either a possessor of attributes or be of the essence of attributes *But it cannot be both*[12] The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that there is no need for the cultivation of Bhakti to B in either case[13]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is stated by the Sūtras *Ubhayavapadeśat tvahikuṇḍalavat, Prakāśāśrayavad vā,*** *Pūrvavad vā* (iii 2 28-30) The wording of the first Sūtra refers only to the reason and the illustration in support of the intended proposition to be carried If the statement of the proposition to be carried is to be supplied by *adhyāhāra*, in a manner that would fit in with the illustration of the serpent and its coil (*ahi-*

7 तद्भिन्ने तद्वत्त्वस्य अवाप्यदर्शनात । नश्वरो गुणवान गुणात्मकत्वात सामान्येन यथा न धन धनवत्, दण्डो वा दण्डवान इति युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात (*STC* iii 2 28)

8 यदीश्वरस्य गुणक्रियादयो धर्मा भिन्ना तदा समवायस्य निराकृतत्वात तद्वत्त्वमनुपपन्नम (*NS* p 513)

9 यदि चाभिन्ना तदा ज्ञानानन्दादिमत्त्व आनन्दादिमात्रत्वमित्यप्ययुक्तमिति (*ibid*)

10 न चानन्दादिमात्रत्वं विना तत्स्वरूपस्य महिमा । द्रविणवत्त्वे हि पारिवृढ्यम् न तु द्रविणत्वे (*TP* iii 2 28)

11 न चाव्यक्तत्वादिवदुपपत्ति । तत्र जीवसामर्थ्येन अव्यक्तत्वमीशसामर्थ्येन व्यक्तत्वमिति व्यवस्थयोपपत्तावपि, इह तदुभयस्वीकारायोगात (*STC* iii.2.28)

12 अथापि गुणित्वाङ्गीकारे गुणानां तत्स्वरूपत्वं त्याज्यम । गुणानां गुणिस्वरूपत्वस्य युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात

13 इत्युभयथा तत्र भक्त्यनुपपत्ति (*NS* p 513) (*TP* iii 2 28)

kuṇḍala), the conclusion would appear to be in favor of a '*bhedābheda*' relation (of both difference and identity) between B. and its attributes, which is *not however acceptable to the Siddhāntin.*[14] For, the serpent assumes its coiled form only sometimes and not always. The coiled shape is *not*, therefore, a constant feature or attribute (*yāvaddravya-bhāvi*) of the serpent. The first illustration thus appears to be out of tune with the Siddhānta position that he attributes of B. are always present in B. and constitute its essence. The Bhāṣyakara, therefore, explains that the illustration of the serpent and its coil to bring out the relation of B. to its attributes, is intended for the benefit of the dull-witted[15] who may be unable to understand *how an attributive relation* (*dharmadharmibhāva*) *can be posited as between identicals.*[16] The point of the illustration is that tho' there is an unquestionable identity between the coil and the snake their attributive relation (*dharmadharmi-bhāva*) is governed by the fact of difference of the coil in so far as it is not a constant feature of the serpent. Similarly, norwithstanding the identity of essence that subsists between B. and its qualities of bliss, knowledge and power, etc. *their* attributive relation towards B is governed by Viśeṣas, *the analogue of difference*. It is quite within the competence of the illustration of the serpent and its coil, to dispel the objection that an attributive relation cannot be posited between bliss and the blissful, knowledge and its possesser, power and the powerful, where the attributes are also conceived as being completely identical with the essence of the subject and convince the dull-witted that such an attributive relation is possible in spite of their identity.[17] The particle *eva* introduced by M. in his Bhāṣya: *Ahikuṇḍalavad eva* (*yujyate*) is intended to bring out *this special point*. This has been hinted at by J. in his comment where he introduces the expression "Viśeṣa" in slightly different connotations to suit the exigencies of the illustration and the illustrated. Satyanātha Tīrtha is the only glossator on the *TP* who has gone into all the aspects of this question, taking due note of the apparent incongruity of the illustration of *ahikuṇḍala* from the strict Siddhānta position based on 'Saviśeṣābheda' between B. and its attributes (as distinguished from the relation of *bhedābheda* which is to be admitted as between the serpent and its coil). Satyanātha explains

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14 तत्र हेतुद्रष्टान्तावेव सूचितौ, नतु पक्षपरिग्रहरूपा प्रतिज्ञा। अध्याहारोऽपि हेतुदृष्टान्तबलेन भेदाभेदपक्षपरिग्रहस्यैति प्रतिभाति। अत प्रतिज्ञा दर्शयति– (*NS.* p 514 b)

15 स्थूलमतीनां च प्रदर्शनार्थमहिकुण्डलदृष्टान्त (M. *BSB.* iii 2 30)

16 This is one of the objections of the Pūrvapakṣin and the *ahikuṇḍala* illustration is precisely intended to meet this point, without calling into aid the agency of 'Viśeṣas' in its technical sense. See *AC.*

17. अहिकुण्डलवदेव तावद्युज्यते–अहिकुण्डलदृष्टान्तमात्रेणैवाभिन्नयो धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तिशङ्कापरिहारायाहिकुण्डल-दृष्टान्त उपात्तः। तावतैव स्थूलातीनां शङ्का निवर्तते * * * इत्याशयेन तदुपादानमित्यगीकारात् (*AC.* iii 2 28)

that while the attributive relation between the coil and the snake is rendered possible, by the presence and operation of *'difference'* (coexisting with identity between the coil and the serpent) such a relation in the case of the illustrated (*dārṣṭāntika*) viz. B. is rendered possible by the play of *'Viśeṣas'* (*instead of difference*). The expression *eva* used by the Bhāṣyakāra suggests that the attributive relation (which is the point under discussion) in the *dṛṣṭānta* and the *dārṣṭāntika* pairs should be explained *with special reference to the distinctive element which determines the dharmadharmibhāva and regulates it* in the respective cases —viz. 'difference' in the case of *adhikuṇḍala* and 'Viśeṣa'—the representative (*pratinidhi*) of 'difference' in the case of B. and its essential attributes. There is, thus, no incongruity at all in the use of the illustration of serpent and its coil, if it is properly interpreted and understood in *this sense* and as intended for the benefit of the dull-witted.[19]

एतेन—(विशेषपदस्य भेदपरत्वांगीकारेण) कुण्डलस्यायावद् द्रव्यभावित्वेन भेदाभेदसद्भावात् विशेषेण धर्मधर्मिभाववर्णनमयुक्तमिति परास्तम् (*AC*)

The next two Sūtras provide closer and more precise illustrations of the absolute identity of essence of the attributes of bliss, knowledge and activity etc. with B. going hand in hand with their attributive relation to it. The question, as to how the creative and other activities of B. which take place at stated times and are, therefore, *not* permanent can possibly be regarded as its essence and, therefore, identical with its being, is answered by M. on the basis of the operation of Viśeṣas which self-link the latent and patent states of such activities and hold them in an integrated mould.[20]

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18. (यथा कुण्डलात्मकत्वाद्यहे विशेषादेव कुण्डलित्वम् *TP*) अत्र विशेषशब्दो भेदपरः। ततश्च यथा कुण्डलस्य सर्पस्याभेदे भेदमात्रेण धर्मधर्मिभाव, तथा ब्रह्मधर्माणां सत्यप्यभेदे भेदप्रतिनिधिना विशेषेणैव धर्मधर्मिभाव इत्यर्थः (*AC.* iii 2 28)

19. तत्र हि कुण्डलं यद्यपि भेदाभेदवत्, तथापि मन्दानामभेदे बुद्धिमवतारयितुमुपात्तम् (*NS.* p. 519 b)

20. Read:

नित्य स्थितेऽत्र धर्माणां क्रियादीनामनित्यता
न विशेषात्मता चेयमनित्या शक्तिरूपता।
नैव सत्त्वविशेषात् स्याद्विशेषोऽन्यो न चान्यथा
स्वनिर्वाहकताहेतो तथापि स्याद्विशेषता॥
विशेषेण विज्ञाते प्रमाणैर्यद्यपि
समस्तं सत्त्वरूपेति विशेषो व्यवगम्यते।
शुक्लं च स एवेति तदभेदश्च गम्यते॥
भेदो यदि विशेषस्य स भेदो भेदिना कथम्?
भिन्नत्वेऽनवस्था स्यादभिन्नत्वेन् पुनः न किम्?

and *NS* on the above. (*AV.* iii.2.28)

The first illustration of the complete identity of the attributes with the subject subsisting along with the attributive relation of the properties to B is furnished by the Sun and its lustre The solar orb is the abode of light as well as light itself B similarly is both the qualities and the qualified[21] Preference has been given by the Sūtrakāra to the illustration of the solar orb and its lustre, over other possible illustrations such as of a pot with its invariable properties[22] as an *'antaraṅga-dṛṣṭānta'* in so far both B and the Sun are of effulgent nature' यथादित्यस्य प्रकाशत्व प्रकाशित्वं च, एव वा दृष्टान्त , तेजोरूपत्वात् ब्रह्मण[23]

(M *BSB* iii 2 29)

The *AC* points out that unlike in Sūtra iii 2 28 the use of the additional expression 'Tejastvāt' in this Sūtra is intended to show that as B's being of the essence of lustre is borne out by the Śruti, the fact of its possessing lustre equally as an attribute has to be explained only on the basis of self linking Viśesa and *not* thro' difference between substance and attribute

The illustration of the Sun and its lustre pertains to the field of external perception As B's nature is most subtle, the third Sūtra cites another illustration from the domain of supersensuous reality which is open only to Sākṣipratyaksa This of Time in its different relations as past, present and future In speaking of Time as prior *'pūrvah kālah'* or as subsequent *aparah kālah,* it is both the measure and the measured So also B is both 'bliss' and 'the blissful', 'knowledge' and 'having knowledge', 'power' and 'the powerful'

यथा एक एव कालः पूर्व इत्यवच्छेदकोऽवच्छेद्यश्च भवति । अतिसूक्ष्मत्वापेक्षया एव दृष्टान्त (*M BSB ibid*)

M's bhāṣya cites another illustration of one's body in sleep (*ange sayanam*) where the disposition of the body is but a particular state of the body itself

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21 यथादित्यस्य प्रकाशत्व प्रकाशित्व च, एव वा दृष्टान्त (*M BSB* iii 2 29)

22 घटादौ नीलो घट नीलवान घट इत्यादिव्यवहारदर्शनात सोऽपि दृष्टान्तोऽस्त्विति शक्त

(Vadiraja *TPG* p 141)

23 घटादीनामतेजोरूपत्वात तान परित्यज्य तेजोरूपत्वसाधर्म्यविवक्षया आदित्यदृष्टान्तोक्ति (*BD* iii 2 29) The Sutra-expression प्रकाशाश्रयवत would most naturally suggest the Sun as the intended illustration The expression Tejorupa applied to B for comparison with the Sun has however to be understood in terms of the doctrine of 'analogical senses See *BS* iii 2 34 *ante*

प्रकाशवत् कालवद् वा यथाङ्गे शयनादिकम्[24] ।
ब्रह्मणश्चैव मुक्तानां आनन्दोऽभिन्न एव तु[25] ॥

(M *BSB* iii 2 30)

The last Sūtra: Pratiṣedhācca (iii.2.31) concludes the discourse by setting aside the objection—"Why should one bother to accept the identity of quality and the qualified and try to justify the attributive relation by summoning to aid the category of Viśeṣa? Why should we not simplify matters by accepting difference between the subject and its attributes and explain the attributive relation thro' Samavāya? The answer is that the Śruti denounces the notion of separateness between B and its attributes of bliss, knowledge, etc.[26] and Samavāya has been refuted by the Sūtrakāra (B S ii 2 13).

Śamkara's Interpretation

(*Prakṛtaitāvattvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.22-30))

S bases this *adhi* of nine Sūtras ending with Pratiṣedhācca on Bṛh. Up ii.3 1-6 which after describing the two forms of B—the *mūrta* and the *amūrta*, the material and the non-material, the mortal and the immortal, the defined and the undefined concludes with the statement "Not so, not so". This leads to the following doubts—whether it negates *the two forms of B as well as B* which they qualify; or *only* B; or else only the two forms—*leaving B intact* These doubts give rise to the following Pūrvapakṣas (i) that the two forms of B and B as qualified by them—both these are negated and (ii) that B itself is negated. These

24 'Śayanam' here denotes only a particular posture of the body in sleep and not the actual state of sleep as such Read शयनमवस्थाविशेष, न तु निद्रा, मनोधर्मो वा । तथाच, अङ्गे शयनमिति प्रयोगे अङ्गाभिन्नमपि शयनं यथा अङ्गविशेषणं भवति * *

(*BD* iii 2 30)

25 The fn 1, on p 388 of the printed edn of Raghu's *TPB* (GOS) *misinterprets* his comment on this line against his caution
ब्रह्मणो मुक्तानां चानन्दोऽभिन्न एव तु इत्युद्देश्यविधेयभावप्रतीतिनिरासार्थमाह–ब्रह्मणा मुक्तैश्चाभिन्न एवानन्दो विशेषवशादेव 'ब्रह्मण ,' 'मुक्तानाम्' इति सम्बन्धित्वेनोच्यते इत्यर्थं (*Op cit* p 388)
The Editorial fn of Dr R Nagaraja Sarma explains this as ब्रह्मानन्द एव मुक्तानन्द इति भाव, *which is preposterous from M's point of view* What M's text means is that *tho'* the bliss of B *and* the bliss of the released souls are identical with *their respective selves* they are still referred to attributively as "the bliss *of* B" and "the bliss *of* the released souls," thro' the agency of Viseṣas. This is *not* to say that *the bliss of the released souls is the same as that of B*, as the fn has it

26 The Śrutis in question are

एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (Chān Up vi.2 1)
नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (*Bṛh Up iv* 4 19)

and many others

Pūrvapakṣas are refuted and the Sıddhānta ıs establıshed that only the two forms of B are negated and that B ıs left undısturbed as the resıdual realıty behınd the negatıons The other Sūtras expatıate upon the unmanıfest nature of B ıts relatıonshıp to the Jīva, the means of knowıng ıt and *the dıfferent vıewpoınts from whıch ıts relatıon to the Jīva* can be explaıned *The adhı thus seeks to determıne the meanıng of the negatıve statement of the Upanısad Netı netı about B.*[27]

कोऽस्य प्रतिषेधस्य विषय इति जिज्ञासामहे (S *BSB* ııı 2 22)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣas are developed as follows B ıs of the nature of realıty and conscıousness *It ıs the generalıty of beıng, underlyıng the* appearances of the materıal and non-materıal world of partıculars There are two negatıons made by the text (*netı netı*) The first one negates the two forms and the second that whıch has these forms and ıs qualıfied by them For, when all the partıculars are negated, the generalıty of beıng behınd them also stands negated Accordıngly, the text goes on to say *Na hyetasmād ıtı netyanyat param astı* Here, the words "*there ıs nothıng beyond*" *makes ıt clear that accordıng to the* Śrutı absolute negatıon of everythıng ıs the truth of the matter Statements regardıng B such as "It should be apprehended only as exıstent" are, therefore, to be understood ın the spırıt of certaın ınjunctıons for medıtatıon lıke "Let the mınd be medıtated upon as B" Such statements as "It should be apprehended only as exıstent" do not, therefore, mean to affirm the exıstence of B as a realıty[28] The censure pronounced ın some texts agaınst presumıng B to be non-exıstent ıs merely to be taken as a eulogy of assumıng ıts exıstence for purposes of medıtatıon Statements elsewhere ın the Śrutıs lıke 'Satyam jñānam anantam brahma' (*Taıtt Up* ıı, 1) are also to be understood as beıng made wıth a vıew to negatıng them, lıke the others descrıbıng ıts two forms of *mūrta* and *amūrta* Tho' these negatıons are not made ın the *same place or context they stıll operate as negatıons by vırtue of* logıcal fitness and proprıety Hence, the two statements *netı netı* are to be understood to be an unqualıfied negatıon of everythıng—B as well as ıts two forms[29]

27 नेति नेतीत्येतदर्थंकथनायमिदमधिकरणम (*Bhamatī* ııı 3 22)

28 सदबोधरूप ब्रह्म सर्वासनमूर्तामूर्तरूपसाधारणतया च सामान्य तस्य चैते विशेषा मूर्तामूर्तादय । न च तत्तद्विशेष निषधे सामान्यमवस्थातुमर्हति निर्विशेषस्य सामान्यस्यायोगात । तस्मात विशेषनिषेधेऽपि तत्सामान्यस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनवस्थानात सर्वस्यैवाय निषध । अत एव 'न ह्येतस्मादिति नत्यन्यत्परमस्ति' इति निषेधात पर नास्तीति, सर्वनिषेधमेव तत्त्वमाह श्रुति । 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य' इति चोपासनाविधानवत नेय, नत्वस्तित्वमेवास्य तत्त्वम् (*Bhamatī* ııı 2 22)

29 तत्प्रशसार्थं चासदभावनिन्दा । यच्चान्यत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादन, तदपि मूर्तामूर्तरूप प्रतिपादनवत निषेधार्थम् । असंनिहितेऽपि च तत्र निषेधो योग्यत्वात समन्वयते । तस्मात सर्वस्यैवाविशेषण निषेध इति (*ibıd*)

Or, it may be held that only B is negated by the words *neti neti* and not the two forms comprising the world For, the latter are established by perception and other means of proof whereas B being inaccessible to the mind and speech is inconceivable The existence of such a being is thus fit to be negated. The repetition of the negative is to indicate its absolute nonexistence[30]

प्रत्यक्षादिमितद्वैतनिषेधे तद्विरोधत ।
अमित ब्रह्म योग्यत्वादविरोधान्निषिध्यते ॥

Siddhanta

The Siddhanta rebuts the first Purvapaksa as follows It is impossible that the words *neti neti* should negative both B and its two forms, as it would land us in Nihilism When something unreal is denied, it is with reference to something real—as in the case of the snake and the rope[31] The argument that if all the particulars are negated, there will no generality of being left has no substance, for the categorization of particular and general is not applicable to B The particulars in the form of mūrta and amurta are only adjuncts conceived in nescience They are not real features of B Their negation will not reduce B colored by them to nonexistence or make it incomprehensible When the reflecting media like the mirror are taken away, the human face does not go out of existence or cease to be perceivable[32]

The second Purvapakṣa that only B is negated is also untenable. That will go against what is said at the commencement of the section 'I shall tell you about B It will also conflict with passages like 'One who knows B as non-existing becomes himself non-existent and run counter to the whole spirit and letter of Vedāntic teaching[33] When the limiting adjuncts in the nature of duality are negatived, there is no negation of the reality which has been lying obscured by the limiting adjuncts For all negation presupposes a real base which is not open to negation. B., not being open to any other means of proof save Śrutis is, therefore, *uncontradictable* It will be self-contradictory to hold that

30 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 2 22)

31 [illegible] (S BSB iii, 2, 22)

32 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* ibid)

33 [illegible] (S BSB iii 3 22)

B. is negated by the same source (Śruti) by which its existence has been made known. The negation neti neti is not, therefore, competent to deny the reality of B.[34]

Criticism

The theme of this Pāda has been defined as 'Tvampadārthanirūpaṇa' prior to Na sthānatopi (iii.2.11) and from there onwards 'Tatpadārtha-nirūpaṇa' or Nirviśeṣa-B. *till the end of the Pāda.*[35] It is not, therefore, proper to discuss *the meaning of the negative statements of the Śruti here*, in this adhi., instead of the Nirviśeṣa-B. We cannot accept the explanation that this adhi. also deals with the Nirviśeṣa-B., in the face of the clear statements made by S. and Vācaspati that it is specially designed *to go into the true meaning of the Neti neti text.*[36] It cannot be put in that thro' ascertainment of the true meaning of *Neti neti, it is the Nirviśeṣa B. that is sought to be brought into relief.* That work has been adequately carried out in the Sūtra: *Arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt* (iii.2.14) and others following in the Ubhayaliṅgādhi. It is no use to rejoin that in the Sūtra Arūpavad * * * the nature of Nirviśeṣa-B. has been ascertained with the help of Śrutis like Asthūlam (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.8.8) Arūpam asparśam (*Kaṭha. Up.* iii.15) *but not of neti neti* and that, therefore, there is no redundancy in dealing with the same topic from the point of view of *Neti neti here.* We may remind ourselves here that under the Sūtra iii.2.17 the same *neti neti* text and others of its kind such as *Anyad eva tad viditād* (*Kena.* i.3) *Yato vāco nivartante* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.4.1) have been *fully considered in* respect of Nirviśeṣa-B. by S. *It is thus difficult to make a proper case for the opening of this adhi.*

The *Kalpataru* has offered a fresh explanation *for opening the adhi.*

निषेधश्रुतिभिर्ब्रह्म निर्विशेषं निरूपितम् ।
तासां ब्रह्मनिषेद्धृत्वमिहाशंक्य निरस्यते ॥

"B. has been established as Nirviśeṣa in the previous adhi. on the strength *of the negative texts.* This adhi. *arises by way of dispelling* the objection that these negative texts threaten the very existence of B. and reduce it to a nullity". *It has also* indicated another way of moving the same objection:

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34. ब्रह्म तु नाविद्याप्रसिद्ध, नापि प्रमाणान्तरात् । तस्मात् शब्देन प्राप्त प्रतिषेधनीयम् । तथाच यस्तस्य शब्द प्रापकः स एव तत्पर इति, स ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणमिति, कथमस्य निषेधोऽपि प्रमाणवान् ?

35 Vide. P. 29 fn. 22.

36 Cf. कोऽस्य प्रतिषेधस्य विषय इति जिज्ञासामहे (S. *BSB.* iii.2 22)
See also *Bhāmatī's* admission to the same effect, P. 157, f.n. 27.

सन्मात्र ब्रह्म सामान्य सद्विशेषमपेक्षते ।
विशेषेषु निषिद्धेषु नास्ति ब्रह्मेति शक्यते ॥

"B is pure being or existence in general The concept of the universal presupposes the existence of particulars When such particulars are negated as by the *neti neti* text, the negation will equally affect B and reduce it to non-being (The reading निषेधेषु for विशेषेषु in the printed Edn is wrong) This objection is refuted in this adhi These objections have also been briefly indicated in *S BSB* and in the *Bhāmatī*

The doubt and objection that there is no B at all (*nāsti brahmeti samkyate*) lays the axe at the root of Brahmamimāmsā Śāstra and prevents its commencement The right place to deal with such an objection is at the very beginning of the work or immediately after the first Sūtra proposing the inquiry into B *It passeth all understanding how a doubt of this nature which has passed not only the initial stage of Jijñāsā but far beyond the deliberations of the Samanvaya and Avirodha Adhyāyas where the existence nature and attributes of B have been fully established and doctrines to the contrary have been refuted could spring up at this late stage of the Sādhana Adhyāya!*

The reality of the world of murta and amūrtas and of B are alike established by (*sākṣi*) perception and other Pramāṇas That being so, the Purvapakṣa negating both can hardly arise

Vācaspati has attempted to defend the Pūrvapakṣa as follows No doubt, in several parts of the Upaniṣads the existence and nature of B as reality, knowledge and infinitude has been propounded and the presumption that it does not exist has been frowned upon and its existence affirmed with all emphasis But B is of the nature of being and knowledge Being is the underlying essence of the world of mūrta and amūrta The latter are its expressions thro' particular forms The general cannot survive the negation of the particulars in their entirety The latter involves the negation of the former The conclusion follows that by *neti neti* the Śruti means to negative B also[37]

We may be permitted to ask Vacaspati if the Purvapakṣa here accepts the validity of the Śrutis or not If it does *not*, the terms in which he has made the Pūrvapakṣin conclude his finding *"therefore, the Śruti proclaims the negation of everything including B as the truth'*, would be out of place in being made to come from the lips of a non-believer in the validity of Śrutis speaking as their spokesman

37 अत एव न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति इति निषेधात् परं नास्तीति सर्वनिषेधमेव तत्त्वमाह श्रुति
(*Bhāmati* iii 2 22)

If the Pūrvapakṣa believes in the validity of Śrutis, it cannot have any chance against texts like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* which proclaim B.'s existence and define its attributes Here again, Vācaspati hastens to inject new strength into the Pūrvapakṣa, as follows: The statement in the Śruti that "B is to be apprehended only as existent" (*Katha Up* ii 3 13) should be explained *not* as a statement of fact but as being made for the sake of 'Upāsanā', just as we have in cases like 'meditate on name as B (*Chān Up.* vii 1 5). As for the statements elsewhere referring to B as a real, conscious and infinite Being, that is also to be explained as intended for the sole purpose of being negated, like the descriptions of the mūrta and amūrta world in the Upaniṣads It cannot be objected to this that *neti neti* would only be competent to negate what has been set out *in its proximity*—viz the mūrta and amūrta worlds and *not* the existence of B *taught far away from it in some other Upaniṣad like the Taittirīya,* viz *Satyam jñānam brahma* The question of distance of place or difference of sources is no bar to a negating statement reaching out to a positive one about the same subject, with which it can be brought into logico-syntactical relation and cancelling it

'यस्य येनार्थसंबन्धो दूरस्थस्यापि तेन सः।

This line of argument of Vācaspati, if accepted, would make propositions like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* forfeit their expressed sense It cannot be seriously contended that their purport is a negation. An affirmative proposition cannot have a negation as its purport It cannot be that the statement *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* becoming integrated with *neti neti* will fall into line with its negative purport, even as the Prayāja and Anuyāja texts form a corporate whole with their principal For it has been established by S himself under the Sūtra *Arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt* (iii 2 14) that all Vedāntic texts *have B as their principal purport* We cannot now reverse this finding and give them a *negative purport*

The positive statements like *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* cannot be integrated with others like *neti neti* which carry a negative purport on the plea of the former supplying the material for negation by the latter There are no indications of the existence of any such relation between them such as the presence of a prefatory particle *yat* attached to the former Otherwise, it may be said with equal force that *neti neti* supplies the material for contradiction to *Satyam jñānam* and that the former becoming integrated with the latter comes to have a positive purport Nor do these two statements occur in proximity to

each other in the same source or in the same context to warrant any such relation being set up between then.

The *Bhamatī* has attempted to show that there is no landing in Śūnyavāda, in the event of negation of mūrta and amūrtas. It cites the analogy of the reflected image of the face in the mirror. The face does not go out of existence when the mirror is removed and the reflection disappears. But, then, notwithstanding the disappearance of the imagined features of the reflected image, the face continues to have its own natural features and characteristics of measurement, roundness of shape, etc. But the Advaitic B. has no such *natural characteristics or features.* The analogy is, therefore, inapplicable. If B. should have any such natural characteristics it will have to be accepted as Saviśeṣa and not Nirviśeṣa. If it has none, it cannot be distinguished from Śūnya, having lost its two forms of mūrta and amūrta, which have been negated. If such features as B. may have are non-different from it, their negation will reduce B. to a nullity. If they are different from B. the *neti neti* text will equally shatter them to pieces and *push B. into the arms of Śūnyatā.* If the text should negate the world of mūrta and amūrta, it should negate B. also. The word *iti* is used with regard to approximate things. The context shows what has to be considered as proximate—viz. the two cosmic forms of B. and *that* B. itself to which these two forms belong. Consequently, the negation of B. becomes equally necessary and Sarvaśūnyatāvāda would be *inescapable.*

Vācaspati disputes this as follows: Negation is always of some characteristics superimposed on a given subject. Absolute negation of B. is, therefore, inconceivable. It may be asked—why should it be presumed that there cannot be a negation without a substratum *(dharmi)*? The obvious reply of the Advaita philosopher would be—because it is only with reference to the rope given as the substratum *(adhiṣṭhāna)* that the appearance of the snake is negated. But, then, how is it that it does not occur to this astute thinker that it is only a serpent (or some such creature) that is negated in the rope and *not the hare's horn*? It boils down to this that just as no error or appearance can arise and no negation of it can be explained without a real substratum being given, in the same way, the illusory knowledge cannot arise without *a real snake also being given, in experience.* The negation of the latter would thus be equally impossible. To account for the negation of a world of mūrta and amūrta brought about by its superimposition on B. as the Advaitin would have it—he will *have to recognize a real world* of mūrta and amūrta *besides the false one that he seeks to negate.*

Instead of this unwelcome contingency, he should prefer to opt for negation without a real substratum, and cry quits[1]

We are entitled to ask—Just as there is a negated world "given" in *anuvāda*, why should there not be negation of B similarly given in the same context as refers to the mūrta and amūrta

Vācaspati would fain silence this query as follows It is conceivable that the world given in and thro' natural ignorance (*naisargikāvidyā*) is negated B is not established thro' Avidyā or by other empirical proofs It has, therefore to be established thro' Śruti and *then* negated The Śruti which leads us to knowledge of B becomes the proof of its existence How then can its negation be valid? B is inaccessible to mind and speech It cannot be figured by the intellect How is the negation of such a being possible by the mind or speech or by word On the other hand, the world established by beginningless Avidyā can be recapitulated and negated in B

This is not convincing We have a right to ask 'How is the 'establishment' of 'the world to be negated' to be achieved? Is it thro' valid proof or thro' semblance of proof? If by the first, there can be no negation of what has been established thro' valid proof If, in spite of it, the world is to be negated, what negates it cannot claim to be a real proof Else, even B established by Śabdapramāna may be negated The world of experience is also established thro' valid proof of Śrutis such as "From ākāsa Vāyu is born' etc It is no drawback that the world *is also established by Pratyakṣapramāna*, for it is also a valid means of proof, and cannot be discredited as liable to err If there are cases of erroneous perception, there are also misleading statements like '*Agninā simcet*' If B is established by flawless sabda, the world too is given by flawless Pratyaksa It is yet to be established that everything in experience is imagined by Avidyā The distinction that while B is given by flawless *sabda, the world is given only in and thro'* Avidyā and, therefore, admits of being restated and negated in B is inadmissible Tho' Avidyā may project a world, it cannot *reveal it to experience as it has no such power* Otherwise, in so far as Avidyā reveals the world to our conscious experience it wil have to be recognised as a "Pramāna" within the meaning of being a means of valid knowledge or leading to the understanding of what has not been comprehended before, by any other means of knowledge (*anadhigatārthagantr*) It is possible to predicate the nonexistence of B from the Śūnyavadin's point of view or first account for its establishment thro' the repeated assertions of the Monist that it exists and then have it negated by the words *neti neti* The words of S at the beginning of his commentary on B S

ii.1 1 that it has been shown in the first Adhyāya that B is the purport of all the Vedānta are sufficient to show that B can be implanted in the mind thro' the teachings of the Vedāntas If B is really and utterly inaccessible to mind, speech etc, the negation of B thro' *neti neti* will not be opposed to any pramāna that can establish B—in which case, the operation of *neti neti* in negating it will be unimpeded

The distinction drawn that as the Upaniṣads take great pains to establish B it is not proper to negate it is onesided. For, they have taken equal pains to deal with the origination of the world and the maintenance of its values Tho' the bare existence of merit and demerit, heaven and hell and such other matters are inferable, their interrelations and of their Sādhanas are made known to us only thro' Śabdapramāna as has been emphasized by Jaimini Thus, they are also to be known only thro' Śruti It will thus be equally selfcontradictory for Śrutis to negate their existence by *neti neti*.

Another ingenious argument of Vācaspati to exclude B from the purview of *neti neti* is this In the recital *Dve vāva brahmano rūpe mūrtam cāmūrtam ca,* B is given in the genitive case and the the world in the nominative In this statement B appears as the delimitor of the world (*prapañcāvacchedaka*) As such, it takes but a secondary place in the Vākyārtha and the world takes the primary place For reason, the negation will be of the world and not of B

ननु प्रकृतप्रतिषेधे ब्रह्मणोऽपि कस्मान्न प्रतिषेध इत्यत आह–तद्धि प्रकृतमिति। प्रधान प्रकृत न ब्रह्म। तस्य षष्ठ्यन्ततया प्रपञ्चावच्छेदकत्वेनाप्राधान्यात् इत्यर्थं

(*Bhāmatī* iii 2 22)

The exigencies of Sanskrit grammar cannot rob the B of its importance The descriptive compound Rājapuruṣah does not reduce the king's status in relation to his officer Words are used for the communication of meaning The precedence and prominence given to this or that word in construction or syntax depends on the genius of the language and its idiom. It has no significance outside the rules of grammar It cannot be made the criterion of deciding the importance of entities involved Otherwise, B will have to take a secondary place in terms of 'Brahmajijñāsā' as 'B' is compounded with Jijnāsā in the sense of the objective genitive, the other word jijnāsā being given in the nominative If B should lose its importance on this account, the term yataḥ in the next Sūtra will not be competent to refer to B as it would not be that much important in its grammatical set-up in the first Sutra If the nominative reference is not a criterion of the status and import-

ance of the entities involved a predicative (affirmative) statement, it should be much less so in a negative proposition. There is thus no justification to restrict the jurisdiction of *neti neti* to the world and *not extend it to B. also.*[36]

Śamkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

S. renders the first Sūtra as follows: The Śruti 'Neti neti' negates of B. only what forms the current topic of discussion—viz. B.'s two forms of mūrta and amūrta and not B. also. Thereby B. does not become negated. For, after the negation (*tato 'bhūyaḥ*) the text announces the positive nature of B. by the words *Nahyetasmād* * * * and/or *Satyasya satyam.*

It is not proper to construe *etāvattvam* (*B. S.* iii.2.22) which signifies 'this much' or fixed limit or measure, in the sense of *mūrta* and *amūrta*. To do so, S. has taken another liberty in ignoring the abstract suffix *tva* after '*etāvad*' in the *text of the Sūtra* whose presence would suggest that there is "much more" than what has been stated *of B.*[38] By *dropping this suffix he has sought to establish quite a different sense from what has been intended.* 'Prakṛtaitāvattvam' points to the *inclusion of* 'more' rather than the *exclusion* of the matter on hand (*prakṛta*). The term "bhūyaḥ" in the Sūtra means "much more" (*ādhikya*). But S. renders it as "after" (*ānantarya*).

The concluding statement *Satyasya satyam* (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.3.6) does not reduce the world to unreality or to a lesser order of reality as understood by S. It can be construed in the same sense as the statements *maṅgalānām* ca *maṅgalam, pavitrāṇām pavitram,* etc. where the supreme auspiciousness and purity of B. does not take away anything from the auspiciousness and purity of others regarded as auspicious and pure. The meaning he extracts out of *tato bhūyaḥ* can be expressed by the first word *tataḥ* itself in the Sutra which makes the use of *bhūyaḥ* superfluous. And to complete the sense intended by him he has to import the word "the positivity of B." (*brahmaṇo 'bhāvarupatvam ca bravīti*) meaning that "after negating of B. what has been mentioned upto this, the Śruti refers to the positive nature of B.".

S. introduces the next Sūtra as follows: If B. exists as different from the world of mūrta and amūrta which has been negated, why is it not apprehended by the senses.[39] He answers thro' the second Sūtra

36 The correct way of interpreting *neti neti* will be that it postulates the difference (*anyonyābhāva*) between B. and the world of *mūrta* and *amūrta*.

38 रूपद्वयं निषेध्य चेत् त्वप्रत्ययवैयर्थ्यम् (*Śrutaprakāśa* iii.2.21)

39 यत्प्रतिषिद्धात् प्रपञ्चादन्यत् परं ब्रह्म, तदस्ति चेत् कस्मान्न गृह्यत इति ? उच्यते । (S. *BSB*. iii.2 23)

that the Śrutı says B ıs not apprehended by the eye or by speech Hence there ıs no ground for the objectıon

As already shown, the negatıon of B ıs ınescapable ın the event of the negatıon of the world ın terms of *netı netı* as ınterpreted by S The contentıon that B ıs ıncomprehensıble ıs opposed to hıs own cıtatıons under the next Sūtra—"The Yogıns apprehend ıt durıng presentatıon before the mınd thro' perfect concılıatıon"

Hıs ınterpretatıon of the thırd Sūtra In vıew of the presence of Śrutıs lıke "Some wıse man, however, sees the self wıthın", "Whom the Yogıns medıtatıng sleeplessly, see" ıs not also proper For, whıle the doubt as to how B whıch ıs essentıally unmanıfest can be perceıved (even by the Yogıns) can be cleared by referrıng to the wonderful and mysterıous power and grace of B (as ın M.'s ınterpretatıon), ıt cannot be done by merely re-cıtıng some of the texts *whıch make no reference to B's acıntyādbhutaśaktı but merely repeat that Yogıns see the Lord* In S's ınterpretatıon of thıs Sūtra there ıs need to ımport the word *paśyantı* after *samrādhane*

The next Sūtra (ııı 2 25) ıs ıntroduced by hım as follows The acceptance of the relatıon of medıtator and medıtated wıll lead to dualıty and not to unıty wıth B How ıs thıs to be reconcıled?[40] He answers· Just as lıght, ākāśa and the Sun appear to be dıfferent on account of upādhıs lıke the fıngers, pots and water, so also the appearance of such dıstınctıons and the absence of any natural dıfference between Jıva and B are both compatıble[41]

Thıs ınterpretatıon of the Sūtra ınvolves too many ımportatıons of addıtıonal words The term '*karmanı*' ın the Sūtra ıs gıven *an unusual sense of upādhıs* Instead of the term *abhyāsāt* beıng connected wıth the precedıng word, ıt ıs separated from ıt and made to start a fresh statement at the rısk of Vakyabheda, that the ıdentıty of Jıva and B is establıshed by repeated declaratıons (*abhyāsa*) of Śrutı texts The ıdentıty havıng been establıshed already ın the Ārambhanādhı (ıı 1 14) and in Na sthānatopı * * * (ıı 2 11) accordıng to S, no reasonable doubt on that poınt can rıse agaın If, for some reason, ıt should stıll arıse, ıt ıs naive to expect ıt to be stılled by gıvıng some analogıes and makıng pıous appeals to '*repeated declaratıons of ıdentıty ın the Śrutıs*'[42]

40. ननु संराध्यसंराधकभावाभ्युपगमात् परेतरात्मनोरन्यत्वं स्यादिति (S BSB ııı 2 25)
41 अत्रोच्यते—यथा प्रकाशाकाशसवितृप्रभृतयोऽङ्गुलिकरकोदकप्रभृतिषु कर्मसूपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इवावभासन्ते न च स्वाभाविकीमविशेषात्मतां जहति एवमुपाधिनिमित्त एवायमात्मभेदः, स्वतस्त्वैकात्म्यमेव (ibid)
42. उदये वा अमन्दजिज्ञासोरभ्यासमात्रेण परिहारायोगात् (STC ııı 2 26)

The Sūtra: *Ubhayavyapadeśāttvahikuṇḍalavat* (iii.2.27) has been explained by S. as presenting a different view (*matāntaram*) or Bhedābheda between Jīva and B. resting on the analogy of the serpent and its coil in reply to the objection raised in the preamble to Sūtra 25 and is connected with the Siddhānta Sūtra (iii.2.25) in an artificial way as serving as a foil to the Siddhānta position: मतान्तरमुपन्यस्यति स्वमतविशुद्धये (*S. BSB*). This is not satisfactory, as it involves a needless digression from the main issue. This is why R. begins a fresh adhi. with *Ubhayavyapadeśāt.*

Sūtra 28 is also explained as clarifying the relation of Jīva and B. with another analogy of light and its substratum on account of both being luminous. Sūtra 29 is explained as endorsing the Siddhānta view "set out before" in Sūtra 25. Sūtra 30 is explained as conveying that the Śrutis discountenance difference between Jīva and B.

The Bhedābheda view ought *not* to have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra even as a tentative solution. It is a self-contradictory proposition to hold that difference and identity between Jīva and B. are both *equally true and real in the same sense.* It is making the Sūtrakāra commit an error of judgment in making him take even passing notice of such doctrines to set off the Siddhānta view of pure identity. In defence of bhedābheda S. has argued that the Jīva may be different from B. in point of his Jīvahood and non-different from it in point of sentiency, just as the coil and the serpent are one in point of snakiness but the coil is different in being a coil and the snake a snake.[43]

The rift in the analogy is that while being a snake and being a coil are both real facts and true, sentiency and Jīvahood are both of them *not* intrinsically true of the Jīva, according to S.

Sūtra 28 is only a repetition of the same idea in different words and a different analogy. Sūtra 29 is also superfluous as it advances no fresh argument and the Siddhānta has been already established in Sūtra 25 and can be understood to be so *without being pointed out again as such by Sūtra 29.*

The *Bhāmatī* has criticized the Bhedābhedavāda based on *avacchedakabheda* and *sahopalambha* borne out by Āgama. (supposed to be represented by Sūtra 27 and 28). The former is criticized by refuting the two alternatives of difference and identity of the attributes in relation to the subject. The criticism is inconclusive as absolute difference

43. अहिरूपेणाभेदः कुण्डलादिरूपेण भेद इति विषयभेदात् भेदाभेदयोरविरोध (*Bhāmatī*)

and absolute identity *do not exhaust the gamut of their relationship,*— there being the third alternative of Saviśeṣābheda. As for Sahopalambha, the *Bhāmatī* dismisses it as something which cannot stand scrutiny (*vicarāsaham*), even tho' it is within our experience.[44]

This criticism is off the mark. Bhedābhedavāda insists that both difference and identity between Jīva and B. are given by Āgamapramāṇa as coexisting and are not, therefore, to be dismissed as contradictory, simply because difference and identity are found to be in mutual exclusion *elsewhere.* This cannot be rebutted by bringing in the analogy of *dehātmānubhava* as a counterblast as has been done by the *Bhāmatī.* For, while the coexistence of difference and identity between Jīva and B. is claimed to be borne out by Āgama, the experience that the body is the soul is recognized to be a mistaken notion engendered by a flaw.[45] In cases of data given by valid Pramāṇas intractability to scrutiny is no argument against their acceptability. The coexistence of *aṇutva* and *mahatva* in their transcendental sense has to be admitted as perfectly compatible in B. on the evidence of Śruti *Anor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān* without demur. The last Sūtra (30) is quite unnecessary as the topic has been covered by Sūtra 22.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

(*Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇam* iii.2.26-29)

The Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.* according to R. is the same as for the Sūtra: Prakṛtaitāvattvam pratiṣedhati[46] * * * viz. *Dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam cāmurtam ca* (Brh. *Up.* ii.3.1). *The topic of discussion is confined to Acit.*[47] The problem is in what precise sense Acit is to be conceived as the form (*rūpam*)[84] of B. Three alternatives suggest themselves (i) that Acit is the form of B. in that it is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of B.'s essential nature (*svarūpa*); (ii) in that both B. and Acit participate in the same genus (*ekajātiyogaḥ*); or (iii)

44. न च सहानुपलम्भमात्रं विचारासहं भाविकं भवितुमर्हति। देहात्मभावस्यापि सदानुभूयमानस्य भाविकत्वप्रसंगात्
(*Bhāmatī* iii 2 29-30)

45. एवं विरोधमनुपपन्नम्। तेन हि प्रमाणेन सहोपलभ्यमानयोरन्यत्र विरुद्धत्वेन प्रतीयमानयोरपि सहानवस्थितिनियमस्वागमं विरुद्धत्वं नाम्नानुपपन्नम्। यथा तु, देहात्मभावस्य सदानुभूयमानस्य सत्यत्वप्रसंग इत्युच्यते। तत्र किं केन संगतम्? नहि देहात्मभावः केनचित् प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, किंतु दोषादेवेति सर्वसंप्रतिपत्तिः
(*STC. ibid*).

46. The reader will remember that according to R. this Sūtra forms part of the Ubhayaliṅgādhi.

47. अचिद्वस्तुनः ब्रह्मरूपत्वप्रकारः चिन्त्यते (*Śrībhāṣya.* iii 2 26)

48. The *Śrutaprakāśa* explains that Acit is called *rūpam* of B. in the sense of being a *vibhūti*, having the characteristic of being controlled by B.: नियाम्यत्वलक्षणविभूतित्वमेव रूपत्वम्

that like the Jīvātman it is also a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of B. and, therefore, an *aṁśa* of B., like him.

The Pūrvapakṣas are (i) that Acit must be admitted to be a transformation of B. in order to do justice to its description in the Śrutis in terms of both difference and identity; and (ii) that Acit participates in the same genus as B. and is not its transformation in as much as B.'s perfection and flawlessness will be vitiated if B. should transform itself into Acit. The Siddhānta is that the participation theory cannot explain the statements in the Śrutis such as 'B. is all this': 'Ātman is all this—according to which all words denote the nature of B. Tho' all cows participate in the same genus of cowness, description or epithets like the broken-horned cow, the hornless cow, the cow with full-grown horns, do not denote the same particular. But B. is denoted by the names of all the particulars (*Brahmaivedam sarvam*). We have, therefore, to conclude that like the Jīvātman, Acit too, as the body of B., constitutes a determining attribute of B. and is, therefore, to be regarded as an *aṁśa* of B. like the Jīvātman.[49] The Sūtra is to be construed as follows. The *tu* is used in the sense of emphasis. Like the coiled form or the upright form[50] of the serpent, Acit is only a special form or configuration of B. (*samsthānaviṣeṣa*).

Criticism

The inquiry into the particular sense or mode in which the world of Acit is to be conceived as constituting the form of B.[51] has no relevancy to the theme of this Pāda and Adhyāya. The explanation given by R. that this is done in the interest of proving B.'s freedom from imperfections[52] does not satisfy. For, B.'s freedom from imperfections (*nirdoṣatva*) has been established, according to R. himself, under the Sūtra *Prakaśavaccavaiyarthyāt* (iii.2.15).[53] The fact that cit and acit are both distinguishing attributes of B. has also been established earlier in the Prakṛtyadhi (i.4.23-28) and in the Ārambhaṇādhi (ii.1.15-20). There can, therefore, be no further doubt on the point. It is, therefore, needless to go into this question in regard to Acit alone here. R.

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49 एव सति 'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं' इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वव्यपदेशबाध' स्यात्। अतो जीवस्येव ब्रह्मशरीरतया ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेनाचिद्वस्तुनोऽपि ब्रह्मांशत्वमिति राद्धान्त: (*Vedāntadipa.* iii 2 26)

50 Thibaut *mistranslates* R.'s words: अहेकुण्डलभावर्जुभाववत into "a coiled snake or a coiled-up rope". (*Op. cit.* p. 619).

51. अचिद्वस्तुन. ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वप्रकार इदानी चिन्त्यते (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2 26)

52. ब्रह्मणो निर्दोषत्वसिद्धयर्थम् (*ibid*)

53. यथा च सत्य ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेत्यादिवाक्यावैयर्थ्यात् प्रकाशस्वरूपत्व ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते, तथा सत्यसंकल्पत्वसर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वजगत्कारणत्वमर्वान्मकत्वनिरस्तनिखिलाविद्यादिदोषत्वाद्यभिधायिवाक्यावैयर्थ्यात् उभयलिंगमेव ब्रह्म (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2 15)

has tried to get over this difficulty with the explanation that these two earlier adhikaraṇas have established their conclusions by assuming the position which is being established in the present *adhi.*[54] This gives the whole case away.

The conclusion established in this *adhi.* with regard to acit is covered by the conclusion reached in regard to the Jīvātman's relation to B. in Amśādhikaraṇa (ii.3.42-52). It is, therefore, needless to open a fresh adhi. for the purpose, merely on the ground that this adhi. is concerned with acit while the Amśādhi. is concerned with the cit's (Jīva's) relation to B. Where the directive principles are the same, a mere change in respect of the object (viṣaya) to which it is to be applied or extended cannot call for a fresh adhi.[53]

Transformation of B. as Cit into acit (or jaḍa) is unknown and without precedent. The attempt to claim oneness of nature of Acit with B. on the basis of their participation in the same genus (*ekajātiyoga*) will, if extended to participation in the highest genus of Sattā, do away with all difference and distinction between any two things in the world. The two Pūrvapakṣas thus rest upon very weak foundations.

Coming to the Siddhānta, we may ask: Is it arrived at by admitting difference between the world of *acit* and B.; or their non-difference; or both? In the first case, the Siddhānta will be in conflict with Śrutis like 'Brahmaivedam sarvam' teaching non-difference. In the second case, the Bhedaśrutis will be violated. As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, the third alternative is also unthinkable.[37] It is no use arguing that there is no difficulty if we accept aṁśāṁśibhāva relation between the world of acit and B. for bhedābheda is found to coexist with aṁśāṁśibhāva in the case of the cloth and its parts. For then the difficulty would be that just as there is clothness in a part of the cloth there will be Brahmatva in the world of acit which is a part (*aṁśa*) of B. Such a position will *not* be agreeable to R. If it is to be accepted, the acit also will have to be recognized as the cause and author of the world as B!

It is futile to explain that Brahmanhood consists only in being Sat and not in being coexistent with being the cause and author of the world, —just as a part of a cloth possesses clothness but is not coexistent with having the same expanse of lengthwise and breadthwise interweaving of

54 इह स्थाप्यमान विशेषणविशेष्यभावमङ्गीकृत्य 'प्रकृतिश्च', 'तदनन्यत्वम्' इत्यत्र सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुविशिष्टात् ब्रह्मणः स्थूलचिदचिद्विशिष्टस्योत्पत्तिरनन्यत्वं चोक्तम् (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 2 26)

55. एतेन–'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादित्यत्र जीवब्रह्मणोरंशांशिभाव उक्तः, अत्र तु अचिद्ब्रह्मणोरिति भिदा' इति श्रुतप्रकाशिकोक्तं निरस्तम्। नहि न्यायसाम्ये विषयभेदमात्रेणाधिकरणारम्भो युक्तः (*STC*)

the threads as the whole cloth. For while a part of the cloth is also designated as cloth, the world is *not* designated as B. The words in the Śruti "B. is all this" cannot be accepted in its literal sense. We have to understand them in a figurative (*gauṇa*) sense. *Otherwise, there is* nothing to prevent us from accepting (figurative) statements like 'the boy is a lion' in their primary sense (mukhyārtha). For, by accepting *aṁśāṁśibhāva* relation between the boy and the lion one may hold the boy possesses lionness coexistent with the attribute of valor while differing from the lion in other respects. That would banish Gauṇīvṛtti from the domain of language.

It may be said on R.'s behalf that *aṁśatva* is not to be understood as being a part of a whole in its spatial sense, but in the sense of being a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*). The acit is designated as the body of B. only in this sense. In this sense there is no difficulty in accepting statements like "All this is B." as primary usages. And in so far as there is natural difference between the Viśeṣaṇa and the Viśeṣya (as between a stick and one who carries it) the usage of difference (bhedavyavahāra) is also a primary one.

The argument is superficial. We may ask if the foregoing explanation is based on the acceptance of the position that the Viśiṣṭa (qualified entity) is something other than the attribute (viśesṣṇa), the substance (viśeṣya) and their relationship; or on the presumption that the viśiṣṭa is of the nature of all these three.

In the former case, tho' it is possible to accept non-difference of the attribute, the viśeṣya and their relation with the viśiṣṭa, from the point of view of the viśiṣṭa's being a product of viśeṣya or of the viśeṣaṇa or of both, there will still be no non-difference between the *viśeṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣya* on the above view. Consequently, statements like *Brahmaivedam sarvam* embodying identity of the Viśeṣaṇa and the Viśeṣya cannot be accepted as primary usages.

Even on the second view that the Viśiṣṭa partakes of the nature of the viśeṣaṇa, viśeṣya and their relationship, the viśeṣya is *not* identical with the nature of the bare viśeṣya. That way, the statement of the Śruti "Brahmaivedam sarvam" cannot claim to be a primary usage.

It cannot be maintained that in the Śruti 'Brahmaivedam sarvam' it is the complex qualified entity (*viśiṣṭam*) comprising all the three elements—viz. the world, B., and their relationship that is designated as "B" and not either the bare *viśeṣya or the bare attribute (viśeṣaṇa)* and that in the circumstances the non-difference of B. with the world

of cit and acit denoted by the term 'sarvam' (of Brahmaivedam sarvem) is indeed a primary usage

We may ask for a clarification of this contention Does R mean that *everywhere* in the Śrutis, this is the meaning of the word "Brahman", or only where B is said to be identical with the world or with the Jivas? The first view cannot be held For then, in all such statements as 'Satyam jnānam anantam brahma', 'Yas sarvajñah', 'Yasyātmā śarīram', 'Yasya prthivī śarīram' the world too will have to be accepted as sharing B's nature of satyam, jnānam, infinitude, omniscience and having the Ātman and the prithvi etc as *its body* That would make B forfeit its nature of being unlimited (aparicchinna) If everywhere it is that which is qualified by the world of sentient and insenstient principles that is the meaning of the word "B", the difference between Jīva and B referred to in the Śruti 'Dvā suparnā' will cease to be intended in its primary sense For the Visiṣṭa being a unity, there will be no room for duality in it The explanation that the term "Brahman", tho' it denotes only the bare viśesya, denotes B qualified by the world of cit and acit thro' Lakṣanāvṛtti will mean that the identity texts cannot be taken in their primary sense, as R claims they can be If the view that in all cases where identity of Jiva and B or the world (of acit) and B is spoken of in the Śrutis, it is the triunity that is called B, then in so far as the relation of Viśeṣanaviśesyabhāva is not an unalterable one but indefinite and reversible depending on exigencies of usage and occasion, and in so far as in such statements as 'Brahmano rūpe', B also figures as the Viśeṣana, the world so qualified by B will also have to be accepted as the meaning of the word 'Brahman'

R has maintained that what is meant by saying that B has the world for its Viseṣaṇa is simply this that the world is the body of B In as much as there is no proof in support of any statement that B is the body of the world—as there is in support of the other view that the world is B's body—there is nothing unphilosophical in regarding B as having cit and acit as its body

This needs further clarification as to what precisely is meant by the statement that "the world is the 'body' of B" If 'body' means the receptacle of B's enjoyment, it would mean B's enjoyment is limited by the world B then would cease to have any enjoyment outside and beyond the world By having the world as its body B will be in for the sufferings also caused by it and thus lose its flawlessness and freedom from imperfections. If having the world for its body means only that the world is its base (āsraya), the conception will be faulty

The ground which is the base for Devadatta does not become his 'body'. It will be a very loose use of the word 'body'.

To be a body and to be a distinguishing attribute are not coexistent terms or ideas. They are not convertible too. The walking-stick carried by Devadatta tho' a distinguishing attribute of his does not constitute his body. 'Conversly, in the description 'Devadatta's body', the body is not his viśeṣaṇa.

It may still be argued that tho' a Viśeṣaṇa is not necessarily a body or *vice versa,* a viśeṣaṇa which is established as inseparable from the subject (*apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa*) deserves to be called the body of B. The world of mūrta and amūrta are such *apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇas* of B. This is not also conclusive. Clay is inseparately established with the pot of which it is the constituent. But we don't call it the body of the pot, which is only a transformation of clay. Moreover, it has been shown that the world too cannot be regarded as an inseparable attribute of B.

CHAPTER XVII

BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES ARE ALL OF TRANSEMPIRICAL CHARACTER

16 *Paramato'dhikaranam* (iii 2 32-34)

The preceding adhi had established that the attributes of B are also the essence of its being and non-different from it The present adhi establishes that they are all of them transempirical in their nature[1] This points to B's transcendence (*sarvotkrṣṭatva*) and inspires the highest Bhakti (*niratisayabhakti*) If its attributes are of the same order and nature as empirical attributes (*laukika*) and on a level with them, they will not be able to evoke the highest form of devotion In the interests of inspiring supreme devotion, it is necessary to remove such impediments to Bhakti, by bringing out the transempirical and transcendent character of B's attributes[2]

The problem of how transempirical attributes come to be denoted by words of common currency in empirical usage such as 'knowledge' and 'bliss' is answered here in terms of the doctrine of 'analogical senses' in the Sūtra *'Buddhyarthah pādavat* (iii 2 34)—a most remarkable anticipation of St Thomas Aquinas, by several centuries

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no need to cultivate Bhakti towards B as its attributes are of the same order and nature as met with

1 पूर्वत्रानन्दगुणानां तदात्मकत्वं सदसत्त्वं वा[illegible]म् । इह तु अलौकिकत्वं लौकिकशब्दवाच्यत्वं वाच्यम्

(Ragh *Ny Muktavali*)

2 अथानन्तप्रमेयस्यालौकिकत्वस्य प्रधानप्रमेयस्य सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वस्य चाभावे सत्युत्तमो प्रतिबन्धक लौकिकेऽनुरागो [illegible] । [illegible] भक्तिप्रतिबन्धकनिरासाय [illegible] (*STC* iii 2 32)

in empirical reality The very fact and circumstance that these attributes of B are referred to in the Srutis by the very same words as *ānanda*, *jnāna* and so forth, which are current in empirical usage, is sufficient proof of this It cannot be held that we may accept that B's attributes are both empirical and transempirical and explain the apparent contradiction in such a position on the analogy of the *ahikundala-nyāya* thro' Viseṣas For Saviseṣābheda is possible only where both the facts or aspects are established by Pramānas In the present case, there is no evidence that B's attributes are really transempirical (also), The Pūrvapaksa thus concludes that, B's attributes should all of them be held to be of the same order and nature as attributes known to us thro' worldly experience Consequently, a Being of such a nature is not fit to inspire and evoke the highest form of devotion There is thus no need for the cultivation of Bhakti towards such a Being [3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that B's attributes are indeed all of them absolutely transempirical in their character There is no impropriety, however, in applying words current in empirical usage to denote them As there is no other means of denotational access to them, words of ordinary usage are used to convey some idea of them,—however faint and inadequate, to human understanding Words like jnāna and ānanda, so employed, help us to understand that B has the power to reveal objects of knowledge to our understanding and is in and by itself the most precious value of life to be desired for its own sake *(anukūlavedanīya)* [4] Tho' one's own bliss is a highly prized value of life, the bliss of B is in a more intimate sense, the highest of values to be prized and cherished by us

Tad etat preyah putrād preyo vittād
preyas sarvasmād yad ayam atmā

(*Brh Up* 1,4 8)

If the objection is taken that there is no way of ascertaining the significative power of words of ordinary usage to denote transempirical attributes, the answer to it is that such relationship can be posited thro'

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3 प्रकृत भगवदगणजात लोकसदृशमिति पूव पक्ष आनन्दादिशब्दवाच्यत्वात। अन्यथा आनन्द ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्' इत्यादिप्रयोग तत्र न स्यात। नहि घटविलक्षण घटपद युज्यत। अस्ति च प्रयाग । अतो लौकिकानन्दादिवत् ईश्वरानन्दादीति न तत्रातिशयन भक्तिर्युक्तेति (*TP* III 2 32)

4 अतो अलौकिकत्वात् परमेव ब्रह्मानन्दादिकम् (*M BSB* III.2 32) भगवदानदस्याप्यस्मदीयानन्दगनानुकूलवदनीयत्वादिधमसदृशधमसदभावेनानुकूलादिपदप्रयोगेऽपि निरुपाधिकत्वादिधर्मान्तरेण तद्वैलक्षण्यस्याप्युपपत्त (*STC*)

Read also आनुकूल्य निरुपाधिप्रियत्वमानन्दस्य। बोधात्मकत्व ज्ञानस्यत्यादि (*NS* p 523)

similarity of nature between them, however faint it may be There is no need to feel that if similarity is the basis of approach from the worldly sense of words to their transempirical sense realized in B, all references to B's attributes thro' such a process will have to be put down as purely figurative usages (*gaunīvṛtti*) like 'Simho māṇavakah' The point is that resemblance is used merely as a link between the two orders of meanings and not to gain first hand knowledge that a word like *ananda* applied to B carries an analogical sense[5] As B's attributes are known to be transempirical, they can be fully expressed only thro' transempirical vocabulary But so far as human needs and standards are concerned, words in empirical usage yield suitable images of transempirical attributes of the Supreme B in the light of information about B's attributes given in the Śrutis, in the first instance and by the instruction of the wise ones Gradually, one learns to associate these empirical words with higher senses transcending the empirical ones[6] The meanings conveyed by empirical language in respect of B's attributes are thus only 'analogical senses' which fall short of the actual by an enormous gap[7] The Siddhānta Sūtra (iii 2 32), accordingly, shows that B's attributes of jñāna, ānanda etc are the bridge and sustainer of all else, that its glory is beyond measure, that the Jivas stand to it in the same relation as a reflection stands to its original and that for these and other reasons, B's attributes are absolutely different from those of everything that constitutes the world of empirical reality[8] The expression *'unmāna'-(tvam)* in the Sūtra is taken by M to signify *purnatvam* and *'sambandha'* in terms of *bimbapratibimbabhāva* as defined in the Amsādhikarana (ii 3 43-50), especially in Sūtra ii 3 50 The second Sutra adduces other reasons why the knowledge, bliss and other attributes of B are to be recognized as transempirical These reasons are that the bliss and other attributes of the Lord are not open to perception or fully comprehensible to the mind or expressible by words, whereas the attributes of the Jivas are given in perception, are

5 न च सिंहशब्दवत् ब्रह्मशब्दस्य गौणीवृत्ति मात्रयस्य प्रत्यासत्तिमात्रत्वेन शक्तिग्रह प्रवेशाभावात (*STC*)

6 लौकिकवैदिकयोः आनन्दादौ तत्तत्प्रयोगा युज्यन्ते तस्यानुभववेद्यत्वात् शासनाय वात । अन्यथा न प्रयोगो पायाभावात । ज्ञानादि मात्रस्य श्रुत्युक्तवचनात् अलौकिकत्वबुद्धिश्च भवति इति भाव । व्युत्पत्तिश्च लौकिकपद परत्र किंचि मात्रयनैवोपपद्यते (*TP* iii 2 34) See also *AV* iii.2 ver 209-10

7 अलौकिकोऽपि ज्ञानादि तत्तद्रूपेण भण्यते ।
ज्ञानार्थाय लोकस्य यथा राजव दर्शनम् ॥
इति पाद्म (M *BSB* iii 2 34)

8 एष सर्वविधृति । य एष आनन्द परस्य । एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य (*Brh Up*) इति ह्युच्यते श्रुत्व । यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते इत्युमानत्वम । एतस्यैवानन्दस्य अन्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति (*Brh Up* iv 3 32) इति स्वरूप

अप्रज्ञानं तु जीवानामप्रज्ञानं परस्य च ।
नित्यानन्दस्य पूर्णं परज्ञानं विधीयते ॥
इति भव (ibid)

comprehensible to the mind, expressible by words and describable in their distinctiveness This is not possible in regard to B's attributes which goes to prove their transempirical character[9] Taking his clue from J's explanation of the term *avyavahāryam* in the Śruti quoted by M under this Sūtra, and from the *AV* and *NS*, Satyanātha *throws clear light on what precisely is the nature of disparity (vailaksanya) between the transempirical attributes of Jnāna* ānanda etc of B and the empirical attributes of jnāna, ānanda, etc —*which is the issue before the Sūtra Paramatas setūnmāna**** Following M and J, Satyanātha explains that the said distinctiveness *vailaksanyam* of B's attribute from the empirical ones lies in this that while B's *ānanda* is also of the essence of its knowledge and its knowledge similarly is of the essence of its ānanda, it is not so at the empirical level of the attributes of Jīvas which do not partake of one another's nature[10] This has been stated by M himself

ते चाखिलविलक्षणा । सर्वे सर्वगुणात्मान (*AV* iii 2 adhi 16)

and explained by J आनन्दोऽपि ज्ञानात्मको ज्ञानमप्यानन्दात्मकमित्यादि । नह्येवमन्त:-करणपरिणामभेदा सुखादय (*NS* p 523)

Tho' participating in one another's nature and essence, the distinction of reference among these attributes of B is rendered possible thro' the presence of Viseṣas This way of explaining the transempiricality of B's attributes *(lokavailaksanyam) gives a new dimension to the problem* discussed and a deeper insight into Divine mystery

The STC raises the interesting question here as to how far it will be justifiable to hold that words referring to B's attributes are all of them transempirical

अलौकिकास्तस्य शब्दास्तथार्था

अलौकिको ह्येष विष्णु परत्वात् । (Q M *NV* iii 2 adh 16)

in the face of the Lokavedādhikarana of the Purva-Mimāmsā It answers that without entering into the larger question whether words used in the Śrutis with special reference to B and its attributes are to be invested with a transempirical status and meanings, the Lokavedadhikarana

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9 दर्शनादेव चान्यानन्दादीनाम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमव्यपदेश्य सुख ज्ञानमोजो बलम इति ब्रह्मण ** इति कौण्डिन्यश्रुति (*M BSB* iii 2 33)
व्यवहारो वाचा व्यपदेशो विविक्ततया निरूपणम (*TP* iii 2 33)

10 Read ननु कदलीफलजन्यानन्दस्यानन्दशब्दवाच्यत्वेऽपि बदरीफलजन्यानन्दवैलक्षण्यवत, ईश्वरानन्दस्याप्यानन्दशब्दवाच्यत्वेऽपि लौकिकानन्दवैलक्षण्यसंभवेनाप्रयोजकत्वादिति चेन्न । आनन्दस्य ज्ञानाद्यात्मकत्व ज्ञानादेश्चानन्दाद्यात्मकत्व च नास्तीत्ययस्य साध्यतया इह (पूर्वपक्ष) विवक्षितत्वात (*AC* iii 2 32)
Also विलक्षणत्वमवेति ज्ञानाद्यात्मकतया यथ (*ibid*)
श्रौतव्यवहारानुसारेण भगवदानन्दस्यापि अनुकूलवेद्यत्वेऽवगते प्रमाणान्तरवशाच्च तस्य ज्ञानाद्यात्मकत्वेऽवगते लौकिकानन्दवैलक्षण्य प्रतिपद्य * * * (*ibid*)
विशेषसद्भावादपर्यायत्व चेति (*ibid*)

confines itself to establishing that within the empirical domain words used in the Vedas are, as far as possible, to be taken in the senses which are habitually associated with them The principle of Samākarṣa (*vide* B S 1 4.16, Vol I, pp 296 7) will adequately explain how words bearing *alaukika* senses come to be associated with laukika meanings *STC* cites several examples of words recognizedly associated with different patterns of meanings [11]

The concluding Sūtra explains with a suitable analogy (*pādavat*) how words in empirical usage like 'ānanda', which refer to empirical bliss as we all know it, can be applied to the transempirical bliss of B The analogy is explained according to M as follows The Śruti mentions three Svarūpāṁśas of B, viz Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva and Vaikuṇṭha, present in the three heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa, Anantāsana and Vaikuṇṭha as the three feet of B planted in those regions Tho' not of the same status as these three forms, the community of Jīvas as a whole is also referred to in the same Śruti by the same word 'pāda'—'All these beings are His foot' The point here is that the same word pāda is used in connection with both the Svarūpāṁśas and Bhinnāṁśas (viz Jivas)—notwithstanding the vast difference in their status The reason for referring to the Jivas as a "Pāda"[12] of B is to make known (budhyartham— bodhanārtham) the fact that the Jivas are (Bhinna)—'aṁśas' of B—tho' not in the same sense as the three Svarūpāṁśas in the three heavenly regions In the same way, the term ānanda, which in empirical usage denotes only limited bliss (laukikānanda) which is terminable and liable to be excelled, should be understood to be used to denote the highest form of transempirical bliss of B which is beginningless and eternal and unexcelled and unexcellable, in order to convey some idea of its nature in terms of its being a desirable value of life (anukūlavedya) raised to the power of n Vādirāja cautions us that it should be noted that the analogy of 'Pāda' does not run on all fours For while the term Pāda, which signifies a limb of the body as applied in the Śruti to the community of Jivas, is figurative (gauṇa), the term ānanda applied to B's attribute of bliss represents the highest plenary sense (*paramamukhyārtha*) of the word viz *nirupadhinirayadhikapremāspada* or being the most desirable and desired value of life for its own sake and one that is unlimited [13]

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11 See also *TC* 1 4 pp 787 99

12 Macdonell renders '*Pada*' here in this Sūkta (RV x 90 3) as "a fourth" or quarter

13 'वृद्धयप पादवत्' इति सौत्रदृष्टान्तार्थः पादविलक्षणेऽपि जीवसमुदाये अभ्यवत्तानाय यथा पादशब्दप्रयोगः, तथा लौकिकानन्दविलक्षणेऽपि भगवदानन्दे आनन्दशब्दप्रयोग इत्येतावदेव निदर्शनं, न तु सर्वसाम्येन। जीवसमुदाये पादशब्दस्य गौणत्वात्। आनन्दादिशब्दानां भगवदानन्दादौ निरुपाधिनिरवधिकप्रेमास्पदत्वाभिप्रायेण परममुख्यत्वस्याभ्युपगतत्वात् (*TPG* iii 2 34)

CHAPTER XVIII

VARIATIONS IN INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES OF JĪVAS EXPLAINED WITHOUT ENTAILING VARIATIONS IN BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES

17. *Sthānaviśeṣādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.35-36)

The transempirical (*alaukika*) character of B.'s attributes of knowledge, bliss etc. has been established in the preceding adhi. on the basis, among others, of Bimbapratibimbabhāva between the infinite bliss, knowledge and other properties of B. and the limited bliss, knowledge, etc. of the Jīvas, on the authority of Śrutis like *Etasyaivānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.32). The present adhi. arises by way of answering an objection to the said Bimbapratibimbabhāva relation.[1] With the disposal of the objection, the alaukika character of B.'s attributes becomes firmly established and the way for the highest form of Bhakti towards a Being possessed of such transempirical attributes is cleared of all difficulties.

Pūrvapakṣa

The objection is : Bliss and other attributes of selves cannot possibly be the reflections (*pratibimba*), in the sense defined, of the corresponding attributes of B. For, the former vary in range and intensity from one soul to another and disclose differences of degree and complexion. They cannot, therefore, be accepted as reflections of the same source. In that case, their obvious variations cannot be explained without recognizing corresponding variations in their source or Bimba as well.

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1. अत्र प्रागुक्तबिम्बत्वहेतुकालौकिकत्वस्येह आक्षेपेण शंकोदयात सगति· (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)

That would necessitate the acceptance of internal differences and variations within the being of the original source or Bimba forms themselves And that will act as a damper to the highest form of devotion. For a Being which is subject to such variations in the nature of its intrinsic attributes cannot evoke the kind of devotion that has been expected of the Seeker[2] This objection cannot be covered by the answer given in the Adrṣṭāniyamādhi (ii 3 51), for variations in the intrinsic properties of knowledge, bliss, etc of Jivas who have been existing from beginningless time, cannot be explained on the basis of a principle like their adṛṣta which has a beginning in time In view of this difficulty, we cannot allow that B's attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc are *alaukika* or transempirical in their character There is thus no need to cultivate Bhakti towards such a Being[3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta postulates that the variations among the attributes of Jivas as Pratibimbas of B do not necessarily entail similar variations in the corresponding attributes of B which is their Bimba They can be explained on the basis of the special character of the place, receptacle or reflecting surface (*sthānaviseṣa*) or on the basis of the extraordinary power of the Bimba itself To explain, the Sun's rays reflected thro' a sunstone produces combustion while the Sun's reflection in water or in a mirror does not do so In the same way, the variations in the bliss and other attributes of Brhamā and other selves can be understood to be reflections of B's attributes, which are invariable,—the variations of the former being due to their own specific natures[4]

The next Sutra adduces another reason that such variations may be caused by the extraordinary power of the Bimba itself Explaining this reason which is indicated by the word *upapatteh* J[5] points out that besides the special character of the receptacle or the reflecting surface, the special power of the Bimba also is to be taken into account in explaining the variations in the nature of the reflections If the former alone should determine the nature of the reflection it should be pos-

2. [illegible] मिथो वैचित्र्य[illegible] । मिथो विचित्राणामपि [illegible] वैचित्र्यं स्यात् । [illegible] (*TP* iii 2 35)

3. न [illegible] वैचित्र्यम् । [illegible] । [illegible] (TP iii 2 35)
On this see fn. 10,

4 ([illegible]) [illegible] (M. *BSB* iii 2 35)

5 [illegible] । न [illegible] किन्तु [illegible] । वैचित्र्य [illegible] (*TDP* iii 2 36)

sible for the face reflected in the mirror to emit heat and fire.[6] We cannot on this account confine the power to produce variations in the nature of the reflections to the power of the Bimba alone and withhold it from the special character of the receptacle or reflecting surface. The power of Bimba is constant everywhere. The power of the receptacle or reflecting surface is not so. Hence both these factors are to be pressed into service in trying to account for the variations according to the needs of each case. Both the Sūtras have thus their own purposes to serve, in providing an answer to the problem at issue.[7]

As pointed out by the *TC* (See vol. II p. 296) and by Rāghavendra Tīrtha in his *TPB* here, this *adhi.* is *not* rendered superfluous by the Adṛṣṭādhi. (ii.3.51-53). The latter disposes of the objection that the multiplicity of Jīvas who vary so much in their essential characteristics cannot be put down as Pratibimbas of B. which is uniformly the same as Bimba, in regard to all the Pratibimbas. The theme of the present adhi. is different—that in spite of qualitative and quantitative variations in the bliss and other attributes of the Pratibimbas, there are no such variations at all in the attributes of the Bimba which are consant and uniform throughout.[8]

Rāghavendra points out that notwithstanding the acceptance in the Adṛṣṭādhi. of these 'adṛṣṭas' of Jīvas as their 'anādisvarūpopādhis', which have no beginning in time,[9] the Purvapaksa holds that even with such beginningless adṛṣṭas and their variations from one soul to another corresponding variations in the attributes of the Bimba (B) will have to be recognized.

He clarifies that the reference in the *TP* to the adṛṣṭas having a beginning is from the point of view of particular adṛṣṭas which have a beginning, while the entire series is without a beginning.[10]

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6 सूर्यकान्तादिगतसूर्यकादेर्वैचित्र्येऽपि विम्बसामर्थ्यस्याप्युपयोगदर्शनात्। स्थानगुणस्यैव निमित्तत्वे मुखप्रतिविम्बस्यापि तद्गतस्याग्निजनकत्वप्रसगात् (*TP.* iii 2 36)

7. न च तर्हि विम्बसामर्थ्यमेवोपयोगीति वाच्यम्। तस्य सर्वत्र साम्यात्। अतो युक्त सूत्रद्वयमपि (*ibid*)

8 नादृष्टानियमादित्यनेन पौनरुक्त्यम्। तत्र विचित्रब्रह्मादिजीवानामेकरूपब्रह्मप्रतिविम्बत्वायोगादिति शङ्काया एव निरासात्। यथोक्त न्यायविवरणे–'न च वैचित्र्यमनाभासत्वे कारणम्' इति। अत्र तु, न च ब्रह्माद्यानन्दवैचित्र्येऽपि बिम्बभूतविष्ण्वानन्दवैचित्र्यमिति। उक्त च चन्द्रिकायामेवमेवापौनरुक्त्यमदृष्टानियमादित्यत्र
– (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 2 35)

9. Cf. स्वरूपोपाधिवैचित्र्यस्यैव अदृष्टानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात् (Ragh. *TPB* ii 3 53)

10 यद्यप्यदृष्टादेरनादित्वमप्यस्ति, उक्त च भाष्ये–'अनादिविद्याकर्मवैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यम्' इति। तथाप्युक्त दिशानाद्यदृष्टवैचित्र्यसिद्धब्रह्माद्यानन्दवैचित्र्येण बिम्बानन्दवैचित्र्यापादन एव तात्पर्यम्। अदृष्टादेरादिमत्त्वोक्तिरप्यदृष्टव्यक्त्यपेक्षयेति ध्येयम् (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 2 35)

CHAPTER XIX

BRAHMAN TRANSCENDS EVEN THE FORM SEEN IN MEDITATION

18. *Tathānyatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.37)

This adhi. reaffirms that B. is by nature unmanifest (*avyakta*) by disarming an objection that it must be open to manifestation by human effort in so far as it is perceived in meditation. This contention is refuted by showing that what the Upāsaka perceives in his meditation is *not* the actual substance, form and lineaments of B. but only his own mental construct of them. This presentation is an image of the original and not of the original (Bimba) form of B. as such. This leaves the unmanifest nature (*avyaktatva*) of B. intact.[1]

The word 'tathā' in the Sūtra requires the extension (*atideśa*) of the principle of interpretation of the previous *adhi.* to the question raised here. Accordingly, the Sūtra comes to mean that just as the knowledge, bliss and other attributes of B. are quite different from those of the Jīvātman's which have only a limited capacity and are subject to intrinsic variations, even so the form of B. perceived in meditation is quite different from and other than the actual substance of B.—being but a mental construct of the Upāsaka.[2]

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1. प्रकृतमप्यव्यक्तमेव ध्यानदृष्टावव्यक्तत्वोक्त्या समर्थितं इत्यतो न पौनरुक्त्यम् (Ragh. *TPB.* iii.2 35)
2. यथा जीवानन्दादेरन्यत् ब्रह्म, तथोपास्याकारादि (M. *BSB.* iii 2 37).

' For the full force of the expression *yathā* and *tathā* in the Bhāṣya see J.'s comment in the *TP.*

It would follow from the conclusion established in the Paramato'dhi. (iii.2.32-34) that being of an absolutely transempirical nature, the substance, attributes and lineaments of B. can never be brought within the scope of direct empirical perception, even by the most intensive forms of meditation which has to build its image on the foundations of Vāsanās, which may impose their own distortions.[3]

Purvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa, however, contends that B. *must* be recognized to be Vyakta and *not* Avyakta. For, it is going to be established by the Sūtrakāra that it is B. that dispenses the fruits of the deeds of individuals. The Śruti also says B. responds to the manner in which it is meditated upon. If what is perceived and realized thro' such meditation is what is not-Brahman, but a mere mental construct of Vāsanās perceived by the mind, all the trouble taken over such meditation will be futile.[4] It must, therefore, be admitted that what is perceived in meditation is the real form and substance of B. As such perception is attained by the power of individual effort, it means B. is amenable to manifestation and must, therefore, be "Vyakta" in essence and *not* "Avyakta" As such a being can be perceived by individuals thro' the power of upāsanā, there is no need to insist upon Bhakti as the indispensable means of perceiving B.[5]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that Dhyāna is essentially an act of constant dwelling of the mind upon a thought-content centering on B. by objectifying the settled impressions (vāsanās) regarding the nature and attributes of B. derived from the patient study and reflection of Śāstrārtha.[6] It has, however, been made clear in the Paramatodhikaraṇa that the attributes of B. are all of them transempirical, beyond measure and stand in the relation of an original Bimba to its reflection towards the attributes of Jīvas. It has also been made clear in the Arūpādhi. (iii.2.14-17) that B.'s nature is non-material, free from all imperfections and endowed with every sublime character of excellence. A being of this nature cannot be reduced to the level of what is objectified in

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3. ध्यानप्रतीतस्याब्रह्मत्वात् । उपासाकृतस्य दुर्लक्षणत्वादिना कारणेन ब्रह्मणस्ततो वैलक्षण्यात् (*TP.* iii.2 37)
4. पूर्वपक्षस्तु–'फलमत' इति वक्ष्यमाणदिशा ब्रह्मण एव फलप्रदत्वात् 'तं यथा यथोपासते' इत्युपासितस्यैव फलदातृत्वात्, ध्यातस्याब्रह्मत्वे तस्याफलदातृत्वेन ध्यानवैयर्थ्यात्
5 ध्यानकालप्रतीतमेव ब्रह्मेति भक्तिं विनापि पुरुषप्रयत्नेन व्यक्तत्वसंभवात्, न तत्र भक्तिरावश्यकीति (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)
6. श्रवणमननोत्पन्ननिर्णयजन्यवासनामयस्य वस्तुनोऽविच्छिन्नमानसालोचनस्य ध्यानत्वात्, तद्विषयस्य वासनापरिणामत्वात् (अब्रह्मत्वमिति भाव:) (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 2 37)

meditation by Vāsanās. For, Vāsanā-oriented objects of meditation are susceptible to many imperfections and shortcomings, whereas the nature of B. is untouched by defects.[7] It is indeed for this very reason that the Śruti warns us against mistaking the mental construct of B. perceived by the mind in meditation for the real substance of B. and identifying it with it:[8]

Yan manasā na manute yenāhur mano matam
Tad eva brahma tvam viddhi nedam yad idam upāsate.

(*Kena. Up.* i.5)

"That which is not thought of by the mind, but by which the mind itself is known, know that to be B.—*not* the mental construct built up by Vāsanās in meditation but that which, while being inaccessible in its entirety to the mind and speech, yet condescends by its grace to *abide in the mental construct* built up in meditation thro' Vāsanās:

यदिदं वासनामयमुपासते ध्यायति, नेदं वासनामयं ब्रह्म; किंतु, तदेव वाङ्मनोऽगोचरं वासनामयस्थं ब्रह्म विद्धि (Rāgh: *Khaṇḍārtha*)

The wording of the Śūtra "*Tathānyat*[9] *pratiṣedhāt*" clearly underlines this point.

This mental construct of B. in upāsanā stands to the real object of meditation in the relation of a Pratibimba to its original. It is B. *abiding in the Pratibimba* that bestows the fruit (of Aparokṣajñāna) on the Upāsaka thro' its grace as in the case of an ardent worshipper of an image. This disposes of the difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣa regarding the dispensation of fruits, if B. were not directly perceived in meditation.[10]

The Avyaktasvarūpa of B. being thus shown to be unaffected by the facts connected with nature of the object perceived in Dhyāna, the need for the cultivation of Bhakti to secure the grace of B. and thro' such

7. 'अन्यदेव' इत्यादावुक्तदिशा अप्राकृतनिर्दोषसर्वसुलक्षणदिव्यरूपविग्रहस्य हरेः नानादुर्लक्षणयुक्तध्यानप्रतीतवस्तुन्यायोगेन तदन्यत्वावश्यम्भावात् (Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali* iii 2 37)

8. निर्दोषदोषिणोः ब्रह्मोपास्याहृतयोरैक्यानुपपत्तेरेव हि 'नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इति श्रुतिः तस्य ब्रह्मत्वं प्रतिषेधतीति भावः. (TP. iii 2 37)

9. S., R. and others read: *anyapratiṣedhāt* as one word (cpd).

10. पश्यन्ति परमं ब्रह्म चित्ते यत्प्रतिबिम्बितम् ।
ब्रह्मैव प्रतिबिम्बे यदनन्तेषां फलप्रदम् ॥
तदुपासनं च भवति प्रतिमोपासनं यथा ।

grace alone the direct vision (aparokṣa) of B. remains as imperative as ever before.[11]

Replying to a criticism of M. by Appayya Dīkṣita, Rāghavendra has shown in his *TCP* how M.'s position here that what is perceived in Dhyāna is only the mental construct of B. built up by Vāsanās is not in conflict with his other contention that B. must necessarily be primarily expressible and denotable by all the words and descriptions in the Śrutis, before it can become an object of perception thro' Upāsanā. The point is that Vāsanās have to be derived from a prior experience and direct knowledge of the nature and attributes of B. and without direct prior denotative relationship of the words of Śruti with B., it would not be possible to have such knowledge of B. as can be woven into requisite constructs of Vāsanās.[12] Appayya Dīkṣita's criticism has also been refuted by Vijayīndra Tīrtha in his *Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭakoddhāra*.

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11. दृश्यते त्वपरोक्षेण ज्ञानेनैव परं पदम्
उपासना त्वापरोक्ष्य गमयेत् तत्प्रसादत ॥
इति ब्रह्मतर्के (M. *BSB*. iii 2 37)

12. अत्र केनचिदुत्प्रेक्षितो दोषोऽस्माभिश्चन्द्रिकाप्रकाशे वाच्यत्वनये निरस्तो ध्येय (Ragh. *TPB*. iii 2 37)
Read: उपासनाकालेपूपासकचित्ते प्रतीतप्रतिबिम्बरूपात् बिंबभूत ब्रह्मान्यदित्यंगीकारेऽपि सर्वाण्यपि श्रुतिवाक्यानि उपासनापेक्षितब्रह्मगुणसमर्पकाणीति चांगीकारेऽपि ब्रह्मण: सर्वशब्दवाच्यतानपायात्। वासनामयरूपस्य मनसावलोकन ध्यानमिति चित्ते प्रतीतप्रतिबिंबरूपस्य वासनामयत्वोपगमात्, संस्कारापरनामकवासनायाश्चानुभवजन्यत्वात्, औपनिषदस्य मानान्तरागोचरस्य च वस्तुनोऽनुभवस्य वेदादिशास्त्रेणैवोत्पाद्यत्वात् उपासनाकालप्रतीतप्रतिबिंबजनकवासनाहेत्वनुभवोत्पादनायाखिलवेदवाक्यै: ब्रह्मगुणवर्णनात्
(Ragh. *TCP*. 218 b-218)

CHAPTER XX

BRAHMAN THE SOLE AUTHOR OF COSMIC DISPENSATIONS THRO' ALL TIME AND SPACE

19. *Sarvagatatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.38)

This adhi. establishes that B. is the sole independent author of the eightfold dispensation of the Universe, *at all times and places,—without ever relinquishing such independence in favor of any other author or creator.*[1] This question arises for consideration because it may be contended that just as it has been shown that in spite of being 'Avyakta' or unmanifest in essence, B. condescends to become directly perceived by the Upāsaka after Dhyāna, out of its sheer grace, it may likewise, sometimes, choose to *part with its own sole independence of authorship* of the eightfold dispensation of the cosmos in favor of some other being, at some other time or place.[2] It is, therefore, necessary to dispose of this objection in the interest of cultivation of intensive and undivided Bhakti towards the One Supreme B. There is no overlapping between this adhi. and the theme of earlier ones like Tadananyatvam (ii.1.15) Tejo'atah (ii.3.10) and Sa eva ca karmānusmṛti (iii.2.9) as they deal with entirely different topics, concerning the problem of creation and cosmology.

Tho' it has been established in the Janmādhi (i.i.2) itself that B. is the sole and only independent author of the eightfold dispensations

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1. देशकालान्तरेऽप्यतोऽपि सृष्ट्यादिर्यन्नेष्यतो भूते – अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामपगन्धादिभ्य । सर्वदेशकालवस्तुषु अनेनैव सृष्ट्यादिक प्रवर्तते (M. BSB. iii 2 38)
2. एवमप्यवतारेष्वपि हरे: [illegible] कर्हिचित् [illegible] मतिः
(Ragh. *Ny Muktāvalī*)

f the cosmos, a supervening doubt (*adhikāśaṅkā*) may still arise in this way: Granted that B. is the author of the eightfold dispensations of *he present cosmos*, there is nothing to show that the same B. had created the worlds that have been in the past or will be the author of the worlds that may be created in the distant future. The statements in the Śrutis "He created all *this* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.6): That from which all *these* beings are born, is B." (*Op. cit.* iii.1) have reference obviously to the *present world-order* and not to those of the past or the future, which may conceivably be the work of some other Being than B. This doubt has to be set at rest in the interest of inculcating intensive Bhakti to the One Supreme B.[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that, for aught we know, at other times and places than the present, the sole authorship of the eight dispensations of the cosmos may freely be passed on by B. to another Being. This is well within the realm of possibilities; for we have accounts in the Purāṇas of the Krishnāvatāra laying aside its original supremacy and acting as a messenger and chariot driver of the Pāṇḍavas, washing the feet of Brahmins and so on. Moreover, there are sovereign rulers over different parts of the world in different times. In the same way, different parts of the cosmos may be under the dispensation of different authors at different times. There is no need then to cultivate Bhakti solely and intensively towards B.[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that for all time and at all places and with reference to all other things past, present and future, it is B. that is the *sole and only author of the eightfold dispensations of cosmic systems.* Any other assumption to the contrary is opposed to the Śrutis and is unsupported by definite proofs.[5] Vain suppositions to the contrary will not alter the facts[6] Even in the Avatārs, B. does not relin-

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3 'स इद सर्वमसृजत' इत्यादीनामिदशब्दश्रवणेन वर्तमानकालीनजगत्कारणत्वपरत्वस्यैवोचितत्वात् कालान्तरे पुनरस्यैव जगत्कारणत्वे मानाभावेन, न कालान्तरीयजगत्कारणत्वमस्येत्यभ्यधिकाशङ्कानिरासेनास्य तस्यैव जगत्कर्तृत्वादिसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसगति (*AC.* iii 2 38)

4 सर्वसृष्ट्यादि न ब्रह्मण एव, किंतु देशकालान्तरेऽन्यतोऽपि, राजादीना तथा दर्शनात् । न च विष्णोरन्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्याभावेन तत : सृष्ट्यादिक्रिया युक्तेति वाच्यम् । भगवतैवान्येभ्य स्वस्वातन्त्र्यदानेनोपपत्ते । न चैतदसभावितम् तस्यावतारेषु विविधासभावितलीलादर्शनात् । अतोऽन्येषामपि स्वातन्त्र्यात् न विष्णावेव निरतिशयभक्तिर्युक्तेति भाव (*TP.* iii 2 38)

5 भगवतैव सर्वदेशकालीनसृष्ट्यादि, न तु देशकालान्तरेऽन्यस्य कल्पनीयम् । तथाहि विष्णो सर्वकर्तृत्वादौ प्रमाणाभावादेतत् कल्प्यते; अन्यत्र प्रमाणसद्भावाद्वा, उत सभावनया? नाद्य, श्रुतिसद्भावात । न द्वितीय, तदभावात् (*TP.* iii 2 38)

6 अप्रमाणिककल्पनस्य क्वाप्यनुपयोगात (*TP.* iii 2 38)

quish its sole sovereignty and independence, while sporting an apparently subordinate role.[7] For all time and space and in respect of everything in the cosmos, it is B. that is the sole and only author and sustainer of the eightfold dispensations. Hence, intensive Bhakti towards such a Being is absolutely necessary to earn its grace.

The expression *anena* ('by it') in the Sūtra read with an implied emphasis (*eva*) draws pointed attention to the fact that all cosmic dispensations, for all time, space and things are *B.'s sole prerogative.* The compound *Sarvagatatvamāyāmayaśabdebhyaḥ* embodies the probans on the basis of which the sole authorship of the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos for all time and space is predicated of B. As J. points out, the probans of 'Sarvagatatva' or B.'s immanence in all things indicates that it is by virtue of such immanence that the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos take place. This may be seen from the significant statement of the Śruti:

Anena (eva) Jīvenātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākarot
(*Chān. Up.* vi.3.2)[9]

The term 'māyāmayaśabda' in the Sūtra is to be understood to refer to the Śruti texts which interpret the epithet 'māyāmaya' found applied to B.,[10] in terms of "the One being which brings about the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos in all places and at all times and of all things, by its own eternal will or power known as Māyā. It is the essence of its being and, therefore, B. is referred to as 'māyāmaya'.[11]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

(*Parādhikaraṇam* iii.2.31-37)

According to S., this adhi. establishes that *nothing else exists beyond and besides B.* This is done by showing that statements and expres-

7. अवतारेष्वपि–
स्वातन्त्र्यात् क्रीडते विष्णुर्न हि स्वातन्त्र्यमन्यगम् ।
करोति क्वापि * * * ।।
इत्यादेरप्यवनस्वातन्त्र्यस्यैव क्रीडात्वगमात् (*ibid*)

8 S., R. and others read: '*Sarvagatatvam āyāmaśabdādibhyah.*'

9. सर्वगतत्वं च ब्रह्मणः सर्वस्रष्टृत्वाद्यर्थमेव । 'अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरोत्' इत्यादेः (*TP.* iii 2 38)

10 'मायामयशब्द' मायामयशब्द व्याख्यातो श्रुति. (*TP.* iii 2 38)

11 The Śruti cited in this connection in M.'s bhāṣya is:
सर्वत्र सर्वमेतस्मात् सर्वदा सर्ववस्तुषु ।
स्वरूपभूतया नित्यशक्त्या मायाख्यया युतः ।
अतो मायामयं विष्णुं प्रवदन्ति सनातनम् ।। (*Caturvedaśikhā*)

sions used in the Śrutis apparently implying the existence of something else besides B are to be regarded as purely metaphorical[12]

The Pūrvapakṣa is drawn from a number of texts which presuppose the existence of some entities besides B as when they speak of B as a bank, as having a size, being connected with something else and as being differentiated from some others To begin with, the *Chān Up* (viii 4 1) describes B as a bank or a boundary which checks the flow of water or demarcates the territory beyond Another passage ascribes size to B as having four feet, eight hoofs and sixteen parts Wherever there is an object with a definite size there is something else different from it which limits it We read of the individual self being united with the Sat (*Chān Up* vi 8 1) in Suṣupti and its being embraced by the Prājña in deep sleep (*Bṛh Up* iv 3 21) This shows there is another entity besides B

The Pūrvapakṣa summed up in the opening Sūtra is *refuted in the subsequent Sūtras* B is called a bank not because there is something beyond it, as in the case of a bank, but only on account of similarity. Just as a bank keeps back the water, B *maintains the world and its values intact*[12a] It is depicted as having size for the sake of Upāsanā The statements about connection with others and difference from others are due to the operation of upādhis or limiting adjuncts Sūtra 35 offers reasons to show that the connection of Jīva with B in deep sleep is *not real*. The merger of the Jiva in B shows that it is a natural connection or inherent identity and not a *connection* between two different beings Sūtra 36 points out that denial of all other things besides B is writ large on the scriptures Sūtra 37 concludes By this is established the all-pervading nature of B as can be seen from the Śrutis to the effect that B is without a second If the texts describing B as a bank etc are taken literally, B would cease to be all-pervasive and unlimited. But that it is so is established by texts such as "He is omnipresent like ether and eternal"[13]

Criticism

The inquiry opened here whether there exists any entity or reality in addition to B is *unnecessary and superfluous*, as it has already been

12. यदेतन्निरस्तसमस्तप्रपच ब्रह्म निर्धारित, अस्मात परमन्यत तत्त्वमस्ति नास्तीति श्रुतिविप्रतिपत्ते सशय । तेषा परिहारमभिधातुमयमुपक्रम (S *BSB* iii 2 31)

12a जगत त मर्यादाना च विधारकत्व सेतुसामान्यमात्मन । अत सेतुरिव सेतुरिति प्रकृत आत्मा स्तूयत (S *BSB* iii 2 32)

13 सेत्वादिव्यपदेशनिराकरणेनान्यप्रतिषेधसमाश्रयणेन च सर्वगतत्वमप्यात्मन सिद्ध भवति। अन्यथा हि तन्न सिध्येत । अन्यप्रतिषेधेऽप्यसति वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरात व्यावर्तत इति परिच्छेद एवात्मन प्रसज्येत (S *BSB* iii 2 37)

well-established in the Tadananyatvādhi (ii.1 14-20) and in Pakṛtaitāvatvādhi (iii 2 22-30) on the basis of a multitude of texts that *there is no such thing as a real world besides or beyond B.* The Pūrvapakṣa resting on the description of B as a bank has been given a decent burial under the Dyubhvādyadhi (i.3.1-7) and there is no point in reviving it here

Recognizing that in the Dyubhvādyadhi B's description as a 'Setu' has not been taken in its conventional sense in both the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta position, the *Kalpataru* has wisely refrained from pressing forward with the Pūrvapakṣa based upon it in the present *adhi.* S's attempt to proceed with the Pūrvapakṣa by adopting the primary sense of the term Setu, here, is thus a clear case of inconsistency.[14]

When the existence of the world of external reality expressly recognized in the Śrutis in terms of *mūrta* and *amūrta* has already been negated, according to S, *in the preceding adhi*, there is hardly any need to devote *one more adhi again to negate the same world,* by making out its existence in a roundabout way, thro' the implications of *setu, unmāna, sambandha, bheda* and other data Such a negation is also without proper logical sequence of thought and connection with the preceding *adhi* It cannot be said in defence that just as in the previous *adhi* it was demonstrated that there cannot be any negation of B whose existence is given by the Śrutis, the subject matter of this *adhi.* may be said to arise by way of refutation of a similar stand that it will not be permissible to negate the world whose existence is likewise given to us by the same Śrutis But, then, while it will not be permissible to attempt to negate B which is *not given by or open to any other source of knowledge except the Śruti*—on the strength of Śrutis themselves, there will be *no such inconsistency in attempting to negate the world given by other sources of knowledge* such as perception and inference, on the strength of Śrutis The opening of the present *adhi* cannot, therefore, be justified by stretching the point of objection of the previous *adhi* to apply to this one also

We are unable to see how it benefits S to hold that the reference to B as a bank is to be understood only on the basis of similarity to the extent that B "maintains the world and its values" *How can B do so unless there is a real world with its values, given and granted as existing?* His explanation of the ascriptions of size as meant purely for purposes of meditation and not to be taken as true state-

14 न च द्युभ्वाद्यधिकरणे सेतुत्वस्य पूर्वपक्षेऽप्यमुख्यार्थत्वात् विचारणीयमत्र आश्रितं । इह तु मानत्वभेदसम्बन्धानां मुख्यार्थमाश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षोऽस्मिन् । अतस्तस्य समाधानाय पुनरारम्भ इति वाच्यम्, सेतुत्वस्यान्यत्र पूर्वपक्षानुत्थानासम्भवात् । (*STC* iii 2 28)

ments has already been shown to be repugnant to the true spirit of Upāsanā, which is inconsistent with superimposition.[15] Where difference and connection between Jīva and B. can be explained on the basis of natural distinction, it is not permissible to introduce the theory of difference thro' upādhis as S. has done, under Sūtra 34. His interpretation of Sūtra 35, that the union of the individual self with B. in Suṣupti, being one of their essential nature (*svarūpasambandha*), negates their difference, is in clear conflict with what the Sūtrakāra himself has said on the point in *Suṣuptyukrāntyor bhedena* (i.3.42 *even* as interpreted by S. himself:

एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूम :– सुषुप्तावुत्क्रान्तौ च शारीरात् भेदेन परमेश्वरस्य व्यपदेशात्
(S. *BSB.* 1.3.42)

Advertising to the text: "He is gone to his self" (*Chān. Up.* vi.8.1) S. renders the words *upapatteśca* (B.S. iii.2.35) to mean "because *only such a connection is possible* between Jīva and B. *as rests on upādhis*,[16] as envisaged in Sūtra 34. This comparison is *not in order* as the union pre-supposed by *Svam apīto bhavati* is not based on upādhis but on essential nature, according to S. Even if the words are intended to draw a constrast between the two cases, the difficulty would persist as S.'s philosophy does not admit any Svarūpasambandha as such and all relation is superimposed (*ādhyāsika*).

The interpretation of Sūtra 36 as denying all other existences but B. involves redundancy as this point has already been made in *Prakṛtaitāvattvam pratiṣedhati* (iii.2.22). The expression *tathā* at the beginning of this Sūtra is unnecessary from S.'s point of view, as the desired sense can be expressed without it. It cannot be understood in a conjunctive sense as the preceding Sūtra carries no distinct statement of *facts* which can be combined with it. It would be far from happy to try to combine the denial with a criticism of the Pūrvapakṣa position in 35.

S. has attempted to interpret Sūtra 37 in such a way as to establish B.'s omnipresence (*sarvagatatva*) by denying the existence of any other entity besides B. This misses the point that omnipresence is presence in all things or pervasion over all other things. In the absence of things to be pervaded, there can be no talk of 'pervasion'. Pervasion thus involves difference between the pervader and the pervaded.

15. See Vol. I, p. 142. Also under BS. IV.1 4.
16. तथा भेदव्यपदेशोऽपि ब्रह्मण उपाधिभेदापेक्षयोपचर्यते, न स्वरूपभेदापेक्षया । (S. *BSB.* iii.2 34)
उपपद्यते चायमीदृश एव सबन्धो नान्यादृशः स्वमपीतो भवतीति हि स्वरूपसंबन्धमेनमामनन्ति ।
(S. *BSB.* iii 2 35)

It does not exclude the pervaded The way in which S interprets the wording of Sūtra 37 as putting forward two distinct propositions (1) by this demonstration B's omnipresence is established (अनेन सर्वगतत्वं सिद्ध भवति) and (2) That the self is omnipresent follows from the texts which proclaim its pervasion (सर्वगतत्वं चायामशब्दादिभ्योऽभिज्ञायते) leads to a 'Vākyabheda' and requires the importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the additional expression '*tacca*' to combine the two predications

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this adhi discusses if there is any being *higher than* B The Siddhānta is that there is no such being and that the highest B is absolutely Supreme [17]

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that there must be some entity higher than B For one of the texts describes B as a bank or a bridge (*setu*) A bridge enables us to reach the other bank So there must be something other than B to be reached Another text says the bridge is to be crossed This implies that there must be something more important than B to be reached by such crossing Other texts describe B as measured or limited in having four quarters, sixteen parts, etc This presumes the existence of something else that is unlimited, to be reached thro' that bridge While a bridge is a means to reaching the thing connected with the bridge, it is not the means of reaching itself What is reached must be different Other texts refer to a Being beyond the highest (*parāt param*) to be something different (*Mund Up* ii 2 8) These arguments are refuted in the subsequent Sūtras (31-36)

Criticism

It will be remembered that R has interpreted the Sūtra Prakṛtaitāvattvam * * (iii 2 21) as part of the Ubhayalingādhi (iii 2 11-25) and as refuting an interim objection that the Śruti text 'Neti neti' negatives the previously mentioned *mūrta* and *amūrta* forms of B thereby leaving B as nothing but pure being (*sanmātram*) This is followed by the Ahikuṇḍalādhi (iii 2 26-29) which according to R begins an inquiry into the particular mode in which the world of Acit is to be conceived as constituting the form of B [18] However, on R.'s own showing, this is done *after it has been shown in the preceding adhi* that the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of B and that B's nature is

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17 परस्मात् ब्रह्मणोऽपि पर तत्त्व किंचिदस्ति नेति संशय । (R *Vedāntadipa* iii 2 30)
18 तस्याचिद्वस्तुनो ब्रह्मरूपत्वप्रकार इदानीं चिन्त्यते । (*Śrībhaṣya* iii 2 26)

not confined or limited to the two attributes or forms of mūrta and amūrta alone, previously described.[19]

If then, a doubt should arise if there exists any other being higher than this B. such a doubt should have been taken up immediately after *Prakṛtaitāvattvam* (Sūtra 21) and disposed of *before turning* to the question of the particular *mode in which the world of Acit is to be regarded as a form of B.* This makes the interposition of the Ahikuṇḍalādhi. *between* Prakṛtaitāvattvam[20] * * and Paramataḥ unsustainable, in R.'s interpretation. Apart from this R. has admitted under III.2.21 that the Śruti '*Neti neti nahyetasmād iti netyanyat param asti* denies the existence of any Being *higher than B.*:

अयमर्थः—'इति न' इति यत् ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितं, तस्मादेतस्मादन्यत् वस्तु परं न ह्यस्ति। ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् स्वरूपतो गुणतश्च उत्कृष्टं नास्तीत्यर्थः॥

(*Śrībhāṣya* iii.2.21)

That being so, there is hardly any likelihood of a doubt still arising in the mind if there is any being higher than B. It may also be pointed out that B.'s supreme position as the highest conceivable being has been established according to R. in the Akṣarādhi (i.3.9-11) also.

Sensing these difficulties, R. makes a feeble attempt at justifying the opening of this topic, saying that "*the Sūtras now proceed to refute the contention based on some fallacious reasonings,* that there is a Being higher than B.'[21] The scope for fallacious reasonings being practically unlimited, the Sūtrakāra will have to be pursuing them *ad infinitum.* Such a defence does little credit to the Sūtras or their commentator. Nor does the question raised by R. have any appropriate sequence of thought-connection with the theme of the preceding adhi.[22]

R.'s Sūtrārtha Examined

Coming to R.'s arguments in the Pūrvapakṣa, it may be pointed out that the mere mention of a bridge or a bank does not necessarily lead to the presumption of the existence of a higher entity. For, one need not expect correspondence of the 'dārṣṭāntika' with the 'dṛṣṭānta' in all respects. The idea that a bank is competent to contain and hold the flow of the waters does not involve the idea of the presence of a higher entity and does not, therefore, specially favor the Pūrvapakṣa.

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19. अथात आदेशो नेति नेतीति मूर्तामूर्तादिवस्तुरूपतया ब्रह्मण इयत्ता प्रतिषिध्यते। (*ibid*)
20. The *Śrutaprakāśa* wonders why the Sūtra *Prakṛtaitāvattvam* (iii 2 21) has been read as part of the *Ubhayaliṅgādhi.* (*Op. cit.* iii.2 26).
21. ब्रह्मणः परमपि किंचित्तत्त्वमस्तीति कैश्चित् हेत्वाभासैराशंक्य निराक्रियते। (*Śrībhāṣya.* iii 2.30)
22. The *Śrutaprakāśa* too refers only to the *avāntarasaṅgati* of this adhi. but not to any *anantarasaṅgati.*

If the text 'Having crossed the bridge' suggests the existence of something higher to be reached, only that one should have been cited for the Pūrvapakṣa.

The way in which R. restricts the second Sūtra '*Sāmānyāt*' to dispose of the objection based on the reference to the *setu alone* is not proper. The resemblance can be extended to the other cases of measure, connection, etc. also. The probans of sāmānya as used by R. is also inconclusive in that it is not competent to rule out the other characteristics of a setu viz. the existence of some other thing to be attained thro' it from being taken into account.

How the unlimited B. comes to be limited has to be answered on the basis of its *rationale* and *not* by expatiating on the *purpose served by such a description.*

R.'s interpretation of the Sūtra *Upapatteśca* merely removes an obstacle (*bādhaka*) to the description of B. as 'setu' taken on the ground that in the absence of something higher to be attained (thro' the setu) B. cannot be called a bridge. R.'s answer to this objection in the words of the Sūtra 'Upapatteśca' that B. is its own upāya (means) as well as upeya (goal to be attained) does not offer any positive reason that directly establishes the point that there is no being higher than B. to be reached by the bridge. In other words, the Sūtra, as interpreted by R., removes only an impediment; it does not adduce any direct evidence that there is no being higher than B. to be reached, by the bridge. The Sūtra 'Upapatteśca' can be used to find justification for the description of B. as 'Setu' even in the absence of something higher than B. being accepted, only *after* suitable answers have been given to the objections based on 'sambandha' and 'bhedavyapadeśa' and *not before.*

As the purpose of Sūtra 35 is to disprove the contention that there is some other being higher than B., according to R., top priority must be given to that task in the wording of the Sūtra. The precedence given to '*tathā*' as a conjunctive, at the head of the Sūtra, to conjoin other texts of similar import from other sources, is *not*, therefore, quite proper. That purpose can be served by substituting a 'ca' at the end. (*anyapratiṣedhācca*). This precedence to 'tathā' is an indication that the real purpose and import of the Sūtra as a whole are possibly different from what R. has made out. As the Śruti 'Nahyetasmād iti netyanyat param asti' has already been cited and taken into account in the Sūtra *Prakṛtaitāvattvam pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ* (iii.2.21) according to R.'s own Bhāṣya, to refute the existence of any Being other than B and as the possibility of the existence of such a Being can be

ruled out by bringing the matter under the purview of the previous Sūtra 'Upapatteśca', the Sūtra: *Tathā anyapratiṣedhāt*' turns out to be superfluous in R.'s interpretation.

The last Sūtra: *Anena sarvagatatvam āyāmaśabdādibhyaḥ*, emphasizing B.'s omnipresence in view of the declaration of its extent (*āyāma*), in the Śrutis, according to R.'s interpretation, is also superfluous. We may ask: What is the purpose of the Sūtra? If it is intended to furnish additional supporting evidence (*sādhakāntara*) to establish that there is no other Being higher than B., we should expect to find a conjunctive particle *ca* in the Sūtra to link it with the earlier evidences. If its purpose is to indicate another counter-evidence (*bādhakapramāṇa*) to the effect that if any such Being had been recognized in the Śrutis they would be proclaiming the omnipresence of *that other Being* and *not of B.* we should expect a conjunctive '*ca*' to combine this counter evidence with the earlier ones. The syntactic connection and juxtaposition of 'anena' and 'sarvagatatvam' where 'anena' refers to B. as the agent in the act of pervasion (*sarvagatatvam*) is grammatically faulty, as the rules would require the genitive form '*asya*' here in place of '*anena*'. The construction of the words *anena sarvagatattvam* adopted by R. is not, therefore, in order.

CHAPTER XXI

BRAHMAN IS THE BESTOWER OF FRUITS OF ALL KARMAS

20. *Phaladānādhikaraṇam* (iii.2.39-42)

In the interests of the cultivation of intensive Bhakti towards B., this adhi. brings out the greatness of B. as the supremely independent bestower of the fruits of their karma on the Jīvas.[1] The term fruits of karma, as used in this adhi., has to be understood in its widest and most comprehensive sense embracing fruits of works of every description in the work a day world, such as good or bad deeds done in the religious, ethical and spiritual spheres for the attainment of heaven and hell not to speak of the fruits of karmakṣaya, utkrānti, mārga and bhoga in the case of those eligible for Mokṣa.[2] Thus, in the last analysis, it denotes the fruits of works in accordance with the Anādisvarūpayogyatā of all Jīvas.

The adhi. arises by way of an 'ākṣepa' against the conclusion established in the previous adhi., that B. is the sole author of all the eight dispensations of the cosmos for all time and space and in respect of every animate and inanimate thing in the world. The objection is that B. cannot be the sole author of the eightfold dispensations of the world, if it is not the sole bestower of the fruits of karma on the Jīvas.[3] Accord-

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनभक्त्यर्थं तस्य कर्मफलदातृत्वसमर्थनादस्य शास्त्रादिसंगतिः । (*TP.* iii 2 39)
2. This point has been well brought out in the *STC:*
अत्र कर्मफलदातृत्वसमर्थनादिति टीका तु स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेन प्रवृत्ता, न तन्मात्रपरा । अन्यथा, सूत्रे सामान्योक्ति' स्वर्गनरकादिकर्मेति मुधा चादिशब्दश्च न स्यात् ध्यानावर्णयोश्च दातृत्वविचिकित्सायामधिकरणान्तरमपि च स्यात् । अत एव 'यदविद् ज्ञानं जनयन् भस्म कुर्यात् स्वेच्छावृत्ति तस्य विष्णोः सदा' इति कर्मदातमपि भागवतेन करोतीति विवरणे सिद्धान्तोक्तिरपि घटते । (*STC.* iii 2 29)
3. (अनेनेति पूर्वसूत्रस्य तस्य) हरेः फलदातृत्वाभावे पूर्वोक्तसर्वदेशकालीनसृष्ट्याद्यष्टककर्तृत्वासंभव इति पूर्वाक्षेपेण प्रवृत्तेरनन्तरसंगतिः । (Ragh. *TPB* iii 2 39)

ingly, the main point to be considered is whether karma by itself is the giver of fruits and B.'s role is subsidiary to it or whether B. plays the leading role and karma only the subordinate one. To decide this, we have to inquire further if the Śruti text—

> *Vijñānam ānandam brahma*
> *Rātir datuḥ parāyaṇam* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.9.28)

which ascribes to B. the bestowal of the fruits of karma, is to be understood in a metaphorical sense,—the leading part being that of karma. To settle this, the inquiry has to be pushed further as to whether the observed concomitance between karma and its fruits, tested by *anvaya* and *vyatireka,* favors the leading role of karma or is consistent with its being subordinated to B. To answer this question we have to find out if there is any evidence to support the leading role of karma in the bestowal of fruits or not.

Tho' karma performed by individuals is to be invested with the power of leading to its natural results in the form of agreeable or disagreeable fruits, there is an important difference between the position of B. and Karma in respect of the bestowal of the fruits (of karma). The difference lies in this that B. is the ever-independent all-knowing manipulator of karma (and its fruits) while karma as an unintelligent principle is subject to its direction. Even the limitations of time and space in the fructification of karmas are not solely governed by it. As God wills it, some karmas bear fruit tardily and some prematurely and some not at all or bear fruit in a different environment. Even the power of karma to bear fruit is not uniform in all cases. We have it on the authority of the Śāstra that the fruits of meritorious karma of a knower of B. outweigh those of one who knows not B. (*Bṛh. Up.* i.4.15). It is also on record that the meritorious deeds performed by those who harbor feelings of hatred towards B. go in vain. The Śrutis also hold that the earlier sins and transgressions of one who has attained Aparokṣajñāna get destroyed while his later ones no longer cling to him. It is also stated that meritorious deeds performed by the Aparokṣajñānin bear 'inexhaustible fruits'.[4] If karma has the absolute power of bestowing fruits, all of it will have to be exhausted by enjoyment, which is impossible as karma is anādi, accumulates and multiplies with each

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life, in geometrical proportion. That is why the Śrutis say that in the case of Muktiyogyas, God freezes much of their unrequited karmas. These facts are sufficient to establish that karma is at all times dependent on B.[5] As for B., it is always free to actuate towards their appropriate karmas not only countless number of souls but the Abhimāni-devatās of their karmas too, or turn them away from particular karmas, as the case may be. Moreover, B. awakens spiritual wisdom in the Jīvas thro' their meritorious acts (*puṇya*) and thro' such wisdom it destroys their sins and grants them grace, whereby they get rid of their sins and the unwanted assets of merits (*aniṣṭapuṇya*) and in the end confers on them the inexhaustible fruits of Mokṣa. Such is the unmatched glory and greatness B. that is lighted up by the present adhi., in the interests of inculcating the need for the cultivation of Bhakti.[6]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Karma has to be given the independent and leading role in meting out its fruits. Even when B. is taken to dispense the fruits, it will have to do so in accordance with karma and not arbitrarily. Otherwise, the performance of karma would lose its meaning. That would affect the validity of the Śruti texts which set great store by the law of "as you sow so you reap",[7] and expose B. to partiality, cruelty and arbitrariness, in the event of its dispensing fruits without reference to the good or bad deeds performed by the souls. The fact also that no fruits accrue to one who does not perform any karma goes to show that karma indeed is the chief dispenser of fruits.[8] This is amply proved by the concomitance between karma and its fruits ascertained by the tests of agreement between karma and its fruits and the absence of fruits in the absence of karma. There is no such proof

5 Read:

क्वचिद् ददाति क्वच नो ददाति न ह्यान्तरात्कर्मणां भोगनाश:
स्वातन्त्र्यं चेत् कर्मणां सर्वभोग: स्यान्न ह्येवं क्वापि तत्केनचित् स्यात् ।
यतो हि स्वेच्छया किंचिदेव फलं कुर्याद्विफलं प्रायशश्च ।
क्वचिज्ज्ञानं जनयन् भस्म कुर्यात्, स्वेच्छावृत्तिस्तस्य विष्णोः सदैव ॥

इति ब्रह्माण्डे । (*M. NV.* iii 2 adh.20)

6. परमस्तु स्वेच्छयैव एकैकस्य एवानन्तकर्मणामनन्तजीवराशीनां तत्तदेकैककर्माभिमानिनां चानन्तकर्मणामितरेषामनन्तानन्तानां तत्तत्कर्म प्रवर्तयति निवर्तयति च । पुण्येन ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य, पापं विनाश्य, तस्य पुण्यपापरहितस्य ज्ञानिन: प्रसन्न: स्वयमेव फलमनन्तं ददातीत्यहो भगवतो नारायणस्याश्चर्यरूपोऽयं महिमा इत्यभिप्राय: ।

(Trivikrama *TD.* iii 2 42)

7. पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयति पापेन पापम् । (*Praina* Up iii 7)

8. कर्मैव फलदातृ नेश्वर: । यत् फलदातृत्वमीश्वरस्य उच्यते, तदपि तस्य कर्मनियत्या फलदातृत्वस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यत्वात् अन्यथा तत्कर्मवैयर्थ्यापातात्, वेदाप्रामाण्यापातात्, वैषम्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात्, अकृतकर्मणः फलादर्शनाच्च ।

(*TP.* iii 2 39)

of 'anvayavyatireka' in favor of holding B. to be the bestower of fruits; for fruits are concomitant only with the execution of deeds. Consistent with this, we have to explain that the Śruti text 'Rātir dātuḥ' which describes B. as the bestower of fruits (on the sacrificer) in a relative sense, as the one which causes or impels the Jīvas to do the good or the bad deeds as stated in the Kauṣ. Up. (iii.8).[9] The Pūrvapakṣa also holds that Ācārya Jaimini endorses the same view that karma and *not* B. is the bestower of fruits.[10]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that the fruits of karma are bestowed only by B. as it is perfectly competent to do so, being a sentient and independent Being, whereas karma is a dependent and an insentient principle.

There is no reason, therefore, to dilute the sense of the Śruti *'Rātir dātuḥ'* and make B. the bestower of fruits in a relative sense, as the cause which impels Jīvas to a course of action: *Eṣa hyeva sādhu karma kārayati.* The point is this: While it is established by anvayavayatirekavyāpti that karma generates its fruits, we have also to defer to the statement of the Śruti that B. is the bestower of these fruits. There is no need to explain away the Śruti in a relative sense as there is no obstacle to admitting B.'s leading role in view of its being an independent and sentient Being. The objection that this will involve excessive gravity of assumption (*kalpanāgaurava*) is not valid. For, such gravity is a flaw only where the point under discussion is *not* established by valid pramāṇas. In the present case, B.'s role in the bestowal of karma is established by the Śruti. There is no need to fear that the admission of both B. and Karma as causes in respect of the fruits will place them on an equal footing (*samapradhānabhāva*). For, as the independent and intelligent being, B. will be the free agent (*kartṛ*) in the act of bestowal of fruits and karma as an unintelligent principle will be the means or channel (*karaṇa*) of such bestowal. The anvayavyatireka holds good even for the karaṇa. The Śruti *Puṇyena puṇyam nayati* clearly assigns the role of direct agency to B. and that of being the means or instrument in the act (*nimittam or karaṇam*) to the deeds. And it is an accepted principle that an instrument is operable by the agent.[11]

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9 कर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकात् फलस्य ईश्वर फलदातेति प्रलोभमात्रम् । (*NV*)

10 न केवल कर्मण. फलदातृत्व न्यायप्राप्त, किं नाम जैमिनिराचार्योऽपि मन्यत इति । (*TP.* iii 2 41)

11 कर्मैव फलदमीश्वरे तूपचार इत्युक्तमयुक्तम् । किंतु कर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वात् फलस्य श्रुतिबलादेव ईश्वरकर्म-णोरुभयोरपि तत्कारणत्वम् । तत्रापि नोभयो. समप्रधानभाव. । किंतु फलदानक्रियायामेवं कर्तृ, अन्यत् करणम् तत्रापि न कर्म कर्तृ सत् कारणमीश्वर प्रयोजयति, किं नाम, फलदाने पूर्वोक्त ब्रह्मैव कर्तृ, करणभूतं कर्म प्रवर्तयति करणत्वेऽपि कर्मणोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाविरोधात् चेतनस्य कर्तृत्वमचेतनस्य करणत्वमिति लोके दर्शनात् । पुण्येनेति श्रुत्या ब्रह्मण. कर्तृत्वव्यपदेशात् कर्मण करणत्वव्यपदेशाच्चेति भगवान् बादरायणो मन्यत इति भाव । (*TP.* iii 2 42)

It may still be felt that in so far as B has to depend on karma in the bestowal of fruits, its independence is not unqualified and hence there will be no compelling reason to cultivate intensive Bhakti towards such a B The Sūtra *Pūrvam tu* * * (iii 2 42) is, therefore, explained by M in his *AV* as offering the proper answer to this ticklish point This is shown to be achieved by bringing out the special significance of the particle *tu* in the Sūtra as indicating the role of B as the free intelligent agent (*kartṛ*) in the bestowal of fruits and of karma as the instrument thereof and carrying sense of emphasis (*sāvadhāraṇā pratijñā*)[12] M accordingly explains that the Supreme B, of its own free will, impels a part of the accumulated karmas of individuals to bear fruit[13] This does not mean B is powerless to bestow fruits without their instrumentality or that they compel B to make use of them as such nimitta or instrument They have no such power

स एवाशेषजीवस्थनिसत्ख्यानादिकालिकान् ।
धर्माधर्मान् सदा पश्यन् स्वेच्छया बोधयत्यज ।
काश्चित्तेषा फल चैव ददाति स्वयमच्युत ।
न ते विशेष कमपि प्रेरणादिकमच्युते
कुर्यु. कदापि तेनाय स्वतन्त्रोऽनुपचारत ॥[14] (*AV* iii 2 39-42)

It deserves to be noted that by upalakṣaṇa the term *dharma* in the Sutra (iii 2 41) includes *adharma* also M.'s bhāṣya substitutes for them the generic term 'karma' for easier comprehension[15]

Sūtra 40 putting Jaimini's view in the guise of a Purvapakṣa is only from the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view who labors under a misconception as regards to Jaimini's real position regarding karma's role in the bestowal of fruits[16] M. holds that there is in fact no difference of opinion between Jaimini and Bādarayana in regard to the leading role[17] of B This true position is brought out by taking *ata eva* in Sūtra iii 2 41 as '*tantrenopatta*' i e. doing duty twice

अत एवेति तन्त्रम् (एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति इति श्रुतेरेव) अत एव (ईश्वरादेव) धर्माधर्मस्य (कर्म) कारित इति जैमिनिराह (Ragh. *TDP* iii 2 41)

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12 Cf. तुशब्दस्य कर्तृत्वकरणविभागविषयावधारणार्थत्व चाभिप्रायावधारणार्थत्व दर्शयति ।
Read (*BD* iii 2 42)
परस्य कर्मणश्चोभयो फलकारणत्वेऽपि न कर्म (कर्तृ मत) परस्य प्रवर्तकम । पर एव (कर्ता मत) कर्मण प्रवर्तक । पुण्येन पुण्य लोक नयति इति हेतुव्यपदेशात । (M. *BSB* iii 2 42)

13 Read तत्रन्माशब्दत–तथापि कर्मापेक्षस्येश्वरस्य फलदानत्वेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्य न सिद्ध्यति तत्रश्च न तस्मिन बहुमानातिशय इति । एतत्परिहारार्थमेव पूर्वपक्ष स्थाप्यते–स एवेति । (*NS* p 524 b)

14 काश्चित बोधयति सख्यानपरकरोति सामग्या कल्पनाकरोति न तु तेन विना दातु न शक्नोतीति भाव । (*NS*)

15. सौत्रधर्मपदमधर्मस्याप्युपलक्षणमिति भावेन कर्मेति सामान्यपदेन विवृतम्। (*BD* iii 2 41)

16. सूत्रभाष्य तु जैमिनिमतावष्टम्भेन पूर्वपक्षवादिनोऽभिप्रायवर्णनपरे । न तु जैमिन्याचार्याभिप्रायवर्णनपरे इति ज्ञातव्यम । (Raghu. *TPB* iii 2 42)

17 प्राधान्येन कर्मण कारणत्व जैमिनेरभिमतम तच्चास्माकमप्यभिमतमिति न विरोध । (*TP* iii 2 42)

This way of interpreting this Sūtra shows that there is really no conflict of views between Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, as fancied by some other commentators.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. and R. raise the same problem whether the fruits of actions spring from themselves or are dispensed by the Lord. After criticizing the Mīmāmsaka theory of Apūrva, S. concludes that only an intelligent being like the Lord can bestow the fruits.

Criticism

It is doubtless the correct and unexceptionable position to hold that the Supreme Being is the dispenser of the fruits of Karma. But this particular question falls within the domain of the Saguṇa B. or Īśvara of S.'s conception, and outside the scope of 'Tatpadārtha'—the theme of second half of this Pāda, which is Nirguṇa B. according to authoritative pronouncement (See P. 29 fn. 22). Dispensing fruits of karma is an attribute and (Nirguṇa)-B. has been shown to be devoid of all attributes and characteristics. The discussion as to who dispenses fruits of karma is *not*, therefore, *relevant* to Tatpadārtha.

Feeling this difficulty, S. has put in his usual plea that the matter is discussed here from the 'Vyavahāra' point of view.[18] Even so, the matter stands covered by ii.3.41-42, according to his own showing.

Apart from that, this topic is without natural logical connection with that of the preceding one. The *Kalpataru* has tried to find a connection as follows. The previous adhi. had swept away the existence of everything other than B. That threatens to do away with B.'s dispensing the fruits of karma This adhi., therefore, steps in to safeguard it.[19] This is ingenious but far-fetched The difficulty or impossibility of B.'s *dispensing* fruits of karma because according to the Parādhikaraṇam (iii.2.31-37) nothing exists besides B. cannot be set right by saying that there is no difficulty in *Īśvara being the dispenser of* fruits. The Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of the preceding adhi. centre on the Nirguṇa B. while the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of *this* adhi. pertain to Īśvara or the Saguṇa B., who has nothing to do with the Nirguṇa B. Moreover, with the negation of everything other than B. in

18 तस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिक्यामीशित्रीशितव्यविभागावस्थाया अयमन्य. स्वभावो वर्ण्यते यदेतत् कर्मफल कर्मणो भवत्याहोस्विदीश्वरादिति (S *BSB* iii 2 38)

19 ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुनि निषिद्धे, फलदातृत्वमपि ब्रह्मणो न स्यादित्याशक्य व्यवहारतः तत् समर्थ्यते। (*Kalpataru* iii 2 38)

the previous adhi., the attribute of bestowing the fruits of karma, too, *has to be negated.* To re-establish this attribute of B. will thus end in Apasiddhānta and resurrect duality which has been negated.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

By hypothesis, R. holds that B. qualified by subtle cit and acit is the cause and B. qualified by gross cit and acit is its effect. There is no possibility in this theory of B. *as such* i.e. unqualified by any of these modes, existing by itself, unfettered. It follows from this that it is only B. qualified by subtle cit and acit that is the real dispenser of the fruits of karma and not B. pure and simple, in its unqualified Svarūpa-aspect.[20] The attempt made by R. to establish "B" as the bestower of fruits is thus unsuccessful.

It cannot be said that in so far as the qualified (viśiṣṭa)—B. is the cause of bestowing the fruits of Karma, it is equivalent to the substantive (*viśeṣya*)-B. which forms part of the "whole" (*viśiṣṭa*) being the bestower of fruits. In that case, it should be equally possible for "Karma" also to be accepted as the bestower of fruits. For like the viśeṣya—B, "Karma" which is a "viśeṣaṇa" of B. is also included in the "Viśiṣṭa-B" as part of it. The principle of

विशिष्टस्य यत् भवति तद्विशेषणस्यापि भवति

would apply with inexorable logic.

Further, if we are to understand by the term "B" only the entity qualified by the world of acit which includes the realm of fruits also within the "viśiṣṭa", the "Viśeṣaṇa"—viz. the fruits, cannot *again* be conceived as *being produced* or *bestowed by the same "Viśiṣṭa"*. That would involve the fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*) in argument. Surely, Devadatta qualified by the stick he carries cannot be conceived as producing the stick in the very same act of carrying it. Only if the Viśiṣṭa is not "B" (i.e. only when the "Viśeṣya" alone is accepted as B) would it help R. to emphasize and establish B.'s greatness as the bestower of the fruits of karma on Jīvas. The entanglement imposed by him on B. thro' the concept of B. being ever-viśiṣṭa comes in the way of B., *as such,* acting as the sole bestower of the fruits of Karma.

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20 And yet R. sometimes speaks of B. in its *own form* "Svākāra". See *Vedāntadīpa* I 1 32 and Vol. I, p 137.

III. UPĀSANĀPĀDA

CHAPTER XXII

INTRODUCTION

This Pāda deals with Upāsanā or contemplation of B: उपासना अस्मिन् पाद उच्यते (M. *BSB*. iii.3.1). Contemplation is facilitated by Vairāgya and Bhakti; for, to be fruitful, it has to be carried out with great ardor and uninterrupted continuity. Only then will it be possible for the Upāsaka to construct and retain the mental image of the Supreme B. as meditated upon, in the antaḥkaraṇa. Such ardor and continuity are achieved thro' Vairāgya and Bhakti.[1]

There are three phases of Upāsanā: (1) Śāstrābhyāsa or deep study of Śāstra and intensive reflection of its meaning and content; (ii) contemplation (*dhyāna*) and trance (*samādhi*). The first leads to the second and the second to the third. They are collectively referred to by the term Jijñāsā, in the opening Sūtra (i.1.1). Samādhi has not been separately dealt with here as it is not very much different in content from contemplation (*dhyāna*).[2] The other disciplines of *yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma,* etc. are subsidiary to Dhyāna and particulars about them can be had from the Yogaśāstra.

M. assigns a prominent position to Śāstrābhyāsa or study and reflection of Śāstrātha as constituting the discipline of Jijñāsā alongside of Dhyāna:

सोपासना च द्विविधा शास्त्राभ्यासस्वरूपिणी ।
ध्यानरूपा परा चैव तदङ्गं धारणादिकम् ॥ (*AV*. iii.3.1)

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1 आदरनैरन्तर्याभ्यामेव संस्कारातिशयोत्पादात्, आदरनैरन्तर्यं च नाभक्तस्य भवत. (*NS*. p. 533b)

2 ध्यानसमाध्योरनतिभिन्नत्वात् ध्यानशब्देन समाधिरपि गृह्यते (*NS*. p. 533b)

It would appear from this that Śāstrābhyāsa and Dhyāna are independent forms of Upāsanā and that the former is not subsidiary to the latter. If it were so, it will have to be clarified whether, like Samādhi, Śāstrābhyāsa is also a special form of Dhyāna. However, as Samādhi is an *aṅga* of Dhyāna, it cannot be treated as being altogether independent of it. The position thus needs clarification. The *STC* provides it:

> Śravaṇa and manana constitute Śāstrābhyāsa. They are an indirect means of Upāsanā or contemplation when pursued in the earlier stages for purposes of acquiring correct knowledge of the subject matter of the Śāstra (*prameya*) and the resolution of doubts and misapprehensions about it with the help of *nyāyas* of the Brahmamīmāmśā Śāstra. There are Adhikārins who pursue such study and reflection and exposition of Śāstrārtha with increased ardor and intensity of application even after their doubts and misapprehensions have been set at rest. In their case, Śāstrābhyāsa attains the status of a self-complete discipline like Dhyāna and becomes a substitute for it, as it were, *at this* stage. The power and potency of Samskāras generated by such an unabated process of Śāstrābhyāsa develops a state of mind which is thoroughly attuned to B. and later this leads directly to Aparokṣa. It is this phase of sustained Śāstrābhyāsa that has been referred to in terms of parity of status with Dhyāna as a direct means of Aparokṣa in

अथवा सततं शास्त्रविमर्शेन भविष्यति[3] (M. *Tantrasāra*, iv.17.2)

Elsewhere in his *Nyāyavivaraṇa* M. has insisted that Dhyāna is to be carried on *not only* upto the dawn of Aparokṣajnāna but even beyond, till the attainment of Mukti and he asserts categorically that without Dhyāna there is no possibility of attaining Aparokṣa:

ध्यानं विना अपरोक्षज्ञानाख्यविशेषकार्यानुपपत्तेः (*NV*. iv.1.adh.7)

The *STC* resolves the apparent contradiction between these two positions as follows:

> The evidence of texts shows that there are Adhikārins of high standing who continue to take delight in such intensive form of Śāstrābhyāsa with unabated zeal even after all their doubts have been set at rest and the conviction of truth has been attained.

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3 तयोरपि प्रवचनश्रवणमननाभ्यां वेदार्थभूतब्रह्मविषय शास्त्रजनितानुभवजनितसंस्कारपाटवोद्भूतदृढतरभक्त्यादिसहकारिवशादपरोक्षपर्यन्ताभ्यां वेदार्थश्रवणमननात्मकं शास्त्राभ्यासमपि ध्यानमुपासनाशब्दाभिधेयं कञ्चन मनोवृत्तिविशेषं प्राप्नोति। यथेन–

'अथवा सततं शास्त्रविमर्शेन भविष्यति–'

इति भगवदपरोक्षसाधनमामनन्ति (STC. MS. iii 3 1)

This does not, however, mean that Śāstrābhyasa by itself—i e without one's having to go thro' the discipline of Dhyāna at all, is competent to usher in Aparokṣajnāna[4] The position is analogous to what has been said in the Śrutis about Adhikārins attaining Mokṣa by perceiving B in different ways—some within themselves and some without in external Forms like Avatārs This does not, however, dispense with the need for all classes of Adhikārins to contemplate B within their hearts to be able to perceive it in its Bimba-form in relation to their own selves Such Bimbadarsana is indispensable for all (See *B S* iii 3 53) Once Bimbadarsana has been attained, the Śrutis extend parity of status to it along with perceiving B in external Forms thereafter, as subsequent Bimbadarsana can be attained without a great deal of effort after the first Similar is the case with meditative contemplation[5]

In other words, we have to recognize there are two different kinds of Adhikārins competent to attain God-vision—those who are temperamentally disposed to give primary importance to intensive study and reflection of Śāstrārtha as its means and others who give primary importance to meditative contemplation, for the purpose Some amount of study and reflection of Śāstrārtha is absolutely necessary for those who follow the path of contemplation in the main Some amount of contemplative meditation is likewise necessary for those who give greater prominence to study and reflection of Śāstrārtha The difference lies in this that the former type of Adhikārins does not have to resort to contemplation for such long periods as the other type The second type of Adhikārins which is "Dhyānapradhāna' has not got to put forth so much of intensive study and reflection of Śastrārtha as the other[6]

It is in *this sense* that Sastrabhyasa and Dhyāna have been deemed to be of equal importance in leading to Aparoksa However, as contemplation cannot be successfully achieved without the requisite discipline of Sāstrābhyāsa which paves the way for it thro' *tattvaniscaya and arthaniyama,*[7]* it is recognized as subsidiary to Dhyāna So it comes to be treated at the beginning of this Pāda

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4 तर्हि यवस्य व्रीहिसमकक्षस्य तदपेक्षामन्तरेणैव यागनिवर्तकत्ववत श्रवणमननयोरपि ध्यानम तरेणापरोक्षनिवर्तकत्व स्यात । न स्यात । (*STC* ibid)

5 यथा बहिर्दशनन स्वतन्त्रणव मोक्षवचनात तस्य बिम्बदर्शनेन समकक्षत्वेनोक्तत्वेऽपि हृदि किंचिदुपास्यैव मोक्ष इत्याश्रयणेन बिम्बदर्शनसाधनमपेक्षितमेव। तदनन्तर च बिम्बदर्शनस्यातिप्रयत्नसाध्यत्वाभावेन तदनपेक्षित प्रायमिति समकक्षत्व चाश्रीयते तथा प्रकृतेऽपि (*STC* MSS ibid)

6 अधिकारिणो हि द्विविधा केचन शास्त्राभ्यासपाटवप्रधाना भगवदद्रष्टार केचन ध्यानप्रधाना । तत्र ध्यान प्रधानानामपि किंचित शास्त्राभ्यसनमपेक्षितमेव न पूर्वेषामिव बहुतरम। पूर्वेषामपि किंचित ध्यानमपेक्षितमेव न पुनरुत्तरेषामिव ध्यानमेव बहुकालमनुष्ठेयम (*STC* ibid)

7 इममवातिशयमपेक्ष्य समप्रधानव्यवहार । आहत्योभयथामपि विवक्षितशास्त्राभ्यासम तरा ध्यानानुदयात तस्य तदङ्गत्व चास्ति । अत एव ह्यत्रव निरूपणम (*STC* ibid)

*अध्यतानिश्चिताथध्यानायोगात साक्षात दृष्टिसाधनहेतुतयाप्युपयोग इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्
(Vadiraja *T*D*G* p 155)

Śāstrābhyāsa or Jijñāsā consists of two phases of *śravana* and *manana* which prepare the ground for contemplation Śāstrābhyāsa directed mainly to acquiring the doctrinal content of the Śrutis is śravanam It becomes *mananam* when it is directed to understanding the logic of its thought-content Śravana is defined as receiving the Śāstrārtha imparted by a competent teacher (Guru) It dispels ignorance of the subject matter (*prameya*) of the Śāstras—viz. the Para and the aparatattvas Manana is the systematic employment of reason and the canons of textual interpretation with a view to arriving at a firm conviction that the final interpretation of the Śāstra so arrived at is alone the correct and unimpeachable one It dispels misapprehension and quells one's doubts and confirms the irrefragability of the findings of Śrutis (*parokṣatattvaniśca ya*) Then follows Dhyāna, or contemplative meditation of B in the light of those findings Since ignorance and misapprehension of the truth are obstacles to Dhyāna, its successful accomplishment requires the complete eradication of all obstacles to it This is how Śravana and manana are helpful to Aparokṣa thro' Dhyāna Śāstrābhyāsa is thus an integral part of Upāsana and falls within its scope[8]

The present Pāda has the largest number of adhis,—fortytwo in all The opening *adhi.* forms one Peṭikā It brings the entire heritage of scriptural lore as envisaged in the Samanvaya Sūtra and Adhyāya, within the scope of the Śravaṇa and manana as part of Śāstrābhyāsa leading to Dhyāna on the basis of their settled import The first *adhi* calls for Upāsanā of B on the basis of an exhaustive and integrated knowledge of the nature and attributes of B gathered from the entire body of scriptural literature, as far as it lies within one's competence

However, as B is transempirical in its nature and its attributes are countless and infinite in range, it is impossible for any one of us to comprehend, encompass and bring them all simultaneously into a single act of meditative contemplation. The question, therefore, arises as to how far the seeker of B can hope to attain Aparokṣajñāna thro' contemplation of B in these circumstances

The answer to this question is given in this Pāda where the subject of Upāsanā is treated with special reference to the well-defined natural distinction and hierarchic gradation of all those eligible for Mokṣa based on intrinsic differences of merit and calibre, into mortals, Ṛṣis and Devas

8. [illegible] (STC ibid)

—accepted in the system of Bādarāyaṇa[9] The highest of Adhikārins among the gods is Prāṇa who is of equal rank to the fourfaced Brahamā.

Within this broad classification, it is provided that all Adhikārins are eligible to meditate on four lordly attributes of B. in order to be able to attain their spiritual fulfilment. These four attributes are· B's blemishlessness *(sattvam)* omniscience *(cittvam)* blissfulness *(ānanda)* and its being the inner ruler and life-principle of the souls themselves *(ātmatvam)*.[10] The Ṛṣis and Devas who belong to a higher order of beings than mortals are eligible to meditate at the same time on a much larger and still larger number of attributes than ordinary human beings,—on as many from among the countless attributes of B as "flash forth" before them, simultaneously, during their contemplation, in keeping with their intrinsic capacity Such combination and simultaneous contemplation of larger number of attributes of B with increased lucidity of perception and depth of insight into their natures by the higher orders of Adhikārins goes by the name of 'Gunopasamhāra'.

Incidentally, certain attributes are excluded from being meditated upon by certain classes of Upāsakas, as being out of bounds for them or for other valid reasons The fourfaced Brahmā is alone qualified to meditate on all the attributes of B known from the Śrutis.[11] His consort Sarasvatī, tho' eligible to meditate on all such attributes as he, is eligible to meditate on B's cosmic *activities* only in their generic aspect, but not in all their specific details Similar reservations and restrictions in regard to the meditation of B's form, attributes and activities apply to others in the hierarchy, according to their fitness[12]

Every attribute of B is to be contemplated in terms of its infinitude, as B's attributes are all of them of infinite range and content of meaning The ordinary senses in which we use words like beauty, goodness, wisdom, joy, etc are poor substitutes even when analogically applied

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9 This will be clear from the reference to Upasatraividhya' (in BS i 1.31), the presence of the Devatadhi (i 3, 26-33), the gradational difference in the enjoy ment of Svarupananda based on Taratamya in Bhakti (iii 2 20 21) and the re ference to the manner of Laya by which the Devas attain Mukti instead of thro' *Utkrānti*, as in the case of mortals

10 Cf य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमयति यमात्मा न वेद एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृत (*Brh Up* iii 7 3)

11 Some modern writers on Mysticism speak of the spiritual experiences of mystics of form sound, flavor, odor, touch light, color, etc A strinkingly similar view has been expressed by M

सद्देह सुखगन्धश्च ज्ञानभा सत्पराक्रम
ज्ञानज्ञान सुखसुख स विष्णु परमा मत (*AV* ii 2 41)

12 Elucidating the scope of this statement the *Ānandamāla* writes सर्ववेदान्तेष्वाद्यन्तत आक्षरात् आस्वरात् आघोषात् अपुनरुक्त्योदितै निर्दोषपरिपूर्णै गुणैरुपास्य परमपुरुषा विष्णु सर्वाधिकार्यधिपतिना चतुर्मुखब्रह्मणा (*Op cit* iii 3, p 115)

to B.'s attributes. This is verily the first lesson in Mysticism given by one of the adhikaraṇas, here (iii.3.59). The insights into these infinitudes of range and depths of meanings of these attributes of B. obtained by different orders of Adhikārins are also admitted to vary in regard to their nature and quality according to their capacity (iii.3.60).

Prior to the attainment of Mokṣa, upāsanā is mandatory. It becomes voluntary in the case of released souls. These continue their contemplation of B.'s transempirical attributes with greater zeal than ever before, as an act of free self-expression, with feelings of boundless gratitude to their Redeemer from beginningless bondage. *Such Upāsanā carried on by the released souls is no longer a means to and end. It is an end in itself.* This raises the concept of Upāsanā in Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy as expounded by M. to a height of mystic experience, which has *seldom been spelt out in such clear terms in any of the other forms of Theism known to us.*

The importance of the Upāsaka receiving instruction in scriptural truths *(śravaṇa)* from a competent Guru who is to initiate him into the special attributes or form of B. the disciple is qualified to meditate upon and the final importance of the Guru's grace in facilitating the dawn of illumination in the Upāsaka have also been dealt with in appropriate adhikaraṇas, in this Pāda, as part of the *itikartavyatā* of Upāsanā.

Besides contemplating the Supreme B. the Sādhakas are required to contemplate the hierarchy of gods which is part of the retinue of the Supreme Lord of the Universe and which plays a notably beneficent role in the lives of the Sādhakas.[13]

The most outstanding example of devout voluntary contemplation of B. comes from Cit-Prakṛti or the goddess Lakṣmī who has the unique status of never being subject to bondage like the Jīvas. In her, Brahmopāsanā may be said to reach its culmination and highest form of sublimation and serve as a beacon light to all Muktas and Mumukṣus.

Upāsanā as a Sādhana reaches fulfilment when the Upāsaka envisions his own Bimba-Form of B. This is accomplished only with the grace of B. and not by the power of any sādhanas, howsoever intensive. The light that reveals B. comes only thro' Its grace and *not* by the power of any of the means adopted by the soul such Jnāna or Bhakti. They are only auxiliaries. It is only the envisioning of the Bimba

13 मानुषमुक्तवर्गमिव देवानामन्वयतो सिद्धियुक्तं (*NV.* iii 4, adh. 7)
देवाना स्वस्या सिद्धौ मनुष्याणामिन्द्रियादिप्रेरणाद्वारेण ज्ञानादिलाभाच्च मुक्तिरनंभवादिति भाव:
(Raghu. *NVB.* iii 4, p. 118)

Form of the Lord that leads to the cessation of bondage and the attainment of complete release. Such vision is called by the significant name of '*mocaka-aparokṣa*'. The contemplation of some other special manifestations of B such as Nṛsimha before the ripening of Bimbopāsana helps to overcome obstacles and interruptions, if any, caused to such Upāsanās by sins or by the malevolence of Kali by causing distraction of the mind

The most significant fact that emerges from M's exposition of the subject of Upāsanā, in this Pāda, is that the whole technique of Upāsanā and its details have the Supreme B alone as their subject and have nothing to do with any lesser forms of meditation of this or that Vidyā, unconnected with B or only remotely connected with it Brahmopāsanā in the true sense requires to be *wholly* and directly centred on B *at all stages* Even the contemplation of the gods in the hierarchy commended to the seeker is no exception to this, for they are to be meditated upon only as dependent on B in the hierarchic set-up Independently of B's will and grace, it is not possible for anyone to attain its direct vision by the might of any of the Sādhanās, be it Bhakti or Jñāna

The above is the substance of the adhikaranas of this Pāda, according to M's bhāsya

Lacunae in this part of the manuscripts of the *STC* make it difficult to have a clear picture of the nature and constitution of Peṭikās in this Pāda The opening *adhi* is treated as one Peṭikā The next three *adhi.s* dealing with the topic of 'Upasamhāra' of given attributes and the anupasamhāra of larger number of attributes depending on the fitness of the different orders of Adhikārins forms another Petikā. This is more or less in the nature of a prolegomena to the theme of the Pāda viz Dhyāna From *adhi* 5 to the end of the Pāda we have one Peṭikā (it appears from the wording of the remarks in the mss of the *STC)* devoted to Dhyāna, with subdivisions pertaining to details regarding the Upāsanā of different orders of Adhikārins such as human beings, Devas, the fourfaced Brahmā, the released souls, the goddess Lakṣmī and so on[14]

The *TPB* of Raghūttama, however, gives a fuller and more detailed description of the Petikās here The first two Peṭikās are the same as for the *STC* Adhi s 5 16 are, however, reckoned as separate Peṭikās

14 आनन्दादय प्रधानस्य (iii 3 12) इत्यारभ्य आपाद ध्यानस्य निरूपणादेका पेटिका। तत्रापि कैश्चिदधिकरणै मनुष्याणामुपास्तिप्रकार कैश्चित् देवाना, कैश्चित् चतुर्मुखस्य इत्यवा तत्पेटिकात्वम्
(*STC* MS iii 3 1)

The Ānandādhikarana (iii 3 12) names the four great attributes of B which are to be meditated upon, simultaneously and *not* successively by all orders of Mumukṣus from Brahmā down to the human beings The Priyaśiratvādhi. (iii 3.13), Sambhṛtyadhi (iii.3 24) and Vedhā dyadhi (iii 3 26) deal with attributes reserved for meditation by higher or special Adhikārins Adhi 7 deals with the meditation of a larger number of attributes by Devas Adhi 9 expains the correct sense of the mandate *Ātmetyevopāsitā* (*Bṛh Up.* i 4 7) 'meditate on B as 'Āman' *only,' apparently restraining one from meditating on any other attribute of B* The explanation is given in a manner that helps subsume the Upāsanā of the four or more attributes meditated upon according to the capacity and understanding of the higher Adhikārins in the connotation of "Ātman" This resolves the apparent conflict between the prescription Ātmetyevopāsita and the prescription of four attributes for purposes of meditation by all. The next *adhi* (no 10) explains how 'Ātmatvam' in spite of its standing for all the other attributes of B admits of the possibility of non upasamhara of more attributes by those who are not eligible for such upasamhāra

Adhis 17-18 deal with the Upāsanā in the state of release by Mukta-Jivas So it forms a separate Peṭikā. The next seven *adhis* also are separate Peṭikās *Adhis* 19-21 form another unit They emphasize the supreme importance of receiving instruction and guidance from a competent Guru and securing his grace in getting illumination The next unit of adhis lays stress on the preeminence of Aparokṣajñāna as the final means of God-vision and the importance of Bimbāparokṣa in this connection The next unit discusses the relative position of Bhakti and God's will and grace in conferring release The next unit shows how the identity of amsas and amsins is a necessary postulate of the doctrine of *anādiyogyatā* of Jivas as regards their differences in the matter of adhikāra for different orders of Upāsanās The next adhi. deals with the Upāsanā of the gods in the hierarchy who have their genesis from the different limbs of the Supreme B (*RV* X 90 13) in the larger context of Brahmopāsanā The next two *adhis* emphasize the need to raise the attributes chosen for meditation to the power of their infinitude of range and content, for all attributes of B are *ex hypothesi* infinite in range and content and must be so contemplated The existence of gradation of insights in the infinitude of the same attributes contemplated by different orders of Adhikārins is also acknowledged in a separate *adhi.* Other forms of Upāsanā besides Bimbopasanā with specific objectives conducive to Mokṣa are also taken into account The last unit deals with the mode of Upāsanā to be practised by the gods with reference to those

(gods) who have their loci in particular limbs of the Supreme. The total number of Peṭikās is thirty-two according to Raghūttama's reckoning

PADARTHA ACCORDING TO SAMKARA EXAMINED

S Introduces this Pāda with the words "We have explained in the previous Pāda the nature of the object of cognition viz B The present Pāda discusses whether the Vidyās or Vijñānas (cognitions of B) which form the subject of different Vedānta texts are separate cognitions or not"[15]

Here, we have to ask for a clarification whether B taught according to him in the previous Pāda is the Saguna or the Nirguṇa—the Vidyās connected with which are proposed to be inquired into in this Pāda for deciding their oneness or separateness[16]

As the Saguna-B clothed in different attributes and descriptions will wear a different complexion and have different forms and lineaments apropos their additions, omissions and alterations, these Vidyās cannot *but* be different from one another and the attempt of the Siddhāntin to establish that they are all non different cannot pass muster. There is also another difficulty[17] The *Kalpataru* has made it clear that in the previous Pāda, the subject is the determination of the nature of the individual self (*tvampadārtha*) upto the Ubhayalingādhi (iii 2 11-21) and that from that *adhi* till the end of the Pāda, the theme is the determination of the universal self (*tatpadārtha*) or the Nirguna-B[18] *This makes it difficult to hold that the Saguṇa-B. has been accepted as the subject of the preceding Pāda If, on the other hand, Nirguna-B should be the subject of the previous Pāda, no such investigation as proposed here will be called for, as S. himself has* held that it has been fully established in the previous Pāda that B is free from all distinctions whatever, that it is one and of absolutely uniform nature, like a lump of salt and that there is no reason for raising any question whether the cognitions of such a B are separate ones or constitute only one cognition[19]

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15 व्याख्यात विज्ञेयस्य ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वम । इदानी तु प्रतिवेदान्त विज्ञानानि भिन्नानि न वेति विचार्यत
(S BSB iii 3 1)

16 तत्र प्रष्टव्यम्–किं पूर्वपाद विज्ञेय ब्रह्म सगुण निर्गुण वेति (*STC* iii 3 1)
17 आद्ये सगुणस्य प्रतिविशेषण भिन्नत्वात्तद्विशेषणाणा विज्ञानाना भेदस्य को निवारयिता ? (*STC* ibid)
18 विरक्तस्य तत्त्वपदविवेकार्थं द्वितीय पाद आरभ्यते तत्रापि न स्थानतोऽपीत्यत प्राक् त्वपदार्थो विवेचित । तत आरभ्य तत्पदार्थ (*Kalpataru* iii 2 1)
19 विज्ञेय ब्रह्म पूर्वापरादिभेदरहितमनन्तरम सैन्धवघनवदवधारित तत्र कुतो भेदाभेदचिन्तावतार ?
(S BSB iii 3 1)

Granting the force of this objection, S himself has accepted the position that the present Pāda has the qualified B, Prāṇa and the like for its theme[20] But this can be agreed to only if the Saguṇa B is recognized to be the subject of the preceding Pāda also. That has been negatived by S's own statement quoted above and the statement made by the *Kalpataru*[21]. The attempt to treat the question whether there is unity or difference among the Vidyās taught in the Vedānta texts as the theme of this Pāda by S and his commentators is thus foiled by the stand they themselves have taken regarding the theme of the preceding Pāda which they wish to lead on to this Pāda,—a thing which it is unable to do, as we have shown This being a Sādhana Adhyāya, it would be more proper, nay most proper, to make *B.'s actual Upāsanā itself in its different forms and aspects, with its modus operandi and requisites, the main theme of this Pāda.* This is what M. has done.

The *Kalpataru* goes on to explain that after sifting the meaning and connotation of *'tat'* and *'tvam'* principles in the previous Pāda, the present one seeks to determine the import of texts relating to the Saguṇa and Nirguna B with the aid of the schematic device of Guṇopasamhāra or suitable combination of details so as to bring about proper alignment, integration and equivalence of attributes of any chosen Vidyā for purposes of meditation[22] The application of this methodology helps settle the meaning of Saguna and Nirguna texts A few cases of separateness of Saguna Vidyās are made out as exceptions Nirguṇa Vidyās, being uniform in essence throughout, there is no need to raise the issue of separateness among them So, only the lines of Upasamhāra of attributes which have to be taken in to secure a complete content of meaning is indicated in their case, as in *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya* (iii.3.11)[23]

The inquiry into the meaning of Saguṇa texts in this set-up of determining whether the Vidyās with which they deal are separate or one contributes to the purification of the mind and sharpening of the

20 तदुच्यते– सगुणब्रह्मविद्याविषया प्राणादिविषया चेयं विज्ञानभेदाभेदचिन्तेत्यदोषः (S *BSB* iii 3 1)
21 See fn. 19 and 20
22 In this connection *read*
आनन्दत्वसत्यत्वज्ञानत्वादिसामान्यानि ब्रह्मणि कल्पिता धर्माः । तथा सर्वशाखासूपसंहारो नाम तत्तद्वाक्यानन्दादिपदानामेकवाक्यतयोच्चारणं, आनन्दं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म शुद्धमद्वयमात्मेति (*Ratnaprabhā*, iii 3 11)
23 इदानीं सगुणनिर्गुणब्रह्मवाक्यानामर्थोऽवधार्यते । पदार्थोपसंहारेण वाक्यार्थावधारणाय च सगुणविद्यानामभेदचिन्ता भेदचिन्ता तु तदपवादत्वेन । निर्गुणविद्यायां तु विद्याभेदादैक्यं सिद्धमिति न तत्र विचारणा । गुणोपसंहारस्तु आनन्दादय इत्यधिकरणे वक्ष्यते (*Kalpataru* iii 3 1)

powers of concentration and enables one to advance to the Nirguṇa level.[24]

These explanations are unsustainable. We have seen that the settlement of the import of Nirguṇa Vākyas (both of the negative and the positive varieties) has been carried out in the *Ubhayaliṅgādhi.* (iii.2.11-21) and others following it and nothing more remains to be done in that direction. Moreover, except for the *Ānandādhi.* (iii.3.11-13) and *Akṣaradhyadhi.* (iii.3.33) according to the *Kalpataru,* to which two more are added by the *Parimala,*[25] the majority of the thirtysix adhi.s in this Pāda is concerned, according to S.'s own Bhāṣya, with Saguṇa-Brahma Vidyās and Prāṇa Vidyā and other matters.[26] This shows how impossible it is to think of making the ascertainment of the meaning of Nirguṇa texts the theme of this Pāda, even for purposes of Upasamhāra.

The plea that the inquiry into the Saguṇa texts to decide whether they constitute different cognitions of B. or one makes for purification of the mind and facilitates passing on to the Nirguṇa level is of doubtful value. The chances are that the fixing of the meaning of Saguṇa texts as 'Viśiṣṭārthabodhaka' will confirm B.'s character as endowed with a number of lordly attributes as opposed to its being devoid of any. Such a knowledge would act as a deterrent to the realization of B.'s Nirguṇatva. It will thus put Upāsanā on the reverse gear instead of on the road to Nirguṇa.[27]

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24 सगुणवाक्यार्थचिन्ता तु तद्विद्यानां सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारा निर्गुणविद्योपयोगात् (ibid)

25. See its comments on the Pratika अधिकरणं in the *Kalpataru* (*Op cit* p. 734-35).

26 See *adhi.s* 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 30, etc

27 सगुणवाक्यार्थचिन्तया निर्गुणविद्याविरुद्धगुणनिश्चयेन तत्त्वनिर्णयप्रतिबन्धकेनानन्तया चित्तस्य मलिनतया चित्तशुद्ध्यनुत्पादात (*STC.* iii 3 1)

CHAPTER XXIII

BRAHMAN IS TO BE KNOWN THRO' CONCLUSIONS OF ENTIRE VEDIC LITERATURE

1 *Sarvavedāntapratyayādhıkaranam* (ııı.3 1-5)

This *adhi* establishes that the study and reflection of the entire body of Sacchāstra has to be carried out by every Sādhaka as a necessary subsidiary to contemplation (dhyāna) [1]

The expression '*pūrvam*' used for B in the last Sūtra of the preceding Pāda is construed as the subject[2] of the predicative element 'Sarvavedāntapratyayam' here The word '*anta*' in 'Sarvavedānta' is used in the sense of the *conclusions* (cf *Gītā* ıı,16) *and not the concluding parts of the* Vedas viz the Upanıṣads, as other commentators have understood it Pratyaya is knowledge The entire predicative phrase 'Sarvavedāntapratyayam' is thus a Vyadhıkaranabahuvrīhı meaning that B is the object of knowledge (*pratyaya*) to be attained by applying the conclusive principles of interpretation set forth in Brahmamīmāmsāśāstra for determining its nature and attributes as taught in the entire body of Vedic literature [3] The reason is '*codanādyavıśesāt*'—that there is no restriction in the injunctions[4] that B should be known by the Kānvas

1 [illegible] (*TDP*)

2 The reading [illegible] given on p 400 of the printed edn of Raghuttama's *TPB* MGOS CXLII 1956 is an unfortunate error for [illegible]

3 [illegible] (Paghu *TPB*)

4 चोदना is an injunction (*vidhi*) which in the present context means a [illegible] Read

[illegible] (*STC* ııi 3 1)

in a particular manner and by the followers of some other Vedic Śākhā in a different manner. In other words, knowledge of B. which all Sādhakas, irrespective of their scholastic allegiance to this or that Śākhā, are expected to acquire and meditate upon is integral and comprehensive in its nature and not something piecemeal. This will be evident from the universal nature of the terms in which the mandate is couched in different Śākhās:—"The Supreme is to be meditated as one's life-principle.[5] "The Supreme is to be meditated upon as supreme light.[6] "Let him know only the Supreme B."[7]—without any restrictive clause attached to them that it applies only to the followers of a particular Śākhā. The expression "*ādi*" after *codanā* in the Sūtra refers to connected reasonings in the guise of arthavādas occurring in the vicinity of these injunctions such as: *Atraite sarva ekam bhavanti* which proclaim that all other attributes mentioned in the same passage and elsewhere in other contexts of the numerous other Śākhās are subsumed under the connotation of the term "Ātman", as applied to B.[8] These arthavādas make it clear that there is nothing to show that the attributes of B. spoken of in the different Vedic passages are hemmed in by any restrictions that they should be known and meditated upon only by the followers of the particular Śākhās where they are cited.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: The study of the Śrutis derives from the *Svādhyāyavidhi.*[9] which pertains to one's own Śākhā. In principle then, the knowledge of B. expected of a Sādhaka has to be confined to the nature and attributes of B. presented in one's particular Śākhā and not from outside it—least of all, from the whole body of the sacred literature. Otherwise, the qualification "one's own" applied to such body of texts in the mandate Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ (*T.Ā.* ii.15) cannot be justified. The objection that the qualifying attribute of the subject of a proposition has no syntactic value is not always true; for in injunctions like

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5. *Brh. Up.* i 4.7
6. *Brh. Up.* i 4 15.
7. *Mund. Up.* ii 2 5.
8. Cf. अत्रात्मत्वरूपगुणे 'प्राणन्नेव प्राणो नाम भवति वदन् वाक् * * इत्यादिनोपासनाविधितः पूर्ववाक्योक्ता प्राणत्ववक्तृत्वद्रष्टृत्वादय. सर्वेगुणा एक भवन्ति, अन्तर्भवन्ति। तस्मात् प्रशस्तमात्मत्वविज्ञानमिति तत्र सवगुण- सग्राहकत्वयुक्तिरुच्यते। तथा 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत' इत्यत्र 'य आत्मानमेव लोकमुपास्ते न हास्य कर्म क्षीयत इत्यक्षयकर्मफलहेतुत्वयुक्ति। 'तमेवैक जानथ आत्मानम्' इत्यत्र 'अमृतस्यैष सेतु' रिति मुक्तोपसृप्यत्व युक्तिः (Ragh. *TPB.* iii.3.1)
9. Svādhyāyavidhi is the famous text *Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ* enjoining the study of one's own Śākhā. अध्ययनं च स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विधीयमान स्वशाखाध्ययनपरमेव युक्तम्; अन्यथा, स्वशब्दवैयर्थ्यात् (*STC.* iii.3.1)

Agnīn ādadhıta the plurality of fires is taken into account We cannot, therefore, disregard the epithet 'Sva' attached to the study of sacred texts in the *Svādhyāyavıdhı*[10] Moreover, if other Śākhās besides one's own have to be studied by all, the ritualistic acts prescribed in them will forfeit their characteristic of novelty *(apūrvatā)* where they prescribe the same rituals as are found in one's own Śakhā which is in no way dependent on them[11] We have several principal sacrifices mentioned with all their subsidiaries in more than one Śakhā If all the Śākhās are to be studied by every one, the principals described in one's Śākhā and to be performed with all their subsidiaries will forfeit their novelty if other Śākhās are also to be studied and the ceremonials prescribed in them followed[12] As the Adhyayanavıdhı has to find its fulfilment in the fruitful acquisition of the meaning of texts studied, it will be incumbent on all those who study other Śakhas besides their own to perform the ceremonials prescribed in them Where, as in conflicting prescriptions like *'Udıte juhoti', 'anudıte juhoti'* one has to carry out only one of the two and desist from the other, there will be the risk of incurring sin (pratyavāya) by so doing[13]

Very few can hope to study all the extant Śākhās If then, the Svādhyāyavıdhı is to be understood as prescribing the study of all the known Śākhās, many will have to go without such study[14] In any case, the Karmakaṇḍa parts of the Vedas not being connected with B, their study will have to be excluded from the scope of the Vıdhı, so far as Brahmajıjñāsā is concerned as not being conducive to Mokṣa. A further restriction in respect of the study of one's own Śākhā even for purposes of Brahmajıjñāsā cannot therefore, be ruled out as unwarranted[15]

The Pūrvapakṣın further argues that these different Śākhās give us different descriptions of the nature and attributes of B One describes it as of the nature of reality and, intelligence and another leaves out the attribute of reality and describes it as of the nature of intelligence and bliss another as reality intelligence and infinitude In yet ano-

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10 न च धान्यादिविषयवत् स्वत्वमविवक्षितम् [illegible] विवक्षितत्वात् (ibid)

11 शाखा[illegible]नियम शाखा[illegible] न स्यात् (ıbıd)

12 किंच शाखान्तरे[illegible] ? (ıbıd)

13 किंचाध्ययनविधि[illegible] शाखानां [illegible] प्रत्यवायापत्तिः (ibid)

14 किंच [illegible] इति [illegible]धिकारोऽपि न स्यात्

15 किंच [illegible] दुर्वार । [illegible] विवक्षितमेव । (ıbid)

ther, it is described as 'the seer, hearer, thinker and as 'free from sin and limitation (*Chān Up* viii 1 5) This shows they are not talking of one and the same entity and that, therefore, the same B is not to be known as described in all the Śākhās but only as represented in one particular Śākhā For an Adhikārin is expected to know only one given thing [16]

The Siddhānta is that one who proposes to enter upon the final stage of contemplation has got to know B thro' study and reflection of the entire body of Vedic literature whose import has been ascertained with the help of principles of interpretation set out in the Brahma-Mimāmsāśāstra For so far as B is concerned, no restrictions have been imposed as in the case of the rituals of the Karmakānda that the followers of this or that Śākhā alone shall know B as endowed with a particular set of attributes and not all Sādhakas regardless of their Śākhā-affiliation This point has already been established

The objection that as there are different accounts of B's attributes to be met with in different Śākhās and as there is no agreement among them, it follows that all these accounts are not meant for the benefit of one and the same seeker and intended to be known by him, but only by the followers of particular Śākhās only, is not maintainable As the second Sūtra points out, we come across varied descriptions of B not only in different Śākhās but in the different parts of the same Śākhā [17] For instance, in *Brh Up* (iii 9 28) B is described as 'supreme intelligence and bliss' and as 'unlimited and blissful' in *Chān Up* (iv, 10, 5) If the Pūrvapakṣin should satisfy himself that in such cases there is no bar to unity of theme as different and more and more attributes are predicated of the same subject the same explanation will hold true of the Siddhānta also [18] The other objection that if the same B should be described in different Śākhās, there will be repetition of ideas at least in those respects where the accounts tally will apply with equal force to the description given within a given Śākhā also, where the accounts tally [19] If the repetition is justified on

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16 सवशाखोक्तमेकेनैव ज्ञातव्यमिति न युक्तम । एक हि वस्त्वनेन ज्ञातव्यम । नहि सवशाखोक्त वस्त्वेकम । क्वचित शाखाया हि विज्ञानानन्दरूप वस्तूच्यते । क्वचिच्च सत्यज्ञानानन्त क्वचित श्रोतृमन्तृत्वादिरूप चान्यदेवेति । अपहत पाप्म वादिरूपमन्यत्र येवमादि । अत मवशाखोक्ताना पृथक्त्वात एकस्यैव ज्ञेयत्वात स्वशाखोक्तमेव ज्ञातव्यमिति । (*TP* iii 3 2)

* अत्र स यत्वभावाभावाभ्या प्रतिपाद्य भिद्यते (*AC*)

17 तथा सति एकशाखोक्तस्याप्यकेनाज्ञातव्यत्वप्रसगात तत्रोक्तार्थानामपि पृथक्त्वदर्शनात (*TP* iii 3 2)

18 अथोच्यत-तत्र धर्म्यनुवादेनान्यधर्म विधानात एकमेवोच्यत इति । हन्त तर्हि अत्रापि तथा किं न स्यात ? (*TP* iii 3 2)

19 न च सवशाखानामेकविषयत्वे अशे पौनरुक्त्यमिति, एकस्यामपि साम्यात । (*TP* iii 3 2)

the other grounds of context or schematic purpose, a similar defence is possible for the Siddhānta also[20]

The objection regarding absence of novelty and against repetitiveness of particular texts where other Śākhās besides one's own are brought under the scope of the Svādhyāyavidhi are easily disposed of Even in such cases, there is room for novelty in respect of particular additional details enjoined over and above the common factors[21] The Jyotiṣṭoma for instance is prescribed in both the Yajurveda and in the Ṛgveda Neither prescription forfeits its novelty on that account The presumption that the follower of a particular Vedic Śākhā is under no obligation to study the Śākhās of another Veda is not well-founded. For, in the Yajurveda itself, we find that certain sacrificial rites and ceremonies prescribed in it are not described with the full complement of their subsidiaries pertaining to the offices of the Adhvaryu, Hotṛ and Udgātṛ priests and without them it is hardly possible to carry out the ceremonials in full If repetitions within a given Śākhā are to be justified on the ground of reinforcement, the same explanation can also be pressed into service by the Siddhāntin The objection that the dull-witted will not be in a position to enter upon contemplation of B as they cannot contemplate all the attributes of B taught in so many Śākhās is answered by the analogy of rivers finding their way to the sea It does not mean that because the minor streams and lakes do not find their way to the sea the mighty rivers of the land are also subject to the same disability The Siddhāntin readily concedes that the less competent persons are eligible to know and meditate on a few of the attributes of B, while Adhikārins of a higher order are eligible to concentrate on more without insisting that the Adhikārins at the lower level are also expected to know and meditate on all the attributes of B[22] The relegation of the Karmakanda to the domain of pure ritualism is not accepted in the Siddhānta Its attunement with B thro' Mahayoga (See Vol I pp 50, 275, 278) renders it quite possible to bring it also under the scope of sravana and manana, for purposes of Dhyāna

The third Sutra sets aside another impediment to extending the scope of the Svādhyāyavidhi to the entire body of scripture as part of Śravana and manana to be undertaken by the Mumukṣu The Svā-

20) अथ यदि तत्र [illegible] न च मम प्रसङ्गोऽपि [illegible]

21 [illegible] (STC)

22. [illegible] (STC iii 3 1)

dhyāyavidhi is comprehensive in its scope[23] It does not set any statutory limits to such study as the Pūrvapaksin imagines It will be shown, in due course, that the purpose of such a study is to know the meaning and import of the texts studied and utilize such knowledge for spiritual advancement in the direction of Moksa and not merely by way of following a traditional routine of bare recitation (*aksaragrahana*) The objection that the apportionment of different Śākhās to different persons has come to stay in actual practice of study is easily met It is merely due to considerations of convenience and the circumstance of the inability of men of average ability to traverse all known Śākhās But that cannot be elevated to a principle For, in principle, a twice-born is expected to study the entire Vedic literature together with its esoteric portions, know their meanings and perform all the karmas prescribed in them, to the extent possible M quotes a Smrti as authority in this connection

सर्ववेदोक्तमार्गेण कर्म कुर्वन्ति नित्यश ।
आनन्दो हि फल यस्माच्छाखाभेदो ह्यशक्तिज ।
सर्वकर्मकृतौ यस्मादशक्ताः सर्वजन्तव
शाखाभेद कर्मभेद व्यासस्तस्मादचीक्लृपत
—इति समाचारे[b] सर्वेषामधिकाराच्च
(M BSB iii 3 3)

This extends the right (*adhikāra*) of studying all the Sākhās and performing well all the religious acts according to them to all the twice-born, each according to his capacity

The practice of confining one's Svādhyāya to particular Śākhās in common practice does not, therefore, come in the way of Adhikārins of a superior order like highly qualified souls such as the Rṣis and the Devas diving deeply into the entire body of Śruti literature commensurate with their capacity

The next Sūtra *Salilavacca tanniyamah* (iii 3 4) meets another objection to the stand taken by the Siddhāntin that if only one who knows B as described in the entire body of Śrutis is eligible to enter upon Dhyāna, all those of a lower level of competency who cannot

23 The expression *tathatvam* in this Sutra is a paraphrase of *aviseṣat* in Sutra iii 3 1 This is well brought out in M's *bhasya* by the statement that the Svadhyayavidhi is a *Samanyavidhi* (i e सर्वाधिकारिसाधारण)

23b- समाचार is satisfactory performance सम्यगनुष्ठानम —*BD* iii.3 3 It is not the name of any particular work Ragh *TDP* suggests that the words of the pratijna in the first Sutra are to be had by *anuvrtti* and read after *Samācāre adhikaracca*

सर्ववेदोक्तज्ञान सर्वेषामधिकाराच्च सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्यय ब्रह्म ।

manage to study and reflect on all the known Śākhās will have to miss the chance of going in for Dhyāna and attain Mokṣa. The reply is that the injunction to study and reflect on the entire body of Śrutis is to be understood on the analogy of the general principle that the waters of all rivers find their way to the Sea, where they are not impeded in their course by obstacles or get diverted. In the same way, Adhikārins of superior intelligence and equipment will be in a position to study and reflect on the entire body of Śrutis, for purposes of contemplation of B while men of less endowment or opportunities will have to be content with the study and reflection according to their fitness and enter upon Dhyāna and qualify for Mokṣa.[24] This is confirmed by a passage from the *Āgneya:*

यथा नदीनां सलिलं शक्ये सागरगं भवेत्
एवं वाक्यानि सर्वाणि पुंशक्त्या ब्रह्मवित्तये ॥ (Q. M. *BSB.* iii.3.4)

"As the water of all the rivers find their way, wherever possible, to the sea, so too all statements of the Śrutis, lead to an adequate measure of knowledge of B. according to the ability of persons". This is reinforced by the last Sūtra which cites relevant authority.[25]

Śāaṁkara's Interpretation
Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇam (iii.3.1-4)

S. renders the opening Sūtra as follows: "The forms of knowledge[26] validated[27] by all the Vedāntic texts are identical, because there

24 न मन्दानां ध्यानाभावप्राप्तिः । यथा खलु सर्वासामपां समुद्र एकायनम् (*Brh. Up.* ii 4.11) इति नियमः प्रतिबन्धाभावसंश्रयैव, तन्वतिवृद्धः, एवं सर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण ध्यानेच्छुना ब्रह्म ज्ञातव्यमिति पुरुषशक्त्यपेक्षमिति भावः (*TP* iii 3 4) Note that S and others read 'Savavacca' for 'Salilavacca' (M)

25 M's Bhāṣya here cites the following:
सर्वेषु वेदेषु परमो हि देवो
जिज्ञास्योऽसौ नान्यवेदे प्रसिद्ध्येत् ।
तस्मादेतं सर्ववेदानधीत्य
विचार्य च ज्ञातुमिच्छेत् मुमुक्षुः ॥
इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम् ।
सर्वान् वेदान् सेतिहासान् सपुराणान् सयुक्तिकान् ।
सतर्कतन्त्रान् विज्ञाय विष्णुर्ज्ञेयो न चान्यथा ॥
इति ब्रह्मतर्के (Q. M *BSB* iii 3 5)

26 'Vijñānāni' are the Vidyās or Upasanās taught in the Vedānta texts.

27 The rendering of '*pratyayam*' in *Sarvavedāntapratyayam* as "intimated" or "described" in all Vedānta texts given by Thibaut, Radhakrishnan and Viresvarananda, according to S's c., does not bring out the precise meaning of the term as intended by S "Sarvavedantapratyayam" is a Bahuvrīhi cpd. qualifying "Vijnānam" which is to be *understood* (in the plural) to be the grammatical subject of the Sautra proposition which has further to be connected with its predicated "are identical" अभिन्नानि also *to be supplied.* That "pratyaya" is used in the sense of "validity" (of the Vijnanas in question) is clear from the explanation:
सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययानि सर्ववेदान्तप्रमाणानि विज्ञानानि तानि तान्येव ie यान्येकस्मिन् वेदान्ते, तान्येव सर्ववेदान्तेष्वपीति (S *BSB* iii 3 2)

is no difference among them in respect of the criteria of such oneness recognized by the PMS ii 4 9 viz of injunction, conection with results, nomenclature and outline of form

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that these Vidyās or meditations taught in the various Upaniṣadic texts are all different and are not identical and the details found in one cannot, therefore, be combined with those of another They differ in their description, names, forms and results promised[28] To quote an example, while the Chandogas mention only five fires in the Pancāgnividyā (*Chān Up* v 10 10), the Vājasaneyins add a sixth (*Brh Up* vi 2 14) The *Mund Up* dealing with Brahmavidyā mentions the rite of carrying the sacred fire on the head by the student As this observance is found only among Ātharvanikas, the Brahmavidyā taught in this Up must be different from the others taught in other Upanisads[29] Moreover, if the vidyās described in different sākhās are *not* different, but the same, it will be impossible to supplement and unify the details of a given Vidyā from all the Śākhās where is it found described, for purposes of Upāsanā, for it will be virtually impossible for any one to study all the Śākhās and know all the divergences among the respective Vidyās and coordinate their details for purposes of meditation If one can coordinate details of Vidyās from Śākhās not at all studied by him, the Adhyayanavidhi too requiring the study of one's own Sākhā will lose its point This difficulty can only be overcome by admitting that the Vidyās taught in the different Śākhās are all of them distinct and different from one another and that the study of one's own Śākhā is all that is expected of any one and that, therefore, each Vidyā or Upāsanā is a self-complete one without standing in need of any coordination of details of the kind fancied by the Siddhāntin[30]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that in spite of minor differences of detail, the Vidyās taught in all the Upanisads pertaining to Prāna or B are the same in essentials That being so the discrepancies found in one or more Śākhās on a comparison of their recitals with reference to parti-

28 अस्ति चात्र विज्ञानेष्वन्यदन्यन्नाम तैत्तिरीयक वाजसनेयक कौथुमक कौषीतक शाट्यायनकमित्येवमादि (S BSB iii.3 1)

29 अस्ति चात्र धर्मविशेष यथा आथर्वणिकाना शिरोव्रतमिति (ibid)

30 अशक्यत्वच– न ह्येक पुरुष सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययामिमकामुपासनामुपसहर्तु शक्नोति। सर्ववेदान्ताध्ययनासामर्थ्यात् अनधीतार्थोपसहारेऽध्ययनविधानवैयर्थ्यप्रसगात्। न प्रतिशाख भेदे तूपासनायामय दोष (Bhāmati iii 3 1)

cular Vidyās have to be made good by supplying the omissions and arriving at a proper alignment. Notwithstanding the mention of the additional fire in *Bṛh. Up.*, the five fires are recognised in both the Upaniṣads in the same form. The minor discrepancy in regard to the sixth fire cannot take away the unity of the Vidyā even as the option allowed in the use of the Ṣoḍaśī cup in the Atirātra sacrifice makes no difference, either way, to the Atirātra itself as such.[31] Anyway, the mention of the sixth fire in the *Bṛh. Up.* is only for purposes of removing the fanciful assumption of fuel, smoke etc., which runs thro' the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and others are imaginatively identified for purposes of Upāsanā. The sixth fire is not enjoined as an object of meditation. It is mentioned as a remark about what has already been said about the physical fire to which the dead body of the departed soul is consigned.[32]

The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute prescribed only for those who have to acquire the Brahmavidyā with the help of the Upaniṣad belonging to the Ātharvaṇa school. The Vidyā becomes fruitful only when acquired under the condition of Śirovrata set for its acquisition, thro' the particular work. The same Brahmavidyā acquired by the Chandogas or others without fulfilling the condition of Śirovrata becomes equally fruitful.[33] The Śirovrata is thus a condition attached to the study of the Ātharvaṇa work (the *Muṇḍaka Up.*) and has nothing to do with Brahmavidyā as such. This is clear from the rite of Śirovrata being mentioned as exclusive to the Ātharvaṇikas in the work called *Samācāra* treating of Vedic observances. This limitation of Śirovrata is like the seven homas from the Saurya to the Śataudana which are enjoined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvaveda, who maintain the single fire called Ekāgni. They are not connected with the three fires maintained by the followers of the others Vedas.[34]

The practical difficulties in studying all the known Śākhās in addition to ones's own is not a sufficient reason to dispute the unity of the respective Vidyās. Tho' the Svādhyāyavidhi is strictly limited to

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31 यद्यपि षष्ठस्याग्नेरग्रहणं न भवति, तथापि द्युप्रभृतीनां पञ्चानामग्नीनां उभयत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् न विद्याभेदः। नहि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयोरतिरात्रो भिद्यते। (*Bhāmati* iii.3.1)

32 वाजसनेयिनस्तु भाषादिविषयस्याग्निकल्पनानुवृत्तायां समिद्धूमादिकल्पनाया निवृत्तये 'तस्याग्निरेवाग्निर्भवति, समित् समित्' इत्यादि समामनन्ति, स नित्यानुवादः (S. *BSB.* iii 3 2)

33. यैराथर्वणिकग्रन्थाध्ययनं विद्या वेदितव्या तेषामेव शिरोव्रतपूर्वाध्ययनप्राप्तग्रन्थवासितैर्ज्ञाता फलं प्रयच्छति, नान्येषाम्। अन्येषां तु छान्दोग्यादीनां सैव विद्या अर्थाच्छिरोव्रतेनापि फलदा इत्याथर्वणग्रन्थाध्ययनसंबन्धादवगम्यते (*Bhāmati* iii 3.3)

34. यथा च सवा सप्त सौर्यादयः शतौदनपर्यन्ता वेदान्तरोदितत्रेताग्न्यसंबन्धात् आथर्वणोदितैकाग्निसंबन्धाच्चाथर्वणिकानामेव नियम्यन्त (S. *BSB* iii 3 3)

one's own Śākhā one can always learn the details of respective Vidyās described in other Śākhās from the knowers thereof and coordinate them[35]

The concluding Sūtra is interpreted as follows The Veda declares the identity of Vidyās described in the different Upanisadic texts as all of them present the object of knowledge as one—the same B This is clear from the pronouncements 'That goal which all the Vedas declare" (*Katha Up.* 1.2.15) "Him only the Bahvrcas meditate upon in the great Uktha, Him the Adhvaryus in the sacred fire, Him the Sāmavedins in the Mahāvrata ceremony" (*AĀ* iii 2 3.12)[36]

Criticism

It is curious that S should have invoked the Pūrva Mīmāmsā criteria of '*Codanāviśesa*[37] etc, to establish identity of Vidyās and meditations of B laying aside, for the nonce, his dogma of B not being the object of any injunctions[38] The way in which the *Bhāmatī* limits the adhyayana to one's own Śākhā and explains the possibility of Upasamhāra of other details from other Śākhās thro' information supplied by others is far from happy For, orthodox tradition frowns upon acquisition of knowledge of Vedas except thro' self-study and has always recognized it as a broad principle that the entire Vedic lore is expected to be studied by everyone to the best of his ability and opportunities If we are to take the *Bhāmatī* at its word, one may as well get all the information about the contents of one's own Śākhā, too, from others who have studied it and save oneself the trouble of its personal study! The proper way of containing the objection against the impossibility of one's studying all the Śākhās is to recognize the duty of Sarvaśākhādhyayana, *in principle*, side by side with the gradation of Adhikārins in regard to such study and powers of Gunopasamhāra

In Saguna Vidyās, it is the qualified B that has to be recognized as the object of knowledge and meditation Such a qualified being

35 अशक्तिरपि न भेदहेतु । स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति स्वशाखायामध्ययननियम । ततश्च शाखान्तरीयानर्थानन्येभ्य तद्विद्येभ्योऽधिगम्योपसंहरिष्यति (*Bhamatī* iii 3 4)

36 दर्शयति च वेदोऽपि विद्यैकत्व सर्ववेदान्तेषु वेद्यैकत्वोपदेशात् सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति इति । तथा एत ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते एतमग्नावध्वर्यव एत महाव्रते छन्दोगा इति च (S *BSB* iii 3 4)

37 एकं वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याविशेषात् (*PMS* iii 4 9)

38 Anticipating this difficulty, the *Bhāmatī* has tried to construe *Codana* in the sense of the effort or activity put forth by the individual This is also objected to by the *STC*
चोदनाशब्दस्य विधौ रूढत्वेन, प्रयत्नपरत्वायोगात । यागादिविषयप्रयत्नस्य तदनुकूलपरिस्पन्दादीनामनुमेयत्वेऽपि इह विद्याविषयकप्रयत्नस्यानुमापकत्वाभावाच्च
It will be seen that M is in a position to take 'Codanā' in the accepted sense of '*Vidhi*'

cular Vidyas have to be made good by supplying the omissions and arriving at a proper alignment Notwithstanding the mention of the additional fire in *Brh Up*, the five fires are recognised in both the Upanisads in the same form The minor discrepancy in regard to the sixth fire cannot take away the unity of the Vidyā even as the option allowed in the use of the Ṣodasi cup in the Atirātra sacrifice makes no difference, either way, to the Atirātra itself as such[31] Any way, the mention of the sixth fire in the *Brh Up* is only for purposes of removing the fanciful assumption of fuel, smoke etc, which runs thro the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and others are imaginatively identified for purposes of Upāsanā The sixth fire is not enjoined as an object of meditation It is mentioned as a remark about what has already been said about the physical fire to which the dead body of the departed soul is consigned[32]

The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute prescribed only for those who have to acquire the Brahmavidyā with the help of the Upanisad belonging to the Ātharvana school The Vidyā becomes fruitful only when acquired under the condition of Śirovrata set for its acquisition, thro the particular work The same Brahmavidyā acquired by the Chandogas or others without fulfilling the condition of Śirovrata becomes equally fruitful[33] The Śirovrata is thus a condition attached to the study of the Ātharvana work (the *Mundaka Up*) and has nothing to do with Brahmavidyā as such This is clear from the rite of Śirovrata being mentioned as exclusive to the Ātharvanikas in the work called *Samācāra* treating of Vedic observances This limitation of Śirovrata is like the seven homas from the Saurya to the Śataudana which are enjoined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvaveda who maintain the single fire called Ekāgni They are not connected with the three fires maintained by the followers of the others Vedas[34]

The practical difficulties in studying all the known Sakhās in addition to ones s own is not a sufficient reason to dispute the unity of the respective Vidyās Tho the Svādhyāyavidhi is strictly limited to

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31 यद्यपि षष्ठस्याग्नेरुपसंख्या न भवति तथापि छन्दोगानां वाजसनेयिनां च उभयत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् न विद्याभेदः । नहि षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणाभ्यामतिरात्रो भिद्यते । (*Bhamati* iii 3 1)

32 वाजसनेयिनस्तु षष्ठमप्यग्निं पञ्चाग्नित्वनुवृत्तौ समिद्धूमादिकल्पनाया निवृत्तये 'तस्याग्निरेवाग्निर्भवति समित् समित्' इत्यादि समामनन्ति स नित्यानुवादः (S BSB iii 3 2)

33 यद्यप्याथर्वणिकानां शिरोव्रतवतामेव विद्या फलवती तथापि न विद्याभेदः । यथा तु छान्दोग्यानामनैव विद्या शिरोव्रतवतां फलवती ... (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 3)

34 यथा च सवाः सप्त सौर्यादयः शतौदनपर्यन्ता बाह्याग्न्याहिताग्निसंबन्धाद् आथर्वणिकानामेव नियम्यन्ते (S BSB iii 3 3)

one's own Śākhā one can always learn the details of respective Vidyās described in other Śākhās from the knowers thereof and coordinate them [35]

The concluding Sūtra is interpreted as follows The Veda declares the identity of Vidyās described in the different Upanisadic texts as all of them present the object of knowledge as one—the same B This is clear from the pronouncements "That goal which all the Vedas declare" (*Katha Up* 1 2.15) "Him only the Bahvrcas meditate upon in the great Uktha, Him the Adhvaryus in the sacred fire, Him the Sāmavedins in the Mahāvrata ceremony" (*AĀ* iii 2 3 12) [36]

Criticism

It is curious that S should have invoked the Purva Mimāmsā criteria of '*Codanāviśesa*[37] etc , to establish identity of Vidyās and meditations of B laying aside, for the nonce, his dogma of B not being the object of any injunctions [38] The way in which the *Bhāmatī* limits the adhyayana to one's own Śākhā and explains the possibility of Upasamhāra of other details from other Śākhās thro' information supplied by others is far from happy For, orthodox tradition frowns upon acquisition of knowledge of Vedas except thro' self-study and has always recognized it as a broad principle that the entire Vedic lore is expected to be studied by everyone to the best of his ability and opportunities If we are to take the *Bhāmatī* at its word, one may as well get all the information about the contents of one's own Śākhā, too, from others who have studied it and save oneself the trouble of its personal study! The proper way of containing the objection against the impossibility of one's studying all the Śākhās is to recognize the duty of Sarvaśākhādhyayana, *in principle*, side by side with the gradation of Adhikārins in regard to such study and powers of Gunopasamhāra

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चोदनाशब्दस्य विधौ रूढत्वेन, प्रयत्नपरत्वायोगात । यागादिविषयप्रयत्नस्य तदनुकूलरसदादीनामनुमेयत्वेऽपि इह विद्याविषयप्रयत्नस्यानुमापकत्वाभावाच्च

It will be seen that M is in a position to take 'Codana' in the accepted sense of *Vidhi*

(*viśiṣṭa*) is necessarily different in each case In the circumstances, difference of Vidyās and Upāsanās, corresponding to difference in the nature and attributes of the object known, will *have to be conceded.* This makes the Siddhānta view of identity of Vidyās *unsustainable*

The attempt to force these vidyās into oneness, serves no genuine purpose [39] The combination of attributes mentioned in other Śākhās for the purpose of Upasamhāra cannot by itself be an adequate purpose, for, just as the failure to study other Śākhās is not regarded as a drawback, not combining the attributes from other Śākhās need not be a foible The *Bhāmati* itself has conceded the point that the same Vidyā is fruitful with reference to the Ātharvanikas when studied after fulfilling the Śirovrata and without it for the followers of other Vedas In the same way, the Upāsanā of B with the attributes of *satyam jñānam anantam* for the followers of the Taittiriya Śākhā and with the attributes of *vijñāna* and *ānanda* for the Vājasameyins can both be admitted to be equally fruitful

Śamkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

S's interpretation of the first Sūtra itself suffers from three major defects (i) It gives an unusual sense of *pramāna* (authority, validity) to the expression pratyaya [40] (ii) Since the phrase *Sarvavedāntapratyayam* is adjectival, the subject of the proposition has to be supplied —which is done by introducing 'Vijnānam' and later changing it into the plural *Vijnānāni*, by adhyāhāra, to suit the exigencies of the interpretation [41] It is pertinent to remark that if the Sūtrakāra really intended to establish the oneness of the Vidyās described by all the Vedānta texts, he would, in the first place, have used the correct expression '*Sarvavedāntapratyayāni*' Why has he used the unaccountable singular instead, which can agree only with a singular noun? Does not the singular form indicate that the subject of the proposition moved by the Sūtrakāra are not the different Vidyās or meditations described in the Upaniṣads but is an entity or being which is 'one'? (iii) After externally introducing the subject of the proposition thro' *adhyāhāra*, S resorts to *another adhyāhāra* in respect of the predicate

39 It may be noted that in M's view the *Upasana* of B has to be carried on in terms of Guṇapurnatva to the extent possible for each Adhikāri. Gunopasamhara in this sense has a meaning and purpose In S's view, on the other hand the attributes pressed into service for purposes of Upasana are not real and are only superimposed for the nonce, on the object of meditation. See Chap XXII fn 21

40 See fn 27 *ante*

41 [illegible] (S *BSB* iii 3 1)

viz *abhinnāni* (are non different)[42] All this contrasts unfavorably with the smooth and natural way in which B which has been referred to by the term *'pūrvam'* in the closing Sutra of the preceding Pāda has been made the subject of the proposition in M's interpretation[43] Or, in view of the identity of interest between this adhi and *Tattu samanvayāt* (1.1 4) 'Tat' or B would readily suggest itself as the subject of the proposition

S's commentary on the fourth Sūtra here shows a readiness to extend the benefit of the oneness of the object of meditations beyond the limits of the Upaniṣads also In view of this, his way of understanding the use of the expression *'anta* after *'Veda'* so as to restrict the scope of such identity of Vidyās to those met with in the Upaniṣads alone and his construing the term 'Vedānta' in iii 3 1 accordingly, are inadmissible This impropriety is avoided in M's interpretation, where the expression *'anta'* in *Vedānta'* here has been understood in the specialized sense of the settled conclusions (of *Gita* ii 16) of the Vedic lore[44]

As most of the objections against the oneness of Vidyās resting on discrepancy of details etc among them can be set at rest on the basis of established rulings of the Pūrva Mimāmsā, there is no need to consider them here in the absence of *adhikāsankās.* Those put up by S are not strong enough

In view of the disapproval of Upasanās thro superimposition expressed in the Smrtis, it is not possible to accept S's explanation that the reference to the sixth fire is to cut short the 'fanciful assumption' regarding fuel, smoke etc as the five fires

The interpretation of the third Sūtra is open to the following objections (i) While the expression *tathātvena* in Sutra 3 read in conjunction with 'Svādhyāyasya' can readily be understood in sense of

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42 तानि तायत्र (S *BSB* iii 3 1)

43 पूर्वसूत्र पूर्वपदोक्त ब्रह्म मदवदनिणयनापाद्यज्ञानविषय (*TP* iii 3 1)
also cf बादरायणस्त्वाचाय पूर्वोक्तमत्रेश्वर फलहेतु मयत (S *BSB* iii 2 41)

44 Failing to see the rationale of M's interpretation of this word in this context of the Upasanapada V S Ghate attributes it to M s difficulty in 'finding support in the Upaniṣads for his own doctrine (*Op cit* p 156) It is an interpretation to be judged entirely on its merits of being true to the genuine spirit of the Vedic lore There is no question of Dualistic or monistic doctrine involved in it It is also necessary to prevent the unwisdom of restricting the unity of Brahmavidyas to the Upaniṣads alone *after* recognizing the presence of such meditations of B in the Karmakaṇda parts connected with the preoccupations of the Bahvṛcas the Adhvaryus and the Chandogas in regard to the Uktha the fire and the Mahavrata See fn 36

recognizing the study of all Vedic lore, in principle,[45] S's interpretation of 'Svādhyāya' keeps it confined to the study of the Upaniṣad of the Ātharvaṇikas only, as is clear from his C स्वाध्यायस्यैव धर्मं (न विद्याया)

But the wording Svādhyāyasya in the Sūtra is too general and non-committal to necessitate a reference to the rite of Śirovrata practised by the followers of a particular Vedic Śākhā—viz the Ātharvaṇikas We need a more substantial clue in the wording of Sūtra 3, to accept S's finding that this Sūtra is trying to overthrow an objection against the unity of Vidyās, brought up on the ground that a certain Brahmavidyā described in the *Muṇḍ Up* is exclusively connected with the observance of the Śirovrata distinctive to the followers of the Atharvaveda (ii) The words *Samācāre* and *adhikārāt* are syntactically kept apart and each is expanded into a separate sentence, *with a generous measure of importations* It is doubtful if the term 'Samācāra' is really intended to refer to a work of that name Nowhere else has the Sūtrakāra made a specific reference to any particular (Smṛti) work *by name* Nor has S cited the *ipsissima verba* of the reported statement from that work, to clinch the issue[46] There is no consensus as to what Śirovrata really stands for It appears from a quotation given by M that it is merely the fulfilment of the obligation to one's own Veda in the first instance which alone gives one the right to study the other Vedas and carry out all the ceremonies and spiritual disciplines taught in all of them. If this interpretation of Śirovratam is accepted, its restriction to the followers of the Atharvaveda can no longer be sustained and the whole argument will fall to the ground (iii) S and other commentators read *Savavacca tanniyamah* as part of the third Sūtra and as supplying an illustration of the main point of the Sūtra that the Śirovrata is a precondition for the study of the Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad alone and does not constitute a part of the initiation into the Vidyā The linking of the seven homas with a distinctive appurtenance of the Ātharvaṇikas like the Ekāgni establishes their exclusive connection with them But the Śirovrata itself is not so linked with any such appendage of the Ātharvaṇikas to justify the analogy drawn Bereft of this analogical connection, the words *Savavacca tanniyamah* cease to be a part of the earlier part of Sūtra 3 In consequence, one may have to modify the reading of Savavacca, and treat it as a separate Sūtra[47]

The object of knowledge in the 'Vedas' (taken in the sense of the Saṁhitās and the Karmakāṇḍa portions) and the object of knowledge

45 See Chap XXIII p 219

46 What R has cited admits of a different explanation also

47 [illegible] (*STC* iii 3 1-5)

in the 'Vedānta' or the Upaniṣads, are not the same, according to S In the circumstances, it is highly inconsistent with his position to say under the fourth Sūtra that the 'Veda' also establishes the oneness of all Vidyās in the Vedānta and cite the passage *Sarve Vedā yat padam āmananti* in support While the expression *sarve vedāh* may *include* the Upanisads, it cannot *exclude* the Vedas—its Samhitās and Karmakānda parts S compromises his position, still further, by citing the famous passage from the *AĀ* (iii 2 3 12) which refers to the Supreme B as the object of meditation of the *Rgvedic priests* in the Uktha, of the Adhvaryus in the fire and of the Chandogas in the Mahāvrata ceremony These are all connected with the Karmakānda of the Vedas and have nothing to do, in S's view, with the Jñānakānda or the Upanisads and its B

When S talks of the oneness of Vidyās thro' oneness of their object of knowledge, he means by it the Nirguna B alone[48] The Saguna Brahma Vidyās are, therefore, in reality, different from one another This is the glaring truth With what show of reason then, can S say in the preamble to the opening Sūtra of this adhi that the discussion about the unity of Vidyās, raised here, has for its object only the Saguna B[49]?

The *Bhāmatī* tries to rescue S from this awkward position by making the desperate suggestion that even tho' the Veda does not directly pronounce the Saguna Vidyās to be one, they may be presumed to do so in so far as some of them found in the vicinity of Nirguna Vidyās can be blended with them By resort to analogy even the other Saguṇa Vidyās not so situated can be treated as one, just as when a person's name is found among those of VIPs he too is presumed to be one[50]

This is wishful thinking The presumption cannot be conceded as there is no such thing as a Nirguna Vidyā occurring in the proximity of a Saguna Vidyā The text *Saksī cetā kevalo nirgunasca (Śvet Up.* vi 11) cannot be pointed out as one such Nirguna Vidyā, for the very epithets Sākṣi, Cetā and Kevala imply the attributes of being the witness, knower, being the inner ruler of all etc

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48 Cf ननु सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति इति वाक्य यदैक्यद्वारेण विद्यैक्यप्रदर्शनं निर्गुणब्रह्मविषयं कथमनेन सगुणविद्यैक्यसिद्धि ? (*Kalpataru* iii 3 4)

49 See Chap XXII f.n 20

50 यद्यपि सगुणब्रह्मविद्यानां न साक्षात् वेद एकत्वमाह तासामपि तत्प्रायपठितानां तद्विद्यानां प्रायपाठादेकत्वमेव । तथा ह्यप्रप्राय लिखितं दृष्ट्वा भवेदयमपि इति बुद्धिरिति (*Bhamati* iii 3 4)

Rāmānuja's Interpratation

R. also considers Savavacca * * * * as part of Sūtra 3 but includes the Sūtra उपसंहारो,*** as part of the first adhi. To him also the theme of the adhis. here is, by and large, one of unity or difference of Vidyās, the former for purposes og Guṇopasamhāra and the latter for restrictive utilization of the attributes.[51] Tho' R. observes that the purpose of the discussion whether the Vidyās are one or different is to decide the question of Guṇopasamhāra or Guṇavikalpa with reference to the Upāsanā of B., the instrusion of certain *adhi.*s exclusively devoted to Prāṇa cannot be properly accounted for. While he is able to retain the singular form of Sarvavedāntapratyayam by holding *upāsanam* to be the subject of the adjectival clause and thereby is able to free himself from the awkwardness of changing the singular to the plural as in S.,[52] he is equally under the necessity to import the predicate *'ekam'* to secure the desired sense. His commentator justifies this in the light of the incorporation, in the opening Sūtra, of 'Codanā' and other grounds mentioned in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra—as the criteria for deciding the oneness of Karmas.[53]

Like S., R. also does not recognize the study of other Sākhās as a precondition of Upasaṁhāra of attributes, in principle. He interprets the Sūtra *Darśayati ca* (iii.3.4) that as *Chān. Up.* (viii.1.1) mentions the eight attributes of *apahatapāpmatva* of B. etc. to be medicated upon and the *Mah. N. Up.* (x.2.3) referring to this same declaration, says 'What is within the small space is to be meditated upon' without mentioning the eight attributes to be meditated upon, this necessitates the coordination of the attributes and this in its turn establishes the unity of the two Vidyās in the two Śākhās which will not be in order without conceding the necessity of studying other Śākhās besides one's own. If knowledge of other Śākhās can be gathered from others who have read them, the same short cut can be availed of in respect of one's own Śākha too and its study dispensed with. As the main point of the Siddānta Sūtra is the oneness of the Vidyās, it is natural to expect the Sūtra: *Darśayati ca* to directly establish such oneness by citing evidence instead of suggesting that without Guṇopasamhāra, in the manner indicated, such unity cannot be established.

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51. इदानीं ब्रह्मोपासनानां गुणोपसंहारविकल्पनिर्णयाय विद्याभेदाभेदचिन्ता प्रस्तूयते (*Śrībhaṣya* iii.3 1)
52. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमेकमुपासनम्; चोदनाद्यविशेषात् (*Śrībhaṣya* iii 3 1)
53. कर्मैक्यसूत्रस्मारणपरत्वात् तत्रस्य एकमिति पदमध्याहर्तव्यम् (*Śrutaprakāsa* iii 3 1)

CHAPTER XXIV

BRAHMAN TO BE MEDITATED UPON BY COMBINING ALL EXCELLENCES AND ABSENCE OF IMPERFECTIONS.

2. *Upasamhārādhikaraṇam.* (iii.3.6-9)

This ādhi. establishes that the contemplation of B. is to be practised by combining all the attributes of B. from the whole range of Vedic literature. This it does by disposing of what may be regarded as a formidable objection that the kind of contemplation envisaged by the Siddhāntin viz. by combining all the countless attributes and excellences of B. and bringing them all simultaneously under a single act of intellection[1] is impossible of achievement like crossing the ocean by bodily jumping over it. The Pūrvapakṣa therefore contends that the Upāsanā-vidhis couched in unrestricted terms such as: "The Supreme Being higher than the highest is to be contemplated as described in all the Vedas together with the Itihāsas, Purāṇas and Pañcarātras and as possessing all the excellences revealed in their various parts," have, therefore, to be summarily restricted to a few manageable attributes only from one's own Śākhā. While it may be possible to *know* B. as possessed of countless attributes or *know* a large number of them, as their knowledge arises in the mind only thro' their successive combination, the case is different with simultaneous mental comprehension of all them in one single act.[2] The restriction of meaning of terms in

1 उपसंहारो युगपद् बुद्ध्यारोपणं, तेन तत्पूर्वकं ध्यानं गृह्यते (*TDP.* iii 3 6)

2 ईश्वरः सर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण ज्ञातव्य एव, न तु सर्वगुणानुपसंहृत्य ध्यातव्यः। तथाविधध्यानस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अतः सर्ववेदोक्तप्रकारेण ध्यानायोगात् तदर्थमुक्तं सर्वज्ञानं स्वधर्मिणि ज्ञानं तु क्रमभावित्वात् शक्यमेव। (*TP.* iii 3 6)

such cases is observed in such instances as *'Sarvebhyah (kāmebhyo) darsapūrnamāsau', 'Sa sarvavid bhavati'* Moreover, the Śruti, *Ātmetyevopāsīta* recognizes that one should meditate on B as 'Ātman' only, rules out meditation of other attributes The scholastic tradition also recognizes separate Vidyās such as Parovariyastva, Vaiśvānara, Śāndilya and Pañcāgni The differences can be explained only if the restriction of meaning of Sarva is agreed to, so that only the attributes actually mentioned in the different Vidyās may be contemplated by those eligible to practise them. It cannot be argued that in the context of a particular Vidyā all the attributes are intended to be indicated by Upalakṣana and that in this way, the meditation of all the attributes becomes duly authenticated If this explanation is accepted, it would render superfluous the mention of other attributes like *Udgīthatva* in the context of the Parovariyastvavidyā. By the same token, other attributes in other Prakaranas also will share the same fate[3]

There is also another difficulty If the expression "all" is not restricted in its scope, one will have to include in meditation such attributes as "weeping" which are ascribed to B in some Vedic passages like *So'rodit* (*T S* i 5 1) But this cannot be acceptable to the Siddhāntin as afflictions are incompatible with Divine supremacy and, therefore, regarded as non-existent in B and the meditation on what is non-existent is tabooed in the Siddhānta[3a]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sutra *Upasamhāro'rthābhedad vidhisesavat samāne ca* 'Sarvaveda" comes over by *anuvrtti* from iii 3 1 and is construed with 'upasamhārah' after being placed in the genitive[4] The term *'arthābhedat'* is likewise syntactically connected with 'upsamhārah (kartavyah)[5]

सर्ववेदानामर्थाभेदात् उपसहार (कर्तव्य)

(*M BSB* iii 3 6)

The term 'artha' (of Vedas) denotes both the positive (*guna*) and the negative (*doṣabhava*) attributes of B The positive ones are those like reality, omniscience, bliss, satyakāmatva satyasamkalpatva, etc (*Chān Up* viii 7 1) and the negative ones are freedom from the limita-

3 प्रकरणभेदान्नोपसंहारः कार्यः । परोवरीयस्त्वादिषु तावन्न दृष्टत्वम् (*M BSB* iii 3 8)

3a [illegible] (*Śamkarṣa Sutra* q *TP* iii.3 6)

4 सर्ववेदेति षष्ठ्यन्ततयानुवर्तन (*TDP* iii 3 6)

5 अर्थाभेदादुपसंहार इत्यन्वय (Raghu *TPB* iii 3 6)

tions,, evil, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst etc (*Chān Up* viii.7 1)[6]

'Arthābhedāt' is an elliptical ablative meaning 'treating alike, for purposes of Upasamhāra, the positive and the negative attributes, i e to say not leaving out one of them—the negative ones, but combining both the positive and the negative attributes on an equal footing[7]

'Vidhiśeṣavat' conveys that such 'upasamhāra' has to be carried out with the help of subsidiaries (śeṣa)[8]—like the Prayājas connected with the principal Vidhi in respect of Darśapūrnamāsa sacrifices

The last term in the Sūtra *Samāne* (*ca*) used in the sense of '*viṣayasaptamī*' makes the special point in regard to Upasamhāra that it holds true *only*[9] of attributes which are in keeping with Divine majesty This rules out the upasamhāra of attributes like 'weeping'[10], being subject to decapitation (*T Ā* 1 5) referred to in some contexts of the Śruti

समानविषये चोपसहार : । न तु सोऽरोदीत्[11] इत्यादीनाम्
(M *BSB.* iii 3 6)

Thus, the entire Sūtra means "The upasamhāra of attributes from the entire sacred literature should be carried out in B giving equal importance to the positive and negative attributes, subject to the condition that such attributes are in harmony and in keeping with Divine majesty and perfection (*pūrnatva*) and not in any way derogatory to them[12]

The second Sūtra takes up the objection that there are texts to the contrary which restrict upasamhāra to a few attributes only[13] or even to rule out the meditation of any other attribute save '*ātmatva*'.[14] If

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6 अर्थशब्दश्च गुणदोषाभावपर (Raghu *TPB*)
गुणा इति विधिमुखवेद्या वेदोक्तधर्मा दोषाभावा इति निषेधमुखवेद्या (*TP* iii.3 6)
... विधायाविच्छेदेनेति यावत (*STC* iii 3 6)

7 अर्थाभेदादिति ल्यब्लोपनिमित्ता पचमी । सववेदार्थानामभेद
कस्यापि गुणस्य त्यागमकृत्वेत्यर्थ (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 6)

8. शिष्यत इति शेष , कर्मणि घञ (Ragh *TPB*)

9 सूत्रभाष्ययो चशब्द एवार्थ (Ragh *TPB*)

10 'सोऽरोदीत तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम' 'रुद्रस्यात्ति शिर उत्पिपेष' (*T Ā* 1 5) इत्यादौ तदधीनत्वादयंवदित्युक्त-
न्यायेन रोदनस्वातन्त्र्यादय उपसहार्या, न रोदनादय इत्यर्थ (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 6)
नत्वयोग्या रोदनादय (*TP* iii 3 6)

11 समाना भगवति योग्या पूर्णत्वाविरोधिन त एवोपसहर्तव्या । (Ragh *TPB*)
स्मृतौ पूर्णत्वविरोधिन मितभुक्त्वादयो ग्राह्या

12 Cf न युक्तमीशितु किचिदीशत्वस्य विरोधि यत । यदीशत्वविरोधि स्यात्तदेवायुक्तमजसा
ईशत्वस्याविरोधन योजपित्वाखिला प्रमा (*AV* iii 2 adhi 9)
See also Vol I, pp 231-32, 413 14

13 अनुपसहारस्यापि विहितत्वात इति कतिपयमात्रगुणोपसहारस्यापि विहितत्वादित्यर्थ (*AC* iii 3 p 90)

14 अनुपसहारस्येति गुणान्तरानुपसहारस्येत्यर्थ (Vādiraja *TPG* p 146)

this mandate is not heeded one will be guilty of a lapse in one's obligation

अतः सर्वगुणोपसंहारे विहितक्रियालोपप्रसंगात्[15]

(*TP* iii 3 7)

The objection is met by pointing out that there is no specific ban in regard to the meditation any attribute except as provided for already But the text *Ātmetyeyopāsita* does not belong to that category What it means is that B should always be meditated upon as one's Ātman (ruler) and never without the idea of this rulership, in any of our meditations (See *B S* iii 3 16 and iv 1 3)

आत्मेत्येवेत्यवधारणमनात्मत्वनिवृत्त्यर्थम्

(M *BSB* iii 3 7)

The third Sūtra *Na vā prakaraṇabhedāt parovariyastvādivat* (iii 3 8) takes up the objection that it is beyond the capacity of persons to fulfil the condition of having to meditate on all the countless attributes of B, taught in the Vedas thro' upasamhāra and that the well-defined demarcation among Vidyās such as Parovariyastva, Vaiśvānara, etc is evidence of the upāsanā and upasamhāra being limited to the attributes taught in each one's Śākhā alone and nothing else besides

The Sūtra recognizes limitations of Upāsakas and says those who are *not* fit for carrying out sarvaguṇopasamhāra are not called upon to do so It is only those who are capable of it that are called upon to practise it[16] The particle *'vā'* in the Sūtra is, accordingly, to be understood in the sense of a settled option (*vyavasthitavikalpa*) as in respect of the case of the Ṣodasi cup, in the Atirātra (Ragh *TDP* iii 3 6) The different levels of Adhikārins implicit in this answer are made explicit by the Sūtrakāra in the next *adhi*[17]

The concluding Sūtra goes on to show how Adhikārins of the higher order like Nārada in his dialogue with Sanatkumāra in the

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15 [illegible] (*AC* iii 3 p 90)
But see *NV* (iii.3.adhi) Raghu *TPB* (p 402), Ragh *TPB* (iii 3 6)

16 It is recognized in the Siddhanta that among Adhikarins only the four faced Brahma is eligible for sarvaguṇopasamhara and the rest of the gods Ṛṣis etc in descending order are eligible for upasamhara of proportionately less number of attributes Manuṣyottamas are eligible to meditate on only the *four principal attributes* and carry out their upasamhara in their meditation
[illegible] द्विविधः । [illegible] । [illegible]

(Vadiraja *TPG* p 146)

17 [illegible] इति भावः । [illegible] (*STC*)
[illegible] इति भावः (Ragh. *TPB* iii 3 8)

Chān. Up. (vii.1.1-5), to whom all the vidyās taught in the Śrutis are names and attributes of B., are in a position to practise the Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B. mentioned in all the Vidyās in all the Vedas while others of inferior calibre have to be content with the contemplation and upasamhāra of fewer attributes. There is, of course, a definite coordination between the content and range of the upāsanā (and upasamhāra) and its result, in terms of the intensity and joy of the insight obtained—which are *incommunicable.*

Śaṁkara's Interpretation (iii.3.5)

S. constitutes Sūtra 5 as a separate *adhi.* by itself, embodying the outcome of the discussion in the four previous Sūtras, that where there is unity of Vidyā based on common particulars in several Śākhās and no difference in essential matters, all those particulars and attributes are to be combined in meditation.

As this outcome of the unity of Vidyās is going to be applied and elaborated in the Sarvābhedādhi (iii.3.10) and others, there is no need to state it here. The formulation, application and elaboration of the principle of upasamhāra can be combined *without setting apart one adhi. for its bare statement.* This can be compared with M.'s treatment of the Upasamhārādhi. which includes a discussion of other issues connected with Upasamhāra, including objections to it.

The Sūtrakāra's preoccupation in the whole of this Pāda with Guṇopasamhāra is glaringly inconsistent with S.'s Nirguṇa Brahmavāda. The greater is the inconsistency if the guṇas whose combination in Vidyās is called for are to be treated as non-existent in B. *The discussion of the upasamhāra of non-existent attributes of B. can have no place in a seriously undertaken science of truth* (*tattvaśāstram*). If it is all intended as the means to 'Kramamukti'[18], the question will be: What is 'Kramamukti'? Is it the attainment of the Nirguṇa B. by first attaining the Saguṇa; or the attainment of final Mukti thro' the birth of Nirguṇavidyā, by means of Saguṇopāsanā? There is no evidence to show that any such intermediate stage as Saguṇamukti is recognized in the Śrutis. They show that by meditating on B. which is Saguṇa in reality thro' the Dahara vidyā and others one attains the supreme Light of B. and such attainment of the Paraṁjyoti is the final goal and that there is nothing beyond the Paraṁjyoti to be reached. Saguṇopāsanā can never be expected to produce Nirguṇajñāna. It will only harden the dualistic impressions and confirm dualistic predilections of the mind. It will be farfetched to expect Sagunopāsanā to lead to Nirguṇavidyā -

18 क्रममुक्त्यर्थानि च कानिचित् सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण (S. *BSB.* iii 3.1)

thro' the intervention of '*adṛṣṭas*' as there is clear evidence that Saguno-pāsanā itself leads directly to the realization of the Supreme B As it is going to be established, even according to S's own showing, that *ānanda* and all other attributes which *belong to the subject* viz B and *depict its true nature* are to be combined in all places where B is the subject of upāsanā, in the *Anandādhi* (iii 3 11), it will be a contradiction in terms to speak of a Nirgunavidyā anywhere *The whole Pāda devoted to Gunopasamhāra is thus a rebuff to S*

Śamkara's Anyathātvādhikaranam (iii 3 6-8)

According to S this *adhi* deals with cases of *apavāda* or exception to oneness of vidyās [19] Certain vidyās, in spite of agreement in many points are really different on account of difference of subject matter The Udgītha vidyā from the *Bṛh Up* (i 3 7) and *Chān Up* (i 2 7) are taken up for discussion and shown to be different

Pūrvapakṣa

The opening Sūtra presents the Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of their unity In the *Bṛh Up* we read "The gods said to Prāna in the mouth, 'Chant the Udgītha for us and he did so' But in *Chān. Up* we read "then they meditated on Mukhya Prāna as Udgītha" In spite of these different ways of commencement (*upakrama*) the two descriptions show a large number of similarities or points of agreement such as the Devas and Asuras falling out, the consultation as to how to overcome the Asuras, the shattering of the Asuras by Mukhya Prāna like pieces of tiles hurled at a rock. Hence, in the account of the *Chān Up* also Prāna should be deemed to be the producer of udgītha, by resorting to Lakṣanā and the two vidyās treated as the same

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta affirms that in spite of these similarities, the two Vidyās in the Udgītha Brāhmana and the Udgīthādhyāya are *not* one, because of the vital difference in the manner of their commencement (*upakrama*) For, in the *Chān Up*, account the text begins by broaching the meditation of *om* as part of Udgītha, after lauding its virtues, as being the essence of all essences and proceeds to tell with regard to the same syllable om, which is part of Udgītha, the story of the gods and the Asuras Here occurs the statement that they meditated on Udgītha as Mukhya Prāṇa If then, we should take it that the expression Udgītha represents the entire act of worship and not merely its part 'om'

19 [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iii 3 6)

and also that the performer of the worship viz. the Udgātr is said to be meditated upon as Prāna, there is violence to the upakrama and resort to Laksanā

To avoid these two defects in interpretation, it is to be admitted that in the Chān text it is the syllable *om* which is part of udgītha that is required to be meditated on as Prāna and that in the Brh Up. text there being no reason to take it that by the word 'udgītha' only its part om is meant, the entire worship is taken to be directed towards Udgītha only Thus, the two vidyās are different, just as the upāsanās of Udgitha in the same *Chān Up* (i 9 2, i 6 6-8, i 7 5-9) are different, in spite of their identification of the Udgitha with the Supreme B, because in one case the attributes ascribed are Parovariyastva etc while in others it is abiding in the eye, and the Sun The last Sūtra disposes of the objection of identity of names given to both these Vidyās as 'Udgīthavidyā This agreement of names (titles) is not a point of material evidence It is external to the textual materials considered The names are given by ordinary folk for convenience of designation of topics and have no binding force

Criticism

The Siddhānta argument based on *'rūpabheda'* (difference of form) between the two vidyās in this case is likely to land S in difficulties with the acceptance of unity of vidyās by him in three parallel cases of the colloquy of the Prānas in the *Brh Up* (vi 1 1-14) *Chān Up* (v 1 1-15) and *AA* (ii 1 4) These three accounts register striking differences in the manner of upakrama and some other details For example, in *Chāndogya* the Prānas (indriyas) claiming self-superiority appeal to Prajāpati to decide In *Brh. Up* the decision is made by the neuter Brahman and in the *AĀ* by common consent among the Prānas The *AĀ* has also some other distinctive details

To secure unity in these cases the Siddhāntin will have to adopt laksanā in regard to Prajāpati and Brahman and make light of the reference to *Śriyah* in *AĀ* in the *upakrama* In the circumstances, a similar resort to lakssnā by the Pūrvapakṣin cannot be objected to on the sole ground of its being a defect

Even accepting difference of form (*rūpabheda*), the conclusion of difference of Vidyās may still be open to question The vidyās in question cannot be adjudged to be different only by looking to their manner of commencement but taking into account all the relevant details Otherwise, the Antaryāmi Brāhmana in the Kānva and the Mādhyandina recensions will have to be regarded as different vidyās For, be-

tween them, there is difference in the form of the statement: *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan* * * in one and *Yo vijñāne tiṣṭhan* in another, as in *Satyaṁ jñānam anantam* (*Taitt. Up.*) and *Vijñānam ānandam brahma* (*Bṛh. Up.*), in spite of which their unity has been accepted. Differences in the commencement, by option, is possible even in case of unity of vidyās.

Sūtrākṣarārtha Examined

S. has to interpret '*anyathātvam*' here as 'unity of vidyās'. Following, as it does, the Sūtra *upasaṁhāro'rthābhedāt* * * * it can legitimately mean only *anupasaṁhāra*—the contrary of *upasaṁhāra*. That would give striking support ot M.'s way of construing *anyathātvam*. The term *śabda* (in 'śabdāt') is generally used by the Sūtrakāra only in the sense of a Śruti text or authority of *Śabdapramāṇa*. It is a most unusual proceeding to give it the sense of 'difference in upakrama' (*anyathā prakrāntatvam*) as S. is obliged to do.

The interpretation of the second Sūtra here as the Siddhānta is open to question as it is not proper to interpret '*Parovarīyastvādivat* as *a settled example* of difference of Udgīthavidyās in the different places of its occurrence. The use of '*vā*' in Sūtra 7 in addition to '*na*', there, is quite superfluous as no special purpose is served by *vā*.

'*Saṁjñātaḥ*' in the last Sūtra is construed by S. as *saṁjñaikyāt* (on account of identity of name). This is resorting to lakṣaṇā. The Sautra-prātipadika (*Saṁjñā*) is a feminine noun. The reference to it by *tad* (api) (in the same Sūtra) will be incorrect. This makes the interpretation put upon this Sūtra doubtful.

As R.'s interpretation is more or less the same with a slight variation in respect of the first Sūtra, the criticisms apply to his interpretation also.

CHAPTER XXV

UPASAMHĀRA AND ANUPASAMHĀRA ACCORDING TO FITNESS OF ADHIKĀRINS

3. *Prāptyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.10)

This adhi. establishes that it is proper to recognize the two forms of contemplation of B. one by combining all the attributes mentioned in all the Śākhās and the other by not combining all of them,—on the basis of the doctrine of gradation of fitness in respect of Guṇopasamhāra.[1] It arises by way of answering an objection that it is self-contradictory for the Sūtrakāra to have maintained that Guṇopasamhāra *has* to be carried out, in Sūtra 6 and/or may not be, in Sūtra 8. The objection may also be brought up in another way. For the benefit of the largest number of bound souls and in keeping with the accepted demarcation of Vidyās and contexts of Upāsanā, one should not insist on Upasamhāra, much more so upasamhāra of *all the countless attributes* of B. in Upāsanā.[2] The issues to be decided in this connection are, therefore, whether the combination or non-combination of attributes in upāsanā spoken of in Sūtras 6 and 8 are to be carried out or not. That leads to the other question whether the concurrent option of upasamhāra and anupasamhāra can be explained with reference to different orders of Adhikārins and if so what authority there is for recognizing such a gradation of adhikāra.

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1 अत्र प्रागुक्तगुणोपसंहारानुपसंहारपूर्वकध्यानयोरधिकारिभेदेन युक्तत्वसमर्थनात् सङ्गतिः (Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali* iii 3 Adhi 3)

2 सर्वानुपसंहार एव बह्वनुग्रहाय प्रकरणभेदनिर्वाहाय चाभिमतः स्यात्, ननु सर्वोपसंहारः, अनवच्छिन्नत्वात् प्रकरणभेदानुपपत्तेश्चेति शङ्कनात् सङ्गतिः (*STC.* iii 3 10)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is

केषाचिदुपसहार : सामस्त्येन भवेदिह ।
सर्वेषामविशेषत्वात् न चेत्कस्यापि नैव स : ॥

(*STC*)

"If some persons (can) practise Upasamhāra of all the countless attributes of B, all can do it If all are not able to do it no one can do it" If it is said that the option will be settled by eligibility, the question will arise as how the eligibility itself is to be ascertained None of us has any foreknowledge of his eligibility for upasamhāra or anupasamhāra If it is to be made known by a Guru who knows it, that will be a vain hope for no such Guru can be found in spite of one's best efforts If, then, we are to start the Upāsanā when such a Guru turns up and puts us in possession of knowledge of our eligibility, we shall have to take a long long holiday, indeed, till then[3] But the Śāstra exhorts one not to miss śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna even for a single day[4] The belief that the completeness of Mokṣa is related to the measure and range and quality of upāsanās of different orders of Adhikārins is unsustainable There cannot be different orders of completeness in Moksa It must be the same for all. It would thus be a waste of time and energy to trouble oneself about Sarvaguṇopasamhāra, which is bound to remain an unrealizable ideal for all time[5] It should thus be enough for the seeker to *know* that B is all-perfect and endowed with countless attributes mentioned in the Śrutis It is neither possible nor necessary to bring them all under upasamhāra at the same time

Moreover, we can talk of option only where the same fruit or result is attainable by different means of equal efficacy as in *Vrihibhir yojeta, yavair yajeta.* It has been argued that Mokṣa must be the same for all In the circumstances, no one is likely to overexert himself with Sarvagunopasamhāra The Vikalpa or option is thus pointless

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B and non-upasamhāra are both possible and understandable in relation to the

3 तादृशगुरोरन्वेषणेऽप्यलाभात् । यदा तल्लाभस्तदारम्भ भविष्यतीति चेत्, तर्हि इदानीं तूष्णींभाव प्राप्नोति (*STC*)

4 श्रवणादि विना नैव क्षण तिष्ठति कर्हिचित् ।
अत्ययस्य तु निद्रादौ पुनरेव समाचरेत् ॥ (*AV* iii 3 3-5)

5 मुक्तौ सम्यक् चासम्यक् चर्याविप्रतिपिद्धत्वेन मुक्तिफलसाम्येन व्यायामायोगेन सर्वोपसहारस्य निरर्थकत्वात् प्रसङ्गाच्च (*STC*)

difference in the calibre of Adhikārins[6] Tho' the competency or eligibility of persons is not open to perception, one can infer their nature from the vivid and simultaneous flashing forth before his mind's eye, in meditation, of *as many attributes as he is competent to concentrate upon, like the two arms of his own person*

यस्य यावद्गुणाः स्पष्ट प्रतिभासन्त्युपासने ।
युगपद् स्वभुजौ यद्वत् ध्यायेत्तावत एव सः ॥
(*Śruti* Q M *NV* iii 3.10)

Vādirāja adds that tho' it is possible for the Sādhaka as a result of his study and reflection of Śāstras to have a knowledge of the numerous attributes of B and be able to recall them to his mind before meditation, yet in Dhyāna only those of the Divine attributes he is fit to meditate upon pass his mind simultaneously and not all the others he has *known of*. The fitness for Upasamhāra thus extends only to such attributes and he will thus come to know his limitations and find his level[7]

Tho' such vivid and simultaneous flashing forth of the attributes in the mind should *precede* the meditation, one can enter upon meditation after initiation by the competent Guru who knows his deserts He should then continue to meditate on those attributes which the Guru, knowing his deserts, directs him to contemplate In due course, he will come to experience their vivid flash and be able to continue There is no need to take a holiday from meditation till such a Guru makes his appearance in the spiritual life of the Mumukṣu The Sūtra *Ānandādayah pradhānasya* (iii.3.12) provides for the regular meditation by *all Mumukṣus at all levels of spiritual fitness,* of four principal attributes of B: viz *sattvam, cittvam, ānandah, ātmatvam* The meditation on these four attributes is common to all Mumuksus and does not require to be put off till the destined Guru's appearance It is open to the higher orders of Adhikārins also to carry on the meditation on *these four attributes* till they discover their own spiritual level and the exact nature and extent of their calibre and fitness from their destined Gurus[8]

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6 स्पष्टप्रतीतेस्तेषाच गुणाना योग्यतागते ।
अधिकारिविभेदस्य सुज्ञेयत्वात व्यवस्थिति (*STC*)

7 शास्त्रश्रवणमननाभ्या शास्त्रोक्तसकलगुणपरिज्ञाने पृथक् पृथक् एकैकगुणस्मरणे च सत्यपि, ध्यानकाले युगपद
स्वयोग्या एव गुणा भासन्ते, नापरे । एव च युगपत भासमानेषु गुणेषु योग्यता, अभासमानेषु गुणेषु योग्यता नेति
विवेकोपपत्तेरिति (*TPG* p 146)

8 स्पष्टप्रतिभासस्योपसहारात पूर्वभावित्वेऽपि, तत्तद्योग्यताभिज्ञगुरूपदेशेन प्रवृत्तौ स्पष्टतरप्रतिभासेन योग्यता-
निश्चयो दृढीभवतीत्यदोष । गुरुलाभपर्यन्त तूष्णीभावशङ्का त्वानन्दादय प्रधानस्येति वक्ष्यमाण यायेन
सर्वमुमुक्षुसाधारण्येन चतुर्णां गुणाना सख्यानिर्देशाभ्या क्लृप्ततया, तावत्पर्यन्तमेव तदुपासनस्यावर्जनीयतया
परिहरिष्यते । तेषु विवक्षितगुरुलाभानपेक्षणात (*STC*)

When the Sadhaka carries on his meditation continuously with faith and devotion the grace of God will put him in touch with the competent Guru who will reveal to him his real fitness and put him on the road of progress God's grace will reward him according to his deserts in Mokṣa too, by enabling him to realize his *Svarūpānanda* in full[9]

Thus the hypothesis of Yogyatabheda in Upāsanā explains fully and satisfactorily the options of Sarvaguṇopasamhāra and Anupasamhāra

Samkara's Interpretation

Vyaptyadhikaranam (iii 3 9)

According to S this *adhi* discusses the question whether in the *Chan Up* text *Om ityetad akṣaram udgītham upāsīta* where the terms om' and '*udgītha*' are placed in coordination, their relation is to be construed as of specialization as in *nīlam utpalam* or in terms of superimposition sublation or identity[10] It is shown that the other three relations are inappropriate involving, as they do, lakṣanā, fruitlessness and other defects The decision is given that the word 'udgītha' is used to specialize the term om", as 'omkāra is found all over the Vedas recited at the commencement and conclusion of every Sūkta and anuvāka in the Rg and Yajur Vedas Its specialization by 'udgītha' is to make it known thro' lakṣanā that it is the 'om' which is part of Udgītha that is required to be meditated upon in this context[11]

Criticism

After it has been shown in the last *adhi* that identity of name is no bar to difference of vidyas, it would be natural to take up other disputed cases of difference or identity of Vidyas There is no topical relevancy for going back to the same text to consider in what sense the *sāmanādhikaranya* (coordination of case relation) between *om* and *udgītha* is to be understood The *Kalpataru* explains that in the previous adhi the conclusion that the two Udgītha-vidyās in the *Chan* and *Bṛh Ups* are different was arrived at by *taking it for granted* that in the *Chan Up* text referring to the meditation of om, the term udgītha specializes the word 'om' In the present *adhi* this particular point

9 तथाच [illegible] प्रसन्नो भगवान् [illegible] (*STC* iii 3 10)

10 ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत इत्यत्र [illegible] सामानाधिकरण्य श्रूयमाण [illegible] (S *BSB* iii 3 9)

11 [illegible] (*Bhamati* iii 3 9)

is discussed in full.[12] But, then, the discussion is *not* relevant, as this is not a Śāstra *where the shades of meaning of particular syntactical usages in Śruti texts are to be discussed*—in separate adhi.s. It must, however, be admitted that the discussion is not for its own sake but to set the seal of approval on the Siddhānta of the previous *adhi.* that the two udgītha-vidyās are different. But, the difference of Vidyās stands on grounds which are independent of the decision about the sense of the case relation between om and udgītha. Hence, the discussion is not necessary.

The words of the Sūtra: *Vyāpteśca samañjasam* are interpreted by S. as follows:—"By reason of the pervasiveness of omkāra all over the Vedas, the 'Om' figuring in the meditation enjoined by the *Chān. Up.* (i.1.1) has to be understood as being specialized by the term 'Udgītha', so that this omkāra may be (distinguished from the rest and) meditated upon. That alone will be appropriate".[13]

But, then, the pervasion of omkāra in the Vedas does not in itself constitute the reason for the appropriateness of understanding its case relation to Udgītha in a particular sense. The crucial point is that the Sūtra does not contain words sufficient and necessary to compel us to accept the conclusion that 'Udgītha' is used to specialize 'om' and/or words expressive of counter reasons to show how or why other alternative explanations of the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* cannot be accepted. It is S. who gives us these reasons. That is not equivalent to their being embodied in the Sūtra or intended by the Sūtrakāra. The interpretation has also to resort to a good deal of adhyahāra.[14] Instead of discussing not so pertinent an issue as thus, it would be better to let this *adhi.* say something fresh about the subject of Upasamhāra itself—in which case the reading 'Vyāpteśca' may have to be changed to a more suitable one.

12 ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमिति वाक्यं ओंकारस्योद्गीथेन विशेषणमयं सिद्धवत्कृत्य प्रकरणभेदाद्विद्याभेदो दर्शित । इदानीं स एवार्थश्चिन्त्यते (*Kalpataru* iii 3 9)

13. व्याप्तेः सर्ववेदसाधारण्यात् सर्वव्याप्यक्षरमिह मा प्रसञ्जीत्यत उद्गीथशब्देनाक्षरं विशेष्यते। कथं नाम? उद्गीथावयवभूत ओंकारो गृह्येत इति। अतश्च, व्याप्तेर्हेतोरोमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमित्यस्य उद्गीथमित्येतत् विशेषणमिति समञ्जसमेतत् (S. *BSB.* iii 3 9)

14 व्याप्तेरोंकारगताया सामञ्जस्ये हेतुत्वायोगात् * * विशेषणमावश्यकमिति योजनान्न निपततीति चेत्;- न, विशेषणप्रयोजनोक्तिलाभेऽपि विशेषणपक्षसामञ्जस्येऽवश्यवक्तव्यहेतो, पक्षान्तरे बाधकस्य चानुक्तत्वात्। बह्वध्याहारप्रसङ्गाच्च (*STC.* iii.3 10)

B.B.S.

CHAPTER XXVI

UPASAMHĀRA OF MORE ATTRIBUTES ACCORDING TO YOGYATĀ HAS ITS REWARD IN ĀNANDA IN MOKṢA

4 *Sarvābhedādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 11)

This *adhi* establishes that the Upasamhāra of a large number of Divine attributes, in the manner prescribed, is worthy of being practised as it has its own reward[1] It arises by way of answering a pertinent objection that granting that there are differences in the calibre of Upāsakas, there is no need for anyone to practise the upasamhāra of a multitude of attributes, as no clear evidence has so far been adduced in the Sūtras to establish the point that there is a definite relation between the content, quality and range of the upasamhāra and the number of attributes comprehended in a single act and their fruit of maukti-kānanda This adhi embodies an authoritative statement on this point[2]

The Siddhānta makes this clear —*Sarvābhedād anyatra ime* The expression 'sarva' in the Sūtra referring to the attributes implicated in the Upasamhāra is understood in both the senses of 'all' and 'many' according to fitness of Adhikārins[3] The words 'upasamhāra', 'samañjasa' and the particle 'ca' follow by *anuvṛtti* from the previous Sūtras These are suitably connected with the words of the present Sūtra to

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1 अत्र बहुगुणोपसंहारस्य फलाधिक्यार्थता बलवत्तया साध्यते (Ragh *TDP* iii.3 11)

2 अस्तु योग्यताभेद उपासने । तथापि न बहुगुणोपासनार्थं उपसंहारः कार्यः । फलातिशयाभावे व्यर्थायासत्वात् अयोग्यत्वात् इति मन्दत्वात् भवति । तत्तद्योग्यतानुसारेणोपासनं कर्तव्यमिति प्रमाणतात्पर्यादिनम । न तु तत्र फलातिशयोऽस्ति । तत्र सर्वप्रमाणानुसन्धानात् व्यवधानस्य बुद्धिमत्त्वादिप्रयोगावरत्वात् (*STC* iii 3 11)

3 Cf वेदोक्तगुणोपसंहारो द्विविधः । नानाशाखोक्तगुणोपसंहारः, बहुतरगुणोपसंहारश्चेति

(Vādirāja *TPG* p 146)

give a coordinated meaning[4] 'Abheda' in the Sūtra has the same sense as in Sūtra 6 viz 'without restriction', 'embracing all the attributes' and leaving out none' (according one's calibre)[5] 'Anyatra', with the particle ca in the emphatic sense, qualifies the expression 'phale' (fruit or reward), understood from the context *'Anyatra'=anyasmin* (phale) means a different kind of fruit—far excelling that of others belonging to lower orders of Adhikārins, who either do not resort to such upasamhāra or achieve only a very limited form of it[6]

The special reference to "these" (*ime*) in the Sūtra is to pinpoint the existence of some of those eligible for the upasamhāra of 'all' the attributes[7] (known or knowable from the Srutis)[8] The highest of such Adhikārins is of course the fourfaced Brahmā[9] The others" referred to by the expression *ādi* in the Bhāsya are, according to *TD*, his consort Sarasvati and others below in rank and eligibility for contemplating a fairly large number of attributes[10]

The overall meaning of this Sūtra, according to M's bhāsya is —

"These (*ime*) great souls (like Brahma) thro' their contemplation of B by means of an all-inclusive comprehension of all its attributes made known by the Śrutis in one mental act, become eligible for a different kind of fruit from others who limit their contemplation to fewer attributes"

सर्वगुणयुक्तत्वेनोपासनात् अन्यत्रैव फले ब्रह्मादयो भवन्ति

(M *BSB* iii 3 11)

This interpretation is supported with a quotation from the *Pādma*

सपूर्णोपासनात् ब्रह्मा सपूर्णफलभाग्भवेत् ।
इतरे तु यथायोग सम्यङमुक्तौ भवन्ति हि ॥

'Thro' complete contemplation of all the attributes of B the fourfaced

4 अत्र पूर्वसूत्रादवधारणार्थकचशब्दशिरस्कस्य विपरिणतसमजसपन्म्य उपसहारसूत्रादुपसहारपदस्य चानुवृत्त्या युक्त एव ब्रह्मादीना बहुगुणोपसहार इति साध्यनाभ (*BD* iii 3 11)
(*STC* iii 3 11)

5 सर्वाभेदात । भेद सकोच । सर्वेषु गुणेष्वसकोचात उपासनाया कृतायातिमिति शेष (*BD* iii 3 11)

6 अन्यत्र अनुपसहारल्पाधिकारिभ्योऽन्यत्र तत्फलविलक्षण फले भिन्न भिन्न फल भवन्तीति सूत्रार्थ (Vadiraja *TPG* p 146)
अन्यत्रान्यास्मिन भिन्न । इद चावर्तनीयम (*TD* iii 3 11)

7 इम इति विशेषत प्रस्तुतत्वात सर्वोपसहारका उच्यन्ते

8 निरवधिकसर्वगुणाना ब्रह्मणाप्युपासितुमशक्यत्वात वेदोक्तसकलगुणप्रतीतिरित्यर्थ (Vādiraja *TPG* p 146)

9 एतान्श्युपासनायोग्यता ब्रह्मण एवास्ति न त्वन्येषाम

10 यद्यपि ब्रह्मैव सर्वगुणोपासक तथापि तन्न्यूनब्रह्माण्यादिविषय आदिशब्द । इतरे तु यथाशक्त्युपासित (*TD* iii 3 11)
कुर्वाणा यथायोग फलभाजो भवन्ति
सूत्र स्ववचन चोक्तमन्यस्योपसहरणमिति सूचितम । तथाच सर्वगुणोपास ब्रह्मान्य इति वक्ता भाष्यकारेण
नात ततोऽपि क्रमेण न्यूनगुणोपासनान्निति साधनवैचित्र्यमुक्त भवति (Vadiraja *TPG* p 146)

Brahmā attains perfect bliss Others by upāsanā to the best of their abilities have complete Mokṣa, consisting of freedom from all misery"

Śamkara's Interpretation (iii, 3 10)

According to S this *adhi* determines the unity of the Prāṇa-vidyās in different Upaniṣads such as the *Bṛh*, *Chān*, and *Kauṣītaki* In the first two the attributes of being the oldest and the greatest, being one who helps to dwell (*vasiṣṭhatva*), of being the abode etc, are finally ascribed to Mukhya-Prāna in the colloquy of the indriyas But in the same colloquy occurring in the *Kaus Up.* (ii 14) these qualities are *not* mentioned or attributed to Mukhya Prāṇa The doubt, therefore, arises if these attributes are similarly to be inserted in the Prāna Vidya of the *Kauṣ Up* also[12]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Prāna Vidyā in the *Kauṣ Up* must be held to be different from the others in the other Ups as the attributes of *Vasiṣṭhatva* etc are not found ascribed to Mukhya Prāna There is also another difficulty The *Kaus* text says, "He who knows thus, having recognized the preeminence of Prāna * * *" (ii, 14) The adverb "thus", which here indicates the object of knowledge, always refers to something mentioned not far off It cannot refer to a set of attributes mentioned in a different Śākhā altogether So the Prāna Vidyā in the *Kauṣ. Up* and those in the *Chān* and *Bṛh* should be considered as complete in themselves each with its own given set of attributes and that there is no need for a combination of their attributes[13]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the attributes of *Vasiṣṭhatva* etc are to be inserted in the Prāna Vidyā of the *Kauṣ Up.* also as the Prana Vidyā is the same everywhere on account of the correspondence among the colloquies The presence of the adverb '*evam*' is no impediment to their

11 The *TD* observes that it should *not* be supposed that the Mokṣa attained by those who are able to meditate only on a few attributes of B is not a complete Mokṣa but something incomplete

सम्यङ्मुक्तिरिति वचनात् अल्पगुणोपासकानां मुक्तिरपि सम्यङ्मुक्तिरेव नासम्यङ्मुक्तिरिति सिद्ध्यति दुःखलेशाभावात् (*TD* iii 3 11)

12 तत्र संशयः किमिमे वसिष्ठत्वादयो गुणाः क्वचिदुक्ता अन्यत्राप्युपसंह्रियेरन् नोपसंह्रियेरन् इति (S *BSB* iii 3 10)

13 तत्र प्राप्तं नोपसंह्रियेरन्निति। कुतः? एवंशब्दसंयोगात्। 'अथ यो ह वै विद्वान् प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा' इति अत्र एवंशब्देन यद्वस्तु निर्दिश्यते। एवंशब्दस्य संनिहितावलम्बनत्वात् न शाखान्तरपठितमपि गुणजातं शक्नोति निवर्तयितुम्। तस्मात् स्वप्रकरणस्थैरेव गुणैर्निरपेक्षप्राणविद्येति (S *BSB* iii 3 10)

oneness. Tho' the expression 'thus' (*evam*) used in the *Kauṣ. Up.* does not refer to the attributes mentioned in the far off *Chān.* or *Bṛh. Up.* still those attributes are denoted by the term *'evam'* (thus) used in *Bṛh. Up.*[14] As the Vidyā has thus been proved to be one there is no difficulty in taking "thus" here to refer to all those attributes also and having them inserted.[15]

Criticism

The inquiry proposed in this *adhi.* is unnecessary as the ruling has already been given in the Upasamhāradhi (iii.3.5) that particulars of identical Vidyās given in different Śākhās or places are to be combined into one meditation.

The Pūrvapakṣa lays over-much stress on the expression "thus" in "*Ya evam vidvān*" in the Kauṣ. text. But in doing so S. has allowed himself to forget that the simple "*evam*" is not equivalent to "*evam eva*" (only thus). Hence, it is not a serious objection.

If a doubt should still arise on account of this point, the topic should have been considered immediately after the ruling had been given about unity of Vidyās in adhi. 2 and not kept waiting till now.

It will not do to explain that in *adhi.* 3, the doubt about oneness of Vidyās discussed there, was set at rest by showing that the word "om" is specialized by the term "udgītha". The Pūrvapakṣin here may try to adopt the Siddhāntin's own line of argument there that in as much as there is the word 'thus' in this context of the Prāṇavidyā of the *Kauṣ. Up.* it will naturally impose a restriction and forbid the extension of *Vasiṣṭhatva* and other attributes into the Prāṇavidyā described in it from the other Ups. on the far off plea of want of unity of Vidyās. There is propriety, therefore, in taking up this topic after adhi. 3 and its aftermath in adhi. 4.

Such an explanation cannot be sustained. For, while the use of the term "udgītha" to specialize "om" is competent to set at rest the Pūrvapakṣa for oneness of the Udgītha Vidyās in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* (as S. would have it), it is placing too much weight on *'evam'* here to expect it to sustain the Pūrvapakṣa and preclude the oneness of the Vidyās so patent from the other indications. The Pūrvapakṣa of this *adhi.* therefore, rests on very feeble foundation.

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14. यद्यपि कौषीतकिब्राह्मणगतेनैवंशब्देन वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणगत गुणजातमसंशब्दितं,असन्निहितत्वात् तथापि, तस्मिन्नेव विज्ञाने वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणगतेन एवंशब्देन तत् सशब्दितमिति न परशाखागतमप्यभिन्नविज्ञानावरुद्धं गुणजात स्वशाखागतात् विशिष्यते (S. *BSB.* iii 3.10)
15. अभेदे च विज्ञानस्य कथमिमे गुणाः क्वचिदुक्ताः अन्यत्र नाम्येरन् ? (*ibid*)

The Siddhānta too is open to objections. The principle that the attributes mentioned in different Śākhās can be called up thro' identity of the subject (*vedyaikya*) has been honoured in the breach by S. himself.[16] in adhi. 3. It is no use arguing that only non-contrary attributes can be coordinated in the name of oneness of Vidyās and not contrary ones and that while attributes like *jyeṣṭhatva* and *śreṣṭhatva* are not contrary, *Vasiṣthatva* and others will be contrary. If that be so, *Udgīthatva* and omkāratva cannot be looked upon as contraries as their meanings coincide and, therefore, no differentiation of Vidyās can be made out in respect of the Udgīthavidyās under adhi. 3.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also addresses this *adhi.* to the same purpose. He has not, however, followed S.'s lead in making much of the term "*evam*" in the *Kauṣ. Up.*

Pūrvapakṣa

R.'s Pūrvapakṣa is that tho' Prāṇa is to be meditated upon as endowed with the attributes *jyaiṣṭhya, śraiṣṭhya,* etc. in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* his association with other attributes of vasiṣṭhatva, etc. belonging to speech and other indriyas is manifest from the wording of Śruti itself. In the Kauṣ. Up. this is not so. Therefore, it should be regarded as different from the others, on account of difference of form.[17]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is—these attributes of *vasiṣṭhatva* "are there" in the Prāṇa Vidyā of the *Kauṣ. Up.* also, because the manner of establishing the greatness and excellence of Prāṇa is, in all respects, the same as in the other two Vidyās in the other two Ups. For the glory of Prāṇa has been demonstrated here by showing how the staying power and functioning of speech and other indriyas are due to Prāṇa.[18]

16. धर्मिणोऽपि गुणवत्तस्य बुद्धिस्थतया [illegible] । यतः [illegible] वागादिप्राणानामनुप्रवेशादिदर्शनानुसंधानेन [illegible] मन्निधिः 'अन्यथात्व शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्,' इत्यादौ [illegible]. (STC. iii,3,10)
17. यद्यपि सर्वत्र ज्येष्ठश्रेष्ठगुणकस्य प्राण एव गुणेशास्य. तथापि छन्दोगानां वाजसनेयिनां च ज्येष्ठश्रेष्ठगुणकस्य प्राणस्य वागादिगतवसिष्ठत्वादिगुणसंबन्धित्वमपि शब्दादेव प्रतीतं। कौषीतकिनां तु न तथेति रूपभेदात् विद्याभेदः (R. Vedāntadīpa iii.3.10)
18. सूत्रार्थस्तु—सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे। अन्यत्र कौषीतकिप्राणविद्यायामपि इमे वसिष्ठत्वादयः सन्त्येव। कुतः? सर्वाभेदात्। प्राणस्य ज्येष्ठश्रेष्ठत्वोपपादनप्रकारस्य सर्वस्य तुल्यत्वेनाभेदात् (ibid)

Criticism

If R.'s statement that the attributes of *Vasiṣṭhatva* and others "are there" (*santyeva*) mentioned in the *Kauṣ. Up.* is literally true,[19] there should be no need to pursue the discussion. If he means these attributes are to be 'understood' (*adhyāhārya*) in the Prāṇavidyā of the *Kauṣ. Up.*, the reason of "abheda" (*Sarvābheda*) given in the Sūtra, which, according to R., means "the identity of the manner of expounding the preeminence of Prāṇa" will be inconclusive. For R. himself has held under the Sūtra *Na vā prakaraṇabhedāt* (iii.3.7) that notwithstanding the sameness of manner of expounding the oneness of Prāṇavidyā there, by reason of the presence of attributes like Prāṇa's being invulnerable to the onslaughts of the Asuras, etc. the two Udgīthavidyās in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh.* are *not identical* but different It will be inconsistent for him to now call to aid the *Upapādanaprakārābheda.*

19 As a matter of fact the *Kauṣikakī* text does not make any reference to vasisthatva and other attributes. Nor does the section begin in the *Kauṣ Up.* with the words अथ हेमा देवता प्रजापति पितरमेत्यूचु को वै न श्रेष्ठ —as R. writes in his *Śrībhāṣya*. The section begins with the words अथातो नि श्रेयसादानम् as quoted by S

CHAPTER XXVII

FOUR ATTRIBUTES TO BE MEDITATED ON BY ALL MUMUKṢUS

5. *Ānandādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.12)

This *adhi.* arises by way of satisfying an objection that it is pointless to recognize two forms of Upāsanā one based on 'Sarva-guṇopasamhāra' and another on the upasamhāra of a large number of attributes according to the varying capacities of Adhikārins, without first laying down the norm and fixing the minimum number of attributes whose meditation is a "must" for all Mumukṣus.[1] This adhi. does this *by fixing the number of such attributes and identifying them for the benefit of all*;[2] for without them it would be meaningless to talk of additions and combinations by way of 'upasamhāra' of 'many', 'more' or 'all' the attributes according to higher powers of concentration of different Adhikārins.[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is—there cannot be any fixed number of such attributes to be identified by all for purposes of meditation. Even if the number is fixed at four or five, the question of preference in their selection and the rationale of it will pose another problem. An arbitrary

1 स्वस्वयोग्यतानुसारेण सर्वोपसंहारतदभाववद्बहुगुणोपसंहारादिकमयुक्तम्। स्यात्तदा युक्तं, यदि सर्वसाधारणा गुणा संख्यानिर्देशाभ्यां क्लृप्ता स्युः। योग्यतानिश्चयात्पूर्वं तेषामुपास्यत्वासंभवात्, न च क्लृप्ता, इति शङ्कनात् संगतिः (*STC.* iii 3 12)

2. ये साम्यमुक्तिमात्रमिच्छन्ति, न तत्र विशेषान्वेषा ये गुणा उपास्या ते के इत्यधुना निरूप्यते (*TD.* iii 3 12)

3 The objection that for this very reason this *adhi.* should have preceded the upasamhārādhi has been answered by Ragh *TPB.* (p 307b).

and random selection at one's will and pleasure will be a disrespect to the Śrutis, where all Divine attributes are given equal recognition[4]

Apart from this, the Pūrvapakṣin also argues that the contemplation of the attributes of B for the purpose of attaining Mokṣa and the trouble that is being taken to find out which are the attributes to be meditated upon for the purpose are an exercise in futility He asks What exactly is this contemplation of the attributes of B intended to achieve? If it is facilitating the complete manifestation of our own pristine nature and the attributes of selfhood lying latent in us, in the state of Mokṣa, it will defeat its own purpose For the real character of Mokṣa, logically considered, must be one of complete extinction of all the faculties of the understanding (*buddhi*) and of the experience of bliss socalled which is held dear by the ill-informed[5]

For, there can be no such thing as a state of pure bliss Pleasure and pain are concomitant states We cannot have the one to the exclusion of the other There is no need to fear that if Mokṣa does not carry with it the prospect of experience of unalloyed bliss, no one will be induced to strive for it The prospect of complete cessation of all pain and misery in that state held out by the Pūrvapakṣin will offer an equally sufficient incentive to effort[6]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is absolutely necessary for Mumukṣus to meditate on certain principal attributes of B in order to attain the fulfilment of their own selfhood whose essential characteristics are *sattvam*, *cittvam*, *ānanda* and having the Supreme B for their inner self and ruling principle (*ātman*) The Pūrvapakṣa itself has accepted the point that freedom from pain and misery is indeed a Puruṣārtha worth striving for This is what *sattva* understood as *nirdoṣatva* stands for, in the present context[7]

4 यदि चतुष्पचपा आनन्दादय इत्युच्यन्ते, तर्हि केषांचित मुमुक्षवे येनामपि मुमुक्षुप्रयोगे नियामकभयात (*TP* iii 3 12)
नियामक विना स्वेच्छयैव पुजीवरण श्रौतत्वाविशेषात् भगवद्गुणत्वाविशेषाच्च गुणान्तरपुरीरणस्यापि न्यायप्राप्तत्वात् (Vadirāja *TPG*)

5 ननु किमत्र गुणोपास्तिप्रयोजनम् ? यदि स्वात्मगि गुणगणाभिव्यक्ति तदर्थं हेतु गुणोपासना स्यात् । बुद्धि मुखादीनां गुणानामत्यन्तोच्छित्तेरेव अनर्थहानित्वेन मोक्षत्वात् (*TD* iii 3 12)

6 सुखज्ञाने हि दुःखज्ञान दुर्वारम् । न च गुणानुभवाभावे प्रवृत्त्यभावप्रसंग । सुखदुःखयोरितरेतराव्यभिचारात् दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थं तदुपपत्ते (*ibid*)

7 It should be specially noted that in this context the word *sat* used by M in his interpretation of this Sūtra आनंदो ... (M *BSB* iii 3 12) and in the verse from *Brahmatarka* q by him (iii 3 12) has the meaning of 'freedom from blemishes' and not 'reality' cf also सद्भावे साधुभावे च ... (*Gītā* xvii 26) and in the *Anubhāṣya* सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति ... सत्त्वदोषादिनिर्दोषत्वस्य (*BD*)

The other contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that Mokṣa is not a state where one experiences unalloyed bliss is unsustainable. The inference resorted to by the Pūrvapakṣin, that Mokṣa is not a state of experience of pure bliss as it is claimed to be, without any trace of pain, unlike the state of bondage, is fallacious. For, in God who is the abode of bliss, according to all accounts, there is no trace of pain or misery. The state of Mokṣa attained by the souls may likewise be one of complete happiness without a trace of misery. There are any number of Śruti and Smṛti texts which depict the state of Mokṣa as one of utter happiness. We have, therefore, to dismiss the contention that if it should be a state of bliss it should equally be a state of misery. For if Mokṣa were only a negative state of absence of misery, without being a state of unalloyed bliss also, it will not be a worthy aim of human pursuit. Even the eradication of all pain can be a worthy aim of human beings only when it is *experienced* as such by a surviving consciousness of the released soul and not otherwise. Without forming part of the experience of a surviving consciousness it will be as good as the condition of a stone and no normally constituted person will care to pass into a state of utter unconsciousness in his Mokṣa.

It is a faulty reasoning to say that some persons unable to bear extreme pain wish and try to pass into the forgetfulness of sleep That itself is a proof that they expect to find happiness in sleep. For deep sleep is a condition of experience of happy repose. This is established by the recollection of its happiness immediately on awakening. We cannot say it is only a cessation of pain in deep sleep that is conventionally regarded as a state of positive happiness, as when one says he is happy after having relieved himself of a heavy burden he was carrying. That again is a tacit admission that it is only the conscious experience of an agreeable state that can be regarded as a worthy object of human pursuit. The position that there is no such state as of pure happiness other than the absence of pain is not sustainable. Happiness or bliss is a state that is experienced by us without requiring a knowledge of any counter-correlative—*unlike the negation of something*. Otherwise, one may as well say the experience of pain is equally a negative state,—the absence of happiness. If experience is to be the test whether happiness and misery are negative or positive states, both are equally entitled to be regarded as positive states. Purposeful human activity for the attainment of Mokṣa cannot, therefore, be explained without admitting Mokṣa to be a state of positive bliss. This is supported by the evidence of Śrutis galore.

That being so, it becomes necessary to go into the contemplation of the blissful nature of B. in order that the Jīva's own intrinsic property of blissfulness can be brought into complete manifestation in Mokṣa

One may yet persist in arguing that God Himself may remove our sufferings and make us realize the happiness of selfhood, moved by our meditation of any of His attributes and that there is no need to go thro' all the trouble of finding out how many and which of the attributes of B are best suited for such contemplation For we see that without any effort on our part we all get into the state of sleep every day and experience happiness there and all souls pass into the state of Pralaya where there is complete cessation of all pain Where then is there any need for this inquiry as to how many and which are the attributes to be meditated upon for the attainment of Moksa[8]?

The expression '*pradhānasya*' in the Sūtra *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*, answers the latter question and the whole Sūtra answers the question as to how many and which are the attributes of B best suited for meditation by all and why it is so

There is no comparison between the everlasting flawless experience of full svarūpānanda in Mokṣa and the brief spells of repose of sleep or the suspended animation of beings in Pralaya The Jīva's dependence on B is but imperfectly realized without the element of Bhakti being present therein, in Susupti[9] The purpose of contemplation as a Sādhana is to enable the Jivātman to attain to the fullest realization of the bliss of his selfhood which can be done only after the riddance of all Prākrtic bondage in Moksa Susupti and Pralaya are no substitutes for Moksa

The Pūrvapakṣin himself has admitted that cessation of pain is also a Purusārtha Over and above this, the spirit of man yearns for unalloyed bliss of selfhood also It has been established in B S iii 2 5, that the complete manifestation of the content of selfhood in Mokṣa is possible only with the grace of B[10] and that has to be attained thro' Bhakti and Dhyāna

The term '*ādi*' after '*ānanda*' in the Sūtra refers to the three other principal attributes of B besides *ānanda*—which are to be meditated

8 *TD* iii 3 12

9 न च [illegible] , [illegible] । [illegible] स्वरूपत्वाच्च (*TD* iii 3 12)

10 See *Parābhidhyānādhikaranam* (iii 2 5)

upon by all Mumukṣus for the purpose (*artha*) of attaining the principal fruit (*pradhānaphala*) of their lives[11]—viz. Mokṣa

M.'s elucidation of the significance of the term *pradhānasya* in the Sutra, as above, deserves to be noted by all serious minded students of the science of B as profoundly consistent with the content and purpose of Upāsāna—which is the subject of this Pāda

The three other attributes signified by the term ādi according to M. are *sattvam, cittvam* and *ātmatvam* What intimate and immediate bearing the meditation of these particular attributes of B have on the Jiva's attainment of the principal fruit of his life and how they are entitled to priority of selection over the other attributes in the context of meditation for the attainment of 'Samyangmukti' have been very well brought out by J in his commentary

सत्त्वं निर्दोषत्वम् । तच्च ज्ञानानन्दौ च सर्वापेक्षित फलम् । आत्मपदोदित स्वामित्व तु स्वसंबन्धानुस्मरणस्य भगवत्प्रीतिसाधनत्वादुपास्यम् । तच्चाग्रतो वक्ष्यते

(*TP* iii 3 12)

Rāghavendra in his *TDP* points out that the Sutrakāra has used the expression *'pradhānasya'* in lieu of *moksasya* to highlight the fact that Moksa which is the *summum bonum* of life, highly prized and sought after by all thinking persons is the condition of the conscious experience of supreme bliss without a blemish and it is the meditation on these particular attributes alone that can bring about their consummation in the spiritual life of the Mumuksus[12] The Śruti text *Tam yathā yatho-*

11 प्रधानस्य [illegible] (M BSB)
[illegible] (*BD* iii 3 12)

The *BD* raises the question of Ekagunopasakas (also known as Tṛnajivas) in this connection and observes that in the present context they are *not* kept in mind by the Sutrakara and the Bhasyakara They are regarded as meditators on only one attribute—of *atmatva* who have no utkranti thro Brahmanadi and are called Asampurnamukta, for this reason Vadiraja has categorically rejected the existence of such a class of Upasakas He has argued that without meditation on the attribute of *ānanda* they can have no realization of Svarupananda the most essential feature of Mukti and without utkranti no destruction of their Lingasarira without which no mukti is possible He holds that under the terms of iii 3 10 the meditation only as Ātman should also be taken to confer the benefits of meditation on all the four attributes A separate class of Ekagunopasakas need not therefore be recognised But Raghu-*TPB* Ragh *TPB* *AC* and *STC* are all silent on this question The *BD* fully supports the existence of Ekagunopasakas and criticizes Vadiraja for his stand and cites *Ānandamalā* in its support. The *Madhvasiddhantasara* and some other compendia of M theology accept the existence of Tṛnajivas or Ekagunopasakas and justify it with reasons. For Ekagunopasakas see also Chapter LXXXVII (Samanādhi) f.n 27 28 and *TD* on iii,3 16 Chap XXX. fn. 9

12. [illegible] (*TD* iii 3 12)

pāsate tadeva bhavati (Satapatha B. x.5, 2, 20) also endorses this point that by meditating on the Lord as *saccidānanda ātmā* the Jīva is enabled to realize in these attributes the archetypes of those of his own selfhood [13]

Vādirāja alone explains that the meditation on the attribute of 'ātmatva' is to realize the attribute of one's own jurisdiction in Mokṣa over those below.[14] But the trend of M's own interpretation of the Sūtra *Ātmeti tu upagacchanti grāhayanti ca* (iv 1 3) seems to favor J.'s line of thought here as being more in keeping with the spirit of that Sūtra which is also alluded to by the term *ādi* in iii 3 12 as pointed out by J. Raghūttama and Rāghavendra also hold the same view as J. The position of TD is the same The *STC* observes that as this Sūtra is meant for the benefit of all Mumukṣus it cannot be that the meditation on ātmatva is for making manifest the quality of lordship with reference to their inferiors in this case.[15] For it is only the *Adhikārins who have such authority.* (See *BS* iv 4.19) It is, therefore, best to understand it to mean that the meditation on *ātmatva* for all souls is for awakening and enlivening their sense of gratitude to and dependence on the Supreme Lord to whom they owe *so much* [16]

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13 न च निर्दोषसुखानुभव तथा तदुपास्ति विना प्राप्यते । 'त यथा यथोपासत तदेव भवतीति श्रुत (*TD*) तदेव भवति, तदेव प्राप्नुवन्तीत्यर्थं । भू प्राप्तौ परस्मैपदम एकवचन च छान्दसम (Ragh *TPB*)

14 यथायोग्य स्वावरनियामकत्वस्य चेति गुणचतुष्टयस्यैव सर्वैरप्यंतेति (*TPG* p 147)

15 स्वामित्व तु कथमुपास्यम् ? तस्य मुक्त स्वकीयावरयन्ता इत्यादेरधिकारिविशेषनिष्ठत्वावगमेन सर्वसाधारण्याभावात् (*STC* iii 3 12)

16 यद्यपि त्रिकमेव साधारण, तथापि ईश्वरप्रसादेनैव तल्लभ्य, न पुन साधनशतानिराकापीत्युक्तम् । न च प्रगाढ स्वकृतोपकारानुस्मर्तरि भगवतोऽप्युपासने भवति (*STC*)

CHAPTER XXVIII

SOME ATTRIBUTES LIKE PRIYAŚIRASTVA *NOT* TO BE MEDITATED UPON BY ALL

6 *Priyaśirastvādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 13)

Under the terms of the Sūtra *Bhūmnah kratuvad jyāyastvam* * * (iii 3 59) the Sūtrakāra requires that every attribute of B shall be meditated upon in its infitude of range, aspects and shades of meaning For instance, in the description of B. as Ānandamaya in the *Taitt Up* (ii, 5) the attributes of having pleasure for its head, delight for the right side, felicity for the left and so on have been mentioned as the special features (*viśeṣāh*) of Ānandamaya who is no other than the Pūrṇānanda-B The question, therefore, arises if these *viśeṣas* or manifold aspects and shades of such attributes are also to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus who have to meditate on the four attributes[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa here argues that these viśeṣas of the attributes of *ānanda* etc should also be included in the meditation of B by all the Mumukṣus who meditate on the four attributes Then only will their meditation on the attribute of *ānanda*, for example, be complete in all its richness of aspects and shades of meaning Otherwise, the upāsanā of the attribute of *ānanda* will be truncated and incomplete and the fruit of Mokṣa associated with the upāsanā of *ānanda* etc will be

1 It should be noted that by upalakṣana the ruling given in the Siddhanta here applies to the countless aspects of every one of B's attributes The *adhi.* is not, therefore limited to *priyaśirastvadi* alone See also adhis 12 and 14

correspondingly incomplete[2] It cannot be that the meditation of *ānanda* together with its attributes of *priya, moda, pramoda,* etc is fruitless and need not, therefore, be carried out The evidence of Sruti shows that these effervescent aspects (*upacaya*) of *ānanda* of B *are there* and they must be included in their meditation by all Mumukṣus in order to merit complete Mokṣa Left out and falling outside the scope of any-body's upāsanā, their recital in the Śruti will lose its purpose For, it is established in principle that the recital of attributes of B in the Srutis has no other objective than that they should be meditated upon (See BS iii 3 15) By meditating on these attributes of *priyasirastva* etc the upāsaka will derive proportionate benefits and no one will be averse to having them It must, therefore, be admitted that the meditation of these attributes also is *open to all Mumukṣus*[3] If this is admitted, the restriction imposed in the preceding Sūtra (iii 3 12) on the number of attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus will be untenable[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the meditation of Priyasirastva and such other attributes of B is *not* open to all Mumukṣus—because (*hi*) the amplification and curtailment (*upacayāpacayau*) of inner shades or aspects of each attribute chosen for meditaion (depending on the competency of upāsakas) have to be accepted in the interests of (upholding) the gradations (*bheda*) in the fruits of the chief goal (*pradhānasya*) of life viz Mokṣa

This interpretation emerges from the following syntactical correlations By context, the word '*priyasirastvadi*' stands for the *meditation* of those attributes The word '*aprāpti*' in the (Siddhanta) Sutra suggests its contrary '*prapti*'[5] (meaning fitness or *yogyatā*) in the Pūrvapaksa This word is then connected with '*Sarvesām*' (to all) to complete the argument of the Purvapaksa that it is open to all Mumukṣus to meditate on Priyasirastvādi and other shades of *ānanda* etc This

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2 प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनामानन्दादिविशेषणत्वेनैव दर्शनात् तेषामपि सर्वोपसंहार्यत्वमिति * * * (*NV*)
अन्यथा आनन्दादेः सम्यगनुपासनेनामुक्तिप्रसङ्गात् (*TP* iii 3 13)

3 न च तथोपासनं निष्फलम् । आनन्दाद्युपचयसद्भावात् । अन्यथा, तस्यापि न तदुपासनं प्राप्यतेति तदर्थं तदा म्नानं व्यर्थं स्यात् । न चोपचय सर्वेषां नावाञ्छित विशिष्टफलत्वादिति पूर्व पक्ष (*STC* iii 3 13)

4 The BD points out that tho the reason given in Sutra 12 (*pradhanasya phalabhedartham upacayapacayau abhyupeyau*) explains only why *ānanda* and the other three attributes are to be chosen for meditation but does not say why the meditation should be limited to those four only in the case of all Mumukṣus in general the reason for it is implicit in the selection of the four having regard to the incompetency of all to meditate on more The implication is brought out by the Bhaṣyakāra (*BD*)

5 अप्राप्तिरित्यनेन प्राप्तिपूर्वपक्षसूचनात्

is refuted by the Siddhānta that there is no fitness (*prāpti*) for the Upāsanā of Priyassirastva and other attributes for all Mumukṣus This is supported by giving the reason that amplification and curtailment (*upacayāpacayau*) have to be admitted in the matter of upāsanā of the attributes of B in the best interests of the differences in the nature of the fruits of the highest goal (*pradhānasya*) of life viz Mokṣa

In this interpretation the locative *bhede* in the Sūtra is to be construed according to the *TD* and the *BD* as a *tādarthya* or *nimittasaptami* meaning 'for the sake of' or 'in the interests of' difference and read with *pradhānasya* (*phale*)—i e 'fruits of Mokṣa'[6] The *STC* prefers to construe '*bheda*' itself in the sense of 'what differs in each case according to the nature of the upāsanā—i.e the fruit[7] and *prāpti* in the sense of 'yogyatā' for upāsanās as in Sūtra 10

In meditation the amplification or curtailment of the manifold shades and aspects of each attribute of B is directly related to the gradations present in the fruits of Mokṣa While curtailment does not certainly prevent one from getting what is legitimately due to his Upāsanā by way of fruits (of Mokṣa), the amplification naturally brings greater spiritual rewards in Mokṣa[8] Tho' these higher rewards may be highly prized and desirable in themselves no Sāttvika Jiva, having faith in the Śāstras and knowing his place and limitations is likely to entertain any unmerited desire for them This disposes of one of the incidental objections of the Pūrvapakṣa against the restrictions placed on such Upāsanās

The other objection that the fruits of Mokṣa will have to remain incompletely realized if *priyasirastva* and other manifold aspects of *ānanda* etc are left out of upāsanā by those eligible for the upāsanā of the four attributes is not valid[9] For, in a deeper sense, of all the other attributes of B being the diverse expressions of the attribute of *ātmatva*, as pointed out under iii 3 1, and iii 3 17, all the rest of them can also be taken to be represented by *ātmatva* in which case whoever meditates on *ātmatva* will have to be considered as having meditated on all the attributes of B and be eligible for the highest fruits associated with

6 भेद इति निमित्तसप्तमी । भेदे भेदाय (*TP* iii 3 13)
भेद इति तादर्थ्यसप्तमी (*BD* iii 3 13)

7 फलं यस्मात् भिद्यते इति भेदः फलम् । उपासनाया [illegible] उपचयापचयौ वृद्ध्यवृद्धी भवताम् (*STC* iii 3 13)

8 Cf सर्वेष्वपि गुणेषु [illegible] भवति । [illegible] भवति [illegible] । [illegible] भवति (*TD* iii 3 13)

9 [illegible] । [illegible] (*TP* iii 3 13)

the meditation of all the attributes actually.[10] But the Ānandatāratamyaśruti in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.8) disarms such irresponsible deductions, by recognizing well-defined and clear cut gradations of bliss in Mokṣa, in deference to which we have to recognize equally well-defined distinctions and gradations in the system of Upāsanās also, befitting the *Yogyatā* of different orders of upāsakas.[11]

There is no need to suppose that is the absence of meditation on *priyaśirastva* etc., *the meditation of ānanda and the other attributes will* not, by itself, be able to achieve Mokṣa. For, the manifestation of the innate bliss of selfhood and the direct vision of B. are due, thro' Aparokṣajñāna, to the meditation of those attributes which are vividly comprehended in one's Dhyāna, of duly authorized attributes.[12] By hypothesis, it is beyond the capacity of those who are eligible only for the meditation of the four attributes to vividly comprehend the manifold aspects and shades of *priyaśirastva* etc., beyond knowing or remembering that such aspects exist in B. or have been described in the Śrutis. But such knowledge or recollection alone of them, without their vivid comprehension is insufficient for Dhyāna, as has already been made clear. The question of missing the full benefits of Mokṣa as a result of not meditating on these manifold *viśeṣas* of *ānanda*, etc. *does not, therefore, arise in the case of the Caturguṇopāsakas.*[13]

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10 सर्वगुणानामपि गुणचतुष्टयविशेषत्वस्येत्यत्र गुणचतुष्टयान्तर्गतात्मत्वेऽन्तर्भावादित्यर्थ

(Vādirāja *TPG* p. 147)

11 न च सर्वेषां सर्वगुणोपास्तिरस्त्विति वाच्यम्; आनन्दश्रुतिसिद्धफलभेदसिद्ध्यर्थं गुणोपासनेऽपि तारतम्यस्यापेक्षितत्वादिति भाव. (*TP.* iii.3 13)

12 न च प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यनुपासने मोक्षाभाव –

'यथायोग्यं गुणपूगानुपास्य फलं भवेन्मुक्तिगं नैव चान्यत् ।
नित्यैवाग्र्यव्यक्तताहेतुतश्च साक्षात् दृशिर्नो तद्विशेषे स्मृतेश्च' इति श्रुते (*TP* iii 3 13)

See also p. 239 fn. 7.

13. विशेषानुपासनेऽपि योग्यगुणोपासनेनैव फलप्राप्ते. (*TP* iii 3 13)

CHAPTER XXIX

DEVAS AND ṚṢIS ELIGIBLE FOR UPASAMHĀRA OF 'MADHYAMAGUNAS'

7 *Itarādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 14)

While the Sūtrakāra has made it clear in *adhi* 4 that only the four-faced Brahmā is eligible to meditate on all the attributes of B made known by the Vedas and in *adhi* 5, that human souls are eligible only for meditation on four principal attributes, nothing definite has been said about the eligibility of the gods other than Brahmā and the Ṛṣis, Gandharvas, etc It would appear from this that they too are eligible for the meditation of not more than the four principal attributes[1] However, as it has been shown that the Caturgunopāsakas have no competency to meditate on *priyasirastva* and such other attributes, it would seem that these are open to meditation by these gods and Ṛṣis who are above the level of ordinary mortals and very much below the four-faced Brahmā, in rank For this reason, they may be considered eligible for meditating on the very large number of attributes and their *viśeṣas* which lie beyond the province of the mortals

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa objects that such a conclusion is barred by the fact that unlike in the other two cases, there is no express authority for ascribing to those gods eligibility for meditating on the large number

1 [illegible] (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 14)

of attributes falling under *the category of the indefinitely large area of attributes beyond the four and less numerous than those which the four-faced Brahmā is competent to meditate upon* How can the gods launch upon their meditation of this multitude of attributes without making sure of their eligibility for it? In the case of Brahmā and the mortals there is no such difficulty, as the nature and range of their eligibility have been authentically established [2] The gods and Ṛṣis cannot be expected to discover their own eligibility by actual trial and experimentation within that wide area, for while doing so they may run the risk of straying into the preserves of other gods or Ṛṣis above them in rank as in the case of mortals attempting to meditate on *priyaśirastva* etc and thereby incurring sin (*pratyavāya*) [3] For, there are gradations among the gods themselves such as Ṛjus and others fit for special status of Vasus etc whose eligibilities do naturally differ The vagueness surrounding the question of the eligibility of the gods is thus insurmountable For these reasons the Pūrvapakṣa contends that these attributes cannot come in for Upasamhāra by the gods and the Ṛṣis etc [4] The reference to their upasamhāra by the gods and others[5] in Sutra 10 is not, therefore, justifiable

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the attributes beyond the four and falling short of those which the four-faced Brahma is entitled to meditate upon (*itare*)[6] are to be meditated upon and combined by the gods Ṛṣis and others

The objection that they will not be in a position to determine before entering on their meditation how many and which among them are open to them and that they may run the risk of exceeding their bounds and incurring sin by forging ahead without proper authority, are met by providing that they will be instructed by the four-faced Brahmā who is their appointed Guru Other Gurus also may be sent into their lives

2 तत्र युज्यते चतुर्मुखस्य सर्वगुणोपासनम् । सत्त्वमुमुक्षूणां च चतुर्गुणोपासनायोग्यताया एव निर्णीतत्वात् । न च तथा मध्यमगुणेष्वप्यस्यैतावतोऽस्यैतावन्त इति योग्यतानिश्चयः शक्यते ज्ञातुं येनोपासना स्यात्

(*TP* iii 3 14)'

3 न चोपासनाभ्यासे सति यस्य यावन्तो गुणा युगपत् प्रतीयन्ते तस्य तावन्त इति योग्यतानियमो ज्ञातुं शक्यत इति वाच्यम् प्रागेव योग्यतानियमाज्ञानेऽयोग्योपासनाप्रयत्नप्रसङ्गेनानर्थप्राप्तेः (*TP* iii 3 14)

4 अतो मध्यमगुणानामनुपास्यत्वात् तदुपसंहारविधानानुपपत्तिरिति (*ibid*)

5 Read यथाशक्ति सर्वोपसंहारस्य तत्राभिमतत्वेन देवाद्यधिकारिणां गुणोपसंहारस्यापि तत्र प्राप्तत्वात् अत एव विरिञ्चिवद्गुरूक्ति प्राप्तश्च इत्यत्र ब्रह्मादयो भवन्ति इत्यादि भाष्योक्तिः (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 14)

6 Read ननु चतुर्भ्य इतरे इत्युपपन्नम् । न तु सर्वेभ्य इतर इति । एतेषां सर्वान्तःपातित्वेन तदितरत्वायोगात् । सर्वगुणेतरत्वं च गुणत्वमेव न स्यात् इति चेन्न । सर्वत्वचतुष्ट्वयोर्भिन्नधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वात् उपसंहृतव्यवस्थाभिमतत्वात् (*AC* iii 3 14)

to enlighten them[7] Meantime, they can very well start with the meditation of the four gunas which are open to all Mumukṣus and in due time and after instruction from their appointed Gurus take up many more[8] which are implicitly contained in the four principal attributes themselves,[9] to be discovered by progressive meditation under conditions of vivid comprehension and proceed further on the same lines by extending the range of their upasamhāra, wherever possible, till Aparokṣa is attained[10] The provision made for the upasamhāra of these *'madhyamagunas'* is therefore quote in order

The meaning of the Sutra is 'The other attributes (*itare*) are to be meditated upon and combined, in conformity with the equitableness of fruits according to the fitness of upasakas[11] by other gods, Ṛṣis and Gandharvas

The expression *artha* in the Sūtra signifies the 'fruit' of mokṣa and *'sāmya'* its equitableness, conforming to *yogyatā* and not a flat sameness of the fruits The ablative (*arthasāmyāt*) is elliptical as can be seen from its paraphrase (*phalasāmyāpekṣayā*) in the *Bhāṣya*[12] Tho' the ablative form *'arthāt'* alone (elliptically understood) will do, to convey the sense of 'having regard to (the variations in) the respective fruits of Mokṣa, the addition of *sāmānyāt* (in all equitableness) is to bring out the reason implicit in it that there is an equitable relation between the upāsanā and its fruits[13]

Śamkara's Interpretation Ānandadyadhikaranam (iii 3 11-13)

According to S this *adhi* is intended to draw the line between attributes which are assigned to B for the sole purpose of meditation and others which are posited to represent B *as it is* Only the latter are to be combined in meditation[14]

Attributes like "*samyadvāmatva* and *satyasamkalpatva*' belong to the former category They are, therefore, kept strictly confined to their

7 तथा सान्युक्तं भावा ब्रह्मणो वा यस्य वा भवन्त्य गुणा तदनुसारिगुणनियमादतारतम्यरीति । तथा च श्रुति 'या या मात्रा देवताना विमुक्तौ * * इति (*TP* iii 3 14)

8 साधारण्येन चतुर्णां गुणानां क्लृप्तत्वात् तथ्ववारायणायामभ्यस्यमानायां तदन्तर्भावितासाधारणनिबद्धा यावन्तो गुणाः स्पष्टं प्रतिभासन्ते, तावदुपासनम् * * * (*STC* iii 3 14)

9 Cf. सर्वगुणानामपि गुणचतुष्टयविशेषत्वस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् (*TP* iii 3 13)

10 तत्र तेष्वनुशासनायामभ्यस्यमानायां, तत्रान्तर्भाविना उपासितासाधारणनिबद्धा यावन्तो गुणाः स्पष्टं प्रतिभासन्ते तावतामुपसंहारमित्येव क्रमेणोपासनाद्यास (*STC* iii 3 14)

11 इतरे गुणाः फलसाम्यापेक्षयोपसंहर्तव्याः (M. *BSB* iii 3 14)

12. अत्र उक्तम्—अर्थेति। स्पष्टार्थं पञ्चमी। स्वस्वयोग्यफलसाम्यसद्भावात् (*TDP* iii 3 14)

13 अर्थसाम्यादित्येव पूर्णे सामान्यादिति पुनरुक्तिः फलोपासनयोः साम्यादिति युक्तिं सूचयितुम् (*ibid*)

14. गुणविधानस्य वास्तवगुणाख्यानार्थं विवक्षायामिदमधिकरणम् (*Bhāmati* iii 3 11)

own special contexts in which they are ascribed and are *not* allowed to be amalgamated with one another. On this analogy, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the bliss and intelligence posited as *attributes* of B. *in Taitt. Up.* (ii.1.) are not to be amalgamated with others like *vibhutva, nityatva, sarvagatatva,* mentioned in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.6) to form one meditation.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is—Just as the attributes of *Samyadvāmatva* etc. posited in the Upakosalavidyā of the *Chān. Up.* (iv.15.2)' and *satyakāmatva, satyasankalpatva* etc. posited in the Daharavidyā (*Chān. Up.* viii.1.5) are not mutually amalgamated to form one meditation, even so, the attributes of ānanda, vijñāna etc. posited of B. in the Taitt. Up. and others like vibhutva and nityatva, mentioned in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* are not to be amalgamated with one another to form one meditation. Otherwise, samyadvāmatva and others also ought to be amalgamated with satyakāmatva etc. as the subject of which they are predicated is the same B. in both the Vidyās and there is no reason to object to the amalgamation.[15]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the attributes which depict the *nature of the thing as it is* and *attributes given to it* in connection with some activity to be performed (whether mental or physical) determine the invariable or variable nature of the subject. An attribute which belongs to the essential nature of the thing in question persists as long as the thing lasts. Given in one context with reference to that thing, it cannot be *said to be non-existent in the subject or not to belong to it, even tho'* it may *not* be actually mentioned in some other place or context, where it is described with some *other* attributes. An attribute enjoined *ab extra* to accomplish some activity is contingent on human exertion. A distinction has, therefore, to be drawn between attributes on the basis of their being real i.e. depicting the true nature of the subject *as it is* (*vastudharma*), and their being ascribed to it in connection with the performance of some act. The former type of attributes endure as long as the subject endures *and it cannot, therefore, be supposed that* an attribute which has been duly posited of such a subject in one place and not posited of it in another similar context is, on that account, to be treated as *non est.*[16] An attribute which has been enjoined for the

15. यथैकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः संयद्वामत्वादयः सत्यकामात्वादयश्च गुणाः न संकीर्यन्ते, एवमानंदविज्ञानत्वादयो विभुत्वनित्यत्वादिभिर्गुणैः प्रदेशान्तरोक्तैः न संकीर्येरन्। तत्संकरे वा संयद्वामत्वादयोऽपि सत्यकामत्वादिभिः संकीर्येरन्। नहि ब्रह्मणो धर्मिणः सत्त्वे कश्चिद्विशेषः इति पूर्वः पक्षः (*Bhāmatī* iii.3.11)

16. वास्तवविधेययोर्वस्तुधर्मतया चानुष्ठेयतया चाव्यवस्थाव्यवस्थे व्यवतिष्ठेते। वस्तुधर्मो हि यावद्वस्तु व्यवतिष्ठते। नासावेकत्रोक्तोऽन्यत्रानुक्तो नास्तीति शक्यं वक्तुम् (*Bhāmatī* iii.3.11)

fulfilment of some activity, mental or physical, is related to human exertion being directed towards it

In a meditative act with reference to B, for example, this human exertion applies only to as many attributes by which B is sought to be qualified for purposes of that act of meditation Its application does not extend to the domain of some other attributes connected with the same subject but enjoined somewhere else in connection with some other meditative activity The attributes are governed by the exigencies of their *vidhi* and *vidhis* have their bounds Unlike *satyakāmatva* or *satyasankalpatva*, attributes like *ānanda* and *vijnāna* have been ascribed to B to depict it *as it is, in reality* They are, therefore, to be amalgamated with others like *vibhutva nityatva*, etc all of which describe the essential nature of B as it is[17] But the attributes of *samyadvāmatva*, *satyasankalpatva*, etc, belong to the sphere of activities connected with meditation They have to be confined to their own contexts and are not to be inducted beyond their limit Therefore, while attributes like *ānanda*, and *vijnāna* can be freely amalgamated with *vibhutva, nityatva*, etc for meditation, no combination of *satyakāmatva, satyasankalpatva* and *samyadvāmatva* is permissible[18]

Criticism

As S has agreed in principle to unity of Vidyās by virtue of unity of the subject of knowledge, the amalgamation of *satyakāmatva, samyadvāmatva* and others cannot be resisted It is not, therefore, proper to raise the Pūrvapakṣa on the analogy of assumption of non-integration of *satyakāmatva* and *samyadvāmatva* to challenge the amalgamation of ānanda, vijñāna, etc with *vibhutva, nityatva*, etc[19]

The formulation of the Siddhānta by resorting to an artificial distinction between 'subsistent' attributes and 'enjoined' ones and distinguishing *samyadvāmatva, satyasamkalpatva*, etc from 'subsistent' attributes like *ānanda*, is unsustainable How can S accept *ananda* as a subsistent attribute of his B which is Nirguna[20]? If *ānanda jnāna* and others are not 'attributes' of B, why should a number of them be

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17 विधेयस्तु पुरुषप्रयत्नतन्त्र । पुरुषप्रयत्नश्च यत्र यावद् गुणविशिष्टे ब्रह्मणि चास्ति तावदेवावतिष्ठते नाविहितमपि गुणं गोचरयितुमर्हति तस्य विधितन्त्रत्वात् विधेश्च व्यवस्थानात् । तस्मादानन्दविज्ञानाद्या ब्रह्मस्वरूपा यत्र यत्र ब्रह्म श्रूयते तत्र तत्रानुवर्त्यन्ते [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 3 11)

18 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* ibid)

19 [illegible] (STC iii.3 14)

20. [illegible]

used to depict B. '*as it is*? The usual explanation that these are employed to secure in B. the absence of their opposites (of misery, ignorance, etc.) does not carry us far. For, unless there actually exist in B. the attributes of existence, knowledge and bliss *competent to dispel the approach of their opposites,* their elimination from B. can never be secured. The belief that upāsanā of B. can be carried on with foisted attributes *is repugnant to the spirit of the Śāstras.* Anyway, so far as we can see, the attributes of *samyadvāmatva, satyasaṅkalpatva* etc. also endure in B. as much a ānanda and others. If they are to be regarded as *not* belonging to B. *(avastudharma)* because they have to be conceived thro' an "other" (*sāpekṣa*), the objection would apply to 'satyatva' and others also in so far as B.'s reality is to be conceived, in Advaita, in terms of its otherness from the unreal (*asattvavyāvṛtti*). In principle then, both positive and negative attributes of B. presuppose "an other" —a reference to something other than themselves. It is purely a matter of detail which makes no difference to the question of 'Sāpekṣatva' that while a positive attribute like omniscience presupposes an object to be known, the negative requires a counter correlative to make the negation intelligible. Nor is it possible to treat *satyakāmatva* as not subsisting in B. and enjoined merely for purposes of meditation and, therefore, subject to human exertion. The injunction to meditate on them does not make them dependent on human exertion. The meditation may be so but not the attributes themselves. Otherwise, the attribute of *ānanda* also which S. accepts as *vastudharma* of B. will have to be regarded as dependent on human exertion because it is also enjoined for meditation in *Sa tapo atapyata sa tapas taptvā ānando brahmeti vyajānāt (Taitt.* Up. iii.5-6) and in *Tad brahmetyupāsīta sa ya evamvid ānandamayam ātmānam upasankrāmati* (*Taitt. Up.*iii.10, 4-5).

It must, therefore, be admitted that the fact of being enjoined for meditation does not necessarily render the attribute so meditated upon any the *less real in B.* For under the Sūtra: *Vyatihāro viśimṣanti* * * (iii.3.37), after insisting on the double enunciation of meditation of the identity of Jīva with B. and of B. with Jīva, S. has himself concluded that the instruction about B.'s possessing such qualities as *satyakāmatva,* given for the purpose of meditation proves, at the same time, the existence of a Lord endowed with such attributes,[21]—which means the attributes in question do exist in Him in reality! It is thus inconsistent for S. to hold under the present Sūtra that *satyakāmatva* and other attributes have no existential value. In so far, then, as both the facts of (i) B.'s being satyakāma, satyasaṅkalpa and (ii) possessing the attri-

21. आध्यानार्थेऽपि सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशे, तद्गुण ईश्वर. प्रसिद्ध्यति. तद्वत् (एकत्वमपि दृढीभवति)
(S. *BSB.* iii 3 37)

butes of *ānanda*, etc. are equally uncontradicted by other Pramāṇas and are *not* made known to us thro' any other source of knowledge save the Śrutis and as neither is associated with any injunction to meditate upon it;[22] and both are equally hostile to the concept of a Nirguṇa-B., it is *sheer invidiousness to treat the attribute of ānanda alone as really existing in B. and deny the privilege to satyakāmatva, satyasaṅkalpatva, etc.*

S. interprets the Sūtra as saying that bliss and other properties are attributes which describe B. as it is and that, therefore, all such attributes are to be combined everywhere with its other existential attributes like *vibhutva, nityatva*,[23] etc. But the Sūtra as it stands worded contains neither the predicate nor the reason fancied by S. As this is a Guṇopasaṁhārapāda, there can be no objection to supplying the predicate *'upāsyāḥ'* after *ānandādayah* and allowing *'prādhānasya'* to embody the reason. But S.'s way of taking *'pradhāna'* to denote B. as the subject to which *ānanda* and others belong as existent attributes and that these attributes ought, therefore, to be combined in upāsanā needs both the predicate and the reason to be supplied by adhyāhāra, in the Sūtra. By its very nature *'pradhāna'* (*sya*) is an adjective. As ānanda and other exalted attributes can by no means be held to belong to any other being but B. it is quite unnecessary to qualify B. by using the expression *'pradhānasya'*. Its use in the Sūtra to denote B. as the subject of the existent attributes of *ānanda* etc. by S. is not justifiable.[24]

As it would readily follow that the attributes of *ānanda, vijnāna*, etc. should be combined with *vibhutva* and others mentioned elsewhere on account of the oneness of the subject of knowledge (*dharmiṇa vedyasya ekatvam*) as in respect of the *upasaṁhāra* of the attributes of *vasiṣṭhatva*, etc. in Prāṇa in the Kauṣītakī śakhā (as established in adhi. 5), the entire Sūtra turns out to be superfluous for the sole purpose of propounding the *upasaṁhāra* of *ānanda*,[25] etc.

The *Kalpataru* has tried to justify the opening of this *adhi.* on the basis of an *adhikāśankā* that in the case of the Prāṇavidyās in the *Kauṣītakī* and other Upaniṣads, the *upasaṁhāra* (amalgamation) of the attributes of *vasiṣṭhatva* etc. from other Śākhās is admissible because Prāṇa is after all a Saviśeṣa entity. But as B. is 'Nirguṇa' and 'Nirviśeṣa' its meditation on the basis of attributes given is one's own Śākhā

22. The attributes of *satyakāmatva*, etc are also posited of B. in a context *other than of upāsanā* (vide *Chān. Up.* viii 1 5).

23. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्माः सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्याः (S. *BSB.* iii 3 11)

24. आनन्दादीनामन्यधर्मत्वाभावेन व्यावृत्त्यप्रसिद्ध्या प्रधानस्येत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यात् (*STC.* iii.3 14)

25. धर्मिण एकत्वेन कौषीतकिविद्यायां वसिष्ठत्वादीनामिवानन्दादीनां सर्वत्रोपसंहारसिद्धेः समग्रसूत्रवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् (*ibid*)

itself will do without having to resort to supplementing it with attributes given in another Śākhā for there is nothing to supplement by way of *additional attributes in a Being that is ex hypothesi* Nirviśeṣa![26]

If this be so, the supervening objection (*adhikāśankā*) will be irrefutable. For, the Sūtra disproves that B. is 'Nirviśeṣa' by predicating of it *ānanda, vijñāna*, etc. as its essential and unalterable attributes'. If it is conceded that *ānanda* and others are attributes which do not differ from the being of B. and that, therefore, they can be combined with other such attributes, the same thing can be said of *satyasankalpatva* and others also.

The clear reference to *Priyaśirastva* etc. as attributes of Ānandamaya-Brahman in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.5) creates an awkward predicament for S. To M. the question here is not whether these are attributes of B. or not; but *whether they are permitted to be meditated upon by all* Mumukṣus, without distinction or are reserved for higher orders of upāsakas.[27] To accept them *as attributes of Ānandamaya-Brahman as* implied by the wording of the Sūtra ('*aprātiḥ*') and dismiss them as unfit for meditation on the ground of their being subject to fluctuations of measure and intensity (and therefore *not to be regarded as attributes of B.*) *is not fair.* The proper way out of the difficulty would be to understand the explanatory part: *upacayāpacayau hi bhede* in a sense consistent with their remaining attributes of B.—tho' precluded from being meditated upon by some *for special reasons.* That is what M. has done.

As colorful aspects of *ānanda*, there can be no difference between *ānanda* and its other forms of expression such as *priya, moda* and *pramoda*.[28] S. cannot get away with the explanation that they are *not* the attributes of B. but of Ānandamaya-Kośa and that, therefore, only ānanda, vijnāna and others are attributes of B. We have seen in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa (See Vol. I. pp. 96-110) that the Śruti and the Sūtra do not permit any such distinction to be made between B. and Ānandamaya and, therefore, between B. and *priya, moda, pramoda,* etc.

If they are not attributes of B. there is no need for the Sūtrakāra to take any notice of them! S. tries to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that the Sūtrakāra's main purpose here is to dispel the upasam-

26 प्राणस्य सविशेषत्वाद्युक्त शाखान्तरीयधर्मिष्ठत्वाद्युपसंहार । ब्रह्मणस्तु निर्विशेषत्वात् स्वशाखागतधर्मैरेव प्रमितिसिद्धे नानन्दाद्युपसंहार इति व्यवस्थानात् सङ्गतिः (*Kalpataru* iii 3 11)

27 See adhi. 6 *ante.*

28 Cf. यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुद प्रमुद आसते ।
स्वधा च यत्र तृप्तिश्च तत्र माममृतं कृधि ॥ (*R. V.* ix 113 11)

hāra of *samyadvāmatva, satyasankalpatva* and such other attributes and that he does this by banning the upasamhāra of *priyaśirastva*, etc and thereby he achieves his main object of banning the upasamhāra of *samyadvāmatva, satyasankalpatva*, by extending the same principle of rejection to them[29]

But then, the grounds on which *samyadvāmatva, satyasankalptva*, etc are *not* to be amalgamated are *not* the same as those for banning the upasamhāra of *priyaśirastva*, etc The latter are, according to S *not* attributes of B but of the Kośa But *samyadvamatva, satyasankalpatva* and others are attributes of B all right (*niscitabrahmadharma*) and this is admitted by S himself under iii 3 37 as well (*See* also f n 21)

There is thus no basis for the extension of the principle of rejection *from the one to the other* If the Sūtrakāra had the intention to disapprove of the upasamhāra of *samyadvāmatva*, etc he would have surely set about it *in a forthright manner*, instead of having recourse to such a devious device of '*bakabandhana*'! Moreover, according to S himself (iii 13 12) the reason for the non upasamhāra of *samyadvāmatva, satyasankalpatva*, etc is that of '*upakramabheda*' already dealt with under Sūtra iii 3 7, which is in no way connected with the reason applicable to *priyaśirastva*, etc The *atideśa* is, therefore, *baseless*

S goes on to say that the qualities of *priyaśirastva*, etc, are nevertheless attributed to B not because they depict B's nature as it is but to facilitate the mind s gliding towards B[30] If letting the mind glide towards B means a real contemplation of B, it will make B an object of meditative contemplation and meditative perception which is *not acceptable to S* An *āropa* or superimposition is repugnant to serious upāsanā of B and no Adhikārin who has attained Tattvampadaviveka in Pada 2, is likely to indulge in vain superimposition on B! There is no need to seek the aid of superimposition of attributes in upāsanā in trying to fix the mind on B It can very well be done with real attributes of B (including *priyaśirastva*, where permitted) The very fact that the Śruti mentions ānanda and such other attributes for meditation should be enough to show that the fixing of the mind on B is to be done, in the opinion of the Sūtrakara with the help of attributes that do really exist in B[31] Indeed there is no other purpose for the ela

29 ब्रह्मधर्मान्वेषणेन कृत्वा न्यायमात्रमिदमाचार्येण प्रदर्शितम्—'प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्ति' रिति । स च न्यायोऽन्येषु निश्चितेषु ब्रह्मधर्मेषूपासनायामनिष्यमानेषु नेतव्य सत्यकामादिषु सत्यसंकल्पादिषु च (S BSB iii 3 12)

30 परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि चित्तावतारोपायमात्रत्वेन परिकल्प्यन्ते न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन (S BSB iii 3 12)

31 अनारोपितधर्मैरेव चित्तावतरणसंभवाच्च ।
अन्यथा अनारोपितान्न्यासिता न युज्येत (STC iii.3.14)

borate recitals of B's numerous attributes in the Śrutis than to enable the mind to get fixed on B by intensive contemplation of those attributes, according to each one's capacity (Cf *ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt* iii.3 15)

The third Sūtra as interpreted by S merely reiterates the position taken in the opening Sūtra that attributes like *ānanda* are intended to depict B's true nature and are, therefore, valid for all other passages referring to B It is, therefore, superfluous The term '*itare*' in this Sūtra should rather point to some *other attributes* instead of referring back to ānanda and others, again

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R constitutes Sūtras 11-17 as one *adhi* The opening Sūtra is interpreted by him as follows "The expression '*abhedāt*' follows from Sūtra 10 Read with '*Ānandādayah pradhānasya*' it means "As the possessor of the attributes of *ānanda* and others is the same B in all meditations they are inseparable from B (everywhere)"[32] However, as the attributes are also mentioned separately from B as in *Ānandam brahmanah* (*Taitt Up* ii, 9) it seems unnecessary to insist on an inseparable relation of the attributes with B in R's special sense of *aprthaksiddhi* But if *aprthaksiddhi* is to be admitted in principle it will go hard with R when it comes to *priyasirastvādi* whose upasamhāra cannot be excluded for the very reason of their *aprthaksiddhi* relation with B

R is, however, ready with the answer that *Priyasirastvādi* are not the qualities of B[33] We have, however, to ask why R is not prepared to recognize *priyaśirastvadi* as the qualities of B Is it because they are to him also attributes of the Kosa, as they are to S or because they do not enjoy the status of *aprthaksiddhi* as *ānanda* and others do? R does not hold Ānandamaya to be a kosa He accepts it as B He is, therefore, bound to accept priyasirastvādi also as qualities of B as they are ascribed to Ānandamaya in the Upaniṣad In the circumstances, there is no reason for R to deny them the status of *aprthaksiddhi* with B as in the case of *ānanda* and other attributes The objection that if limbs like head and wings are to be accepted for B there will be the liability to increase and decrease of bliss in B which is against the teaching of the Sruti is no formidable one For R is committed to

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32 आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य । अभेदादिति वर्तते । प्रधानस्य गुणिनो ब्रह्मणः सर्वत्रोपास्यत्वेनाभेदात् गुण्यपृथग्भावात् गुणानां सर्वत्रानन्दादयः तद्गुणा उपसंहर्तव्याः (*Śrībhasya* iii 3 11)

33 प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनामप्राप्तिः तेषामब्रह्मगुणत्वात् (*Op Cit* iii 3 12)

the position that B.'s body is composed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes of strength, valor, wisdom, energy and other noble qualities and that it is not composed of flesh, marrow and bones.[34] He has, therefore, to maintain that tho' possessed of a body and limbs, B. is not liable to any increase or decrease in the measure or intensity of svarūpānanda.

However, R. talks of the 'figurative representation' of B. in the form of an animal body with limbs such as head and wings.[35] If this representation has no correspondence with reality but is merely an imagery, it would mean that such a teaching in the Śruti will have no validity as Śāstra. The explanation that it is meant only for the purpose of upāsanā is inadmissible as upāsanā based on mere superimpositions are repugnant to the spirit of the Śrutis.

Under the third Sūtra, R. makes a distinction between attributes like ānanda which give us a true notion of B. as the object of meditation and other qualities like compassion, dignity, beauty, etc. which tho' they cannot exist apart from B. are still not necessary elements of the idea of B. and need not, therefore, be included in all meditations but only where they are mentioned.[36]

But this overlooks the fact that in the well-known description of B. as Sarvasya vaśī, sarvasyeśānah... (*Bṛh.* iv.4,22) no true notion of B. can be formed without taking into account the element of sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) etc. which R. is disinclined to treat as being *'arthāmubandhi'*. If by attributes which give us a true notion of B.'s nature, R. means their giving us the bare notion of B. as a subject (*dharmimātrapratītyanukūlam*), even *ānanda* and *jñāna* will have to be considered as not coming up to the mark, as they do *not* give us the idea of B. as abstracted from its qualities. If they should, R. should have no quarrel with S. over the right way of interpreting the text *Satyam jñānam anantam* (*brahma*). The right view to take would be that tho' all the attributes of B. partake of its essence, the choice of particular attributes for meditation depends on the upāsaka's needs, interests and capacity or fitness to meditate on them.

34. Read: परस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपवत्त्वं श्रुतवाक्यं वदति–अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशादिति। योऽसावादित्यमण्डलान्तर्वर्ती तप्तकार्तस्वरगिरिनिभः पुण्डरीकदलायमानलोचनः सुभ्रूललाटः सुनासः सुस्मिताधरविद्रुमः तनुमध्यो विशालवक्षाः ममविभक्तसर्वाङ्गः स्निग्धवर्णः पुरुषो दृश्यते स च परमात्मा परब्रह्म नारायणः अस्य देवादिरूपेणावतारेष्वपि न प्राकृतो देह इति महाभारते प्रतिपादितः (*Vedārthasaṅgraha*)

35 ब्रह्मणः पुरुषविधत्वरूपणमात्रानर्थत्वात् प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनाम् (R. iii 3 12)

36. ये तु निरूपितस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः कारुण्यादयो गुणाः तेषां गुणापृथक्स्थितत्वेऽपि प्रतीत्यननुबन्धित्वाभावात् ये यत्र श्रुताः ते तत्रोपसंहार्याः (Op. cit iii 3 12)

CHAPTER XXX

FEASIBILITY OF UPASAMHĀRA AND ANUPASAMHĀRA SHOWN

8. *Ādhyānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.15-16)

This *adhi.* reinforces the Upasamhāra and Anupasamhāra of attributes in the sense already defined in adhi. 3 by disposing of certain fresh objections against them.[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is difficult to sustain the injunction regarding upasamhāra of all the attributes or of a few of them. The fruit of Upāsanā can only be Mokṣa. But we have seen that Mokṣa has been assured for all those who are able to successfully meditate on only the four principal attributes of B. This makes the upasamhāra of all the attributes or of larger number than four quite unnecessary and pointless.[2] The fact that all the Vidyās are in a sense laudations of B. does not mean that all the attributes of B are necessarily to be meditated upon. In that case, we should expect them to be given *in one place.* But they are found scattered among so many Vidyās, which shows they are not all of them meant for meditation.[3]

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1. यद्यपि सर्वमध्यमगुणोपसंहारोऽल्पगुणोपसंहारस्यानुपसंहारश्च प्रमाणतः साधितौ विषयभेदेन चाविरोधश्च नीतौ, तद्भेदश्चोक्तः, तथापि प्रागुक्तप्रमाणानामत्राक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यां दृढीकरणेन विशेषप्रमाणोक्त्या च तयोरिह समर्थनम् (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3.15)
2. सर्वापेक्षितफलस्य चतुर्गुणोपासनेनैव सिद्धेः ब्रह्मण्युक्तसर्वगुणोपसंहारः तदितरेषूक्तानुपसंहारश्च नापेक्षित इति भावः (Vādirāja. *TPG.* p. 148)
3. गुणानां नानास्थलेषूक्तत्वेन तदभिधानस्योपासनार्थत्वाभावात् (*TP.* iii 3 15)

The case for Anupasamhāra in the sense of being satisfied with the combination of only a few attributes is equally unclear It cannot be that disposition of the attributes among many Vidyās is for indicating that only a few of them are to be taken up for meditation at a time and not all the rest For even in a given context there is no definite statement of how few are to be meditated upon [4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that as all the Vidyās in the Śrutis are in substance and in principle expositions of the countless attributes of B and as the only final purpose of the study and reflection of those attributes is that they are to be known and utilized in contemplation thro' upasamhāra, there is sufficient justification for recognizing in principle the need for upasamhāra of all or of as large a number of these attributes as possible, according to the fitness of Adhikārins [5] This is suggested by the force of the preposition *'ā'* used in the sense of all-inclusiveness *(abhividhi)* [6] As for the disposition of the attributes in different places, the Adhikārin who takes pains to collect[7] and combine as many of them as lie in his power will have his own reward, in terms of exhuberance of bliss in Mokṣa [8]

As for Anupasamhāra, it is open to all Adhikārins, other than the four faced Brahmā, down to the lowest in rank, to confine themselves to fewer number of attributes leaving the rest out of upasamhāra for reasons of inability or on account of their being ineligible for their upasamhāra [9]

The Sutra *Ātmasabdacca* (iii 3 16) refers to the authority in this behalf The reference is to the Śruti *Ātmetyevopāsīta atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti (Brh. Up* i 4 7) In this Śruti the particle *'eva'* (meaning 'only') embodies the sanction for limiting the meditation to as few

4 [illegible] (TP iii 3 15)

5 [illegible] (TP iii 3 15)

6 [illegible] (STC iii 3 15)

7 [illegible] (TP iii 3 15)

8 [illegible] (TP iii 3 15)

9 The *TD* extends the benefit of this provision even to those who are unable to meditate on all the four principal attributes mentioned in iii 3 12 [illegible] (*TD* iii 3 16)
This shows the author of *TD* accepts the class of Ekagunopasakas'

attributes as are within the competence of the lesser Adhikārins Tho' the connodenotative power of the word Ātman' is such as to embrace all the attributes of B in its sweep (Cf. *atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti*), each Adhikārin is able to comprehend in it or by it only as much of its connodenotative content as lies within his eligibility for upāsanā. This point has already been brought out in the Sūtra: *Prāpteśca samañjasam* (iii.3.10) This illustrates the principle of Anupasamhāra at work.[10] In connection with Anupasamhāra, the same particle *'ā'* in the Sūtra is to be understood in the sense of diminution (*īsadarthe*[11])

Samkara's Interpretation (iii, 3, 14-15)

According to S this *adhi* seeks to determine whether in the passage of the *Katha Up* (i 3.10 11) which runs "Higher than the senses are the objects of sense, higher than they the mind, higher than the mind is buddhi, beyond it the mahat and beyond it the unmanifest Higher than avyakta is the Puruṣa and beyond him there is nothing" We have to find out if the purport of the passage is to declare that each of the principles successively mentioned is higher than the preceding one or whether the purport of the entire passage is only one viz that the Puruṣa is superior to all else,—the enumeration of the others being intended to express nothing more than the greatness of Puruṣa[12]

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that each statement here is to be taken as a separate proposition at its full face value The meditation on each statement separately has its own reward[13] The objection of Vākyabheda

10 The full force of *Praptesca samañjasam* as explained above with reference to upasamhāra and anupasamhara in relation to the Śruti *Ātmetyevopasita* has been very well brought out by Vadiraja Tirtha

आत्मपदेन येषां सर्वगुणप्राप्तिः तेषां व्यवच्छेद्यगुणान्तराभावादवकार आत्मत्वविशेषणमगत्या अयोगव्यवच्छेद करोति। येषां तु, सकलगुणवाचकोऽप्यात्मशब्द तद्योग्यतानुसारेण कतिपयगुणानेव तच्चित्ते प्रापयति, तान् प्रति आत्मशब्दोदिता गुणास्तावन्त एव। अन्ये त्वात्मशब्दनाप्राप्तत्वात् तान् प्रत्यनात्मान एव। एव चात्मेत्यात्मशब्दप्राप्तस्वयोग्यगुणावान् इत्येवोपासीत, न त्वात्मशब्दाप्राप्तगुणवानित्यात्मशब्दाप्राप्ता गुणा एव व्यवच्छेद्या भवन्ति। अत सकलगुणोपासकाना प्रागुक्तायोगव्यवच्छेद, अन्येषां त्विदानीमुच्यमानोऽन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद इत्युभयथाऽविरोधादित्यथ (*TPG* p 148)

11 एतेन आ सम्यक् स्वप्राप्यफलानुसारिध्यानाय इत्याङोऽर्थान्तर सूचितम (*Ragh TPB* iii 3 16)

12 'इन्द्रियेभ्य परा ह्यर्था' इति। किमत्र सर्वेषामर्थादीना परत्व प्रतिपिपादयिषित आहो पुरुषस्यैव तत्प्रतिपादनार्थं चेतरेषा परत्वप्रतिपादनम् (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 14)

13 तत्र प्रत्येकमर्थादिपरत्वप्रतिपादन श्रुते श्रूयमाणे तत्परत्वे च सभवति न तदतिक्रमेण सर्वेषामेकपरत्वाध्यवसान न्याय्यम्। न च प्रयोजनाभावादसभव। सर्वेषामेव प्रत्येक परत्वाभिधानस्याध्यानप्रयोजनत्वात्। तत्तदाध्यानाना च प्रयोजनवत्त्वस्मृत। तथाहि स्मृति.

दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तका।
भौतिकास्तु शत पूर्णं सहस्रं त्वाभिमानिन।
बौद्धा दशसहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वरा
पूर्णं शतसहस्रं तु तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तका
पुरुष निर्गुण प्राप्य कालसख्या न विद्यते॥ इति (*Bhāmati* iii 3 14)

or splitting what is a single proposition into separate ones is not applicable to cases where the splitting is supported by Pramāṇas [14]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is when a concrete fruit of the highest value is known to accrue from perceiving the Puruṣa to be the highest tattva and goal, it is not proper to split the passage into several separate propositions each connected with some unseen merit of limited range [15] This is confirmed by the next Sūtra which points out that the subject of the discourse in the Upaniṣad has been called 'Ātman' indicating thereby that the others in the series are "Un-Ātman" [16]

Criticism

There is no sequence of thought in going into the question of Ātman's superiority to arthas, mind and other tattvas while we are in the midst of the discussion regarding oneness or difference of Vidyās

The *Kalpataru* has tried to put in that the inquiry into oneness or difference of meditations would involve the possibility of Vākyabheda in case of difference of Vidyās It thus becomes necessary to rule out Vākyabheda so as to establish oneness of Vidyā here [17] But then, Vākyabheda is not always concomitant with difference in Vidyā Identity between Vidyās taught in different Upaniṣads is possible in spite of Vakyabheda existing between them Vākyabheda is, therefore, no proof of absence of oneness of Vidyā This may be seen from the description of the Pañcāgnividyā in the *Chān Up* and the *Bṛh Up* in the same terms The sixth fire too is mentioned in both the Upaniṣads [18] As the attributes of the Vidyā are the same in both the Upaniṣads, there is no question of Guṇopasaṃhāra between them As the two descriptions are found in two different Upaniṣads they certainly cannot be said to constitute one Vākya Nevertheless they are the same Vidyā This shows Vākyabheda is no criterion of Vidyābheda Where then is the need to open the present *adhi*?

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14 प्रामाणिकस्य वाक्यभेदस्याभ्युपगमात् । प्रत्येकं उपासनादीनां परस्परासम्बन्धान्निति वाक्यानि
(*Bhamati* iii 3 14)

15 यत्र यस्य गम्यमानं प्रयोजनवत्त्वं दृश्यते तत्र तस्यैव गम्यताम् । दृष्टं च त्रिभिः पुरुषज्ञानस्य निखिलानर्थसमाप्त्याविद्यानाशम् । अर्थान्तरावबोधस्य न तु दृष्टमस्ति प्रयोजनम् । न [illegible] समभवत्युपलब्धा चाम्यः (*Bhāmati* iii 3 14)

16 अत एव प्रकृतं पुरुषमात्मेत्याह अनात्मानो भवितरानिति गम्यते (S *BSB* iii 3 15)

17 विद्याभेदाभेदप्रसङ्गेन वाक्यभेदाभेदचिन्ता ततिश्च विद्याभेदाभेदचिन्तनात् पादसङ्गतिः
(*Kalpataru* iii 3 14)

18 वाजसनेयिनः षष्ठमपरमग्निमामनन्ति पञ्चत्व च पञ्चाग्नि छन्दोगः
(S *BSB* iii 3 2)

The *Kalpataru* has further suggested that after the inquiry into *ānanda* and other attributes which constitute the essence of B and are, therefore, to be combined in all meditations, there is relevance in turning to attributes like B's superiority to the senses, mind, buddhi, etc. which is an attribute that is not vital to the description of B's true nature and is not, therefore, to be combined in mediations with other vital attributes[19]

But we see no reason why B's superiority to sense objects, mind, buddhi, avyakta, etc either severally or in an overall sense cannot be held to depict its true nature like *ānanda* and other attributes The objection that they involve a reference to an "other" has already been disposed of[20] That would also give the *adhi* a direct nexus with the topic of Gunopasamhāra The *Bhāmatī* itself concedes this point when it says in the preamble to the Siddhānta that the whole passage describes the true nature of B as it is[21] If we deny this, it would mean that in reality B is *not* superior to the objects of sense, the mind, avyakta, etc. which no Vedāntin can afford to admit.

As the Ekavākyatā or singleness of purport of the whole discourse of the *Katha Up* (i 3) in B has already been fully established in the Ānumānikādhi (i 4 1-7) and others, no Pūrvapakṣa can arise in disregard of it *at this stage* Granting the possibility of the Pūrvapakṣa, the manner of dislodging it is not very satisfactory In view of the evidence cited by the *Bhāmatī* regarding the different fruits accruing to those who meditate on the indriyas, the subtle bhūtas, the abhimānidevatās of the indriyas and avyakta,[22] we have to accept a subsidiary import (*avāntaratātparya*) of the different (separate) statements of superiority, without prejudice to a *mahātātparya* in respect of the overall superiority of B It will not do to take the extreme position dismissing the relative superiority of each succeeding tattva over the preceding member of the series, as devoid of fruit or purpose, Even the concluding statement in S's bhāṣya that the whole series of principles is enumerated only to the end of giving information about the Puruṣa shows that the overall superiority of Purusa made out thro' each subsidiary statement has its own meaning, place and significance as part of the Mahāvakya[23]

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19 ब्रह्मस्वभावभूतोपसंहार्यधर्मचिन्तानन्तरमस्वभावस्यानुपसंहार्यस्याप्यर्थादिपरत्वरूपधर्मस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्युपायत्वचिन्तनादवान्तरसंगति (*Kalpataru ibid*)

20 See Page 263 *ante*

21 उच्यते—इन्द्रियेभ्य परे ह्यर्था 'इत्येष संदर्भ वस्तुतत्त्वप्रतिपादनपर प्रतीयते (*Bhamati* iii 3 14)

22 See fn 13 *ante*

23 'तद्विष्णो परमं पदमित्युच्यते किं तदध्वन पार विष्णो परमं पदमित्यस्यामाकाङ्क्षायामिन्द्रियाद्यनुक्रमणात्-परमपदप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं एवायमायास इत्यवसीयते (S BSB iii 3 15)

If the point of the objection is that the separate enunciations are not the main purport of the passage as a whole, even the superiority of Puruṣa, who is *'mithyā'* to S, will be in the same predicament The objection put forward by the *Bhāmatī* that the supremacy of B as the chief purport is associated with concrete benefit of the dissolution of Avidyā, whereas the knowledge of the relative position of the objects, mind, buddhi, etc, has no such direct benefit accruing to it[24] is also open to question from S's point of view For even the knowledge that Purusa stands at the head of the series of tattvas is incompatible with knowledge of the Nirguna B which alone in S's view dissolves Avidyā and leads to Kaivalya

The wording of Sutra 14 gives no indication that a reference to the series of tattvas in the *Katha Up* is intended The interpretation put on the two words of the Sūtra requires a good deal of importations (*adhyāhāra*) to sustain it (In the passage from the *Kaṭha* the reference to the objects, mind, buddhi, etc, as higher than the preceding members of the series) is intended only for the purpose of their meditation to gain true knowledge of B—the enumeration having no other purpose (of its own)" The probans *'prayojanābhāvāt'* is not conclusive in as much as the supremacy of the successive principle is competent to give correct knowledge of the place and position of each of them and thro' each link, of the final knowledge of the overall superiority of B There is, therefore, *no* reason to hold that while the knowledge of the overall supremacy of B in the series has a definite purpose to serve, the knowledge of the place of each successive member which goes to make up the series is *not* contributory to that purpose

The assertion in the next Sūtra that by calling the Puruṣa under discussion "Ātman" the text wishes it to be understood that the other things enumerated are *not* Ātman has no relevance to the discussion The Pūrvapakṣa has not held that any of the other Tattvas in the series is "Ātman"

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

We have already seen how R treats Sūtras 14-17 as part of the *Ānandādhi* Accordingly he interprets Sūtra 14 as embodying the reason why if they are not really the attributes of B, *priyaśirastva*, etc should at all be used to represent B as having the form of an animal body The answer is—to facilitate meditation and for no other purpose

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24. यर्पास्पिरं ब्रह्मत्यपम्य न तु दृष्टमस्ति प्रयोजनम

But the reason cuts both ways. For the attributes of *ānanda, jñāna* and others are also intended for meditation of B. and have no other purpose. We have already seen that with his commitment to the *apṛthaksiddhi* relation between B. and its attributes, R. cannot afford to hold with S. that attributes other than *ānanda, jñāna,* etc. do *not* represent the true nature of B.

CHAPTER XXXI

ĀTMATVA EMBRACES OTHER ATTRIBUTES ALSO IN ITS CONNOTATION FOR UPASAMHĀRA

9. *Ātmagṛhītyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.17)

In the previous *adhi.* authority for the *anupasamhāra* (non-combination) of attributes was sought in the text: *Ātmetyevopāsīta.* The present *adhi.* shows that such *anupasamhāra* cannot be stretched to the extent of leaving out even the attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *nirdoṣatva* by all Mumukṣus and confining the meditation to the attribute of *ātmatva alone.*[1] This is done by elucidating how the attribute of *ātmatva* embraces within its conno-denotative power, the attributes of *ānanda*, *jñāna* and *nirdoṣatva* also.[2]

1. यदि 'आत्मशब्दाच्च' इति पूर्वसूत्रे आत्मेत्येवेत्यवधारणस्यान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदकत्वमंगीकृत्य नञ्छिरस्कात्मशब्दस्यानुपसंहारे प्रमाणत्वमंगीक्रियेत, तर्ह्यात्मत्वमेवोपास्यं न तु आनन्दादयश्चत्वारोऽपीत्याक्षेपोत्थानादनन्तरसंगतिः
(Raghu. *TPB*, iii.3.17)

2 According to Trivikrama Paṇḍita "inner ruler" is the expressed sense of the word 'Ātman'. The other three meanings of *ānanda*, *jnāna* and *nirdoṣatva* are conveyed by it thro' Lakṣaṇā. The basis of Lakṣānā is their coexistence in B. as shown in the Smṛti text cited by the Bhāṣyakāra from the *Bṛhattantra*. According to Jayatīrtha, the word 'Ātman' itself *expresses* all the four senses. This difference between the two commentators may be seen from the way in which Trivikrama speaks of the other three meanings being '*Vivakṣita*':
आनंदादयो गुणा विवक्षिता एवात्मशब्देन। आप इत्यानन्दत्वं स्वामित्वं च। आ प्रकृष्ट इति निर्दोषत्वं च लक्ष्यते
(*TD*. iii 3.17)
while J. speaks of the word Ātman expressing (*abhidhāyaka*) the other three senses: आत्मशब्दस्य स्वामित्वमात्रानभिधायकत्वे स्मृतिं चाह (*TP*. iii 3 17)
The *Smṛti* cited by the Bhāṣyakāra is.

आनन्दानुभवत्वाच्च निर्दोषत्वाच्च भण्यते।
नियन्तृत्वाच्च तथात्मेति वेदवादिभिरीश्वरः॥

Read: आनन्दव्याप्तत्वात् आनन्दानुभवव्याप्तत्वात्। अत सातत्यगमने। आशब्दो ह्यभाववाची। योऽस्य तथा दोषाः अवाप्यन्ते। निर्दोषत्वमिति यावत्।

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is It is not necessary to go beyond the meditation of B as one's Ātman or inner ruler It is the easiest to carry out and is at the same time the speediest means of direct realisation of B as it involves the most direct relationship between the Upāsya and the Upāsaka Concentration of the mind on some other attributes of B such as *ānanda* or *jñāna* would require more strenuous effort over a much longer period of time and the result even then may be considerably delayed. The emphatic particle 'eva' in the Śruti *'Ātmetyeva upāsīta'* shows that B is to be meditated upon only in terms of its being one's inner ruler There is no reason then to go beyond it and meditate on any of the other attributes such as *ānanda, jñāna* and *nirdosatva* The Siddhāntin is not, therefore, justified in holding that 'Ātmatva' embraces within its scope several other attributes like *ānanda* on the basis of the arthavāda passage *Sa yo ata ekaikam upāste na sa veda * * * atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti* attached to the Vidhivākya *Ātmetyevopāsita* (*Brh Up* i 4 7) For, an arthavāda is not to be taken at its face value It is only meant to praise and extol the vidhi We have to leave it at that[3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the fact of meditation on a particular attribute of B being the easiest to practise cannot be made the sole criterion of its choice for obtaining direct vision of B which is to enable *us to attain the highest fulfilment of life's spiritual aspirations*[4]

Moreover, the complete manifestation in Mokṣa of the essential *characteristic of selfhood viz of unalloyed bliss, intelligence etc is hardly* possible without meditating on corresponding attributes of B Meditation on the four principal attributes of B as set forth in adhi 5, is, therefore, indispensable for all Mumukṣus to attain the fullest manifestation of the essential characteristics of selfhood.[5] Where the full face value of an arthavāda is not opposed to other Pramanas it can be taken as it

3 आत्मत्वमेव सर्वेषामुपास्य नान्यदिष्यते ।
सुशकत्वादाशुभावात् एवकारश्रुतेस्तथा । (*STC*)
The STC points out that the recognition given to *anupasamhara* of many attributes coupled with the ease and quickness with which Aparokṣa can be attained by meditating on Ātmatva alone revives the Purvapakṣa here against the meditation of all the four *principal* attributes *as laid down in adhi* 5

4 अत्यलौकिकपरमपुमर्थहेत्वापरोक्ष्यऽतिसुशकत्वस्यागुणत्वात

(Ragh. *Ny Muktavali* iii 3 adh 9)

5 स्वापेक्षितमानानन्दादिफलप्राप्त्यर्थत्वेनान्योपासनस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात (*ibid*)

stands.[6] The opening part of the Śruti, where the arthavāda occurs, describes the Supreme B. as Prāṇa because it is of the essence of spotless bliss. It is called 'manas' as it is of the essence of thought or intelligence. The prefix *'pra'* signifies flawlessness. The Śruti thus concludes the *arthavāda* saying: One should therefore meditate on B. as "Ātman" only; for in it all the abovementioned attributes become unified.[7]

The overall sense of the Sutra is:- "In the Śruti 'Ātmetyevopāsita' by the term 'Ātman' all the other principal attributes of bliss, intelligence, etc., are also taken into account because of what follows the Vidhivākya, in the form of an arthavāda,—just as in other cases like *satyam, jnānam, anantam* several other attributes besides those mentioned are also conveyed".[8]

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6. वाक्यशेषात्स्यार्थवादे वेऽप्यविरुद्धस्वार्थतात्पर्याबाधात् (*ibid*)

7. 'प्राणन्नेव प्राणो नाम भवति, वदन् वाक्, पश्यन् चक्षु: शृण्वन् श्रोत्रं मन्वानो मन: * * * आत्मेत्येवोपासीत अत्र ह्येते सर्वं एक भवन्ति' (*Brh. Up.* i 4 7)

8 For example how 'Satyam' stands for B's power of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world of matter and souls has already been explained in Vol. I, p 96.

CHAPTER XXXII

POWER OF ĀTMATVA TO DENOTE OTHER ATTRIBUTES REGULATED BY YOGYATĀ OF ADHIKĀRINS

10 *Anvayādhikaranam* (iii.3 18)

This *adhi* disposes of an objection against the conclusion established in adhi 8 that the four principal attributes (denoted by the term Ātman) should be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus The objection is as follows It has been shown in *adhi* 9 that the term Ātman is capable of denoting countless number of attributes of B and not merely four or a few more In the circumstances, the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsīta', with its emphatic particle, would naturally oblige us to conclude that it is intention of the Śrutis that every Mumukṣu should meditate on all those countless attributes of B denoted by the term "Ātman"[1] This is sure to pose a most perplexing problem for the upāsaka, who will be at a loss to know or decide what is to be done[2]—whether to meditate on only four principal attributes as commended in Sūtra 12 or attempt to meditate on all the countless attributes denoted by the term Ātman For we find it stated on the authority of a Smṛti text also that B is called "Ātman" because it possesses the characteristic of all-pervasiveness in terms of space, time and attributes This means B is endowed with all possible attributes and that all these attributes are de-

1 आत्मशब्देन चतुर्गुणनामुक्तेरानन्दादिचतुष्टयोपासनसमर्थनमयुक्तम् । सर्वगुणानामात्मशब्दावतनयावधारणेन तेपामेवोपास्यताप्राप्तेरिति शकनात सगति (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 18)

2 तथाचात्मशब्द श्रुतचतुगुणोपासनस्य पुसो विभ्रमकर एव भवति, न त्वेवमुपासन कार्यमिति निश्चायक (Raghu *NVB*)

noted by the term Ātman[3] The Upāsaka's perplexity cannot be got over by his being told that he should confine himself to four or as many more out of the "all" denoted by the term Ātman which it is within his power to comprehend and within his competency to meditate upon. Such a solution would be inapplicable as the emphasis laid in the vidhi-vākya 'Ātmetyevopāsīta' would amount to an insistence on the meditation of all the countless attributes of B denoted by the term Ātman, by all Mumukṣus[4] The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in view of this perplexity created by the term "Ātman" we cannot accept the position that all Mumuksus should meditate on the attributes denoted by it Consequently it becomes equally unsustainable to find authority for anupasamhāra of attributes in the text *Ātmetyeva upāsīta,* as has been done under Sūtra 16

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta readily concedes that the term 'Ātman' is capable of denoting all the countless attributes of B as stated in the text *Āptavyāter ātmaśabdah paramasya prayujyate* and in other sources But this holds true only of topmost Adhikārins like the four-faced Brahmā and not of the rest The rest below him have no reason to be confounded For with reference to *them,* the same word Ātman will connote only as many attributes out of the "all", as are commensurate with their powers of comprehension and their competency for meditation[5]

The reason why a distinction has to be made in the connotative capacity of 'Ātman' with special reference to Adhikārins at different levels is this If the same restricted connotation is made applicable to all Adhikārins, the statements found in several authoritative sources that the four-faced Brahmā alone is qualified to meditate on all the attributes of B made known by the Śrutis will be falsified.[6]

It is only by agreeing that the term Ātman has the power of connoting all the attributes of B to only the highest Adhikārin viz. Brahmā

3 सर्वगुणानामात्मशब्दवाच्यता भवति– 'आप्तव्याप्तेरात्मशब्दः परमस्य प्रयुज्यते' इति वचनात्—— (M. BSB iii 3 18)
यावन्त्राप्यव्याप्ति [illegible] तथापि तस्मिन् हेतुगर्भविशेषणम् (BD iii 3 18)

4 न चात्मशब्दस्य सर्वगुणाभिधायकत्वेऽपि तदुक्त्या स्वयोग्यमेवोपास्यमिति वाच्यम् तथात्वे, 'आत्मेत्येव' इत्यवधारणस्य [illegible] (Ragh. TPB iii 3 adh 10)

5 सर्वगुणाभिधायकत्वमात्मशब्दस्य यद्यप्युक्तं तथापि स्यादेव। इयांस्तु विशेषः– सर्वगुणत्वात्मशब्दो ब्रह्मादीन् प्रत्येव वदति नान्यान् प्रति। यथायोग्यत्वात्। अतस्तत्राविप्रलम्भकत्वात् [illegible] सर्वेषां युक्तमिति भावः (Ragh TPB iii 3 adh 10)

6 अन्यथा सर्वोपसंहारवचनविरोधात् (M. BSB iii 3 18) [illegible] ब्रह्मादीनधिकारिणि [illegible] तदुक्तमेवात्मत्वम्। तथा च [illegible] सर्वगुणानभिव्यज्य [illegible] 'सर्वगुणोपास्त्या ब्रह्मा परमस्य', इत्यादिसर्वोपसंहारवचनविरोधः (TP iii 3 18)

and that this power comes to be proportionately restricted in the case of all those below him in rank that a satisfactory explanation can be given for the position that all Mumukṣus should meditate on B. with the help of attributes denoted by the term "Ātman".[7] This leaves the authority of the text *Ātmetyevopāsīta* to regulate the non-combination of attributes (*anupasamhāra*) intact.[8]

The *STC* disposes of an incidental objection as to how a *word* like "Ātman" which is unintelligent can be said to take note of the eligibility of different Adhikārins and connote for their benefit just as much of its entire meaning as may be commensurate with their power of meditation. It answers that some words have a wide range of significative powers by virtue of *yoga, vidvadrūḍhi* and *mahārūḍhiyoga.* The word Ātman is one such word. It can, therefore, reveal more of its content of meaning to one who knows all of it and less of its content to others who know only a part of it.[9]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

(*Ātmagṛhītyadhi.* iii, 3.16-17)

S. treats the Sūtras: *Ātmagṛhītir* * * and the following one as one *adhi.* and has given two different interpretations of it. The first one relates to a topic from the *Ait. Up.* and the second to another from the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* taken together. The first 'Varṇaka' discusses the question whether in the passage: *Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt * * * sa īkṣata lokān nu sṛjā iti* (*Ait. Up.* 2.1), the 'Ātman' referred to is the Supreme B. or Hiraṇyagarbha.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapaksa is that it is clear from the connected sense of the passage that it is Hiraṇyagarbha who has been referred to by the term 'Ātman' here as the passage speaks directly of the creation of the worlds without *mentioning the creation of the great elements. It is Hiraṇya-*

7. न वयमात्मशब्द. सर्वान् प्रत्येव निरकुश सर्वान गुणानभिधत्त इति वदाम', कितु, तत्तद्योग्यतानुसारेण तत्तद्योग्यानेव सर्वान् गुणानिति (*TP.* iii 3 18)
8 न चैवमनुपसहारमानत्वोक्तिविरोध । अस्यानुपसहाररूपत्वात्
(Ragh. *Nyāya Muktāvali* iii 3 adh 10)
9 शक्तिग्रहमनुसृत्यानेव शक्त्यभिज्ञचतुर्मख प्रति सर्वान् गुणान्प्रत्याययति। तदनभिज्ञान प्रति तु यथाशक्तिग्रहमल्पानेव गुणान् प्रकाशयतीत्युभयोपपत्ते (*STC.* iii 3 18)
Read: उत त्व पश्यन् न ददर्श वाच-
मुत त्व. शृण्वन् न शृणोत्येनाम ।
उतो त्वस्मै तन्व विसस्रे
जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासा. ॥ (*RV.* x 71 4)

garbha who is associated with the creation of the *worlds* in the Śrutis and Purānas while the creative activity of the Supreme B begins with the creation of *ākāśa and* the *great elements* [10]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it is only the Supreme B that has been referred to everywhere in all contexts of creation as in *Taitt Up* (ii 1 1) The act of willing referred to in *Ait Up* (ii 1-2) which precedes all creation is primarily associated with B everywhere The second Sūtra dismisses the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the connected sense of the passage favors Hiranyagarbha The emphasis laid on the fact that Ātman alone existed in the beginning points unmistakably to B The reference to the creation of the worlds should be interpreted so as to include the earlier creation of the elements[11]—a detail which can be supplied from similar contexts as clarified under *BS* ii 3 10 *In reality, however, the Śruti is not interested in the colorful stories of creation of the worlds*[12] The fiction of their creation is utilized merely to show that behind all this appearance there is the changeless being of the one self This is shown by the concluding statements *Brahma tatamam apasyat sarvam tat prajñānetram, prajñānam brahma*[13] (*Ait Up* v 3)

Criticism

The topic chosen for discussion has no relevance to the theme of this Pada, as it has nothing to do with the question of unity (or difference) of vidyās or of Gunopasamhāra As the question raised by S is whether a particular text refers to B or to some other person, its proper place is in the first Adhyāya and *not here* *This has been conceded by the Kalpataru* [14]

The Pūrvapakṣa of the first Varnaka makes too much of the nonmention of the creation of Mahābhutas in the given context—a detail

10 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 3 16)

11 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* ibid)

12 [illegible] (S *BSB* iii 3 17)

13 [illegible] 'सत्र ... प्रज्ञानेत्रम्' इति [illegible] (S *BSB* iii 3 17)

14 [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iii 3 16-17)

which can be supplied in conformity with the principle of Sarvaśākhā-pratyaya. In appealing to the concluding part to settle the issue, the deciding voice has to be given to the upasamhāra over the upakrama—which will be against the principle of Upakramaprābalya accepted by S. It cannot be said that as the upakrama is vague and inconclusive, the upasamhāra is called in to decide. As Ātman denotes Hiraṇyagarbha by *rūḍhi*[15] the Pūrvapakṣa may claim the upakrama to be decisive enough, supported further by the role of Hiraṇyagarbha in the creation of the worlds. Apart from the irrelevance of this question to the Pāda, S.'s *interpretation of* Sūtra 17 *has to adopt a* farfetched construction of *anvayāt* as *vākyabhedābhāvāt* and import many words to complete the sense of *avadhāraṇāt*—such as *prāg ekatva-(avadhāraṇāt)* and add a rider: *Hiraṇyagarbhagrahaṇe ekatvāvadhāraṇam amukhyam syāt* to sustain it.

Śaṁkara's Second Varṇaka

The other Varṇaka *deals with the question whether the texts in the Bṛh. Up.* and the *Chān. Up.* beginning with the words *Katama ātmā* (*Bṛh.* iv.3.7) and *Sadeva idam agra āsīt* (*Chān.* vi.2.1 and) ending with *Eṣa ātmā mahān ajaḥ* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.25) and *Sa atmā tattvam asi* (*Chān. Up.* vi.8.7) represent the same Vidyā or not. The doubt arises because in the Bṛh. Up. the beginning is made with 'Ātman' and in the *Chān. Up.* with 'Sat'.[16]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the term Sat is applied to self and not-self alike, it denotes 'being' in general. In a proposition like *San ghaṭaḥ* where 'Sat' is placed in apposition with a subject, it denotes that subject while in *Sad eva idam agra āsīt* no subject (*dharmi*) being given, it must refer to 'being' in general. Thus, the concluding part (*upasamhāra*) viz. *Sa ātmā tat tvam asi* read with the beginning will have to be understood in the sense that Ātman should be meditatively oriented as Sat or being in its generic sense. As 'being' in its widest sense pervades all entities, knowledge of this Sattā makes for the knowledge of "all" and fulfils the promissory statement: *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* made in connection with this vidyā. This vidyā *in the Chān. Up.* is thus different from the one in *Bṛh. Up.* commencing with the words '*Katama ātmā*'.[17]

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15 Cf. 'आत्मा विरिंच सुमना सुधातश्चेति कथ्यते'

16 सदुपक्रमस्य सदर्भस्यात्मोपक्रमस्य च किमैकार्थ्यमाहोस्वित् अर्थभेद.। तत्र सच्छब्दस्याविशेषेणात्मनि चानात्मनि च प्रवृत्ते (*Bhāmatī* iii.3.16-17)

17. किंतु समस्तवस्त्वनुगतसत्तासामान्यार्थत्वम् तथा चोपक्रमभेदात् भिन्नार्थत्वम्। स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति चोपसंहार उपक्रमानुरोधेन सपत्त्यर्थतया व्याख्येय। तद्धि सत्सामान्य परमात्मतया सपादनीयम्। तद्विज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान महासामान्यस्य सत्ताया समस्तवस्तुविस्तार-व्यापित्वादित्येव प्राप्ते– (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 16-17)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that in the passage quoted from the *Chān Up* also it is Ātman that is referred to by the term 'sat' This is clear from the subsequent teaching identifying Ātman with B[18] Even supposing that the expression Sat stands for being in general (*sattasāmānya*) the force of the concluding statement of identity would compel us to interpret the statement that Sat alone existed in the beginning as referring to Ātman. For, without giving a settled meaning to the upakrama, the upasamhara cannot be explained meaningfully[19] If then Sat should mean being in general and the concluding statement *Sa ātmā tat tvam asi* were to be explained as prescribing a meditative superimposition of Satsampatti on Ātman such a meditation will have no concrete benefit but only an unseen merit.[20] If Sat is understood in the sense of Ātman at the outset the oneness of Ātman and B taught in the concluding part will be seen to lead to concrete result of liquidation of Samsāra By taking Sat in the sense of pure being in general in *Sadeva idamagra āsīt* there will *not* be any worthwhile fulfilment of the assurance held out in the promissory statement that by knowing the one the many becomes known. For by knowing that everything has being in general will not give us knowledge of anything with its specific content. The knowledge that Ātman is B will have such a specific content[21] As that which is comprises the self and the not-self, the definite statement about the self in the concluding passage has to be used to define the sense in which the indefinite statement in the opening passage in terms of Ātman itself. If this is done, the theme and purport of both the vidyās will be the same—the identity of the individual self with the Supreme B

Criticism

The ground of the Purvapakṣa that these are different vidyās because of their *different ways of commencing is* not valid. There is, in fact, a very large area of agreement of thought between the two discourses in respect of the nature of the conclusion, repetitions, novelty, arthavāda and reasonings Even the alleged difference in their commencement is *not true* For in S's thought both Sat and Ātman denote

18 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 16-17)

19 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī*)

20 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 16-17)

21 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 16-17)

the principle of consciousness which is the substratum of all empirical predications of change.

The establishment of the Siddhānta about the unity of Vidyās by appealing to the upasamhāra as against the upakrama goes against the conclusion established in the third adhikaraṇa where it has been shown by S. that owing to difference in the nature of the commencement, the two teachings about udgītha given in the *Chān.* and *Bṛh. Ups.* must be deemed to be different.[22] In the present case also, since to S., Ātman alone is real and all else is Anirvacanīya, 'Sat' will be but another word for 'Ātman'. There can thus be no difference of vidyās due to difference in the nature of commencement.[23]

In the case of 'udgītha' and 'omkāra' figuring in the Viṣayavākyas of the third *adhi.* too, if 'udgītha' is denoted by its component element of 'om' thro' Lakṣaṇā, there will be no difference of vidyās. The difference in commencement cannot, therefore, be treated as a serious obstacle to unity of vidyās. Otherwise, we will have to deny unity of Vidyā in respect of the teachings of the two texts: *Asad va idam agra āsīt* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.7) and *Sad eva idam agra āsīt* (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.1) where the commencement shows that in one text the subject is 'Asat' and in the other 'Sat'. If Sat and Asat which have opposite meanings can be unified by Lakṣaṇā (put upon 'Asat') it should be easier still to reconcile udgītha and omkāra thro' lakṣaṇā seeing that om is only a component element of udgītha.[24]

S. renders the opening Sūtra as follows: "The passage "Being only this was in the beginning" in the *Ait. Up.* should be understood to refer to "Ātman", as in the other text from Bṛh. Up. mentioning Ātman, because here in the *Chān. Up.* there is the subsequent statement about the identity of Ātman with B."

If by "Ātman" we are to understand the Jīvātman here, the identity said to be established at the end would make no sense. It will also be highly inconsistent with the way in which the Sat has been proclaimed in the same context as the creator of the subtle elements and bringing about their tripartition, which are marks of its unmistakable majesty and which are not present in the Jīvātman and its being represented as the material cause of the world indicated by the formula of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam*, as interpreted by S.

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22. बहुतरप्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽपि उपक्रमभेदात् तदनुरोधेनोपसंहारवर्णनात् * * विद्याभेद इति राद्धान्त. (*Bhāmati* III 3 6-8)

23. अत्रात्मन एव सत्यत्वादन्यस्य च मिथ्यात्वात् सच्छब्द आत्मपर्याय इत्युपक्रमभेद एवासिद्धः (*STC.* III 3, 18)

24. न ह्यवयवावयविभावादिरूपप्रसिद्धसम्बन्धवतोरोंकारोद्गीथशब्दयोर्लक्षणयैकार्थ्यसंपादनं दुष्करं, विरुद्धार्थयोः सदसच्छब्दयोः तत्सुकरमिति युक्तम् ! (*STC*, ibid)

On the other hand, if the term "Ātman" should be taken to signify B, the marks of Jivahood mentioned there in describing the Ātman as *vijñānamaya, hrdyantahpuruṣah* would militate against their identification

The interpretation of *'anvayāt'* in the second Sūtra as "the term Ātman is not found used in the commencement in the *Ait Up* passage" (Yaduktam upakramānvayāt upakrame ca ātmaśabdaśravanābhāvāt) goes against the positive tenor of the wording (*anvayāt*) The interpretation of *avadhāranāt* as pointing to the principle of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* so as to dispose of the objection that the term Ātman is not found used in the commencement of the Ait passage is also inadmissible For the text *Yena asrutam srutam bhavati* (*Chān Up* vi 1 1) carries no *avadhārana* (emphasis) in its wording In any case, the other term *"uttarāt"* in the Sūtra will be quite sufficient to stand for the principle of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* embodied in *Yenāsrutam srutam bhavati* for purposes of this Varnaka—making the use of the term *avadhāranāt* superfluous The appeal to the *upasamhāra* is not in keeping with the acceptance of 'Upakramaprābalya' in the Siddhānta, as pointed out in the case of the other varnaka also

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R reads Sūtras 16-17 as part of the *Ānandādhi* His interpretation of the other Sūtras of this *adhi* has already been noted His distinguishing *annamaya* and the others from the Supreme B in the interpretation of Sūtra 17 is not tenable as has been shown under the *Ānandamayādhi* itself He has to resort to a good deal of importation in interpreting the term *avadhāranāt* in Sūtra 17 (** प्रकृतस्य आत्मन एव प्राणमयादिषु आत्मशब्देन) अवधारणात्, to complete the sense

CHAPTER XXXIII

WHY BRAHMAN'S ATTRIBUTES SHOULD BE MEDITATED UPON AS TRANSEMPIRICAL

11 *Kāryākhyānādhikaranam* (iii 3.19)

The Sūtrakāra had made it clear in the Parānandādhi (iii.2.32-34) that all attributes of B are transempirical in their character and do not form part of the world's nature The present *adhi* reinforces this special character of theirs against objections It also lays down that they should only be so meditated upon and combined, by disposing of objections to such upasamhāra It is not, therefore, rendered superfluous by the earlier *adhi* (iii 2.32-34) which merely establishes the transempirical character of the attributes of B —while this one insists upon their *meditation* as such (i e in their transempirical character), by disposing of objections against the possibility of meditating on transempirical attributes [1]

Pūrvapaksa

The objection is briefly this Our experience of attributes like *'jñāna'* and *'ānanda'* is limited to the empirical and is based on the operation of suitable means of ascertaining the significative power of the words to denote their respective senses We have no means of contact with transempirical attributes No knowledge or experience of them is, therefore, possible for us Being *ex hypothesi* transempirical, the

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1 'परमत' इत्यत्र भगवद्गुणानामलौकिकत्वसमर्थनम्। अत्र तु तेषामेवोपसंहर्तव्यत्वसमर्थनमिति तयोर्भेदः (Raghu *TPB* iii.3 19)

अलौकिकत्वोपास्तिपरमेतदतो न 'परमत' इत्यनेन पुनरुक्तिराशङ्कनीया (*TP* iii.3 19)

existence of such attributes is not open to perception or inference We have, therefore, to rely entirely on the help of words to have some knowledge of them But words can make known their meanings only when one has a prior knowledge of the nexus established by convention between a particular word and the meaning associated with or assigned to it The knowledge of such convention presupposes an acquaintance with the word as well as its meaning Tho' the word as such may be known thro' acoustic perception, the fact that it denotes a transempirical meaning cannot be vouched for *save by another word* The same difficulty would confront that other word also and yet another which may be called to aid, endlessly[3] As the transempirical sense cannot thus be brought within the range of experience, there is no possibility of its being kept revolving in the mind in constant meditation The whole scheme of Guṇopasamhāra, if it is to be of transempirical attributes, would thus become an impossibility There will be no such difficulty if the attributes to be meditated upon are the empirical ones, for then a nexus between the word and its meaning can be gathered on the analogy of other empirically known attributes denoted by their appropriate words[4] Thus, the objection based on the impracticability of having 'Śaktigraha' in the case of transempirical attributes as such would override the explanation offered in iii 2 24 that words of worldly usage may denote the transempirical attributes also thro' analogical approximation[5] The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that the meditation of B is possible only thro' empirical attributes Not being experienced, the transempirical attributes cannot be remembered in the process of meditation And meditation on what does not exist so far as the upāsaka is concerned would be a transgression. The conclusion established in *Paramatah* (iii 2 32-34) is, therefore, of no value

Siddhānta

The Siddānta is pronounced by the Sūtra *Kāryakhyānād apūrvam.* The expression 'apūrvam' here, denotes what is unique, what does not form part of the world s nature (*anyatra adṛṣṭam*) i e to say

2 अलौकिकानामननुभूतत्वेन ध्यानवानसम्भवात् (*TD* iii 3 19)

3 अत्र प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरगोचरत्वे प्रमेयस्य च शब्दस्य सङ्गतिग्रहणापेक्षत्वात् तस्य च सर्वविज्ञानाधीनत्वात् शब्दस्य सर्वविज्ञेन प्रत्यक्षेणापि अप्रत्यक्षविषयेण शब्दान्तरेण [illegible] शब्दान्तरेण तत्रापीत्यनवस्थापत्त्या [illegible] शब्दानामननुभूतत्वेन [illegible] (Ragh *TPB* iii.3 19)

4 लौकिकत्वे हि समयग्रहितो तु सादृश्यमुपादानमिति [illegible] प्रसिद्धानामानन्त्यादिसादृश्येन ईश्वर गुणानि [illegible] (Ragh. *TPB* iii.3.19)

5 ननु [illegible] इत्यानन्त्यादिस्वरूपस्य [illegible] कथ [illegible] न । अलौकिकत्वे [illegible] (Raghu *TPB* iii 3 19)

transempirical[6] This term is to be repeated in the Sūtra and read once with the word *'kārya'* taken in its abstract sense (*kāryatva*[7]) the compound *'kāryākhyānād'* being treated as elliptical (*madhyamapadalopi*[8]) —

अपूर्वकार्याख्यानात् अपूर्वं गुणजात उपसहृत्य ध्येयम्

(*TDP* iii 3 19)

The words *'guṇajātam'* (bunch of attributes) and *upasamhrtya dhyeyam* (are to be combined in one mental act and meditated upon) are "given" by the context of Gunopasamhāra which is the theme of this Pāda—so that they can readily be understood and connected with the other words in the Sūtra as indicated above The meaning of the Sūtra as a whole is As Moksa which is to manifest the bliss of selfhood is a transempirical state achieved by meditation on the attributes of B, the attributes to be meditated upon must needs be of the same transempirical nature,[9] consistent with the principle that one attains results according to the quality of one's meditations The empirical alone will not suffice to usher in the transempirical[10]

The difficulty of establishing denotative relationship of words current in empirical usage with unexperienced transempirical meanings is met in the Siddhānta by the answer that competent Gurus who have had direct vision of the transempirical form of B can convey to others an adequate conception of transempirical attributes by their upadeśa, which will be sufficient to enable the upāsakas to have meditative rapprochement with such attributes[11]

Vādirāja in his *TPG* (p 149) points out that what is meant by upasamhāra of transempirical attributes is to simultaneously compre-

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6 अपूर्वं=अलौकिकम (*TDP* iii 3 19)

7 कार्यपद भावप्रधानमावननीय च (*BD* ii 3 19)

8 अनेन कार्याख्यानादिति सूत्रभाष्यया कार्यस्यालौकिकत्वाख्यानादिति मध्यमपदलोपो समास

(Raghu *TPB* iii 3 19)

9 'अलौकिकास्तस्य गुणा ह्युपास्या
अलौकिक मुक्तिकार्यं यतोऽस्य ।
इति कार्याख्यानादत्यन्तादृष्टा एव गुणा उपास्या (M *BSB* iii 3 19)
'एव इत्यननापूर्वपद सावधारणमिति सूचितम (*BD*)

10 फलानुसारिध्यानस्य वक्तव्यतानियमात (*TP* iii 3 19)
'त यथा यथोपासते तदेव भवतीतिश्रुते रितिभाव (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 19)

11 शास्त्रोक्तवस्तुनश्चैव व्युत्पत्ति शास्त्रलिगत इत्युक्तरीत्या * * अनुकूलवेदनीयो भगवदगुणो य स आनन्द इति साक्षात्कृतभगवदगुणाना विदुषामुपदेशन उपस्थितौ तत्र तत्पदशक्तिग्रहोपपत्ते

(Ragh *TPB* iii.3 19)

साक्षात्कृतभगवदगुणाना यत्सवविषय तदीश्वरत्वानमित्याद्यपदेशेन तदविदुषामपि तत्प्रतीत्युपपत्त

(Raghu *TPB* iii 3 19)

hend in one mental act and dwell upon the fact that in B there exist transempirical attributes like *jñāna, ānanda*, etc to an unlimited extent It does not mean that the upāsaka is to mentally construct and perceive them as he does the mentally constructed form of B built up thro' Vāsanās For even when the Upāsaka is rewarded with a vision of the transempirical form of B as existing *in* the mental construct built up by him thro' acute Dhyāna, the transempirical attributes of B are not specifically perceived by him There is much less possibility, therefore, of their being perceived in the mental construct of the Form during Dhyāna The reason for this is that the transempirical attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc of B cannot be constructed in the mental image of B's form in the Prākṛtic mind, during Dhyāna—even as they cannot be transferred to the physical representations of the Divine Form in idols worshipped by devotees What is possible to achieve in Dhyāna is this After learning from the competent Guru the nature of one's Bimba Form to be meditated upon, the Upāsaka should evolve a mental construct of such a Form and meditate upon it For the original Bimba Form as such, being essentially unmanifest to the physical senses including the mind will not be amenable to meditation The Upāsaka should go on dwelling upon the mental construct he has built up with deep concentration suggesting to himself all along that within the mentally constructed representation of the Divine Form there dwells the transempirical form of the Supreme B endowed with transempirical attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc[12] Such meditative consentration leads to direst vision of B By direct vision of B is meant the envisioning of the Divine Form of transempirical essence of *jñāna, ānanda*, etc in all its beatitude *This envisioning is done by the mind itself when it comes to be empowered to do so after the film of Avidyā is for the time being lifted by the grace of B. pleased with the upāsaka's singular devotion and meditation*[13]

Satyanātha also raises the question of how one could speak of meditation of the transempirical attributes when as a matter of fact, the

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12 अलौकिकगुणानुस्मरणं नाम अलौकिका निरवधिका आनन्दाद्या गुणा भगवति सन्तीति युगपन्मनसानुचिन्तनमात्रम् न तु मनोमयप्रतिमादर्शनवन्मनसा निर्माय दर्शनम् । भगवदलौकिकमूर्त्यपरोक्षेऽप्यपि विशिष्य दर्शनाभावात् । किमुत ध्यानकाले । भगवदानन्दज्ञानादिगुणानां शिलादिप्रतिमास्विव जडमनोमयप्रतिमासु रचनायोगाच्च ।

एवं च ध्यानं नाम गुरूपदेशात् स्वस्वबिम्बमूर्तिं ज्ञात्वा अव्यक्तस्वभावायास्तस्या एव साक्षात् ध्यानासामर्थ्यात् तादृशीं काञ्चन मनोमयीं प्रतिमां विधाय तामेव मनसा निरन्तरं पश्यतः । तदन्तर्गतस्यालौकिकी भगवन्मूर्तिरस्तीति निरन्तरस्मरणं तस्मिन् भगवत्यलौकिकस्वरूपभूतगुणानामपि यौगपद्येन निरन्तरानुस्मरणं ध्यानमुच्यते (*TPG* p 149)

13 एवं च मनसा भगवत्साक्षात्कारो नाम निरन्तरध्यानस्मरणादिसन्तुष्टभगवत्प्रसादात् आवरकाविद्याया अपगमे भगवत्प्रसादसहकृतेनातिशयितेन मनसा ... (Vadiraja *TPG* p 150)

upāsaka perceives with his mind only the Form built up by Vāsanās and reflected in the mind by the steady flow of impressions He answers that even so this has for its content the transempirical in the same sense in which the knowledge of a mark of inference embraces the knowledge of that which bears the mark [14]

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

(Kāryākhyānādhi iii, 3, 18)

According to S and R the adhi discusses the question whether in the Prāna-vidyā of the Chān Up (v 2 2) and Brh Up vi 1 14) the rinsing of the mouth with water is enjoined or only meditation on the water used for rinsing as the garment of Mukhya-Prāna, or both (S)

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that as both are intimated by the text, both must be taken to be enjoined, or else the rinsing alone is enjoined having regard to the injunctive *'ācāmet'* in the Mādhyandina text of *Brh Up* [15] In this case, the meditation on Prāna as being dressed in the water will serve to glorify the act of rinsing

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that as rinsing before and after meals is a well-known religious duty conducive to purity and laid down in the Smrtis, it would be proper to hold that only the meditation on the water used for rinsing as constituting the dress of Prāna is enjoined To admit that both rinsing and the meditation are enjoined would lead to splitting the sentence (*vākyabheda*) Moreover, even as the passage "Whatever there is even unto the dogs, etc that is thy food" (*Brh Up* vi 1 14) does not enjoin the indiscriminate use of all food, as that would be impossible, but merely teaches meditation on all food as food of Prāna so too its continuation "water is thy dress" should only be taken to call for the meditation on the water used for rinsing as the dress of Prāna

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14 ननु ध्यानं तु लौकिकानामेव। चित्तप्रतिबिम्बितस्य वासनामयस्य लौकिकत्वात् तदवलोकनस्यैव ध्यानत्वात्। तथाचालौकिकस्य ध्यानमिति व्याहतं वच इति चेत्। सत्यम् मानसवासनामयस्य वस्तुनः मनसावलोकनमेव ध्यानमिति। तथापि * * * अलौकिकार्थानुभवजनितवासनोपादानकपदार्थावलोकनस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् भवति च वासनोपादनकार्थध्यानं वासनामयमुल्लिखदपि लिङ्गज्ञानं लिङ्गिविषयमिव, वाक्यज्ञानं वाक्यार्थविषयमिव, अलौकिकार्थविषयं च। तदुक्तम्–'तदुपासनं च भवति प्रतिमोपासनं यथा' इति (*AC* iii 3 19)

15 तस्मादेवंविदशिष्यन्नाचामेदशित्वाचामेत् एतमेव तदनमनग्नं कुरुते (*Madhyandina Śakhā*)
The words एवंविद् आचामेत् would lend weight to the position that apart from the *Smartavidhi* the injunction in respect of *acamana* here has additional purport as '*kratvartha*

Criticism

The topic raised by S and R has nothing to do with the question of difference or unity of vidyās Nor is it necessary to decide here which of the two aforesaid items is enjoined in order to facilitate its combination (*upasamhāra*) in other contexts of Prānavidyā where it may have been omitted The combination will not be affected in any way even if it should be established that rinsing alone has been enjoined The discussion is, therefore, pointless The case is other with M's interpretation

There is break of sequence and continuity in S's discussing such a question immediately after establishing in the preceding *adhi* that despite the different ways of commencement with Sat and Ātman in the *Ait* and *Chān Ups* unity of vidyās remains unaffected

The *Kalpataru* hastens to justify the discussion on the following ground In the preceding *adhi* the doubt occasioned by the commencement of the passage in the *Chān Up* with 'Sat' was set aside on the basis of the concluding part of the passage (*vākyaśeṣa*) In the present case too, there is room for a Pūrvapakṣa on the ground that the use of the indicative *'ācāmanti'* in *Bṛh Up* (vi 1 14) passage gives room for a doubt if an injunction could really be meant This is set at rest by pointing to the concluding part of the statement in the (Mādhyandina) text, where the injunctive form *'ācāmet'* is used, giving clear support to the position that rinsing of the mouth is *enjoined* Such a contention from the Pūrvapakṣa has got to be refuted now Hence, the discussion[16]

But, then, as pointed out earlier, the consideration of this question is irrelevant to the Pādārtha Apart from that, it can, with equal propriety, be held that in view of the injunction in the Smrtis about rinsing द्विजो नित्यमुपस्पृशेत् the act of rinsing has to be accepted as necessary, to ensure ceremonial purity and preclude the contingency of incurring sin by violation of the duty Besides being a 'Puruṣārtha' in this sense, nothing prevents its being enjoined as 'Kratvartha' here, like the forbidding of telling a lie during the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice for purposes of Kratvartha This disposes of Vācaspati's

16 संदिग्धमुपक्रमस्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णयवत् अशिष्यन्त आचामन्ति इत्यादिवर्तमानापदेशेन विधिसंदेहे सति 'अशिष्यन्नाचामेत्' इत्यादिवाक्यशेषादाचमनविधिपरत्वं निर्णयमिति पूर्वपक्षमाह भगति
(*Kalpataru* iii 3 18)

attempt to depreciate the 'Vidhivibhakti' in *'ācamet'* as not intended (*avivaksita*) as in *Jartilayavāgvā vā juhuyāt gavīdhukayavāgvā vā*[17]

The argument that as it is impossible to regard everything as the food of Prāna, the statement has to be understood in the sense of commending that all food is to be meditated upon as the food of Prāna is not conclusive As Mukhya Prāna is pre-eminent among the deities of the senses there is nothing inconsistent in his having the power to devour everything Cf अनद्यमानो यदनन्नमत्ति (*Chān Up* iv 3 7)

In order to interpret the Sūtra in terms of आचमनस्य न विधेयत्वम्; कार्याख्यानात् प्राप्तमेव हीद कार्यत्वेनाचमन प्रायत्यार्थं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धमन्वाख्यायते (S *BSB* iii 3 18), S has to import a negative and the expression *'vidhīyate'* to connect it apart from importing *ācamanam itself not to* speak of prefixing *'anu'* to *ākhyānād* and construing *vidhīyate* again with *apūrvam* (i e *apām vāsassankalpanam*) Thus, *'Kāryākhyānād'* is not taken as the reason for establishing the conclusion implicit in *apūrvam* as would be most natural to the wording of the Sūtra S has to make two separate statements out of the two words of the Sūtra *Kāryākhyānād apūrvam* thereby resorting to *'Vākyabheda'* for which he himself has censured the Pūrvapakṣin! This sort of breaking up of a Sūtra is not satisfactory especially when it involves the further addition of a negative taken to be understood

R also is obliged to break up the words of the Sūtra into two statements, import the negative and the expression *vidhīyate* after it (besides *ācamanam*) tho' he has given his own interpretation of *'kārya'* which is different from and verily the opposite of S's[18]

As the scope of *'vidhi'* (and *anuvāda*) has been fully defined in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā Śāstra in terms of प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकेनाप्राप्तांशे विधि it is unnecessary for S and R to make this Sūtra repeat the same ruling *This shows that it deserves a different and a better interpretation* based on the Pādārtha—viz Gunopasamhāra in B

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17 एव यत्रापि विधिविभक्ति तत्रापि जर्तिलयवाग्वा वा गवीधुकयवाग्वा वा जुहुयात इतिवत विधित्वमवि वक्षितम (*Bhamati* iii 3 18)

18 अप्राप्तमपां प्राणवासस्त्वानुसंधान विधेय न पुन: प्राप्तमाचमनम । कार्याख्यानात कार्यस्याप्राप्तार्थस्याख्यान स्वभावत्वात शास्त्रस्य (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 18)

CHAPTER XXXIV

ACCORD OF UPĀSANA AND FRUITS IN THE CASE OF BRAHMĀ, HIS CONSORT AND OTHER DEVAS

12 *Samānādhikaranam* (iii 3 20-21)

This *adhi* arises by way of answering an objection against the conclusion of the preceding one that Upāsanā and its fruits are perfectly balanced.[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Purvapakṣa argues that it cannot be agreed to that fruits are strictly in proportion to the nature of the Upāsanā[2] Take the example of the upāsanā of top-ranking Adhikārins like Brahmā and his consort Sarasvati As it would be contradictory to say that their upāsanās are both absolutely equal and unequal at the same time, they must be regarded as either absolutely on a par or are not equal at all[3] Nevertheless, in either case, we have to reckon with the fact the fruits of their upāsanās are partly equal and partly not equal For while both enjoy Sthānaikya in Mokṣa on account of their having Sayujyamukti accord-

1 [illegible] • • • [illegible]
(Raghu. *TPB* iii 3 20 21)

2 उपासन स्यानुसारित्वमिति पूर्व पक्ष (*TP* iii 3 20)

3 ब्रह्मणो ब्रह्माण्या उपासनस्य तत्साम्यात । तयोः सम विषम वोपासन स्यात । समविषमोपासनस्य विरुद्धत्वेनायुक्तत्वात (*TP* iii 3 20)
[illegible] (Ragh. *TPB* iii 3 20)

ing to the Śrutis and are able to meditate on all the attributes of B., there is still a difference in the measure of their Jñāna and Svarupānanda in Mokṣa.[4] This shows that Upāsanās are not strictly related to the fruits of Moksa and that, therefore, there is no reason to insist upon the meditation of transempirical attributes alone to achieve the transempirical bliss of Mokṣa.[5]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta estabilshes the accord between Upāsanā and its fruits by showing that the Upāsanā of Hiraṇyagarbha and his consort are on a par with each other in some respects and unequal in some other respects, at the same time.[6] To explain: Tho' both are entitled to meditate on all the attributes of B and all the activities associated with B. in their general aspect, Brahmā *alone is entıtled to combine in his meditations* certain special forms of activities of B. such as taking three strides, associated with certain casual manifestations of the Divine Form such as Trivikrama, *separately and always*.[7] Notwithstanding the supernatural character of such phenomenon as B.'s takıng the three steps with three feet,,Brahmā's consort is *not* eligıble to include them in her meditation separately but only as implicit and included in the general attribute of its eternal prowess (*nityavikrānti*).[8]

एवं च, सामान्याकारेणोपास्यत्वमप्यस्ति । भगवदीयनित्यक्रियास्वनित्यक्रियाया अन्तर्भावलक्षणाभेदस्य सद्भावात् (*STC*. iıı.3.21)

The same principle is extended mutatis mutandis to the upasamhāra carried out by other Adhikārıns lıke Rudra, Indra and so on.

The next Sūtra answers the objection as to how even the four-faced Brahmā can be said to carry on upasamhāra, always and in their

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4 न च फल तादृशम् । स्यानैक्यस्य गुणतारतम्यस्य च सद्भावेन फलस्य समविषमत्वात् (*TP*. iiı 3 20)

5. अत्र यदुक्त पूर्वनये * * * अलौकिकत्वेनोपास्यमिति, तदयुक्तम् । तादृशनियमस्यैवायोगात् । ब्रह्मब्रह्माण्योरुपासनाया व्यभिचारादिति (*STC*. iii 3 20)

6 नोक्तलिंगेनोपासनस्य स्वानुसारिफलप्रदत्वाभाव । ब्रह्माणीब्रह्मणोः फलवदुपासनस्यापि समविषमत्वात् (*TP*. iii 3 20)

7 ब्रह्माण्या हि सवगुणोपसहार' क्रियासु च सामान्यक्रियोपसहारोऽस्ति, हिरण्यगर्भवत् । ननु, तद्वत् त्रिविक्रमत्वादिकदाचिदभिव्यक्तक्रियोपसहार सदा पृथक्त्वेनास्ति (*TP*. iii 3 20)

Other similar acts referred to here ın the Bhāṣya by the term *adi* are the slaying of Kamsa, Jarāsandha, Rāvana, Hiranyakaśipu, etc. (Vādirāja, *TPG*. p. 150).

8. किंतु, नित्यविक्रान्त्यादिसामान्यक्रियास्वन्तर्भाव एवेति । न च वाच्यम्—त्रिविक्रमत्वादिक्रियाणा लोकविलक्षणत्वेनात्याश्चर्यत्वात् कथ तदुपासन ब्रह्माणी हास्यतीति । तासामपूर्वत्वेऽपि, योग्यस्यैवोपास्यत्वात् ब्रह्माण्याश्च नित्य तदुपास्तियोग्यताभावादिति भाव. (*TP*. iii 3 20)

distinctive aspects, of B.'s supernatural acts like taking three strides with three feet, as such acts are in their very nature occasional and impermanent and cannot, therefore, be in actual existence at the time of Hiraṇyagarbha's meditation.[9] For upasamhāra is necessarily in terms of the actual presence and existence of the attributes meditated upon in B. and not in terms of their past or erstwhile existence.[10]

This objection is met by the Sūtra: *Sambandhād evam anyatrāpi.* All manifestations, attributes and acts of B. are by hypothesis, 'Saviśeṣābhinna' (colorfully identical) with B. and are integral to its essence.[11] Tho' the manifestations (*prādurbhāvas*) of the Trivikrama-form and such others occur at certain times and for certain purposes, they have nevertheless a permanent existence in their latent aspect (*saktyātmanā*)[12] in B. Unlike other Adhikārins, the four-faced Brahmā has the ability to comprehend these forms and their acts in their latent aspects also always and is thus in a position to carry on his meditation of them in their distinctiveness.

The overall meaning of the second Sūtra is: 'Upasamhāra' is carried out in this way (*evam*) by Hiraṇyagarbha, in respect of these other wonderful acts (such as taking three strides with three feet),[13] in view of the integral relation (of identity) existing between B. and its numerous forms, attributes and acts.[14]

The TDP points out that the use of the term *'sambandha'* (relation)[15] in the Sūtra instead of *'abheda'* (identity) is intended to make it clear that the intimate nature of the relation between B. and its

9. अत्र प्रथमसूत्रेण ब्रह्माण्या क्रियासंकोचेन ब्रह्माणीब्रह्मणो समविषमोपासनमित्युक्ते, क्रियाणामनित्यत्वात् ब्रह्मणोऽपि क्रियोपासनासंभवात् कथं समविषमोपासनमित्याक्षेपसमाधानं द्वितीयेन कृतमिति
(Raghu. *TPB.* iii 3.21)

10 Read: गुणानामुपसंहारो नाम, अत्रैते गुणाः सन्तीति विज्ञानम् * * सन्तीति विज्ञानस्यैव उपसंहारत्वेन, आसीदिति ज्ञानस्यानुपसंहारात् (*AC.* iii 3 20-21)

11. Cf. गुणक्रियादयो विष्णोः स्वरूपं नान्यदिष्यते।
स्वरूपेऽपि विशेषोऽस्ति स्वरूपत्ववदेव तु॥
भेदाभावेऽपि तेनैव व्यवहारश्च वर्तते। (M. *VTN*)

12. परमात्मसंबन्धित्वेन नित्यत्वात् त्रिविक्रमत्वादिष्वपि उपसंहार्यत्वं युज्यते (M. *BSB.* iii 3 21)
नित्यत्वं च शक्त्यात्मनेति भावः। क्रियया - शक्तिव्यक्तिप्रकारश्च, अत्ता चराचरग्रहणादित्यत्रानुभाष्यसुधयोर्व्यक्त.
(Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3 21)

13 Read: त्रिविक्रमत्वेति। अत्र त्रित्वस्यान्वयः पादद्वारा विन्यासेषु। त्रिविक्रमरूपस्य पादत्रययुक्तत्वात् (*BD.* iii 3 20) No other commentator on M. gives this information.

14 अन्यत्रापि त्रिविक्रमत्वादिक्रियाविषयेऽपि एवमुपसंहारः कार्यः संबन्धात्, ईशतादात्म्यात्, तासां नित्यत्वादिति भावः
(*TDP.* iii 3 21)

15 संबन्धः तादात्म्यम् (*TP.* iii 3 21)

attributes (acts, etc.) proclaims their identity with its being.[16] It also serves to bring out the point that this identity is such as to accommodate between the act and one in whom the act inheres, the relation of attribute and possessor of attribute and so forth and also to suggest that the play of Viśeṣas makes it possible for the attributes, acts, etc. to be latent or become patent according to eligibility of Adhikārins.[17]

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16 नित्यत्वादिति वाच्ये एवमुक्ति तत्र युक्तिसूचनाय

17. सम्बन्धादिव्युक्ति तादात्म्येऽपि विशेषात् क्रियानद्वत्त्व व्यक्त्यात्मना कादाचित्कत्वमित्यादि सूचयितुम्

(*TDP.* iii 3 21)

This disposes of other connected objections of the Pūrvapakṣa:

कादाचित्कानां त्रिविक्रमत्वादीनां सर्वदा पार्थक्येनोपासनमयुक्तम्। योग्यताविशेषात् युक्तमिति चेत् सायुज्यभाजो (ब्रह्माणीब्रह्मणो.) विशेषे प्रमाणाभावात्। भावे वा, कादाचित्कानां सदाभिव्यक्त्यभावेन नित्यव्यक्तचिदानन्दादिवत् तदुपासने मिथ्योपासनत्वापत्त्या हेयत्वाच्च (*STC.* iii 3 21)

CHAPTER XXXV

UPASAMHĀRA AND ANUPASAMHĀRA OF ATTRIBUTES CONNOTED BY 'ĀTMAN" REGULATED BY ADHIKĀRIYOGYATĀ

13 *Na va viseṣādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 22-23)

This *adhi* clarifies how the expression, 'Ātman' occurring in the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' (*Bṛh Up* i 4 7) serves as sufficient authority for the non-inclusion in meditation (*anupasamhāra*) of such of those attributes of B as fall between "the all' and "the four" and which are beyond the sphere of competence of different Adhikārins *other than* the fourfaced Brahmā and his consort[1] and the inclusion by them of such of them as are within the sphere of their competence for meditation Unless such a clarification is given by way of a 'Vyasthitavikalpa', the attributes in question would remain unexpressed by the term 'Ātman'[2] and the injunction 'Ātmetyevopāsita' and the Sūtra *Itare tvarthasāmānyāt* (iii 3 14), would lose their point This *adhi* is not, therefore, rendered superfluous by *'Itare tvarthasāmānyāt'* (iii 3 14) It reinforces the point made therein by disarming the possible objection against it The *TPB* of Raghuttama reviews several objections against the present position of this *adhi* and answers them (*op cit* pp 418-19) Vādi

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1 अत्र आत्मशब्दाच्च (iii 3 16) इत्युक्तानुपसंहारमात्र यथा यथाऽस्य भाव्यते (*TDP* iii 3 22)
It has been shown already that by *anupasamhāra* is meant the combination of fewer number of attributes in meditation (*upasanakḷptālpaguṇopasamhārah*)

2 The reader knows that it has been held under Sutra 18 that all the attributes of B are simultaneously presented by the single word Ātman in a single mental act of upasana of the fourfaced Brahmā

rāja in his *TPG* while admitting frankly the close parallelism of thought between this *adhi.* and the tenth, holds that it deals with the special position of the Tāttvikadevatās, who are endowed with an inborn knowledge of the bounds of their individual competence for combination of attributes in their upāsanā without having to derive such knowledge from a Guru, as in the case of lesser beings.[3] This will not however, affect the importance of the grace of the Guru in making the upāsanā fruitful (See BS. iii.3.44). For Vādirāja's point here is simply that the Tāttvikadevatās do not need a Guru's guidance to *know* which are the attributes they are fit to meditate upon.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the attributes connoted by the term 'Ātman' are not to be meditated upon by all the Adhikārins; for this term Ātman happens to express all the attributes of B. and all Adhikārins are not obviously qualified to meditate on all the attributes. It has no doubt been pointed out earlier in Sūtra 18 that the term 'Ātman' connotes all the attributes only to top-ranking Adhikārins like Brahmā and not to all and sundry. Still, as there is no means of determining how many and which out of the numerous attributes falling between the all and the four should each one of the Adhikārins of the middling order take up for upāsanā, he cannot embark upon it effectively. It would not be logical to hold that a given word (like Ātman) sometimes connotes more attributes and sometimes less. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore concludes that in the circumstances, it cannot be maintained that the attributes connoted by the term Ātman are to be meditated by all the Adhikārins.[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that tho' the term 'Ātman' has the power to connote all the attributes of B., such power operates strictly in accordance with the fitness of different orders of Adhikārins to combine a greater or less number of attributes in one mental act of meditation[5]

3 यद्यपि, 'अन्वयादिति चेत् स्यादवधारणात्' इत्यधिकरणस्य 'न वा विशेषा' दित्यधिकरणस्य च पूर्वपक्ष-सिद्धान्तयोरेकप्रकारता, तथापि तात्त्विकदेवानामुपासनायां स्वयोग्यताज्ञानमप्यनादिकालमारभ्य स्वसामर्थ्य-विशेषादेवास्ति, न तु तज्ज्ञापनार्थमपि गुर्वपेक्षेति सूचयितुं (आत्मशब्दस्य तत्तद्योग्यगुणाभिधायकत्वे श्रुतिं प्रमाणीकर्तुं च) अधिकरणारम्भः (*TPG.* p. 151)

4 नात्मशब्दोक्ता गुणाः सर्वोपास्या इति पूर्वः पक्षः। आत्मशब्दस्य सर्वगुणाभिधायकत्वात्। उक्तमत्र उत्तमाधिकारिणं प्रत्येव सर्वगुणाभिधायको न सर्वान्प्रतीति, सत्यम्, तथाप्यस्यैतावन्त एवोच्यन्त इति प्रातिस्विकनियमाभावेन उपासनासंभवात्। नहि स कदाचित् बहुगुणान् कदाचिदल्पानपि बोधयतीति। अत आत्मशब्दोक्तगुणानां सर्वोपास्यत्वाभावात् अनुपसंहारप्रमाणत्वोक्तिरयुक्तेति (*TP.* iii 3 22)

5 (आत्मशब्दस्य) बहुगुणाभिधायकत्वशक्तावपि अधिकारिविशेषात् तत्तद्योग्यगुणाभिधायकत्वात्

(*TP.* iii 3 22)

The objection to Upāsanā on the ground of there being no definite and reliable basis of determining how many and which are the attributes that a particular Adhikārin should take up for meditation is thus unsustainable The position is clear that each Adhikārin should meditate on as many of these attributes as flash forth before him in one mental act of comprehension.[6]

The words *ātmagrhīti* follow by *anuvrtti* from Sūtra no. 17 and '*sarvaguṇānām*' from the syntactic relation of words implicit in Sūtra 18 The fully expanded Sūtra will thus read:

सर्वगुणानां नात्म (शब्देन) गृहीतिः (कुतः?) (अधिकारि) विशेषात् (व्यवस्था)

(*M. BSB.* iii.3.22)

"All the attributes are not comprehended by the term Ātman, in meditation, in the case of all Adhikārins. It is governed by the difference in the eligibility of Adhikārins for such meditation".

The upasamhāra and anupasamhāra of attributes connoted by the term Ātman in upāsanā is thus well regulated by the principle of Yogyatā or fitness of Adhikārins. The particle '*vā*' in the Sūtra refers to this regulated option (*vyavasthitavikalpa*) in the operation of the connotative power of the term 'Ātman'.[7]

The next Sūtra *Darśayati ca* (iii.3.23) adduces the authority of Smrti in support of the Siddhānta position established in the first Sūtra on the basis of reasoning (*sandhih*). The *STC* sums up the Siddhānta neatly:

प्रतीतिरात्मशब्देन सर्वेषामस्ति सर्वशः ।
गुणानां; किंत्वयोग्यत्वाद्युगपत् प्रत्ययो न हि ॥

(*STC.* iii.3.22)

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R treat Sūtras iii.3 20-22 beginning with *Sambandhād evam onyatrāpi* as one adhi. The topic discussed is whether the two secret names 'ahar' and 'aham' mentioned in the Satyavidyā of *Brh. Up.* (vi 5,

6 न्यूनाधिकाधिकारिभेदेन प्रतिनियतनियमाभावादुपासनानुपपत्तिरिति न वाच्यम् । यस्य यावन्तो गुणा आत्मशब्देन प्रतीयन्ते तेन तावन्तो ध्यातव्या इति व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः (*TP* iii 3 22)
As J points out it is this flashing forth of the attributes corresponding to one's fitness that counts for purpose of Upāsana and not the possibility of one's knowing that by the laws of derivation the term 'Ātman can connote a very large number of attributes
आत्मशब्देन गुणप्रतीतिरियं योग्यतानिमित्ता न प्रमाणत्वनिमित्ता प्रतीतिरिति भाव (*TP.* iii 3 22)

7 विविक्तसर्वात्मशब्दः सर्वगुणप्रकाशक । मनुष्याणां च चतुर्गुणप्रकाशकोऽपि मध्यमदेवानां मध्यमगुणप्रकाशकोऽपि

1-2) respectively with reference to the Purusa abiding in the orb of the Sun and in the right eye are both to be applied to the Adhidaiva abode and Adhyātma abode or only one name as given in the respective contexts[8]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the particulars are to be combined in both the cases as in the Śāndilyavidyā For the object of meditation in both the abodes is the same Satya-Brahman The Siddhānta is that tho' the expression *tasya* in *Tasyopaniṣad ahar iti* etc denotes neither the subordinate element of abode nor the mere characteristic of B's being so located in the abode but primarily the B itself qualified by such location, still the object of meditation becomes different owing to this difference of abodes For the nature of one *viśiṣṭa* or qualified thing cannot partake of the nature of *another* 'qualified'

विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टान्तरेऽननुगमात्[9]

The two names are not, therefore, to be combined or exchanged

Criticism

The combination of the name 'ahar' in the meditation of the person in the eye has clear sanction and support from *Chān Up*

तस्यैतस्य तदेव रूप यदमुष्य, यदमुष्य रूप यदमुष्य गेष्णौ यन्नाम तन्नाम[10]

(i 7 5)

This makes the Siddhānta that the two names are *not* to be combined unsustainable[11] It cannot be said that the words "the name of the one is the name of the other" (*Chān. Up* i 7 5) is only a general statement and that it contemplates the extension of names *other than* 'ahar' in respect of the Person in the right eye There is no valid reason to impose such a restriction It cannot be that difference of Vidyā makes such a restriction necessary For it is yet to be established that there is a real difference of Vidyās in this case The difference of abodes

8 बृहदारण्यके 'सत्य ब्रह्म' इत्युपक्रम्य तस्यैवाधिदैवमध्यात्म चायतनविशेषमुपदिश्य द्वे उपनिषदावुपदिश्यते—तस्योपनिषदहरित्यधिदैवतम् तस्योपनिषदहमित्यध्यात्मम् इति। तत्र संशय किमविभागेनैवोभे अप्युपनिषदावुभयत्रानुसधातव्ये उत विभागेनैका अधिदैवमेका अध्यात्ममिति (S *BSB* iii 3 20)

9 नोभयत्रोभयनामचिन्तनमिति सिद्धान्तयति (*Kalpataru* iii 3 20)

10 'Now, this Person seen in the eye is the ṛk the saman uktha yajus and Brahman The form of this one is the same as the form of that Person seen in the Sun The songs of the former are his songs The name of the one is the name of the other (*Chan Up* 1 7 5)

11 'To us it seems that *Chan Up* (1 7 5) identifies the Purusas in the eye and in the Sun with each other without making the distinction of the upaniṣads *aham* and *ahar* and therefore it cannot be quoted as authority for explaining the *Brh Up* passage S himself seems to have felt this difficulty" (P M Modi *A Critique of Brahmasutras* T p 123)

does not make for difference in Vidyā For in the same Śruti text, it has been recognized that the person who is in the orb and He who is here in the right eye "these two rest on each other" (*Brh Up* v 5 2) This shows difference of place or abode of the object of meditation does not necessarily make the vidyas different The objection raised by the *Kalpataru* against the combination of the name 'ahar' with the meditation of the Person in the right eye as 'aham' on the ground that one Visiṣta or qualified thing will not admit of complete coalescence of its nature with another Visiṣta will for the same reason, disrupt the unity of the object of meditation in the Śaṇḍilyavidyā as given in the *Śatapatha Brahmana* and in the *Brh Up* For, in the former the object of meditation viz B is given as having the dimension of Ākāsa,[12] while the *Brh Up* says it is like a grain of rice or barley As these two qualified beings will have no coalescence of natures according to the principle of 'Visistasya visiṣṭantarānanugamaḥ' it will mean that B taught as the object of meditation in the two different texts of Agnirahasya is different and not the same In that case, the mutual combination of the attributes of the object of meditation as given in the Brāhmana and the Upanisad accepted by S under BS iii 3 19 will stand discredited[14] The *Śrutaprakāsa* also makes the same point against S's interpretation of the next *adhi*

अधिदैविकच सम्भृत्यादयो नाध्यात्म भवन्तीति परैरुच्यते। तद्गुणविशिष्टताभेदाद-प्रत्यभिज्ञापन चेत् क्वचिदपि गुणोपसहारो न स्यात्

(*Op cit* iii 3 23)

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12 स आत्मानमुपासीत * * * भारूपमाकाशात्मान कामरूपिणम (*Śatapatha B*)
13 तस्मिन्नन्तर्हृदये यथा व्रीहिर्वा यवो वा (*Brh Up* v 6 1)
14 विशिष्टानानुगमस्य वक्ष्यमाणप्रयोजकत्वात् । अन्यथा सर्वत्र शाण्डिल्यविद्यायामप्यन्यधर्मोपसहार पूर्वाधिकरणोक्त न स्यात् । तत्र ह्यग्निरहस्ये आकाशमात्मान कामरूपिणमित्याकाशपरिमाणस्य बृहदारण्यके तस्मिन्नन्तर्हृदये व्रीहिर्वा यवो वेति व्रीह्यादिपरिमाणस्याम्नानात विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टान्तरानुगमात विद्याभेदापत्ते सैव हि सत्यादय (*BS* iii 3 38) इत्यत्र विषयस्य तत्रैव वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च (*STC* iii 3 22 23)

CHAPTER XXXVI

ONLY DEVAS FIT TO MEDITATE ON SAMBHṚTI, DYUVYĀPTI AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES

14. *Sambhṛtyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.24)

This *adhi.* shows by extension (*atideśa*) of the principle of fitness for meditation[1] (*yogyatā*) from Sūtra iii.3.22, that other attributes like '*sambhṛti*', and 'dyuvyāpti' celebrated in texts like '*Ukṣā sa dyāvāprthivī bibharti*' (*RV*. x.31.8) and '*Eṣa hi sarveṣu lokeṣu bhāti*' ( ) are not to be included in meditation by all Adhikārins but only by the gods.

The particle *api* in the Sūtra calls up the negative particle (*na*)[2] from Sūtra 22 and gets connected with it. The 'ca' after '*ataḥ*' has the the force of 'only' (*eva*). The Sautra proposition thus reads:

अत एव संभृतिद्युव्याप्ती अपि न (सर्वोपास्ये; किंतु देवोपास्ये)

"For the same reason, the attributes of being the nourisher and pervader of all by light are *not* to be included in contemplation by all Adhikārins."[4]

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1. अत्र पूर्वं [विशेषादित्युक्त योग्यताविशेषरूपसिद्धान्तन्याय एवात्राप्यत इति सिद्धान्तन्यायत्वेन अतिदिश्यत इत्यवान्तरसगति (Raghu. *TPB.* iii 3 24)
2. भाष्येऽनुक्ते · स्वयमनयो श्रौतत्व दर्शयति--उक्षेति (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3.24)
3. अपिपदान्नञ समाकर्षं (*TP.* iii 3 24)
4. The TD brings many other attributes like *vīrya, aiśvarya,* under the *atideśa* and finds support for such inclusion in the Sūtra after sambhrtidyuvyāpti, notwithstanding the Pragrhya form '*sambhrtidyuvyāpti*': द्वित्वमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं '' विला-प्रगृह्यासूत्रयत् (*TD.*) S. and R. explain it as a Dvandvaikavadbhāva.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that attributes such as being the supporter of all (*sam-bhṛti*) and pervading all by light (*dyuvyāpti*) referred to in the Śrutis quoted above are to be meditated upon by all Adhikārins who are seekers of Mokṣa. For, the purpose of Upāsanā is the realization of the desired fruits in Mokṣa. All Adhikārins would naturally wish to acquire the spiritual excellences of supporting and nourishing their inferiors in Mokṣa and the power of shining there in their full light. As these targets are to be attained only thro' upāsanā, it follows that it should be open to all Adhikārins desirous of achieving these goals to meditate on attributes of B. such as *sambhṛti, dyuvyāpti* etc., in order to be able to realize them in their own lives in the state of Mukti.[5] There is nothing to forbid their entertaining such a desire to be fulfilled in Mokṣa thro' the Upāsanā of the appropriate attributes of B. now. There is no point in the objection that this will give the right of upāsanā of all the attributes of B. to all Adhikārins. For it is by no means certain that every one desirous of Mokṣa is interested in acquiring for himself the benefits arising from the meditation of each and every one of the attributes of B. The case for the meditation on the attributes of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* is, however, entirely different. For every Mukta will naturally aspire to enjoy the light of his being and exercise beneficial control and give support to those below him in status in Mokṣa. He can expect to realize these wishes only thro' meditation on the attributes of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* here and now.[6] The Pūrvapakṣa thus arises by way of challenging the ruling given in iii.3.12 that all Adhikārins in general are entitled to meditate on only four principal attributes of B. for attaining the fruits of Mokṣa.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is based on the ruling already given that it is the spiritual fitness (*yogyatā*) of the Adhikārins for the upāsanā of particular attributes of B. that determines their right to its upāsanā and not merely their desire for or expectation of particular fruits accruing from such upāsanā in Mokṣa.[7] To reverse this principle and make the desire for certain fruits the criterion of upāsanā would open the door to undesirable consequences and the Śāstras warn us against Ayogyopāsanā

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5 सम्भृतिद्युव्याप्ती विषय । सर्वोपास्य इति पूर्व. पक्ष.। सर्वेषां मुमुक्षुत्वसाम्यात्। मोक्षे च स्वाधमभरणस्य प्रकाशव्याप्तेश्च सर्वेष्टित्वात्। फलं चोपासनानुसारेण भवति –
'यादृशो भावितस्त्वीश· तादृशो जीव आभवेत्' इत्यादे (*TP.* iii 3.24)

6 न चैवं सर्वगुणोपास्ति·। सर्वेषां सर्वगुणापेक्षाभावात्। अत सम्भृतिद्युव्याप्त्यो· सर्वोपास्यत्वात् चतुर्गुणोपास्तिनियमो न युक्त इति (*TP.* iii 3 24)

7. योग्यतैव उपास्तिनियमप्रयोजिका, न फलापेक्षेति भाव: (*TP.* iii 3 24)

or indulging in forms of upāsanā to which one is not entitled[8] *On the* present question the Bhāṣyakāra quotes authority from the *Brahmatarka* that only the gods are entitled to meditate on the attributes of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti*:

देवादीनामुपास्यास्तु भृतिव्याप्त्यादयो गुणाः ।
आनन्दाद्यास्तु सर्वेषामन्यथानर्थकृत् भवेत् ॥

As for the upāsakas achieving their own measure of support and *spiritual nourishment to their inferiors in Moksa and their own measure* of inner light of being, it is possible for them to do so by their meditation (at the Sādhana level) of those aspects of B.'s attributes as are associated in *general terms* with the contemplation of the Lord as being adored by the hierarchy of gods and as being possessed of pervasive light[9]—but *not in their specific forms of plenitude.* Vādirāja in his TPG says the use of the preposition '*sam*' before '*bhṛti*' in the Sūtra and the particle 'eva' in J.'s statement देवादीनामेव तदुपास्तियोग्यता are *intended to bring out this point*:

एवकारेण सूत्रे समित्युपसर्गसूचितं विश्वरूपतया द्यावापृथिवीभरण महाप्रकाशश्च व्यावर्त्यंते (*TPG*. p 151)

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R this *adhi.* considers whether the attributes of *supporting the world and pervading the sky mentioned in the* Khila of the Rāṇāyanīyas are to be included in the meditations of B set forth in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā (*Chān Up* iii 14) and others The answer is in the negative The reason is the same as in the previous *adhi* viz. difference of abodes[10]

The Pūrvapakṣa according to S is Even tho' the attributes set forth in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and others have an adhyātmic abode and the attributes of supporting the world and pervading the sky have an adhidaiva abode and, therefore, the topic proposed to be discussed is covered by the principle of difference of abode and the conclusion fol-

8 फलापेक्षाया एव तत्साधनानुष्ठाने नियामकत्वे त्रैवर्णिकेतरेषा स्वर्गहेतुयागाद्यनुष्ठानात्फलप्राप्तिप्रसगेन, अन्यथा ऽनर्थकृत भवेदिति भाष्योक्तस्मृतावयोग्यानुष्ठानस्यानर्थफलत्वोक्त्या च योग्यताविशेषस्यैव नियामकत्वात
(Ragh *Ny Muktavali* iii 32 3 24)

9 यच्च प्रकाशादिमात्रमपेक्षित तच्च भगवद्रूपप्रतीत्यविनाभूतप्रकाशादिनैव लभ्यते (*TP*. iii 3 24)
Read अपेक्षितप्राप्तिर्वा कथ भवेदित्यत आह - यच्चेति। 'उद्यदभास्वत्समाभास' इति 'युक्ता प्रदीपवर्णाश्च इत्युक्तदिशा भगवदध्यानरूपप्रतीतिविषयप्रकाशन 'विपै शक्रादिकैरपि सेव्यमान ' इति सपरिवारध्यानेन यत्किचित भरणस्य समवादित्यर्थं (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 24)

10 सभृतिद्युव्याप्तिप्रभृतयो विभूतय शाण्डिल्यविद्याप्रभृतिषु नोपसहर्तव्या । अत एव चायतनविशेषयोगात्
(S *BSB* iii 3 23)

lows that the attributes should *not* be combined, there is still scope for opening a fresh adhi. based on a supervening objection (*adhikāśankā*)[11] For we come across adhidaiva excellences also like "being greater than the earth, the atmosphere, the sky and all the worlds" side by side with the adhyātmic excellences Further, in certain other vidyās like the one which describes B as having sixteen parts, no special abode is mentioned However, as all these vidyās are connected with B there is nothing to forbid the inclusion of *sambhṛti* and *dyuvāpti* etc. in the Śāndilya and other vidyās as well as in the one dealing with the sixteen parts of B[12]

According to R. the Pūrvapakṣa is that as the attributes of holding together and pervading the sky are not stated in connection with any special meditation (*anārabhyādhīta*) they are to be included in all meditations of B[13]

The Siddhānta according to S is that it is not permissible to combine supporting the worlds and pervading the sky with the other attributes given in the Śāṇḍilya Vidyā and others For the Sambhṛtidyuvyāptividyā does not carry any of the distinctive attributes of the Śāṇḍilyavidyā or others Tho' certain adhidaiva excellences like pervading the universe are common to both the Sambhṛtividyā and the Śāṇḍilyavidyā, yet such correspondences are also to be found in the Vaiśvānaravidyā, the Ṣoḍaśakalāvidyā and others If we rely on such correspondences alone for upasamhāra, it would be opening the gates too wide, resulting in promiscuous combinations A very large number of vidyās recognized as distinct would then forfeit their distinctiveness, if the mere fact of being connected with B be made the sole criterion of unity of vidyās[14]

Criticism

As the mutual inclusion of the names *ahar* and *aham* has been struck down in the previous *adhi* in spite of their being recognized as non-

11 यद्यपि न्याय्यं यत् शाण्डिल्यादिविद्यासु आयतनभेदादध्यात्मिकत्वाद [illegible], सम्भृत्यादीनां गुणानां आधिदैविकानामायतनभेद [illegible] • • (*Bhamati* iii 3 23)

12. तथापि 'ज्यायान् दिव' इत्यादिना सर्वेषामाधिदैविकविभूतिसमभिव्याहारात् षोडशकलासु च विद्यास्वायतना [illegible] ब्रह्माश्रयतया साम्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सम्भृत्यादीनां गुणानां शाण्डिल्यादिविद्यासु षोडशकला [illegible] विद्यासु चोपसंहार इति पूर्व पक्ष (*Bhamati* iii 3 23)

13 तैत्तिरीयके [illegible] विष्णु च सम्भृति [illegible] गुणानाम् । [illegible] सर्वासु विद्यासु [illegible] (*Sribhasya* iii 3 23)

14 [illegible] नियमानगुणश्रवणं प्रत्यभिज्ञापकं [illegible] सम्भृत्यादिगुणकब्रह्मविद्यायाः शाण्डिल्यादिविद्या [illegible]। यत्तु व्याप्त्यादिकमाधिदैविका विभूतिः शाण्डि-ल्यादिविद्यायाः [illegible] । नैतावता [illegible] । [illegible] । ब्रह्माश्रयत्वं तु [illegible] (*Bhamati* iii 3 23)

different and of being connected with B on the sole ground of difference of abode in meditation (*āyatanabheda*), it would follow that neither the identity of the attributes nor B's being the subject matter of the meditation is competent to establish unity of these vidyās This ruling given against the 'upasamhāra' in the previous *adhi* thus effectively disposes of similar doubts in regard to the inclusion of *sambhrti, dyuvāpti*, etc No fresh *adhi* is, therefore, called for to discuss their claims [15]

The transition of thought from the question of the inclusion or exclusion of a '*name*' is the previous *adhi*, to the inclusion of certain '*attributes*' given in a Khila Śruti is rather farfetched Even granting that such an issue is in order, the manner of its solution is far from satisfactory S has attempted to dismiss the coordination of attributes like *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* with the adhidaivic attributes given in the context of the Śāndilyavidyā on the ground that the correspondence of attributes does not extend to the "distinctive" attributes (*asādhāranagunas*)[16] such as are met with in respect of attributes like *manomayatva* given in the Agnirahasya section in both the *Śatapatha Brāhmana* and the *Brh Up* but only to the general attributes But then, no attribute ascribed it B in the Śrutis can be treated as *not distinctive* Apart from that, the attributes of being the ruler of all, the Lord of all and governor of all (*Brh Up* p 6) are indeed equivalent to being the supporter of all and the pervader of all, so that there is nothing to prevent *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* from being accepted as "distinctive" attributes and included in the Śāndilyavidyā etc Even the attributes of *manomayatva* and others which have been treated as distinctive of the vidyā of Agnirahasya are to be found in connection with several other vidyās also

The text *Brahmajyesthā* * * * has been quoted from a Khila Śruti There is admittedly *no injunction there* to the effect that the attributes of *sambhrti* and *dyuvyāpti* given there are to be meditated upon, as we have in regard to the attributes in the Śāndilyavidyā (*Chān Up* iii 14 1) The question of upasamhāra and anupasamhāra depends on the presence of such a vidhi[17] The *Kalpataru* has tried to get over this difficulty by suggesting that a suitable Vidhi be *assumed* in order to

15 सत्याख्यब्रह्मण तस्य भरिति शिर ' इत्याद्युक्तगुणाना एक्यप्रत्यभिज्ञान चायतनभदेन नाम्नो पूर्वाधिकरणे व्यवस्यागीकारेण ब्रह्मतद्धमप्रत्यभिज्ञानस्याप्रयोजकत्वनिश्चयात् तेन पुनरिह शकानुदयात (*STC*)

16 समानगुणाम्नानन हि प्रत्युपस्थापितासु विप्रकृष्टास्वपि विद्यासु विप्रकृष्टदेशा गुणा उपसह्रियेरन (S *BSB* iii 3 23)

Read समानगुणत्यसाधारणगुणसाम्य विवक्षितम (*Kalpataru*)

17 In this connection contrast the interpretation of the Sutra *Adhyanaya prayojanabhavat* (iii 3 14) by S and M

raise the question of (their) upasamhāra and have it rejected on the ground of difference of Vidyās[13] The *Kalpataru* evidently has overlooked the fact that a Khila Śruti by its nature is non-injunctive in character, being concerned only with the subsidiary details connected with a *vidhi* given elsewhere

The other argument that the attributes of supporting the universe and pervading the sky are not to be combined with the others mentioned in the Śāṇḍilya and other Vidyās as they are of such a nature as to exclude each other and that for this reason the meditation on *sambhṛti*, *dyuvyāpti*, etc should be treated as a separate vidyā is *not* correct For even in the same vidyā, there are given attributes which are mutually incompatible such as *anutva* and *mahattva* (see *Bṛh Up* iii 8 8) Moreover, even conceding the non inclusion of the attribute of pervading the sky there is no difficulty in including the other one of supporting the Universe

If the attribute of *manomayatva* given in *Chān Up* (iii 14 2) cannot be combined with *dyuvyāpti* on account of *incompatibility of abode*, for the same reason the upāsanā of *manomayatva* etc and attributes like being the ruler of all, the Lord of all and governor of whatever there is (*Bṛh Up* v 6) should not also be allowed to be combined with *manomayatva* in meditation

R. has tried to explain away the fact that in the same vidyā where B mentioned as abiding in a small place is also said to be as great as the universal ether, by suggesting that the latter attributes are not to be taken in their literal sense (and included in meditation) but must be treated as *glorifications of the object of meditation* His characterisation of some of B's attributes as Svābhāvika and of others as aupādhika for purposes of upasamhāra and anupasamhāra has already been shown to be unwarranted in our discussion of his interpretation of the Sūtra *Priyaśirastvādyaprāptiḥ* (iii 3 12) —See pp 267-268, 274 275

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13 [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ (*Kalpataru* iii 3 23)

CHAPTER XXXVII

ALL ADHIKĀRINS HAVE TO COLLECT GUṆAS FOR MEDITATION ACCORDING TO YOGYATĀ FROM DIFFERENT ŚĀKHĀS

15. *Puruṣavidyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.25)

It has been shown in the earlier adhis. that the three orders of Adhikārins—viz. the fourfaced—Brahmā, the gods and men have to gather all such attributes of B. as they are entitled to meditate upon in one single act of mental comprehension, from the different Vidyās taught in various Śākhās in different places. The present *adhi.* arises by way of answering an objection against such a position[1] with particular reference to Adhikārins of the last two orders (and incidentally with reference to the highest order). No doubt the objection against upasamhāra of all the attributes had been set at rest in the second *adhi.* itself.[2] But the chief point of objection in that *adhi.* was the impracticability of such upasamhāra, speaking from an ordinary (human) standpoint.[3] It was accordingly pointed out in reply to that objection that while, primarily, the combination of *all the attributes* is open only to certain very highly placed souls like Brahmā and his consort, so far as the other orders of Adhikārins are concerned, the principle of Sarvaguṇopasaṁhāra is to be understood in the light of the obvious limita-

1. एवमियता ग्रन्थेन सुरनरविरिञ्चरूपमध्याधमोत्तमाधिकारिणा बह्वल्पसर्वगुणध्यानाय त्रिविधैरपि स्वस्वयोग्यगुणा इतस्तत उपसंहार्या इति यत्सिद्ध, तदयुक्त (एवंक्वचैव विद्यासु तत्तद्योग्यगुणोक्तिसम्भवात्) इति शङ्कनात सगति. (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvalı* iii 3 25)
2 ननु, द्वितीयाधिकरणे सार्वत्रिकगुणोपसंहारसमर्थनेन वैयर्थ्यं परिहृतम् (*STC.* iii 3 25)
3. सत्यम्; अशक्त्यादिभिन्नसार्वत्रिकगुणोपसंहारः समर्थितः, तद्द्वारा वैयर्थ्यं च (*STC.* iii 3 25)

tation by the concerned classes of Adhikārins Hence the plea made in favor of Sarvagunopasamhāra is untenable[8]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that the presumption that different orders of Adhikārins can pick up their quantum of attributes for meditation be they a few or many or all, ready-made, from any one Vidyā or Śākhā is not correct

एकत्र तत्तद्योग्यानां गुणानां ग्रथनं न हि ।
तत्तद्योग्यगुणा यस्मात् विक्षिप्ताः सर्वशाखिनाम् ॥
(*STC* iii 3 25)

They are found dispersed among different Vidyās and Śākhās From them they have to be selectively assembled by each Adhikārin, according to his fitness for meditation (which is to be asceratined thro' other ways provided for the purpose) In the nature of things, there is no single Vidyā which can be treated as a ready-made container of the requirements of those who are fit to meditate on fewer or more numerous attributes of B or all of them[9] Otherwise, there would be one such Vidyā exclusively embodying all the (countless) attributes that the highest of Adhikārins viz Brahmā and the Rjuganas are entitled to meditate upon *If such a Vidyā exists anywhere it should be the famous Puruṣasuktavidyā which is recognized as the highest and the best But even in that Vidyā there is omission of several attributes of B required for meditation*[10] (not only by Brahmā but by other Adhikārins as well). Similar omissions in the several other Vidyas are easy enough to understand The insistence on knowing all the attributes of B and on Sarvagunopasamhara from different Vidyās is thus necessary and purposeful in the case of all orders of Adhikarins from the highest to the lowest In the case of Madhyamādhikārins, altho' there is likelihood of parity of numbers in respect of some of the attributes among those coming under the purview of Upasamhāra by those who are eligible to meditate on

8 तत्तदुपासनायोग्यगुणानामेकस्यामेव विद्याया मानारूपेण ग्रथनात स्वयोग्यगुणावगाहिविभागमात्राध्ययनेन तत्तद्विद्यान्तराध्ययनाऽध्ययनमेव । शाखान्तराध्ययनादे सम्पादनद्वारा तन्मात्रश्रवणमननादिनापि ध्यानसंभवेन आद्यावेन सर्वपरिज्ञानं न सर्वं संपादनीयम (*STC* iii 3 25) ध्यानप्रयन्नात । ध्यानस्य चायोग्यत्वात न चैवम (*STC* iii 3 25)

9 स्यादेतत् यदि बहल्पान्गुणाभिधायकैव विद्या स्यात

10 अन्यथा सर्वगुणोपासकचतुर्मुखयोग्यसर्वगुणाभिधायकविद्याङ्गीकारापातात् । न चेष्टापत्ति । सर्वगुणानां मानारूपेण ग्रथनं पुरुषसूक्तं संभावितम् महाविद्यात्वात् । न च तत्रापि योग्यसर्वगुणाम्नानमस्ति । एवं सति ब्रह्मणश्च सर्वगुणोपासकत्वात सर्वेषां गुणानां पुरुषसूक्तेऽनाम्नानात विद्यान्तरं शाखान्तरं च तेनाप्यध्येयमेव (*STC* ibid)

Read सर्वत पौरुषं सूक्तं गुणा विस्तारकारिता ।
तत्रापि नव सर्वेऽपि तस्मात् कार्योपसंहृति ॥ (*M. BSB* iii 3 25)

more or less number of attributes, the need to collect all such attributes from more than one Vidyā will always be there,[01] for reasons already stated. This dutiful collection of all such attributes according to one's Yogyatā for meditation from all the Vidyās and Śākhās and their combination in one single mental act of Upasamhāra, is thus obligatory on all the orders of Adhikārins.[12] Hence the elucidation of this topic in the present *adhi.* by way of answering an *ākṣepa* (See fn. 9).

The *TPG* of Vādirāja points out that not only with reference to the higher orders of Adhikārins like Brahmā and the gods but even with reference to human beings, there are omissions of important attributes of B. required to be meditated upon by them in the Puruṣasūkta as well as in other Vidyās in the Upaniṣads. In the Puruṣasūkta Vidyā for instance there is omission of the attributes of *jñāna* and *ānanda* which are among the four chief ones required to be meditated upon by all aspirants for Mokṣa including human beings.[13] In the vidyā of the *Taitt. Up.* beginning with the words *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma* there is no mention of the attribute of ānanda. In *Vijñānam ānandam brahma* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.9.28) the attributes of *ātmatva* (lordship) and flawlessness (*satyatva*) are omitted.[14] Such omissions render it absolutely necessary even for Adhikārins at the lowest level to supplement them to make up the requisite number of (four) guṇas. It would be much more necessary then for Adhikārins in the higher orders like the gods to go to very many sources and Vidyās to collect the attributes required by them for purposes of upasamhāra.[15]

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. hold that this adhi. establishes that the Puruṣa-vidyās in in the Tāṇḍya and Paiṅgi Brāhmaṇas and in the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad (80) of the *TĀ* are not one and that therefore there is no combining (*upasamhāra*) of their particulars.[16]

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11. सन्त्यात्मत्वसर्वैश्वर्यादि एकस्यामेव विद्यायां सर्वेऽपि [illegible] (*TP.* iii 3 25)

12. एवं दक्षिणेशं देवाना मे ये योग्याः ते ते एकस्यामेकस्यां विद्यायां न प्रथिता इति कैमुतिकन्यायसिद्धमेव। [illegible] गुणानन्त्येऽप्यानेव विद्यानामानुपूर्व्येण, न वर्णनं, किन्तु [illegible]। तथा [illegible] तत्र तत्र [illegible] अपेक्षया एव। [illegible] यदि न सम्भवेत्, तदा [illegible] [illegible]। गुणान्तरेषु [illegible] 'पुरुषस्सूक्तं महत्' इत्यादिन्यायेन [illegible] वा [illegible]
(*STC.* iii.3 25)

13. 'दृष्टानि नैव सर्वाणि' इत्यस्य [illegible] भाव (*TPG.* p. 151)

14. इदं चोपलक्षणम्। 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं' इति वाक्ये ज्ञानानन्द [illegible] विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति वाक्ये ज्ञानानन्दादेरेव कथनात् [illegible] (*TPG.* ibid)

15. एवं च मानुषाणामपि यदा सर्वोपसंहारोऽपेक्षितः तदा किमु वक्तव्यं देवादीनामित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् (*TPG.* p. 152)

16. अस्ति ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनां च रहस्यब्राह्मणे पुरुषविद्या। तत्र पुरुषो यज्ञः कल्पितः। तैत्तिरीयका अपि कांचित् पुरुषविद्यामामनन्ति। [illegible] - [illegible] (पुरुषयज्ञस्य धर्माः) इति।
(*S. BSB.* iii 3 24)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapaksa is the two Vidyās are not different Their names are the same In both we have the fanciful identification of man with the sacrifice and the assimilative correlation of the appurtenances of the sacrifice with the limbs of man Tho' the description in the *T Ā* does not refer to the fruit of the meditation viz long life of a hundred and sixteen years promised in the Chāndogya Śākhā, it can be taken to be applicable to the other version also

Siddhānta

The Siddānta is that altho' both the meditations are of man, they are still separate vidyās—as the differences in particulars are many[17] One version (*Chān Up* iii, 16, 1-5) fancifully identifies the three libations with the twentyfourth, fortyfourth and fortyeighth years of man's life, while in the other text the three parts of the day,—morning, midday and evening are identified with the libations There is difference in the manner of correlation of the sacrificer, his wife and other details between them[18] The similarities in regard to details like the identification of the final bath after the sacrifice with death are *unimportant*[19]

Moreover, the Tāndya version places man in apposition with the sacrifice *Puruso vāva yajñah* The *T Ā* version does not do so It runs The knowing one who is the sacrifice, of him the self is the Yajamāna *Tasyaivam viduso yajñāsya ātmā yajamānah*" This refers to the sacrificer as being connected with the knowing one The two genitives (*vidusah* and *yajñasya*) are not coordinate as the knowing self is stated to be the 'Yajamāna' The same thing cannot indeed be the sacrificer and the sacrifice[20] The sacrificer is the agent (*kartā*) and the sacrifice is the object (*karma*) The two cannot be identical The relation between 'Viduṣah' and 'Yajñasya' cannot, therefore, be one of apposition (*sāmānādhikaranya*) but an oblique one (*vaiyadhikaranya*) The sacrifice which is related to the one who knows 'in this way'—of him the sacrificer is the self[21] Such must be the meaning and construction Taken this way, the identification of the self with the sacrificer

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17 पुरुषविद्येति संज्ञैक्येऽपि * * रूपभेदात (R *Vedantadīpa* iii 3 24)

18 सवनत्रयकल्पनाप्रकारभेदात् यजमानपत्न्यादिकल्पनाप्रकारभेदाच्च (*Vedantadīpa* iii 3 24)

19 यदपि किंचिन्मरणावभृथत्वादिसाम्यं तदल्पीयस्त्वात् भूयसा वैलक्षण्येनाभिभूयमानं न प्रत्यभिज्ञापने क्षमम् (S *BSB* iii 3 24)

20 तैत्तिरीयके पुरुषयज्ञत्वसंपत्तिरसिद्धा । 'विदुषो यज्ञस्य' इति विद्वत्संबन्धियज्ञप्रतीतेः । न चैते षष्ठ्यौ समानाधिकरणे । 'आत्मा यजमानः' इति विदुष आत्मनो यजमानत्वनिर्देशात् । एकस्य च यज्ञत्वयजमानत्वविरोधात् (*Kalpataru* iii 3 24)

21. एवं विदुषः पुरुषस्य यः संबन्धी यज्ञः तस्य संबन्धितया यजमान आत्मा (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 21)

and the fact of the sacrifice belonging to the knowing one can both be understood in the expressed (primary) sense of the terms If the expression "self" (*ātmā*) were understood in the sense of 'intrinsic nature' it can only be in a figurative sense that the sacrificer can be spoken of as the intrinsic nature of the sacrifice The rules of exegesis forbid the adoption of a figurative construction where a primary construction is possible Thus, while the Tāṇḍya and Paingi texts represent man as the sacrifice the *TA* text does not admit of such a construction.[22] The fruits of the two Vidyās are also different—long life in one and the attainment of the greatness of B in the other[23]

Criticism

The non-difference of Vidyās whose subject matter is the same has been affirmed in several instances before It is needless to go on discussing the same issue again and again In the present case too, there is no proof of difference in subject matter *The adhi is, therefore, uncalled for.*

The contention that the two genitives are not coordinate is not conclusive They can be taken as coordinate following the 'Niṣādasthapatinyāya'[24] It can thus be held that in the *T.A* also, the intention is to represent the Puruṣa as the Yajña The argument that if the genitives are taken to stand in an oblique relation instead of in coordination, the identification of the self of the sacrifice belonging to the knowing one, his faith etc , with the Yajamāna, his wife and so on can be understood in their expressed (primary) senses is also untenable If the said identification is merely a super-imposition, there can be no talk of its being made in the expressed or primary sense of the terms If it is a matter of contemplation of their similarity, the agent and the sacrifice both alike being worthy seats of the grace of God, their apposition can be accepted in the primary sense from that point of view[25]

The objection that if the genitives Viduṣaḥ and Yajñasya are understood coordinatively, it would lead to splitting the sentence into many is inadmissible Sentence-split cannot be helped even if we go in for

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22 तथा चात्मना यजमानत्वं च विदुषः श्रद्धा च पत्न्याः मुख्ये स्याताम्। इतरथा आत्मशब्दस्य स्वरूपवाचित्वे विदुषो यज्ञस्वरूपत्वं च यजमानो यज्ञस्वरूपमिति च गौणे स्याताम्। न च मुख्ये सति गौणो युक्तः। तस्मात् पुरुषयज्ञता तैत्तिरीये नास्तीति तथा तावन्न साम्यम् (*Bhāmati* iii 3 24)

23 फलभेदाच्च विद्याभेदः (*Vedantadipa* iii, 3 24)

24 *PMS* vi 1, 13, 51 According to this nyaya, the dissolution of the cpd 'niṣadasthapati', as a Karmadharaya is to be preferred to its dissolution as a Tatpuruṣa in the genitive case

25 कर्मणि कर्तरि च [illegible] मुख्यार्थत्वम्

(*STC* iii 3 25)

an oblique relationship of the genitives For, one will have to recognize several consecutive predications here, *one after the other* (*Vidvat-sambandhiyajñasya*) *Ātmā yajamānah, sraddhā patnī, śarīram idhmam uro, vedih*, etc And it is necessary to admit separate Vidhis in regard to each distinctive predication[26] Where is the harm in holding that as in *Satyam jñānam, anantam brahma* the predication of each attribute marks a complete sentence? In such cases, Vākyabheda cannot be held up as a defect[27]

The contention that the few points in which the two sources agree, such as the identification of the 'avabhrtha' ceremony with death, lose their significance in the face of the greater number of dissimilarities is also unsustainable The principle of Ekavākyatā between the beginning and the ending of a discourse has been accepted by S himself under BS iii 1 5 The corroborative value of the reference to avabhrtha as death in the closing part of the two vidyās cannot, therefore, be minimized in establishing their unity[28]

It is not correct to say the dissimilarities are many such as in the equation of the yajamāna, his wife etc To one who accepts unity of the vidyās, the details missing in one version can readily be supplemented from its counterpart according to the ruling of the Upasamhārādhikarana (iii 3 5)[29] If the discrepancies are to overrule unity of Vidyās, the Prāna Vidyās in *Chnn Up* v 1 and *Brh Up* vi 1 should be treated as different vidyās, instead of being accepted as one For, in the *Brh Up.* version of this vidyā, there is reference to 'retas' going out, which is absent in the *Chāndogya* version[30]

It is common knowledge that many details of a given Vidyā mentioned in one sākhā are often passed over in another version of it Such discrepancies should not, therefore, be allowed to disrupt their unity The fact that in one version of the present case of Puruṣa-yajña-vidyā the three parts of the life of man have been identified with the three parts of the day, (brought up by R.[31])—is no serious discrepancy—

26 यदप्यत्र वाक्यभेददूषणम । तत व्यधिकरणषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि समम । आत्मादीना यजमानादिभावस्यानेकस्यैव विधानाङ्गीकारात । प्रतिविधेय विध्युत्पत्तेरावश्यकत्वात (*STC* iii 3 25)

27 किचात्र सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्मेत्यादिवत प्रतिगुण वाक्यसमाप्ते, क्व वाक्यभेदो दोष ? (*STC* iii 3 25)

28 यच्चोक्त बहुवैषम्येण मरणावभृथादि बाध्यत इति । तन्न । उपसहारानुसारित्वस्य प्रथम एव त्वयापि स्वीकृतत्वात मरणावभृथयोश्चोपसहारे श्रुतस्य बाधायोगात (*STC* iii 3 25)

29 (बहोरपि वैषम्यस्यासिद्ध तथाहि–) उक्तरीत्या विद्यैकत्ववादिन पत्न्यादिकल्पनाप्युपसहाराधिकरणन्यायेन तत्र तत्र श्रुतप्रायत्वात (*ibid*)

30 अन्यथा, वाजसनेयशाखाया प्राणविद्याया 'रेतो होच्चक्राम' इति श्रुतस्य रेतस उत्क्रमणस्य छान्दोग्यस्यप्राण-विद्यायामभावात * * * (*STC*)

as the divisions of the day into morning, midday and evening form part of the *life* of man

As all other vidyās are in truth subservient to Brahmavidyā, there is no question of any difference in the ultimate fruit of the vidyās That one of the Puruṣa-yajñavidyās is associated with the fruit of long life is only by way of intermediary fruit (*avāntaraphala*) The ultimate fruit in both the versions, as in all other vidyās, is the same—viz realization of the greatness of B and attainment of its grace[32]

As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if the expression 'Puruṣavidyā' in the present Sūtra is intended to refer to the Puruṣayajñavidyā of the Tāṇḍya, Paingi, Chāndogya and TA as presumed by S , R and other commentators If the compound Puruṣa-vidyā is construed as a Tatpuruṣa, it would *not* embrace the Chāndogya version If it is construed as a Karmadhāraya (*Puruṣa eva vidyā*) the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* version could not be brought in *Does this not show that the 'Puruṣa Vidyā' which the Sūtrakāra is thinking of is quite different from what S , R and others have been discussing and that the purpose of this adhi is also different?*

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31 यत्माय प्रातर्मध्यंदिन च तानि सवनानि इत्यादय तैत्तिरीयके आम्नाता छादोग्ये सवनत्वेन नाम्नायन्त त्रेधा विभक्त पुरुषायुष छादाग्ये सवनत्वेन कल्प्यत (*Śrībhaṣya* iii 3 24)

32 फलभेदस्तु ब्रह्मविद्याशपत्वमशपविद्यानामगोष्टतमिति नास्त्येव। यत्त्वायुर्विद्यादिश्रवण तदवान्तरफलश्रवण मिति न दोष (*STC* iii 3 25)

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ASCETICS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR UPASAMHĀRA OF SOME ATTRIBUTES

16. *Vedhādyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.26)

This adhi. establishes that such attributes of B. as "putting down the wicked, piercing and destroying them" given in the Vedas (Vide *RV*. x, 87, 4; 7) are not to be comprehended in meditation by all Adhikārins.[1] The contemplation of such attributes associated with violence will be out of tune with the character and disposition of Adhikārins like ascetics who are required to abjure all thought of violence and injury to living beings, in their lives.

It may be felt that this topic should have been discussed either immediately after the Sambhṛtyadhi. or this Sūtra itself could have been amalgamated with it—the whole thing read as *Sambhṛtidyuvāptivedhād-yapi cātaḥ*—as both of them deal with the same topic of exclusion of certain attributes from upasamhāra. Why then has Sūtra 26 been treated as a separate adhi. and why has the Puruṣvidyādhi. been interposed between the Sūtras[2] 24 and 26?

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1. अत्रेश्वरमाक्षात्कारसाधनोपासने भेदनादिगुणाना सर्वोपसहार्यत्वनिरासादस्ति शास्त्रादिमगति (*TP.* iii 3 26)

   The negative particle *na* follows by *anuvṛtti* (with *maṇḍūkapluti*) from Sūtra no. 22.

2. नन्वत्रापि वेधादीनामनुपास्यत्वप्रतिपादनेन सभृतिद्युव्याप्तिवेधादि इत्येकेनैव योगेनानुपास्यत्वप्रतिपादनसभवेन कि योगविभागेनेति चेत् (Raghu. *TPB.* iii 3 26)

ascetics as a class are barred from meditating on such attributes of B as vedha and bhedana, as they are to abjure all thought of violence and injury to any one

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the fruit accruing from the meditation on B's attributes of destroying the wicked, viz the power to put down evil in the world being desired by all good men and being enjoined as part of one's moral responsibility by the Śāstras comes within the scope of one's fitness for meditation and should, therefore, be included in meditation The recognition of only four attributes as open to meditation by all in adhi 5 is not, therefore, justifiable [8]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that we learn from the Smrtis that the power to destroy evil doers and put down evil in the world accruing from the meditation of B's attributes of destroying evil and punishing the wicked is different from the fruits to be attained by ascetics and other classes of Adhikārins,[9] as it is inconsistent with their way of life They will not, therefore, entertain any desire to possess such powers This makes the meditation of such attributes out of bounds for them The Śrutis cited as authority by the Pūrvapaksa are applicable to Devatās[10] only and the Smrti texts advocating the slaying of the worst offenders against the moral law are addressed to Ksatriyas, normally There is thus no valid reason to suppose that such attributes of vedha and bhedana are to be included in meditation by all Adhikārins [11]

Interpretation of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R interpret this *adhi* as excluding the *upasamhāra* of certain

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8 वेधादि सर्वोपास्यमिति पूर्वं पक्ष, दुष्टजननिग्रहफलत्वात। तस्य च सर्वसज्जनापेक्षितत्वात 'प्राणस्त्वा वशो हास्यतीत्यनेन ब्रूयात' (*AA* iii 1 4) 'आततायिनमायान्त हन्यादेवाविचारयन' (*Manu* viii 351) इति श्रुतिस्मृत्योर्विधानात। अतो न चतुर्गुणोपासननियम इति पूर्वं पक्ष । (*TP* iii 3.26)

9 वेधाद्युपासनफलस्य हिंसाया भदात विलक्षणत्वात। योग्यतालब्धस्य प्रतियोगिन उक्ति 'यत्यादिमोग्य फलात इति (Ragh *TPB* iii 3.26)

10 प्रागुक्तश्रुतस्तु –

विष्णुना वशरूपेण सहित वायुना सह ।
न शक्नोषीति मामत्य हास्यतस्त्वामतो हि तौ।
ज्ञानसामर्थ्यवानित्य ब्रूयाद देवादिरुत्तम ॥

इति स्मृत्या देवविषयत्वेन स्मृतेश्च क्षत्रियपरत्वेन सर्वेषा योग्यत्वानिर्णयत्वात
(Ragh *Ny Muktavali* iii 3 26)

11 Read सर्वाधारो वश इत्युपासीत यो हरिम ।
वायु च मुक्तिमाप्नोति य एव तदुपासकम ।
निन्देत विष्णुविज्ञानविषये त वदेत स
विष्णुना वशरूपण * * * * (M on *AA* iii 1 4)

mantras read and rites like Pravargya described at the beginning of certain Upaniṣads

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that in the Ātharvaṇa Upaniṣad we have in the beginning mantras like "Pierce the whole body of the enemy, pierce the heart, crush his veins and head thrice crushed[12]" etc. The Vājasaneyī Upaniṣad reads a Brāhmaṇa passage about the Pravargya ceremony[13] The *Taitt Up* reads May Mitra and Varuṇa be auspicious to us I shall speak the truth * * *. These should be combined in the meditations on B as they are read in proximity to the Upaniṣad portions[14] It is not difficult to think of some suitable connection between them Take the case of the first mantra The heart figures in several Vidyās as the abode of meditations[15] Mantras intended to glorify the heart may, therefore, be accepted as subsidiary elements of the Vidyās, as for instance in the reference—"I take refuge in *bhūḥ* with this one, with this one, I take refuge in bhuvah with this one, with this one" (*Chān Up* iii.15.3)

Tho' rites like Pravargya may have been enjoined with reference to other occasions, they may be aligned with the Vidyās, just as the Bṛhaspatisava is made a subordinate part of the Vājapeyayajña[16]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that there is no upasamhāra of such mantras and ceremonies For, mantras like "Pierce the heart" have no connection with the subject matter of the Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads They cannot be connected with them The first mantra expresses hostility to some persons and is connected with magical rites to hurt the enemy[17] The others can similarly be shown to be subordinated to certain sacri-

12. सर्वं (शुक्र R) प्रविध्य, हृदय प्रविध्य धमनी प्रवृज्य, शिरोऽभिप्रवृज्य त्रिधा विपृक्त '

13 'Pravargya is an important tho' optional and subsidiary ceremony connected with the upasad days of Somayagas It consists of a ceremony of preparing a hot draught of milk and ghee which the sacrificer has to take and an oblation of is given to various deities It is treated with considerable secrecy and significance The draught is boiled in a rough clay pot which is manufactured and baked in the course of the performance itself It is called Mahavīra and Samrat and adored as a deity of paramount power"

14 सन्निधिसमाम्नानाद्विद्यास्वन्वय इति पूर्व पक्ष (*Vedantadipa*)

15 हृदयादीनि हि प्रायेणोपासनेष्वायतनादिभावेन उपदिष्टानि तद्द्वारेण च हृदय प्रविध्येत्येवंजातीयकाना मन्त्राणामुपासनसमन्वयम् (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

16 प्रवर्ग्यादीना कर्मणामन्यत्रापि विनियुक्तानां सतामविरुद्धो विद्यासु विनियोगः वाजपेय इव बृहस्पतिसवस्येति (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

17 नैषामुपसंहारो विद्यास्विति हृदयवेधादय भिन्ना अनभिसंबद्धा उपनिषदुदितविद्याभि । आभिचारिकविषया ह्येत (हृदय प्रविध्यादि) (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

ficial acts on the strength of indications syntactical connection and other means of proof [18] Mere proximity as a means of proof in establishing the relation of principal and subordinate is admitedly weaker than Śruti, linga etc [19] Where the entire meaning of a mantra is subordinated to the glorification of something, it may be subordinated to it But in "Pierce the heart" etc , the heart or its glorification is not the entire meaning of the mantra but hostility to the enemy [20] The Brhaspatisava has been expressly mentioned as a subordinate member of the Vaja-peya [21] The mantra *Śam no Mitras sam Varunah* is to be treated as subordinate to the study of the upanisad and *not* as subsidiary to the Vidyā to be combined with it in meditation [22] The Pravargya has been enjoined for a definite purpose by a means of proof of superior strength On the strength of an inferior means of proof of Viniyoga viz proximity in this case, it cannot be subordinated to a different purpose [23] The mantra and the ceremonials referred to are *not* therefore, to be viewed as subordinate to the Vidyās of the Upanisds We must satisfy ourselves that the only reason for their textual collocation with the Vidyās of the Upanisads is that like the latter, they are to be studied in the seclu-sion of the forests,[24] out of hearing of the uninitiated, like women and others [25]

Criticism

The consideration of the topic whether certain mantras given and sacrificial ceremonies described in the proximity of the Vidyās of the Upanisads are to be regarded as their subordinate elements (*sesa*) and, therefore, to be combined in meditation or not is *irrelevant to the theme of the present Pada*—which according to S and others is whether the cognitious of B which form the subject of different Vedantic texts are separate cognitions or not [26] The question whether a mantra or cere-

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18 अयपामपि मन्त्राणा कयाचित लिगन केपाचित् वचनन केपाचित प्रमाणान्तरेणत्यवमर्था तरेपु विनियुक्ताना न सन्निधिमात्रण विद्याशप वोपपत्ति (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

19 दुवलो हि सनिधि श्रु यादिभ्य इ यक्त प्रथमे तन्त्र (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

20 हृदयमात्रसकीतनस्यैवमुपयोग क्यचिदु प्रश्यत। न च हृदयमात्रमत्र मत्राथ । आभिचारिक विपयो ह्ययोऽस्य
(*ibid*)

21 वाजपेय तु बहस्पतिसवस्य स्पष्ट विनियोगा तर 'वाजपेयनष्टवा बहस्पतिसवेन यजत इति (*ibid*)

22 शनो मित्र श वरुण । सह नाववतु इ यादे मन्त्रसामर्थ्यादध्ययनविनियोग इति न विद्याग त्वम
(R *Vedantadipa* iii 3 25)

23 अपि चैकोऽय प्रवग्य सकृदुत्पन्नो बलीयसा प्रमाणना यत्र विनियुक्ता न दुबलेन प्रमाणा तरणान्यत्रापि विनियाग महति (S *BSB* iii 3 25)

24 तस्मादेवजातीयकाना मन्त्राणा कमणा वा न सन्निधिपाठमात्रण विधिशप त्वम । अरण्यानुवचनादिधमसामा यात्तु सन्निधिपाठ इति सन्तोष्टव्यम् (*ibid*)

25 अनुपनीतस्त्याद्यश्रवणाथ अदष्टाथ वा तत स्यात (*Srutaprakasa* iii 3 25)

26 Cf इदानी प्रतिवेदा त विज्ञानानि भिद्यन्ते न वेति विचायते (S *BSB* iii 3 1)
इदानी ब्रह्मोपासनाया गुणोपसहारविकल्पनिणयाय विद्याभदाभदचिन्ता प्रस्तूयन (*Sribhāsya* iii 3 1)

monial is subordinate (*śeṣa*) to a Vidyā of B or not, is thus irrelevant to the theme of this Pāda[27]

It may be urged that the question whether the Vidyās are one or different subserves the purpose of Upāsamhāra If a mantra or a sacrificial act is shown to be subserventi to a Vidya, it has to be combined in its meditation, otherwise not. From this point of view such an inquiry is necessary[28]

This explanation is not satisfying Even if the mantras and ceremonials are subservient, their 'Upasamhāra' in the Vidyās can hardly be sustained For, the essence of 'Upasamhāra' of guṇas in Brahmavidyā is to hold together in one mental act of contemplative concentration different attributes of B No such alignment of mantras and sacrificial rites is, therefore, possible in one and the same mental act of contemplative meditation.[29] The reference to the text "I take refuge in the *bhūh*" as being enjoined in Upāsanā is beside the point For the repetition of mantras which are likely to be hostile to mental concentration as part of Upasamhāra cannot possibly be accepted[30] The carrying out of sacrificial ceremonies like the Pravargya during meditation is obviously out of the question[31] There is no substance in the contention that the subservience of the mantras is only in respect of its *meaning*, in Upasamhāra Even where the mantra is accepted as subservient, there cannot be any actual Upasamhāra of its content of meaning—which will consist in its performance, as part of upāsanā. The proposed inquiry will thus be pointless[32]

The Pūrvapakṣa itself is too feeble to pass muster For, the inferiority of proximity (*sannidhi*) as a proof of 'viniyoga' to 'linga' and 'vākya' is an accepted principle of Pūrva Mīmāmsā Śāstra—the 'Pūrvatantra' In the face of it, the Pūvapakṣa relying on proximity can hardly arise[33] Nor can the mantra *Sarvam pravidhya* * * be

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27 अस्याश्चिन्ताया पादसङ्गत्यभावात् । विद्याभेदाभेदविचारस्येह पादे प्रस्तुतत्वेन, शेषाशेषिभावस्याप्रस्तुतत्वात् (*STC* iii 3 26)

28 ननु, विद्याभेदाभेदविचारस्योपसंहारफलकत्वेनेह प्रस्तुतत्वम् । मन्त्राणां कर्मणां च विद्यायां उपसंहारः, विपरीत विपर्यय इति फलवत्त्वात् नासङ्गतिरिति चेत् (*STC* iii 3 26)

29 न । अन्यत्वेऽपि मन्त्रकर्मणामुपसंहारायोगात् । नहि विद्यासन्निहित उपासने कर्मणां एकबुद्ध्यारोहात्मक उपसंहारः सम्भवः (*STC*)

30 'भूः प्रपद्ये' इत्यादि मन्त्र उपासनेषु विनियुक्तः श्रूयत इति चेन्न । उपासनाकाले चित्तैकाग्र्यनाविरोधिनां मन्त्राणां स्यात्मनां कर्तव्यत्वासम्भवात् (*STC*)

31 प्रवर्ग्यादीनां कर्मणां चोपासनाकाले कर्तव्यत्वं चित्तैकाग्र्यप्रतिविरोधाद्दुरापास्तमेव सुस्पष्टं (*ibid*)

32. ननु, अर्थत्व मन्त्रस्य तस्य उपासनाकाले उपसंहारो भविष्यतीति चेन्न । मन्त्रस्य अर्थत्वेऽपि तदर्थस्य कर्मणः पृथक् भेदनान्तरीय विद्यायामुपसंहारायोगात् । (*ibid*)

33 पूर्वपक्ष एवासिद्धः । नहि पूर्वतन्त्रे लिङ्गवाक्याभ्यामतिदुर्बलस्य प्रसिद्धसन्निधेः विनियोजकत्वं स्वीकृतम् (*STC*)

taken to subserve upāsanā as it does not represent only the heart as the abode of upāsanā[34] The possibility of making the Pravargya ceremony subservient to upāsanā thro' what is called the power of words to denote something (*śabdasāmarthyaam lingam*) is even more remote[35]

If the Siddhānta is to be arrived at by totally denying that there is any subservience of mantras and sacrificial rites to Brahmavidyaā, it will *not* be true to facts For, the subservience of mantras and sacrificial acts in general in creating the necessary climate of mental purification required for upāsanā of B has got to be accepted. Much more so those which are set out in close collocation with particular Vidyās[36]

If the Siddhānta is to be arrived at by accepting subservience of mantras and sacrificial rites to Brahmavidyā *in principle*, but holding that they are not to be included by way of Upāsamhāra *at the time of upāsanā*, there will be another kind of difficulty If there is no difference between the Upaniṣadic Vidyās and the others dealing with Pravargya rites etc in view of this subservience exhibited in collocation, it would mean that they deserve to be combined in meditation If they are to be regarded as different, *there will be no case for Upasamhāra at all* Both ways *there will be no need to open this adhikarana*[37]

S and R construe the words 'Vedhādyarthabhedāt' of the Sūtra in the sense that the meanings of mantras such as "sarvam pravidhya* * viz the piercing of the heart etc have no relation with the Vidyās taught in the Upanisads This entails a good deal of importation (*adhyahāra*) of words and ideas 'Want of connection' is not the straight sense of the term *'bheda'* in the Sutra

If the Upasamhara is understood in terms of piercing of the enemy as being done by the power of the Supreme B, there will be no difficulty in understanding the connection of the mantra with the Vidyā with which it is placed in collocation This again will make it clear that

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34 नहि सव प्रविध्य यादिमन्त्रषु उपासनोपयुक्तहृदयमात्रप्रकाशनेन विद्यागत्व सभवति (*ibid*)

35 प्रवर्ग्यादीना च सवथा सामथ्यमुत्प्रेक्षितुमपि न शक्यम् यन लिंगादिना विनियोग आशक्यत (*ibid*)

36 सिद्धातोऽपि मन्त्रकमणो सवथा विद्याशषत्व नास्तीति मतमाश्रित्य प्रवतते उत तत्काले उपसहायत्वाभाव इति ? नाद्य उपासनापेक्षितचित्तशुद्धिनिवतकत्वेन मन्त्रकमणो तच्छेषत्वावश्यभावात । यदा त्वसनिहितानां कमणामपि शषता कमणा ज्ञानमातनोति इति श्रुतिरेव स्पष्ट श्रावयति तदा सनिहिताना अमीषा कमणा सुतरा तत्सिद्ध (*STC*)

37 न द्वितीय । उपनिषदारम्भे आम्नातानां प्रवर्ग्यादिविद्यानां च भदाभावे उपसहारस्यैवासिद्धे भदे तु तत एवोपसहारसिद्ध अधिकरणारम्भायोगात (*ibid*)

such connection between the Vidyā and the mantra (*hṛdayam pravidhya*) is established not by virtue of proximity of mention but by the competence of the 'linga'—viz the attribute of destroying one's enemies, possessed by the chief object of meditation viz B

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R has practically shifted the Pūrvapakṣa from *Śukram pravidhya, hṛdayam pravidhya* and others on account of its obvious weakness He rests the Pūrvapaksa on the Śāntimantra *Śam no mitras śam Varuṇah* Saha nāvavatu etc treating the former set of mantras (*hṛdayam pravidhya etc) purely as an illustration* that they are *not* connected with the Brahmavidyā of the Upaniṣads He, therefore, recognizes the Śāntimantras alone as the Viṣayavakya of the *adhi*[38] This does violence to the wording of the Sūtra and the priority of place given to the words 'Vedhādi' therein The *Śrutaprakāśa* makes a vain attempt to justify the inclusion of the Pravargya texts also within the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa and confesses that tho' their position is beyond doubt, the doubt is still introduced *superficially speaking*[39] So long as there is a doubt whether *Hṛdayam pravidhya* etc is subsidiary to the Vidyā or not it cannot be cited as an established illustration in support of the Siddhānta[40] If there is no doubt in respect of the mantras *Hṛdayam pravidhya* because they are connected with magical rites, no doubt can arise in the case of the Śānti mantras too which are required to be recited at the beginning of the Vidyās[41] The Pūrvapakṣa can hardly arise in their case *also* In S's case, there is at least a semblance of possibility of a Pūrvapaksa arising on the basis of the 'heart' being an abode of meditation In R's case, there is not even that semblance of possibility so far as the Śāntimantras are concerned[42] If the Pūrvapakṣa is to be justified on the ground that happiness (*śam*) is a proper and desirable object of meditation which can be accepted as a subsidiary element of the Vidyā, the Siddhānta will have to fall to the ground Such a Pūrvapakṣa will however, have to be based on a 'linga' in the sense of 'Śabdasāmarthyam' In that case, the Siddhānta

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38 This comes out explicitly in his सूत्रार्थस्तु—वेधाद्यर्थभेदादित्यस्य वधाद्यर्थभेदवत् 'सत्यं वदिष्यामि तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु' इति शनो मित्रादे मन्त्रस्याप्यध्ययनमात्र धर्मपार्थभेदान्न विद्यांगत्वमित्यभिप्राय ।
अत· शनो मित्रादिमत्र एव अधिकरणस्य विषय (*Vedantadīpa* iii 3 25)

39 प्रवर्ग्यादि मन्त्रस्य विद्यत्वाभावेऽपि आपातप्रतीत्यनुगुण संशय उक्त (*Śrutaprakasa* iii 3 25)

40 हृदय प्रविध्येत्यादे संदिग्धस्य दृष्टान्तत्वानिर्विरोध । वधादराभिचारिकत्वमपि प्रसिद्धत्वात
(*STC* iii 3 26)

41 यदि तत्र न सन्देहोत्पाद तर्हि विद्यारम्भे शनो मित्रादे नियमेन पाठान्न तत्रापीति समम् (*ibid*)

42 पूर्वमते हृदयादीनामुपासनायतनतया मन्त्रस्य तदंगत्वशंकाया संभावितत्वेऽपि इह मते आपाततोऽपि तदसंभवात
(*STC* iii 3 26)

cannot override this liṅga merely by *another* liṅga.[43] In that case, the Śāntimantras should have been given the priority of place over *Hṛdayam pravidhya* resting on *sannidhi* alone, in the statement of the Pūrvapakṣa. The two commentators seem to have lost track of the true significance of the *adhi.* and to be pursuing shadows of their own creation.

43 मुग्रादीनामुपास्यानामत्र श्रवणाल्लिगात् तदगत्व शक्यत इति चेत्, तर्हि सिद्धान्तानुपपत्ति । नहि लिंगेन पूर्व-पक्षिते तेनैव सिद्धान्तो युक्त (*STC.* iii 3 26)

CHAPTER XXXIX

UPĀSANĀ CONTINUES IN MOKṢA ALSO

17 *Muktopāsanādhikaranam* (iii 3 27-28)

In this adhi the Sūtrakāra expounds the true nature of upāsanā as being spontaneous in its origin and expression and not tied down to expectation of any rewards to be attained by it This exalted nature of upāsanā as conceived by the Sūtrakāra has been elucidated here by showing how it continues to find expression as its own fruit in the [1] ves of the released souls

अत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानसाधनोपासनस्य मुक्तावनुवृत्तिसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसङ्गति (*TP* iii 3 27)

The full significance of J's words *muktāvanuvṛttisamarthanam* has been brought out by the *AC* (and *STC*) as '*phalarūpānuvṛtti*' or the continuation of upāsanā, as its own fruit, in Mokṣa The correct appreciation that their upāsanā has this quality of surviving and flourishing as its own fruit and reward in Mokṣa has a great bearing and impact on the conduct of upāsanā in the state of Samsāra by way of imparting to it a great deal of zeal and exclusive ardor[1] In the absence of this knowledge, upāsanā may of course be carried on in the state of Samsāra as the means of acquiring direct knowledge of B, but then, it will be pursued only as a means to end and not as an end in itself The knowledge of the fact of its continuation as its own fruit in Mokṣa gives *it an additional incentive to be carried on for its own sake and as its own reward with all the zest and ardor*[2]

1 मुक्तावनुपासनासिद्धौ तस्य प्राप्तिसाधन फलत्वसिद्धि (*TP* iii 3 27)
2 मुक्तावनुवृत्त्यभावे प्राप्तदेश फलत्वसिद्धिरपि (*STC* iii 3 27)

The *adhi.* thus imparts to Upāsanā a new dimension and a higher *end-value* over and above the usual *means-value* it enjoys. The expression *'hāni'* used in the Sūtra stands for Mokṣa, which is the cessation of bondage and transmigration (*samsārahāni*).[3] The particle *'tu'* added to *'hāni'* points to the special feature which distinguishes the conduct of upāsanā in Mokṣa from its conduct in Samsāra[4]—viz. its freedom from the necessary connection with fruits to be attained (*prāptavyaphalatvam*). This is denoted by the word *'ācchanda'* in the Sūtra meaning that the upāsanā carried on by the Mukta Jīvas is at their own pleasure (*svecchayā*). It is not in obedience to a mandate, as earlier, and is free from a necessary connection with fruits to be attained. The reason for this is this. All texts (*śabda*) *enjoining upāsanā* of B. serve the purpose (*śeṣa*) of attaining Mokṣa (*upāyana*), thro' Brahmāparokṣa and thereby getting closer to B. in the Samīpya and other forms of Mukti.[6] They, therefore, cease to be operative in respect of those who have attained Mokṣa.[7] In the circumstances, the upāsanā, which is known thro' Śrutis[8] and Smṛtis to be carried on in Mokṣa by the Muktas cannot be ascribed to the operation of injunctions with a necessary relation to fruits to be attained.

मोक्षसिद्धयर्थं प्रवृत्ता विधयः कथं मुक्तविषया भवेयुरिति भावः (*TP.* iii.3.27)

A vidhi or mandate is thus out of the question in the case of upāsanās carried on by Muktas. They are therefore, to be accepted as being absolutely voluntary in nature and not by way of compliance with any mandate. They are not, therefore, linked with any fruits to be attained, *other than the joy of the upāsanā as such.*

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there is difficulty in accepting either of the two positions (i) that the Muktas are bound by injunctions to carry on upāsanā in Mokṣa or (ii) that they carry them on without a

3 'हानि' रित्युक्ति सर्वक्लेशसबन्धत्यागो मुक्तिरिति तत्स्वरूपोक्त्यर्था (Ragh. *TDP*). This is intended to make clear the possibility of carrying on upasanā, voluntarily at one's own pleasure, and in the absence of a mandate.

4 तुशब्द इदानी प्रवृत्तितो विशेष दर्शयति (*STC*)

5 उप समीपेऽयन गमनमुपायन मोक्ष । तस्य शब्द. 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इत्यादि । तच्छेषत्वादुपासनाविधीनाम् (*AC.* iii 3 27)

6 सामीप्यादिरूपमोक्षस्य ज्ञानसाधनताभिधायकवाक्यशेषत्वात् (*BD.* iii 3 27)

7. मोक्षवाक्यशेषत्वादुपास्तिविधीना मोक्षमुपाय कृतार्थत्वात् (*TD*)

8 Cf 'एतत् साम गायन्नास्ते' (*Taitt. Up.* iii 10 5) ऋचा त्व पोषमास्ते पुपुष्वान् गायत्र त्वो गायति (*RV* x 71 11) (For M's interpn. of the ṛk see J *VTNṬ*. Par i)

mandate In both the cases, there will be no escape from the fruits or results to be attained by such upāsanā These will have to be worked out and exhausted by the Muktas thro' personal enjoyment That would make the Muktas forfeit the position as 'Āptakāmas' or those who have had all their desires and fruits of actions fulfilled, and have nothing more to attain Moreover, making Upāsanā of Muktas depend on mandates will bring down the state of Mokṣa to the level of Samsāra, where mandates have meaning and purpose [9] For these reasons, all upāsanā will have to be relegated to the Samsāra level [10] It will be enough then to carry it on as a means of Aparokṣajñāna For this purpose, it is not necessary to infuse into it any extraordinary amount of zeal and ardor on the ground of its being its own reward in Mokṣa [11]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds on the authority of Śrutis and Smṛtis (*taduktam*) like He goes on singing the Sāman (*Taitt Up* iii 10 5) that the Muktas do carry on upāsanā of B in various ways The presumption that all upāsanā is necessarily governed by Vidhis is not correct It is quite possible for upāsanā to be undertaken freely in the state of Mokṣa without a mandate The Sutra cites an example *Kusācchandastutyupagānavat* (*tat*) [12] Usually, learned Brahmins engaged in the formal study of Vedic mantras and recitation of Sāmans observe the formality of holding Kusa grass[13] in their hands and sitting facing the east However, even after the completion of their course of study according to prescribed regulations these Brahmins voluntarily observe the same procedure of sitting facing the east and holding Kusa grass in their hands, at their own pleasure (*ācchanda*) whenever they choose to repeat the same mantras and recite the sāmans,[14] long after the formal period of their study is over [15] In the same way (*vat*) thro' force of earlier Samskāras (on their Svarupamanas)[16] the Muktas also continue

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9 किं मुक्तानामुपासना विहिता न वा ? नाद्यावपि कल्पौ । फलप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गात् तथा चापूर्णताप्रसक्तेः । आद्ये विधिबद्धत्वेन मुक्तेः संसारसमानधर्मतापत्तेश्च (*TP* iii 3 27)

10 अतः सार्वाधिकमेवोपासनमिति भक्तिव्यथा (*TP* iii 3 27)
ततश्च सार्वाधिकमेवोपासनमिति मुक्तिपर्यन्तमेवोपासनं कार्यम् न तूपासने आदरातिशय इति (*AC* iii 3 27)

11 ज्ञानसाधनत्वमात्रेण कर्तव्यत्वसिद्धावपि तस्य फलरूपत्वज्ञानपूर्वकं अतिबहुमानेन कर्तव्यत्वासिद्धे
See also भक्तिव्यर्था (*TP*) आदरो व्यर्थ इत्यर्थः (*AC*)

12 Read आच्छन्दपदं बुद्ध्या विवक्षन् कुशग्रहणं तच्छन्दार्थोपागमनादौ चान्वेति (*BD*)

13 कुश stands for कुशग्रहणम्

14 स्तुत्युपगानशब्दाभ्यां मन्त्रसामाध्ययनानि (Raghu. *TPB*)

15 ननु कुशग्रहणस्यापि नियतस्वाध्यायविधिविधेयत्वेन करणात् कथं दृष्टान्तत्वमित्यतो भाष्ये नियतस्वाध्यायान्तर्गतमित्युक्तम् (Raghu *TPB*)

16 विध्यभावे नियमेनोपासनाकरणानुपपत्तिः कारणाभावादित्याशङ्कापरिहारः संस्काराख्यकारणसत्त्वादिति न्यायविवरण एवास्ते द्रष्टव्यः (Raghu *TPB*)

their upāsanā in Mokṣa, at their own pleasure, even tho' there is no vidhi enjoining such upāsanā on them.[17]

The next Sūtra: *Sāmparāye*[18] *tartavyābhāvāt tathā hyanye* (iii 3 28) rebuts another objection of the Pūrvapaksa that even conceding that the upāsanā of Muktas is not governed by mandates they may still be carried on with a view to overcoming certain obstacles or unforeseen impediments which may arise in their new lives There is thus nothing incongruous in concluding that injunctions regarding upāsanā have a double purpose of helping the attainment of Mokṣa thro' Aparokṣajñāna and overcoming subsequent difficulties and impediments in the lives of Muktas[19]

These objections are given a suitable answer It is pointed out that the state of Mukti (*sāmparāya*) is, by hypothesis, one that is completely free from all impediments and adversities The Śrutis declare that the Mukta once for all crosses over all obstacles and impediments (*Bṛh. Up* iv.3, 22) such upāsanā, then, as he carries on, as we have seen, on the authority of Śrutis, must, therefore, be recognized to be a spontaneous expression of his own nature as the creative activities of B are an erpression of Its nature[20]

Devasyaisa svabhāvo'yam (*Mānd Up* i, 9)

By showing that there is also continuation of upāsanā in the lives of Muktajīvas, the Sūtrakāra has impressively brought out the point that there is every reason to carry on upāsanā in the Samsāra state also with the same spirit of its inwardness shorn of all thought of its being contingent upon the attainment of fruits

अतो मुक्तावप्युपासनानुवृत्तेः निरुपाधिक तत् ससारे कर्तव्यमिति सिद्धम्
(*AC*)

This position of the Siddhānta that it is necessary to establish the continuation of upāsanā in Mokṣa as its own fruit in order to infuse

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17 ब्रह्मतर्के च –
मुक्ता अपि हि कुर्वन्ति स्वेच्छयोपासन हरे ।
नियमानन्तर विप्रा कुशार्थैरप्यधीयते ॥ (M *BSB* iii 3 27)

18 Samparaya' means Mokṣa
पर परमात्मा । त प्रत्ययन गमन पराय । सम्यक् पुनरावृत्ति विना पराय सपराय , सपराय एव साम्पराय (*STC*)
अत्र हानिशब्दोक्त उपायनशब्देन विवृतोऽपि मोक्ष सुप्त्यादिव्यावृत्तये पुन सापरायशब्देन विवृत इत्यदोष (*STC*)

19 नहि निष्फल स्वेच्छयैव प्रवृत्ति पश्याम । किंच उपासनाविधीना मोक्षार्थत्व मुक्तावनिष्टपरिहारार्थत्व च कि न स्यादित्याशका परिहरत् सूत्र व्याचष्टे (*TP* iii 3 28)

20 मुक्तस्योपासन स्वेच्छयैवागीकार्यम् । न त्वनिष्टपरिहारार्थम् । 'तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वान शोकान हृदयस्य भवति' इति श्रुतेस्तस्य तदव्यानिष्टस्यैवाभावात । फलाभावेऽपि क्रियेश्वरवदुपपद्यते (*TP* iii 3 28)

into its conduct at the Samsāra level an immense zeal and ardor highlights the mystic joy that is intrinsic to Brahmopāsanā The *AC* has impressively brought out this aspect of the Siddhāntin's position It says "To begin with, upāsanā is the means of Aparoksajñāna for all those who have *not* attained it In the case of those who have attained Aparokṣajñāna, the same upāsanā carried on with zest and ardor makes for the welling up of their Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa When carried on by those who have *attained* Mokṣa, it becomes an expression of the inexhaustible bliss of their own selfhood Such is the greatness of upāsanā and it is to awaken the Adhikārin to a full realization of its deep-lying potentialities that the Sūtrakāra has brought up this point in the present *adhi*"[21]

Śamkara's Interpretation

Hānyadhikaranam, III, 3, 26

According to S this adhi establishes that the statement in different upaniṣads regarding the Jñānin's getting rid of all his good and evil at death are to be combined with others to the effect that these good and evil are taken over,—the former by his friends and the latter by his foes The texts considered are from the Chāndogya and Mundaka and from the Kauṣītaki and Śāṭyāyanī. Of these, the first two merely state that the Jnānin rids himself of his good and bad deeds alike These texts pertain to the Nirgunavidyā The Kausitaki Up states in the Vidyā known as Paryankavidyā that the Jnānin sheds his good and bad deeds which are obtained by his friends and foes respectively The Śāṭyāyani text refers only to the obtainment of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin by his friends and foes respectively

The doubt arises whether in the Nirguṇa Vidyā of the Chāndogya and Muṇḍaka there is to be the addition of the circumstance of the inheritance of the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin, when he sheds them, by his friends and foes respectively, as stated in the Saguna Vidyā of the Kauṣitaki and other sources[22]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as meditation of Nirguṇa Vidyā is possible even without the addition of the circumstance of the inheritance of

21 मुक्तावनुवृत्तिरपि वनिशयन वस्त्वन्तरसिद्धि प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात् न समयनायमिति परास्तम् । तत्समयनस्य बहुमानातिशयजननायत्वात् । अनपरोक्षिणामपरोक्षज्ञानसाधनमप्युपासनं अपरोक्षिणामनुष्ठितमानन्दातिशयहेतु भवति । मुक्तानामुपास्यमानं तु तत्स्वरूपमेव भवतीत्युपासनमहिमवर्णनं बहुमानातिशयार्थमुपादानात्

(*AC* III 3 28)

22 यत्र तु हानमात्रं सुहृद्दुष्कृतयोः श्रुतं न श्रूयते उपायनं तत्र किमुपायनमुपादानं गतिरस्ति नवेति संशयः

(*Bhāmatī* III 3 26)

the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin by his friends and foes mentioned in the Saguna Vidyā, the said circumstance is not to be included in the meditation of the Nirguna Vidyā, as there is no mention of it therein[23] It is not proper to contend that as this detail is mentioned in the Paryankavidyā in the neighbourhood of shaking off of good and had deeds, it should be taken into account along with the fact of shaking off of both good and evil The Paryankavidyā is a Sagunavidyā while the Vidyā described in the following terms—viz "Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair and shaking off the body as the moon frees himself from the mouth of Rāhu, I obtain self made and fulfilled the eternal B" (*Chān Up* viii 13) and "the knower shaking off good and evil realizes the highest oneness, free from passions" (*Muṇd. Up* iii 1 3) is a Nirgunavidya

There is no reason to think that shaking off cannot be explained without reference to what is shaken off being obtained by others and, therefore, bringing into the Nirgunavidyā what is part of the Sagunavidyā It is perfectly understandable that, as in the case of sins expiated by Prāyaścittas *not* being inherited by or transferred to others, the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin may be shaken off and shed completely without necessitating the assumption of their being transferred to or inherited by his friends and foes respectively[24]

The Pūrvapakṣa concludes that the latter detail is not to be supplied in the two passages mentioned as the text is silent about it and also because what other Śākhins say about it falls within the scope of a different Vidyā and finally getting rid of good and evil is something done by the Jñānin himself, while the obtaining of them is the work of *others* There is no connection between the two Hence, there is no justification to supply the latter on the basis of the former[25]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the latter circumstance is to be added as it is supplementary (*sesa*) to the statement about the former This is

23 एकत्वे ह्युपासनाकर्मणामन्यत्र श्रुतानामप्यन्यत्र समवायो घटते। न त्विहोपासनानामेकत्वम्। सगुणनिर्गुणभेदादित्यर्थ (*Bhamati* iii 3 26)

24 ननु यथोपायनं श्रुतं हानमुपस्थापयति एवं हानमप्युपायनमित्यत आह—ग्रहणं हि न स्वामिनाऽपगममन्तरेण भवतीति ग्रहणादपगमसिद्धिरवश्यंभाविनी। अपगमस्त्वसत्यप्युपायने ग्रहणे दृष्टो यथा प्रायश्चित्तेनापगतिरेनस इति (*Bhamati* iii 3 26)

25 विद्यान्तरगोचरत्वाच्च शाखान्तरीयस्य श्रवणस्य। अपि च, आत्मकर्तृकं सुकृतदुष्कृतयोर्हानं परकर्तृकं तूपायनम्। तयोरसत्यावश्यकभावे कथं हानेनोपायनमाक्षिप्येत? तस्मादसंनिपातो हानादुपायनस्येति (S *BSB* iii 3 26)

हानौ केवलायामपि श्रूयमाणायामुपायनं संनिपतितुमर्हति, तच्छेषत्वात्। हानशब्दशेषो ह्युपायनशब्दः समधिगतः कौषीतकिरहस्ये। तस्मादन्यत्र केवलहानशब्दश्रवणेऽप्युपायनानुवृत्तिः (*ibid*)

shown by the Kauṣītaki text. So, even where only getting rid of good and evil is mentioned, the circumstance of their being obtained (*upāyana*) by friends and foes, in the manner described, is to run on.

The objections raised by the Pūrvapakṣa are irrelevant. For we are not concerned here with anything *to be done* in obedience to some injunction. The inheriting of the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin by others is mentioned in the texts merely by way of *glorification* of the power of knowledge attained by the Jñānin that it transfers his good and evil deeds—the cause of Samsāra, to others! As such, it is to be added to the broad statement about the shaking off of good and evil by the Jnānin. As it is merely a glorificatory passage, we need not rack our brains about the justice or the ethics of how the good and evil of one can be transferred to someone else and are obtained by him. The Sūtrakāra has merely availed himself of the opportunity of indicating how even glorificatory passages have to be inserted in texts, where they are wanting.[26]

The latter part of the Sūtra quotes examples from the Nigamas of the Bhāllavins, Paiṅgins etc. regarding the wooden rods (*kuśāḥ*) used by the Udgātṛ priests in counting the stotras, certain statements about the metres, the praises and the singing by the Ṛtviks, whereof the broad general statements made in one text is supplemented by more specific details given by another source.[27] If we do not define a general text by another more particular one, we would be forced to go in for optional procedure—which according to the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā is to be avoided, as much as possible.[28]

Criticism

The *Bhāmatī* has tacitly admitted that the inquiry about the glorification of Nirguṇavidyā thro' *upāyana* of good and bad deeds of the Jnānin, has no direct thematic relevance or connection with theme of this Pāda, which according to S., is whether the Vidyās are one or

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26 यदुक्तमश्रवणाद्विद्यान्तरगोचरत्वाच्चासन्निपात इति, तदुच्यते। सर्वथा व्यवस्थार्थविधित्वेनानुष्ठेयं किंचिदन्यत्र श्रुतमन्यत्र विधीयते। नन्विह हानमुपायनं वानुष्ठेयत्वेन सङ्कीर्त्यते। विद्यास्तुत्यर्थं त्वनयोः सङ्कीर्तनम्—इत्थं महाभागा विद्या, यत्सामर्थ्यादस्य विदुषः सुकृतदुष्कृते संसारकारणभूते विधूयेते, ते चास्य सुहृद्द्विषत्सु निविशेते इति। विद्यास्तुत्यर्थत्वाच्चास्योपायनवादस्य कथमन्यदीये सुकृतदुष्कृते अन्यैरुपेयेते इति नातीवाभिनिवेष्टव्यम् (S *BSB* iii 3 26)

27 कुशाच्छन्दःस्तुत्युपगानवदित्युपमोपादानम्। तद्यथा भाल्लविना 'कुशा वानस्पत्याः स्थ ता मा पात' इत्यस्मिन् निगमे कुशानामविशेषेण वनस्पतियोनित्वेन श्रवणे शाट्यायनिना 'औदुम्बराः कुशाः' इति विशेषवचनात् औदुम्बर्यः कुशा आश्रीयन्ते * * * * (S *BSB*. iii 3 26)

28 श्रुत्यन्तरकृतं हि विशेषं श्रुत्यन्तरेऽनभ्युपगच्छतः सर्वत्रैव विकल्पः स्यात्। स चान्याय्यः सत्यां गतौ (S. *BSB*. iii 3 26)

different. The *Kalpataru* has attempted to establish a connection as follows: In the previous *adhi* it was shown that certain mantras and sacrificial ceremonies found in the proximity of some upaniṣadic vidyās are not entitled to Upasamhāra as they have no connection with them. In the same way, it may be contended that the obtaining of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin at his death by his friends and foes stated in the proximity of statements about the shedding of all his good and bad deeds by the Jñānin, is not entitled to upasamhāra in so far as such casting off of good and bad by the Jñānin is possible without necessarily involving their being obtained by his friends and foes. This contention is brought up and disposed of in this *adhi*.[29]

But then this objection to the opening of the *adhi* has to be made on the ground that *upāyana* or inheritance of good and bad deeds by others is not necessary to explain or account for shedding them, as the latter can be explained by itself without the former following suit (*upāyanasya hānopapādanasāmarthyābhāvaḥ*). This is an argument in terms of a 'linga' which cannot be overridden by considerations of Samakhyā. That apart, inheritance of the Jñānin's deeds by others cannot be conceived as an attribute of B eligible for upasamhāra. It can only pertain to the *deeds* themselves. It cannot be said that as B is the object of the Jñānin's realization of the truth which holds the marvellous power of transferring his good and bad deeds to his friends and foes respectively, the said inheriting becomes an attribute of B and as such it is eligible for upasamhāra. For, the text says nothing *to that effect*. However, as 'B' to S is of the nature of pure intelligence only and is never the object of any knowledge or anybody's knowledge, it will not be permissible from his point of view to regard B as being or becoming the object of the Jñānin's knowledge or realization of B to which the said powers are ascribed.[30]

If such a characteristic is to be ascribed to B in Māyic parlance or thro' Māyā, the whole context can no longer be regarded as a Nirgunavidyā, as S would have it. That will also explode the distinction between the Saguna and Nirguna vidyās which he and his commentators have been at so much pains to read into the Chāndogya, Mundaka, Kauṣītaki and Śāṭyāyani texts.[31]

29 यथा विद्यासन्निधौ श्रुतस्यापि मन्त्रादेर्विद्यायामसामर्थ्यादनुपसंहारः एवं हानसन्निधौ श्रुतस्याप्युपायनस्य तदन्तरेणापि हानसंभवेन हानोपपादनसामर्थ्याभावादनुपसंहार इति प्रापय्य प्रतिविधीयते (*Kalpataru* iii 3 26)

30 उपायनस्य परैरुपादानात्मकस्य सुकृतादिधर्मतया ब्रह्मधर्मत्वाभावेनोपसंहार्यत्वासंभवात् । न चैतादृशसुकृतदुष्कृतहानोपादानजनकज्ञानविषयत्वं ब्रह्मधर्म एवेति वाच्यम् । तस्येहाश्रवणात् । ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानात्मकतया क्रियाकर्मभावविरोधेन विषयत्वानङ्गीकाराच्च (*STC* iii 3 27)

31 मायिकं च तदस्तीति चेन्न । निर्गुणविद्याविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः (*STC*)

While the Sūtra *Hānau tu upāyanaśabdaśeṣatvāt* contains no explicit reference to the disposition of the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin, it deserves to be noted that the same topic is discussed at some length according to S himself under BS iv 1 13-17 This is bound to raise a doubt as to how far S and R are right in raising the issue here No wonder, they have been led as a result to put the phrase *Upāyanaśabdaśeṣatvāt* on the reverse gear to yield the sense *upāyanaśabdasya hānivākyaśeṣatvāt*. However, as R has not chosen to take advantage of the use of the word *'śabda'* after *'upāyana'* in the Sūtra, in the way S has done, his meaning could be expressed more compactly by the words *upāyanaśeṣatvāt* leaving out the addition of *'śabda'*.

S's further explanation that the inheriting of the deeds by others has been referred to in the Śrutis and Sūtra only for purposes of glorification and that the same is to be extended to the Nirgunavidyā also under the guise of upasamhāra of the upāyana cannot bear scrutiny In his eagerness to exalt Nirgunavidyā he has led himself into making this Sūtra an exception to the very purpose to which this Pāda is devoted, according to himself

If this representation (*samkīrtanam*) of the *upāyana* (inheriting) by others for purposes of glorification of Nirgunavidyā means that we are to import the necessary words conveying such a sense into the text of the (Nirguna)-vidyā in question, it cannot be allowed For the text of this Vidyā, as it stands worded in the Upaniṣad, is complete in itself, and conveys a complete sense, without any gap in thought and, therefore, raising no further expectancy (*ākānkṣā*) in the mind [32] to be satisfied by supplying further details from other sources If a syntactic expectancy is to be roused on the analogy of 'Raktapaṭanyāya' there is no reason for such goaded expectancy (*utthāpyākānkṣā*) [33] If the mention of upāyana in proximity to *'hāna'* in the Paryankavidyā is sufficient reason to raise a similar expectancy in regard to Nirguṇa vidyā also, we will have, by the same token, to accommodate other glorifications of the same Paryankavidyā in the Nirgunavidya *and concede their upasamhāra too* If the representation of upāyana is for purposes of contemplation only, even then the same complications will have to be faced. It is doubtful how far the transference of good and bad deeds of the Jnānin to others can really be taken to redound to the glorification of the Nirgunavidyā When it is said that this power of know-

32 सगुणायां विद्यायामुपायनस्य स्तुत्यर्थं कीर्तनमिति निर्गुणायामपि स्तुत्यर्थं तत्कीर्तनमवर्जनीयमिति निरस्तम्। किमिदं सङ्कीर्तनम्? तद्वाचकशब्दाध्याहारः? तदर्थानुसन्धानं वा? नाद्यः निर्गुणविद्यान्तरवाक्यस्य विशिष्टार्थाभिधायित्वेन निराकाङ्क्षत्वात् (*STC*)

33 उत्थाप्याकाङ्क्षायाश्च कारणाभावात् (*ibid*)

ledge of Nirgunavidyā transfers the good and bad of the Jnānin to others, it *also means that it is powerless to destroy those deeds root and branch and merely transfers them to others' shoulders*[34]

According to S and R the phrase *upāyanasabdaśeṣa* in the Sūtra means that the statement regarding the obtaining of the deeds of the Jnānin by others is supplementary to the statement about his getting rid of them[35] It is, however, difficult to define the supplementariness (*śeṣatva*) of *upāyana* satisfactorily from their point of view There are three or four ways in which "Śeṣatva" can be taken (i) what serves another's interests, (ii) what follows in the wake of another, (iii) what is invariably concomitant with another, or (iv) what exists in a part of the same place with another The statement about obtaining the good and bad deeds of the Jnānin by others cannot be defined as being supplementary to the statement about their shedding by him in any of these senses The upāyana or obtaining of the good and bad deeds is not an ingredient of 'hāna' in the sense a Purodāśa cake is, for example, an ingredient necessary for the accomplishment of the sacrifice The second sense is not applicable to the fact of inheritance so far as the statement in the Śāṭyāyani is concerned which does *not* refer to the shedding of the deeds[36] This sense of Śesatva is also inappropriate to the examples of Kuśas, the metres, etc For, these statements occur in different sources and it will be difficult to fix their order of succession and say which comes after which The third sense is out of the question as the shedding of the deeds can be conceived independently and in the absence of their being obtained by others The case of sins washed away by expiation (without transfer to others) is in point The last sense will *not* be applicable to the examples of the Kuśas, the metres, etc given in the Sūtra, for, these two sets of texts regarding Kusas, metres, etc are from different sources They cannot be regarded as belonging to the same place or being part of the same source[37]

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34 न स्याच्च निर्गुणविद्यास्तुति । नहि बन्धक कर्म स्वरूपतयैव क्षपयति निर्गुणविद्येत्युक्तादप्यन्यत्र यापयतीत्युक्त्या स्तुतिबुद्धिरुपजायते, प्रत्युत निर्गुणविद्याया कर्मण स्वरूपेण क्षपणे सामर्थ्याभावस्यैव प्रतीते (*STC* iii 3.27)

35 उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्॥ उपायनशब्दस्य हानिवाक्यशेषत्वात (*Śrībhasya* iii 3 26) Thibaut has erred in his translation of this phrase according to R.'s bhaṣya in saying 'If (the getting rid of the deeds) is supplementary to the statement of obtaining (*op cit* p 645-45)

36 किञ्चोपायनशब्दस्य शेषत्व पारार्थ्यमुत तदनन्तरभावित्व, तदर्थाविनाभूतार्थत्व वा? नाद्य उपायनशब्दस्य हानिशब्दार्थत्वायोगात् ।। तन्निवर्तककर्मस्य तादर्थ्यस्यायोगात । न वा यागनिर्वर्तकेषु पुरोडाशष्विवोपायन हाननिवर्तकत्वमस्ति येनार्थद्वारा शब्दयो शेषशेषिभाव समाश्रीयेत । न द्वितीय, शाट्यायनिशाखाया तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातय इत्युपायनोक्तरेव भावेन तदसिद्धे (*STC* iii 3 27)

37 कुशादिदृष्टान्तासिद्धश्च । नहि प्रदेशान्तरस्थवाक्य प्रदेशान्तरस्थवाक्यस्यानन्तरभावीति वक्तु युक्तम् । न तृतीय, असिद्ध । न ह्युपायनाविनाभूत हानम । उपादातुरन्यस्याभावेऽपि प्रायश्चित्तादिना पापादेर्हानिदर्शनात । प्रत्युत हानाविनाभूतत्वादुपायनस्य वैपरीत्यस्यवौचित्याच्च । नापि तदेकदेशत्व तच्छेषत्वम । असिद्धे । नहि शाखान्तरस्थवाक्यस्य शाखान्तरस्थवाक्यमेकदेश इति पूर्ववादी मन्यते (*STC* iii 3 27)

In the case of the four sets of passages relating to the Kuśas, the metres, etc , a definite supplementary relation between the constituents is regulated by the general and specific nature of the statements. But the shedding of the deeds and their obtainment by others bears no such relation to one another[38] In conformity with the Sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva between the pairs contemplated in the illustration, the Sūtra should have been worded beginning with the words "Vānaspatya"-cchanda * * * * rather than as 'Kuśācchanda" * * *

Commenting on the last word of the Sūtra "taduktam" R rejects the suggestion that the different statements regarding "hāna" and "upādāna" may be viewed as optional and insists on their being combined by making the latter supplementary to the former. But the resort to option can be rejected only where two conflicting statements made in close proximity and therefore, ascertained to form part of a whole as in "Yajatisu yeyajāmaham karoti nānuyājeṣu' are to be resolved into a unitary proposition in the interests of their 'ekavākyatā'. The statements regarding the shedding and the obtaining of the deeds are not in proximity *everywhere*[39]

R pins down the inquiry to the combination of the two statements rejecting the resort to option However, where only the obtaining of the deeds by others has been referred to, it would naturally presuppose their being shed by another and necessitate the two statements being combined without further ado The only point to be settled then will be in regard to statements where only the shedding of the deeds is mentioned This will give rise to the question whether they are to be combined with the statements about upāyana But as shedding of the deeds can be explained by itself without bringing in their being obtained by others (where it is not stated) the Siddhānta would not be right. for to presume supplementary relation between statements from different Śākhās will be overstepping the limits[40]

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38 चतुर्ष्वपि कुशादिवाक्येषु वानस्पत्यछन्दस्तुत्युपगानशब्दानां सामान्यवाचितया, निर्विशेषस्य सामान्यस्यानीवत्वनानुष्ठातुमशक्यत्वात् तद्विशेषाणामाकाङ्क्षितानां समर्पणेन शाखान्तरस्थवाक्यानां 'औदुम्बर्यः कुशाः' इत्येवमादीनां 'तेजो वै घृतम्' इत्यादिवत् शेषत्वेऽपि इहादाहनोपायनवाक्यस्य शेषत्वे नियामकाभावेन दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभावानुपपत्तेः (*STC* ibid)

39 यत्त्वावनम्–उपायनवाक्यस्य हानवाक्यशेषतया समवल्या गतौ, न विकल्पो युक्त । तदुक्तं पूर्वस्मिन् काण्डे 'अपि तु वाक्यशेषः स्यात् अन्याय्यत्वाद्विकल्पस्य' इत्यादिना (R *Vedāntadīpa*) इत्यादि सूत्रान्त्यपदव्याख्यानम्, तदपि न समञ्जसम् । 'यजतिषु येयजामहं करोति, नानुयाजेषु' इति सन्निध्याम्नानात् तदेकदेशत्वनिश्चयेन प्रतीतैकवाक्यतानुरोधाय विकल्पानाश्रयणेऽपि इह सन्निध्याम्नानाभावेन विकल्पनिरासायोगात् (*STC* ibid)

40 केवलोपायनस्य हानसापेक्षत्वेन तत्समुच्चयस्य सिद्धतया संदेहाभावात् । तत्र केवलहानचिन्तनप्राप्तौ उपायनचिन्तनेन समुच्चीयते नवेति एतावदेव चिन्तनीयम् । तत्र हेत्वभावात् सिद्धान्तासिद्धिः, उपायनमन्तरेणापि हानसम्भवात् । शाखान्तरस्थविमोचनवाक्यस्य शेषता चातिरीत्यातिप्रसञ्जकत्वात् * * * (*STC*)

S. discusses an alternative interpretation of the words "Hānau tu". based on the root-meaning of the expression 'vidhūya' in the viṣaya-vākya: 'Aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpam' (*Chān. Up.* viii.13.1) in terms of the intransitive sense of 'trembling' and rejects it in favor of 'shedding completely'. After some discussion over the need to adopt a Lākṣaṇikārtha here, Vācaspati rejoins that a root can have more than one meaning and the root '*dhūñ*' is also found used in the sense of abandoning completely. As this is not a science of grammar or language, the whole 'Varṇakāntara' turning on this one point seems to be an exercise in futility (which R. has avoided).

As merits and demerits (*puṇyapāpa*) of the Jnānin referred to in Chāndogya and Maṇḍaka texts are not mūrtadravyas, they cannot be said to 'tremble'. To make sense out of 'Puṇyapāpe vidhūya' the Pūrvapakṣin too has to accept the figurative sense of shedding completely in the last analysis. In the circumstances, this Pūrvapakṣa cannot pretend to claim serious attention.

CHAPTER XL

MUKTAS ENGAGE IN KARMA ONLY AT THEIR CHOICE

18. *Chandādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.29-31)

This adhi. considers the question which arises incidentally[1] out of the previous topic whether the Mukta Jīvas continue to perform sacrifices and other karmas also. The question arises because the texts refer to such karmas being performed by the Muktas:

ऋचां त्वः पोषमास्ते पुपुष्वान् गायत्रं त्वो गायति शक्वरीषु ।
ब्रह्मा त्वो वदति जातविद्यां यज्ञस्य मात्रां विमिमीत उ त्वः ॥
(RV. X.71-11)

कृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोहैः (*Mbh.* XIII, 18, 16)

By way of answer, it is held that there is a fundamental difference between the continued performance of upāsanā in Mokṣa and the performance of karmas by the Muktas. The latter unlike the former are not constant and unremitting but are carried on just by the way and occasionally.

As the Pūrvapakṣa arises on the ground that like Upāsanā the performance of karma also, by the Muktas, must be deemed to be constant and invariable and as the performance of karma is shown to follow

1. उपासनावत्सततनियमाभावात् कर्माण्युपासनवत् मुक्तौ नियतमेवेति शङ्कनात् सङ्गतिः (Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali*)
प्रासङ्गिकत्वान्नाध्यायादिसङ्गतिः (J. *TP.* iii 3 29)
But read: एतच्च मुक्तोऽस्य स्वाधीनस्वेच्छयाचरणम् । यत्तत्तु प्रकृतस्य ज्ञानसाधनोपासनस्य प्रागविद्य-सिद्धपर्यन्तस्य अभ्यासादमसन्योऽप्यस्यत्वर्माव इति ध्येयम् (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 29)

a different course, this adhi. stands related to the previous one by way of noticing an exception to the rule.[2]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa contends: It has been shown in the preceding adhi. that upāsanā has to be carried on in the state of Samsāra as being valuable for its own sake (*nirupādhika*) and, therefore, with extreme zeal, ardor and constancy, as it continues in the released state also. Now, as Karma also is known to continue to be performed by Muktas (on good authority), it should also be held to be worthy of performance in the Samsāra state as being valuable in itself and for its own sake and with equal zeal and constancy. That would place Karma and upāsanā on an equal footing.[3] That would be against the ruling to be adopted in the next Pāda that Aparokṣajñāna produced by upāsanā excels karms in value and importance among Sādhanas.[4] The Pūrvapakṣa argues that in the matter of the conduct of Sādhanas, the only determining factors should be one's ability to carry out the particular Sādhana and an interest in the benefits accruing from it. Tho' Muktas, having already attained all their cherished desires, have no unfulfilled aspirations, yet it is reasonable to suppose that as in the case of those who have acquired the highest illumination still continuing their upāsanā out of their own free will and at their own pleasure, these Muktas may continue to perform various karmas also as worship of B. being quite competent to do so. It it is to be supposed that they do not carry on karmas in Mokṣa in spite of their competency to carry them on, there is no reason to hold that they continue their upāsanās either.[5] Moreover, if Muktas have no competency to do karmas, want of such competency would make a mockery of their freedom (*muktatva*).

Nor can it be argued that as the different types of karmas like *kāmya, nitya* and *naimittika* and others which help the performer to get over certain lingering obstacles entail bondage thro' their performance and involve a person in sin in the event of their non-performance and as the Muktas have no reason to engage in any of the above mentioned types of karma, there is no scope for associating with them any

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2 तेन पूर्वसिद्धान्तन्यायेनेह पूर्वपक्षोत्थानादापवादिकयवान्तरसगतिरपि सूचिता (Ragh. *TPB.* iii, 3, 29)

3 यदुक्त मुक्तावुपासस्यानुवर्तमानत्वात् ससारदशाया अत्यादेरण निरुपाधिकमेव तत्कर्तव्यमिति, कर्मणामपि मुक्तावनुवतमानत्वात् तदप्यादरेणैव कर्तव्यमिति प्राप्त्या, उपासनस्य कर्मणोऽतिशयाभावप्रसगात् (*STC.* iii 3 29)

4 न चेष्टापत्ति । उपासनासाध्यज्ञानस्य कर्मतोऽतिशयस्य चतुर्थे वर्णनानुपपत्ते (*STC.* iii 3 29)

5 साधनानुष्ठाने हि तज्जन्यफलार्थित्वे सति शक्तत्व प्रयोजकम् । मुक्ताना च प्राप्तफलत्वेनार्थित्वाभावेऽपि सिद्धवैदुष्याणा स्वेच्छयोपासनानुष्ठानवत् कर्मकरणेऽपि शक्तिसद्भावात् कर्मणो भगवत्पूजारूपत्वाच्चानुष्ठानसद्भावात् कर्मापि नियमेन कुर्वन्त्येव, अन्यथा उपासनमपि नियमेन न कुर्यु अविशेषादिति (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)

performance of karma in Mokṣa. For this question of their liability to incur bondage by perforance of karma or suffer sin in the event of non-performance of karmas can arise only when the Muktas are bound by a mandate to carry on karmas. But as by hypothesis the Muktas have been held to carry on karmas at their own choice and pleasure and without compulsion from any suarter, the possibility of bondage and sin is ruled out. The presence of Samskāras will suffice to explain the performance of karmas,[6] as a matter of course. And so far as we can see, there is nothing to show that while thus carrying on karmas in Mokṣa, the Muktas do so with less constancy and regularity than their upāsanās.[7]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is this : True, the performance of karma by the muktas is itself in the nature of a worship of B. And they are of course quite competent to perform whatever karmas they wish to. But their constant performance as a rule is determined by some other factors such as their being enjoined or the vulnerability to sin (*pratyavāya*) in the event of non-performance and the fruits associated with the permance *not* being already attained. These conditions do not apply to the Muktas who are Āptakāmas and are outside the jurisdiction of mandates. For this reason, they do not engage in the performance of karmas as a matter of necessity or invariably but only sometimes, as a worship of B. thro' the influence of Samskāras acquired thro' their performance in the Samsāra state.[8] As for upāsanā, they continue to carry it on as before with unbroken regularity.[9] For the Samskāras pertaining to karma and upāsanās differ in their complexion, intensiveness, and quality. In regard to upāsanās there is, for example, the strict requirement in the Śāstras that no Sādhaka shall remain for a moment without going thro' *śravaṇa manana*, etc. But there is no such rule in regard to karmas. Unlike karma, upāsanā partakes of the nature of Jñāna and is an expression of the intrinsic nature of sentiency of

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6 न च शास्त्रनित्यनैमित्तिककर्तव्यतारूपाणां बन्धप्रत्यवायापादकत्वात्, कारणाभावाच्चासम्भवत्क्रियात्वान्न मुक्तास्तानि कुर्वन्तीति वाच्यम्। विधिवद्धत्वेन तत्करणे हि बन्धप्रत्यवायापत्तिः, न तु स्वेच्छयैव करणे। संस्कारस्य कारणसद्भावाच्च, संस्कारस्यावश्यम्भावीकार्यत्वाच्च (*STC.* iii.3.29)

7. न च कर्माणि कुर्वन्तोऽपि उपासनावन्नियमेन कुर्वन्तीत्यत्र विशेषहेतुरस्तीति पूर्वपक्ष (*STC*)

8 सिद्धान्तस्तु—कर्मणो भगवत्पूजात्मकत्वेऽपि मुक्तानां तदनुष्ठानशक्तत्वेऽपि न तावन्मात्रं नियमेनानुष्ठाने हेतुः ; किन्तु विहितत्वमकरणे प्रत्यवायवत्त्वं, अप्राप्तफलत्वं च। न चैतत्सर्वं मुक्तानामपि। मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थत्वप्रसङ्गेन विध्यादेरभावात् प्राप्तफलत्वाच्च तेषाम्। अतो न नियमेन कर्म कुर्वन्ति किन्तु भगवत्पूजात्वात् पूर्वानुष्ठानवासनाबलाच्च कदाचिदेव कुर्वन्ति (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)

9. उपासनं तु पूर्वनियमेनाविच्छिन्नानुष्ठानेन तदुपासनस्यापि नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वान्नित्यं ध्यायन्ति केशवम्' इत्यादिस्मृतेरपि (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)

the self. The intensive mental impressions (*saṃskāras*) of constant upāsanā in the Samsāra state pave the way for the full manifestation of the intrinsic Saṃskāras of the Muktas in repect of Upāsana. Thus altho' there is continuation of both Upāsanā and karma in Mokṣa, only the former is carried on constantly and invariably as a rule while the karmas are carried on only sometimes.[10]

Vādirāja makes a significant observation in this consection. Knowledge instrinsic is the essence of Jīvas and it becomes fully manifested in Mokṣa. Hence, there is full scope for constant upāsanā there. But for the manifestation of this intrinsic knowledge to ts fullest extent, the Muktas will cease to be sentients (*cetanas*). Tho' *kriyāśakti* or power of activity is also an intrinsic property of the self, very often it remains in a latent condition and becomes fully operative only at times—as for example the activity of B. in the creation of the world. This explains the constancy of Upāsanā is Mokṣa and absence of constancy in the performance of karmas by the released souls.[11]

Ragh. (*TPB*) points out that tho' the subject of performance of karma by the Mukta Jīvas belongs to Adhy. IV. it has been raised here in the Sādhana Adhyāya as the purpose of the discussion here is to justify the superior role and importance of upāsanā in the Samsāra level as against the performance of karma.[12]

The next Sūtra: *Gater arthavattvam ubhayathā anyathā hi virodhaḥ* (iii.3.30) explains why it is necessary to admit that the Muktas are completely outside the scope of injunctions to perform karmas and are not exposed to sin on account of non-performance of karma. The goal of Mokṣa (*gati*) will be meaningful (*arthavat*) only when the Mukta is not bound by injunctions to perform karma and is not liable to incur sin (*pratyavāya*) in the event of non-performance of karma. Without these conditions being fulfilled, the state of Mokṣa

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10 यद्यपि संस्कारमात्रमस्ति, तथापि न तादृश नियमसाधक किंतु संस्कारपाटव ज्ञानस्वरूपत्व च। नहि तथा संस्कार-पाटवमस्ति यथोपासने 'श्रवणादि विना न क्षणमप्यवस्थाननिषेधस्येव कर्मणा विना; तदभावात्। यद्यपि संसारदशायामनवरतश्रवणाज्जात: पटुतरसंस्कारो मुक्तौ नास्ति, तथापि प्रागापादितपटुतरसंस्कारेणैव मुक्तावपि स्वरूपसंस्कार पटुरेवाभिव्यज्यते उपासनांशे। न तथा कर्मांश, इति कारणाभाव. सिद्ध । उपासनस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वान्नियमेन करण युक्त, कर्मणस्तु तयोरभावात् वैपरीत्यम्। तथाच, कर्मोपासनयो. मुक्तावनुवृत्ति साम्येऽपि नियत्यनियतिभ्या विशेषोपपत्तेरुक्त युक्तमिति (*STC.* iii 3 29-31)

11 'नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात्' इत्यत्र नित्यमभिव्यक्तज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात् (इत्यर्थ) ज्ञानाभिव्यक्त्यभावे चेतनत्वमेव न स्यात्। क्रिया तु बहुश शक्त्यात्मना तिष्ठति। कदाचित् व्यक्त्यात्मना, ईश्वरसृष्ट्यादिक्रियावत्। अतो ज्ञानरूपेण मन्त्रेव सदास्ति। न तु क्रियेति भाव (Vādirāja *TPG*, p. 152)

12 एतेन मुक्तप्रकृतिचिन्तारूपत्वात् चतुर्थे निवेश स्यादिति निरस्तम्। फलतस्तु प्रकृतस्य ज्ञानसाधनोपासनस्य प्रागाधिक्यसिद्धयर्थत्वात्, अध्यायपादयोरप्यस्त्यन्तर्भाव इति ध्येयम्। भोक्त्रापत्तेरित्यस्यैव फलतोऽत्र निवेशोपपत्ते (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3 29). See also Vol. I, pp. 357-58).

would be indistinguishable from Samsāra, where he is bound by karmic injunctions and exposed to risks It is futile to expect the state of Mokṣa to be meaningful in the face of such drawbacks or expect it to be distinguished from Samsāra as a state where the joy of selfhood is manifested to the fullest extent. For, it will be meaningless to talk of Mokṣa as a state of manifestation of the unalloyed bliss of selfhood so long as one is bound by the mandate of karma and is liable to pratyavāya in the event of not obeying the mandate [13]

बन्धप्रत्यवाययोरभावे हि मोक्षस्यार्थवत्त्वम् । अन्यथा, मोक्षत्वमेव न स्यात् ॥
(M BSB iii 3 30)

The last Sūtra answers another objection that the absence of liability to injunctions to perform karmas and of vulnerability to sin make it merely probable that Muktas do not have to perform karmas as a rule But they are not sufficient reasons to accept it as a *proved fact* For, in spite of being free from these limitations, the creative activity of B in respect of the world goes on as a rule [14] This is answered by pointing out that it is eminently reasonable to hold that Muktas do sometimes perform *karmas* and *sometimes do not* For they have attained Mokṣa which is the ultimate fruit of karma *thro' Jnāna.* Results attained dispense with the means thereafter [15] If then the Muktas do sometimes perform karmas it must be treated as entirely voluntary—like the performance of the rite of Viṣnukramana even after the sacrifice has been completed with its performance [16] Thus tho' upāsanā and karma are both continued in Mokṣa by the released souls, only the former is carried on constantly and the latter only sometimes and at their choice The conclusion reached in the preceding *adhi* that in its own right upāsanā is to be carried on as its own reward in the Samsāra state also with great ardor is not affected by the place given to karma in the lives of Jivas both before and after release

Śamkara's Interpretation

Sāmparāyādhikaranam (iii 3 27-28)

According to S this adhi consists of two Sūtras as above It considers the question whether the discarding of good and evil by the knower of B takes place at the time of his death or on his (mid)-way

13 न च वैलक्षण्यान्तरेण मोक्षापत्तिः । संसारमध्यमात्र तद्वैलक्षण्यस्य व्याहतत्वात् (*TP* iii 3 30)

14 ननु, विध्याद्यभावो मुक्तानां कर्मनियमसम्भावनार्थैव भवति नात्यापादनाय ईश्वरकर्मणि व्यभिचारात्

15 कदाचित् कर्म कुर्वन्ति कदाचिन्नेति । अथ भाव मुक्तानामुपपन्न एव । परम्परया कर्मफलस्य मोक्षस्य प्राप्तत्वात् फलस्य स्वप्राप्त्यनन्तरं स्वसाधननियमनिवारणलक्षणत्वात् (ibid)

16 यथा याज्ञ विध्यर्थत्वेन विष्णुक्रमणादिकं कृत्वा समाप्तकर्मा इच्छया करोति न करोति च

(M BSB iii 3 31)

to Brahmaloka, thro' Devayāna. The Pūrvapakṣa holds on the basis of the text of the *Kauṣ. Up.* (i.3-4) which describes the onward travel of the knower along Devayāna. The text says "he goes thro' the world of Agni, Varuṇa, Sūrya, etc. and finally to the world of Brahmā who is seated on a couch called Amitaujas." The welcome at the entrance to Brahmaloka that awaits him is given in colorful details. "He comes to the lake Āra and crosses it by the mind. He comes to the river Virajā which he crosses by the mind. Then he shakes off his good and bad deeds—his dear ones inherit the former and his adversaries his bad".[17]

On the basis of this text, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the knower of B. casts off good and bad *only on the way to Brahmaloka* and not at the time of his death. For the pronoun *'tat'* preceding the words *Sukrtaduṣkrte vidhūnute*" used in the sense of "thereby" (*tasmāt*) shows that only by crossing the Virajā is he able to cast off his deeds and not before, at the time of his death. The crossing of the Virajā-nadī is the cause of the casting off of the deeds.[18] We cannot say the casting off of the deeds takes place earlier at death on account of the power of the Vidyā (knowledge) (i) on the ground that Śāṭyāyanins and the Tāṇḍyas speak of the event as taking place earlier (*Chān. Up.* viii.13.1) or (ii) because the sense order of a passage has the right of superseding the word-order where there is a difficulty in accepting the latter as in *'Agnihotram juhoti, yavāgūm pacati.'* For, in the present case, it is not only the text order that places the shedding of the deeds after the crossing of the river Virajā.[19] There is, in addition, the clear statement of the Śruti which conveys thro' the pronoun *'tat'* which refers to its antecedent viz. the crossing of the river as that which causes the knower to cast away his good and bad deeds.[20] *It is in deference to* this that the Chāndogya text makes the general statement placing the casting off of the deeds before the attainment of Brahmaloka and not specifically earlier still at the time of the knower's death. It will not, therefore, contradict the Chāndogya text in any way, if we accept that

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17. स एत देवयान पन्थानमासाद्य * * * (*Kaus. Up.* 1 3) * * * स आगच्छति विरजां नदीं ता मनसैवात्येति तत्सुकृतदुष्कृते धूनुते तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातय सुकृतमुपयन्त्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम् (*Op. cit.* i 4)

18 नैतत्पाठक्रममात्रमपि तु श्रुति सुकृतदुष्कृते विधूनुत इति। तदिति सर्वनाम तस्मादर्थे सन्निहितपरामर्शक तस्य हेतुत्वमाह। सन्निहित च यदनन्तर श्रुत तच्चार्धपथवर्ति विरजानदीमनोऽभिगमनमित्यर्धपथ एव सुकृतदुष्कृत-त्याग· (*Bhāmati* iii 3 27)

19 Evidently the name 'Virajā' is an *anvarthasaṁjñā* in this sense. Cf. 'प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधि '

20 न पाठक्रममात्रमत्र तदिति सर्वनामश्रुत्या सन्निहितपरामर्शादित्युक्तम् (*ibid*)

the deeds are shed while the Jñānin is actually on his way to Brahma loka *after* his death[21]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is —

प्रधाना प्रकृता विद्यां परामृशति तच्छ्रुतिः ।
अर्थात् पाठाच्च बाध्येत यवागूपाकहोमवत् ॥

The casting off of the deeds must be placed at the time of death itself. For, the knower of B can obtain B only after he has been cleansed of all his impurities by the power of the knowledge which enables him to go by Devayāna to attain B The journey thro' Devayāna is thus impossible without the destruction of impurities, just as Agnihotra cannot be performed without first cooking the gruel We learn from the Śruti that the Vidyā is the means of attaining B in the Paryanka, when practised with the help of yama, niyama and other disciplines And it is only Vidya that can arm him with the power to liquidate his impurities and send him speeding on the path of Devayāna How then is it possible for the destruction of impurities to occur while he has already lost his physical body—with those help alone he could practise the disciplines, and is already half way thro' to Brahmaloka? We have, therefore, to reject the text order of the Kauṣitaki and give preference to the sense order and accept the position that the casting off of the good and bad deeds by the Jñānin takes place at the time of his death only[22] The pronoun *tat* merely helps to put us in mind of what has been said earlier This applies as much to the Vidyā as to the crossing of the river The express statement is thus in favor of the Siddhanta position too[23] What remains to be taken into account is

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21 न च श्रुत्यन्तरविरोध । अर्धपथेऽपि पापविधूननं ब्रह्मलोकगमनवत् प्राक्कालतामापन्नं । एवं शाट्यायनिनामप्यविरोध । नहि तत्र जीवन्निति वा जातः इति वा श्रुतम् । तथाचाध्वन्य एव सुकृतदुष्कृतत्याग इति पूर्वपक्ष
(*Bhamati* iii 3 27)

22 यद्यप्यस्तु–विद्यासामर्थ्यविधूतकल्मषस्य तावत्तु उत्तरेण पथा गत्वा ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः । न चाप्रक्षीणकल्मषस्य उत्तरमार्गगमनं सम्भवति यथा यवागूपाकात् प्रागग्निहोत्रम् । यमनियमाद्यनुष्ठानसहिताया विद्याया उत्तरेण मार्गेण पर्यङ्कस्थब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायत्वश्रवणात् अप्रक्षीणकल्मषस्य तदनुपपत्तेः विद्यैव तावत् कल्मषं क्षपयति । क्षपितकल्मषं चोत्तरमार्गं प्रापयति इति [illegible] ? तस्मात् पाठक्रमबाधनायार्थक्रमानुसरणम्
(*Bhāmatī*)

23 (तस्मिन्निति सप्तम्या [illegible]) [illegible] । बुद्धिसन्निधानमात्रमत्रापेक्ष्यते नार्थः । तस्मात् [illegible] विद्याप्रकरणात् विद्याया अपि समाना श्रुतिः [illegible] । [illegible] न च [illegible] पूर्वपक्षः । अत एव रागाणि विधूय इति हि स्वतन्त्रस्य पुरुषस्य व्यापार [illegible] । न च [illegible] स्वातन्त्र्यम् । तस्मात् [illegible] (*Bhamati* iii 3 27)
The *Kalpataru* says there is no substance in the contention that the pronoun *tat* refers to the crossing of Viraja as the antecedent. A pronoun as a rule refers to the first or chief antecedent in the context, which in this case is the Vidyā and not the crossing of Viraja to which reference is made subsequently

the sense vs. the text-order. For reasons given, the latter is weaker and has to be rejected. The contradiction with the Chāndogya text cannot be got over by the Pūrvapakṣin, as it says the knower shakes off his body as the horse shakes his hairs. This calls for effort on the part of an independent person. A dead person cannot exercise such effort. The contradiction is, therefore, insurmountable.

Criticism

As the subject of destruction of good and bad deeds of the Jñānin forms part of his deliverance, its proper place of discussion will be in the next Adhyāya. It is not relevant to this Adhyāya and the theme of this Pāda which, according to S., is the question of unity or difference of Vidyās.

The *Kalpataru* has come forward with an explanation. The Upasamhāra of the inheriting of the good and bad deeds cast off by the Jñānin by others had been approved in the previous *adhi. taking it for granted* that knowledge of B. has the power to destroy his karma and make it infructuous. The present *adhi.* arises by way of meeting an objection to this that it is not right to presume that Nirguṇa-Vidyā has any such power of destroying the Jñānin's karma as this destruction is reported to take place on his way to Mokṣa *after* his death which cannot, therefore, be attributed to the power of his Vidyā. Hence the discussion of this topic *here.*[24]

The question of the Upasamhāra of the circumstance of others *inheriting the karmas shed by the Jñānin can be discussed apart from* and without reference to the other question whether his casting off the deeds is accomplished by the power of Vidyā or on account of the crossing of Virajā. The two issues have no necessary connection. The desrtuction of karma on the Jñānin's way to Brahmaloka as reported in *Kauṣ. Up.* is not beyond the power of Jñāna. The cause does not cease to be so if it takes its own time to act, in some cases. The pronoun *tat* can accordingly be understood to say that the destruction of karma is posterior to the crossing the Virajā (*tadanantaram*) and not necessarily its effect and without prejudice to its being the effect of Vidyā. Reference to its posteriority of occurrence can be explained as intended to indicate the temporal sequence in the effects of Vidyā. Vidyā or Jñāna produces its effects right from its birth. These include all such interim effects as are produced till the final attainment of the

24 सिद्ध कृत्वा विद्याया कर्मक्षयहेतुत्व हानसन्निधावुपायनोपसहार उक्त । इदानी तदेवासिद्ध मार्गमध्ये श्रूयमाणस्य कर्मक्षयस्य विद्याहेतुकत्वाभावादित्याशक्यते (*Kalpataru* iii 3 27)

Paryankastha-B , in this case This has to be conceded, as elsewhere in the *Mund Up* (1 2 6) we hear the Jñānin's entering the rays of the Sun on his way to Brahmaloka

The objection itself is thus unwarranted and the manner of its refutation is untenable For the assumption of S and Vācaspati that there is no going by the Devayāna without prior destruction of karmas is not well-founded Otherwise, as his good works have been shed, the Jñānin's going to Agniloka and Virajānadi, which can be done only with the aid of good works, cannot be accounted for The Śruti

प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधि.

clearly shows that the residue of Prārabdhakarma gets liquidated only after crossing the Virajā and continues to accompany the Jñānin till then on his onward journey to Brahmaloka thro' Devayāna If it is conceded that the destruction of karma by Vidyā is a phased one and does not take place all at once and completely, there is no difficulty in allowing that the Jñānin travels by Devayāna even while his Prārabdhakarma has not been *completely* destroyed. The *Kalpataru's* argument that the pronoun *tat* cannot refer to the crossing of Virajā as its antecedent, as it is only a subject of minor interest in the passage, whose chief interest is the Vidyā, is not conclusive In B S 1 1 2 the pronoun *asya* is taken to refer to the 'world' which has *not* been referred to at all in the previous Sūtra Still, it is somehow admitted to be at the back of the mind and, therefore, contextual and is taken to be referred to by the pronoun *asya* If this is permissible, why should we shy at allowing that the pronoun *tat* here can readily be taken to refer to what has been *expressly stated* in the Upaniṣadic text of the Kauṣitakins immediately *before* the reference to the destruction of the Jñānin's karma—viz. the crossing of Virajā *Sa āgacchati virajām nadīm tām manasaivātyeti tat sukṛtaduṣkṛte dhūnute* (1 4)

S's Sūtrārtha Examined

For these reasons, we cannot accept S's way of interpreting the opening Sūtra that the Jñānin frees himself from his works at the time of departing (and not later) as "there is nothing to be gained by him on the way to Brahmaloka, thro' these works" For, we have seen there is the interim purpose of crossing the Virajā to be still served by the merit of his good deeds In view of this, the other text *Vidhūya pāpam* has to be taken only in a partial sense He interprets the next Sūtra to state that only on his interpretation there is free scope for the Jñānin to practise, *according to his likes*,[25] the disciplines of yama,

25 *Chandatah* For R's interpretation of this term see later

niyama, etc. to free himself from the deeds by achieving their destruction.

It is difficult to see the interconnection between the first and the second Sūtras in this interpretation. If it is in the nature of a fresh criticism of the Pūrvapakṣa we should expect to find a conjunctive *ca* here. If it is felt that the previous Sūtra has urged that there is no vantage to the Pūrvapakṣa in holding that karmas persist without destruction till the crossing of Virajā and that this Sūtra goes on to show that there is a real difficulty in holding that they so persist, we fail to see any such difficulty. Nor has any been pointed out. We cannot agree that there is no competent cause that could destroy such karma. For the surviving karma can as well be destroyed on the way by the power of Jñāna itself,—the crossing of Virajā not being associated with this destruction—it being, in S.'s opinion, a mere detail having nothing to do with the destruction of karma.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

While agreeing with the pattern of S.'s interpretation of the first Sūtra, R. differs from him in treating the four succeeding Sūtras (28-31)[26] *also as constituting* the Sāmparāyādhi.

His interpretation of the second Sūtra (28) calls for comment. To him it means that in as much as it is a settled fact that karmas are completely destroyed at the time of death, out of deference to the two Śrutis: *Aśva iva romāṇi vidhūya pāpam dhūtvā śarīram* (*Chān. Up.* viii.13.1) and *Tasya tāvad eva ciram* (vi.14.2), the concluding part of the offending Kauṣītaki passage 'He sheds his good and bad deeds' (Kauṣ i.4) *found at the tail-end of the statement* 'He comes to Virajā river and crosses it by the mind' should be *transferred* from its existing position at the tail-end to *'Sa āgacchati virajām nadīm'* and *placed and read before the very commencement of the previous section* (1.3) so as to precede the words there : 'Having entered this path of the gods (Devayāna) he comes to the world of Agni' (1.3).

If we are to insist upon the line *Tat sukṛtaduṣkṛte dhūnute* being *bodily lifted* from its existing position and transferred to a *particular place, elsewhere,* for whatever reason, following R., the Sūtrakāra's use of the term *chandataḥ* would be, to say the least, pointless, misleading and unhappy, when he is expected to be most precise (*asandigdham*) in the choice and use of his words!

26 Sūtra 31 (*Yāvadadhikāram*) of R. is read by S. and M. after *Aniyamas sarvesām* and treated as a fresh adhi.

R treats the Sūtra *Gater arthavattvam ubhayathā* * * * (iii 3 21) as raising a further objection on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa and the next one as answering it and the last one as disposing of a supplementary question arising out of the answer But Sutra 29 of R has the ring of a Siddhānta Sūtra of a fresh *adhi* Its interpretation by R as part of the Sāmparāyādhi leads to lakṣanā being put upon several of the words thereof

R. brings in a *suksmasarira* to account for the journey thro' Devayāna after the destruction of all Karma at death The Sūkṣmasarira we are told manages to survive even after the complete destruction of the karmas by which it has been formed and the power of Vidyā enables it to carry the Jñānin along the Devayāna If the power of Vidyā can do that, it can also carry the Jñānin thro' Devayāna with a residue of karma to be finally destroyed after crossing Virajā It is not clear if R is inclined to treat this Sūkṣmasarīra itself as *akarmalabhya* His reference to actual Muktas being in a position to have bodies not formed by karma[27] does not help us much in *this context*—as all bodies of Jivas *prior* to Mokṣa have to be Karma formed If the Sūkṣmasarīra should, however, be 'akarmalabhya', the Jñānin should be able to pass on to the final state of Mokṣa too *in it*—in which case, there will be no point in the Śruti referring to the Mukta's "rising from his body and manifesting himself *in his own form*" (*Chān Up* viii 12 3)

Instead of all these needless assumptions, it would be much simpler and better to accept the position, attested by sound authority that the complete destruction of the last vestiges of Prārabdhakarma of the Jñānin and the final dissolution of his Lingasarira take place only after the crossing of Virajā by the power of Vidyā

Śamkara's Interpretation

Gater arthavattvādhikaranam (iii 3 29 30)

According to S this adhi considers whether there is to be Upasamhāra of the journey after death along Devayāna (which is mentioned in some places as following the discarding of good and bad deeds by the Jñānin) in all Vidyās, just as there is such Upasamhāra of the circumstance of the inheriting of his good and bad by others in all Vidyās where their abandonment by him has alone been expressly mentioned.[28] The Purvapakṣa is that in all Vidyās there should be

27 उत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वम् तदधीनम् । परंज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते इत्यादिषु सत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यर्थो ह्युपलभ्यते (*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 30)

28 क्वचित् पुण्यपापहानसंनिधौ देवयानः पन्थाः श्रूयते, क्वचिन्न। तत्र संशयः — किं हानावविशेषेणैव देवयानः पन्था भवितव्य उत विभागेन क्वचिद्भवति क्वचिन्नेति (S *BSB* iii 3 29)

such Upasamhāra of the Devayānagati It cannot be said that there is no scope for such Upasamhāra in the Nirgunavidyā such as in *Mund. Up* (iii 1 3) where the knower of B is said to attain the highest unity directly after shedding his good and bad. For even here, it can be held that the knower who has cast off the deeds attains highest unity with the pure B when he has reached Brahmaloka thro' the path of Devayāna

The Siddhānta is that the journey thro' Devayāna should be understood to apply in some cases and inapplicable to some other cases, so as to be meaningful It should not be extended indiscriminately to all Vidyās It will be meaningless if extended to the Nirguna Vidyā described in *Muṇḍ Up* For how can the knower of B described here as free from all desires and, therefore, non-moving go to another place? For in his case the highest unity is attained here and now, where he is and not by his transporting himself to another land[29]

The second Sūtra goes on to show that the journey thro' Devayāna is applicable to Saguna Vidyās like the Paryankavidyā in the *Kausītakī Up* where certain tangible results which can be attained only by going to different places are described To reach a village one may have to go by the path which leads to it but not to get rid of an illness and regain health[30]

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here, if the inquiry is mooted recognizing the Saguna *and* Nirguna *Vidyās to* be identical or holding them to be different In the former case, there can be no identity of Vidyās without the upasamhāra of one another's attributes and the question cannot arise It would also be self-contradictory to accept the identity of Saguna and Nirguna Vidyās, after dubbing them as Saguna and Nirguna If their difference is admitted the inquiry will have to be confined to Saguna Vidyās only, as it will be out of place in the Nirguna However, it has already been decided in the third *adhi* (iii 3 6 8) that there is no mutual Upasamhāra in Sagunavidyās *where the details differ* and no further doubt can arise on the point

Apart from this, there is no harm in recognizing that the knowledge of B after it is born, leads to B having due regard to time and place, like sacrifices leading to Svarga What harm is there in admitting that

29 गतेर्देवयानस्य पथोऽर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा विभागेन भवितुमर्हति । क्वचिदर्थवती गतिः क्वचिन्नेति । नाविशेषेण अन्यथा विरोधः (S *BSB* ibid)

30 लोकवच्चैष विभागः यथा ग्रामप्राप्तौ देशान्तरप्रापणः पन्था अपेक्ष्यते नारोग्यप्राप्तौ (S *BSB* iii 3 30)

even the knowledge produced by Nırgunavıdya leads to B by takıng the Jñānı to Brahmaloka thro' Devayāna? Why should the journey thro' Devayāna be dismissed as useless in his case and why should an exception be made in the case of the knower of B thro' Sagunavıdyā, seeing that his karmas also are admitted to be completely destroyed at death before he is on the journey thro' Devayāna, as established in the Hānyadhı (ııı 3 27-28)?

The Sūtrakāra says in his forthright manner that "Gatı is *purposeful both ways*" S *dilutes* it by putting in that it is *purposeful* in respect of knowers of Sagunavıdya and *purposeless* in the case of the knower of Nırgunavıdyā! If the Sūtrakāra had been thinking on S's lines, he should have used the correct expression *Gater arthavattam anyatarasmın (pakṣe)* As the *Mund Up* text (ııı 1 3) contains no open denial of the knower of B going to the world of Agnı etc along the Devayāna, it does not involve any conflict with the Gatısrutı as S asserts As for his comment on the term *lakavat* (ııı 3 30), suffice it to say that a change of place and environment may be absolutely necessary in some cases, to get back one's health

CHAPTER XLI

ALL APAROKṢAJÑĀNINS ATTAIN MOKṢA

19. *Aniyamādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.32)

In the interests of inspiring all Adhikārins to take to upāsanā with confidence, zeal and earnestness, this adhi. establishes that *Mokṣa is open to all Aparokṣajnānins without restriction.*[1] It arises by way of disposing of an objection based on the conclusion reached in the earlier adhikaraṇa that just as Guṇopasamhāra is hemmed in by restrictions of Yogyatā of Adhikārins in respect of certain attributes and forms of upāsanā, even among those who have attained Aparokṣajñāna some may not be entitled to attain Mokṣa either *for want of Yogyatā or because they have no desire for it.* The existence of some Jnānins of the latter category is seen from the sentiments expressed by the four Kumāras in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*[2] (iii.16.49). The Pūrvapakṣa argues on these lines and holds that, in the circumstances, it is not possible for Upāsakas to enter upon their upāsanā without misgivings and hesitation.

The Siddhānta is that all Aparokṣajnānins are fit for and entitled to attain Mokṣa, conferred by B. thro' its grace.[3] For, the final cause of Mokṣa is the graciousness of B. in removing the veils of Svabhāvājñāna and B.'s grace stands promised to the Aparokṣajnānin.[4] The

1. उपासने निःशक्यप्रवृत्त्यभावप्रसंगात् ईश्वरदर्शनसाधनोपास्तिमतामुत्पन्नज्ञानानां मोक्षनियमः समर्थनीयः (*TP.* iii 3 32)
2. कामं भवेम वृजिनैर्निरयेषु नष्टाः चेतोऽलिवद्यदि नु ते पदयो रमेत (*Bhāg.* iii 16 49)
3. ज्ञानिनां मोक्षं ददात्येवेश्वरः, स्वभावात् (*NV.* iii 3 *adhi* 19)
4. प्रियो हि ज्ञानिनोऽत्यर्थमहं स च मम प्रियः. (*Gitā* vii 17)

question of some Aparokṣajñānins being unfit for Mokṣa does not arise at all, for the simple reason that *persons unfit for Mokṣa will never attain Aparokṣajñāna*[5] While there is statutory restriction in the matter of upasamhāra of certain attributes by some Upāsakas based on Yogayatā, there is no such restriction or prohibition standing in the way of all Aparokṣajñānins being admitted to Mokṣa and attaining it This is attested by Śruti and inference[6] The passage quoted from the *Bhāgavata* for the Pūrvapakṣa is in reality meant to highlight the point that the highest type of Jñānins attach the greatest value of Bhakti alone, even in the state of Mokṣa The term "gateh" follows by anuvṛtti from Sūtra 30 The use of the expression 'no restriction' (*aniyamah*) in the Sūtra is to contrast the position of 'Aparokṣajñānin' in attaining Mokṣa with the restrictions imposed by Yogyatā on the part of 'upāsakas' in the matter of upasamhāra of attributes[7] As the impact of the question raised by the adhi falls on upāsanā in the first place, it is discussed in *this Pāda* rather than in the next.[8] As the Chandādhi. and Hānyadhi are concerned with incidental inquiries, the thematic nexus of this adhi. with adhi 16 is not affected.[9]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S having shown in the preceding adhi that the journey thro' Devayāna holds good in the case of Saguna Vidyās alone and not of Nirguna Vidyās, the Sūtrakāra now turns to discuss the question if a similar distinction will hold good among the different Saguna vidyās also—the Devayānagati being present in all of them or found only in some of them

The present adhi accordingly discusses whether the journey thro' Devayāna is restricted to the Pañcāgnividyā, the Paryankavidyā and others where it is mentioned or is to be understood by way of upasamhāra in the case of others like the Madhu, Śāndilya and Ṣoḍaśakalā where it is *not* mentioned.

The Pūrvapakṣa is for confining Devayānagati to those Vidyās where it is actually mentioned in view of the limitative force of the Prakaraṇa. Otherwise, the authority of Śruti will be violated and any-

5 अयोग्यानां ज्ञानमेवात्र [illegible] (*NV*)
6 अविरोधः शब्दानुमानाभ्याम् (*BS* iii 3 32)
7 [illegible] नियम इत्युक्तिः । [illegible] नियम [illegible] (*TDP* iii 3 32)
8. [illegible] नियमः स्यादिति पूर्वोक्तः (Ragh. *TPB*)
9 पूर्वं [illegible] (Ragh. *Bhy Muktāvalī*)
10 [illegible]
(*Kalpataru* iii 3 31)

thing will become true of anything else If the 'Gati' is to be made applicable to other Vidyās, the repetition of the reference to gati in both the Pañcāgnividyā and Upakosalavidyā would lose its point

The Siddhānta is that Devayānagati should be connected equally with all the Saguna Vidyās For we see that the Śrutis "those who know this (*Chān. Up* v 10 1) i e the Pañcāgnividyā proceed on the path of the gods" and "those who in the forest follow faith and austerities" have in mind practitioners of other Vidyās[11] This receives confirmation from *Brh Up* vi 2 15 which refers to those who worship in the forest, faith and satyam (Brahman) The Prakarana is thus to be overridden by the superior validity of statements contained in the Śruti and Smrti The Smrti in support of the Siddhānta is *Gītā* viii 2,6 referring to the white and the black paths—the former being the one of no return

Criticism

The proposed inquiry is unnecessary as the principle of extension of the Prayāja and other angas of the Darśapūrnamāsa to its ectyes is established in the 'Pūrvatantra' (Mīmāmsā) and it will apply to the present problem Tho' there is no 'Prakrtivikrtibhāva' between these vidyās to justify the extension of upasamhāra of Devayānagati from one to all, it can be done on the basis of similarity of Codanā, and agreement in respect of several angas It is not necessary to have an express directive in support of such upasamhāra in such cases Otherwise, the upasamhāra of *ānanda* and other attributes of B in all Nirguna vidyās cannot be sustained The Pūrvapaksa is thus too weak to be thought of The reference to B as Satyam in the *Brh Up* text vi 2 15, quoted in favor of the Siddhānta view turns the tables against it by establishing the connection of Gati with Nirgunavidyā as well—thereby doing away with the baseless distinction between the socalled Nirguna and Saguna vidyās

It is difficult to see the logic behind the distinction of vidyās into Saguna and Nirguna One may ask if there is return from Brahmaloka after the Upāsaka has attained the fruit of Saguna Vidyā. An affirmative answer would run counter to the pronouncement in the Gītā (viii 16) If the answer is in the negative, why should the Sagunavidyā alone be associated with the journey thro' Devayāna when the fruit of Nirgunavidyā viz the attainment of Paramasāmya is also attained without involving a return If there is no return in Sagunavidyā

11 इह श्रद्धातपोभ्या विद्यान्तरोपलक्षणम (S *BSB* iii 3 31)

also what is the point of the distinction made in the Gita when the fruit of no return is authoritatively linked with Devayānagati

The difficulty cannot be resolved by theorizing that the fruit of no return is two-fold—one attainable by Saguṇa Vidyā and another by Nirguna Vidyā and that the present adhi is concerned with the former type This distinction itself is unsustainable If the no return from Brahmaloka associated with Nirguṇavidya consists in attaining the fruit of no return which does not involve going to another world, the fruit of Nirgunavidyā viz Paramasāmyam will also come under the disability of the other For, in the nature of things, attainment of parity of status or character (*samānadharmatvam*) with another cannot but involve such a movement

What will be the criteria of Saguna and Nirguṇa Vidyās? If the first is based on superimposition and the second free from superimposition how is that to be ascertained? It cannot be held that the vidya based on superimposition is that in which there is difference between the subject and its attributes and that in which there is no such difference or which is without subject-attribute relationship and deals with the bare essence of B is unsuperimposed vidyā This criterion is hard ly seen in the wellknown passage *Yadā pasyah pasyate rukmavarnam* * * * *Tadā vidvān punyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanah paramam sāmyam upaiti* (*Mund. Up* iii 2 8) which is hailed as a Nirgunavidyā but which refers to many attributes of B including its difference from the Jivātman.

S's way of construing the Sūtra is also open to question The concord between ('sarvāsām') '*gatih*' and '*aniyamah*' is anything but satisfactory As his interpretation makes out that the prakarana is set at nought by the evidence of Śruti and Smrti vākyas it is an understatement in the Sūtra to speak of a 'conflict' (*virodha*) between them As the appeal is made only to Śrutis and Smṛtis both could be comprehended by a single word '*sabdāt*' standing for *apauruṣeyasabda* and pauruṣeyasabda (Smṛti) instead of the additional 'anumāna' to signify "Smṛti".

CHAPTER XLII

PRESENCE OF TĀRATAMYA IN MOKṢA PROVES DIFFERENCE OF YOGYATĀ IN UPĀSANA

20 *Yāvadadhikārādhikaranam* (iii 3 33-34)

This adhi arises by way of meeting an objection based on the conclusion established in the previous adhi that there is no restriction in the matter of all Aparoksajñānins attaining Moksa The objection is brought forward that in that case the recognition of difference of Yogyatā for different upāsanas among upāsakas serves no purpose for they could attain the fruits of Moksa to a greater or less extent thro' the varying degrees of intensity or measure of their own efforts without being bound by any such limitation as Yogyata[1] The doctrine of adhikāra or yogyatā for different kinds and forms of upāsanā and upasamhāra, which has been pressed into service in some of the earlier adhikaranas like third, fourth, fifth and sixth—which alone can adequately explain the gradation in the enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in the life of the Muktas, is thus vindicated in this adhi

The term 'hānau' from Sutra 27 or '*sāmparāye*' from 28, or '*gati*' (suitably changed to the locative from Sūtra 30) follows by anuvṛtti and is connected with the predicate '*avasthite*' of the Ādhikārikas

1 यद्यनियमेन ज्ञानिनो मोक्ष तर्हि अकिंचित्करोऽसौ योग्यताविशष तत्प्रयोजकफलतारतम्यस्यान्यनैवोपपत्तरिति पूर्वोक्ततर्कप्रतिहतशङ्कनात सगति (Ragh *Ny Muktavali*)
न च मुक्तावानन्दतारतम्यमुपासनाधिकारनियमे प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम्। उपासनादिप्रयत्नतारतम्यनैव तस्योपपत्तेरुपासनाधिकारनियमाप्रयोजकत्वात (*TP* iii 3 33)

Ādhikārikas are Brahmā and other Devas, Ṛṣis and other Muktiyogyas[2] who are temperamentally disposed to adhere strictly to their own natural fitness (*svarūpayogyatā*) in the matter of upāsanā and upasamhāra and never to overstep it This sense is conveyed by the force of the derivative suffix *'ṭhak'* (*ika*) added to the stem 'adhikāra'.[3] The avyayībhāva compound 'yāvadadhikāram' conveys the meaning that the enjoyment of svarūpānanda in Mukti is absolutely in accordance with their adhikāra (i.e *yogyatā*). The emphasis implicit in the sense of the adverbial cpd shows that the gradation in the lives of the Muktas is due to this yogyatā alone and *not* to any other differentiating factor such as variation in the nature, measure or intensity of their efforts in respect of upāsanā [4] For these differences are themselves the outcome of difference in Yogyatā.[5] And it is established on sound authority that these Ādhikārikas do not, as a rule, overstep the limits of their yogyatā in the matter of the nature, measure or intensity of their efforts to attain what is more than their due [6] The Siddhānta therefore points to the existence (*avasthiti*) in Mokṣa (*hānau*) of gradation in the Svarūpānanda of Jivas as proof of the existence of difference in Yogyatā for upāsanā *and upasamhāra* This gradational existence (*yāvadadhikāram avasthitih*) of mauktikānanda cannot be explained by differences in the nature, intensity or measure of efforts in upāsanā but only on the basis of difference in Yogyatā, for differences in the nature, intensity or measure of efforts are ultimately the result of Yogyatābheda Hence, the Sūtrakāra's categorical statement· *Hānau (tāratamyena) avasthitih ādhikārikānām upāsanāyām asya tu etāvān asya etāvan ityadhikāraniyamam sādhayati* [7]

The second Sūtra *Akṣaradhiyām tvavirodhah*[8] * * disarms the most powerful objection usually brought up against the presence or continuation of Tāratamya at the Mokṣa level—which the acceptance of

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2. आधिकारिका मान्याधिकारिण (*TD* iii 3 33)
3 अधिकारो योग्यता । तदनुसारेणानुष्ठाने शील येषां ते आधिकारिका 'शीलम्' (*Pan* iv 4 61) इति सूत्रात् ठक् (Ragh. *TDP* iii 3 33)
4 यावदवधारणे (*Pan.* ii 1 8) इत्यव्ययीभाव । अधिकारानुसारेणैव तेषां मुक्तौ अवस्थिति, तारतम्यावस्थानम् । न तूपासनप्रयत्नतारतम्येन, यत तारतम्यनियमो न स्यादिति (*TDP*)
5 प्रयत्नतारतम्यस्यापि तदायत्तत्वात् (*ibid*)
6 स्वाधिकाराधिकां यत्नं ब्रह्मणा नाचरेत् ।
कस्यचिदधिकं यत्नं कश्चिद् समाचरेत् ॥
इति स्मरणात् (*TD* iii 3 33)
For further details see Raghu. *TPB* iii 3 33 p 431
7 हानौ आधिकारिकाणां अधिकारं यावदधिकारं अवस्थिति (*TDP*) [illegible] भवति [illegible] स्वरूपानन्दादिगुणेषु [illegible] अवस्थिति भवति (*TD* iii 3 23)
8 S R. and others read अवरोध

the doctrine of Svarūpayogyatā and Ānandatāratamya in Mokṣa entails. The pith of the objection is the acceptance of gradational difference among Ādhikārikas in the enjoyment of their Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa will lead to disastrous consequences of perpetual disharmony and discord in the state of Mukti which is universally acknowledged to be one of perfect peace and harmony will lead to heart burning and jealousy among the less fortunate against the more favored ones above them.

The Sūtrakāra exposes the fallacy and weakness of this objection by his thoughtful and significant answer. *Akṣaradhiyām tu avirodhaḥ.* The words 'hānau' and 'ādhikārikāṇām' follow by *anuvṛtti*. The adjective '*akṣaradhiyām*' is implicit with the reason (*hetugarbha*) why there is no fear of *virodha*, discord, disharmony and other adverse reactions notwithstanding the existence of inequality and taratamya in Mokṣa in the enjoyment of Svarūpānanda based on Yogyatātāratamya. To explain:—Jealousy and other bad passions are roused in men who are attached to worldly things and who are selfish and unhelpful to others. Muktas are completely God-centred (*akṣaradhiyaḥ*). They have no interest in worldly things. They are all of them absolutely free from bad passions. The higher-ups among them in Yogyatā have all the good will towards those below them and extend to them their guidance and cooperation. Those below have sincere regard and genuine affection for their betters and never harbor any feelings of antagonism towards them.[9] The argument that inequality of status, equipment or endowment is concomitant with conflict and disharmony is not necessarily or always true. Difference is consistent and compatible with cooperation and goodwill also. As already pointed out, inequality by itself is not the cause of strife. It is the feelings of jealousy and other bad passions that are responsible for it. As these are ruled out in Mokṣa, difference and inequality by themselves can do no harm. Jealousy and other bad passions are traceable to defects in the human character. In as much as Mokṣa is by definition and hypothesis a state of pure blessedness free from all such imperfections of embodied life, there can be no possibility of any strife or discord among released souls because of the existence of intrinsic gradations of yogyatā among them. The Sūtrakāra has given us a worthy illustration—'*aupasadavat*' in point.[10] The

9 विरोधे विषयलम्पटत्वमत्सरादिदोषित्वानुपकारित्वानां प्रयोजकत्वात्। न चैतानि मुक्तेषु विद्यन्ते। तेषां ब्रह्मधीत्वान्निर्दोषत्वात् परस्परोपकारित्वाच्चेति भावः (*TP.* iii 3 34)

सामान्यात् मत्सरादिदोषाभावसाम्यात् तद्भावात्, तदिति तन्त्रम्। तेभ्यो मात्सर्यविषयतयाप्रसजितेभ्य उत्तमेभ्य तस्य प्रकृतब्रह्मज्ञानादिलक्षणोपकारस्य भावादन्येषामवराणामित्यर्थः (Ragh. *TDP*)

10 न चासमत्वेन विरोधो भवति। ब्रह्मधीत्वात्। दोषाभावसाम्यात्. उत्तमेभ्योऽन्येषां भावाच्च। औपसदवत् शिष्यवत् (M. *BSB.* iii 3 34)

attitude of Muktas of lesser yogyatā towards their superiors in yogyatā is like that of a true disciple (*aupasada*)[11] towards his beloved Guru—viz. one of unbounded love, reverence and regard. No true and devoted disciple of an ideal Guru is ever jealous of him or bears him a grudge or ill-will because his attainments are far superior to his own.

Commenting on the virtues of equality, vs. inequality M. points out with a subtle humor that there is no assurance that discord will be completely eliminated from life if absolute equality is introduced. Instances are not wanting in our own experience at the domestic, national and even international levels of persons, communities and nations having jealousy, hatred and evil designs against their *equals.*

भवेयुर्यदि चेर्ष्याद्याः समेष्वपि कुतो न ते ?
तप्यमानाः समान् दृष्ट्वा द्वेषेर्ष्यादियुता अपि ।
दृश्यन्ते बहवो लोके दोषा एवात्र कारणम् ।
यदि निर्दोषता तत्र किमाधिक्येन दप्यते ? (*AV.* iii, 3, adhi. 20)

Precisely the same line of argument has been adopted by Aristotle in defence of the institution of private property against the alluring pleas in favor of community of property:

"Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence. Men readily listen to it and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing of possession of private property (suits about contracts, etc.) which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause—*the wickedness of human nature.* Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common—tho' there are not many of them, when compared with the vast number who have private property."

Aristotle's *Politics*, Tr. Jowett, Oxford, 1931, p. 63.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

Yāvadadhikārādhikaraṇam (iii.3.32)

According to S. this adhi. discusses the question whether the knower of B. acquires another body after giving up the present one or not.[12]

11. The etymology of aupasada is:—उप ब्रह्मसमीपं सादयति गमयत्येनमित्युपसत् गुरुः । तस्यायमौपसदः, तेन शिक्षणीयः शिष्यः । उपसीदतीत्युपसद् । स एवौपसदः स्वार्थिकोऽण् प्रत्ययः. (*BD.* iii 3 34)

12 विदुषो वर्तमानदेहपातानन्तरं देहान्तरमुत्पद्यते न वेति चिन्त्यते (S *BSB.* iii 3 32)

The *Kalpataru* explains the necessity to go into this question as follows — In the earlier adhi it was shown that there is no journey *thro'* Devayāna in Nirguna-Vidyās and that such journey is purposeful only in Saguna Vidyās, where certain results are to be attained which can only be done by going to different places It was accordingly shown that the journey thro' Devayāna is common to all Saguna Vidyās The present adhi arises on the basis of a further objection that for reasons to be indicated the Nirguṇa vidyās too cannot be deemed to be competent to lead to final Mokṣa directly and that it has to be associated with the conferment of certain excellences and as such excellences cannot be attained without having to go thro' Devayāna, it is not proper to make a qualified statement that the journey thro' Devayāna holds true only in respect of Saguna vidyās [13]

The Pūrvapaksa argues that the Śrutis and Smrtis refer to celebrated knowers of B like Apāntaratmas,[14] Sanatkumāra, Bhrgu, Vasiṣtha and *others getting after their death another body formed out of the* karmas which had *not* begun to bear fruit in their former lives and bodies. If these Jnānins are then awaiting the dissolution of only those karmas which had begun to bear fruit, they would be awaiting only the dissolution of the bodies in which they were clothed as Apāntaratamas, Vasiṣtha and *so on to attain final release The fact, however, that* they take one or more births and bodies formed out of karmas which are different from those which went to form their previous bodies shows clearly that the Nirguna vidyā (with which they are credited) does not confer Mokṣa [15] Statements attributing the attainment of Mokṣa to Nirguna vidyā have, therefore, to be understood as praising Nirguna vidyā Only the attainment of certain excellences (vibhūtis) can be regarded as its fruit The Śrutis which speak of "no return" as the fruit of Nirguna Vidyā are also to be regarded as purely eulogistic statements [16]

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13 निर्गुणब्रह्मविधाया गतिं प्रतिषिद्धय सगुणविद्याया गतिप्रयोजकैश्वयविशेषदर्शनात गतिरथवतीत्युक्तम। सगुणासु च गन मावत्रिकत्व वर्णितम्। इदानी निगुणविद्याया अपि मोक्षहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेरैश्वर्यफलत्व वक्तव्यम् ऐश्वर्यविशपश्च न गनिम तरेणेनि सगुणास्विति विशेषण व्यर्थमित्यभिहितव्यवस्याक्षपेण प्रत्यवस्थीयते (*Kalpataru* iii 3 32)

14 S speaks of Apantaratamas being born as Krṣnadvaipayana Vyāsa at the junction of Kali and Dvapara ages (S *BSB* iii 3 32)

15 भाविदेहस्य सर्वस्याप्यप्रवृत्तफलकर्मजन्यत्वात, वसिष्ठादयो यदि देहान्तर गृह्णीयु तर्ह्यप्रवृत्तफलकर्मजन्य देहत्वा मुक्ता न स्यु । अतश्च यदि प्रवृत्तफल कर्ममात्र प्रतीक्षरन तर्हि वसिष्ठादिदेहमात्रारम्भक प्रतीक्षेरन्निति देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तिरित्यय (*Kalpataru* iii 3 32)

16 तन, सत्यामपि विद्याया तदनुपपत्ते न मोक्ष फल विद्याया, विमतयस्तु तास्ता तस्या फलम। अपुनरावृत्तिश्रुति पुन तत्प्रशसार्था इति (*Bhamati* iii 3 32)

The Siddhānta is that these great Jnānins attain final Mokṣa after filling certain high offices of public good in which they are placed by the Supreme Lord of Creation, whom they have propitiated by the devoted performance of their Karmas and their wisdom. The delay caused by the period of their tenure of these offices does not mean that their (Nirguna) vidyā is not competent to confer Mokṣa The Jñānin even tho' he has attained direct vision of B in his last body on earth (*caramadeha*) patiently awaits the dissolution of the karma which has begun to ripen and yield its fruit in that birth and is held up till that karma is worked out and dissolved and attains Mokṣa immediately thereafter Even so, the Jnānin, whose vidyā and karma have placed him in the office of trust for the public good at the will of the Lord, awaits the dissolution of that Prārabdhakarma alone during his passing tenure of office, and takes on simultaneously or one after the other, different bodies, as the case may be, without the least personal attachment to them and gives them up when the time comes to do so and attains final Mokṣa So there is no difficulty in holding that the possessor of Nirgunavidyā attains final release in all cases [71]

Criticism

The objection raised by S that it appears that some Jnānins take birth in bodies formed of karmas which have not begun to bear fruit in the last body in which they attained Brahmasāksātkāra (and that, therefore, Nirguna vidyā cannot be considered as conferring final Moksa) is definitely barred by the Sūtrakāra's clear enunciation in Sūtra iv 1.15 that all works of the Jnānin which have not yet begun to yield results are alone destroyed by knowledge and *not* those which have already begun to yield results in the last body in which Sākṣātkāra had been attained That Sūtra distinguishes between two kinds of past works the accumulated and the commenced and states clearly that the accumulated are destroyed by Jnāna but that the Prārabdha (or those which have commenced to yield their fruits in the body in which Sākṣātkāra has dawned) is destroyed *only* by being worked out. The explanation given in refuting the objection that tho' Mokṣa ought to follow immediatly on the attainment of knowledge it is being held up and obstructed by the excellences (*aisvaryaviseṣa*) conferred on some Jnānins like

17 [illegible] ब्रह्मविद्या ददाति न मुक्तिं [illegible] [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iii 3 32)

Apāntaratamas—just as a dam arrests the flow of water in a river[18] needs clarification

We may ask if this excellence is formed by Sagunopāsanā or Nirgunopāsanā? The excellence earned by the former cannot possibly impede the fruit of Mokṣa earned by Nirgunasākṣātkāra Otherwise, the consciousness of identity achieved in the Jīvanmukti state may also be impeded in the event of Jīvanmuktas taking to Sagunopāsanā as some of them are said to do Nor does the cessation of ignorance at the dawn of knowledge in S 's philosophy need to await any further propitious time or place For, it is recognized that knowledge of truth destroys ignorance then and there Prārabdhakarma is also the effect of Ajñāna in S 's philosophy and it has got to be destroyed then and there when true knowledge dawns If it is not, the Sākṣātkāra can hardly deserve the name of Tattvajñāna Even the position that only karmas other than Prārabdha are destroyed by Jnāna cannot be sustained from the point of view of S 's philosophy in as much as Prārabdhakarma is other than B and an effect of Ajñāna [19]

It is equally impossible to hold that the excellences are formed by Nirgunopāsanā For it can do no such thing If it can, it can also form inexhaustible excellences along with journey thro' Devayāna and there will be no need to controvert it

Moreover, many other sages besides the Ādhikārikas' as defined by S are known from the Purānas to have taken fresh bodies after their attainment of Tattvajnāna, to work out their Prārabdhakarmas There is no point, therefore, in singling out the 'Ādhikārikas' for special treatment in the adhi If these others too are to be considered Ādhikārikas the qualifying epithet 'ādhikārika' in the Sūtra will lose its point

Apart from all these considerations, in the face of the definite statement of the Śrutis that Vidyā confers Moksa no doubt can possibly be put up against it on the slender basis of Itihāsas and Purānas which cannot claim any equal validity with Śrutis Moreover, the affirmation in the Sūtra that Adhikārins remain in corporeal existence as long as their adhikāra lasts, cannot take away the force of the objection that vidyā is not capable of conferring Moksa, for if after having had Brahmasāksātkāra the knower can be in corporeal existence as long as his adhikāra lasts it may also mean that there is no prospect of Moksa after

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18 हेतोरपि सति प्रतिबन्धे कार्यानुपजनो न हेतुभावमपाकरोति । न हि सेतुप्रतिबन्धानापा निम्नदेशानभिसर्पणमिति सेतुभेदे न निम्नमभिसर्पन्ति (*Bhamati* iii 3 32)

19 Cf तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ।
अविद्या सह कार्येण नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥

the passage of the new body of the Adhikārika The explanation that as adhikāra is due to Prārabdhakarma, there is no difficulty in achieving Moksa after it is worked out is not sustainable For, in S's philosophy the socalled Prārabdhakarma is also like a dream-object It cannot endure after the dawn of Tattvajñāna It cannot be contended that Prārabdhakarma comes to rest thro' effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body even as an arrow shot by an archer stops at the end owing to the gradual cessation of the impetus[20] Like the speed of the arrow shot in a dream, the karma and its impetus are both unreal in S's philosophy and can hardly continue to operate after the dawn of knowledge, or awakening Neither the arrow shot in a dream nor its speed can continue unabated when the dreamer happens to awaken at the very moment of his shooting the arrow in his dream! If Vasiṣṭha and others, then, have had no sublating knowledge there is no question of any doubt arising whether Tattvajñāna confers Mokṣa then and there or not In the circumstances there will be no need to open the adhikarana[21]

Śamkara's Aksaradhyadhikaranam (iii 3 33)

According to S the Sutra Akṣaradhiyām tvavarodhah * * constitutes a separate adhi which considers whether the negative descriptions of Akṣara in the *Brh Up* (iii 8 8) and in *Mund Up* (i 1, 5-6) and elsewhere are to be treated as two separate vidyās and, therefore, not to be combined in meditation or as one and combined in meditation[22] The doubt arises because the qualities denied in the one are not denied in the other but different ones The Purvapakṣa is that each denial is valid for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it[23] The Siddhānta is that the Vidyās are one because of similarity (*sāmanya*) everywhere in the manner of establishing the nature of B by way of denial of characteristics and it is the identical B that is recognised as the object of instruction everywhere So why should the conception found in one be not valid elsewhere?[24]

Criticism

The statement *Tatra kimityanyatra krtabuddhayo anyatra na syuh* if it should mean that conceptions which have different contents

20 प्रवृत्तफलस्य तु कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयान्निवृत्तिः (S BSB iii 3 32)
21 *Śrutaprakāśa* iii 3 32
22 अक्षरविषयाणां प्रतिषेधधियां सर्ववेदवर्तिनीनामवरोध उपसंहारः (*Bhamati* iii 3 33)
23 तत्र च क्वचित् कैश्चिद्विशेषाः प्रतिषिध्यन्ते। तासां विशेषप्रतिषेधबुद्धीनां किं सर्वासां सर्वत्र प्राप्तिरुत व्यवस्थेति संशये श्रुतिविभागाद्व्यवस्थाप्राप्तावुच्यते (S BSB iii 3 33)
24 अक्षरविषयास्तु विशेषप्रतिषेधबुद्धयः सर्वाः सर्वत्रावरोद्धव्याः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यां समानो हि सर्वत्र विशेषनिराकरणरूपो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकारः (ibid)

are to be treated as one it will be unsustainable, for the conception of *adreśyatvam*, etc are not the same as *agrāhyatvam*, etc If the conceptions are to be treated as the same because of identity of the qualified Being (*viśiṣṭaikya*), that point has already been made under the second and the eighteenth adhi s (of S) If it means that there is to be adhyāhāra of attributes into the vidyā where they are *not* given from the other one where they *are given*, such adhyāhāra or importation will be permissible and necessary only where the given passage or description is *incomplete*. But each passage quoted here is complete in itself and needs no adhyāhāra Anyway, it has already been shown in adhi 6, according to S that B is described as bliss, knowledge, all pervading, the self of all, true, etc in different texts of different Śākhās But all these attributes are *not* mentioned in all places The question is whether they have to be combined in the meditation of B or not The Sūtra *Ānandādayah pradhānasya* (iii 3 11) says they have to be combined as the object of meditation (B) is one and the same in all Śākhās and, therefore, the Vidyā is one[25] In the light of this the present discussion becomes superfluous

Anticipating this objection, S puts in that adhi 6 deals with the Upasamhāra of positive attributes of B given differently in different Śākhās and this adhi with the negative ones, differently given in different places and that, therefore, there is no redundancy (*gatārthatā*) But then, the directive principle (*siddhāntanyāya*) being the same in both the cases, the redundancy cannot be got over S and Vācaspati plead the usual defence here of explaining the same point in more detail *Prapañcārthascāyam cintābhedah* (S *BSB* iii 3 33) But where is the need to explain the point in more detail?

The *Kalpataru* comes to the rescue with an *adhikāsankā* justifying the opening of a fresh *adhi*. to consider the case of negative attributes —

भवेद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वादानन्दाद्युपसहृति ।
निषेधानामनात्मत्वान्नोपसहारसभव
आनन्त्याच्च निषेध्याना तन्निषेधधियामपि
असख्येयतयैकत्र कथ शक्योपसहृति
स्थालीपुलाकवत् किचिन्निषेधेनान्यलक्षणे
यथाश्रुतेन तत्सिद्धेरुपसहरण वृथा ॥

(*Kalpataru* iii 3 33)

The objection is Ānanda and other attributes being the essence of B their combination in meditation is possible But the negations of attributes being "not-B", their Upasamhāra is impossible in B

25 सवत्र हि तदेवैक प्रधान विशष्य ब्रह्म न भिद्यत (S *BSB* iii 3 11)

Moreover, as the attributes to be negated and the concepts of their denial are legion, their combination will be beyond the capacity of anyone If it is attempted on the basis of a select few, the rest being left to the operation of Lakṣanā, the same result can be achieved by simply sticking to the negative attributes actually given in a particular text and leaving the rest to Lakṣaṇā, without actually going thro' the tedious process of attempting their Upasamhāra

This is unsustainable It does not appear from S's point of view that Upasamhāra and anupasamhāra of attributes are determined by the fact of their being of the essence of B or not There is no invariable rule at least so far as S is concerned that only such attributes as constitute the essence of B are to be brought under upasamhāra. If it were so, there cannot be any upasamhāra as undertaken in the Sūtras of the attributes of omniscience, satyakāmatva, samyadvāmatva, sarvesvar atva, etc which are shot thro' with unreality (*mithyārthagarbhita*) and therefore, stand outside the essence of B and their enunciation in the Śrutis would be futile

What is the difficulty in the upasamhāra of negative attributes? The contention that they are not be the essence of B cannot be pressed too far For, in S's philosophy, *ānanda* and other attributes too signify in reality not positive characteristics of B but only the absence, or negation of pain, misery and so forth.[26] Otherwise ānanda and others will become positive attributes of B which cannot then be regarded as "attributeless" (*nirdharmaka* or *nirvisesa*) The other argument about the impossibility of upasamhāra of negative attributes on account of their countlessness will apply with equal force to positive attributes also like ānanda which are also countless in B as we have it on the authority of Śrutis and Smṛtis[27]

The *Kalpataru* overrules the adhikāsankā on the ground that tho' the negative attributes are in essence "not-Brahman" (*anatmā*), they define and distinguish B and help to produce true knowledge of B in other contexts also[28] If this concedes to the negative attributes the same status as belong to *ānanda* and other defining attributes, it will not do to isolate them as "un ātman."

26 Cf अनृतजडविरोधिरूपमन्तत्रयमलबन्धनदुःखताविरुद्धम् (*Samkṣepasariraka* i 1)
According to another of his (S s) statements ultimate reality transcends ananda. God is beyond blissful and beyond bliss Ranade, *Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought* p 82

27 परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च (*Śvet Up* vi, 8)
मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे (*Bhāg* vi 4 48)

28 प्रतिषेधा अनात्मानोऽप्यात्मलक्षणतां गताः ।
आत्मप्रमितिसिद्ध्यर्थं यथा सत्यत्वसूनृते ॥ (*Op cit* iii, 3,33)

The way S construes the Sūtra *Akṣaradhiyām tvavarodhas sāmānya tadbhāvābhyām* involves a good deal of adhyāhāra The discussion is about the upasamhāra of the conceptions (*buddhi*) of negative attributes The use of the term 'Akṣara' to denote अक्षरविषयविशेषप्रतिषेध-बुद्धय. is, to say the least, stretching the sense of 'Akṣara' too far The meaning of 'recognition' (*pratyabhijñā*) of B everywhere given to '*tadbhāva*' is unauthorised In the Sūtra as interpreted by S the reason 'pratiṣedhasāmānyāt' is coordinate with the conceptions (*dhiyah*) while in reality the negative character (*pratisedhātmatva*) is coordinate only with the attributes of *asthūlatvam* etc The recognition of the same B (*tadbhāva*) everywhere as the subject of these negative descriptions will have *to make use of the consequent unity of Vidyās as the ground* of upasamhāra of their negative attributes in B That would make this *adhi* superfluous as the principle of विद्यैकत्वे गुणोपसंहार has already been established in *adhi* 10 The illustration of 'upasad' has no bearing on *the theme of this Sūtra which is the intimate connection of* all *negative* attributes with Akṣara The *PMS* (iii 3 8) quoted in this behalf turns on 'Gunapradhānahbhāva' whereas the topic under discussion is decided in the Sūtra on the basis of 'sāmānya' and 'tadbhāva' in relation to B

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R also discusses the same question whether the attributes of grossness etc predicated of the Akṣara in the two Upaniṣads are to be comprised in all meditations of B like the attributes of ānanda and others The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no sufficient reason to treat the attributes which are the features of one particular Vidyā as features of another Absence of grossness etc , being in the nature of negations, do not contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of B—as the positive attributes of bliss etc do It is only after the true nature of B is made known as having bliss etc for its character that the attributes of grossness and others belonging to the empirical world are denied of B—for all negation needs a base[29]

The Siddhānta is—the ideas of absence of grossness etc which are connected with B viewed as Akṣara are to be included in all meditations of B For the Akṣara (B) is the same in all meditations and the qualities of non grossness, etc enter into the conception of its essential nature For the apprehension of a thing means apprehension of its specific character Mere bliss and so on do not suggest the specific character of B as these qualities belong to the individual Soul also But the attributes of bliss and others when qualified by those of non gross-

29 आनन्दादिभिरवगतस्वरूपे हि ब्रह्मणि स्थूलत्वादय प्रपचधर्मा प्रतिषिध्यन्ते निरालम्बनप्रतिषेधायोगात्
(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 33)

ness, etc, constitute the true nature of B For, tho' the individual Soul is also not fundamentally connected with grossness and other characteristics of Acit, yet he is open to their contamination in the state of bondage This differentiates him from B for all time It is for the purpose of meditating on the exalted nature of B as not being liable to the contact with grossness, etc at any time that the attributes of non-grossness and others are to be included in all meditations of B

Criticism

The question of the exclusion of non-grossness and other attributes as not contributing to the apprehension of the true nature of B, raised in the Pūrvapakṣa, ought to have been taken up and refuted immediately after laying down the principle that the qualities which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing and, therefore, necessarily entering into the idea of the thing must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself (Sūtra 13) The Siddhānta bhāṣya carries no effective refutation of the point made in Pūrvapakṣa (*see* fn 29) that unless B is first established as having bliss and other qualities as its essential character, it will not be possible to deny of it the qualities of grossness, etc belonging to the empirical world. R has sought to bypass this objection by trying to establish that negative attributes are equally necessary in effectively distinguishing B's essential nature from that of the Jīvātman. The difficulty, however, is that even the combination of ānanda, jñāna and other attributes with absence of grossness, etc will *not* help in effectively apprehending the true nature of B for, in the state of release, the Jīva will also be possessing the attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc and *not* possessing the empirical attributes of grossness, etc If then, in this state, the true naure of B as distinct from the Jīva is to be established, for purposes of meditation now, it can only be done by recognizing with M that B's attributes of jñāna, ānanda and others are *pūrna* and *niravadhika* while those of the Jīvātman are *limited even in the state of Mokṣa,* instead of making a half-hearted confession that the individual soul tho' fundamentally free from evil is yet capable of connection with evil, tho' bliss and other qualities belong to it[30] R's argument that the negative attributes contribute to the establishment of the true nature of B like the attributes of ānanda etc cannot be pressed beyond a certain limit. For in understanding the true nature of B as described in *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma,* the attributes of non-grossness play no part.

30 अस्थूलत्वादिविशिष्टानन्दादि ब्रह्मण प्रत्यगात्मनो व्यावृत्ताकार । यद्यपि प्रत्यगात्मा स्वभावत स्थूलत्वा द्यचेतनधर्मासंबन्धी तथापि न सर्वदा ह्यहेतया अन्यत्र स्थूलत्वादि हि पूर्वं तत्संबन्ध सम्भवात्

(R. *Vedāntadīpa* iii 3 33)

CHAPTER XLIII

GRADATION OF ADHIKĀRINS ENDS WITH PRĀNA

21 *Iyadāmananādhıkaranam* (ııı 3 35 -37)

After concludıng the ıncıdental ınquıry relatıng to the released Souls ın the last four adhıkaranas, the Sūtrakāra now returns to the subject of Adhıkārıns to clarıfy that the gradatıon of theır Yogyatā referred to earlıer ıs not ındefinıte ın ıts progressıon but has ıts upper lımıt ın Mukhya Prāna—Hıranyagarbha The purpose of goıng ınto thıs questıon ıs to substantıate the postulatıon made ın *adhı* 4 that only the four-faced Brahmā (Mukhya Prāna) ıs competent to engage ın the upasamhāra of all the attrıbutes B taught ın the Śrutıs

The Adhıkārıns have been mentıoned ın the *Chān Up* (vıı 1-15) ın an ascendıng order begınnıng from Nāma and endıng wıth Prāna These represent theır respectıve presıdıng deıtıes [1] The questıon arıses ıf there ıs any Adhıkārın above Prāna or ıf Prāna ıs the hıghest Adhıkārın ın upāsanā Tho' the Chān text does not mentıon any one beyond Prana, ıt ıs open to us to presume that there may be some other upāsanā-Adhıkārın beyond Prāna who guıdes and ınıtıates hım, just as there are Adhıkārıns superıor to those below hım For wıthout such guıdance and ınstructıon from a Guru, no upāsanā ıs possıble The Pūrvapaksa takes thıs lıne

The Sıddhānta ıs that the upper lımıt of upāsanādhıkārıns ıs represented by Mukhya Prāna The term 'ıyat' ın the Sūtra ıs to be

1 नामवाङ्मन सङ्कल्पचित्तध्यानविज्ञानबलान्नाप्तेजआकाशस्मराशाप्राणशब्दिता उपास्वाहापजन्यमित्राग्निवरुण विद्युत्प्रवहानिरुद्धाहङ्कारिकप्राणेंद्ररुद्रवाणीमारुता ता देवता उत्तरोत्तराधिक्येनोक्ता

(Ragh *Ny Muktāvalı*)

understood in its abstract sense of *iyattvam* (upper) limit The word 'Adhikārikānām follows by anuvrtti and *āmanana* is a reference to Mukhya Prāna's being referred to as the highest of Adhikārins and there being no upāsanā-Adhikārin above him, in the Kaunṭharavya Śruti.[2] The next Sūtra meets the objection of the Pūrvapakṣa that apart from B and the goddess Śrī,[3] Mukhya Prāṇa may have some superiors who may be higher than he in the scale of Upāsanādhikāra The objection is disposed of by the term 'taduktam' in the Sūtra which is interpreted in two different senses (i) that evidence has already been cited to the effect that there is no upāsanādhikārin above Prāna[4] and (ii) that in the case of Adhikārins below Prāna there is evidence of the presence of superior Adhikārins above them.[5] Tho' Prāṇa is himself the highest in rank among upāsakas, the Supreme B is the Guru of Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) There is thus no difficulty of Prāṇa going without Gurūpadesa.

The next Sūtra meets an objection to the stand taken in the first Sūtra that Prāna is superior to "all." If this is to be taken as an unqualified statement, it will confer absolute supremacy on Prāna. That will clash with the established supremacy of B as there cannot be two independent absolutely supreme beings If then the statement Prāna is superior to "all" is to be understood in a limited sense, it may as well be that he is superior to just a few Adhikārins That will not preclude the existence of some one being superior to him among the Adhikārins[6] These two objections are set aside by the words of the Sūtra 'Upādesa-vat'—meaning as taught in the Śrutis (*yathopadiṣṭam*[7]) by pointing out that the Śrutis establish that (i) Prāna is superior to all other Upāsakas and (ii) B is superior to Prāṇa, as the Supreme Being and the Guru of Prāna.

Cf यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं
यो वै वेदांश्च प्रहिणोति तस्मै (*Svet* Up VI 18)
तस्माच्छ्रुत्वा परं ब्रह्म देवा नारायणाभिधम् ॥
शिष्यप्रशिष्यादिषु च तेऽनयन् वायुनोदितम् ॥
(M. *Ait Bhāṣya*, Q. *TD* i 1 28)

2 प्राणो वाव सर्वेभ्यो भूयान् नहि प्राणात् भूयान् प्राण एव भूयान् तस्मात् भूयान् नास्ति (Q *MBSB* iii 3 25)
3 वस्तुतस्तु मोक्ष पद [illegible] (श्री) श्रियाश्चोपलक्षकमेतत् । अनेन सूत्र [illegible] पदेन सूचित (*BD* iii 3 26)
4 प्राणाद्युत्तमाभावे प्रमाणमुक्तम् (M. *BSB* iii 3 36)
5 अधस्तनानामाधाराभावे न प्रमाणम् । [illegible] (*ibid*)
6 [illegible] (*TP* iii 3 37)
7 [illegible] (*BD* iii 3 37)

Saṁkara's Interpretation.

According to S., this consists of only one Sūtra (iii.3.34) and establishes the unity of Vidyā between the texts *Dvā suparṇā* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.1.1) and *Ṛtam pibantau* (*Kaṭha* 111.1). The former refers to one of the birds eating the fruit of life and to the other as not eating; while the other text refers to the two imbibers of ṛta. (See Vol. I. pp. 152-161). In other words, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that according to one upaniṣad the enjoyer and the non-enjoyer are to be known and according to the other both are to be known as the enjoyers. This makes these Vidyās different. The Siddhānta is that both the texts exhibit the character of the object of knowledge as identical viz. as defined by the number two. The introduction of the individual soul in this connection is only for the sake of conveying their identity and not their difference.

Criticism

The *adhi.* is rendered superfluous by the Guhādhikaraṇa, where S. has admitted that the texts *Ṛtam pibantau* from *Kaṭha* and *Dvā suparṇā* from *Muṇḍaka* come under *the same nyāya.* (See his Bhāṣya on i.2.12). If the Pūrvapakṣa here is made on the assumption that the expression *pibantau* refers to the Jīva alone the dual cannot be sustained. If it is made on the basis of the Jiva's association with some other principle, it has to be clarified what that other principle is to be. It cannot be another Jīva as S. does not admit two Jīvas within a single body. If it is buddhi and Jīva that are referred to by the dual, it cannot be; for the dual can only refer to another of the same status (*sajātīya*), as S. himself has made it clear. If then, the second one is Brahmacaitanya it cannot be the 'drinker' and the prātipadika 'pibat' will be emptied of its content. In this comment on BS.i,2.12 S. has deferred to the interpretation of the Paiṅgirahasya that Dvā suparṇā refers to Sattvam (buddhi) and Jīva whereas in his commentary on this Sūtra (iii.3.34) he holds that both these texts (Dvā suparṇā and Ṛtam pibantau) refer to Jīva and Īśvara. This will be clearly inconsistent. If in the Guhādhi. and in this *adhi.* too it is only the Jīva and B. that are the subject of treatment, there will be repetition of the theme. The question of throwing more light (prapañcana) does not arise, for we find no new light thrown on any point! It would be too much to claim that the expression 'iyat' carries no other sense than delimiting number two or duality (*dvitvasankhyāvyavacchedakam*). The interpretation put upon 'iyat' by S. necessitates also the importation of the word 'abhinnam' as the predicate of the proposition.[8]

8. उभयोरप्यनयोर्मन्त्रयोरियत्तापरिच्छिन्न द्वित्वोपेत वेद्यरूपमभिन्नमामनन्ति (S)

CHAPTER XLIV

PRĀṆATIVĀDIN TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SATYĀTIVĀDIN

22. *Vyatihārādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.38)

This adhi. arises by way of an ākṣepasaṅgati against the conclusion established in the previous *adhi.*, that B. is superior to Prāṇa. Unless the superiority of B. over Prāṇa is conclusively established, Prāṇa himself would become the Supreme one—there being no higher being to be meditated upon by Adhikārins. But Prāṇa being known from other sources to be bound and therefore not competent to confer Mokṣa on others, the endeavours of other Jīvas in their upāsanās for achieving Mokṣa will be faced with utter disappointment. It has, therefore, to be shown that B. is superior to Prāṇa.

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that B. is *not* superior to Prāṇa. For, in the *Chān. Up.* (vii.15.4) Prāṇa has been praised as the highest deity. It cannot be contended that the Upaniṣad admits the existence of the Supreme B. as higher than Prāṇa when, after enumerating a series of deities in their ascending order ending with Prāṇa, it goes on to add *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati* (vii.16.1). For, as in the earlier cases, there is neither a question : Venerable Sir, Is there something greater than Prāṇa, followed by a suitable answer, Yes, Satya is greater than Prāṇa. As such a question and an answer are wanting in respect of Prāṇa, we cannot look upon the words *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati* as representing a fresh section (*prakaraṇa*) referring to the Supreme B. and *not* to Prāṇa. The conclusion, there-

fore, is that the term Satya refers only to Prāṇa. There is, therefore, no being superior to Prāṇa and no upāsanā of B. is, therefore, necessary.

The Siddhānta is that the supremacy of B. over Prāṇa has been clearly stated in the *Chān. Up.* text by the necessary insertion (*vyatihāra*) of the requisite question in the right place. There is good reason to make such *adhyāhāra*. For, as in the other cases also (*itaravat*) the text qualifies (*viśiṁṣanti*) the Satyātivādin (one who holds the supreme B. to be the highest) by contrasting him with the Praṇātivādin by affixing to the former a partitive 'tu'. For, the text makes a reference to two orders of Ativādins in different terms and qualifies the Satyātivādin with a partitive 'tu': *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati,* while the other Prāṇātivādin has been described merely as *Evam vijñānan ativādī bhavati.* This clearly shows the two Ativādins are to be distinguished and that the two Prakaraṇas are distinct. A question regarding a being higher than Prāṇa has, therefore, to be inserted so as to call forth the concluding statement of the Upaniṣad: *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati.*[1]

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1. 'स वा एप एव पश्यन् एव मन्वान एव विजानन् अतिवादी भवति' इति प्राणातिवादिनो ऽतिवादिशब्दितवस्तुवादित्वेनातिवादित्वमुक्तम्। ततश्च एप तु वा अतिवदति य. सत्येनातिवदति' इति सत्यवस्तु वदतो ऽप्यतिवादित्वमुच्यते। तत्र प्राणातिवादिन सत्यातिवादी तुशब्देन विशिष्यते। तेन ज्ञायतेऽन्योऽयमन्योऽसाविति। अत· प्रकरणभेदकसद्भावाद्युक्त प्रश्नाद्यध्याहारेण सत्यस्य प्राणादुत्तमत्वव्याख्यानमिति (*TP.* iii 3 38)
See also Vol. I, p. 217-19.

CHAPTER XLV

VIJÑĀNA, MATI, ŚRADDHĀ, ETC. ARE THE SAME AS SATYA (BRAHMAN)

23. *Satyādyadhikaraṇam* (iii.3.39)

This *adhi.* disposes of an incidental objection arising out of the Chān. Up. text in the Bhūmavidyā, where so many principles like Vijñāna, mati, śraddhā, kṛti and sukha have been mentioned beyond 'Satya.' If all these are to be identified with B. (Satya), there is no reason why Prāṇa too cannot be identified with Vijñāna and others. If that is done, it will go against the conclusion of the previous *adhi.* that B. is superior to Prāṇa and others mentioned below and anterior to Satya from nāma to Prāṇa.[1] The Siddhānta overcomes this difficulty by pointing out that while there is no reason to identify Prāṇa with vijñāna and others, there is very good reason to identify vijñāna, kṛti, niṣṭhā, mati, etc., with Satya (B) as its attributes. For they are introduced in the text by way of answer to the question, Sir, I want to understand Satyam (*Chān. Up.* vii.1.6). There is no such question or answer in regard to Prāṇa to justify our identifying vijñāna, kṛti, etc. with Prāṇa. Otherwise, the reference to vijṇāna, mati, śraddhā, etc. in response to the question about Satyam (alone) would be irrelevant. This shows that there is only one principle and being superior

1 न च विज्ञानादीनां सत्येनाभेदान्न बहूनामुत्तमत्वं प्राणादिति वाच्यम् । तेषामभेदोक्त्यादिकारणविशेषं विना प्राणं विहायाभेदग्रहणस्यान्याय्यत्वात् अत प्राणादपि बहूनामुत्तमत्वात् तस्य विष्णुं विना सर्वोत्तमत्वं, विज्ञानादिरूपधर्मितसर्वोत्तमत्वं च न युक्तमिति पूर्वः पक्षः (*TP.* iii 3 39)

to Prāṇa and not many and that one is Satya or B. itself—vijñāna and others being but the attributes of B.[2]

The Sūtra refers to B. the Paradevatā[3] by the feminine pronoun Sā (*Sā eva hi satyādayaḥ*) in view of the fact that a very large number of the attributes of B. mentioned here are feminine (adjectives) in form (śraddhā, kṛti, mati and niṣṭhā).[4] The *TD* says that as the Chāndogya text teaches so many attributes of B. all to be meditated upon, the Sūtrakāra has brought out the point by the use of the plural 'satyādayaḥ.'

It may be felt that even if vijñāna, kṛti and others are treated as attributes of B. and thus identified with Satya (B) the presence of the particle 'tu' after vijñāna, mati, kṛti, etc. as in respect of Satya and the reference to ahamkāra and Ātman in a separate section beyond Bhūman with the words 'athāto ahamkārādeśaḥ (*Chān. Up.* vii.25.1) 'athāta ātmādeśaḥ' (vii.25.2) place difficulties in the way of accepting the Siddhānta position that there is change of topic and section (Prakaraṇaviccheda) only as between Prāṇātivāda and Satyātivāda.[5]

The Bhāṣyakāra disarms this objection. He points out that the Chāndogya text: *Sa vā eṣa evam paśyan evam manvāna ātmaratir ātmakrīḍa ātmānandas sa svarāḍ bhavati* (vii.25.2) holds out the fruit of Mokṣa to the knower of *ahamkārādeśa* and *ātmādeśa* referred to in vii.25.1. As Mokṣa is attainable only by the knowledge of B. it follows that *ahamkārādeśa and ātmādeśa are really instructions about* Brahmasvarūpa. The terms *atha* and *ataḥ* at the beginning of vii.25.1 and vii.25.2 indicate the instruction about the other form (*rūpāntara*) of B. (after the form of Satya already concluded) and *ataḥ* conveys that it is by the grace (*prasāda*) of this B. that Mokṣa described further

2 सत्यादयोऽहंकारात्मान्ता सा ईश्वराख्या परदेवतैव । न तु ततो भिन्ना । सत्याख्यस्य भगवतो गुणजिज्ञासाया तद्गुणत्वेन तदविनाभूतज्ञानस्योक्तत्वात् तथा चोत्तरत्रापि विज्ञानगुणजिज्ञासाया अविनाभूतमत्यादीनामुक्तत्वादभेदसिद्धे अन्यथा, सत्यादिजिज्ञासाया विज्ञानादिकथनस्यासगतत्वात् (*TP.* iii 3 39)

For the necessity of TP's referring to *ahamkāra and ātman* (instead of only to '*ātman*') see *AC.* iii 3 39 यद्यपि आत्मान्ता इति वक्तव्य तथापि येषामात्मनो विष्णुत्वनिश्चय तान्प्रति अहंकारान्ता सा परदेवतेति वक्तव्यम् । येषा तु, आत्मन्यपि सन्देह तान्प्रत्यात्मान्ता : सेति वक्तव्यमिति ज्ञापनाय 'अहंकारात्मान्ता' इत्युक्तम् (*Op. cit.*)

3 *For the use of term 'Paradevatā' to denote B. see Chān. Up. vi 15 1.*

4 सेति कृतिनिष्ठाद्यनुरोधेन स्त्रीलिंगोक्ति स्त्रीलिंगाना बहुत्वात् (*TDP*)

5 ननु, विज्ञानादे सत्याभेदेऽपि विज्ञान त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्य, मतिस्त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्या इत्यदिना उत्तरोत्तरस्य पूर्वपूर्वस्माद्विशेषण, अथातोऽहंकारादेश, अथात आत्मादेश इति प्रकरणविच्छेदकोक्तिश्च कथ युज्यते? अन्यथा, प्राणात् सत्यस्यापि विशेषण भेदक न स्यात् (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3 39)

6 नन्वस्तु भूमान्ताना भगवद्गुणत्वेनाभेदोक्ति न त्वहंकारात्मनो, तयोरभेदानुक्तेरित्यत आह 'सत्याद्या अहमात्मान्ता' इति। अत्र हेतुर्यस्मादिति । स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेव मन्वान आत्मरतिरात्मक्रीड * * * स्वराड् भवतीत्यहंकारात्मज्ञानान्मोक्ष श्रूयते मोक्षश्च भगवज्ज्ञानादेव । अतस्तयो तत्स्वरूपत्वमिति (*TP.* iii 3 39)

down in terms ātmakrīḍā, ātmānanda is to be attained.[7] This will be evident also from the words : *ātmata evedam sarvam* (vii.26.1). The particle 'tu' added after vijñāna, kṛti, etc. is to indicate that the attributes of vijñāna, kṛti, etc. are colorfully integrated with Brahmasvarūpa thro' the agency of Svarūpaviśeṣas and are not different from B.[8] The 'ahaṁkārādeśa' (instruction about ahaṁkāra) referred to in this connection in *Chān. Up.* (vii.25.1) is not about the *ahaṁkāratattva* an evolute of Mahattattva. It is instruction about Brahmasvarūpa itself. For the same section speaks about the all-pervasiveness of 'aham' (*aham eva adhastād aham upariṣṭād * * * aham evedam sarvam*, vii.25.1). The ahamkāratattva is not all-pervasive while B. is[9] The term 'ahaṁkāra' is thus used in this context of the Chāndogya as equivalent to and interchangeable with 'aham' which is indisputably a synonyom of B. (*Tasyopaniṣad aham iti—Bṛh. Up.* v.5.4).

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

(*Antarābhūtagrāmādhikaraṇam*, iii.3.35-36).

According to S. this adhi. discusses whether the Uṣasta-Brāhmaṇa (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.4.1) and the Kahola-Brāhmaṇa (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.5.1) constitute one Vidyā or not. The Pūrvapakṣa is they represent two different Vidyās. The Siddhānta is that they are one, as the same self is taught as being the innermost self of all (*sarvāntaraḥ*)

Criticism

It will be recalled that in the previous *adhi.* S. had raised a doubt that the Vidyās are different because different things were said in the texts concerned, whereas here he raises the Pūrvapakṣa that the Vidyā must be different as there is repetition of the same statement. (*abhyāsa-sāmarthyāt.* Anyathā *annyūnānatiriktārthe dvirāmnānam anarthakameva syāt:* S.*BSB*.iii.3.35). It would appear from this that a doubt may be raised on any account or a mere reproducion of the same words in different texts or a slight difference in some texts should be taken as a sufficient ground for raising a doubt.

Nor does the word 'antarā' in the Sūtra suggest S.'s Viṣayavākya. It is a far cry indeed from 'antarā' an indeclinable (*avyaya*) in Sans-

7. अथात इत्युक्तिस्तु अथशब्दस्य आनन्तर्यार्थतया युज्यते । अत शब्द तत्प्रमादात् इति छान्दोग्यभाष्यदिशा (Ragh. *TPB.* iii 3 39)

8 एवं च सत्यादीनामैक्ये प्रमिते सति, यत्तुशब्दादिना विशेषणमुक्तं, तत् तत्त्वप्रदीपोक्तदिशा भेदप्रतिनिधिविशेषमात्रेणोपपन्नमिति (ibid)

9 अन्यथा अहङ्कारस्य व्याप्त्युक्त्ययोगात् (*Nym.* 1 56)

krıt grammer to 'antarah' of the Śrutı Ya atmā sarvāntarah (*Brh Up* ııı 4 1) which ıs a declınable adjectıve This applies to R also[10]

We may ask ıf the difference ın Vıdyā ıs beıng refuted on the ground of non-difference of the subject of ınstructıon (*vıdyābheda*) or because of non-difference of the adjuncts of the Vıdyās described In the former case, the difference between the Prāna-vıdyās ın the *Chān Up* and *Brh Up* established ın the Anyathātvādhı (ııı 3 6-8) would be vıolated In the latter case, the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmanas show a significant element of difference of adjuncts betwixt themselves For, ın the former, the text speaks of the Ātman as he who breathes ın and breathes out with one's breathing ın and out On the other hand, ın the Kahola text, the Ātman ıs characterized by ıts freedom from hunger and thirst, sorrow and delight etc The adjuncts are thus different ın the two vıdyās Moreover, S himself ın his Bhāsya on the *Brh Up.* has explained that the Uṣasta Brāhmana raises the question whether the transmigrating self exists or not and ıf ıt exists what ıts characteristics are and that the existence of the self having been established ın the Usasta Brāhmana as one who ıs distinct from the body and ıts organs (*kāryakaranasanghātavılaksanah*), the Kahola Brāhmana *proceeds to make clear the nature of sannyāsa and Brahmajñāna* to enable him to attain liberation from bondage[11] Tho' Ātman ıs the same to S he admits that the Kahola Brāhmana elucidates the trans-empirical character of the self This means the two Brāhmanas deal with different aspects of the problem and that, therefore, the adjuncts of the vıdyās are different In the Upadesa 'Tat tvam ası' the same Ātma-svarūpa ıs being explained over again to remove some further doubt It has been admitted by S that the Uṣastı Brahmāna presents the Ātman as 'Kāryakaranapravılayah' and the Kahola Brāhmaṇa presents him as 'Aśanāyādıvırahıtah' This difference ın adjuncts precludes Vidyaıkatva or unity of vıdyā In the absence of such unity, then, ıt ıs premature to try to explain away the 'abhyāsa' as 'tātparyārthaka' as ın the upadeśa of Tat tvam ası. In view of the difference ın the adjuncts between the two descriptions, ıt can hardly be asserted that there ıs any real repetıtıon (*abhyāsa*) at all ın the true sense of that term vız Ekaprakārā-

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10 Thıbaut and Ghate have both failed to notice this ıncongruence ın S s and R s ınterpretation. Nor has any other modern scholar drawn attention to this very significant point

11 Read यस्तु ग्रहातिग्रहैर्ग्रस्तः संसरति सोऽस्ति वा नास्ति ? अस्तित्वं च विलक्षणं इत्यात्मन एव विवेकाधिगमायोषस्तिप्रश्न आरभ्यते (S *Bṛh Up Bhaṣya* ııı 4 1)
बन्धनं संप्रयोजकमुक्तम् । यश्च बद्धः तस्यास्तित्वमधिगतं व्यतिरिक्तत्वं च । तस्येदानीं बन्धमोक्षसाधनं संन्यासमात्मज्ञानं वक्तव्यमिति कहोलप्रश्न (ııı 5 1)
पूर्वस्मिन् प्रश्ने-अस्ति व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा * * इति द्वितीये तु तस्यैवाशनायादिसंसारधर्मातीतत्वविशेष उच्यते (*Op cit,* iii 5 1)

sakṛduktiḥ (a repetition in the same terms). The contention of the *Bhāmatī* that the adjuncts set out in the two descriptions are *not* intended for upāsanā but to present the true nature of the thing, overlooks the fact that the only purpose of incorporating different details in the different vidyās is their meditation and upasamhāra (*See* B.S. iii. 3.15). It is not therefore difficult to presuppose a suitable Vidhi in the present case also. The interpretation of Sūtra 35 to suit the requirements of the Śvet. up. text (vi.11) quoted as an alternative construction of the words 'Bhūtagrāmavat' would seem to require 'Sarvāntaro bhūtagrāmavat' as the proper reading. Having regard to the words 'Sa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ,' 'eṣa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ' in these two Brāhmaṇas, the use of the nominative form would seem to be more befitting than the genitive (*svā*)-*tmanaḥ*.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Antaratvādhikaraṇam (iii.3.35-37)

According to R. the Antaratvādhi. consists of three Sūtras (ii.3. 35-37) ending with *Saiva hi satyādayaḥ*, the first one being read together with *Anyathā* (*prativacana*) *bhedānupapattiriti cennopadeśavat*[13] which S. and others treat as a separate Sūtra. R. adopts S.'s reading '*svātmanaḥ*' after 'bhūtagrāmavat' and turns the genitive to better advantage as giving point to the Pūrvapakṣa[14] which is concluded with the words of the opening Sūtra 'iti cenna'—the Siddhānta being pronounced by the words 'upadeśavat'. The Viṣayavākya is the same as for S.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the two vidyās presented in the Uṣasti and Kahola Brāhmaṇas are different and not one. In the first Brāhmaṇa it is the Jīvātman that is described as the cause of breathing in and out in the body. In the other Brāhmaṇa it is B. that is described as transcending hunger and thirst, etc. If in both the Brāhmaṇas it is B. that is described, the difference in answer to the question *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ya ātmā sarvāntaras tam me brūhi* in the fourth and fifth Brāhmaṇas as 'he who breathes in the upbreathing....etc. and 'he who overcomes hunger and thirst...' would be inconsistent.

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12 M.'s reading of the Sūtra is *Antarā bhūtagrāmavad iti cet taduktam.*

13 S. and M. drop R.'s "prativacana" after anyathā. S. reads *upadeśāntaravat* while R. and M. have merely *upadeśavat.*

14 This is done by treating '*bhūtagrāmavatsvātmanah*' as a compound word.

आत्मशब्दस्य परमात्मवाचित्वव्यावृत्त्यर्थं स्वात्मन इत्युक्तम् (*Srutaprakāśa*)

भूतग्रामवान्, तदन्तर स्वात्मा प्रत्यगात्मा सर्वान्तर इत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः (*Sribhāṣya* iii.3.35)

The cpd.word is explained as the individual self (*svātmā*) to which the aggregate of material things (*bhūtagrāma*) belongs (*vat*).

The Siddhānta is that the questions and answers in the two Brāhmaṇas refer to the same B. The attributes of causing the body to breathe in and out, independently of any other agency belongs only to the Supreme B. This may be seen from the condition of Suṣupti where the Jīvātman has no control over his body and organs and in which the activity of breathing is carried on by the Supreme Being (as in the other states also).[15] The absence of hunger and thirst etc. are exclusive attributes of B. in reality. The two questions do not, therefore, refer to two different persons—the first one to Jīvātman and the second alone to B. Both refer to B. The two replies also refer to the same B.[16] The difference in their content is intended to bring out the majesty of B. as the *upāsya* possessing the different excellences referred to. The concluding part of the Sūtra *Upadeśavat* subjoins a parallel instance from the Tat tvam asi discourse[17] in support of unity of vidyā.

The next Sūtra and the next are both treated by R. as part of this same adhi. The first one (*Vyatihāro * * **) is introduced as disposing of an objection to the conclusion established in the Siddhānta Sūtra, on the ground that the two vidyās must be reckoned as different in as much as the interrogator in each section is different and the complexion of the answers is also different. This is rebutted by the Sūtra: *Vyatihāro viśiṁṣanti hi itaravat.*[18] As construed by R. this means: It being settled that the questions of the two interrogators refer to the same subject matter of B. in view of their oneness of form (*ekarūpam*)—cf. *Yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma*......, we have to make a mutual interchange (*vyatihāra*) of the thought-content of the two replies between them. In other words, Uṣasta's conception of the cause of all life by breathing in and out being the inner being in all must be entertained by Kahola and Kahola's conception of B. as being above hunger and thirst must be taken to be entertained by Uṣasta When such a combination of ideas is effected, it will be seen that the difference of the All-Inward B. (Sarvāntara) from the Jīvātman will be clearly established by both the sections and grasped by both the interrogators. This is the object of Yājñavalkya's replies which distinguish (*viśiṁṣanti*) the Self as be-

15 निरुपाधिक प्राणनस्य कर्तृत्व परमात्मन एव। प्रत्यगात्मन सुषुप्तौ प्राणन प्रति कर्तृत्वाभावात्
(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 35)

16 नात्र प्रत्यगात्मपरमात्मविषय प्रश्नद्वयम्। प्रतिवचनद्वय च परमात्मन्येकस्मिन्नेव उपास्ये सभवतीत्यर्थः :
(R. *Vedāntadīpa* iii 3 35)

17 प्रतिवचनभेदश्च उपास्यमाहात्म्यविशेषप्रतिपादनपरत्वेन दृश्यते। तद्वत् * * (R. *Vedāntadīpa* iii 3 35)

18 प्रश्नभेदपूर्वकप्रतिवचनप्रकारभेदात् विद्याभेदो ऽवर्जनीय एवेत्याशङ्क्याह- 'व्यतिहार' इति (*Dīpa*)

ing the cause of all life and as being above hunger and thirst etc and as the subject of meditation in both the sections [19]

The concluding word *itaravat* in the Sūtra cites a parallel from the Sadvidyāprakaraṇa (or the Tat tvam asi discourse) in the *Chān Up* (vi 7-16)

The last Sūtra is introduced in answer to another objection as to how the Sadvidyā can be treated as one since there is in it a difference between the several questions and the answers [20] This is met by the answer *Saiva hi satyādayah*—that one and the same Paradevatā called true being *Tat satyam* (sa ātmā tat tvam asi Śvetaketo) is the object of meditation taught by Uddālaka to his son in all the sections [21]

Criticism

As in S so in R there is the same incongruity of the indeclinable *antara* being made to do duty for the declinable word *antarah* in Sarvāntarah of the Viṣayavākya R has also to supply the words *ityuṣastapraśnah* after somehow getting over the difficulty created by antarā, (which is really impossible) as the subject of the predication *bhūtagrāmavatsvātmanah* [22]

Granting that the same Paramātman is the subject matter of both the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇas, that by itself is not sufficient to establish unity of vidyās For then, as the entire Brahmakānda has B for its subject matter, either directly or indirectly, there will be no scope for any difference of vidyās anywhere The criterion of unity of vidyās must, therefore, be found only in identity or sameness of attributes of B to be meditated upon As the first Brāhmana describes B as the cause of all life and the Kahola Brāhmaṇa as one transcending hunger and thirst, the attributes to be meditated upon as set out in the two sections are *not* identical This renders the illustration of Sadvidyā inapplicable

Coming to the second sūtra, R has not given a satisfactory answer to the objection that the two Prakaranas show a difference in the nature

19 द्वयो प्रष्टा प्रश्नस्यैकरूपत्वेन एकविषयत्वं निश्चित्य उषस्तब्राह्मणे प्रतिवचनगतबुद्धिव्यतिहारः कार्यं प्राणनादिहेतुत्वबुद्धिः सर्वान्तरात्मविषया कहोलेऽपि कार्या तथाशनायाद्यतीतत्वबुद्धिः उषस्तेऽपि कार्या। विशिंषन्ति हि उभयत्रापि याज्ञवल्क्यवचनानि एकं सर्वान्तरमवगाह्य (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 36)

20 यद्यप्यभ्युपाम्यैवं प्रश्नप्रतिवचनावृत्तौ सत्यां कथमेकत्वमित्यत्राह (R *Vedāntadipa* iii 3 37)

21 सैव हि सत्यादय । यथ देवतोत्तरेष्वपि सर्वत्र सैव परदेवता एकानुवर्तते तत्सत्यमिति सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि इति न एव सत्यादय सर्वेषु प्रतिवचनेषु उपसंह्रियन्ते (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 37)

22 अन्तरा य आत्मा सर्वान्तर इत्युषस्तप्रश्ना भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः (स्वात्मनः) इत्युपन्यस्य (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 37)

of the attributes to be meditated upon—'Sarvaprāṇiprāṇanakartṛtva' in one case and 'Aśanāyādyatītatva' in the other He tries to get over the difficulty by proposing to treat B's sarvāntaratva alone as the attribute to be meditated upon in both the vidyās—the other two separate attributes being the means to prove its being such and, therefore, *not to be meditated upon.*[23] If such an explanation is to be adopted, there will be no justification for admitting difference of vidyās anywhere In the Prāṇa-Vidyā of the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka, for instance, the attribute of not being pierceable by the Asuras with evil (*asurapāpmāviddhatvam*) stands out as the attribute to be meditated upon In spite of this, the two vidyās have been held to be *different* by R in the Anyathātvādhi (iii 3 6-9) But it will not be difficult to maintain that *in the case of the Prāṇavidyās also* being the producer of Udgītha and being the Udgītha itself that is meditated upon by the gods (*udgānakartṛtvam* and *udgānakarmatvam*) are not the attributes to be meditated upon in the respective Vidyās, that Prāṇa's being unpierceable by the Asuras with evil is the 'upāsyaguna' and that the fact of Prāṇa's being both the singer of udgītha and the udgītha itself meditated upon by the gods merely goes to prove and justify his being invulnerable to the evil designs of the Asuras

The presence thro' interchange (*vyatihāra*) of the attribute of freedom from hunger and thirst in the answer to Uṣasta's question proposed by R does not help in any way to highlight B's Sarvāntaratva Cannot B's sarvāntaratva be brought into relief more effectively by the fact of its being the cause of all life (*sarvaprāṇiprāṇanahetutvam*)? In proposing the mutual interchange and addition of '*Sarvaprāṇiprāṇanahetutvam*' and '*asanāyādyatītatvam*', R evidently thinks that Sarvaprāṇiprāṇanahetutva is *not by itself adequate* to completely distinguish B from the Jīvātman without the addition of the other attribute *of freedom from hunger and thirst* etc *(thro' mutual interchange)* A little reflection would, however, show that it is hardly possible to invest the Jīvātman with Sarvaprāṇiprāṇanahetutva, when as a matter of fact according to R's own showing the Jīvātman in his own deep sleep (suṣupti) is unable to carry on *his own* breathing in and out, by his own initiative! (See f n 15) Nor is the other attribute of freedom from hunger and thirst etc not intrinsic to the Jīvātman, for the Śrutis and Smṛtis invest him with these attributes in his pristine state The interchange is thus ineffective and pointless

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23 अतो ब्रह्मण सर्वान्तरत्वमेवोपास्यगुण । प्राणनहेतुत्वादयस्तु तस्योपपादका नोपास्या

(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 36)

R has done less than justice to the Sutra *Saiva hi satyādayah* in reducing it to the status of a guṇa-sūtra disposing of a supplementary objection to a mere illustration provided in a supplementary sūtra (36). There is no paucity of material to give this Sūtra an independent status as constituting a separate adhi, with a topic of its own. However, if this Sūtra is merely to refer to the final summing up and confirmation of what has been stated in all the preceding sections of the Sadvidyā one should expect precedence to be given to the keyword of the peroration "*aitadātmyam*" (idam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi) which is also the first word therein instead of to "Satyam" which *follows* it And the irony of it is that the phrase 'Satya-*ādayah*' represents the *tail end* of the statement but leaves out the most significant pronouncement of all—viz *aitadātmyam* (idam sarvam) at the *head*!

Śamkara's Interpretation
Vyatihārādhikaranam (iii 3 37)

According to S this adhi discusses the text from the *A Ā* (ii.2 4-6) which runs "What I am that He is, What He is that I am". Here "He" denotes the Being in the Sun and "I" the worshipper[24] The question is whether this text enjoins meditation both ways or only in one way—viz. the first. The Pūrvapakṣa holds that it should be only in terms of the individual soul's oneness with B and not also the other way about For, while in the first way of meditation there is elevation of the Jiva to Brahmanhood, the other way involves a pulling down of B We have, therefore, to treat it as a statement made merely to strengthen the idea of their oneness and not to form part of the meditation.[25]

The Siddhānta is the double way of meditation has been given in the text only for purposes of being adopted in toto—just as in the case of meditation of other attributes like B's being the self of all (*sarvātmatva*) The Jābālins also make a distinctive double enunciation to the same effect "I am you O respected Deity and You are I indeed". Such double enunciation has meaning only if a twofold meditation is adopted As to B's being lowered in the other way of meditation (*Yo asau so'ham*), it is only the unity of Jīva and B that is highlighted by it. The real point is that the text stands for a twofold meditation. That it confirms their unity is true enough and admitted just as instruc-

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24 तस्य वा एतस्य बृहतामुक्थस्य महतस्य परस्तात् प्रजामयो देवतामयो ब्रह्ममयोऽमृतमयः सम्भूय देवता अप्येति य एवं वेद । तद्यदहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहम् । तदुक्तमृषिणा–'सूर्य आत्मा जगतस्तस्थुषश्च' इति । तदु हैवायगतासीत
(*AĀ* iii 2 4)

See also Vol I, pp 130-31, 133-35

25 संसारिणस्तावदीश्वरात्मत्वे उत्कर्षो भवदीश्वरस्य तु संसार्यात्मत्वे निकर्षः कृतः स्यात् । तस्मादैकत्वमेव मतं
(S *BSB* iii 3 37)

tions about the meditation of attributes like Satyakāmatva prove the existence of a B. endowed with those qualities. The double way of meditation has therefore to be carried out and transferred to other Vidyās with the same theme of Ahaṁgrahopāsanā.[26]

Criticism

The inquiry proposed *has no proper adhikaraṇa and Pāda saṅgatis.* The *Kalpataru* no doubt has tried to put up the nexus of this adhi. with the preceding one as follows: In the previous adhi. it was held in establishing unity of Vidyās between the Uṣasta and Kahola Brāhmaṇas that the repetition (*abhyāsa*) of the descriptions there, was an expression of deep interest in the subject (*ādarārthaḥ*). The Pūrvapakṣa arises here on the same plea that the repetition of the statement *Yoham so asau, Yo asau so aham* is also purely an expression of deep interest in the matter and is not meant to be taken as sanctioning the double way of meditation and involving Īśvaradṛṣti' in the Jīva. But this misses the point that as the wording 'Tad yo' ham so'sau'; 'Yo'sau so'ham' does not answer to the requirement of an '*abhyāsa*' which consists in *repetition in exactly the same form* (*ekaprakārāsakṛduktiḥ*) as in 'Aho darśanīyā aho darśanīyā'. No ākṣepa or objection can, therefore, lie from the point of view of 'abhyāsa' here. Leaving aside the question of adhikaraṇasaṅgati, the topic raised here has no connection with this Pāda which is devoted to the question of establishing unity or difference of Vidyās. As the double statement is given in the very same passage (and not different sections) there is no question of either belonging to a different Vidyā and, therefore, being in need of a ruling in favor of its integration with the other. The other question of upasamhāra of this double meditation in other vidyās of the same theme is already covered by the ruling given in the Prayojana Sūtra (iii.3.5). The adhikaraṇa is thus out of place in this Pāda and unnecessary.

S. has cleverly evaded the Pūrvapakṣin's objection that the meditation of B. as Jīva (*yo asau so'ham*) will be tantamount to pulling down the deity. His answer, that even in that way, only the unity of the self with B. is meditated upon, conceals the disastrous price one has to pay to go in for such upāsanā. If the attributes taught for meditation are really present in the Being meditated upon, the Pūrvapakṣin will be right in calling a halt to the Upāsanā in terms of *Yo'sau So'ham* as it will pull down the deity. *If they are not, it will conflict* with S.'s

26 व्यतिहारेणेह द्विरूपा मतिः कर्तव्या, वचनप्रामाण्यात् नैकरूपतेत्येतावदुपपादयाम फलतस्त्वेकत्वमपि दृढीभवति। यथा ध्यानायऽपि सत्यकामादिगुणोपदेशे तद्गुण ईश्वरः प्रसिद्ध्यति, तद्वत्। तस्मादाध्यातव्यो व्यतिहार समाने च विषये उपसंहर्तव्यो भवतीति (S. *BSB.* iii 3 37)

own statement to the contrary that when attributes like Satyakāmatva are taught for meditation, it proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities (See f.n. 26).

The pronoun 'asau' in the text *Yo'ham so'sau* contextually refers to the Supreme Being seated in the solar orb. The Jīvātman enjoys no such high status. The Śruti cannot be oblivious of this disparity between them to authorize their being looked upon as being mutually identical. It will be a defiance of the high status of Īśvara to regard Him in the light of the individual soul and rob the meditation of the regard which is due to the object of one's meditation. Nor can such upāsanā be put down as permitted by Śruti for purposes of achieving unseen merit (*adṛṣṭārtha*). Far from producing any *adṛṣṭa*, such upāsanā is sure to lead to Divine displeasure.

Tho' to S. upāsanā is a matter of superimposition, he has openly frowned upon the contemplation of the king as his charioteer, as it would lower the king's status to do so and that would *not be* beneficial. He cannot, therefore, consistently with that stand taken by him under the Sūtra *Brahmadṛṣṭir utkarṣāt* (iv.1.5) commend here the meditation of *Yo'sau so'ham* in its literal sense.[27a]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

Satyādyadhikaraṇam (iii.3.38)

According to S. the Viṣayavākyas of this *adhi.* are *Brh. Up.*[27] v.4.1 and v.5.2. The fourth Brāhmaṇa enjoins knowledge of Satyam together with meditation on its component syllables (*sanāmākṣaropāsanā*) in the following words: "Whoever knows the adorable being (*yakṣam*) the first born as B. conquers the worlds. His enemy is likewise conquered and becomes extinct." The Brāhmaṇa (v.5.2) goes on to say: "What is true that is the yonder sun. The Person who is there in that orb and the Person who is here in the right eye these two rest on each other. Thro' his rays that one rests on this one* * *" The next section of the same Brāhmaṇa continues "Of that Person in the orb, the syllable bhūḥ is the head, bhuvaḥ is the arms, svaḥ is the feet.

27a. The Stotrakāra Śaṁkara hastens to draw the line:
सत्यपि भेदापगमे नाथ तवाहं न मामकीनस्त्वम् ।
सामुद्रो हि तरंगः क्वचन समुद्रो न तरंगः ॥ (S. *Viṣṇustuti*)

27 तद्वै तदेव तदास सत्यमेव । स यो हैतं महद्यक्षं प्रथमजं वेद सत्यं ब्रह्मेति, जयतीमान् लोकान् जित इन्न्वसावसत् (*Op. cit.* v 4 1)
तद्यत् सत्यमसौ स आदित्यो य एष एतस्मिन् मण्डले पुरुषो यश्चायं दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुष. तावेतावन्योऽन्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितौ (*Op. cit.* v 5 2)

His secret name is "ahar" and the next section (v 4) continues · Of the person in the right eye, bhūh is the head, bhuvah is the arms and svah the feet His secret name is 'aham' He who knows this destroys evil' The sixth Brāhmana runs This Person consists of mind He is of the nature of light He is within the heart like a grain of rice of barely He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all, governs all that there is" (v 6)

The doubt arises if these Vidyās viz *Brh Up* v 4 1 and v 5 2 are one Vidyā or two different ones The Pūrvapakṣa is that tho' the object of meditation in both is the same B and has, therefore, been referred back as "*that* satyam" in v 2 yet the two Vidyās are *different* as they are associated with different results—conquest of the world in the former and destruction of sins in the other,—just as the prescriptive śāstra relating to the kāmya and nitya performance of Darśapūrnamāsa is different, notwithstanding the oneness of the injuctive sense of 'yajeta'

The Siddhānta is that the two Vidyās are the same The Purvapakṣa argument that the back-reference can be explained on the basis of the sameness of the object of meditation can be accepted only in cases where the difference of Vidyās is ascertainable on other clear grounds In the present case, there is possibility of both alternatives being true and the back reference enables us to conclude that there is only one Vidyā of 'Satyam'

The injunction regarding the main upāsanā of Satyavidyā having been concluded in v 4 1 with a statement of its own reward of world-conquest, the destruction of sins mentioned in v 5 3-4, has to be viewed only as a glorification (*arthavāda*) of the subsidiaries (*angas*) of the said Vidyā such as the meditation of the secret names of '*ahar*' and '*aham*' of the Person in the solar orb and in the right eye[28] It is an established principle of exegesis that subsidiary rites derive their connection with fruits thro' their organic relation to the main rite The secondary fruits spoken of in the arthavāda passages are, therefore, ignored in such cases On the other hand, if for the reason that the main Vidyā (v 4 1) contains no explicit statement that a person desirous of such and such a fruit shall meditate on the Satyam-B in such and such a way, it is insisted that the fruit is to be supplied from the arthavāda part, the Siddhāntin's reply to it will be that as there is unity of Vidyā here, all *those fruits* mentioned in the *text* in con-

28 अङ्गानां प्रधानान्वयद्वारेण फलसम्बन्धसिद्धेरर्थवादगतानि गुणफलानि प्रयाजादिफलवदुपेक्ष्यन्त इत्यर्थ

(Kalpataru)

nection with the various parts of the Vidyā are to be combined and placed in connection with the Vidyā as a whole. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the conclusion is inescapable that the text records only one Satyavidyā with many details and that all the attributes mentioned therein are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.[29]

Criticism

We have to point out that after having dealt with the meditation on Hṛdaya-B. (in v.3) the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text sets forth *one after the other* several distinct Vidyās of Satya-B. each with its own fruits, places of meditation, special attributes to be meditated and Adhikārins. A conspectus of these will easily bear this out. In v.4, the first Satya-vidyā is associated with the conquest of the world as its fruit. V.5.1 refers to the Devas as the Adhikārins of this meditation and ascribes to it the fruit of immunity from injury by untruth. V.5.2 refers to the solar orb as the abode of the Satya-B. to be meditated upon and gives destruction of sins as its fruit. The latter part of v.5.2 gives another meditation of Satya-B. whose abode is the right eye and the fruit as before. Brāhmaṇa 6, refers to the meditation of Satya-B. in the āyatana of the heart as smaller than the grain of rice or barley.

This should make it clear that each of these Satya-vidyās is different and self-contained. We may ask if the unity of Vidyās is sought to be established between v.4.1 and the two meditations of Satya set forth in v.5.2; or between the two meditations alone found together in v.5.2, one of the Person in the solar orb and the other of the Person in the right eye? So far as we can see, S. is interested in establishing unity of Vidyās between v.4.1 and the two meditations in v.5.2 and no others as he has quoted only these two passages for his Viṣayavākya. In the Vidyās set out in v.5.2, the Vyāhṛtis are mentioned as the head, arms and feet of the Person, while the Satya to be meditated upon in v.4.1 is the adorable, first-born (*prathamajam yakṣam*). The upāsyaguṇas are thus different in each of these. And v.5.2 is also separated from v.4 by another section which also carries a meditation of Satyam by the Devas. No satisfactory reason is forthcoming as to why S. should be at pains to establish unity of Vidyās between v.4 and v.5.2 only and give short shrift to the intervening v.5.1. Unless this intervening section is also given the benefit of unity, it will not be possible to cross over to v.5.2 and hold v.4 and v.5.2 to be one Vidyā. It cannot be contended that this Vidyā (v.5.1) also forms a

29 अर्थवादेन पुनः कल्पयितव्ये सति विधिवत्त्वे वाक्यशेषे श्रूयमाणानि बहून्यपि फलान्यवयविन्यामेव विद्यायामुप-संहर्तव्यानि भवन्ति (S. *BSB*. iii 3 38)

unity with the preceding and the following meditations For this one deals with the meditation of the three syllables of Satya and thus the 'upāsyagunas' here are different from the rest Unity of Vidyās cannot be accepted on the sole basis of the object of meditation being the same —in the face of other factors like difference in 'ayatana' and upāsyagunas This principle has been accepted by S and Vācaspati —

परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीथोपासन अक्ष्यादित्यादिगतहिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टोद्गीथोपासनात् भिन्नम् (S *BSB* iii 3 7)

यद्योद्गीथोपासनासाम्येऽपि, आदित्यादिगतहिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टोद्गीथोपासनात. परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टोद्गीथोपासना भिन्ना तद्वत् इदमपीति (*Bhāmatī* iii 3 7)

It will be noticed that S has quietly ignored this aspect of the matter and has been talking mostly about the grounds of 'phalabheda' on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa which is only a part of the story

Coming to the other possibility of unity of Vidyās as between the first and second parts of v 5 2, they present formidable obstacles to forcing them into an artificial unity They show glaring differences of *adhiṣṭhāna* or receptacle of upāsanā—the solar orb and the right eye and different secret names to be meditated upon—*'ahar'* and *'aham'* In other words, each is a Viśiṣṭopāsanā and the ruling has been given in the Sambandhādhikaranam (iii 3 20-22) that there is no interpenetration between two viśiṣṭas —

विशिष्टस्य विशिष्टान्तरेऽननुगम

In confining the scope of the inquiry to only two of the Vidyās set forth in *Brh Up v* 4 and v 5 2, and concluding the same on that basis,[30] S has failed to take note of the plural form Satyādayah in the Sūtra The term 'Satya' may perhaps be made to indicate the Vidyā of that name by Laksanā But is not the 'ādi' added to 'Satya' in Satyādayah a useless appendage?

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30 किं द्वे एते सत्यविद्ये किं वैकवेति (S *BSB* iii 3 38)

CHAPTER XLVI

WHY ŚRĪTATTVA IS *NOT* LISTED AMONG ADHIKĀRINS

24. *Kāmādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.40-42)

In the Satyādhi., it was shown that vijñāna, mati, kṛti, śraddhā etc. mentioned subsequent to Satya are identical with it as its attributes and that therefore except Satya (B), Prāṇa (Hiraṇyagarbha) has no other superior being. However, there is still room for a doubt and another objection to this conclusion.There is (bound to be) consensus that Cit-Prakṛti or Śrītattva (the goddess Lakṣmī) as the Abhimāni-devatā of Jaḍa-Prakṛti occupies a position of high status immediately *above* Prāṇa-Hiraṇyagarbha and *below* Satya (B). The question is bound to be asked sooner or later as to what her position is in the general set-up of Upāsanā-Adhikārins. As she is not superior to B, there is a *prima facie* case for placing her in the class of Adhikārins and defining her position as an Adhikāriṇī above Prāṇa. In order to do that, we have to go in for one more adhyāhāra or vyatihāra of a suitable question and an answer inserted on behalf of Śrītattva[1] *after Prāṇa*. One would naturally expect such a question in this context. How is it then that the text of the *Chān. Up.* is silent on the point and gives us not even the remotest hint of the possibility of such a vyatihāra, as in the case of the Prāṇātivādin?[2] M.'s bhāṣya raises this pertinent question thro' a well-thought-out Pūrvapakṣa :

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1 एवं सत्यादेः सर्वस्य विष्णोर्वोक्तौ श्रियोऽप्यधिकारित्वात् प्राणादूर्ध्वं श्रियोऽप्यध्याहारः स्यात् तथा च प्राणाव-धित्वमधिकारित्वर्गस्यानमयुक्त इति मतनात मगति । अत्र प्राणविष्णुसन्निधापिना श्री किमुपासनाधिकारिणी वप नेति चिन्ता (Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvalī* iii 3 40)

प्रकृतेरपि जन्मादे. ससारप्राप्ते , किमिति नामादिष्वपाठ.? [2]

(M *BSB* III.3 40)

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that Śrī must be put down as an Adhikāriṇī for upāsanā For, she is referred to in the *Bhāgavata Purāna* (x 33 6) and elsewhere as engaged in the upāsanā of the Supreme Being, like the gods Brahmā, Rudra, the Rsis and the Sāttvatas Such upāsanā, on her part must, therefore, be deemed to be undertaken for attaining release from bondage thro' the grace of B as in the case of the others Adhikāra or title for upāsanā is determined by the factors of the person in question being desirous of attaining something *(arthitva)* having the capacity to achieve it (*sāmarthya*) and intellectual and spiritual qualifications for it (*vidvattā*) As Śrī is a Cetana, there is no difficulty in associating the desire for release with her, for no sentient being is without desire नाकाम कस्यचित् भवेत् Otherwise, even Mukhya Prāna who is an Ekānta-Bhakta having no desire for Moksa as such will turn out to be a non-Adhikārin

As Śrī does not fall within the category of Nityasamsārins or Tamoyogyas, her eligibility for Moksa as an Uttamādhikarinī (*sadhutvam*) is easily established The Śruti *Yatah prasūtā jagatah prasuti* (Mah N Up xi 1) and the fact of Śri's having birth and death in her incarnations as Sītā and Rukminī shows she is subject to transmigration (*samsāra*) and, therefore, must be counted as an Adhikārinī for Moksa Moreover, the very fact that Śri is known to engage herself in Upāsana shows that she is *not* krtakrtyā' (one who has nothing to gain by Upāsana) There is no proof that her Upāsanā is due only to exhuberance of spontaneous devotion to the Lord Otherwise, the same thing can be said of the other upāsakas like the gods and the Sāttvatas For all these reasons, it is proper to hold that Śri's embodied lives as Sitā and Rukmini etc and exit from those bodies are to be put down to the effects of Karma She must, therefore, be regarded as bound by Samsāra, like the other Jīvas and being bound, eligible for Moksa on account of her Sadhutva (belonging to the higher class of soults) She is, therefore, certainly an Adhikārinī and a suitable question and answer ought to be inserted in the Upanisad for the purpose The *STC* points out that tho' it is relevant here only to consider if an adhyāhāra of question and answer in respect of Śri is called for or not, the question of her Adhikāra is also discussed as being relevant to the theme of this Pāda, which is Upāsanā

2 अपाठ पाठाभाव नामदिषु मध्य, विप्रयुक्त विद्य तदध्याहार तत्पाठोऽध्याहृतव्य एवेत्यर्थ (*BD*)
स च भवन प्राणादुपर्यव भवेत । तथा च नाधिकारिणा प्राणावमानत्वमिति भाव (*TP* III 3 40)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra: *Kāmād itaratra tatra cāyatanādıbhyaḥ.* The term 'kāmāt' is to be repeated (*āvṛttih*[3]). The subject of the proposition is Śrīḥ brought up naturally by the earlier context of Prāṇa and Satya—as the one standing above the former and below the latter.[4] The whole Sūtra thus conveys the meaning: Śrī or the goddess Lakṣmī incarnates herself (*avatarati*) purely by her own free will (*kāmāt*) alone (*ca=eva*) which is always in accord- with the will (or wish: *kāmāt*) of the Supreme Being (*Īśvarādhīna-svecchayaiva*)[5]. This she does while being there (*tatra*) i.e. by the side of the Lord, in Heaven in her original form (*mūlarūpa*) while assuming the Avatars elsewhere (*itaratra*), on earth, at the same time (as Sītā, Rukmiṇī, etc.). This is borne out by the Śrutis which ascribe to her such august attributes as being Sarvāyatanā, Sarvakālā, Sarvecchā, etc. Sarvāyatanā and Sarvakālā mean being present in all places and at all times.[6] Sarvecchā means everything is dependent on her will. The reference to her Avatars is to disabuse the mind of the notion that her births and deaths are due to the effects of karma. Birth and death in her case are to be understood in the sense of becoming open to human perception and ceasing to become open to human perception. The *TD* explains the terms Sarvāyatanā[7] and Sarvakālā differently as: "His (B.'s) place is hers, His time is hers, His wish is from Him." Here 'sarva' stands for B. the infinite (*pūrṇam*[8]). The above Vatsa-Śruti quoted by M. goes on to add—"She is not bound, but she binds the Jīvas (as the abhimānidevatā of Jaḍaprakṛti). She is the Cit-Prakṛti without modification."[9] The above mentioned Vatsa-Śruti quoted by M. bears witness to Śrī's *not* benig bound (*na baddhā*) by Samsāra as it refers to her assuming her Avatāras at her own will and recognizes her dependence on the Lord, when it refers to her as "Sarvecchā" in the sense explained by the TD. This means Śrī's *not being bound* and at the same time her *not being the independent* bestower of Mokṣa on

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3. कामादित्यावृत्तिः (*TDP.* iii 3 40)
4. प्राणविष्णुमध्यगसन्निधापिता श्रीरन्वेति (*ibid*)
5. कामात् कामात् कामाधीनात् कामादेव ईश्वरेच्छानुसारिस्वेच्छयैव, न कर्मतः (*ibid*)
   Cf. कामेन मे काम आगात् (*TA.* iii 15 2a)
6. तत्र तथाप्यितरत्रैवान्यत्रेच्छयावतरतीत्येतत् सर्वगतत्वादिवाचिश्रुतिसिद्ध इति वदन् आयतनेभ्य इत्यर्थवत् (*ibid*)
7. Ragh. *TPB.* explains that as the purpose of the Sūtra is to indicate the intended Śruti 'Sarvāyatanā' etc. the Sūtrakāra has contented himself with merely referring to its keyword '*āyatana*' in the Sūtra.
8. सर्वं पूर्णत्वात् विष्णुरिति वाच्यं । तस्यायतनमेव अस्या आयतनम् । तत्काल एव कालः, तस्मादेव इच्छा चेति सर्वायतना, सर्वकाला सर्वेच्छा च (*TD.* iii 3 40)
9. 'सर्वायतना सर्वकाला सर्वेच्छा न बद्धा, बन्धका सैषा प्रकृतिरविकृतिः '

account of her dependence (pāratantrya) on the Lord—carry the implicit reason why she has not been mentioned in the *Chān. Up.* (vii.15-16) *in between* Prāṇa and Satya thro' a further insertion (*vyatithāra*) of a *question and an answer. This implication of the* Chāndogya Śruti *is fully* brought out by the detailed explanation of the point given by the passage from the *Brahmatarka* quoted by M. as ancillary authority:

नामादयस्तु बद्धत्वात् मोचकत्वात् परोऽपि च ।
उभयोरप्यभावेन यथाऽव्यक्तं न तूदितम् ॥
श्रुतौ, तथा जीवपरावुच्येते, किंच नेतरत्
नोच्यते च, तदा तत्त्वद्वयं वै समुदाहृतम् ॥

In the series of fifteen Tattvas beginning with nāma (Uṣā) vāk (Svāha) manas (*Parjanya*) *saṅkalpa* (*Mitra*) *citta* (*Agni*) *dhyāna* (Varuṇa) * * * and ending with Prāṇa (Mukhya Prāṇa) given as Upāsanādhikārins in their ascending order of merit, in the *Chān. Up.* and in the acceptance of Satya-B. as the goal and object of their meditation, the Upaniṣad has not included Śrītattva because it is neither bound by Samsāra like the other fifteen Tattvas nor is it competent to confer Mokṣa on the Upāsakas *independently* of the will and the grace of the Supreme B. It is from this point of view that the Śrutis more often speak of only *two Tattvas*—Jīva and B.—as in *(Dvā suparṇā)*—not that Avyakta (Śrītattva) and Jaḍa-tattvas are not there, or are *not* to be taken into account.

The *TD* makes a point here that it follows from this that the Śruti may be understood as comprehending Śrītattva under the Paratattva (Supreme tattva) itself:

अव्यक्तस्याबद्धत्वेन परतत्त्वेऽन्तर्भावात् * * * एवं च, प्रकारान्तरेणापि (श्रुति) योजना अस्तीति गम्यते (*TD.* iii.3.40)

In an impassioned and thoughtful note, Trivikrama Paṇḍita further observes that lest it should be thought that as Śrītattva has not been mentioned in between Prāṇa and Satya-B. in the Śruti, she is not entitled to be worshipped and meditated upon by the Upāsakavarga, the Sūtrakāra has deliberately chosen this special context to remove such a misconception by giving the prominent position that belongs by right to Śrī—the mother of Mukhya Prāṇa, in the Upāsanā Pāda, to drive home the truth that she must be meditated upon by all Adhikārins in *the closest and most intimate association with the Supreme Being and as* standing far above Mukhya Prāṇa.[10] He adds: when it is incumbent

10 अन्तरालानुक्तिपक्षेऽपि नोपासनीया सेति मा भूत् शङ्का इत्येवैवोपासनापादे प्रस्तौति देवी प्राणप्रसूतिम् । प्राणादुपरि सहैव भगवता मुमुक्षूणामभिध्यातव्येति (*TD*)

upon all Mumukṣus to meditate upon all the Adhikārins beyond Nāma and ending with Prāṇa as the retinue of the Supreme B. in the ascending ōrder of their excellences, it needs no special emphasis that the best-beloved consort of the Supreme Ruler of the Cosmos who is constantly waited upon the four-faced Brahmā and other gods has also to be worshipped and meditated upon with supreme devotion.[11]

The next Sūtra : 'Ādarād alopaḥ' answers the question : Why is Śrī engaged in constant Upāsanā of the Supreme, as stated in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (x.33.6), when, as a matter of fact, she is not at all bound by Samsāra—as has already been established in the first Sūtra? The answer is that her Upāsanā is an act of *ādara* which means spontaneous devotion of the highest order (*nirupādhikabhaktyatiśaya.*[12]) She engages in such Upāsanā not because she is bound by Samsara[13] like other Adhikārins'; for she is ever free from Samsāra (*nityamuktā*). The next Sūtra raises a further objection as to how it is possible for Śrī to be a 'Nityamuktā.' She cannot be so by herself as she is not independent and only an independent being can be nityamukta. The Sūtra *Upasthites tadvacanāt*[14] gives the answer that she is the recipient of the highest form of grace of the Supreme Being by reason of her closest, most intimate and inseparable association with the Supreme from beginningless time and this accounts for her being a nityamuktā.

Thus the first Sūtra shows that there are no reasons such as birth and physical embodiment to make Śrī subject to bondage and, therefore, an Adhikāriṇī for Upāsanā. The second answers the objection as to how Śrī can engage in Upāsanā if she is *not subject to Samsāra*[15] by explaining that her Upāsanā is an expression of spontaneous devotion without any strings attached to it. The last Sūtra shows how Śrī remains the *only* Nityamuktā among dependent beings, by reason of the closeness and intimacy of her eternal association with the Supreme, vouchsafed to her by special grace.

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11. नामप्रभृतिप्राणपर्यन्तानामपि परिवारभूतानामुत्तरोत्तरतो विशेषादुपास्तिपूजनादिकं विवक्षितम्। किं पुनरखिलेश्वरस्यानिशप्रियतमाया विरिञ्चमुखनिखिलसुरवरपुरःसरमज्जनमन्तरसेव्याया देव्याः ? (*TD.* iii 3 40)
    Cf. also यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि तं ब्रह्माणम् (*RV.* x 125 5)
12. 'आदरो भजनं भक्तिर्बहुमानं च सेवनम्' इत्यभिधानम् (*TP.* iii 3 41)
13. अबद्धत्वेऽपि भक्तिविशेषादेव उपासनाप्रवृत्तिः तस्याः (*M. BSB.* iii 3 41)
14. उप समीपे स्थिते नित्यस्थितत्वात् श्रियः (*TDP*)
    Cf. यत्र श्रिता श्रीः (*TD.*). The very word Śrīḥ applied to her is suggestive of this closeness of association.
15. द्वितीये असंसारित्वे तस्याः कथमुपासनमित्याक्षेपपरिहाराय उपासनायाः प्रीत्यादरनिमित्तकत्वोक्तिः (Raghu. *TPB* iii 3 42). The reading संसारित्वे, in the printed edition of Raghu's TPB is a grievous misprint for असंसारित्वे

In this connection, M.'s bhāṣya quotes the Gaupavana Śruti which refers to the Supreme B. and Śrī as nityamuktās, being always together *(anadiyuktau)*. They delight in each other. The Lord delights in Himself who is present in her. He is Para-ma as He is superior *(para)* to her *(mā)*.[16] However, being 'Nityamuktā Śrī is also without Laya. see Samanādhi. iv, 2.7-14.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation
Kāmādyadhikaraṇam (iii.3.39)

According to S. this *adhi.* considers whether the two passages : *Chān. Up.* viii.1.1-5 which speaks of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in connection with the ether in the heart-lotus and *Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.22 which speaks of the great unborn self which is surrounded by the ether in the heart and which is represented as the ruler of all, constitute one Vidyā or not and whether the particulars of the one are to be comprised in the meditation of the attributes of the other. The Pūrvapakṣa is there is no inclusion of the guṇas from the Chāndogya as it is taught there that the 'daharākāśa' is the object of meditation whereas in the Bṛh. Up. text it is Ātman having daharākāśa as its abode that is to be meditated upon.

The Siddhānta is that the two passages from one teaching and the qualities mentioned in each are to be combined with those of the other as they have many points in common. It has been shown in BS.i.3.14, that 'ether' in the *Chān. Up.* passage refers to B. So the abode *(āyatana)* in both is the *same*—the heart. There is thus no difficulty on that *score. The object of meditation in both is the same Lord. Common* too is the Lord's being mentioned as the bank preventing the worlds from getting confounded.

However, the Vidyā taught in the Chāndogya is 'Saguṇa' while the one in the *Bṛh. Up.* is 'Nirguṇa.' The Upasamhāra of the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. given in the Saguṇa Vidyā of Chāndogya for actual meditation *is, therefore, permitted in the Nirguṇavidyā of the Bṛh. Up.* purely as eulogizing B. and *not* for purposes of meditation. The attributes of being the Lord of all *(vaśitva)* found in the Nirguṇavidyā are, in their own context also, *not* enjoined for meditation. Their Upasamhāra in the Saguṇavidyā is not, therefore, to be taken as equivalent

16 द्वावेतौ अनादिनित्यौ अनादियुक्तौ नित्यमुक्तौ अनादिकृतौ नित्यकृतौ योऽस्य परमो या च प्रकृति । रमते ह्यस्या परमो रमते ह्यस्मिन् प्रकृति. स्वस्मिन् हि रमते परमो न स्वस्मिन् प्रकृति., अत एनमाहु. "पर-म" इति
(M. *BSB.* iii 3 42)

Read also: सशान्तसविदखिल जठरे निधाय लक्ष्मीभुजान्तरगत स्वरतोऽपि चाग्रे
(M. *Mbh. T.N.* i, 2)

to enjoining their meditation in the Sagunavidyā but merely as 'comprehended' within the range of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in so far as Vasitva etc are inseparable from Satyakāmatva Their Upasamhāra is purely technical—by way of subsumption (*'antarbhāva'*) Thus the 'Upasamhāra' of the attributes of Satyakāmatva in the Nirguṇavidyā of Bṛhadāraṇyaka is to be understood *not* for purposes of meditation but as eulogy and the Upasamhāra of Vaśitva and other attributes of the Nirgunavidyā in the Sagunavidyā is not for purposes of meditation but just by way by of subsumption (*antarbhāva*) of vaśitva etc under Satya kāmatva and others [16]

Criticism

The purpose of this Pāda is Gunopasamhāra for purposes of meditation Since this *adhi* as interpreted by S and his commentators does not contemplate or fulfil this requirement and tries to divorce upasamhāra from its purpose of actual meditation of the attributes involved, it falls outside the scope of this Pāda There seems to be no point in maintaining a division of Vidyās as Saguṇa and Nirguna if the mutual upasamhāra of the attributes given in them is to be per mitted in any form or sense

It will be remembered that the Upasamhāra of attributes of one Vidyā with those of another has been repudiated in respect of the two Prāṇavidyās of the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka on grounds of difference in the commencement of the passages *(prakrambheda)*—in *adhi* 3, in the case of the Akṣi and Ādityavidyās on the ground of difference of abode of the object of meditation in adhi 11, and in the Prāṇa and Brahmavidyās on account of difference of the object of meditation.

In the present case also, the two Vidyās have different commencements The Chāndogya passage commences with the words Brahmapuram (viii 1 1) and the *Brh Up* passage with "Mahān aja ātmā" (iv 4 22) In one the abode is the lotus of the heart and in the other it is the ether; in one Brahman to be mediated upon is Saguna and in the other "Nirguna" Thus, these two Vidyās exhibit all the three differences of *upakrama*, *āyatana* and *vedya* together! Why then should a different stand be taken in their case alone?

16 निर्गुणायां तावद्विद्यायां ब्रह्मस्तुत्यर्थमेव सगुणविद्यागतवशित्वादिगुणोपसंहार इति मन्तव्यम् । सगुणायां च यद्यप्यध्यानात्
न वशित्वादिगुणोपसंहार एव अपि तु सत्यकामादिगुणान्तर्गततया वर्णनया प्राप्तिरित्युपसंहार उच्यते
(*Bhamati* iii 3 39)
नास्ति न भवन्त एषां तत्र तथनमस्तन । सत्यकामत्वादिमध्यपतितं सर्वेश्वरत्वमिदं । अतो अन्तर्भावमात्र
मुपसंहार इत्यर्थ (*Kalpataru*)

One can understand the necessity for eulogizing where some activity is to be initiated The Nirguna-B by hypothesis has no excellences by itself nor any that can be evoked upon it by any sort of device (*anādheyātiśaya*) In the circumstances, even the attributes of *mahatva, ajatva, ātmatva* and *sarvavaśitva* enumerated in the context of Nirgunavidyā itself cannot operate as eulogies of the Nirgunavidyā in their own context How then can one expect the attributes of Satyakāmatva and others enumerated in a different Śākhā (the Chāndogya) to do so, out of their context? Otherwise, it should be possible to predicate that the attributes given in all the Sagunavidyās, irrespective of their differences, go to eulogize the Nirgunavidyā—which would ultimately mean that everywhere it is only the Nirgunavidyā that is being taught There will be no point then in recognizing one set of Vidyās as Saguna and another as Nirguna As the attributes of Satyakāmatva and others have been given in the Sagunavidyā only for purposes of meditation, their Upasamhāra in the Nirgunvidyā, if conceded, *should* also be for purposes of meditation and *not* for mere eulogization The contention that attributes intended to be meditated upon should be accompanied by an injunction to the effect and that there is no such injunction in regard to the attributes of the Nirgunavidyā is futile For, in the case of Satyakāmatva and others also in the Sagunavidyā, there is no injunction to meditation The attributes mentioned *in the Nirgunavidyā being self sufficient raise no expectancy of having* to be supplemented by others Hence, there is no need to carry forward the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc from the Sagunavidyā to eulogize them in order to fulfil any such expectancy It is not possible to presume such expectancy on the basis of sameness of abode of the Vidyās and so on We have seen that the *āyatana, upakrama* and others are virtually different in respect of the two Vidyās There is thus no room for any such expectancy It is farfetched to argue that as the presence of the word 'ātman' in both the Vidyās enables us to recognize their oneness, the meditation on Satyakāmatva will be incompatible with Nirgunavidyā and its Upasamhara is, therefore, to be taken as intended for purposes of eulogy What is really Nirguna *cannot possibly forfeit* its Nirgunatva even it is meditated upon as having the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc There can thus be no harm even if the actual meditation of Satyakāmatva is admitted thro' Upasamhāra It is difficult to accept the position that the attributes of vaśitva and others are to be subsumed under Satyakāmatva etc thro' Upasamhāra Being the more pervasive of the two it would be more logical and consistent to subsume Satyakāmatva under Sarvavaśitva The subsumption of vaśitva and others under Satyakāmatva etc serves no purpose It cannot be that its purpose is the Upasamhāra of vaśitva and other attributes

in the Sagunavidyā for purposes of meditation For the *Kalpataru* has definitely closed the doors on their meditation when it says their Upasamhāra is bare subsumption and nothing more · *Ato antarbhāvamātram upasamhārah* Tho' vaśitva has not been enjoined in the Nirgunavidya for purposes of meditation, it can be argued on the strength of the recognition of oneness of the Vidyās that as attributes given by a valid source of knowledge cannot altogether be brushed aside, they seould be taken into account for purposes of meditation It is not necessary that what is included in one Vidyā for a particular purpose cannot be allowed to serve a different purpose when it is transferred to some other Vidyā S himself has conceded that the attribute of Satyakāmatva read for purposes of actual meditation in the Saguṇavidyā of the Chāndogya serves a different purpose of eulogizing the Nirguṇavidyā, when it is taken over there by way of Upasamhāra Mantras which at the time of their recitation have only an 'adṛṣṭārtha' serve the purpose of achieving more tangible results when employed in the performance of a rite

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Kāmādyadhikaranam (iii 3.38-40)

R reads the three Sūtras 38-40 as one *adhi* The Viṣayavākyas and the question raised are the same as in S The opening Sūtra establishes that in the Chāndogya (viii 1 1 5) and *Brh Up* (iv 4 22) the Vidyā is the same The reasons are that the abode of meditation (*āyatana*) in both is the same viz. the heart There are also other correspondences Above all, there is the identity of the qualities of lordship over all (*sarvavaśitva*) and others given in the *Brh Up* with the attributes of B's *satyasankalpatva* (being capable of realizing all one's purposes) given in the Chāndogya For vaśitva and other attributes are but the special aspects or effervescence of the attributes of satyasankalpatva which is the last in the series of eight Divine attributes mentioned in the Chāndogya beginning with apahatapāpmatva. The presence of Vaśitva and others in a Vidyā therefore naturally implies the presence in it of satyakāmatva and others also represented by Satyasankalpatva [17]

The next Sūtra sets aside the objection that Vaśitva and other attributes cannot be the form of B as all duality has been denied of B in the text *Neha nānāsti kiñcana* going before and *Neti neti* following

17 वशित्वादयश्च छान्दोग्ये श्रुतस्य गुणाष्टकान्तर्गतस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वस्य विशेषा एवेति सत्यसंकल्पत्वसहचारिणां सत्यकामत्वादीनामपहतपाप्मत्वपर्यन्तानां सद्भावमवगमयन्ति । [illegible]
(*Śrībhāṣya* iii 3 38)

later The rejoinder is that the attributes of Vaśitva etc cannot be denied *(alopah)* of B because Śrutis posit them of B with special fervor and interest and because their existence in B is made known to us exclusively on the authority of Śrutis and is not ascertainable or refutable thro' any other Pramāna

The last Sūtra disposes of another objection that in the same Chāndogya text the fruits associated with knowing B endowed with the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc are the attainment of the world of the Pitṛs etc (viii 7 1-10) Since the object of the Mumukṣu is to attain the Supreme B only and not any of these worlds he should have nothing to do with such meditations Hence, the attributes of Satya-kāmatva etc are not to be meditated upon by the seeker of Mokṣa This objection is refuted by the last Sūtra which points out that even the attainment of the world of Pitṛs etc at one's desire referred to in the *Chān Up* is part of the fruits to be enjoyed by the released Souls There is, therefore, no point in the objection that the seeker of Mokṣa need not bother about the Upāsanā and Upasamhāra of the attributes of Satyakāmatva, etc

Criticism

The chief obstacle to the oneness of the Vidyās in question is the difference of their 'Upāsyagunas' R's plea that vaśitva and others are only the special aspects of Satyasankalpatva, if accepted, would preclude the meditation of Vasitva and others as in the case of priyaśirastva and others which are special aspects of ānanda Moreover, in the same way, the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc can also be treated as special aspects of vasitvam, satyatvam, etc (in satyam, jñānam, anantam) Thereby Satyakāmatva may be taken to be recognizable as the common element of several other Vidyās so much so that the distinction of Vidyās into Dahara, Vaisvānara and so on will become pointless

R's interpretation of the second Sūtra has free recourse to a good deal of importations The expression 'alopah' has been construed in the sense of apratiṣedhah (not negated) which involves a liberal dose of lakṣanā. Apart from that, the Sūtra contains no competent reason which can be taken to rebut the objection raised by R.'s Pūrvapakṣin It is most unlikely that the objector who refuses to recognize Vasitva and others as the essential attributes of B will ever concede R's plea that the Śruti is deeply and fervently interested in telling us that they are the essential attributes of B ! Nor does the passage containing the reference to the attributes of Vasitva etc indulge in any repetition of

them (abhyāsa) as a mark of 'ādara' The interpretation of the Sūtra is thus purely fanciful

R reads the first word of the last Sūtra in the locative singular[18] Having regard to its close syntactic connection with the next word *atah* as conceived by R, the use of the genitive form 'upasthiteh' would have been more appropriate

Śamkara's Interpretation

Ādarādhikaranam (iii 3 40-41)

According to S this *adhi.* considers whether the rite of "Prānāgni hotra" (offering of food to the five Prānas)[19] enjoined in the Vaiśvānara Vidyā before the Upāsaka takes his food is to be carried out even when the eating of food is itself omitted The Pūrvapakṣa holds that as the priority of Prānāgnihotra is insisted upon in the arthavāda passage of the Jābālins

पूर्वोऽयितिभ्यो अश्नीयात् यथा ह वै स्वयमहुत्वा अग्निहोत्र परस्य जुहुयात् एव तत्

which expresses special interest in and respect for it, it is to be offered without fail even when the eating of food is omitted (*adarad alopah*) The connection of this offering with "the first food that comes" (*Chān Up* v 19 1) is not absolute The purpose of this passage is only to prescribe some particular material (*guna*) viz the first food that comes, as distinct from the fundamental Agnihotra whose materials of offering are milk and other things The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes on the basis of the Mīmāmsā ruling 'Guṇalope na mukhyasya' that Prāṇāgnihotra has to be performed even when no food is eaten, with some suitable substitute material such as water

The Siddhānta is given in the next Sūtra (41) that Prāṇāgnihotra is to be performed only with the food first eaten The analogy between fundamental Agnihotra and that of the Kuṇḍapāyins is inapplicable here as the term Agnihotra applied to the Prāṇāhutis occurs only in an Arthavāda passage in the Upaniṣad (*Chān* v 24,2) and has, therefore, no injunctive force as is possessed by the 'Agnihotra' of the Kuṇḍa-

18 उपस्थितिरुपस्थान ब्रह्मास्मरति । उपस्थिते ब्रह्मास्मरणे एव ब्रह्मोपस्थितस्य स्या पितृलोकादिप्राप्तिश्रवणात (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 40)

19 Not to the priests" as in Radhakrishnan (the *Brahmasutras* p 491) The rite consists in taking five small bits of food with the mantras Pranaya svaha etc after Pariṣecana of the food with water and sipping a small quantity of it before putting the bits of food into the mouth The rite is observed regularly at meals by orthodox Brahmins

pāyins If we admit such force it will require compliance with many other details which cannot be fulfilled in respect of Prānāgnihotra The respect given to Prānāgnihotra in the Śruti is meant only to emphasize the *priority of the host* in the case of food that is actually eaten It does not empower the offering of Prānāgnihotra as a permanent obligation irrespective of whether there is any eating of food or not

Criticism

If this inquiry in simply to determine whether Prānāgnihotra is to be performed or not, it is irrelevant to this Pāda as such a question has nothing to do with the theme of the Pāda which is the establishment of identity or difference of Vidyās, and is in no way contributory to it If it is undertaken to decide whether this rite is to be meditated upon as an "Agnihotra" or not it can be done in the light of the ruling to be given in the following adhikarana (according to S) on the basis *of the principle of flexibility (aniyama). The adhi is, therefore, superfluous* from this point of view

The reason in support of the Pūrvapaksa conveyed by the term "ādara" is inconclusive If the censure on the guests being served with food before the host is the reason, it would only serve to emphasize that instead of the guest the host shall eat first How will it suffice to make out that Prānāgnihotra shall be performed *even when no food is actually eaten?* If it serves to emphasize the priority of Prānāgnihotra, it would simply mean that at the time of eating it should have precedence—*not that it should be carried out even when no food is being eaten!* The Pūrvapaksa is thus unsustainable

We may ask if Prānāgnihotra consisting of the five āhutis is identical with the act of eating or different from it In the former case, there will be no point in asking if in the absence of eating, Prānāgnihotra will be there or will not be there If the two are conceived as different, is their relation here one of Vyāpyavyāpakabhāva or not? In the former case, there will be the same impossibility of any doubt, for the pervaded cannot be conceived to exist in the absence of the pervader The act of eating is one of general swallowing the food—swallowing it to the accompaniment of mantras is a special way of doing it The relation is thus one of sāmānya and viseṣabhāva which binds them in a vyāpyavyāpakabhāva—for there is such a relation between the sāmānya and viseṣa and the doubt cannot, therefore, be raised with propriety There is no bar to one's performing Prānāgnihotra (even with the substituted material) in the absence of eating cooked food

The case is not parallel to the Sviṣṭakṛddhoma, for the food eaten to the accompaniment of Prāṇāhutis is not put to any further use in any further rite in the same set-up. Prāṇāgnihotra thus stands complete in itself. As it has been enjoined with its own complement of dravya, devatā, mantra and phala, there is no difficulty in treating it as a self-complete and independent rite. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as a subsidiary one. In keeping then with its independent status its being carried out, even in the absence of eatable food, or food being eaten with a suitable substitute, in accordance with the ruling of the Mīmāmsā Śāstra—'Guṇlope na lopaḥ' is not only reasonable but entirely justifiable.

CHAPTER XLVII

ŚRAVANA MANANA AND DHYĀNA TO BE INCLUSIVELY CARRIED OUT

25 *Nırdhāranādhıkaranam* (ııı 3 43)

Havıng commenced thıs Pāda wıth a dıscourse on the subject of Śāstrābhyāsa consıstıng of śravana and manana, the Sūtrakāra had, ın the next twenty three *adhı s*, dealt wıth the dıfferent ways of medıtatıon thro' Gunopasamhāra and Anupasamhāra, the gradatıon of Adhıkāras, the dıfferent orders of Upāsakas, the nature and com plexıon of theır Upāsanās and the supreme posıtıon occupıed by the object of all medıtatıon vız B as the apex of hıs vertıcal pluaralısm based on a well-defined hıerarchy of dıvınıtıes [1]

Havıng thus dealt wıth both the forms of Upāsanā — vız Śāstrābhyāsa consıstıng of sravana and manana and of dhyāna, the Sūtrakāra now turns to the ımportant questıon of the need to carry out both these forms of Upāsanā and whether eıther of them wıll not do for God-vısıon.[2] The questıon raısed ıs—wıll ıt not be suffıcıent for the Upāsaka to carry out both śravana and manana alone or only śravana or only manana or Dhyāna alone, or ıs ıt absolutely necessary and essentıal to carry out *one and all of them*

Thıs calls for an ınquıry ıf the result attaıned by these two forms of Upāsanā are the same or are dıfferent If theır results are dıfferent,

1 पूर्वत्राधनये श्रवणमननयोरर्थं त्रयोविंशतिनयै ध्यानप्रकारध्यानाधिकारनियमध्यातृध्येयानां निरूपणानन्तरं अत्र श्रवणादित्रयस्य फलभेदोक्त्या सर्वस्य कर्तव्यत्वसमर्थनस्यावसर इति पूर्वसंगति (Ragh *TPB* ııı 3 43)

2 अन्यतरोपासनमात्रेण फलसिद्धौ किमुभयानुष्ठानेन इत्याक्षेपोत्थानादनन्तरसंगति (Raghu *TPB* ııı.3 43)

we have to determine how and to what extent sravana and manana contribute to the attainment of the final fruit of God vision In this way, this *adhi* makes for a clear pronouncement on the place and inter-relation of sravana, manana and dhyāna as means of Brahmāparokṣa, by showing their equal importance (samaprādhānya) as well as their organic relationship (*angāngibhāva*) with Dhyāna as the principal element (*angin*) Their equal importance is borne out by the fact that *Brh Up* (ii 4 5) enjoins all of them for purposes of God-vision

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य

not alternatively but inclusively At the same time, their organic relationship with Dhyāna arises from the very nature of the function which sravana and manana accomplish in bringing about God-vision thro' Dhyāna The *STC* observes that the seeming incongruity of their equal importance with their angāngibhāva relationship, their different results and the requirement that all of them should be repeatedly carried out are to be resolved on the basis of Divine will that God vision shall be attained thro' these means placed in this particular set up with reference to one another[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues All Upāsanā is for the attainment of God vision It has no other end in view, nor is any other admissible or acceptable As God vision can be attained thro' sravana and/or manana, we may dispense with dhyāna altogether It cannot be said that hindrances to Aparoksa being many and very tough it is necessary to turn to dhyāna In that case, the other two can be dispensed with. We have no grounds to believe that God vision can be attained only by combining sravaṇamanana with dhyāna There is nothing to show that each of them has its own place and function in bringing about Aparokṣa. Nor does the Vidhivakya contain any indication that Śravaṇamanana should be combined by all with dhyāna—by using the conjunctive particle ca 'Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitvayas *ca*' In the absence of any such indication the vidhi can be understood as optional in respect of any one of the means Moreover, it is not possible to sustain the position that each of these means has its own use in bringing about God vision—Śravaṇa by giving us knowledge of B not known before, manana giving such knowledge the requisite measure of certainty and fixity and dhyāna generating God vision In such a set up where each

3 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (*STC* iii.3 43)

means has a separate and distinctive result accruing to it, all of them cannot be deemed to be enjoined for the achievement of one and the same result The injunction cannot, therefore, be interpreted as embracing all the three taken together [4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it appears from the disposition of the Vidhi that each of the means is equally important and every one of them bears the stamp of being enjoined with a view to attaining direct vision of B There is no question of vakyabheda here if we look at the Vidhi from the standpoint of the 'Khale kapotanyāya'—where the same motivation operates severally from different sources to achieve the same end This does not affect the angangibhāva relation as between Śravana manana and dhyāna

For, in spite of the fact that Dhyāna too has its share in removing obstacles to God-vision, and in spite of its sharing the injunctive suffix *(tavya)* with Śravana and manana in the Vidhivākya, we have to recognize on the authority of texts like

ततस्तु त पश्यति निष्कल ध्यायमान (*Mund Up* iii 1 8)

that God-vision is attainable mainly and directly thro' Dhyāna alone Hence it is the 'angi' This does not dispense with the need for sravana and manana or make them fruitless They have their distinctive role of usefulness in bringing about Aparokṣa by removing obstacles to such vision viz ignorance of the subject, doubts and misconceptions Śravana gives birth to knowledge of the Para and Aparatattvas and thus sweeps off ignorance of the subject matter Manana or logical reflection helps to fix the true purport of the Śrutis beyond doubt and vacillation, putting an end to all lingering doubts and misconceptions

The accurate perception of the truth about Para and Apara tattvas and conclusive understanding that such and such alone and no other is the teaching of the Śrutis are of course different from the direct perception of B The immediate result of Śravana manana is the removal of obstacles as explained above, to such direct perception [5] Thus, they act in unison with dhyana thro' their well defined 'angāngibhāva' and lead to the goal in perfect harmony M's bhāsya sums up

4 न चाज्ञातज्ञापकत्वेन श्रवणस्य तन्नियमजननन मननस्य दृशिजननन ध्यानस्योपयोग इति युक्तम। तथाच त्रित यस्यापि पृथकफलत्वेन दशनोददशन त्रितयविधानानुपपत्त । एव * * * दशनस्य त्रितयसाध्य वाभावेन फला भावान्न समस्तोपासन कायमिति (Ragh *Ny Muktavali* iii 3 43)

5 श्रवणादिफल चानानविपययादिदशनप्रतिब धनिवत्ति (M *BSB* iii 3 42)

the inner harmony of this process with a well-chosen quotation from the *Brahmatarka*.

श्रुत्वा मत्वा तथा ध्यात्वा तदज्ञानविपर्ययौ ।
सशय च पराणुद्य लभते ब्रह्मदर्शनम्[6] ॥

The absence of a conjunctive particle does not render the Vidhi optional with reference to the three means, for there is no decisive evidence of option conveyed by the expression '*vā*'[7]

It should be noted that the words 'phala' and 'taddṛṣṭi' are to be repeated in the Sūtra for purposes of proper construction. The expression 'tat' (in tannirdhāraṇa') in the Sūtra understood in the abstract sense (*bhāvapradhāna*) refers to the Para and Apara tattvas spoken of in the earlier adhi s (21-23) from 'Iyadāmananāt' to 'Saiva hi satyādayah' 'Tat' in 'taddṛṣṭeh' in the Sūtra stands for Brahman referred to as 'Sā' in *adhi* 23

The Sūtra as a whole emphasizes the fact that the fruits of Śravana-manana, while they differ from the fruits of direct vision of the Lord arising from dhyāna are still vitally contributory to God-vision, in the manner defined. The compound 'Tannirdhārnārthaniyamah'[8] tho' a collective Dvandva is allowed to retain its masculine singular form as a 'Chāndasaprayoga.'

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Tannirdhāranādhi (iii, 3 42)

According to S and R. this *adhi* deals with the question whether certain Upāsanās (*nirdhāranāni*) like 'Om ityetad akṣaram udgītham upāsita' (*Chān Up* i 1 1) mentioned in connection with some subordinate elements of sacrifices (*karmangavyapāsrayāni*) are inseparably connected with them like the sacrificial ladle made of Parna-leaf or are optional like the 'godohana'-vessel.

The Purvapakṣa is that tho' the Upāsanās in question are not mentioned in those specific topics dealing with the sacrifices, they are connected with udgitha and others which are mentined in the sacrifices. So like the subordinate parts of those sacrifices such as the ladle they are to be permanently connected with them.

6 Cf [illegible] ।
[illegible] * * * * ॥ (M. BSB iv.1.12)

7 [illegible] (Ragh. *TPB* iii 4 42)

8 S and R. read 'Tannirdharaṇaniyamaḥ'

The Siddhānta is that these Upāsanās have no necessary connection with the sacrifices This follows from the Śruti (*Chān Up* i 1.10) allowing both persons who know and who do not know (the Upāsanā) to perform the sacrifice Another ground is the indication that devotion to the Vidyā is said to bear additional fruit over and above the fruits of the sacrifices in that devotion to the Upāsanā brings about the result of the sacrifices much earlier and without any obstacles This implies a difference between the performance of the sacrifice with and without knowledge of the Vidyā The ignorant performers have their own reward but the learned ones receive rewards of superior quality [9] This makes it clear that Vidyās are dependent on persons who have the option of employing them to receive the rewards of the sacrifices more easily and without obstacles—as the statement 'He does not hear bad news' associated with the use of the Juhū made of Parna-leaf, for pouring the ghee

Criticism

The Viṣayavākya as conceived by S does not offer any scope for any discussion whether the Upāsanā contemplated is to be inseparably connected with some sacrificial performance or only optionally so If it is assumed that in the text 'Om ityetad akṣaram udgitham upāsita' the syllable 'Om' is given as the substrate and 'Udgītha' the predicative element of the Upāsanā, it will be against S's statement reckoning Udgītha as the substrate What is not conceived as the substrate cannot be the object of predication of some form of Upāsanā Nor can 'Udgītha' be the substrate and 'Om' the predicative element, for there is no Om contained in the Udgitha If the meditation is purely assumptive, it will be no genuine Upāsanā, as stated before If it is to be in terms of both Omkāra and Udgītha being the substrates alternatively, it will require splitting a single proposition into two Omkāra cannot be conceived as standing in an adjectival relation to Udgītha, as the two are different entities and cannot, therefore, be placed in appositional relation So, in whichever way it is looked at, the proposition fails to yield any meaningful predication to be taken up for serious discussion whether such Upāsanā as is contemplated by it is to be regarded as an inseparable part of the sacrifice where it is mentioned or not [10]

9 यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीयवत्तर भवति (*Chan Up* i 1 10)

10 According to M the Chandogya passage lays down the meditation of B (udgitha) as denoted by the plenary sense of Om

ओतत्ववाची ह्योकारो वक्त्यसौ तदगुणोततम । (*AV*)

This is free from any difficulty such as faces S

S and R interpret the world 'nirdhārana' in the Sūtra as 'Upāsanā.[11]' Its straight and simple sense accepted is a decision on any disputed point The sense of Upāsanā can be read into it only thro' Lakṣanā by a wide stretch of the imagination The *Śrutaprakāsa* has tried to etymologize the interpretation on the basis of some preliminary questions and answers given about some details [12] But they have nothing to do with the fact of the Upāsanā as such. In any case, there is no basis for claiming Upāsanā to be the 'vācyārtha' (expressed sense) of the term nirdhārana. It may be the lākṣaṇikārtha or vyangyārtha but can *not* be the vācyārtha. Thibaut and Radhakrishnan have translated 'nirdhārana' as 'assertions' or 'determinations' which is not what S or R. mean by the term nirdhārana here Only Date and Viresvarananda have correctly brought out the meaning of the term 'nirdhārana' as intended by S

The contention that sacrifices can be performed by the ignorant or without a modicum of Brahmajñāna, to enable the performers to attain their rewards is repugnant to the real spirit of the Śāstras and accepted principles 'Yad eva vidyayā karoti tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati' 'Arthī samartho vidvān yajata.' Such 'vidvattā' cannot be limited to mere knowledge of matters pertaining to the sacrifice Even the performance of sacrifices by those who have no realization of the Supreme B as the enjoyer of all sacrifices has been declared to forfeit the full fruits of such acts This shows there is no difficulty in treating the Upasanās of B as inseparable features of true sacrificial acts by the right type of adhikārins That there are ignorant performers of sacrilces does not effect the truth of things See also quotation from *Bhāgavata Purāna* (V 7 4-6) referring to King Bharata's performance of sacrifices, side by side with contemplation of the supreme B., given in the Phalasrutyadhi (iii. 4, 44-46) f.n 13

11 निर्धारणं निश्चयनं [illegible]

12 [illegible] 'इति [illegible] इति [illegible] (*Śrutaprakasa* iii 3 41)

CHAPTER XLVIII

PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GURU IN THE ASPIRANT'S SPIRITUAL LIFE

26. *Pradānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.44)

This adhi. tells us about the mode (*itikartavyatā*) or the proper and recognized manner in which the threefold Sādhanas of Śravaṇa manana and dhyāna are to be pursued to make them effective instruments of Aparokṣajñāna.[1] The question is sure to be asked if anything else is required to make the three Sādhanas fruitful. The Sūtra makes it clear that as the spiritual equipment of Śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna is a precious asset, it has to be built up under the benign guidance and direction of a proper Guru with all his loving grace.

True to the ancient traditions of the Upaniṣads, the Sūtrakāra does not countenance the building up of these assets by one's own unaided effort without the help and guidance of a competent Guru.[2] No overhearing or hearing in concealment will help. The Guru has to take the disciple under his care and guidance and see him thro' with his boundless grace.

As M.'s commentators put it, what is significant to the spiritual evolution of the seeker is directly receiving what is imparted by the Guru (*dāna*) with all his boundless love and grace (*pra-*[3]). This is

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनोपासनेतिकर्तव्यतासाधनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसगति : (*TP.* iii 3 44)
2 Cf. 'आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद' (*Chān. Up.* vi. 14, 2) 'श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्य आचार्याद्धैव विद्या विदिता साधिष्ठं प्रापयतीति (*Op cit.* v 9 3)
3 दानमुपदेश । प्रीतिपूर्वकत्वरूपप्रकृष्टदानयुतमेव दृष्टयाख्यफलवत् इति योज्यम । (Ragh. *TDP.* iii.3.44)

indeed a very felicitous interpretation of "pra-dāna" as used by the Sūtrakāra Well may P M Modi (who has not looked into M's interpretation) deplore in his *Critique of Brahmasutras* that "no satisfactory interpretation has been put forth for the word 'pradāna' by any commentator" (*op cit* p 189) His own is as far removed from the subject of Sādhana-Adhyāya as it can be

According to M the expression 'tat' is to be read once over (by āvrtti) into the body of the Sūtra Pradānavad eva hi taduktam The first refers to the triunity of Sādhanas (Śravana, manana and dhyāna) of the previous adhi as its *antecedent*[4] The second 'tat' read with 'uktam' conveys the meaning that the procedure *(itikartavyatā)* laid down for properly carrying out Śravaṇa, etc with the instruction, guidance and grace of the Guru *(pradānavad eva)* has the backing of the Śruti (*tad uktam*)—the Śruti text cited being Ācāryavān puruṣo veda (*Chān* vi, 14, 2) of Uddālaka's famous discourse to his son[5] See also *Śvet Up* vi, 23

The *raison d'etre* for bringing in Gurupradāna here is that otherwise those eligible for the Upāsanā of the '*madhyamagunas*' as explained in B S iii 3 14, will have no means of knowing where they stand in respect of their eligibility for Gunopasamhāra and how far they should go[6] Apart from this, the general principle underlying the importance attached to Gurūpadesa and Guruprasāda in respect of all orders of Upāsakas is in full accord with the highest spiritual traditions of the Śāstras *It deserves to be noted that M is the only Bhāṣyakara on the Brahmasūtras* (leaving aside Baladeva who, as a follower of his Sampradāya, adopts his interpretation) *who has thought it fit to incorporate this most important topic of 'itikartavyatā' of the principal Sādhanas in the body of the Sūtra in what is undoubtedly its rightful place—viz the Sādhana-Adhyāya and its Upāsanāpāda* Other commentators may have conceded or talked elsewhere of the importance of Gurupādesa and Guruprasāda in the spiritual life of Mumukṣus But none of them has had the insight to find them embedded in the Sūtras by interpreting them in their proper perspective The present is a telling instance in point

Another significant point to be noted in M.'s interpretation is that the suffix 'vat' in 'pradāna-vat' is to be construed as a possessive ter-

4. अत्र तच्छब्दः पूर्वसूत्रप्रान्तस्थश्रवणाद्युपासनपरामर्शार्थः (Raghu *TPB*)

5. तत् गुरुप्रदानाधानत्वमुक्तं आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद इति श्रुत्यादिष्वित्यर्थ (*TDP*)

6. गुरुप्रदानाभावे तु स्वस्यान्तरङ्गाधिकारज्ञाने मध्यमगुणा गुणवत्प्रकारेणोपास्या इति 'इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्' (BS iii.3.14) इति प्रागुक्तमयुक्तं स्यादित्यर्थ (Ragh. *TPB* iii 3 44)
Vadiraja (*TPG* p 156) observes that the Guru envisaged is the 'Niyataguru'

mination (*matub-artha*) and rounded off into a complete statement with the predicate 'jñānasādhanam' from the previous *adhi*[7] S and R have construed the 'vat' after 'pradāna' in the sense of 'similar to' (*sādrśy-ārtha)* and have explained the words pradāna-vat to mean 'like the offerings made severally to Indra, under his different attributes' But then as this *fully* explains the context, the additional reference to the *Sankarṣakānda* in further elucidation of the difference of deities by the words 'taduktam' becomes *superfluous*

Tho' primarily only Śravana has to depend on Gurupradāna while manana and nididhyāsana by their very nature may be deemed to depend on one's own powers of reflection and concentration, it is pointed out that manana too has to depend equally upon sound reasonings communicated by the Guru and Dhyāna likewise is the deep concentration on the august attributes of B which the Guru's grace communicates to the disciple Rightly then has the question of 'itikartavyatā' been considered with reference to *all the three Sādhanas*[8]

Tho' one may raise the question of the itikartavyātā of the Sādhanas either before or after concluding that topic, the Sūtrakāra here has chosen the latter mode of treatment[9]

Pūrvapaksa

The Purvapaksa is that Śravana, manana etc are competent to lead to Aparokṣa in whatever manner they are carried out For in the Śruti, *there is only the bare injunction with regard to them If then Aparokṣa* were to depend on the grace of the Guru, the attainment of Mokṣa too by Jñānins may likewise depend on the Guru's grace in which case one may have to run the risk of forfeiting his Moksa on account of the Guru's wrath If the Guru's displeasure is impotent, his favors too will be equally in vain[10] If the Guru's wrath could prevent one from attaining Moksa it will contradict the statement already made in B S iii 3 32 assuring Mokṣa to all Aparoksajñānins Aparokṣajñāna cannot, there-

7 सूत्रायस्तु—श्रवणादिमात्र न ज्ञानसाधनमित्यध्याहार । किंतु प्रदानवदेव गुरुप्रदानयुक्तमेव (*STC* iii 3 44)

8 यद्यपि श्रवणमेव गुरुप्रदानसाध्य दृष्ट न मननध्याने न्यायानुसधानादे स्वबुद्ध्यधीनत्वात अत श्रवणस्यैव चिन्ता युक्ता तथापि मननस्य गुरूपदिष्टगुणचिन्तनात्मकत्वात ध्यानस्य च गुरूपदिष्टगुणचिन्तनात्मकत्वात समुच्चय पेटिकान्तर्भावाच्च त्रितयविषयिणी चिन्ता युक्ता (*STC* iii 3 44)

9 ननु त्रयस्यैव विधान विरुद्धमिति चेत नायमस्ति विरोध यत साधन विधायापि इतिकर्तव्यताविधान प्रसिद्ध मिति वा हृदयं (*STC* iii 3 44)

10 यथाकथचिदनुष्ठितश्रवणादि ज्ञानसाधनमिति पूर्व पक्ष । 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य इति श्रवणादि-मात्रस्यैव ज्ञानहेतुत्वावगमात । ज्ञानस्य च गुरुप्रदानाधीनत्वे, ज्ञानिनोऽपि मोक्षस्य तदधीनत्वप्रसगश्च । नेद मनिष्टमिति चेन्न, कदाचित गुरुकोपेन तदभावप्रसगात (*TP* iii 3 44)

fore, be made to depend on the Guru's favor. There is no need, therefore, for the Sādhanas to be carried out under the Guru's directions.[11]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that śravaṇa and other Sādhanas are not alone the means of Mokṣa. They are to be duly augmented by the Guru's gracious bestowal. For the realization of the fruits of Sādhanas depends on the Guru's grace. This does not conflict with the general statement referring to Śravaṇa manana etc. as the means of jñāna. The emphasis on Gurupradāna means that it is the *modus operandi* thro' which they become effective instruments of jñāna.[12] It is to be understood as an auxiliary tho' not expressly so mentioned in the Vidhivākya. When Soma twigs are to be pounded and pressed to get the juice, there is no need to say in so many words that the juice must be wrung out with strong hands. There is no need to fear the forfeiture of Mokṣa in the event of one's falling into the Guru's disfavor. For by Divine regulation, Mokṣa, is assured to all Aparokṣajñānins. While the Guru's ire may curtail Jñāna or prevent the welling up of innate joy to some extent and for some time it will not preclude the Aparokṣajñānin's attaining release from bondage. In the light of these facts, the Mumukṣu should receive instruction, guidance and grace from the Guru in the pursuit of all the three Sādhanas.[13]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. this adhi. establishes that the meditations on Vāyu and Prāṇa described in the *Bṛh. Up.* (i.5.21) and in the Samvargavidyā of the *Chān. Up.* (iv.3.1) are to be kept apart in spite of the oneness of Vāyu and Prāṇa, described in each of them. For, in the two meditative forms mentioned in the text, the ādhyātmika and the adhidaiva aspects are distinct. This is analogous to the case in which the Puroḍāśa

11 अन्यथा, गुरुकोपवत् तद्वरस्यापि निरर्थकता स्यात् । अभ्युपगमे च 'अनियम' (*B S.* iii 3 32) इत्युक्तिविरोध । अतो ज्ञाने गुर्वपेक्षाभावादुक्तप्रकारेणोपासनमयुक्तमिति (*TP.* iii 3 44)

12 न श्रवणादिमात्रं ज्ञानसाधनम् । किं तु, प्रसादपूर्वकगुरुप्रदानयुक्तमेव । गुरुप्रदानानुसारित्वात् फलस्य । न चैवं श्रुतवचनविरोध । गुरुप्रदानं ज्ञानसाधनस्य श्रवणादेरितिकर्तव्यता इत्यभ्युपगमात् ।

13 नहि दृढमुष्टिनिपीडनादि पृथक् साधनमुच्यते इति भाव । न चैवमुक्तरीत्या ज्ञानाप्रभाव. । तज्ज्ञानमोक्षयोरीश्वरफलितत्वात् । न चैव गुरुशापो विफल । ज्ञानादिह्रासहेतुत्वात् । उक्तं च —

ज्ञानिनो गुरुशापेऽपि नामुक्ति सम्भवेत् ।
आनन्दह्रासमात्रेण नैव मुक्तिर्विदुष्यति ।
ये ज्ञानविषया. शापा मुक्तिगास्त्वाधिकारिणाम
कादाचित्कास्ते भवन्ति नैव ते सार्वकालिका ·
तेषा ज्ञानस्य मुक्तेश्च तारतम्यस्य चैव हि ।
भगवन्नियतत्वात्तु शापादिर्नैव कारणम् ॥ इति ॥

अतो गुरुप्रदानस्यावश्यकत्वात् उक्तं युक्तम (*TP.* iii 3 44)

offerings are made separately to Indra the ruler, Indra the over-ruler and Indra the self-ruler (*Taitt. S.* ii.3.6) in the Tripuroḍāśeṣṭi. The *Saṃkarṣakāṇḍa* also says one and the same deity becomes known differently on account of different qualities. However,, in the context of knowledge (unlike the Karmakāṇḍa) we may have one Vidyā, as in the present case—as is clear from the Upakrama and Upasaṃhāra. Yet as in the case of Agnihotra which is different in the morning and in the evening on account of difference of deities,[14] tho' the Vidyā of Vāyu and Prāṇa are one, the meditations are to be separate because of the difference between the ādhyātmika and adhidaiva aspects of the Vidyā.

Criticism

In the Sambandhādhi (*BS.* iii.3.20-22) S. had held that the meditations on the same Satya-B. referred to in *Bṛh. Up.* v.5.3 and v.5.4 are to be treated as *different Upāsanās* because of the difference of place in terms of adhyātma and adhidaiva. The same principle of interpretation is applicable to the present topic also. There is no justification, then, to think of difference in the conduct of the Upāsanā *(prayogabheda)* here, instead of difference of Vidyās.

S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 43, to the effect that the two Upāsanās are to be kept apart on account of difference between their adhidaiva and adhyātma aspects, as in the case of the three Puroḍāśa offerings to Indra under different names, is not in order. For, the reason given to hold the Upāsanā of Vāyu and Prāṇa to be different on account of difference of abode of their adhyātma and adhidaiva aspects is not applicable to the offerings to Indra whose attributes of rāja, adhirāja, svarāja show no such difference of abode.[15]

The illustration of 'pradāna' is thus out of place. If the contention is that Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be meditated upon as separate deities, that will go against S.'s admission that "in the present case, there is no difference of Vidyās here, as in the Karmakāṇḍa, as is clear from the upakrama and Upasaṃhāra in and thro' the adhyātma and adhidaiva aspects of Vāyu and Prāṇa."[16]

If Prayogabheda of the Upāsanās is the subject of predication in this adhi., the proper illustration of it to be given by the Sūtrakāra would

14 Sūrya and Prajāpati are the morning deities while Agni and Prajāpati are the deities of the evening Agnihotra.

15 इन्द्राय राज्ञे पुरोडाशमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेत् । इन्द्रायाधिराजायेन्द्राय स्वराज्ञे (*TS.* iii 3 6)

16. नैवमिह विद्याभेदोऽस्ति । उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यामध्यात्माधिदैवोपदेशेष्वेकविद्याविधानप्रतीते (S *BSB.* iii 3 43)

be Agnihotra which tho' essentially one and the same still admits of differentiation in performance with different deities for the morning and evening sessions[17] The illustration of the offerings (pradāna) to Indra is, therefore, far from satisfactory

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R avoids redundancy of subject matter of discussion, pointed out in the interpretation of S by selecting his Viṣayavākya from the Daharavidyāprakaraṇa[18] of the *Chān Up* (viii 1-6)—where a meditation on the small ether (i e Paramātman) is first mentioned and separately from it another one on the qualities of satyakāmatva, apahatapāpmatva etc is mentioned. The question is whether the meditation on the Paramātman as the possessor of the qualities is to be repeated in the meditation of the qualities or not The Siddhānta is that there is a difference between the Paramātman viewed in his essential being *(svarūpamātram)* and as possessing those qualities *(guṇaviśiṣṭākāra)* He is, therefore, to be first meditated upon in his essential aspect and then again bringing in those special qualities on the analogy of the Purodāśa offerings to Indra who tho' one is offered separate oblations connected with his three different attributes Śrīkantha follows R in this interpretation

Criticism

It deserves to be noted in this connection that the Yājñika practice here, as quoted by the *Kalpataru*, is to make a simultaneous offering of all the three Purodāsas However, while the repetition of the offerings may be justified on the ground of difference of the deities denoted by the different words indra rāja, indra-adhirāja and indra-svarāja, according to Pūrva Mimāmsā tradition and the Samkarṣakānda, there are not different words in the Dahara Vidyāprakaraṇa denoting the possessor of the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, satyakāmatva, etc. The repetition of the Upāsanās as stated by R cannot, therefore, be justified on that ground.

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17 See f.n. 14.

18 तस्मात् विशेषणत्वेन स्थितं पृथक् पृथक् चिन्ताविचारो यथायथं तथा विषयं प्रदर्शनाय अतो दहरविद्यायामपि चिन्ता युक्ता (*Śrutaprakaśa* iii 3 42)

CHAPTER XLIX

GURU'S GRACE OR PERSONAL EFFORT—WHICH IS THE MORE EFFICACIOUS MEANS?

27. *Liṅgabhūyastvādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.45)

This *adhi.* establishes the superior efficacy of the Guru's grace as the indispensable *modus operandi* in respect of the Sādhanas[1]—without belittling the necessity for personal effort in carrying out the Sādhanas, on the part of the Mumukṣu.

The question raised is whether the Guru's grace is more powerful or the disciple's personal effort in the form of the Sādhanas; or whether both of them are to be regarded as of equal efficacy in leading to Aparokṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is : Personal effort of the disciple must indeed be deemed to be the powerful factor. For, Guruprasāda is only a *modus operandi*. As such it cannot be more powerful than the Sādhanas themselves of which it is the *modus operandi*.

Even if it is not conceded that the disciple's effort is more important it deserves to be treated on a par with Guruprasāda instead of

1 The *AC* compares Guruprasāda as a *modus operandi* to the Upanayana ceremony which determines the power of Vedic study to produce dharma. Read द्विविधमग दृश्यते–किंचित् प्रधानगतकार्यजननशक्तिनियामक, यथोपनयनादि, तेन विना प्रधानस्य वेदाध्ययनस्य क्वापि धर्मजनकत्वाभावात्। प्रत्युताधर्मस्यैव जननात्। किंचित् सौष्ठवापादक यथा प्राङ्मुखत्वादि; तेन विनापि धर्मजनकत्वात्। गुरुप्रदान तु, न प्राङ्मुखत्वादिवत् सौष्ठवापादक किंतूपनयनादिवत् प्रधानशक्तिनियामकमेवेति समर्थ्यत इति भाव· *(AC. iii 3 45)*

being relegated to an inferior position. For, after all, the Guru is as much a human being as the disciple. His action in advancing the spiritual evolution of the disciple cannot be credited with greater efficacy than the personal effort of the disciple. It cannot, therefore, be that Guruprasāda is the *sine qua non* for successful carrying out of the Sādhanas.

The Siddhānta is that as between the two Guruprasāda is undoubtedly the more powerful factor in achieving Aparokṣajnāna. This is proved by a number of indications *(liṅgabhūyastva)* in the Śrutis (see *Chān. Up.* iv.4.5; 6-9; 10-14)[2] where the disciples seek to be instructed again by their own Gurus even tho' they have received enlightenment at the hands of the gods. Rāghavendra in his *TDP* points out that the Sūtrakāra here has used the comparative form 'balīyah' instead of the positive form 'balavat' to indicate that Guruprasāda is neither inferior nor merely equal to personal effort of the disciple in efficacy but is decidedly more powerful.[3]

The contention of the Pūrvapakṣin that Gurupradāna and Guruprasāda as *modus operandi* are of lesser efficacy than the personal effort of the disciple is unsustainable. There are cases where the *modus operandi* is observed to be quite powerful. For example, injury to life entails sin. But injury to life done in a sacrifice with due observance of the subsidiary rites of prokṣaṇa, añjana, paryagnikaraṇa and others and the recitation of mantras wards off sin and confers merit instead.[4]

Tho' not God, the Guru has earned his status by the grace of God and by his previous merit and the Śiṣya takes his place as a disciple and has to seek the help of the Guru to augment the efficacy of his own effort.

2 The references are to the story of Satyakāma Jabāla and Upakosala, in the Up. Satyakāma, after being instructed by the gods Vāyu, Agni, Brahmā and Varuna in the form of a bull, the sacred fire, a swan and a diver-bird, begs again to be instructed by his own Guru. The Guru, after hearing from him what he has been taught by them, gives his approval and blessings. Upakosala after being instructed by the Fires prays again to his Guru to instruct him further. The *TD* points out that in Satyakāma's case, he had departed to the forest to tend the cows of the Guru, immediately after Upanayana without undergoing Vedic studies. When the gods voluntarily instruct him in Brahmavidyā he feels he has not fulfilled the obligation of serving them and requests to be taught over again by his own Guru thereby emphasizing the point that Brahmavidyā imparted by the Guru who has initiated him and obtained thro' long devotion to him and with his abundant grace is alone the efficient means of Aparokṣa.

3 बलवदिति वाच्ये बलीय इति प्रयोगेण न श्रवणादितोऽपि दुर्बलं नापि तद्वत् बलवत् किन्तु बलीय इति दौर्बल्यतरसाम्ये व्युदसितुमिति (*TD.* iii 3 45)

4 न चेतिकर्तव्यत्वेन दौर्बल्यम्। यागीयहिंसायामितिकर्तव्यताया एव प्राबल्यदर्शनात् (*TP.* iii.3 45)

The greater importance attached to Guruprasāda does not mean that Aparokṣajnāna is attained without the practice of Śravaṇa, manana, etc. as prescribed. The last two words of the Sūtra (tad api) are meant to correct such an impression that if Guruprasāda is the more powerful instrument of Aparokṣa, the cultivation of Śravaṇa, manana and other Sādhanas, as such, may well be dispensed with. They emphasize the point that the personal effort in diligently carrying out the Sādhanas is equally necessary.[5] The particle 'hi' in the Sūtra underlines this necessity of personal endeavor as well.[6]

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5 Cf. तदपि श्रवणाद्यपि कार्यमित्यर्थं (*TDP*)

6 अत्र श्रोतव्य इत्यादिश्रुतिसूचको हिशब्द (ibid)

CHAPTER

CHANGE OF GURUS—WHEN PERMITTED?

28 *Pūrvavikalpādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.46-47)

The importance of Guruprasāda or the Guru's grace for spiritual realization has been dealt with in the previous adhi. The Sūtrakāra now goes on to emphasize that the Mumukṣu should always try to obtain spiritual instruction and guidance from the best preceptor suited to his Yogyatā For, having a Guru or receiving instruction from him is not a mere matter of form.[1] The purpose of seeking a Guru is to obtain fulness of grace from him after learning from him the nature and limitations of one's own Yogyatā for the Upāsanā of the sovereign attributes of B One should stick to such a Guru.

But it may happen that after having placed oneself under a Guru, one may come into contact with another and a more competent one who can bestow full grace and illumination on him. Or one may feel drawn towards an equally competent one as the first Guru who is disposed to bestow full grace and illumination. The Sūtra lays down the procedure to be followed in such circumstances It will be remembered that under *B.S* iii 3 14, provision has been made for the meditation of attributes falling within the range of "madhyamagunas" by those eligible for it, as directed by competent Gurus who may come into their lives at the proper time (See P 260 f.n 7) The conditions of this provision cannot be fulfilled unless one is free to take guidance from the more competent Guru when he comes into his life and is not

1 [illegible] (*AC* iii.3.46)

prevented from going over to him leaving the former one to whom he had been attached.[2] This *adhi.* is, therefore, necessary to thresh out these problems.[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that one should stick to his first chosen Guru and never change him, as the purpose of spiritual life is realized by having a Guru. The Śāstras also visit severe punishment on those who abandon the Guru without sufficient reason.[4] So whosoever is sought as the Guru in the first place will do for the rest of one's spiritual life. That being so, if by chance one is not fortunate enough to get a very competent Guru who can adjudge his spiritual Yogyatā and guide him accordingly, in the meditation of "madhyamaguṇas" the provision made in terms of Itare tvarthasāmānyāt (*B. S.* iii.3.14) will have to be treated as impracticable.[5]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra : Pūrvavikalpaḥ prakaraṇāt syāt kriyāmānasavat—which means : "There is option *(vikalpa)* for change from a former (*pūrva*) preceptor (to a better or an equally competent one) taking into account the bestowal by him of fulness of grace and enlightenment (*pra-karaṇāt*[6])—as there is in the mental act *(kriyamānasavat)* of Dhyāna with regard to two or more forms of B. chosen for meditation, the fruits whereof are equal."

The point is this. There is no absolute principle that the first sought is the only Guru to be adopted throughout one's spiritual life. A new Guru may be sought where it is found necessary to do so. For, the purpose of resorting to a Guru is to obtain full measure of grace and enlightenment according to one's Yogatyā. If such grace and illumination can be received from a preceptor other than one's present one and/or from one who is more competent than he, it is obligatory

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2 उत्तमगुरोरस्वीकारे सार्वज्ञाभावेन भाविफलानुसारेणोपासनानुपपत्तिप्रसगात् विचारणीयमेव तत् (*TP.* iii.3 46)

3 उत्तमगुरोरस्वीकारे साधारणगुरोरुपयुक्तसार्वज्ञ्याभावेन तन्मुखेन स्वप्राप्यभाविफलानुसारिगुणोपदेशालाभात् अधिकारिणा फलानुसारेणोपासनायोगात 'इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्' इत्यत्रोक्तमयुक्त स्यादित्यर्थ

(Ragh *TPB.* iii.3 46)

4 गुरुत्याग भवेन्मृत्युर्मन्त्रत्याग दरिद्रता।
गुरुमन्त्रपरित्यागे रौरव नरक व्रजेत्।।

5 See f.n. 3.

6 न च पूर्वप्राप्त एव गुरुरिति नियम। समग्रानुग्रह चेत् पश्चात्तन करोति स्वयमेव तदा विकल्प

(M. *BSB.* iii.3 46)

The meaning given to 'pra-karanāt' is closely connected with that given to 'pra-dāna' in the previous Sūtra.

to go to him However, even a superior Guru who would *not* bestow complete grace and illumination on the disciple (for valid reasons) should not be sought in preference to one who is disposed to do so[7]

Thus the option to change from the first to another Guru holds only in respect of Gurus of equal competency who are pleased to bestow fulness of grace and enlightenment In exercising the option, the permission of the first Guru is to be obtained. There is, however, no obligation to change the Guru, where the old and the new ones are of equal competence The option is to be exercised in such cases only where the equal one turns up in the life of the disciple, of his own accord There should be no deliberate attempt to go in search of such a one Where a new Guru who is more competent than the first one is disposed to bestow full grace and illumination is available there should be no hesitation in going to him and no permission from the former Guru is necessary. The option to change in respect of Guru equal in competency is analogous to the acts of meditation, whereof in regard to such meditations on two or more forms of B upon which one is eligible to meditate the fruits may be equal[8] In such cases one is free to meditate on either of them.

The censure on changing the Guru is not applicable to such *bona fide* cases They apply to changes made without such reason, or without permission or in favor of a less competent Guru.[9]

The second Sūtra of this *adhi* 'Atideśācca' refers to the words of the Śruti exhorting the disciples in the words of their teachers, to seek fulfilment of their spiritual lives by seeking light and guidance from their betters also—in addition to their present Gurus and serve them with devotion just as they serve their own teachers[10] The term 'atideśa'

7 This explains why Satyakāma went back to his own Guru after receiving partial instruction, grace and illumination from the gods. It is suggested that tho' undoubtedly superior to Satyakama's own Guru they refrained from conferring full illumination on him as he was *not* eligible to receive it *from them*. Satyakama, therefore, went back to his own Guru with their (tacit) permission and obtained full grace and illumination from him

समग्रानुग्रहाभावात् सत्यकामः स्वकं गुरुम् ।
कृपयाऽप्यनुज्ञया चैव प्राप तस्माद्धि युज्यते ॥
इति बृहत्तन्त्रे (M BSB iii.3 46)

अनेनानमर्थि ऋषभः स्वस्मात् श्रवणायास्य वक्ति मद्गुणानुग्रह इत्यवादीदिति ज्ञायते
(Vādirāja *TPG* p 157)

8. ध्यानवत् समफलत्वे तु विकल्पः कामतो भवेत् ।
एवं गुरौ द्वितीयस्य विकल्पो ग्रहणेऽपि च ॥ इति ब्रह्मसंहितायाम् (M. *BSB* iii.3 46)

9 दोषवचनस्य विषयो दर्शितो भवति—अज्ञसम्यक्कारविषयं वा अयथास्वीकारविषयं वा, अनुज्ञाभावविषयं वेति
(*TP* iii.3 47)

10 दृष्टान्तमुखेन वचनमतिदेशः (*BD* iii.3.47)

is used here in the sense of an exhortation to proper behavior towards other teachers of equal or superior merit and not in its purely technical sense of an 'extension of the rule.'

The first Sūtra thus adduces the intimate reason (*antaraṅgahetu*) justifying the change of Gurus for a superior one or of equal merit under certain circumstances. The second Sūtra gives the external reason that noble-minded Gurus themselves as stated in the Pauṣyāyaṇa Śruti, exhort their disciples to seek light and guidance on the road to spiritual progress from still more competent teachers where and when available.[11]

There are two grammatical points to be noted in connection with M.'s interpretation of the opening Sūtra. The first is connected with his interpretation of the term 'pra-karaṇāt.' This has been explained by M. with his usual brevity and depth of thought as fulness of grace (samagrānugraham apekṣya) (pūrva gurostyāga)-vikalpaḥ. The option in respect of changing the first Guru is dependent on (*apekṣya*[12]) the ability and preparedness of the other one to bestow *(karaṇa)* fulness *(pra)* of grace and enlightenment.[13]

This way of interpreting 'prakaraṇāt' deserves to be contrasted with S.'s interpretation of it (*See* later).

The other word in the Sūtra which deserves similar attention is : 'kriyāmānasavat' which according to M. means 'the mental act of "Dhyāna" (*mānasakriyāvat*). The post-position of the word 'mānasa' in the karmadhāraya compound is to be explained according to M.'s commentators on the authority of Pāṇini's Sūtra : *Kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye*[14] (ii.2.38). Such compounds admit of being read either way—kriyāmānasa (vat) or mānasakriyā (vat.[15])

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11. 'ब्रह्मोपास्व ब्रह्मोपचरस्व तच्छृणुहि तत्त्वामवतु। यथा ब्रह्मोपचरे यथा मामुपचरे ये चान्येऽस्मद्विधा श्रेयसश्च तानुपास्व तानुपचरस्व तेभ्य श्रणुहि ते त्वामवन्तु' इति पौष्यायणश्रुतावतिदेशाच्च (M. *BSB.* iii 3 47)
Cf उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत (*Katha. Up.* i 3 4)

12 The *BD* explains the ablative in prakaranāt as elliptical (*lyablope pañcamī*):

13 समग्रानुग्रहमिति प्र इत्यस्यार्थकथनम्। अनुग्रहमित्यनेन सूत्रे प्रकृष्टानुग्रहमिति ल्यब्लोपे पचमीत्युक्त भवति (*BD.* iii 3.46)
शिष्याज्ञानादिपरिहरणसमर्थतदपेक्षितार्थोपदेशार्थानुग्रहमित्यर्थं। (*ibid*)
See also Raghu *TPB* (p. 441)
अनुग्रह प्रकृत। अनुग्रहस्य प्रकर्षेण करणात् हेतो (*TDP.* iii 3 46)

14 मानसी च सा क्रियाच, तद्वत् ध्यानवत् 'कडारा. कर्मधारये' इति परनिपात (Ragh. *TDP.* iii 3.46)

15. सूत्रे षष्ठीद्विवचनान्तात् वति

CHAPTER LI

APAROKṢAJÑĀNA AND NOT KARMA IS THE DIRECT MEANS OF MOKṢA.

29 *Vidyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.48-49)

This *adhi* arises by way of disposing of an objection that the whole scheme of Upāsanā as described in the foregoing *adhis.* with all its ramifications of fruits, gradations of adhikārins, and itikartavyatā for the attainment of jnāna is a colorless painting in the air. For it is not yet conclusively established that jnāna attained thro' śravana, manana and other forms of upāsanā is the only means of Mokṣa The latter is attainable thro' much easier and simpler means of karma.[1] No doubt, the place of Karma in relation to Jñāna as the means of Mokṣa has been defined earlier in the Bhāktādhikaraṇa (iii.1 7). But there is still room for a supervening objection *(adhikāśankā)* on the point in support of the claims of karma as the direct means of Mokṣa. This is set at rest in this *adhi*[2]

Vādirāja points out in his *TPG* (p 157) that tho' the treatment of subject of Aparokṣajnāna as the means of Mokṣa has its proper place in the next Pāda, the Sūtrakāra has dealt with it in the midst of the Upāsanā-Pāda itself with a view to inspiring full confidence in the mind

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1 [illegible] (Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali*)

2 भाष्ये * * * 'कर्मणा' इति [illegible] (Raghu. *TPB* iii.3.48)
The reading [illegible] in the printed Edn is wrong

of the Upāsaka about its power to confer on him the highest Purusārtha and get rid of all evil—so as to enable him to carry forward the arduous discipline of Upāsanā with full hope and confidence.[3]

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapakṣa is—there is no need to acquire jñāna thro' Upāsanā, in order to be able to attain Mokṣa Moreover, such Jñāna as is contemplated by the word Vidyā can be attained thro' Śravaṇa which makes the other forms of Upāsanā and Dhyāna unnecessary[4] It is also doubtful if Jñāna confers Mokṣa Just as it appears from the Śruti 'He who knows the Ātman crosses over sorrow' (*Chān Up.* vii.1.3) that Jñāna leads to Mokṣa, it appears from the Smrti. *Karmaṇaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitā Janakādayah* (Gitā iii 20) that karma is the direct means of Mokṣa The Siddhāntin may flatter himself that the place and role of Karma *vis a vis* Jñāna have been defined once for all and shown to be secondary *(gauṇa)* as the means of Mokṣa, in the Bhāktādhikaranam (iii 1 7) But that cannot be accepted as final There is still room for disagreement on the point

For, the Śruti 'Tarati śokam ātmavid' does not expressly refer to Mokṣa Nor has it used the word Vidyā in the third case so as to bring out the fact of its being the direct means of Mokṣa As against this we have in the Smrti text· "By Karma only Janaka and others accomplished the highest good" (*Gītā* iii 20) an express reference to Moksa *(samsiddhi)* and the use of the word 'karma' in the instrumental case (*karmanā*[5])

These two facts are enough to make the Smrti text get over its initial inferiority of status as pitted against a Śruti text and challenge its stand

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Śruti text 'Nānyah panthā vidyate aya naya' (there is no other way than knowledge, leading to release) expli-

3 सत्यम । ज्ञानस्यष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपत्वाभावेन साक्षात् पुरुषार्थत्वाभावात् तदर्थं विहिते कष्टसाध्य उपासने न निःशंका प्रवृत्ति स्यात् यावत् ज्ञानस्येष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहाररूपमोक्षसाधनता नोच्यते । अत फलाशया अधिकारिणो निःशंकतया प्रवर्तयित मध्ये ज्ञानफलनिरूपणस्य सार्थकत्वादिति ज्ञयम्

(Vādiraja *TPG* p 157)

4 By Jñana here the Purvapakṣin understands only indirect knowledge (paroksajñana—See *AC* iii 3 48)

5 न च 'भाक्त वानात्मवित्वात्' इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम । तृतीयाया साक्षात करणार्थत्वात । ससिद्धिपदेन च साक्षान्मोक्षाभिधानाच्च (*TP* iii 3 48)

It should be noted that 'karana' has been defined as 'Sadhakatamam' (Pan i 4 42)

citly negatives the position of being the direct means of Mokṣa in respect of all other Sādhanas like karma and ascribes it to (Aparokṣa)—Jñāna alone[6] and uses the word 'ayana' which means Mokṣa Hence the inherent validity of Śruti is not affected by the Smṛti text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa[7] The position of karma as a subsidiary means of Mokṣa by contributing to Jñāna or welling up of the spiritual joy of Mokṣa in different circumstances has already been defined in the Sūtra Bhāktam vā anātmavittvāt (iii 1 7) and remains unaltered (See Vol II p 380)

The next Sūtra 'Darśanācca' corrects the presumption at the back of the Pūrvapakṣa that Parokṣajñāna (indirect knowledge) in the form of manana based on śravana is the direct means of Mokṣa—so that there is no necessity at all for Dhyāna.[8] The Sūtra 'Darśanācca' makes two points (i) that the Śruti 'Dṛṣṭvaiva tam mucyate nāparena'—'only after having seen Him the Jīva attains release' *(Kauśika Śruti)* recognizes direct vision of B as the sole and only direct means of Mokṣa—as no other Being has the power of releasing the Jīva from bondage, and (ii) that such direct vision is possible only thro' Dhyāna Tho' the root √ 'drs' is also current in the sense of indirect knowledge, it more properly connotes direct perception *Such direct vision of B is to attained only thro' Dhyāna* For this reason Upāsanā consisting of śravana, manana and dhyāna is essential Karma cannot, therefore, usurp the place of Jñāna[9] The true meaning of 'Karmanaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitāh' (*Gitā* iii.20) has been *explained earlier* without involving any conflict with the pre-eminent position of Aparokṣa Jñāna as the only direct means of Mokṣa (See Vol II p 382).

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6 तमेव विदित्वाति मृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय (*Śvet Up* iii.8) इति निर्धारणात् विद्यैव मोक्ष (*M BSB* iii.3 48)

7 'नान्यः पन्था' इति सावधारणविद्यावचनस्य कर्मवचनादपि प्राबल्येन ग्रहणात् विद्यैव साक्षात्साधनमिति निर्णयः पर्यवस्यति (*TP* iii.3 48)
Here the negation of other means to Moksa is equivalent to an emphasis (*avadharana*) on Jñāna as the only direct means (*AC* iii 3 50)

8 न ह्यस्माभिः परोक्षज्ञानमत्र मोक्ष उच्यते येन मननेनैव कृतार्थत्वात् ध्यानवैयर्थ्यं स्यात्, किं नाम, उपासनाजनितं तदपरोक्षज्ञानम् (*AC* iii.3 48)

9 अतो ज्ञानस्य मुक्तिसाधनत्वनियमात् तदर्थोपासनस्य कर्मान्यत्वादुक्त साधनमिति (*TP* iii.3 49)

CHAPTER LII

PRIMACY OF JÑĀNA NOT CONTRADICTED BY THE ROLE OF KARMA SET FORTH IN THE SMRTIS

30 *Abādhādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 50)

If Aparokṣajñāna is to be recognized as the only direct means of Mokṣa because of the exclusive emphasis laid upon it in the Śruti text Nānyah panthā vidyate 'yanāya (*Śvet Up* iii 8), the objection is bound to be revived that there is an equally exclusive emphasis on Karma as the direct means of Moksa in the Smṛti text quoted from the *Gītā*

Tho' the objection has been partly met in the previous *adhi*, there is scope for a supervening objection (*adhikāsankā*) based on that text, on behalf of karma This supervening objection takes it stand on the contention that this Smrti text happens to be the word of the Lord Śrī Krsna Himself and is as such entitled to greater weight[1] This text cannot be disposed of as not excluding the association of other means (*ayogavyavaccheda*) rather than as excluding all other means (*anya yogavyavaccheda*) on the ground that where a Smrti text is opposed to a Śruti, the latter prevails '*Virodhe tvanapeksam*' (*PMS* i 3 3) This principle of interpretation operates only where the validity of Smrti goes back to a *Śruti* (*srutimūla*)

In the present context (according to the Pūrvapakṣin) the Smrti represents the word of God and as such its validity has not got to depend on being in agreement with a Śruti or be derived from it as required by

1 यदि श्रुते सावधारणत्वेन बलवत्त्व तर्हि स्मृतेरपि तथात्वात आप्तवाक्यत्वाच्च बलवत्त्वमिति शङ्कनात सगति (*Ragh Ny Muktavali* iii.3 50)

the Pūrvamīmāmsā dictum[2] Its validity is self-contained as an Āptavākya or the words of a most reliable person It carries an emphatic pronouncement on the role of Karma and is as such entitled to override the Vidyāśruti The view that greater importance is to be attached to the Vidyāśruti (*Śvet Up* iii 8) is thus entirely mistaken The prominence given to Aparokṣajñāna as the only direct means of Mokṣa as against Karma, is therefore, to be set aside (*bādha*)

This seemingly formidable objection is refuted by this *adhi* with an impressive array of counter-arguments embodying a weightier Śruti, weightier indications (linga), reasoning (*upapatti*) and Smṛti

श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च (न बाध.)
in support of the preeminence of Jñāna

The arguments are as follow (i) The Śruti 'Nānyah panthā vidyate ayanāya', as already pointed out, carries an exclusive emphasis on Jñāna which cannot be otherwise explained while the emphasis apparently laid on karma admits of a different explanation *(sāvakāśa)* (ii) There is a decisive indication *(balavallingam)* contained in the following passage from the *Mahābhārata*[4] "Indra, the king of the gods, after having performed a hundred Aśvamedhas, went to Brahmadeva and submitted Neither by karma, nor by wealth nor by other means have I found happiness Please instruct me, therefore, in the highest truth" This passage confirms the superiority of Jñāna to karma as the means of Mokṣa by carrying the clear indication *(linga)* to the effect by pointedly asking for true knowledge after confessing to the futility of Karma in the attainment of lasting happiness[5]

(iii) The Muṇḍaka text Nāsti akṛtah kṛtena (i 2 12) says the everlasting end of human pursuit viz Mokṣa *(akṛtah)* cannot be obtained by deeds *(kṛtena)* whose fruits are, by their very nature, subject to origination and destruction. This is a sound reason corroborating the superior weight to be given to Jñāna It is irrefutable and is voiced by a

2. न चैतावता साम्यम् भगवद्वाक्यत्वेन प्रबलत्वात्। एतेन श्रुतिस्मृत्या श्रुतिर्बलवती तत्परत्वात् स्मृतरिति वा पराहस्तम् (*TP* iii.3.50)

3 विधायवचनस्य प्राधान्य भ्रम (*NV*)

4 The *BD identifies* this verse as spoken by Bhimasena to Drona इति श्रुति मान वचनमेतत् The *TDP's* and *Ny Mukttavali's* (Bangalore Edn 1974) reference to it as a Śruti text is evidently a misprint for Smṛti. The Belgaum Edn. of *Ny Muktāvali* reads सुप्रसिद्धम्य in place of श्रुतिप्रसिद्धम्य of the Bangalore Edn. Ragh. *TPB* and *AC* are silent on the point

5 बहुकर्मकृद्वामीन्द्रस्य दुःखाभिन्नसुखस्मापाय तत्त्वज्ञानप्रार्थनालिंग च बलवत् निरवकाशत्वात् (*TP* iii.3.50)

Śruti which enjoys an intrinsically higher status over the Smrti text quoted for the Pūrvapaksa[6]

(iv) Lastly, there is an unqualified pronouncement in the words of the Lord Himself in the *Vyāsasmrti* which says The Jiva is subjected to bondage thro' karma He is released through knowledge Therefore, sages who have conquered their passions and have envisioned the Lord do not perform (*kāmya*)-karmas

In this way, there are many supporting evidences in favor of the preeminence of Aparoksajnāna as the direct means of Moksa—partaking of the nature of sruti *linga*, *upapatti* and *Smrti*

The statement of the Gitā Karmanaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitāh' can be harmonized with these by construing its words "by karma only" (*karmanaiva*) with the predicate as *excluding the absence* of others means *(ayogavyavaccheda)* If construed in the sense of excluding all other means it will contradict the numerous other evidences referred to in the Sūtra Such Karmayoga as is harnessed to Jñāna thro' *ayogavyaccheda* contributes to the more intensive enjoyment of Svarūpā nanda in Moksa—as has been explained in the Bhāktādhikarana It is thus well established that as the Smrti "Karmanaiva hi samsiddhim āsthitāh" is not conclusive evidence of Moksa being attained or attain able thro' karma alone, the indispensability of Upāsanā consisting of Śravana, manana and Dhyāna for the attainment of Aparoksajñāna—which is the only direct means of Moksa, stands unshakeable

The *AC* raises an interesting question here about the propriety of treating this Sūtra as a separate *adhi*, instead of as part of the previous one as it contains no separate predication and merely sets aside the ground on which the pre-eminent position of Jñāna has been disputed on behalf of Karma It gives a suitable answer that the *adhi* goes into both the explicit sense and the implicit corollary of the main theme In support it points out that the Bhāṣyakāra in his *AV* has accordingly indicated distinctive lines of Pūrvapakṣayuktis for the two *adhis* in terms of *kāranānirnaya* and *(prādhānyam) bhramah* and distinct Siddhāntayuktis in terms of *prādhānya* and *prīti* respectively

The *STC* informs us that some commentators of the Mādhva school itself have treated this Sūtra as part of the Vidyādhi It points out that tho' the Bhāṣya of M has not expressly indicated that this Sūtra forms

6 उत्पत्तिनाशवत्त्वेनावधुनकर्मणा नित्यपुरुषार्थो न भवतीत्युपपत्तिश्च बलवती दूषणशून्यत्वात् श्रौतवाक्य (*TP* iii.3.50)

a separate *adhi*, his *NV* and the *Sambandhadīpikā* (of Śamkarācārya) have done so

The *STC* points out that tho' for the most part the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of these two adhis coincide, the additional point of the Pūrvapakṣa here lies in trying to dismiss the pre-eminence of Jñāna based on the reference to it as the exclusively direct means of Mokṣa as arising from an erroneous idea *(bhrama)* In other words, the Pūrvapakṣa of the previous adhi is grounded in Kāraṇānirnaya while that of the present adhi, is grounded in Kāraṇanirnaya in favor of Karma's pre-eminence This distinguishes the two Pūrvapakṣas The Siddhānta too differs in its complexion making out the greater weightiness of the Vidyāsruti as against the Gitā-Smṛti (in favor of Karma) on *several grounds* It also embraces an additional ground refuting the Pūrvapakṣa contention of 'Prādhānyam bhramah' by arguing that release from bondage is dependent on the grace of a sentiment being—viz. B and the Lord has declared that he regards the Jñānin as dearest to him—which proves the pre-eminence of Jñāna as the only direct means of Mokṣa. Tho' the question of the role of Jñāna as the means of Mokṣa has been dealt with in the Bhāktādhi (iii 1 7) and in the Vidyādhi (iii 3 48-49), the present *adhi* is not rendered superfluous thereby For it arises here by way of having to reinforce the pre eminent position of Jñāna by refuting the fresh objection based on the same Smṛti text A reopening of the issue is permitted where an abhyadhikāsankā necessitates it That such an objection exists in respect of this *adhi* has already been pointed out

Moreover, like Gurupradāna and Guruprasāda being the 'itikartavyatā' of Upāsanā, the knowledge that Mokṣa is not achievable by Karma as its direct means but is attained only thro' Aparokṣajnāna as its direct means is also part of the *itikartavyatā* of Upāsanā In this sense the discussion of the place of Aparokṣajñāna among the means of Mokṣa is certainly in place, in this Pada If the place of Jñāna were discussed elsewhere in Pāda iv, the knowledge of the fact of its being the chief means of Mokṣa, instead of Karma will *not* be understood as forming part of the *itikartavyatā* of Upāsanā

The objection that this adhi is superfluous as its Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhāntanyāyas as well as its topic are the same as in *adhi* 29, has been answered in the *STC* It points out that this does not stand in the way of having a fresh adhi to consider the same or allied topic, if there are sufficient reasons to do so We find for instance that the same Siddhāntanyāya is applied in establishing the conclusion in the

Ākāśādhi (i 1 22) and in the Antasthatvādhi (i 1 20) where 'talliṅga' and 'taddharma' concide There is similar agreement between the Siddhāntanyāyas of the two consecutive adhis in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā which establish the Yaugika character of the terms 'Prokṣaṇīh' and 'Nirmanthya' (*PMS* i *adhi* 9-10)

In conclusion, it may be said that the rejection of the pre-eminence of Karma in the Bhāktādhi (ii 1 7) arises incidentally in connection with the consideration of the topic of the Jiva's peregrinations thro' diffe rent worlds introduced to bring out the need for Vairāgya The discussion of the place of Jñāna *vis a vis* Karma here, is introduced in its own right and legitimate context of Upāsanā which is the means of attaining Aparokṣajñāna [7]

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7 'भाक्त वेत्यादौ कर्मणा मोक्षप्रतिषेधो गत्यादिनिरूपणाप्रसङ्गप्राप्त । अत्राय स्वतन्त्रविचार (*TD* iii.3.50)

CHAPTER LIII

BHAKTI IS THE ESSENTIAL 'ITIKARTAVYATĀ' OF *ALL* SĀDHANAS

31 *Anubandhādhikaranam* (iii 3 51)

This *adhi* arises by way of disposing of an objection that if Vidyā independent of Karma leads to Mokṣa, the need for Bhakti as a necessary Sādhana for Mokṣa as established in Sūtras iii 2 19 and 20 can be altogether eliminated from Upāsanā[1]

As the *STC* points out, this adhi makes it clear that Bhakti is the basic 'itikartavyatā' of all other Sādhanas The term *'ādi'* in the Sūtra (Anubandhādibhyah) is to include several other angas like the cultivation of Śama, dama and other virtues and mental and physical disciplines like yama, niyama, etc

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is that Bhakti is not at all necessary to attain Jñāna It can be had thro' Guruprasāda and Gurupradāna alone For there is nothing which the Guru's grace cannot achieve This does not mean we can dispense with Upāsanā too for there is a well-established anvayavyatireka relation between Jñāna and Gurupradāna There is no such concomitance between Bhakti and Dhyāna For Dhyāna is possible even in the absence of Bhakti or love of God For Dhyāna

1 पूर्वत्र श्रुतिस्मृत्यादिबलात् कर्मनिरपेक्षा विद्यैव मुक्तिहेतुरित्युक्तौ तर्हि भक्त्यादिनिरपेक्षापि उपासनापि ज्ञानहेतुः स्यादिति प्रत्यवस्थानात् सङ्गतिः (Ragh *TPB* iii.3.51)

understood in the sense of fixing the mind on a given something is possible even if one loves or hates the person he is thinking of to the point of an obsession. There are texts in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* which tell us in so many words that men like Śiśupāla attained Mokṣa by sheer hatred of God. Since Mukti by Jñāna (attained thro' Guru-prasāda) can somehow be attained by 'Dhyāna' even thro' hatred of God, there is absolutely no need *to include Bhakti within the orbit of* itikartavyatā of Upāsanās.[2]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta presents Bhakti as the corner-stone of all Sādhanas and their 'itikartavyatā.' It is only by virtue of Bhakti that other noble attributes which lie at the core of one's being get awakened by the grace of the Guru. Such awakened Bhakti harnessed to the active pursuit of Upāsanās leads to Aparokṣa. *Mighty* as may be Guruprasāda, God-vision is not attained thro' śravaṇa, manana and other forms of Upāsanā *without* Bhakti *towards the* Supreme B.[3]

The presumption that it is concentration of thought alone that matters in Dhyāna irrespective of love or hatred for the object of meditation for purposes of Mokṣa is utterly misconceived.[4] Dhyāna founded on dislike or hatred of God as the object of meditation is fraught with disastrous consequences. The Śrutis and Smṛtis make this clear to the meanest intelligence. The stray references like 'Dveṣāc Caidyādayo nṛpāḥ'[5] are not to be taken as approving of Dvesa (dislike or hatred of God) as *a means of attaining* Mokṣa. *They refer to cases of original* and *natural Bhaktas who act as haters of God while under the* power of a temporary disability of a curse or the like.[6] *A grave misconception* of the ideology of Bhakt and Dhyāna has been responsible for the emergence of the socalled theory of Dveṣa-Bhakti and its coming to be read into some of our Purāṇic stories and incidents. Echoes of this supposedly mystic view are to be found in the writings of some of the

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2. न भक्त्यादिक ज्ञानार्थमपेक्षितम्। गुरुप्रसादासाध्यस्यवाभावात्। न चैवमुपासनाभाव। ज्ञानस्य तदन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात्। न चोपासन भक्तिमन्तरेण न भवतीति वाच्यम्, द्वेषेणापि ध्यानसम्भवात्। स्मर्यते खलु द्वेषेण ध्यायतामपि मुक्ति 'द्वेषाच्चैद्यादयो नृपा ' इत्यादि। मुक्तिश्च न ज्ञान विनेत्युक्तम्। अतो गुरुप्रसादसहितोपासनेन यथाकथचित् ज्ञानोपपत्ते व्यर्थं भक्त्यादीत्यतीतपादानुपपत्तिरिति (पूर्व पक्ष) (Ragh. *TPB*. iii 3 51)

3 न केवल श्रवणादिना प्रबलेनापि गुरुप्रसादेन भगवद्दर्शन, किंतु हरिगुरुभक्तिशमदमादिभिश्च (*TP*. iii.3 51)

4 द्वेषयुतध्यानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वेन श्रुतिस्मृत्यादिसिद्धत्वात् (*TP*. iii 3.51)

5 *Bhāgavata* vii 1.30
See also *Op. cit*, xi 5 48, vii 1.29.

6 'द्वेषाच्चैद्यादयो नृपा.' इति भक्तप्रियत्वज्ञापनार्थं, नित्यध्यानस्तुत्यर्थ च। स्वभक्तस्य कदाचित् शापबलात द्वेषिणोऽपि भक्तिफलमेव भगवान ददातीति। भक्ता एव हि ते पूर्वं शिशुपालादय. शापबलात् द्वेषिण.
(M. *GB* ix 12)

religio philosophical schools of a popular brand as embodying freedom from rigidity of means in the approach to God—as in the opinion of these schools God attaches no value to man's motives or attitudes of love or hatred towards Him and grants Mokṣa to all as He has no friend or foe [7]

Madhva is the first and only Bhāṣyakāra of the Vedānta system to refute anti Theistic heresies by way of preventing the infiltration of such misleading ideas into the body-politic of the genuine traditions of the religious and philosophical doctrines of Bhakti and Dhyāna, in his *AV* —

> द्वेषाद्यन्मुक्तिकथन श्रुतिवाक्यविरोधि तत् ।
> रिपवो ये तु रामस्य विमुखत्वान्निरामिण
> अभिद्रोहपदे नित्यमन्धे तमसि ते स्थिता.
>
> * * *
>
> "हिरण्यकशिपुश्चापि भगवन्निन्दया तम
> विविक्षुरत्यगात् सूनो प्रह्लादस्यानुभावत " (*Bhāg* iv, 21, 47)
> "यदनिन्दत् पिता मह्य त्वद्व्रते मयि चाघवान्
>
> * * *
>
> तस्मात् पिता मे पूयेत दुरन्ताद् दुस्तरादघात्"। (*Bhāg* vii, 10, 15 17)
> "निन्दा भगवत शृण्वन् तत्परस्य जनस्य वा ।
> ततो नापैति य सोऽपि यात्यध सुकृताच्च्युत " (*Bhāg*)
>
> * * *
>
> "तानह द्विषत क्रूरान् ससारेषु नराधमान् " (*Gītā* xvi 19)
> इत्यादिवाक्यसदोहात् द्वेषिणस्तम एव तु (*AV* iii 3, adhi 31)

The expression 'anubandha' in the Sūtra has been explained by M. in his *BT* as Bhakti

> अनुबन्धस्तु भक्ति स्यात बन्ध स्नेह उदाहृत (M *BT* vii 1, 48)

With his insight into the Sūtrakara's choice of words, Vādirāja writes that the expression 'anubandha' brings out the power of true

7 Cf मत्सरी का विषयवरागे अथवा वैरें
म्हणानि पार्ई। प्रवगावेया मामा टाट
उयायांची माहा। कनि पथ (*Jnānesvari* ix.467)

Bhakti to hold God *as if bound to the Bhakta* so as to make God respond to his appeal to lift him from the depths of transmigration.[8]

J. make it clear that Bhakti which is at the core of one's being paves the way for the Guru's grace which in its turn makes the seed of Bhakti sprout and develop into mellowed devotion which leads to Aparokṣa.

यदनादिसिद्धमव्यक्तं भक्त्यादि तेन गुरुप्रसादः, तेन भक्त्याद्यभिव्यक्तिः, अभिव्यक्तभक्त्यादिना च ज्ञानमित्यर्थः (*TP.* iii.3.51)

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8 अनु—अनुकूलतया बध्नाति, बद्धमिव वशयति स्वप्रभुमित्यनुबन्धः स्नेह इति व्युत्पत्तिः सूचिता। तेन च स्वप्रभोरनुकूलीकरणशक्तिः भक्तेरस्तीति लभ्यते। अतोऽन्याक्षरत्वालाभेऽपि भक्तिपदं विहायानुबन्धपदं गृहीतम्। अत एव—

'स्नेहानुबन्धो बन्धूनां मुनेरपि सुदुस्त्यजः' इति भागवतम्। स्नेहरूपोऽनुबन्धः स्नेहानुबन्धः

(Vādırāja *TPG* p 157)

CHAPTER LIV

DIRECT VISION OF BRAHMAN DIFFERS IN ITS COMPLEXION INTENSITY ETC AMONG ADHIKĀRINS

32 *Prajñāntarādhikaranam* (iii 3 52)

Is the drect vision of B uniform for all Upāsakas or does it differ in form and content according to differences of Adhikārins and their Sādhanas is the question discussed here[1]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it should be uniform—the object of Aparokṣa viz B being the same for all If the form and content of Aparokṣa should vary, the vision of B cannot be true to its actual being and content But Śruti says 'Only by perceiving B all are freed' This presupposes that the vision of B is uniform for all those who perceive it There is also the statement in the Gitā—"Thro' Bhakti one understands Me, how pervasive and what I am in reality" (XVIII 55) This makes it clear that complete knowledge of B is attained by Bhakti Now, Mokṣa can only be attained by complete knowledge *(pūrnam jñānam)* and not by half-knowledge or a fraction of knowledge As the *Gītā* statement is a generalization applicable to all Aparokṣajñānins, it follows that everybody's vision must be equally comprehensive of the entire truth of B 's form and being Were it not so, those who have no complete Aparokṣa will not be entitled to Mokṣa That will go against the position taken under *B S* iii 3 32, that all those who have directly seen the Lord attain Mokṣa without exception Since that is so, it does

1 एवं [illegible] तारतम्येन स्थितमिति मन्ये, [illegible] अन्यथा [illegible] इति (*TP* iii.3.52)

not stand to reason to hold that there is any difference in the of Aparokṣa or in the fruit of Mokṣa[2]

The Siddhānta is—the vision of B attained by different Up is *not uniform* It corresponds to the variations and differences in vividness, intensity, quality and other aspects of the Aparokṣa on the range, content, duration and other factors of the Upāsanās the Yogyatā or fitness of the upāsakas themselves It should be rea then to hold that the fruits of Upāsanās should be commensurate their means The fruit of Mokṣa cannot be compared to cultu sometimes achieving the same targets of quality and production employing different means or modes of cultivation[3]

The Kamatha-Śruti tells us that some Jñānins have direct of B. in their own selves, some perceive B in its transcendental in the Avatār-forms and some perceive it everywhere and that Devas this perception of B.'s omnipresence becomes more and more and comprehensive in the ascending order upto Brahmadeva[4] The ception of the others is in accordance with their fitness The d of the shades of differences are to be learned from the competent te who can speak with authority on the subject The statement of *Gītā* that the Jñānins obtain complete knowledge of the nature extent of B.'s pervasiveness and perfections is primarily to be stood with reference to Brahmadeva In the case of the others knowledge is said to be complete in its general surface sense going into the inexhaustible details The presence of infinite of difference and perfections in each of the attributes of B has b very impressively brought out by the *Ānandamālā* in this connection

सन्त्येव ह्येकस्मिन्नपि गुणे पुनरप्यनन्तानन्तविशेषगुणयुक्ताः। ... माणेषु क्रियाविशेषगुणेष्वेको गुणः घटस्रष्टृत्व हि। तस्मिन् एव गुणे तत्पर ... तद्विशेषगुणाः पुनरनन्ता युज्यन्ते। एकघटपरमाणूनामपि घटादिद्रव्यवदनन्तत्वात् ... यवानामपि तत्परमाणुवदनन्तत्वात्, तदेकावयवानामपि तद्वत् अनन्तत्वमित्यपर्यवसितिः

(*Op. cit* p 11

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2 'दृष्ट्वैव त मुच्यते नापरेण' इति सर्वपामविशेषितज्ञानेन मोक्षश्रवणात, तथा 'भक्त्या मामभिजानाति यश्चास्मि तत्वत " इति सर्वेपा भक्त्यादिना पूर्णज्ञानात्पत्ते, सपूर्णज्ञानेनैव मोक्षस्मरणात् ... सर्वविषयत्व ज्ञायते। अत सर्वेषा दर्शनस्य साम्यात् उक्तमुक्ततारतम्यमयुक्तमिति पूर्व पक्ष (*TP* iii 3

3 अनेकप्रकारमेवाधिकारिणां भगवद्दर्शनम् तत्साधनोपासनस्यानेकप्रकारत्वात, फलस्य च साधनानुसारित्वात (*TP*

Read also

यथादर्शे तथात्मनि यथा स्वप्ने तथा पितृलोके।
यथाप्सु परीव ददृशे तथा गन्धर्वलोके।
छायातपयोरिव ब्रह्मलोके (*Katha Up* ii 3 5)

4 'अन्तर्दृष्टया बहिर्दृष्टयोऽव्यक्तदृष्टय सर्वदृष्टय इति। देवा वाव सर्वदृष्टय, नपु चात्तरोत्तरमाब्रह्मण यथायोग यथाचार्या आचक्षते" (M BSB iii.3 52)

This *adhi* is not rendered superfluous by the Vṛddhihrāsādhi (iii 2 20-21) The topic of the latter is that Bhakti and all other Sādhanas must be admitted to differ among different Adikārins corresponding to the difference in the nature of the fruit of Mokṣa The topic of this adhi is that the form and content of Aparokṣajñāna differs according to the differences in the nature and content of Upāsanās

The Sūtra 'Prajñāntaraprthaktvavad dṛṣṭis taduktam' has been interpreted by M as follows The direct vision of B *(dṛṣṭih)* varies in different persons (pṛthak) according to the differences (*prthaktvavad*) in the range, vividness, intensity and other aspects (*antara*) of their Upāsanās (*prajñā*) [5]

The *BD* explains prajñā as Upāsanā or dhyāna consisting in a continuous flow of mediate knowledge of the object of meditation derived from scriptural descriptions (*sabda*) and marks (*linga*) —

प्रज्ञान्तर प्रज्ञाविशेष । लिंगशब्दजन्यमविच्छिन्नपरोक्षज्ञानसन्ततिरूपध्यानम् । तस्य पृथक्त्ववत् तदनुसारेण दृष्टि ब्रह्मदर्शनं च पृथक् भिन्नमनेकप्रकारमेव (*Op cit* iii 3 52)

5 Raghuttama (*TPB*) has a learned disquisition here, disposing of certain technical objections against construing prajña in the sense of dhyana or upasana (as M has done) and the propriety of each of the expressions *antara* and *pṛthaktva* appended to *prajna* (in *prajnantaraprthaktva*)

CHAPTER LV

VISIONING BIMBA-FORM THE SINE QUA NON OF APAROKṢA

33. *Na sāmānyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.53)

This *adhi.* arises by way of answering the following objection. It has been established that there is perfect commensurability between Upāsanās and their fruits. It has also been shown that Aparokṣajnāna is not uniform in content for all, and that the measure of its fruits varies accordingly. This cannot, however, affect Aparokṣajnāna in its general aspect leading to Mokṣa as such. There seems to be no need then to insist on the association of the specialized aspect of "Bimbatva" with all the Upāsanās leading to Mokṣa.[1]

The *adhi.* meets this objection and establishes as part of the 'itikartavyatā' of Upāsanā that Aparoksajnāna pertaining to the vision of one's Bimba-Form (of B.) alone leads to Mokṣa. It will be seen that such particular Upāsanā of Bimba-Form is implied in the prescription of appropriate forms of Upāsanā to different orders of Adhikārins like the Antardṛṣṭis, the Bahirdṛṣṭis, etc. as part of their Sādhana in achieving Antardarśana, Bahirdarśana etc. It is, therefore, necessary to establish in principle, that Mokṣa is attained only thro' (Yogya)-Bimbopāsanā.[2]

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1. साधनफलयोरैकरूप्यनियमादुपासनस्यानेकप्रकारत्वात्, यदि ज्ञानं तत्फलमनेकरूपमङ्गीक्रियते, तर्हि सामान्याकारज्ञानस्य मुक्तिसाधनत्वात् तत्साधनमुपासनमपि सामान्याकारमेव कर्तव्यं प्रसज्यत इति बिम्बत्वप्रकारमुपासनं नावश्यकमित्युत्थानादनन्तरसङ्गतिः (*STC.* iii.3.53)
2. अन्तर्दृष्टयो बहिर्दृष्टय इत्यादिना पूर्वत्र व्यवस्थितदृष्टयुक्त्या तत्साधनबिम्बोपासननियतिरपेक्षिता सा न सिद्ध्यतीति (Ragh *TPB.* iii.3.53)

The Purvapakṣa argues that as all forms of B have equal powers of bestowing Mokṣa, there is no point in insisting on the perception of particular forms of B for the attainment of Moksa If only some forms of B have the power to bestow Mokṣa and not the others, we shall have to modify the conclusion established in the Sthānabhedādhi (*B S* iii 2 11 12) that all Forms of B are of equal excellences and powers and that there is no difference among them[3] We have, therefore, to agree that the Upāsanā of *any Form* of B *is competent to bestow* Mokṣa There is thus no justification for insisting on the Upāsanā and vision of one's Bimba Form alone, as qualifying for Mokṣa, as implied in references to Antardṛṣṭis, Bahirdṛṣṭis etc, among Adhikārins

Further, if the visioning of other Forms of B were not competent to bestow Mokṣa, their perception would be in vain It would be difficult in that case to explain why higher Adhikārins like the Devas who *are competent* to see B everywhere should yearn to have the vision of Avatar Forms[4] To avoid these difficulties, it has to be admitted that the vision of any Form of B in general is sufficient to bestow Mokṣa If it is admitted in principle, that the vision of a particular Form of B *alone will bestow Mokṣa and not some other Forms it may likewise* happen that the visioning of Bimba Form too may not, in some cases, be able to bestow Moksa[5]

The Siddhānta is that tho' all Forms of B are equal *in their power* to bestow Mokṣa (*sāmānyāt*) it is not attained by the visioning of any unspecified Form of B at random,[6] but only by the vision of one's own Bimba Form in particular Such is the will and pleasure of the Lord

समोऽपि भगवान् स्वबिम्बदर्शन एवैन मोचयति (M *NV* iii 3 53)

This is explained by the following illustration Tho' death as such is the same in all cases of death, the knowers of B do not attain Mokṣa thro' any one of them occurring *any time in the course of their trans*migration but only at one such death which synchronizes with the

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3 भगवत सवरूपष्वपि साम्यात । नहि कस्यचित रूपस्य मोक्षदानाद्यशक्ति कस्य चिन्नति विशेषाश्रि । तथात्व वाक्यविरोध (*TP*, iii.3.53)

4 दर्शनमात्रा मोक्षदत्वाभावे कदाचिद् दर्शनानां वैयर्थ्य स्यात । तथाच भगवद्वपुष्ट्यर्थ देवतादिदृष्ट्या नैराकाङ्क्ष्यम् (*TD* iii.3.53)

5 अपि च यदि क्वचित्पाकात मुक्तिहेतुत्वं नहि विकल्प नहि बिम्बज्ञानमपि क्वचिन्मुक्तिहेतु क्वचिन्न इत्यनियम इत्युक्तमार्गेण (Ragh *Ny Muktāvali*)

6 The TDP shows how the term Samanyat in the Sutra *stands contextually* connected with 'Brahmasvarūpanām' and the negative particle with 'muktiḥ both suggested by the reference to '*dṛṣṭiḥ*' in the preceding Sūtra so that we have the clear proposition ब्रह्मस्वरूपाणां सामान्येन उपास्य सामान्येन न मुक्ति । दृष्टिग्रहणात् दर्शिता मुक्ति ब्रह्मस्वरूप पार्थि । सामान्यान्यायवृत्ति

destruction of their Prārabdhakarmas In the same way, Jñānins attain Moksa only after perceiving, as is required of them, a particular Form of B from among its numerous ones[7]

The BD interprets *'mrtyu'* in the sense of Aparokṣajñāna also in that it puts an end to transmigration In this interpretation, the point is that it is not Aparoksajñāna in general but one that is qualified by the complete destruction of Karma that bestows Moksa In the same way, tho' all Forms of B are equal, it is only the vision of the parti cular form known as Bimba-Form that bestows Moksa and not any of the others[8]

The concluding part of the Sūtra 'Nahi lokāpattih'[9] answers the objection that if Moksa is not to be attained by the vision of any Form of B in general, their perception will have to go in vain As it cannot go in vain, it must necessarily bear fruit and being a vision of B its fruit must indeed be Moksa We have, therefore, to admit that the vision of any one of the numerous forms of B will do for Moksa and that, therefore, the Upāsanā of any one of them will serve the purpose The insistence on the Upāsanā and the vision of one particular form of B in respect of different Adhikārins is, therefore, unsustainable

The Sūtra answers the objection, pointing out that the visioning of other Forms of B in general by the Jñānin has its own fruit of bestowing the higher worlds of 'Mahar' etc on the knower

But the attainment of such worlds is certainly not the same as attaining Moksa Mukti in the full sense of the term is thus attainable only thro' the Upāsanā and vision of the Bimba Form

सामान्यदर्शनाल्लोका मुक्तिर्योग्यात्मदर्शनात्

(M *BSB* iii.3 53)

The objection that even the visioning of the Bimba form may *not* like the vision of any other form in general, in some cases, be productive of Moksa but only of higher worlds is set at rest with a categorical assurance ·

मुच्यते नात्र सन्देहो दृष्ट्या तु स्वात्मयोग्यया[10]

7 न भगवद्रूपाणां साम्येन सामान्यतो दर्शनेन सर्वेषां मुक्तिः, किन्नाम स्वबिम्बदर्शनादेव । यथा खलु मृत्युत्वसाम्येऽपि न मृत्युमात्रानन्तरं मुक्तिः किन्तु मृत्युविशेषानन्तरमेव भगवद्रूपाणां साम्येऽपि रूपविशेषज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं न सामान्यदर्शनमिति (*TP* iii.3.53)

8 यद्वा मृत्युशब्देन मारक उच्यते संसृतेरिति शेषः । तथाच, यथा ब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञाने संसारमृत्युत्वे समानेऽपि ज्ञानरूपमृत्युमात्रादनन्तरं न मुक्तिः, किन्तु प्रारब्धकर्मावसानकालीनत्वविशेषितात् मृत्योरवतरणानन्तरमेव, एवं भगवद्रूपाणां साम्येऽपि रूपविशेषज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनम् (*BD* iii.3.53)

9 भक्तिरित्यध्याहारः । मुक्त्यवदित्यत्रापि गबध्यते (*STC* iii.3.53)

10 दर्शनेऽपि विकल्पात् बिम्बदर्शनेऽपि न स्यादित्यत आह–मुच्यत इति (TP iii.3.53) See *AC*

followed by another from the *Adhyātma* that 'Yogyātmadarsana' invariably and without fail bestows Moksa

दर्शनेनात्मयोग्येन मुक्तिर्नान्येन केनचित्

There is some difference of opinion among M 's commentators as to the identity of the Form of B whose Upāsanā and Aparoksa are said to bestow Moksa on the different Adhikārins

The *NV* pointedly refers to this Form as ' Sva-Bimba" while the Bhāṣya paraphrases it as "Yogya-Ātma" (darsana) The *TP* sticks to the expression "Svabimba" or "Bimba" throughout

While holding that the Upāsanā of Bimbarūpa is obligatory for all, the *TPB* of Rāghavendra is of opinion that the "Bimba" referred to need *not necessarily* be identified with the one in the heart as defined in the verse

हृदिस्था या हरेर्मूर्ति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक
यद्वशे वर्तते जीव सा तु जीवकला[11] स्मृता

(Q M *BT* xi 27 22)

with reference to all Adhikārins[12] The *BD* agrees with this view while recognizing that the Avatar forms visioned externally by human beings, among Adhikārins, is also to be recognized as *their* "Bimbarūpa"[13]

The *Bhāvabodha* of Raghūttama holds that by Bimbarūpa is meant only the one in the heart defined as above (in the verse quoted *ante*) Its Upāsana and vision are, however, *restricted* to the Ṛṣis or Yogins *who are Antahprakāsas Its Upāsanā and vision are not open to all* Human souls are to achieve Mokṣa by the Upāsanā and vision of the external forms only such as Avatars Raghūttama, accordingly, explains the statement in M 's *Brh. Up Bhāṣya* (ii 1 15) that "even those who are eligible to attain Mokṣa thro' Upāsanā of external forms should carry out some amount of Upāsanā within the heart ' as prescribing such Upāsanā for them with a view to perceiving those Avatar-forms with

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11 जीव कला यस्या सा जीवकला भगवन्मूर्ति (M *BT* XI 27.22)
जीव कला अंशो यस्यासौ जीवकला (*BD*)

12 बिम्बशब्दोऽत्र स्वयोग्यात्मपर । 'मुक्तिर्योग्यात्मदर्शनात' इत्युक्त । न तु हृदिस्था या हरेर्मूर्ति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक । यद्वशे वर्तते जीव इति हृदिस्थरूपमात्रपर । तथा न दृष्टैव इति भागवतविरोध
(Ragh *TPB* iii.3.53)

13 स्वमाति ' इति श्रुतौ बिम्बशब्दो योग्यात्मपर । न तु– हृदिस्था या हरेर्मूर्ति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक ' इत्युक्त हृदिस्थरूपविषयपर ' दृष्टैव इति वाक्यविरोधात (*BD*) See also the view of *STC*

the special (supra-psychical) insight of "Jñānadṛṣṭi" indicated by the use of the adverb 'añjasā' after 'dṛṣṭvā '[14] See also P 144-145, fn 14-15 (*AC*)

The *STC*s view is distinct and more comprehensive It holds that there is no difference of Adhikārins in respect of Bimbopāsanā in the sense of some being entitled to it and others not *It is obligatory for all* However it reduces the forms of Upāsanā based on Antardṛsti, Bahirdṛṣṭi and Sarvadṛṣṭi *to the position of angas or subsidiary disciplines* to Bimbopāsanā by the different Adhikārins By practising such angopāsanās these different Adhikārins earn the grace of the Guru and reach the higher stage of integral meditation of the external, internal and omnipresent forms of the Lord previously envisioned by them, with the Bimba Form in the heart, defined as 'Jīvo yatpratibimbakah'

Cf देवतासु भगवन्तमुपास्य तत्तद्देवताना समीप प्राप्य पुन स्वहृदिस्थमुपास्यैव मोक्षो भवति
(M *Brh Up* c 11 1 14)

It is this unitary Upāsanā of these forms in their identity relation with the Bimba aspect that constitutes the 'Bimbopāsanā" meant by the Śruti —

ननु-'दृष्ट्यैव ह्यवताराणा' 'दर्शनेनान्तरेणान्ये' 'अन्तदृष्टयो, अवतारदृष्टय, सर्वदृष्टय' 'केषाचित् हृदये हरि' इति केषाचिदेव बिम्बोपासनप्रतीते केषाचित सामान्यदर्शनेनापि मुक्तिप्रतीते कथमय नियम इति वाच्यम्।

बिम्बोपासनसाधनानामेवोपासनानामधिकारिभेदेनात्र कथनेऽपि बिम्बोपासनस्य ज्ञापकाभावेन शकत्यभावात्। न च 'हृदयस्था या हरेर्मूर्ति जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक। यद्वशे वर्तते जीव' इत्यादिवचनेन बिम्बस्य हृत्स्थत्व, 'दर्शनेनान्तरेणान्ये' केषाचित् हृदये हरि' इति हृद्दर्शन केषाचिदेवेति ज्ञायते इति वाच्यम्। बिम्बातिरिक्तस्य दृश्यमूर्त्यन्तरस्य विवक्षया तदुपपत्ते। नहि बिम्बातिरिक्त रूप हृदि नास्ति, प्राज्ञस्य उपलभात्। अत एव बिम्बे दृश्यत्वमपि न प्रयोजकम्। अधिकारिविशेषान् प्रति बिम्बभूतरामादे बहिष्ठत्वात। अत एव 'जीवो यत्प्रतिबिम्बक' इत्येव लक्षणम्। हृदिस्थितिस्तु 'यद्वशे वर्तते जीव' इतिवत स्वरूपकथनमेव जीवप्रतिफलननिमित्तविशेषत्वस्य बिम्बलक्षणत्वस्यानतिव्याप्तत्वात।

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14 बिम्बदर्शनादेवेति—नाय नियम सर्वेषाम। किंतु य बिम्बदर्शनयोग्या ऋष्यादयस्तेषामेव। सर्वेषा बिम्बदर्शना योग्यत्वात। यथोक्तम—उपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगादिति। 'ऋषयोऽन्त प्रकाशा' इति श्रुतेश्च। अन्यथा दृष्ट्यैव ह्यवताराणाम इति प्रागुक्तविरोधात। यथा बहिरुपासनन मोक्ष तेषामपि हृद्युपासन किंचित कार्यमेव इति बृहदारण्यकभाष्य तु अवतारादिदृष्टिविशयायमेवावान्तरोपास्त्यावश्यकत्वपरम। अत एव दृष्ट्यैव इत्यत्राञ्जसा इत्युक्तम्। यथोक्त काठकभाष्य —

प्रादुर्भावानते विष्णुमिन्द्रियर्नैव पश्यति।
प्रादुर्भावानपि यदा ज्ञानदृष्ट्यैव पश्यति
तदव मुच्यते यागी न दृष्टैरिन्द्रिय क्वचित। इति (Raghu *TPB* iii.3 53)

अत एवान्तरुपासनस्यैव विम्बोपासनात्वात् नानयोः साध्यसाधनभाव इति निरस्तम् । अत एव 'येषां बहिरुपासनया मुक्तिः तेषां हृदि किंचिदुपास्यमेवेति बृहदारण्यकभाष्ये स्पष्टं बहिरुपासनादीनां तत्त्वमुक्तम् । किं बहुना ? 'हरिः' इत्यादि सामान्यप्रकारकमपि विम्बविषयमुपासनं बिम्बत्वप्रकारकोपासनांगमेव । 'तेषां विशेषमाचार्यो वेत्ति सर्वज्ञतां गतः' इति नियनगुम्पदेशमात्रसाध्यत्वावगमात् ।

तथा च, विम्बत्वप्रकारकोपासनं सर्वेषामावश्यकमेव । न तत्राधिकारिभेदोऽस्ति। किंतु तत्साधनोपासनेषु देवादिभेदेनाधिकारिभेदः । तथा चानेकविधा अप्यधिकारिणः बहिरन्तः इत्यादिस्वस्वयोग्योपासनाजन्यनियतगुरुकटाक्षभाजो विम्बत्वप्रकारकोपासनजदर्शनविशेषेण, पूर्वदृष्टरूपविशेषस्य विम्बैक्यदर्शनेनेति यावत्, स्वस्वयोग्यां मुक्ति लभन्त इति न कश्चित् विरोधः ।

केचित्तु–विम्बशब्दो न हृत्स्थमूर्तिविशेषपरः । किंतु स्वस्वयोग्यात्मपरः । तेन 'दृष्टघैव ह्यवताराणां' इत्येनेन न विरोध इत्याहुः

अन्ये तु–बिम्बदर्शनादेव मोक्ष इत्ययं नियमस्तु न सर्वेषाम् । किंतु, ये विम्बदर्शनयोग्या ऋष्यादयः तेषामेव । सर्वेषां विम्बदर्शनायोग्यत्वात् इत्याहुः (*STC* iii.3.53)

CHAPTER LVI

ONLY B.'S GRACE ENABLES BHAKTI TO BRING B. WITHIN REACH OF THE JĪVA.

34. *Tādvidhyādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.54)

It had been stated in *adhi.* 31 that Bhakti is the means of direct vision of B. The present *adhi.* goes into the question whether such direct vision of B. arises by the sole power of Bhakti—independently of the grace of B. or by Bhakti blessed with the grace of B. The doubt arises because the Māṭhara-Śruti says: "Bhakti alone draws Him to the Jīva, Bhakti alone reveals Him. The Supreme Puruṣa is entirely in the power of Bhakti. It is the best of means."[1] This text makes out that Bhakti is the independent means of Aparokṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Bhakti is referred to in this Śruti as the independent agent (*svatantrakartrī*) in leading to Mokṣa. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to the position of mere instrument or means (*karaṇam*). There is no reason why the Śruti should single out Bhakti and refer to it in such high terms as 'Bhaktir eva enam nayati' if it is not intended that it acts by its own power, independently of the grace of B.

The Siddhānta is that it is against the spirit of the teaching of the Śrutis to ascribe independent agency to Bhakti in leading to Aparokṣa. The *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii.1.4) teaches that the Supreme B. cannot be attained by any amount of discourses, erudition, śravaṇa, manana or other means

1 'भक्तिरेवैन नयति भक्तिरेवैन दर्शयति भक्तिवश. पुरुषो भक्तिरेव भूयसी'। भक्तिसामर्थ्येनैव अपरोक्षज्ञान न परमात्मप्रसादेन। 'भक्तिरेवैनम्,' इति श्रुतौ भक्तेरेव स्वातन्त्र्येण दर्शनादिसाधनत्वदर्शनात (*TP.* iii.3.54)

without the complement of Bhakti Pleased with the seeker who endeavors with the help of Bhakti, discourses and erudition, the Supreme Being, it is said, in this Śruti, enters Vāyu and presents itself before the seeker in him as its base *(adhisthāna)* or in the heart of the seeker, to be realized by him there[2] This makes it clear that it is only the Supreme B that bestows Aparokṣa thro' its absolute grace We cannot, therefore, ascribe independent agency *(kartṛtva)* to Bhakti Bhakti can only be the means or instrument of achieving Jñāna *(karanam)* Tho' only an instrument (karaṇa) in reality, Bhakti is given the place of honor among Sādhanas as the chief means of leading to Jñāna Independent agency in the bestowal of Jñāna is B's Bhakti remains the anga of all sādhanas like sravana, manana, dhyāna and vision of B and is part of the itikartavyatā of Jñāna The Śruti Bhaktir evainam nayati, bhaktir eva enam darsayati' however refers to Bhakti as the agent *(kartṛ)* giving prominence to it as the most important among the sādhanas of Jñāna. We have an example of such a courtesy-reference *(aupacārikaprayoga)* in the Epic line हन्ता रामशर where Rāma is the independent agent in the killing of Vali and his arrow only an *instrument*[3]

In the Sutra परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्य भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्ध the word 'Para' refers to the Supreme B The 'ca' carries an emphasis *(avadhārana)* The word 'dṛṣṭi' follows from Sūtra 52 'Śabda' (in *śabdasya*) refers to the Śruti 'Bhakti' alone brings the Supreme B to the Jiva' The expression tādvidhyam which means 'suchness of declaration' refers to the manner in which Bhakti has been said to bring BRAHMAN within the reach of the Jiva Such a declaration is to be understood, not literally, but from the point of view of the *(bhūyastva)* prominence given to Bhakti *(anubandha)* among sādhanas of Jñāna The overall meaning of the Sūtra is thus briefly given by Vādirāja in his *TPG*[4]

Śamkara's Interpretation
(Lingabhuyastvādhi iii 3 44-52)

S treats Sūtras iii 3 44 52 as a single *adhi*, discussing whether the Sampādika Agnis Manscita, Vakcita, Prānacita, etc mentioned in the

2 'एतैरुपायैर्यतते यस्तु विद्वान् तस्यैष आत्मा विशते ब्रह्मधाम
[illegible] (TP iii 3.54) cf M. BT xi 15.22
Read also' [illegible] (TD)

3 The instrument is generally required to be put in the instrumental case in formal statement. Banena hato Vali

4 [illegible] (Op cit p 158)

Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyī Śākhā are subsidiary to the rite of constructing the fire altar with bricks,—or form an independent Vidyā

The adhi opens with the Siddhānta position that in spite of the Pūrvapaksa view which relies on the context *(prakarana)* to hold these (mental) fire altars to become connected with the act of construction of the altar built of bricks and supplementary to it,—there are many indicatory marks *(lingabhūyastva)* which go to show that these (mental) fires form a separate Vidyā and are not supplementary *(kriyānvayinah)* to the ritual act These indicative marks are more powerful than the context This point is established in the *PMS* (iii 3 14)

Criticism

The Pūrvapakṣa based on prakarana or context can hardly arise in the face of the "many marks" favoring their separateness as a Vidyā, which are *admittedly more powerful* If these 'lingas' admit of being explained otherwise and shown to be weaker so as to let the Pūrvapaksa pass muster, the same weak Lingas cannot be hailed as 'more powerful' and included within the scope of 'ādi' in Śrutyādibaliyastvād (Sūtra 49) at the Siddhānta stage There is no difficulty in treating these mental fires as supplementary to the ritual act *(kriyānga)* like the mental offering of the Soma cup on the Avivākya day of the Soma sacrifice which forms an auxiliary element in the actual outward sacrifice performed and as such assumes the character of an action It is, therefore, cumbersome to infer a vidhi based on the arthavāda passage 'Tad yat kimcemāni bhūtani manasā sankalpayanti tesām eva sā krtih' to establish the status of a separate vidyā for these fires

The usual order of Pūrvapaksa and Siddhānta has been given up here by S in treating the second and third Sūtras as the Purvapaksa and the first and the rest as representing the Siddhānta views

The interpretation of the opening Sūtra involves the importation of a whole clause Manascidādinām agninām svātantryam' before the probans 'lingabhuyastvat' No word in this sutra or before suggests a reference to the topic raised by S

It is superfluous to refer to the *PMS* by the words 'tadapi' in the Sūtra, after it has been expressly shown that the linga is more powerful than the prakarana and affirmed again in the words of the Sūtra *tad dhi baliyah* (the linga is indeed (hi) stronger than the prakarana) Where is the need to quote chapter and verse on this obvious point from the *PMS* to clarify it? Does this not show that th[illegible] ndling of this Sutra as connected with the question of the Samp[illegible] is far

from satisfactory? This impression is confirmed by the very unsatisfactory way in which the five Sūtras following 'Vidyaiva tu nirdhāranāt' have been interpreted with a number of loose ends and redundancies, as we shall see

The interpretation of the expression 'vikalpah' in Sūtra 45, in the sense of Viśesopadesa or prakārabhedopadesa (an instruction about a particular mode of the same kriyāmayāgni) is *unusual* Apart from this, the concatenation of the words of the compound-form 'Pūrvavikalpah' and their juxtaposition with 'prakaranāt' in the Sūtra present a serious stumbling block to our acceptance of the facile interpretation extracted by S out of them पूर्वस्य क्रियामयस्याग्ने प्रकरणात् तद्विषय एवाय विकल्प

In this interpretation the term prakaranāt cannot be syntactically connected straightway with 'pūrvavikalpah' In the Sūtra, we have only the word 'kriyā' which cannot be stretched into 'kriyāmayāgni' as S would like to have it If the Sūtrakāra wanted to convey the sense which S has in mind, he would have used the more compact and commensurate expression *Pūrvavikalpo mānasavat* If the expression 'kriyā' is to be understood in the sense of 'kriyānupraveśena pūrvavikalpah syat mānasavat' it, will lead to the adoption of Lakṣanā in interpretation

Moreover, there is a clear statement recognizing 'kriyānupraveśa' to 'mānasa-graha' in

एष वै दशमस्यान्हो विसर्ग

But there is no such statement in regard to the mental fires, to support *the Pūrvapakṣa which takes away all the* force from the comparison attempted in the Pūrvapakṣa Sutra with the 'mānasagraha'

Coming to Sūtra 46, the passage 'Each one of the 36,000 fires is as large as the previous Agni' is only a laudatory statement (*prasamsāvākya*) which is not the same as an *'atidesa'* Even conceding the *atidesa,* it is not sufficient to establish 'kriyānupravesa' or the sāmpādika[5] fires being treated as part of the sacrificial act For the 'sāmānya' is only in respect of their size and not in respect of the 'kriyā'

The Sūtra 'Vidyaiva tu nirdhāranāt' as interpreted by S is rudundant—as the conclusion that the Sāmpādika fires are not only indepen dent of any sacrificial act, but also constitute a vidyā of their own is supported by more or less the same passage Tān haitān evamvide sarvadā sarvāni bhūtani cinvanti' etc under Sūtra 44 Equally super-

5 'Sampādikāh' means चित्याग्निस्वनानमग्नि

fluous is Sūtra 48 as under it S advances no new argument but *refers back* to what he himself has said under Sūtra 44 (*Tat purastād darśitam lingabhūyastvād ityatra*).

As the inferiority of strength of prakarana to Śrutyādi has been well-established by S under Sūtra 44 by the words 'Tad dhi baliyah' there is no room for any 'bādhāsankā' (possibility of being set aside) *or its refutation in* Sūtra 49 It is hardly necessary to remind the Pūrvapakṣa of what has been established on the strength of direct enunciation, indicatory marks etc. just four Sūtras before (in 44)' The Pūrvapakṣin cannot be *that short of memory* Further, Sūtra 49 turns to the task of dislodging an objection to the Siddhānta (bādhakoddhāra), for the first time in the course of the discussion The conjunctive particle 'ca' in Sūtra 49 is, therefore, out of place

As the words 'Śrutyādi' in Sūtra 49 refers mostly to the same points as have been covered by Lingabhūyastva in Sūtra 44, Sūtra 49 in keep ing with uniformity of statement should have been more compactly worded as 'Lingādibaliyastvād na bādhah' as the Śruti quoted in this regard embodies a 'linga'.

The point made by 'Manasaivādhīyanta tesām ekaika eva tāvān yāvān asau pūrvah' quoted under the Sūtra 'Anubandhādibhyah' (50) can as well be comprehended by the terms of Śrutyādibalīyastvād (Sūtra 49) This renders Sūtra 50 superfluous

As the Śāṇḍilyavidyā and others are not introduced in the context of sacrificial acts, there is no difficulty in recognizing them to be separate vidyās each with its own particular connection It is not, therefore, appropriate to cite them as illustrations in support of recognizing Manaścita and other fires which are given in a ritualistic context, as constituting a separate vidyā

The illustration of the taking out (*utkarsa*) of the 'Avesti' offering from the context of the Rājasūya (in Sūtra 50) to support the (similar) separation of the Sāmpādika fires from their ritual context to consti tute them into a separate vidyā, is inappropriate The Sāmpādika fires are sought to be separated on the ground that they are not connected with the ritualistic fire or act The Aveṣṭi offering is taken out of the context of Rājasūya, where it is mentioned, only because Rājasūya is restricted to Ksatriya-born kings whereas the Avesti offering is open to the members of the three Varnas In being taken out (*utkarsa*) from the context of Rājasūya, the Avesti offering does not forfeit its connection with a sacrificial act It is, therefore, beside the point to explain

the term *'drstah'* in Sūtra 50, as alluding to the taking out of the Avesṭi offering, by way of illustration It is evidently for this reason that R interprets the term 'drṣtah' in quite a different sense, instead of following S tho' he agrees with him about the general pattern of thought of this adhi, so far as the topic of the Sāmpādika fires is concerned[6] It is absolutely superfluous to embody a reference to the *PMS* thro' 'Taduktam' in Sūtra 50, after directly referring to the taking out of the Avesti offering, by the word drstasca

The sandwiching of Sūtra 50, adducing arguments in support of the Siddhānta, between Sūtras 49 and 51, which rebut counter-arguments against the Siddhānta disrupts the sequence of thought

As the counterargument of 'Mānasagraha' can be silenced on the basis of the comparative weakness of the context (*prakaranadaurbalya*), there is no need for a separate Sūtra (51)

S takes 'mrtyuvat' in this Sūtra to be a reference to *Brh Up* iii.2 10, where Agni is said to be 'death' and another passage (Śat. *B* x 5 2 3) where 'Āditya-Puruṣa' is said to be 'death' (*mrtyuh*) He observes that tho' the word 'mrtyu' (death) is commonly applied to Agni and Āditya Puruṣa, the two are not the same (equal) on that account If that is the point the Sūtrakāra is driving at, the proper way of phrasing it would be 'Agnyādityapuruṣavad' and not 'mrtyuvat' Similarly it is going off the mark to explain the words 'Nahi lokāpattih', taken for another illustration, referring to *Chān Up* (v 4 1) as meaning 'Nahi lokasya Agnibhāvāpattih'

The whole clause 'Mrtyuvan na hi lokāpattih' bears the stamp of a single illustration—judging from the absence of a conjunctive particle too But S sees two illustrations in it instead of one as does R It is difficult to see how an additional illustration by itself will add to the weight of the Siddhānta.

The evidence of the subsequent (*parastād*) and the preceding (*purastād*) Brāhmaṇa passages" cited in favor of the Siddhānta view can very well be brought under the scope of 'Lingabhūyastva' already referred to in Sūtra 44 This renders the last Sutra 'Parena ca tādvidhyam * *' superfluous The term 'sabda' in this Sūtra does not seem to be very essential to bring out the sense intended by S

6 Some of the criticisms against S s interpretation of certain Sutras of this adhi are applicable *mutatis mutandis* to R s interpretation also where it agrees with S's

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

To steer clear of the superfluity of the Sūtra 'Lingabhūyastvād' (iii 3 43) in the event of its forming an adhi with the following ones and dealing with the question of the Sāmpādika fires as in S, R separates it from the others and treats it as a separate adhi

He assigns to it a topic from the *Mah N Up* beginning with

सहस्रशीर्षं देव विश्वाक्ष विश्वशम्भुवम् ।

and ending with

सोऽक्षर परम स्वराट् ।

wherein no meditation is enjoined[7] The question is whether the above is a recital of qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in the preceding Dahara-Vidyā alone

दह्र विपाप परवेश्मभूत हृत्पुण्डरीक पुरमध्यसस्थम ।
तत्रापि दह्र गगन विशोकस्तस्मिन्यदन्त तदुपासितव्यम् ॥

(*Mah. N* x 23)

or whether it is a recital of qualities to be included in the meditation of the highest Self *as enjoined in all the Vedāntic texts*[8]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as this section follows the Daharavidyā-prakarana, it is to be taken as merely stating the qualities which are to be included in the meditation of B as enjoined therein The Siddhānta is that its scope is wider, embracing the qualities of the highest self *predicated in all the Vedāntic texts* The reason is that the sentences in the latter section carry many marks proving that that section is meant to declare the characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all the meditations of the highest Being *and* the identity of that Being with Sri Nārāyana The term "linga" is used in this Sūtra in the sense of clauses (vākyas) which contain a specific indication (*cinha*) to the above effect—and not in the usual sense of the Mimāmsā sāstra[9]

Criticism

The principle governing the Siddhānta of this adhi is the same as has been enunciated by the Sūtrakāra at the commencement of this Pada—viz Sarvavedantapratyayam * *' A separate Sutra to esta-

7 अस्मिन्ननुवाके नोपासन विधीयते (*Vedantadipa* iii 3 43)

8 किमय पूर्वानुवाकावतदहरविद्याया आनन्तर्यात तदुपास्यविशेषनिर्धारणार्थ उत सर्ववेदान्तोदितमवविद्योपास्यविशेष निर्धारणार्थ इति सशय (*ibid*)

9 अत्र लिंगशब्द चिह्नपर्याय । चिह्नभूत वाक्य बहुनरमस्तीत्यर्थ (*Sribhaṣya* iii 3 43)

blish thıs point, ın effect, with reference to one more text at thıs stage ıs quite unnecessary. The Sūtra, therefore, requires a much more plausible topic for discussion than the one suggested by R. by way of improvement to S ’s way of utilizing the Sūtra The way ın which R. ıs forced ın consequence of the change of topic made by him for Sūtra 43, to construe the term "linga" ın the extended sense of ‘cinhabhūtam vākyam’[10] speaks for the weakness of his interpretation

10 प्रकरणात बलीयसा वाक्यन नारायणानुवाकस्य सर्वविद्यासाधारण्यमुक्तम (*Śrutaprakasa* ııı 3 44)

CHAPTER LVII

ANĀDYABHINNĀMŚAS AMONG JIVAS DERIVE THEIR YOGYATĀ FROM THEIR AMŚINS

35 *Ekādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.55-56)

It was shown in the previous adhi. (34) that beginningless asset of Bhakti acts as the chief instrument of direct vision of B only thro' Its grace.

अनादितो गुणाः सन्तो भवत्याद्या न ह्यमूमुचन् ।
जीवं तद्गुणसुव्यक्तिं कृत्वैन मोचयेद् हरिः ॥
इति ब्रह्मतर्कवचनात् अनादिगुणविस्तरे सत्यपि अव्यक्त्यादिना तदिच्छा विना मोक्षाप्राप्तेः

(M NV iii 3 *adhi* 34)[1]

The present adhi. arises by way of disposing an objection to the 'anāditva' (beginninglessness) of the asset of Bhakti, Jñāna and other forms of yogyatā The 'anāditva' of such yogyatā of assets is deftly challenged here thro' a pertinent objection based on the Siddhānta position that the Jivas are 'Sāmśas' (See Vol. II, p 207 and the Vyatirekādhi —ii.3.27).

It is to be noted that tho' the theme of this adhi is the non-difference of the amśa and the amśi (Jīva), it brings the anāditva of Bhakti as part of the individual's yogyatā within the scope of the 'itikartavyatā' of upāsanā by disposing of the objection to the oneness of the amśa and

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1 भक्तेरेव स्वातन्त्र्याङ्गीकारे तस्या अनादित्वेन पूर्वमेव मुक्तिः स्यादिति भावः । एवं चानादिगुणविस्तारे सत्यपि भगवद्दर्शनाभावात् युक्तं तस्याव्यक्तत्वमिति (*Raghu NVB iii.3 adhi.34*)

the amśı—for the objection threatens to disprove the anādıtva of the Jīva's assets of Bhaktı, etc Hence the need to enter ınto thıs question whether the amśa and the amśı are one [2]

The Pūrvapakṣa accordıngly argues that the Svarūpayogyatā of Jīvas ın respect of Bhaktı and other assets for purposes of upāsanā cannot be regarded as begınnıngless (*anādı*) as establıshed ın ııı.3 54. Jıvas lıke Arjuna have been recognızed ın the Epıcs and Purāṇas as amśas of Indra and other beıngs It cannot be that the yogyatā of an amśa-Jıva lıke Arjuna has no begınnıng For Arjuna as the amśa of Indra has a bırth and a lıfe of hıs own whıch has a begınnıng. Hıs Yogyatā cannot, therefore, be wıthout a begınnıng whıle hıs lıfe has a defınıte begınnıng and he hımself ıs 'sādı'

The Pūrvapakṣa contınues that ıt cannot be held that as the Amśı-Jıva ıs wıthout a begınnıng, hıs amśa ıs also 'anādı' and exısts wıthout a begınnıng That the amśa and the amsı Jıvas are dıfferent from each other should be clear, says the Purvapakṣın, from the fact that when the amśı has 'upalabdhı', Vrttıjñāna (mental), happıness, etc the Amśa does not share them [3] The Amśa ıs also known to behave and react contrary to the behavıor of the Amsı ın varıous sıtuatıons Take the case of Arjuna hımself Whıle hıs Amśı (Indra) ıs bent upon preventıng the burnıng down the Khāṇḍava forest by Agnī hıs Amśa (Arjuna) fıghts to foıl hıs attempt to consume the forest (See *Mbh Ādıparva*, Ch 252-53) As the amsa and the amśı are thus dıfferent entıtıes, and the amsa has a defınıte bırth and a begınnıng, hıs yogyatā must also have a begınnıng [4]

The Sıddhānta ıs just as the Amsı, goes ınto occupatıon of another body as a result of hıs own karma, so also when he mıgrates from one body to another thro' hıs amśa, the body whıch he comes to occupy ıs also the outcome of hıs (Amśı's) own karma For thıs reason, the amśa tho' tenantıng a dıfferent body from the Amsı, ıs stıll the same

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2 पूर्वाधिकरणे अनादिभूताया भक्त कर्ण वाक्ते जीवाशानामुत्पत्तिम वनानादिभूततद्योग्यताया एवाभावेन कथ जीवस्यानुबधित्वेन भवयादरनादित्विमि याग्यात्यानात अनत्यमगनि (Raghu. *TPB* ııı.3.55)

3 The expression 'upalabdhıvat' ıs construed ın terms of मत्यम्यत्नात वनि ।

4 इन्द्रादिजीवाशानामर्जुनादीना योग्यताया तदभावात तयामवान्पत्तिमत्वेन तद्मस्यानादि वायायान । न चाशिना-त्मादि वादशम्यान्तरमभाव । अशाशिना पृथक् वान । अशिनि शानिनि सुखिनि दु खिनि चाशे ज्ञानाद्यभावेन अशस्य अशिव भोग तुल्वान् । अन्यथा ज्ञानादिभदा न स्यात । अतो अशाशिना पृथक् वात अशस्योत्पत्तिरनादि याग्यतामावात उपासनाद याग्यताया नास्तीति तदस्यवभ्यितमिति भाव (*TD* ııı.3.55)

Vadırāja (*TPG* p 159) pushes the poınt further so as to call ınto questıon the *anadıtra* of the *yogyata* ın the case of the Amsı also एव च न्यायमान्यादेना-न्त्विवन्यानुकमरति सतितुर्निर्णय

as the Amśı and not a dıfferent beıng The anādıyogyatā of the Amśı therefore holds true ın the case of the amśa also [5]

The Sıddhānta lays emphasıs on the poınt that the amśa has no separate karma to hıs credıt, for prıor to ıts relatıonshıp wıth the present physıcal body, the amśa (Arjuna) has had no separate exıstence other than that of hıs Amśı (Indra) [6] *It ıs a well-establıshed fact that* wıthout karma there ıs no lıabılıty to embodıment If the body of Arjuna as the amśa ıs not the outcome of karma, ıt would be 'natural' to hım and would not be lıquıdated by the exhaustıon of karmas—lıke the other 'bodıes' earned thro' karma It would then be a permanent appendage of the amśa and he cannot shake ıt off and attaın Mokṣa [7]

The second Sūtra rejects Pūrvapaksa argument that the amśa and amśı are dıfferent beıngs ın vıew of the dıfferences ın theır knowledge, happıness, behavıor,[8] etc It ıs poınted out that ın spıte of these mınor dıfferences, there ıs experıentıal ıdentıty, coordınatıon and assımılatıon of the fruıt of Sādhana—vız Bımbadarśana of the Amśa by the Amśī [9] Whıle the Amśı ıntuıts the knowledge, happıness, etc of the Amśa, the abılıty of the amśa to ıntuıt and assımılate the entıre experıence of the Amśı *as ıts own* ıs precluded by the dıspensatıon of God due to the lımıtatıons ımposed by terrestrıal envıronment, physıcal embodıment, food and other factors [10]

As the amsas are thus *not* dıfferent from theır Amśıs, there ıs no genesıs or svarūpotpattı of the amsas The yogyatā of such Anādyabhınnāmsas (begınnıngless and non-dıfferent amśas) can, therefore, be accepted as a begınnıngless asset The Sıddhānta posıtıon that upāsanā ıs regulated by anādıyogyatā thus remaıns uncontradıcted [11]

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5 यथाशी शरीराच्छरीरान्तर स्वकर्मनिर्मितमेव प्राप्नाति, यदात्वशन शरीरान्तर प्राप्नाति तदापि तथैव स्वकर्मनिर्मितमेव । अत शरीरान्तरवर्ती स नपि अशो अशिना एक एव (*TP* ııı 3 55)

6 एतच्छरीरसब धात् पूर्वमर्जुनादीना इन्द्राद्यशिव्यतिरेकस्यैवाभावादिति (Raghu *TPB* p 453)

7 न चाशस्य पृथक कर्मास्ति । न चाकर्मनिमित्त शरीरससर्गो युक्त । अपवर्गाभावप्रसगादिति (*TP* ııı 3 55)

8 उपलब्धीत्युपलक्षण ज्ञानसुखादौ (*TDP*)

9 अल्पे ज्ञानादावनुस धानाभावेऽपि प्रधानसाधनोपासनादिफलानुस धानात *TP* साधनात्तमस्यादृष्टस्याशिष्ट तम्याशन भुज्यमानत्वात (*NV* ııı 3 adh 35)
Read उपासनादिफलमपरोक्षज्ञानिनाऽपि इ द्रस्य नित्यपरोक्षभावेन मध्य मध्य उपास्यबिम्बापरोक्षदशन तस्यानुसन्धानात अशनानुसधानादित्यर्थ । अशगतसर्वानुसधानाभावेऽपि तस्य बिम्बदशनेऽयमपि बिम्ब पश्यति । इद चानुस धान भेदे सति कथ स्यात ? (Vadıraja *TPG* p 159)

10 अल्पज्ञानसुखाद्यनुसधानस्य मानुषमपत्र प्राक्तता नभाजनादिना भगवदिच्छया चापपत्त्या च बाधकाभावन * * *
(Ragh *Ny Muktavalı* ıiı.3.56)

11 अशाशिनोरभेदात अनाद्यभि नाशस्य स्वरूपोत्पत्त्ययागेन तस्याप्यनादित्वन, तद्धर्मभूतयाग्यतायाा अप्यनादित्व सभवात अस्त्यनादियाग्यतापेक्षा उपासनादाविति (*ıbıd*)

the amśi—for the objection threatens to disprove the anāditva of the Jiva's assets of Bhakti, etc Hence the need to enter into this question whether the amśa and the amśi are one [2]

The Pūrvapaksa accordingly argues that the Svarūpayogyatā of Jīvas in respect of Bhakti and other assets for purposes of upāsanā cannot be regarded as beginningless (*anādi*) as established in iii.3.54. Jīvas like Arjuna have been recognized in the Epics and Purāṇas as amśas of Indra and other beings It cannot be that the yogyatā of an amsa-Jīva like Arjuna has no beginning For Arjuna as the amśa of Indra has a birth and a life of his own which has a beginning His Yogyatā cannot, therefore, be without a beginning while his life has a definite beginning and he himself is 'sādi'.

The Pūrvapakṣa continues that it cannot be held that as the Amśi-Jiva is without a beginning, his amśa is also 'anādi' and exists without a beginning That the amśa and the amśi Jivas are different from each other should be clear, says the Pūrvapakṣin, from the fact that when the amsi has 'upalabdhi', Vrttijñāna (mental), happiness, etc the Amśa does not share them [3] The Amśa is also known to behave and react contrary to the behavior of the Amśi in various situations Take the case of Arjuna himself While his Amśi (Indra) is bent upon preventing the burning down the Khāṇḍava forest by Agnī his Amsa (Arjuna) fights to foil his attempt to consume the forest (See *Mbh Ādiparva*, Ch 252-53) As the amsa and the amsi are thus different entities, and the amsa has a definite birth and a beginning, his yogyatā must also have a beginning [4]

The Siddhānta is just as the Amsi, goes into occupation of another body as a result of his own karma, so also when he migrates from one body to another thro' his amśa, the body which he comes to occupy is also the outcome of his (Amśi's) own karma For this reason, the amśa tho' tenanting a different body from the Amsi, is still the same

2 पूर्वाधिकरणे अनादिभूताया भक्त्यादियोग्यताया ... जीवस्यानुवर्धित्वं ... अनन्तत्वमपि (Raghu. *TPB* iii.3.55)

3 The expression 'upalabdhivat' is construed in terms of मन्यमानात् वर्ति ।

4 इन्द्रादिजीवानामर्जुनादीनां योग्यताया तदभावात् ... । न चांशिना- ... । अंशिना पृथक्त्वात् । अंशिनि ज्ञानिनि सुखिनि दुःखिनि ... अंशस्य अंशित्वाभावात् । अन्यथा ज्ञानादिभेदो न स्यात् । ... अंशिना पृथक्त्वात् ... (*TD* iii.3.55)

Vadirāja (*TPG* p 159) pushes the point further so as to call into question the anāditva of the *yogyatā* in the case of the Amsi also ...

as the Amśi and not a different being The anādiyogyatā of the Amśi therefore holds true in the case of the amśa also[5]

The Siddhānta lays emphasis on the point that the amśa has no separate karma to his credit, for prior to its relationship with the present physical body, the amśa (Arjuna) has had no separate existence other than that of his Amśi (Indra)[6] It is a well-established fact that without karma there is no liability to embodiment If the body of Arjuna as the amśa is not the outcome of karma, it would be 'natural' to him and would not be liquidated by the exhaustion of karmas—like the other 'bodies' earned thro' karma It would then be a permanent appendage of the amśa and he cannot shake it off and attain Mokṣa[7]

The second Sūtra rejects Pūrvapakṣa argument that the amśa and amśi are different beings in view of the differences in their knowledge, happiness, behavior,[8] etc It is pointed out that in spite of these minor differences, there is experiential identity, coordination and assimilation of the fruit of Sādhana—viz Bimbadarśana of the Amśa by the Amśī[9] While the Amśi intuits the knowledge, happiness, etc of the Amśa, the ability of the amśa to intuit and assimilate the entire experience of the Amsi *as its own* is precluded by the dispensation of God due to the limitations imposed by terrestrial environment, physical embodiment, food and other factors[10]

As the amsas are thus *not* different from their Amsis, there is no genesis or svarūpotpatti of the amsas The yogyatā of such Anādyabhinnāmsas (beginningless and non-different amsas) can, therefore, be accepted as a beginningless asset The Siddhānta position that upāsanā is regulated by anādiyogyatā thus remains uncontradicted[11]

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5 यथांशी शरीराच्छरीरान्तरं स्वकर्मनिर्मितमेव प्राप्नोति यदात्वंशन शरीरान्तरं प्राप्नोति तदापि तथैव स्वकर्मनिर्मितमेव। अत शरीरान्तरवर्ती सन्नपि अंशो अंशिना एक एव (*TP* iii 3 55)

6 एतच्छरीरसंबन्धात् पूर्वमर्जुनादीनां इन्द्राद्यंशिव्यतिरिक्तस्यैवाभावादिति (Raghu *TPB* p 453)

7 न चांशस्य पृथक् कर्मास्ति। न चाकर्मनिमित्त शरीरसंसर्गो युक्त । अपवर्गाभावप्रसंगादिति (*TP* iii 3.55)

8 उपलब्धीत्युपलक्षणं ज्ञानसुखादौ (*TDP*)

9 अल्पज्ञानादावनुसंधानाभावेऽपि प्रधानसाधनोपासनादिफलानुसंधानात *TP*. साधनात्तमस्यादृष्टस्यांशिन्तस्यांशेन भुज्यमानत्वात (*NV* iii 3 adh 35)
Read उपासनादिफलमपरोक्षज्ञानिनाऽपि इन्द्रस्य नित्यपरोक्षभावेन, मध्य मध्य उपास्यबिम्बापरोक्षदर्शनं तस्यानुसंधानात अंशनानुसंधानादित्यर्थ। अंशगतसर्वानुसंधानाभावेऽपि तस्य बिम्बदर्शनञ्चमपि बिम्ब पश्यति। इदं चानुसंधानं भेदे सति कथं स्यात ? (Vadiraja *TPG* p 159)

10 अल्पज्ञानसुखाद्यनुसंधानस्य मानुषमपक्वप्राकृतान्नभोजनादिना भगवदिच्छया चापपत्त्या च बाधकाभावेन * * *
(Ragh *Ny Muktavali* iii.3 56)

11 अंशांशिनोरभेदात अनाद्यभिन्नांशस्य स्वरूपोत्पत्त्ययोगेन तस्याप्यनादित्वेन तद्धर्मभूतयोग्यताया अप्यनादित्व संभवात अस्त्यनादियोग्यतापेक्षा उपासनायामिति (*ibid)*

But how is it that the amsa is able to intuit and assimilate the Bimbāparoksa of the Amsi while he is not able to intuit and experience as his own other experiences of the Amsi? Vādirāja explains the difference with a vivid illustration A man seldom feels the weight of a piece of cloth thrown over his shoulders But he feels the weight of stone placed on his head The Supreme B is dearest and nearest to the hearts of the gods The direct perception of one's beloved Bimba Form is a source of supreme joy to every member of the divine hierarchy Being the most powerful and vivid, its experience by the Amsi is shared by the amsa, while other ordinary experiences of either are not shared or intuitively assimilated by way of experiential identity [12]

The Siddhānta rejects the plea of difference (*vyatireka*) between the amsa and the amsi The amsa and the amsi are one The particle 'ca' following from Sutra 54 is connected with the predicate of the Sautra proposition and emphasizes it The reflexive 'Ātmān' in the opening Sūtra refers to both the amsa and the amsi by 'tantra' The opening Sūtra thus conveys आत्मा (अंश) आत्मना (अंशिना) एक एव for the amsa abides (*bhāvāt*) as the subject of experience (*abhimānitayā*) in the body (*sarīre*) generated by the karma of the Amsi (*ātmanah*) himself

अंशांशिनोरेकत्वमेव । अंशिकर्मविनिर्मितशरीरे एवांशस्य भावात्

(M BSB iii 3 55)

There is no separate birth of the amsa It merely tenants the body wrought by the karma of the Amsin himself If the two are different entities, it cannot be explained how the Amsa comes to occupy the body which is the outcome of the karma of the Amsi

It will thus be seen that M construes the opening word of the first Sutra 'Eka ātmanas sarire bhāvāt' as the nominative *singular* (*ekah*) and *not* as the nominative *plural* (*eke*), as S has done As a result of his reading S is obliged to utilize this adhi as a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine that the soul is not a separate entity from the body *But such a discussion is neither necessary nor called for at this stage of the Sūtrakāra's work, as we shall see*

The reflexive pronoun 'ātman' (used in the genitive case) is taken by M to refer to both the amsa and the amsi so as to convey the pre-

12 [illegible] । उक्तविधया बिम्बदर्शनमनुभवन । [illegible] (Vādiraja TPG p 159)

dication of their identity.[13]

अशी अश. (इति) एक एव[14]

The second half of the Sūtra· 'ātmanaś śarīre bhāvāt' adduces the reason why the two should be looked upon as identical The reason is that the amśa (*ātmā*) is lodged (*bhāvāt*) in the body (*śarīre*) earned by the karma of the Amsin himself[15] The opening Sūtra thus comes to mean according to M —

अशाशिनोरैक्त्वमेव । अशिकर्मनिर्मितशरीर एवाशस्य भावात्

(M *BSB* iii 3 55)

The prose order of the second Sūtra according to M is Upalabdhivat na (ātmanor) vyatirekah Tadbhāvabhāvitvāt The meaning is that it should not be supposed that there is complete difference (*vyatireka*) between the amśa and the amśi as there is in their experiences of jnāna, sukha, etc Their oneness follows from the fact of 'tadbhāvabhāvitva' or the amśa being in a position to intuit, assimilate and enjoy (*bhāvitvāt*) the superabundant fruits of the upāsanā and Bimbāparoksa (*bhāva*) of the amśī (*tad*)[17]

The *TD* cites authority from the *Śabdanirnaya*

भावो वृद्धि समुद्दिष्टा क्वचित् भावो मन. स्मृतम्

in support of M.'s interpretation of 'tadbhāvabhāvitvāt' as the intuitive assimilation and enjoyment of the superabundance of joy of the fruit of the upāsanā of the Amsi by the Amsa as his own

Samkara's Interpretation

Aikādhikaranam (iii, 3, 53-54)

According to S this adhi is *a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine that there is no self other than the body* The opening Sūtra states the Pūrvapakṣa that life, consciousness, movement, remembrance, etc are observed only within the bodies and not outside them As an abode of these qualities different from the body cannot be proved, they must be put down as qualities of the body itself

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13 सूत्र आत्मन इत्यशस्य अशाश्युभयपरत्वम (Ragh *TPB*)

14 पूवसूत्रादवधारणाथक्चशब्दस्यानुवृत्तिवा सव वाक्य सावधारणमिति ·यायन वा सौत्र एकशब्द सावधारण इत्युक्त भवति (*ibid*)

15 अशिकर्मनिर्मितत्व पष्टचथ

16 The suffix vat is added to the locative form of upalabdhi (सप्तम्यन्तात वति)

17 Read भावशब्द आवर्तत । तत्रैकस्यानुभवोऽय भवनरनुभवाथत्वात । अन्यस्य मानसत्रियारूपध्यानाख्य मुपासनमर्थ । अपरस्य उपासनाफलमान दवद्धिरथ (*BD* iii.3 56)

The Siddhānta is that the self is *other than* the body because consciousness and other attributes do not exist even when there is the body (in the state of a corpse) after death has supervened 'Upalab dhivat' gives the analogy of perceptive consciousness Tho' perception takes place when there is a body, it does not imply that it is an attribute of the body The body may be used as a mere auxiliary

Criticism

The irrelevance of introducing a refutation of the Lokāyata doctrine to establish the existence of the soul (*ātman*) as different from the body in which it is taken to dwell is too glaring to be passed over without comment *at this stage of the development of the philosophical thought in the Sūtras of Bādarāyana after the Vairāgyapāda* where the post mortem existence and peregrinations of the soul, its sufferings in hell and journey to the moon have been dealt with by the Sūtrakāra and Tvam padārthaviveka in 4 adhis of Pāda 2 of Adhy III according to S and the reference to the obscuration of the soul's true nature on account of its connection with the body (iii 2 6) The permanence and eternal existence of the soul, as distinguished from its body, has been taught according to S himself in ii 3 17 Sūtra ii 3 19 has referred to the Soul s passing out of the body, its going to heaven, etc and returing from there Sūtra ii 3 48, according to S own rendering, says that injunctions and prohibitions are possible only on account of the *soul's connection with the body*

Feeling uncomfortable at this irrelevance of introducing a refutation of the Cārvāka doctrine at this stage, S has tried to find some artificial reasons for going into this question here One of the reasons, he says, is (i) to establish thereby *the right of the self to bondage and release*—as if these are, in his view, real states which the Ātman goes thro' But the same (?) Ś tells us in his *G B* that these are *not real*, as the same self cannot be subject to two different states, in reality, at different times आत्मनो बन्धमुक्तावस्थे परमार्थत एव वस्तुभूते सर्वथा द्वैतवादिनाम् । अद्वैतिना पुन *** अवस्थाभेदवत्वानुपपत्ते (S *GB*.xii 2) (ii) The other reason, according to him, is that 'if there were no self different from the body, there would be no room for the injunctions that have the other world in prospect, nor could it be propounded to any body that B is his own self (iii) The existence of the self other than the body has no doubt been proclaimed in the Purvamimāmsāśāstra but it has been proclaimed there not by the Sutrakāra Jaimini but by his commentator Śabara Here, on the other hand, the Sūtrakāra himself comes forward to esta-

blish the existence of the self as distinct from the body It is from here that Śabara has taken over the matter for discussion in his work It is for this reason the Upavarṣa in his commentary on the Pūrvamīmāmsā has contented himself with saying, where a discussion on the nature of the self is opportune, that he will discuss it under the Brahmasūtras

(iv) In the preceding adhi it has been shown that the Manaścid and other fire-altars subserve the purpose of man (*puruṣārtha*) and not of the sacrifice (*kratvartha*) Apropos of it there arises a question as to *who that self is whose purpose these fire-altars serve* Hence, the need to go into the question—whether there really exists a self other than the body or whether the body is itself the self, producing consciousness out of its own composition "

The theme of this Pāda, by all accounts, is Gunopasamhāra and anupasamhāra (in upāsanā) To turn this adhi into something unconnected with upāsanā and its related problems of adhikāra, yogyatā, their nature and gradations etc and utilize it to establish the difference between the body and the soul is utterly irrelevant to the Pādārtha *As a matter of fact, the acceptance of the existence of the Soul as something other than the body is the first prerequisite of the inquiry into B* A meaningful pursuit of Brahmajijñāsā is impossible and unthinkable without the acceptance of the truth that the (Jiva) Ātman is *not* the same as his body, which is perishable

We should expect S who insists upon the fourfold Sādhanas of nityānityavastuviveka, samadamādisādhanasampad, ihāmutraphalabhogavirāgah and mumuksutva as the essential prerequisites of effective Brahmajijñāsā, as the meaning of the opening word of opening Sutra of Bādarāyana (Athāto Brahmajijñāsā) to go into this question of 'Dehātiriktātmāstitva' *at the very outset of his commentary and not at this distance in the march of thought in the Sūtras!* The discriminative grasp of an eternal individual self existing in and beyond the body is part of the content of Nityānityavastuviveka The concept of renunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits of Karma here and in the other world and intensive desire to be free from bondage (*mumuksutva*) presuppose the acceptance of a Dehātirikta-ātmā The statement ascribed by S to Upavarṣa need not refer to the question of the *bare existence of a self as different from the body* It can be understood to embrace other questions relating to the nature of the self—such as whether it is atomic or vibhu in size, whether it is sentient or not, whether it is a doer or not, whether it is of the nature of consciousness alone or only a cognizer or both and its relation to the Supreme B—most of which have been discussed in the Sūtras It is unnecessary for Bādarāyana

to *prove* that the self is different from the body, as the doctrine is the very foundation of his thought as derived from his source-books The philosophical reasons which compel us to accept the Soul's otherness from the body have been elucidated by him in and thro' various adhikaranas such as the Vaiṣamyanairghṛnyādhi (ii 1 35-37), Tadantarādhi (iii.1 1), Kṛtātyayādhi (iii 1 8), Yathetādhi (iii 1 9), Aniṣṭādikāry-adhi (iii 1 15), Saptādhi (iii 1 16), Tatsvābhāvyādhi (iii 1 24), Retodhi (iii 1 28), Yonyadhi (iii 1 29) And the Cārvāka school has itself been refuted in the Samayapāda (ii 2 6) S's interpretation of iii, 3, 53-54, is thus wanting in imagination

Coming to his interpretation of the two Sūtras here, we find that his interpretation of the first Sūtra "Some (deny the existence of an) 'Ātman' (as distinct from the body) as it exists (only) when there is a body" imports the predicate and many other words to complete the sense desired

The inference (*śarīre bhāvāt*) put into the mouth of the Cārvāka comes to us as a surprise from one who does *not* recognize inference as a separate means of knowledge The reason would also seem to be inapposite, as on the Cārvāka view that the body itself is the socalled Ātman, it is doubtful if the probans (sarīre sati sattvam) can be shown to be present in the minor term That apart, the Sautra reasoning is inadequate and partial *in that it does not incorporate the negative concomitance*, which is necessary to make the inference fool proof

Coming to the interpretation of the second Sūtra, we find that the negative particle 'na' before 'upalabdhivat' suffers for want of a proper syntactic connection If it is to be connected with the expression 'avyatirekah' (absence of difference)[18] imported for the purpose of supplying suitable syntactic relation to the negative (*dehātmanor na avyatirekah*), it would make the presence of the word 'vyatirekah' (difference) at the commencement of the second sūtra superfluous The negative particle cannot in S's interpretation be connected with the opening word 'vyatirekah' as that would negative the thesis of Dehātmabheda which is sought to be established To expand the 'na' into a separate statement to the effect that "This is not correct—that there is no difference between the body and the soul" would lead not only to repetition (punarukti) in the light of what follows but to vākyabheda as well. These defects can only be avoided by accepting the natural connection of the negative with 'upalabdhivat' and selecting a more appropriate topic for discussion in the adhi, pertaining to the theme of upāsanā

18 Read न त्वेतदस्ति – यदुक्तमव्यतिरेको देहात्मन इति । व्यतिरेक एवात्मनः स्यात् ।
(S BSB iii.3.54)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R., therefore, rightly rejects S.'s topic and chooses a different one connected with Gunopasamhāra. His topic is: In all upāsanās of Para-vidyā, it is incumbent on the upāsaka to correctly comprehend the true nature of the upāsanā, upāsya and upāsaka.[19] The Jivasvarūpa constitutes the 'body' of B. which is the object of meditation. Therefore, it also falls within the category of the object of upāsanā.[20] The point at issue here is, therefore, whether the meditation of Pratyagātman is to be in terms of his character as a knowing, doing and enjoying self, as he is in his transmigratory life, or as he is described in the discourse of Prajāpati (*Chān. Up.* viii 1) as 'apahatapāpmā'[21] etc.

The opening Sūtra embodies the Pūrvapaksa that the Pratyagātman should be made the object of meditation in his embodied aspect only as the meditating self is within the body (*sarire bhāvāt*).[22]

The Siddhānta is that as realization of B. means its realization in its real form, self-realization is realization of the self as it is, in its true realized state.[23]

The meaning of the second sūtra as interpreted by R. is "But this is not so that the Atman should be meditated upon in his embodied aspect of being a knower, doer etc. It is in that other (different) aspect of the Ātman in his realised state, as against his embodied state, in terms of his possessing the character of freedom from evil, etc., that he should be meditated upon. For, it is assured that the individual attains the nature of that (*tadrupāpatteh*). He must, therefore, be conceived in Brahmic meditation, as a constituent of its being, under that form which he has to attain (*prapyākara eva anusandheyah*). This is as in the case of the upalabdhi or intuition of B. (*brahmopalabdhivat*). The intuition of B. has for its object its essential character. So also in respect of the individual soul. It has for its object its permanent essential nature."

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19 सर्वासु परविद्यासु उपास्योपासनस्वरूपवदुपासकस्वरूपस्यापि ज्ञातव्यत्वमुक्तम् (*Śribhaṣya* iii.3.51)
While adopting the reading Eke in the plural as in S. R. rejects S.'s reading Tadbhavabhavitvat and retains Tadbhạvabhạvitvạt (like M.)

20 प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि उपास्यभूतपरब्रह्मशरीरतया उपास्यकोटिनिक्षिप्तत्वात (*Śribhasya* iii 3 52)

21 किमयं प्रत्यगात्मा ज्ञाता कर्ता भोक्ता इहामुत्र संचारी आत्मानुसन्धेय उत प्रजापतिवाक्योदितापहतपाप्मत्वादिस्वरूप (*Op. cit.* iii.3 51)

22 शरीरे वर्तमानस्य यादृश रूप तदेवानुसन्धेयमिति पूर्व पक्ष (*Vedantadipa* iii.3 51)

23 यथावस्थितात्मस्वरूपस्यैव ब्रह्मानुभव फलमित्यत प्रजापतिवाक्योदित यथावस्थितस्वरूपमेवानुसन्धेयमुपलब्धिवत । यथा ब्रह्मस्वरूपोपलब्धि यथावस्थितब्रह्मानुसन्धानयुक्तम्यव, तथा आत्मोपलब्धिरपि
(*Vedantadipa*)

Criticism

R's finding that the Ātman in meditation should *not* be conceived as having the character of being a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, but only in terms of his 'real' characteristics of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc, is inconsistent with his acceptance of jñātṛtva, kartṛtva, bhoktṛtva, etc as real and true characteristics of the Ātman, in his commentary on the Kartṛtvādhikaraṇa and other places —

अतो ज्ञातृत्वमेव जीवात्मन स्वरूपम

(*Śrībhāṣya* ii 3 31)

शास्त्राणि हि स्वर्गमोक्षादिफलस्य भोक्तारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुङ्क्ते

(*Op cit* ii 3 33)

It will be pertinent to ask for a clarification of R's position—whether the characteristics of being a jñātā, kartā, bhoktā etc are *not* to be meditated upon by the Jīva *as not belonging to him independently of B.*, or whether they are *absolutely not to be meditated upon*

The principle that they are not to be meditated upon as belonging to Pratyāgatman *independently of the Supreme B* applies with equal force to the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva and others as well, whose meditation is freely recognized by R—while rejecting their meditation as existing in the Jīva independently of B's will

It cannot be maintained seriously that the Jīva's attributes of jñātṛtva, kartṛtva, etc are *not at all* to be meditated upon It is fully in keeping with the spirit of the Śāstras that such attributes should be meditated upon as existing in the Jīvātman by the unfettered will of the Lord No genuine Theist can, therefore, take objection to their being brought within the scope of meditation of B *in that sense* R himself warmly admits this

यद्यप्यपहतपाप्मत्वादिसत्यसंकल्पत्वपर्यन्तो गुणगण प्रत्यगात्मन स्वाभाविक एव आविर्भूत तथापि तस्य तथाविधत्वमेव परमपुरुषायत्तम्। तस्य नित्यस्थितिश्च तदायत्ता। परमपुरुषस्यैतन्नित्यताया नित्येष्टत्वात् नित्यतया वर्तत इति न कश्चिन् विरोध[24]

(*Śrībhāṣya* iv 4 20)

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24 "The exalted qualities of the Soul such as freedom from evil and sin which manifest themselves in Mokṣa no doubt belong to its essential nature but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person. On Him also depends the permanency of these qualities They are permanent in so far as the Lord Himself on whom they depend has willed it so For it pleases the Lord always that these qualities of the soul remain permanent so they continue to be permanent without any difficulty (Tr adapted from Thibaut)

Unless the Pratyagātman's character of kartṛtva, bhoktṛtva, jñātṛtva are meditated upon as dependent for all time on the will of B., there will not be any effective and meaningful meditation of the Jīvātman's relation to the Supreme in terms of Svasvāmibhāva or Niyamyaniyāmakabhāva.

R.'s theory of upāsanā admits of meditation thro' superimposed attributes as well. It does not, therefore, seem proper for him to qualify the attributes as other than those existing in the embodied state. As kartṛtva, jñātṛtva and other attributes belong to the Ātman, in essence, in the released state also (according to R.), it is not proper to put in the expression 'śarīre' in Sūtra iii.3.51.

He is too farfetched and roundabout in construing the simple term 'vyatireka' which means difference, as denoting the attributes of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc. As he admits there is room for superimposition of character and imaginary identifications in upāsanā, as in the case of the Udgīthopāsanā,[25] it is not open to him to insist, in the present context, that the meditation of the Pratyagātman should necessarily be in his real character in the same way as the upāsanā of B must have for its object the essential nature of B.

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25. उदगीथावयवभूत प्रणव एवाध्यस्तप्राणभाव छन्दोगानामुपास्य (*Śrībhāsya.* iii 3 7)

Criticism

R's finding that the Ātman in meditation should *not* be conceived as having the character of being a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, but only in terms of his 'real' characteristics of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc, is inconsistent with his acceptance of jñātrtva, kartrtva, bhoktṛtva, etc as real and true characteristics of the Ātman, in his commentary on the Kartrtvādhikarana and other places —

अतो ज्ञातृत्वमेव जीवात्मन स्वरूपम

(*Śrībhāsya* ii 3 31)

शास्त्राणि हि स्वर्गमोक्षादिफलस्य भोक्तारमेव कर्तृत्वे नियुञ्जते

(*Op cit* ii 3 33)

It will be pertinent to ask for a clarification of R's position—whether the characteristics of being a jñātā, kartā, bhoktā etc are *not* to be meditated upon by the Jiva *as not belonging to him independently of B.*, or whether they are *absolutely not to be meditated upon*

The principle that they are not to be meditated upon as belonging to Pratyāgatman *independently of the Supreme B* applies with equal force to the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva and others as well, whose meditation is freely recognized by R—while rejecting their meditation as existing in the Jiva independently of B's will

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(*Śribhāsya* iv 4 20)

24 "The exalted qualities of the Soul such as freedom from evil and sin which manifest themselves in Mokṣa no doubt belong to its essential nature but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person. On Him also depends the permanency of these qualities They are permanent in so far as the Lord Himself on whom they depend has willed it so For it pleases the Lord always that these qualities of the soul remain permanent so they continue to be permanent without any difficulty (Tr adapted from Thibaut)

Unless the Pratyagātman's character of kartrtva, bhoktrtva, jñātrtva are meditated upon as dependent for all time on the will of B, there will not be any effective and meaningful meditation of the Jivātman's relation to the Supreme in terms of Svasvāmibhāva or Niyamyaniyāmakabhāva

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He is too farfetched and roundabout in construing the simple term 'vyatireka' which means difference, as denoting the attributes of 'apahatapāpmatva' etc As he admits there is room for superimposition of character and imaginary identifications in upāsanā, as in the case of the Udgithopāsanā,[25] it is not open to him to insist, in the present context, that the meditation of the Pratyagātman should necessarily be in his real character in the same way as the upāsanā of B must have for its object the essential nature of B

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25 उदगीथावयवभूत प्रणव एवाध्यस्तप्राणभाव छन्दोगानामुपास्य (*Sribhasya* iii 3 7)

CHAPTER LVIII

THE RIGHT WAY OF UPĀSANĀ OF AṄGADEVATAS AND UPASAMHĀRA OF THEIR GUNAS

36 *Angāvabddhādhikaranam* (iii 3 57-58)

This adhi deals with the Mumukṣu's obligation to carry out the upāsanā of 'Angadevatas' or the gods like Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Agni etc who have had their genesis from the different limbs of the Supreme B as described in the Śrutis (cf *R V* x 90 13)[1] and how such upāsanā is to be in keeping with their hierarchic status Such upāsanā is absolutely necessary for all Mumuksus including the gods with reference to their own superiors in the hierarchy While the upāsanā of these Angadevatās according to one's natural fitness is necessary for all Mumukṣus, there are special guidelines governing the upasamhāra of the attributes predicated of these gods in B thro' these gods The Sūtrakāra pinpoints the subordinate position of these gods by using the epithet 'anga'—instead of referring to them as Brahmā and other gods in the hierarchy The Taitt Up (i 5) too refers to these gods as 'angas'

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1 The derivation of the term aṅga as applied to these gods is given by M as विष्णोरङ्गसमुद्भूता विष्णोरङ्गानि देवता (*BT* x.38 14)
The expression 'avabaddhah added to anga' in the Sutra means 'connected with' (sambaddhaḥ)—the substantive (*viseṣya*) qualifying aṅgavabaddhah' is upāsanas The predicate of the proposition is kartayah (eva)—to be supplied Ragh *TPB* quotes the explanation of some others that the epithet ava baddha applied to them signifies that they are inferior (*avama*) and in bondage (*baddha*)

of the Supreme' अङ्गान्यन्या देवता: M also emphasizes this point in his *AV*:

परिवारतया ग्राह्या अपि हेया : प्रधानत.[2]

(*AV* i, 1.8)

The Sūtrakāra's object is elucidating the nature of the upāsanā and upasamhāra of attributes of these gods here, is to justify the purposiveness of the Śrutis in giving so much of their attention to these gods, their powers, attributes and doings, in the hymns and elsewhere, in their secondary connotation, as Tattvābhimānidevatās, with specific functions in carrying on the cosmic government under the supreme dispensation of the One Independent B

The adhi thus deals with two interrelated parts of the same topic (i) the obligatory nature of the upāsanā of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, Agni and other Angadevatās—only as members of the retinue of the Supreme B and not directly and independently, and (ii) in what manner the upasamhāra of the attributes of these different gods is to be carried out by *their inferiors* (including all human upāsakas) without infringing the principle of their Tāratamya (hierarchic status and gradation) in carrying out their upāsanā according to one's yogyatā

While allowing for the upasamhāra, according to one's yogyatā, of the attributes of the inferiors in status in the upāsanā of those in a higher status, the Sūtra forbids (thro' the second half—Na śākhāsu hi prativedam) the upasamhāra of the attributes of those of a higher status in the upāsanā of the attributes of those in a lower status As the preceding adhi has established the importance of anādiyogyatā in respect of the gods and their amśas, like Arjuna, there is sequence of thought in taking up the question of the upāsanā of Angadevas and guidelines connected with the upasamhāra of their gunas in the present adhi As the adhi goes into the twin aspects of Angadevatopāsanā, the inquiry is 'dviparvā' as in the *Iksatyadhi* of the *BS* and in the *Arthavādādhi* of the *PMS*[3] The *AC* describes it as an 'emboxed' (*antarbheda*)-adhikarana

The first issue before the adhi is whether the upāsanā of B is to be carried out exclusively without involving the upāsanā of any of the gods in the hierarchy constituting its retinue (*parivāra*) or inclusive of

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2 उपासनागदेवाना परमागतया भवेत् (M *BSB* iii 3 58)
अगादुदभूता अगस्था परिवारभूता वा ब्रह्मादया अगदेवता तेपामुपासना कतव्यैवावरै स्वस्मात परमागत्यात। न च प्राधायेन। परमस्य विष्णोरगत्वेनैव (*TD* iii 3 58)

3 See Ragh *TPB* iii 3 57, p 338b, 338

the upāsanā of the members of the hierarchy as subordinate to Brahmopāsanā[4]

The (first) Purvapakṣa is that only the Supreme B should be the object of upāsanā For the Śrutis, while insisting on the Upāsanā of B, forbid that of all other gods

तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ

(*Mund Up* ii 2 5)

The Smrti also follows suit 'Let him not worship any of the other gods" Accordingly, it follows that as the gods are not to be meditated upon, the Śrutis which expatiate on their powers and attributes are in vain

There is a second Pūrvapaksa connected with the other aspect of the problem Granted that one should meditate on the gods (angadevatās), the lordly attributes and powers of these other gods like Brahmā, Rudra, Indra Agni etc proclaimed by the Śrutis, will have to be uniformly combined in the meditation of all of them like their common attributes of divinity and caitanya Such uniform upasamhāra of their attributes will be in conflict with the conclusion established in the Yāvadadhi (iii 3 33 34) recognizing clear difference in Yogyatā in the matter of upāsanā and upasamhāra among all Muktiyogyas As the attributes of individual gods differ widely, any promiscuous combination of them with one another's for purposes of upasamhāra in upāsanā would lead to 'mithyopāsanā' which is censured in the Śāstra Any such upāsanā of these gods would thus do away with their Tāratamya or hierarchic gradation already accepted in the Vedanta system

The Siddhānta is that it is absolutely necessary to carry out the upāsanā of B and of all the Angadevatās—the latter as part of the upāsanā of B, because the existence of these Angadevatās has been recognized in the Śrutis (as subordinate to B) and their powers and attributes have also been made known to us by the Śrutis The Śrutis can have no other purpose in recognizing the existence of these Angadevatās and describing their powers and attributes than that they should be worshipped thro' meditation of their different attributes It cannot be that these gods are merely to be made known to us as receipients of sacrificial offerings For even in the sacrifices it is only the Supreme B that is primarily the object of offerings and upasanā—the minor gods being only the media (Vide *Gītā* ix 23 24 *AĀ* iii 2 3) The upāsanā of these gods has therefore, to be accepted as part of the comprehen-

4 [illegible] (Ragh *Ny Muktāvali*)

sive teaching of the Śrutis For they have been mentioned outside the context of sacrifices also It may, therefore, be safely presumed on the basis of the ruling given in the Sūtra 'Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt' (iii 3 15) that the attributes of these Angadevatās have been described in the Śrutis primarily for the purpose of their meditation We have, therefore, to construe the statement of the Śruti

तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ

in conformity with the other statement therein Angāni anyā devatāh (*Taitt Up* 1 4) as forbidding their Upāsanā in their own absolute right —i e independently of the Upāsanā of the One Supreme B whose retinue they are

The first part of the Sūtra Angāvabaddhāstu' thus embodies a distinctive predication that the Upāsanā of the Angadevatās is obligatory Angavabaddhā (devatā) upasyā eva

Coming to the second question of the manner of Upasamhāra of the attributes of these Angadevatās, the Pūrvapaksa contends that as in the case of the Upasamhāra of the attributes of devatva, cetanatva, etc the other attributes of all these gods should be combined in their Upāsanā as is the case in the Upasamhāra of all attributes of B following the principle laid down by the Upasamhārādhikarana (iii 3 6) As 'mithyopāsanā' is tabooed and as what follows as a corollary of the Upasamhārādhikarananyāyā has to be accepted without demur, we have to concede the extension of the attributes of one another among the Angadevatās for purposes of their Upasamhāra *and give the go-by to their doctrine of Tāratamya*

The Siddhanta points out that the Upasamhārādhikarananyāya contemplates the Upasamhāra of only non-contradictory attributes in B out of regard for the law of compatibility It would offend the law of compatibility to permit the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the unequals among the gods or those of a higher status among them with the attributes of others of a lower status Such Upasamhāra is, therefore, expressly forbidden by the Sūtrakāra —

Na sakhāsu prativedam (uktam uttamānām gunajātam avameṣu)[5] upasamhriyate—on good authority (hi) (M *BSB* iii 3 57)

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5 उक्तमुत्तमाना गुणजातमवमष्विति शप (*BD* iii.3 57)

The meaning of the above Bhaṣya passage is The aggregate of attributes ascribed to the Angadevatas of a higher status like Brahma in the Śrutis is not to be combined in the upasana of other gods of inferior status such as Rudra or Indra This applies to all the rest of the gods in the descending order This ruling is supported by the authority of the *Brahmatarka* (indicated by the particle hi)

The authority quoted in support of this position is:

समत्वाद् वोत्तमत्वाद् वा नागदेयाद्युपासनम् ।
उपसंहार्यमित्याहुः वेदसिद्धान्तवेदिनः ॥

The gist of the above verse is "If the attributes of a lesser god are combined in meditation with those of others who are higher in status it would necessitate the assumption of their equality in rank and status which is not a fact, for while some of the gods may be on a par with others many of them are not and are definitely of a superior status to others The Śāstras frown upon the worship and meditation of any of the gods in defiance of their Tāratamya

समासमाभ्यां विषमसमे पूजातः (*Gautama D. S*)
समाना विषमा पूजा विषमाणां समा तथा ।
क्रियते येन देवोऽपि स्वपदात् भ्रश्यते पुमान् ॥

But the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the lower gods in the meditation of their superiors is *not open to this objection*, for the gods like Brahmā, Rudra and Indra exercise control and authority over the activities and attributes of those below them and the latter depend for them on their superiors, by Divine will This justifies the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the lesser gods in the meditation of the higher ones—just as the attributes of the minor gods and the Prakṛtitattvas are applied, in the absence incompatibility, to the Supreme B as provided in the Sūtras 'Tadadhīnatvād arthavat (i, 4 3) Anyārtham tu Jaiminiḥ (i 4 19) and so on[6]

Clarifying the point that the special attributes of the Angadevatas like Brahmā set forth in the Śrutis ought not to be unreservedly combined in the meditation of others of a lower status, Vādirāja points out that for example, the distinctive attributes of the fourfaced Brahmā ought not to be combined in the meditation of Rudra as they are incompatible with Rudra and such a meditation is bound to lead to disastrous consequences Only attributes of a comprehensive nature such as Rudra and others being 'gods' in general (*devatva*) and devoted to the Supreme B (*vaiṣṇavatva*) should be made the object of meditation[7]

Such Upāsanā of the Angadevatās dovetailed into the main Upāsanā of B confers special grace on the Upāsaka[8] The *adhi* brings out the

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6 [illegible] (Ragh *TPB* iii.3.58)

7 [illegible]

(Vādirāja *TPG* p 159)

purposiveness of the Srutis in giving a place to the minor gods in the scheme of Upāsanā

Interpretations of Saṁkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R the *adhi* considers the question whether the Upāsanās connected with certain elements of sacrifices, such as the meditation on 'om' as udgitha (*Chān Up* i 1 1) or the meditation of udgitha as the earth (*AA* ii 1 2 1) or the piled up fire altar as the world (*Śatapatha* B x 5 4 1) are restricted to the Sākhins in whose texts they are to be found, or are to be connected with the udgītha and so on in all the Sākhās The difference of accentuation among the Śākhās and proximity are deemed by the Pūrvapaksa to restrict the Vidyās to particular Sakhās in which they are given The Siddhānta is that the injunctions regarding the Vidyās are valid for all Śākhās as there is no specification in the statement regarding the udgitha etc, and there is no reason why a general statement of Śruti should be given a limited reference An express statement of Śruti is weightier than the grounds of proximity of the Vidyās to particular Śākhās The second Sūtra cites the example of mantras mentioned in one Śākhā or Veda being used in another, in connection with that particular rite

Criticism

The identity of Vidyas and Karmas based on agreement of form and many details, notwithstanding minor differences, is clearly recognizable and has been accepted in the Sarvavedāntādhi here (iii 3 1) and in the Śākhāntarādhi of the Pūrvamīmāmsā The subject matter of this adhi *is, therefore, fully covered by their rulings A fresh adhi is not* therefore needed to go into the question The special emphasis on the *difference in accentuation of the texts,* laid by S *and R on behalf of the* Pūrvapaksa, by way of 'ākṣepa'[9] is far from convincing For, it has been established in the earlier *adhi*s that where there is identity in respect of a very large number of details, difference in regard to a few details alone does not make for difference of Vidyās Nor, for that

8 यदा श्रीः नित्यमुक्तानपि प्रीत्यतिशयेन तमुपास्ते तदानन्तवेदोक्तगुणांस्तदनुक्तांश्च स्वयोग्यगुणान् स्वावरगुणांश्च स्वबुद्धिबलेन भगवत्युपसंहृत्योपास्ते ।

यदा ब्रह्मा भगवन्तमुपास्ते तदानन्तवेदोक्तान् गुणानुपसंहृत्योपास्ते । तदङ्गभूतश्रीदेवी च भगवदेकनिष्ठसूक्तातिरिक्तवेदोक्तसकलगुणान् स्वगुणान् स्वावरगुणांश्चोपसंहृत्य । तदेव तस्य भगवतः परमानुग्रहो नान्यथा ।

यदा रुद्र उपास्ते तदा स्वयोग्यवेदोक्तान् भगवत्युपसंहरति । श्रीदेव्या च भगवदेकनिष्ठसूक्तातिरिक्तवेदोक्तगुणानुपसंहरति । ब्रह्मणि च श्रिया हरेश्चासाधारणसूक्तातिरिक्तवेदोक्तस्वयोग्यगुणान् स्वगुणान् स्वावरगुणांश्चोपसंहरति । एवमविवेचने स्वनीचागदेवतागुणस्यापि स्वेनोपास्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन तारतम्यविरोधः स्यादिति भयम्

(Vadiraja *TPG* p 160)

9 अधिकरणारम्भाक्षेपशङ्कां परिहरति—'सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययत्वेऽपि प्रतिवेदं स्वरभेदादुद्गीथादयो भिद्यन्त इति तत्र तत्र व्यवतिष्ठेरन् इति युक्ता शङ्का (*Śrutaprakāśa* iii.3.53)

matter, has the Pūrvapakṣa cited any authority from the Śruti that difference in accentuation of texts makes the Vidyās different

As the particle 'tu' in 'Angāvabaddhāstu' has been construed by S and R as rebutting the Pūrvapakṣa, there is no need to put in the words 'na sākhāsu' after the 'tu' to convey the Siddhānta view—which can be done in a forthright manner by the words 'prativedam' (or pratisākham)

Tho' the sacrifices to which particular mantras belong are the same for all Śākhās, the udgītha and other Upāsanās in different Śākhās may differ on account of difference of accentuation and other factors The objection, therefore, that the Upāsanā of Prāṇa etc ought not to be treated as part of the sacrificial elements, should have been set aside in more positive terms that difference in the accentuation of the texts is immaterial to the oneness of the Vidyās, instead of by a tame assertion that "there is no contradiction implied in our opinion"' *(avirodhah)* The use of the particle 'vā' in a conjunctive sense[10] in R is unusual

10 वाशब्दः चार्थे (*Śribhasya* iii.3.54)

CHAPTER LVIV

INFINITUDE SHOULD BE MADE THE NECESSARY ADJUNCT OF ALL ATTRIBUTES OF B IN UPĀSANĀ

37 *Bhūmajyāyastvādhıkaranam* (ııı 3 59)

Followıng the dıscourse on the oblıgatory nature of the Upāsanā of Angadevatās accordıng to one's Yogyatā and the upasamhāra of theır attrıbutes, the present adhı and the next one whıch constıtute the *Bhūmapetıkā,* deal wıth the vıtal poınt ın the theory and practıce of Brahmopāsanā that the medıtatıon of each and every one of the attrıbutes of Caturgunopāsakas (ııı 3 12) (and of others) has to be conceıved ın terms of ıts ınfinıtude (*pūrṇatvavısesanātmaka*)—as part of the 'ıtıkartavyatā' of Gunopāsana

For only the medıtatıon of the attrıbutes of B as shot thro' and thro' wıth the dıstınctıon of theır ınfinıtude (*purnatva*) wıll be consıstent wıth theır transempırıcal (*alaukıka*) character, as establıshed ın the Paramto'adhı (ııı 2 32-34) Otherwıse, ıt would be medıtatıon of the empırıcal, for empırıcal attrıbutes have no ınfinıtude (*pūrnatva*) and medıtatıon on B 's attrıbutes as anythıng but bhūmā or pūrna and therefore alaukıka wıll be opposed to the teachıng of the Kāryākhyānādhı (ııı 3 19)

The Sūtrakāra has proclaımed 'bhūmatva or pūrnatva (plenıtude) as the hıghest of B 's attrıbutes (see Bhumādhı ı 3 8, Vol I, pp 212-20) [1] The questıon then arıses ıf thıs attrıbute of bhūmatva or plenı-

1 Ragh (*?PB* p 340 b) poınts ont that bhuman' ın ı.3 8 has been used as a substantıve denotıng B whıle here ıt ıs used ın the (abstract) sense of plenı tude as ın B S 1 1 29

tude is to be meditated upon by all the Mumukṣus or not If bhūmatva also should be meditated upon by all, it would go against his pronouncement that (only) the four attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc are to be meditated upon by all (Cf *B S* iii 3.12). There is no reason to show any preference to bhūmatva as against sambhṛti, dyuvāpti, or priyaśirastvādi,[2] unless bhūmatva is assigned supreme importance as having to be intimately interwoven with the meditation of every other attribute that is meditated—as for e g purna-ānanda (infinite bliss), pūrṇa jñāna (infinite knowledge) etc But such interweaving serves no useful purpose[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no reason to accord 'pūrnatva' superiority over other attributes of B For all attributes of B enjoy the same status It cannot be that there is no prospect of attaining Mokṣa without meditating on the attribute of bhūmatva For the Sūtrakāra himself has made it clear that all Mumukṣus can attain Mokṣa by meditating on the (four) attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc (*B S* iii 3 12) Moreover, the highest place among the attributes of B has been given by the Sūtrakāra to ātmatva (See iii 3 16) The meditation of bhūmatva or plenitude is a virtual impossibility, for no one can comprehend or aspire to acquire for himself absolute plenitude thro' meditation as he may do in respect of ānanda and other attributes[4]

However, granting the preeminence of bhūmatva, it has to be clarified whether it is to be meditated upon separately, by itself, like ānanda and others or as qualifying them As the number and identity of the attributes which have to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus have already been fixed (iii 3 12) we cannot add to their number Moreover, unlike ānanda and other attributes which are well within the reach of aspiration of all Adhikārins, the attribute of absolute plenitude (*bhūmatva*) is completely beyond the deserts and aspiration of (almost) all Adhikārins The suggestion that 'bhūmatva' may be meditated upon as qualifying the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc is equally unsustainable For it has not yet been established that 'pūrnatva' possesses any supremacy over all other attributes Even if it is so established, there

2 तत्रोपासकं प्रति भूमगुणस्य सम्भृत्यादिगुणेभ्यो न विशेषः (*TP* iii.3.59)

3 विशेषणत्वेऽपि प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनामिव च तदनुपयोगित्वानुपास्यत्वात्

4 ज्ञानादिवत्पृथगुपासनादेव भूमगुणादृते मोक्षसिद्धत्वात् अनुपसंहारे च आत्मत्वस्यैव विशेषोदितत्वात् भूमगुणस्य च महत्त्वात्सर्वासामप्युपासितुमशक्यत्वात् न तस्य वैशिष्ट्यमिति प्राप्त आह (*TP* iii.3.59)
नहि निरतिशयत्वाद्यपर्यायं भूमत्वं कस्याप्यभीष्टं येन तदुपासनं साधकं स्यात् (*TD* iii.3.59)
पूर्णत्वस्य दुरवगाहत्वाच्च (*STC*)

is no authority in support of its having to be meditated upon as necessarily qualifying every attribute that is meditated upon. Bhūmatva is not, therefore, entitled to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that infinitude must be accepted as preeminent among the attributes of B. and that it must be interwoven with the meditation of every one of B.'s attributes. No meditation of any attribute of B. will be fruitful unless it is interwoven with the concept of its bhūmatva or infinitude, for it is the essence of every one of B.'s attributes:

पूर्णानन्दः पूर्णचितिः पूर्णस्वामीति सर्वशः ।
पूर्णत्वसहभावेन गुणोपास्ता प्रसिद्धयति ॥

As for authority, the concluding part of the Sūtra: Tathā ca darśayati, according to the Bhāṣyakāra, cites the following from the Gaupavana Śruti.[5] The leavening of the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. with the concept of their plenitude (in meditation) does not affect the number and identity of the attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumukṣus having been fixed by the Sūtrakāra; for bhūmatva which is to act as a leaven upon their meditation is nowhere to be meditated upon in isolation from any one of the other attributes but always in unison with them and as qualifying them.[6] The other objection that the concept of the infinitude of any attribute is virtually beyond the capacity and *aspiration of any* Adhikārin is *answered in the next adhi.* where it is shown how the concept of plenitude is not a static or uniform one but differs in its range, depth and intensity from Adhikārin to Adhikarin.[7]

In what sense bhūmatva has preeminence in making the meditation of attributes fruitful is illustrated by "kratuvat" in the Sūtra: Just as the Soma sacrifice becomes fruitful only when it is performed with the accompaniment of all the accessory and complementary subsidiaries (aṅgas) such as the three pressings of Soma a day and the rites of dīkṣā (or consecration of the Yajamāna), the Prāyaṇīya and

5 भूमैव देव. परमो ह्युपास्यो नैवाभूमा फलमेपा विधत्ते ।
तस्माद् भूमा गुणतो वै विशिष्टो यथा क्रतु कर्ममध्ये विशिष्ट ॥ (M. *BSB.* iii.3.59)

6 सर्वगुणेषु भूमगुणस्य प्राधान्य तावदङ्गीकार्यम् । सर्वत्र सर्वध्योपासनीयत्वेन तमृते एकगुणस्याप्यनुपासनीयत्वात् (*TD.* iii.3.59)

7. न च तदुपासनस्याशक्यत्वम् । प्रत्यधिकारिनानात्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् (*ibid*) .

Udayanīya iṣṭis and the 'avabhṛtha' (ablution)[8] in respect of every one of its groups of Ekāha, Ahīna and Sattra—even so the meditations on the attributes of ānanda, jñāna, etc. become fruitful only when they are shot thro' and thro' with the concept of their plenitude in B.

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. discuss here whether the Vaiśvānaropāsanā (*Chān. Up.* v.11-18) is both a piecemeal upāsanā or an entire one or only the latter. The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the upāsanā of the parts has been referred to with their own appropriate fruits and as appropriate fruits are mentioned in regard to the entire upāsanā also, both ways of upāsanā are intended to be valid.[9] As the indicative form of the verb has to be interpreted injunctively in respect of the entire upāsanā, the same freedom can be availed of in respect of the separate upāsanās also.[10]

The Siddhānta is that the commencement shows that Aupamanyava and others who have done part-meditation on Vaiśvānara go to Aśva-

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8. सर्वगुणेषु भूमगुणस्य ज्यायस्त्वं क्रतुवत् सर्वत्र तद्भावात् । दीक्षाप्रायणीयोदयनीयसवनत्रयावभृथात्मकः क्रतुः (M. *BSB.* iii.3.59)

Vādirāja (TPG) and the BD point out that the term 'kratu' has been used in the Sūtra and in the Bhāṣya of M in the sense of the complement of subsidiaries (*angakalāpa*) and not in the Mīmāmsaka sense of the principal sacrifice (*svāngapradhanapara*):

क्रतुपदेन सकलप्रधानयागाङ्गभूता अत एव सर्वत्र कर्तुं योग्यत्वात् क्रतुपदवाच्या दीक्षाद्या कर्मविशेषाः कथ्यन्ते (*TPG*)

This disposes of Appayya Dīkṣita's criticism against M in his *Madhvamatamukhabhanga* of misconceiving Mīmāmsa positions. Appayya's criticisms have been answered by Vijayīndra Tīrtha in his *Madhvādhvakanṭakoddhāra* and by Nārāyanācarya in his *Advaitakālānala*

Read: सर्वेषां हि यागानां ज्योतिष्टोम एव प्रकृतिः । तत्रैव दीक्षाप्रभृत्यवभृथान्तेतिकर्तव्यतारूपस्य सर्वस्यापि विध्यन्तस्याम्नानात् । तथा च ये चान्ये यागा उद्भिदादयः तत्र हि प्रधानमात्रमाम्नातं इतिकर्तव्यतारूपोऽङ्गकलापस्तु कथम्भावाकांक्षानिवर्तकेन तु प्रकृतिवत् विकृतिः कर्तव्येति चोदकेन । अतिदेशेन सर्वोऽपि प्रकृत एवेति दीक्षाद्यवभृथान्तः प्रवर्तत इति मीमांसकानां याज्ञिकानां च सम्मतमेव । तथा च, क्रतुशब्देनोदाहृतश्रुतिस्थेन तदङ्गभूतो दीक्षाद्यङ्गकलापो लक्ष्यते । तदनुविद्धानामेवोद्भिदादिसर्वयागानां अनुष्ठाने तत्तत्फलसिद्धिर्भवति, न केवलेन द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धात्मकप्रधानकर्मात्मकयागानुष्ठानेन ।

एवमानन्दादिगुणेष्वपि भूमानुवेधे फलं भवतीति सर्वं पूर्णानन्दः पूर्णज्ञानः पूर्णैश्वर्य इत्यादिरूपेण भगवानुपास्य इति टीकाकारैः सूत्रस्थ उक्त क्रतुशब्दार्थविवरणपूर्वकं उपपादनं कृतमिति किमत्र विरुद्धम् ?

तथा ज्यायस्त्वाक्तरभिप्राय उक्त — प्रधानेन फले जननीये उपकारकत्वमेव ज्यायस्त्वं, तदनुपकृतेन प्रधानमात्रेण फलजननासामर्थ्यात् । यत्पुनरेतस्याङ्गत्वेनाप्राधान्यं यच्च यागस्याङ्गित्वेन प्राधान्यं तदनुमतमेव । तस्यैव गुणप्रधानभावस्य व्यत्यास इति भ्रान्तिं वारयितुमुक्तं — सर्वयागेष्वनुवर्तनं एव साकल्यादन्यथा वैकल्यात् ज्यायस्त्वमिति (*Advaitakālānala* iv)

9. प्राचीनशाल औपमन्यव इत्यस्यामाख्यायिकायां व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च वैश्वानरस्योपासनं श्रूयते । तत्र संशयः — किमिहोभयथाप्युपासनं स्यात् व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च, उत समस्तस्यैवेति । प्रत्यवयवं क्रियापदश्रवणात्, फलभेदश्रवणाच्च व्यस्तान्युपासनानीति प्राप्तम् (S *BSB* iii.3.57)

10. इह तु, समस्ते व्यस्ते च वर्तमानापदेशस्याविशेषात् अगृह्यमाणविशेषतया उभयत्रापि विधिकल्पनायां फलकल्पनायाश्च भेदात् उभयविधमुपासनमिति प्राप्ते (*Bhāmatī* iii.3.57)

pati and solicit from him knowledge of the entire upāsanā Aśvapati censures separate upāsanā of parts and imparts to them the nature of the upāsanā in its entirety In the interest of ekavākyatā (agreement) between the upakrama and the upasamhāra, it has to be accepted that the upāsanā of the Vaiśvānara vidyā is intended only in its entirety—in the same way as in the Vedic texts enjoining Darśapūrnāmasa[11] or other sacrifices the object is the performance of the entire sacrifice only, together with its members and not in addition to the single subordinate members such as the Prayājas

Criticism

The point at issue in this adhi, as S would have it, stands covered by the ruling given according to him, in the Satyādyadhi (iii 3 38) where it has been established that the texts refer to only one Vidyā with many details and that all the attributes mentioned in the Satyavidyā are to be comprehended in one act of meditation The present adhi is, therefore, superfluous to establish the same point with reference to a different set of examples

The *Kalpataru* explains that in the Satyādhi the non-separateness of the Vidyās is established by the back-reference 'Tad yat satyam', whereas here, there being no such reference, the matter is open for discussion[12] This is not acceptable For, in the present case also, the different parts of the upāsanā coming under the topic of Vaisvānaravidyā can be seen to form a single vidyā in the aggregate[13]

It needs to be clarified if the Siddhānta is that the Upāsanā has to be carried out in the aggregate because it has not been censured or because there is censure of part upāsanā The former position is unhelpful as the Purvapakṣin too accepts that there is no harm in carrying out the entire upāsanā (Cf *Bhāmatī ubhayavidham upasanam iti prāpte*) If the object of the discussion is to lay emphasis on the consolidated upāsanā, the consideration of entirety of upāsanā not having been censured cannot be deemed to be a proper ground for laying such emphasis on it Otherwise, the Śāndilyavidyā in its two recensions may also have to be treated as separate vidyās and upāsanās on account of their separateness not having been censured The apparent censure in regard to part-upāsanā (*Chān Up* v 12 2, 13, 2) is similar to the censure pronounced on the conduct of the homa before and after sunrise

11 R has a different explanation of kratu referring it to the Jateṣṭi

12 'सव हि सत्यादय' इत्यत्र तद्यत तत्सत्यमिति तच्छब्देन प्रकृतपरामर्शात विद्यैक्यमुक्तम । अत्र तद्वत अभदहेत्व भावादगतायत्वम (*Kalpataru* iii 3.57)

13 वैश्वानरविद्यासमाख्यानप्रकरणपाठादे विद्यैक्यप्रज्ञापकस्य समवात (*STC*)

where both the alternatives hold optionally. If it is explained that in such cases the censure is applicable to persons who *fail* to carry out their chosen alternative after having resolved to carry it out for life, and opt for the other course, the censure in the present case also may be explained in terms of those who having resolved to carry out the entire upāsanā fail to do so or confine themselves to piecemeal performance.

Unlike in the case of Jāteṣṭı, there is no conclusive evidence of ekavākyatā in respect of consolidated upāsanā here. The commencement of the Akhyāyikā merely indicates that the teaching is about Vaiśvānaravidyā but there is nothing in it to conclusively establish that only Samastopāsanā is acceptable. The principle of 'Phalavatsannidhau aphalam tadaṅgm' cannot be brought in here to support Samastopāsanā as against part-upāsanā; for there are separate fruits accredited to the different part-upāsanās also (cf. Atsyannam, paśyasi priyam *Chān. Up.* v.16.2 in respect of the part-meditation on water). This cannot be set aside as a mere statement of fact (*vartamānāpadeśa*) and not as a promise of fruits. By the same token, the statement in regard to consolidated upāsanā: He eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves' (*Chān. Up.* v.18.1) cannot be construed as a phalavidhi in respect of samastopāsanā, as the Siddhāntin would like to have it.

The meaning of 'consolidated upāsanā' (samastopāsanā) given to 'bhūman' and of 'being valid' (prāmāṇikatvam) given to 'jyāyastvam' by S. and R.[14] are wanting in authenticity.

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14. सौत्रस्य ज्यायस्त्ववचनस्य प्रामाणिकत्वाभिप्रायेणाप्युपपद्यमानत्वात् (S.)
    भूम्नः विपुलस्य समस्तस्यैव ज्यायस्त्वं प्रामाणिकत्वमित्यर्थः (R.)

CHAPTER LX

COMPREHENSION OF INFINITY, RANGE, INTENSITY ETC. OF ATTRIBUTES DIFFERS WITH ADHIKĀRINS

38. *Nānādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.60)

The previous adhi. enjoined the upāsanā of the attribute of bhūmatva as a necessary adjunct to all other attributes of B. The present one tells us that there are differences of range, intensity, depth, etc., in the comprehension of such infinity of the guṇas among Adhikārins.[1] But then if there should be such differences, how can it be held that all these different comprehensions are equally true and valid and that none of them is erroneous? The question can be settled only by showing that degrees of intensity, range and depth or vividness in the comprehension of bhūmatva of B.'s attributes are possible and consistent with gradation of adhikāra and pramāṇas. This is done in this adhi.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that 'bhūmatva' being absolute plenitude (*niratiśayapūrṇatvam*) does not admit of degrees.[2] Its comprehension too must, therefore, be uniform for all Upāsakas. It cannot be that some persons meditate on and comprehend B. as having absolute plenitude of ānanda, jñāna, etc. and some others as having less of them. The latter would be erroneous and erroneous upāsanās are fraught with disastrous consequences, according to the Śāstra. It must therefore be

1 अत्र भूमोपासनेऽधिकारिणा विशेपसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसगति. (*TP.* iii.3 60)

2 भूमत्व हि निरवधिकपरिमाणम् । न च निरवधिकपरिमाणे उत्कृष्टत्वापकृष्टत्व नाम धर्मद्वयमुपपद्यते (*AC.* iii.3.60)

accepted that all Adhikārins meditate on and comprehend bhūmatva uniformly with the same vividness, intensity, range and depth It follows from this that there is no basis for the assumption of Tāratamya (gradation) among Upāsakas and their realizations, as stated earlier in the Yāvadadhikaranam[3] (iii 3 33)

The Siddhānta is that bhūmatva is meditated upon and comprehended by Adhikārins in different degrees according to their respective Yogyatā,[4] thro' perception, reason and revelation It is well known that the instruments of valid knowledge like perception, reason and revelation give rise to knowledge of the same objects in various degrees of intensity, range, vividness and depth depending on the mettle of the Adhikārins[5] The god Brahmā for instance is in a position to comprehend the plenitude which characterises B's attributes in a manner that transcends the conception of all other Adhikārins Rudra is able to do so to a less extent, Indra still less and so on, in the descending order down to the Manuṣyottamas Vādirāja shows this difference in range of comprehension of bhūmatva among Adhikārins thro' Śabdapramāna by means of an illustration When a human being is told to look at the earth, the term 'earth" connotes to him only a limited part of the earth over which his vision passes To one whose visual range is wider it connotes a wider area, but not extending to the nether regions To omniscient beings like the Ṛṣis the same word connotes the entire expanse of the globe So too in respect of the other Pramānas —

नाना शब्दादिभेदात् (*B S* iii 3 60)
शब्दोऽनुमा तथैवाक्षो योग्यताभेदत सदा ।
ब्रह्मादीनामेकमर्थं बहुधा दर्शयन्ति हि ।
अत पूर्णत्वमीशस्य नानैवैषां प्रदृश्यते ।
अत फलस्य नानात्व नानैवोपासना यत ।। इति ब्रह्मतर्के ।
अतो भूमत्वमपि नानैवोपास्यते ।। (M *BSB* iii 3 60)

The Upaniṣads represent B as infinite bhuman or pūrṇam in every respect and insist upon the contemplation of this attribute as the means of highest realization when they say 'What is infinite is alone blissful

3 सर्वेषां भूमत्वमेकप्रकारेण प्रतीयत इति पूर्व पक्ष । भूमत्वे विशेषकल्पनायोगात । नहि केषांचित सम्यक् पूर्णानन्द इति केषांचित् किंचित्पूर्णानन्द इत्युपासन युक्तम् । तथात्वे मिथ्योपासनप्रसङ्गात । मिथ्योपासनस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात । अत सर्वेषामेकप्रकारेण भूमत्वोपासकत्वात् नोक्ततारतम्यमस्तीति (*TP* iii.3 60)

4 अत्र भूम्न इत्येतत् प्रथमान्ततया विपरिणम्यानुवर्तते । नानेति भावप्रधानम । नानात्वेन उपास्त इति भाव (*BD* iii.3 60)

5 भूमत्वमुपासनैरधिकारिणां नानाप्रकारेणैव प्रतीयते । शब्दादिप्रमाणैः तत्प्रतीतेरवश्यंभावात । शब्दादीना च प्रमाणानामधिकारिभेदेन अनवधिकायप्रतीतिजनकत्वात नानोपासनाच्च फलतारतम्यमुपपद्यत इति भाव (*TP* iii.3 60)

there is no bliss in what is limited" Human intellect may not be able to form an absolute idea of the infinitude of any attribute of B The comprehension of such infinitude would naturally vary according to different levels of Yogyatā There is no difficulty, however, in being able to form an adequate idea of it within the bounds of one's understanding Jayatīrtha gives us a vivid example[6] Infinite is the number of years, months, days, hours and minutes that have sped by since the beginning of time *Yet we are able to form some idea of the* difference between the infinitudes of these infinities The same holds true of the different conceptions of the infinite attributes of B and their bhūmatva which different orders of Adhikārins are able to form in their minds for purposes of meditation[8]

The acceptance of different levels of comprehension of bhūmatva does not expose the lesser or lower levels of such upāsanā and comprehension to the risk of becoming erroneous or untrue For each comprehension while it keeps within its bounds does *not* affirm or imply in any manner that it has exhausted the limits of the infinitude of the attribute in question and that there does *not* exist in B a greater measure of infinitude than what has been realized by it[9] It is thus accepted without reserve that all such comprehensions of infinitude are true and valid, each according to its measure of yogyatā *It should however*, be kept in mind that the Tāratamya in respect of pūrnatva is not with reference to B, as such but only with reference to the upāsaka's comprehension and meditation of it and the measure of illumination granted to him by the grace of B[10]

Interpretation of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S and R discuss in this adhi whether the Vidyās like Sadvidyā, Dahara, Vaisvānara, Satya, Bhūma, etc described in different Śakhās

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6 The *BD* explains that this comprehension of bhumatva by perception has reference to the 'manasapratyakṣa of Yogins
न चोपास्यभूमत्वप्रतीते शब्दानुमानसाध्यत्वेऽपि कथ प्रत्यक्षसाध्यत्वमिति वाच्यम योगिना मनसापि तत्प्रतीति सभवेन तस्या त्रितयसाध्यत्वोपपत्त (*BD* iii.3 60)

7 न च भूमत्वे विशेषानुपपत्ति । अतीतवत्सराणा मासाना आनन्त्यऽपि विशेषवदत्राप्युपपत्त (*TP* iii.3 60)

8 सवत्सरोऽनन्त । तन्मध्यपतिता मासाश्चनन्ता तथापि सवत्सरानन्त्यापेक्षया मासानन्त्य तदपेक्षया वासराणा मानन्त्य ततोऽपि क्षणलवादीनामानन्त्यमधिकमिति सर्वानुभवसिद्धमिति । प्रकृतेऽपि भगवदानन्दाद्यकैकगुणऽपि बहून्यानन्त्यादीनि सन्त्यव । तथापि तत्तद्योग्यतानुरोधन तानि तान्यानन्त्यानि त तमधिकारिण प्रतिभान्ति ध्यानकाले नान्यानि । यथानन्तकोटिसूयप्रकाशोऽपि हरिराधिकारिभदेन सहस्रलक्षामितभास्करोपम इत्युच्यते तद्वत्यथ (Ragh *TPB* iii 3 60)

9 अन्यानिषधानान्ययोपासनम (*TP* iii.3 60)
अन्यति-एतावदेवास्यानन्त्य नातोऽधिकमित्यनुपासनादित्यथ (Ragh *TPB*)

10 अगुष्ठमात्र इत्युपासनमपि व्यक्त्यपेक्षयव । न तु वस्तुत इति हृद्यपेक्षया इत्यत्र व्यक्तम । अत्र केनचिन्र्वाचीन नोक्तदूषणालग्नताप्रकार कण्टकोद्धारे व्यक्त (Ragh *TPB* iii.3 60)

are all one entire Vidyā admitting of Upasamhāra or not[11] The *Bhāmati* observes that so far Gunopasamhāra among vidyās had been discussed presuming them to be different The Sūtrakāra now goes to the root of the matter and institutes an inquiry whether all the vidyās pertaining to B described in the various Śākhās are identical or separate This applies to the Prāṇavidyās and others also[12]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Purvapakṣa is that unlike sacrifices which differ on account of difference of 'apurvabhāvanā' due to their intimate association with the adjuncts of 'dhātvartha', B is an established reality (*siddharūpam*) and its attributes are also established realities A Kṣatriya youth who is described in one place as broad-chested, cakora-eyed and equal to Indra does not shed those characteristics when described elsewhere as lion-faced, and lusty shouldered like a bull An established real cannot differ at every fresh enunciation of attributes If it changes its character with every such fresh predication, it will cease to be itself All the vidyās of B in all the Śākhās, however described with different attributes must, therefore, be regarded as one single and entire Vidyā[13]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta argues against this that Upāsanāvākyas are not 'vastuniṣṭha' They merely enjoin the 'bhāvanā' or human activity in regard to the object of meditation Such 'bhāvanā' is of the nature of something 'to be accomplished' Tho' the 'bhāvanā' in terms of Upāsanā presupposes the Upāsanā and the Upāsanā presupposes the establishment of the Upāsya and B as the Upāsya (object of meditation) is an established reality, still B's objective relationship (viṣayabhāva) to Upāsanā is not constant but emerges occasionally in this or that person and in some particular form In this sense it is a variable relation—just as a woman's form is sexually attractive to one, adorable to another as a

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11 समस्तोपासनान् न्याय इत्युक्तम्। अत्र प्रान्ता बुद्धिर्यापि भिन्नशुत्या युपासनानि समस्यापादिष्यन्त इति
(S BSB iii.3 58)
इह सर्वा विद्या एकात्मागता शाखान्तरगतानारम्भाभ्यहृणम्। कि विद्यैवमुत विद्याभेद इति मणास्यत
(R Śrībhāṣya iii.3.56)

12 सिद्ध कृत्वा विद्याभेदमधस्तात् विचारजातं निवर्तितम्। सम्प्रति तु सर्वासामाम्नायशाखागताना विद्याना किमभेदो भेदो वा एव प्राणादिगोचरास्विति विचारयितव्यम् (Bhamati iii.3.58)

13 युक्तमपूर्वभेदात् कर्मणामपूर्वभावनाना भेद इति। इह ब्रह्मणः सिद्धरूपत्वात् गुणानामपि सिद्धरूपत्वात् सिद्धया सद्ब्रह्मणा विद्यानाम्। नहि विद्यात्मा सर्वात्मना क्षत्रियपुत्रा दुष्यन्तनधर्माणि एकत्रार्पितान्यन्यत्र सिद्धान्या वयस्क प्रत्यादिश्यमान चकारस्य बाधमर्हति। न खलु प्रत्युद्गत वस्तु सिद्धत्व तस्य सर्वत्र नान्यत्वस्यात्। अन्यादृश्य वा तदेव न भवेत्। तस्मात् सर्वासामपि विद्याना न भेद इति प्राप्तम्
(Bhāmati iii.3.58)

mother or to be treated with indifference to a Yogi, depending on the *mental attitude of the person In the same way, the Upāsanās too are* subject to the attitude of the Upāsaka and as such come to be enjoined as subject to human will.[14] As such they do differ according to the difference of attributes prescribed for Upāsanā It cannot be argued that in spite of different attributes, the Upāsanās or Vidyās may be re garded as the same everywhere as in the case of the Agnihotra which is one in spite of the texts prescrbing with reference to it as many as ten different materials of offering like milk, curds, ghee and rice

The attributes of Satyakāmatva etc cannot all of them be treated as Guṇavidhis prescriptive of secondary matter with regard to one and the same B throughout, so that all the various Upāsanāvākyas can be represented as one Śāstra For, the difficulty is that unlike in the case of the Agnihotravidhi *these attributes are given in the same breath with* the Upāsanāvidhis and as such they constitute a separate Vidyā in each case [15]

Moreover, the Pūrvapakṣa contention that all the Vidyās can be brought into one Procrustean bed as a single Vidyā is an impossibility; for it is beyond the power of any Upāsaka to combine and comprehend all the attributes mentioned in all the Srutis in a single Vidyā. We have, therefore, to admit the separateness of the Vidyās [16]

Criticism

The question whether the Vidyās of the Upaniṣads are separate or identical has already been discussed in the opening adhikarana of this Pāda *Its reopening is, therefore, superfluous* S *seems to have felt* the awkwardness of raising such an issue almost at the fag end of the Gunopasamhāra-Pāda, after having shown that twelve of the Vidyās discussed by him so far are identical and six others to be separate However, he satisfies himself with the explanation that "the present *adhi* being thus settled, the first *adhi* of this Pāda has now to be considered"

14 भवेदेव यदि वस्तुनिष्ठान्युपासनावाक्यानि किंतु तद्विषयामुपासनाभावना विदधति। सा च कार्यरूपा। यद्यप्युपासनाभावना ऽपासनाधीननिरूपणा उपासन चोपास्याधीननिरूपणमुपास्य चेश्वरादि व्यवास्थितरूप तथापि उपासनाविषयीभावोऽस्य कदाचित कस्यचित केनचिद्रूपेणेत्यपरिनिष्ठित एव। यथैव स्त्रीकाय केनचिदुपगन्तव्यतया, केनचित् मातृतया केनचिदुपेक्षणीयतया विषयीक्रियमाण पुरुषेच्छातन्त्र, एवमिहापि उपासनानि पुरुषेच्छातन्त्रतया विधेयता नातिक्रामन्ति (*Bhamatī* iii.3.58)

15 न च तत्तद्गुणतयोपासनानि गुणभेदान्न भिद्यन्ते। न चाग्निहोत्रमिवोपासना विधाय दधितण्डुलादिगुणवदिह सत्यकामत्वादिगुणविधि, येनैकशास्त्रत्व स्यात्। अपि तूत्पत्तावेवोपासनाना तत्तद्गुणविशिष्टानामवगमात तत्तद्गृह्यमाणविशेषतया सर्वासा भेद तुल्य (*Bhamatī* iii.3.58)

16 न च समस्तशाखाविहितसर्वगुणोपसहार शक्यानुष्ठान। तस्मात् भेद (*Bhamatī* iii.3.58) समस्तगुणोपसहारोऽशक्य प्रतिज्ञायेत (S *BSB* iii.3 58)

स्यिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्
(S *BSB* iii 3 58)

If this means the present *adhi* ought, in reality, to lead the entire Pāda, we may very well ask why the Sūtrakāra himself has *not* done so Does not this inaptness of handling this *adhi.* show that its real significance has been missed and hence this groping in the dark? Prof V H Date's understanding of S's explanation that "this truth ought to have been stated first of all in the beginning of this Pāda so that the identity of the knowledge of B in all the Vedantic passages might have been better exhibited than it was in the first Sūtra of this Pāda" (*Vedanta Explained,* Vol II p 263) does not improve matters for S

R. is also in the same predicament He has, however, tried to justify the presence of this *adhi* here on the ground that it is only after the distinctiveness of the Bhūma Vaisvānara, Upakosala and other Vidyās is established here in principle that it can be conclusively shown that any given Vidyā such as the Dahara or the Śāndilya can be brought under the principle of Sarvavedāntapratyaya and adjudged to be identical in all the contexts of its occurrence in the different Śākhās[17] In other words, the question of the oneness or separateness of the Vidyās mooted in the first adhi and the directive principle of Sarvavedāntapratyaya enunciated therein are derived from and based on the finding of the present adhi about the separateness of the Vidyās in relation to one another

तस्मादस्रोक्तनायमुपजीव्य पूर्वं वेदान्तप्रत्ययन्यायोऽवतारित तदपेक्षित परस्परभेदोऽत्र निरूप्यत इत्यर्थं
(*Srutaprakāsa* iii 3 56)

If that be so, the question would still persist and call for an answer as to why the Sutrakāra himself did not take care to enunciate the Upajīvyanyāya or the governing principle of 'Vidyābhedahetu' as now adumbrated, before giving expression to his faith in Sarvavedantapratyaya with reference to such Vidyās as fulfil the requirements of their unity Why has he put the cart before the horse in iii 3 1?

The *Srutaprakasa* puts in that earlier in this Pāda the inquiry as regards the unity or separateness of Vidyās was carried on with reference to specific Vidyās while now in the present *adhi.* the scope of the inquiry is extended to all the Vidyās at one sweep[18] But the Sāmānyavisesanyāya would seem to require the consideration of the general ques-

17 अत्रैवानां परस्परभेद समर्थित स यस्मात् दहरादिकाया सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययत्वम् (*Śrībhāṣya.* iii.3.56)

18 पूर्वं विद्याविशेषविचार कृत । इदानीं सर्वविद्याविषयविचार क्रियत इति सङ्गति (*Srutaprakāsa* iii.3.56)

tion first whether all the Vidyās taught in the Śrutis are one, before taking up the question of particular Vidyās as has been done (by S and R) *in the earlier adhikaranas, whether* they constitute one or separate Vidyās The awkwardness created by these interpretations makes us feel that the *adhi* deserves a better deal

The *Bhāmatī's* stand that the Upāsanāvākyas are not vastuniṣtha *takes away their validity If the contention is that* Upāsanā *is of the* nature of knowledge and that knowledge cannot be made the object of an injunction *(avidheya)* neither can Upāsanā be—which goes against Vācaspati's statement

एवमिहापि उपासनानि पुरुषेच्छायत्ततया विधेयता नातिक्रामन्ति (*Op cit* iii 3 5 58)

True, bhāvanās cannot be distinguished like material objects They can be distinguished only thro' the respective Upāsanās The Upāsanās too cannot be distinguished except thro' the difference of their objects The object of Upāsanās being the same B how can there be difference of Vidyās? Nor can the presence of words having different meanings and difference of gunas (sabdāntarādi) be relied upon as determinants of vidyābheda *For then the Agnihotra will have to be differentiated* with the use of different materials like ghee, rice or curds The explanation that the identity of Agnihotra is to be accepted because the bare originating statement is complemented by the subsequent mention of the materials *(dravya)* whereas the constituent attributes of B in the different Vidyās are given in the same breath and that, therefore, the latter exhibit no such distinction as the former and that for this reason these Vidyas have necessarily to be regarded as distinct from one another, can easily be countered by pointing out that in respect of the Vidyās too, we have bare texts like 'Brahma upāsva' 'Brahmavid āpnoti param' enjoining Upāsanā without giving its constituent attributes in the same breath and which are to be gathered from subsequent statements from the vicinity But this does not make for difference

S has contended that if all the Śākhās are to be taken to represent only one entire Vidyā without restriction, on the ground that the object of their knowledge is the same B, the Upasamhāra of all the attributes given in all of them would be beyond the grasping power of any Adhikārin.[19] *But there is surely scope for Vikalpa in such cases* (See iii 3 10, 22) depending on the capacity of the Upāsaka

The question of the Upāsanā and Upasamhāra of all, or a considerable number of the attributes of B depends on Yogyatā What is im-

19 See f.n 16 *ante*

possible for one or for some may be quite possible for some others Otherwise, even the Upasamhāra of the eight attributes of the Daharavidyā of the *Chān Up* may be found to be beyond the capacity of some We may *remind Vācaspati* of what he himself has said in another context about the unbelievable but nevertheless real capacities of supermen, Rṣis and Devas .

दृष्ट च यदल्पबलवीर्यबुद्धीनामशक्यमतिदुष्कर वा, तदन्येषामनल्पबलवीर्यबुद्धीना सुशकमीषत्कर वा। नहि वानरै मारुतिप्रभृतिभि नगैर्न बद्धो नीरनिधिरगाधो महासत्त्वानाम्! नचैष पार्थेन शिलीमुखैर्न बद्ध.। न चाय न पीत. संक्षिप्य चुलुकेन हेलयैव कलशयोनिना महामुनिना!

(*Bhāmatī* ii.1.33)

S and Vācaspati seem to be forgetting that the Devas and Rṣis have also been recognized as Adhikārins of Brahmavidyā and that among them the four-faced Brahmā is fully competent to carry out the Upasamhāra of all the attributes of B found in the Śrutis viewing them as one entire Vidyā[20] If the incapacity feared is from the point of view of some and not all Adhikārins, it is not a sufficient ground to reject oneness of the Brahmavidyās comprising all the Śākhās

In fact, that precisely has been the highest position taken by M. with his bold and uncompromising interpretation of the opening Sūtra of this Pāda (iii 3 1) in keeping with the Mahāsamanvaya of Śāstra in B predicated in 1 1 4—while at the same time recognizing the existence of gradation of Adhikārins in the descending order from Brahmā to the Manuṣyottamas and providing for the Upasamhāra of attributes consistent with Adhikāritāratamya within a complete and all-comprehensive scheme and pattern of Gunopasamhāra[21] It is because S , R and others have failed to formulate such a comprehensive scheme and pattern of Upāsanā and Upasamhāra that they often find themselves in a quandary in the exposition of the intricate theme of Upāsanā and Upasamhāra of gunas The possibility of accommodating Prakaraṇabheda within the expanding ideal of Sarvagunopasamhāra has been clarified by M in terms of

शाखाभेदो ह्यशक्तिज [21]

20 See Sarvabhedadhi. (iii.3.11) P 243

21 See Sarvavedantapratyayadhi (iii 3 1-5) P 218 fn 22, and P 219-220

CHAPTER LXI

ADDITIONAL UPĀSANĀ OF SPECIAL FORMS OF B

39 *Vikalpādhikaranam* (iii 3 61)

Having discussed the special importance attaching to the Upāsanā of the *attribute* of bhūmatva in the two preceding *adhi s*, the Sūtrakāra now turns to discuss the importance of the Upāsanā of certain special *forms of B*[1] *other than one's own Bimba-Form* prescribed in iii 3 53

The *STC* introduces the *adhi* in a slightly different way So far, Upāsanās which have only Moksa for their objective have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra It is now the turn of Upāsanās whose fruits are different from Moksa to be discussed These fall under two heads those which contribute to Moksa by destroying adverse influences and past sins and others which confer worldly advantages not conducive to Mokṣa Both kinds of Upāsanās have been set forth in the *Nrsimha-Pūrva-Tāpanīya* (i 3), *Rāma Uttara-Tāpanīya* (ii) and other Upanisads Of such Kāmyopāsanās, the Sūtrakāra here discusses the place and importance of such Upāsanās (other than of one's own Bimba Form) which are considered helpful in the attainment of Mokṣa, in the manner referred to above

The Upāsanā of other Vaisnava Forms of B such as Nrsimha, Hayagrīva, Rāma, Krsna and so on has been commended in the Śrutis as conducive to the removal of obstacles in the path of Mokṣa It is,

1 पूर्वं गुणोपास्तौ विशय उक्त । अत्र तु स्वरूपोपास्तौ स उच्यत इति सगति (Ragh *Ny Muktāvali*)

therefore, pertinent to consider here whether the Upāsanā of such Forms of B in addition to one's Bimba Form should *not at all* be carried out, or may be carried out in certain circumstances by way of settled option *(vyavasthitavikalpa)*

The Pūrvapakṣa is that *no Upasanā of any Form of B other than one's own Bimba-Form should be carried out by the Mumukṣu*[2] For, the aim of Upāsanā by a Mumukṣu is only the attainment of Mokṣa And Mokṣa is attainable, as has been made clear in the Sāmānyādhi (iii 3 53), only by the Upāsanā of one's Bimba-Form and not of any other common or general form which is not one's own Bimba (in the sense defined earlier) There is thus no need at all go in for the Upāsanā of these other forms Besides, such Upāsanās are not only fruitless but can even be obstacles to Bimbopāsanā by diverting the mind and causing distraction of interest Hence, they ought *not* to be carried out by the Mumukṣu and such Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads are to be dismissed as useless to the Mumuksu[3]

The Siddhānta is that tho' the Mumuksu's objective is only Mokṣa, the Upāsanā of other Vaiṣnava forms of B[4] such as Nrsimha, Hayagriva, Rāma, and Krṣna, is necessary and fruitful in removing adverse influences *(duradrṣṭa)* and the effects of past sins of a grave nature which retard Upāsanā, by helping the steady and unhampered Upāsanā of the Bimba form The Upāsanā of these Forms is, therefore, strongly recommended to such Mumukṣus as are not otherwise in a position to counteract the adverse adrṣtas and sins retarding the progress and fruition of Bimbopāsanā Others who are in a position to shatter these adverse adrṣṭas, sins and obstructions by intensifying their Bimbopāsanā itself are *not required* to carry on such Abimbopāsanā[5] The option recognized by the Sutra is thus a *settled one (vyavasthitavikalpa) and not absolute*

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2 Cf अत्र हरिरूपान्तरस्याबिम्बस्योपासनस्य अकर्तव्यता नियमान्नास्तीत्याह (*TP* iii.3 61)
The reading हरिरूपान्तरस्याबिम्बोपासनाकर्तव्यतानियमात् in the printed edns of the *TP* (1902 and 1926) is a printer's devil

3 मुमुक्षुणा स्वबिम्बातिरिक्तरूपविषयमुपासनं न कर्तव्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः किमनुपासनं मोक्षार्थं कर्तव्यमुत फलान्तरार्थं वा ? नाद्यः तन्मात्रात् । अन्यथात्वे व्याहृतम् । न द्वितीयः तस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वाभावात् अधिकारिणो मुमुक्षुत्वात् प्रत्युत बिम्बोपासनविघ्नाय चेति । अतः तद्वैयर्थ्यमिति (*TP* iii.3 61)

4 नृसिंहादिरूपवच्च इति (भाष्य) सामानाधिकरण्यम् (*TP* iii.3.61)—See Ragh. *TPB*

5 स्वबिम्बोपासनातिरिक्तं च नरसिंहाद्युपासनं कर्तव्यं न वा ? न तु न कर्तव्यमत्र । तस्य बिम्बापरोक्षानन्तरभावित्वेन दुरितनिवर्तितलक्षणमोक्षसाधनत्वेन च कर्तव्यताभावात् । किं तु विकल्पस्तु – यस्य विघ्नप्रतिबन्धोऽस्ति तेन कर्तव्यम् । यस्य तु नास्ति न तेनेति । स्वबिम्बोपासनयैव तादृशदुरितनिवृत्त्युपपत्तेरिति भावः (*TP* iii.3.55)

This happy solution of the problem of Abimbopāsanā or Bimbātiriktarūpopāsanā sustains the fruitfulness of the Upāsanā of Nrsimha, Hayagrīva and other Vidyās recognized in the Śrutis

The whole Sūtrārtha has been neatly summed by M in his Bhāṣya as follows —

स्वयोग्योपासनानन्तर सामान्यस्यापि कस्यचिदुपासन विकल्पेन भवति, विशिष्टफलापेक्षया
मुक्त्यर्थमात्मयोग्य च कार्यमेव ह्युपासनम् ।
नृसिहादिकमन्यच्च दुरितादिनिवृत्तये ॥
उपासते यथायोग न वा फलविभेदत ॥
इति ब्रह्मतर्के (M *BSB* iii 3 61)

Vādirāja (*TPG* p 162) clarifies a very important point that the Upāsanā of Nrsimha and other forms has reference to the period *before* the fruition of Upāsanā and *not after* For, there is no possibility of sins or obstacles persisting after the fruition of Upāsanā And after Aparoksajñāna is attained thro' fruition of Upāsanā all adverse adrṣtas and karmas other than Prārabdha are liquidated Therefore, what is meant is that during the period *before* the fruition of his Bimbopasanā, the Mumuksu may be retarded in his Bimbopāsanā now and then by adverse adrṣtas or by the power of Kali and may be subject to interruptions of his Upasanā thro' distraction of the mind At such times, he should, after bringing his Upāsanā of the Bimbarūpa to a certain stage of progress, take up the Upāsanā of these other forms of Nrsimha etc, liquidate the adverse influences and *resume his Bimbopāsana* For, the mind being anu, there is no possibility of concentrating on two forms of Upāsana simultaneously In this way, the incidental Upāsanās of Nrsimha and other forms cannot be deemed to act as an obstruction to obligatory Upāsanā of the Bimba Form, or be fruitless

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

(*Vikalpadhikaranam* iii 3 59)

S and R (who treats Sūtras 57-58 as a single *adhi*) make this *adhi* discuss the issue whether among the Vidyās which have been shown to be separate in the previous *adhi*, the Upāsaka may make a selective combination, or is bound to choose only one Vidyā for meditation The Siddhānta is that as Vidyās are different there can be no combination It is enough and proper to choose only one as he likes and carry it thro' For once B is realized there is no point in resorting

to another Upāsanā for the same end The practice of more than one Upāsanā will cause distraction of the mind and retard progress of Upāsanā R adds that the goal of Brāhmic realization being one of unlimited and unsurpassable bliss, and as such a state can be attained by one Upāsanā there is no point in trying to attain it thro' another Vidyā also, in addition[6] The next Sūtra permits such combination in regard to the Kāmya-Vidyās, as they do not have Brahman-realization as their object and augmentation of rewards is possible in *their cases* That Sūtra is, however, treated by S as a different *adhi* which has been *objected to by R and his commentator* as it is more in the nature of a continuation of the theme and a corollary drawn from the standpoint of the previous Sūtra[7]

Criticism

The objection that no useful purpose is served by supplementing one Upāsanā by another fails to take note of the fact that the subsequent Upāsanā may conceivably be useful in removing obstacles to the first in its progress It is far from certain that Brahman-realization can be had at the first shot[8] The evidence of Bhrgu-Vāruni approaching his father repeatedly after completing one Upāsanā and receiving instruction in a second and then in a third and so on *shows how difficult realization is*[9] S 's contention that the pursuit of more than one Vidyā will cause distraction of the mind is open to question The Samuccayapakṣa does not surely contemplate more than one Upāsanā *at a time*, but one after the other If a further Upāsanā is forbidden even subsequently there can be no room for Samuccaya anywhere—even as between Darsapūrnamāsa, Agnihotra etc At this rate, even the inclusion of more than one attribute in any Upāsanā will have to be objected to as a potential or actual source of distraction of the mind—so much so that one will have to bid good bye to the entire Upasamhāraprakriyā! The possibility of the Upāsanās such as of Madhuvidyā being carried out by the Devas, even after attaining the position to be attained by such Vidyas, evidently for the attainment of deeper know-

6 S and R accordingly read Vikalpo avisiṣṭaphalatvat unlike M who reads Visiṣṭaphalatvat This also leads to their difference in interpretation

7 काम्यास्त्विति सूत्रमधिकरणान्तरमाहुः । तदयुक्तम् । अविशिष्टफलत्वाभावस्य स्फुटत्वात् । सूत्रप्रयोजनं तु विद्यात्वप्राप्तानामाप्युपमन्नविघ्ननिवारणपरम् (*Srutaprakās* iii.3.58)

8 Cf बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते (Gitā vii 19)

9 See Vol. I p 100 f.n 25

ledge and bliss, has been recognized by the Sūtrakāra himself (in 1.3.33).[10]

R.'s contention that the attainment of Brāhmic realization being in the nature of unlimited and unsurpassable bliss, there is no point in any Upāsaka wanting to augment such bliss by other Upāsanās is based on a total repudiation of gradation of bliss and Tāratamya in Mokṣa. This has been and will be shown to rest on no more than wishful thinking.

10. As the opening Sūtra of the Devatādhi. turns upon the question of the eligibility of the Devas for Madhuvidyā and others, it is but proper to conclude that the approval accorded by Bādarāyaṇa in i.3.33 includes the approval of eligibility for Madhuvidyā and others also and not merely for Brahmavidyā in general. It should be noted that Madhuvidyā is as much a Brahmavidyā as any other.

Cf. उपनिषत्त्वाच्च विशेषतो न यत्किंचिदुच्यत इति वक्तुं युक्तम् (M. *Chān.* Up. Bhāṣya iii 1-11)

CHAPTER LXII

OTHER KĀMYOPĀSANĀS ARE OPTIONAL

40 *Kamyādhikaraṇam* (iii 3 62)

This adhi establishes that the Kamyopāsanā of other forms of B and their attributes as given in the Varāha, Vāmana and such other Vidyās (nirbhujapravādas) and in texts like 'Yas' chandasām ṛṣabho' (Taitt Up i 4 1) recommended for the acquisition of wealth and worldly prosperity in order to gain more knowledge by extending hospitality to learned men and holding spiritual conference with them, and to be able to pay sumptuous Gurudaksinā and fulfil socio-religious duties of dissemination of knowledge by maintaining and imparting knowledge to a number of disciples (*Taitt. Up* i 4 2-4)—are *not* absolutely necessary (obligatory) like the Upāsanās of Nrsimha, Hayagrīva etc referred to in the previous adhi which have a special role to play in counteracting obstacles to Bimbopāsanā

The purely Kāmyopāsanās described in the Śrutis are optional—*not* to be performed by those desirous of Mokṣa alone (Mumukṣus). They may be performed by those who are interested in them for their own sake[2] For Mumukṣus have no hankering after worldly advantages and are not required to perform them There is no necessary relation between the possession of wealth and other advantages and one's being

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1 अत्राधिकरणे ब्रह्मज्ञानसाधनोपासनानामेव आवश्यकत्वं न काम्यसाधनभगवद्रूपगुणविषयोपासनानामिति समर्थ्यते (*BD* iii.3 62)

2 काम्यसाधनभगवद्रूपगुणकामना चेत् तत्साधनीभूता गुणाः इष्टकामना चेत् तत्साधनीभूतगुणाः, अथायकामना चेत् तत्कामसाधनीभूतगुणा नतु कामिभिरुपास्याः (अयमत्र नित्य विकल्प एवम्य) (*AC* iii.3 62)

able to acquire and improve one's spiritual knowledge and qualifications for Mokṣa[3] A staunch devotee of the Lord without any of these advantages can also acquire spiritual knowledge[4]

The option 'Kāmyāstu yathākāmam samuccīyeran na vā purvahetvabhāvāt' admits of being explained in respect of non-Mumuksus and Mumuksus as well, from different standpoints These Kāmyopāsanās *may* be carried out by Mumukṣus purely for the sake of earning Divine grace and pleasing the Lord, for the Lord is eminently pleased by the performance of any amount of Niskāmakarmas and Niskāmopāsanās[5] But the Mumuksus ought not to perform the Kāmyopāsanās for the sake of attaining worldly advantages and prosperity which is opposed to the spirit of Vairāgya inculcated in the first Pāda of the Sādhana Adhyāya The *AC* explains that Mumuksus who are in a position to earn Divine grace and please B thro' intensive Bimbopāsanā itself are not to carry out such Kāmyopāsanās Other Mumuksus who cannot go to such heights of intensive Bimbopāsanā are to perform these Kāmyopāsanās for the purpose of earning the grace *(prasāda)* of the Lord and *not* for gaining worldly advantages[6]

Thus the option indicated by 'na vā' is to be understood from the point of view Adhikāribheda as between Amumuksus and Mumukṣus on the one hand and of Phalabheda in the case of Mumuksus themselves The option left to perform the Upāsanās sustains the validity and purposefulness of the Kāmya Vidyās taught in the Śrutis without weakening the foundations of Vairāgya laid in the first Pāda The expression pūrvahetvabhāvāt' is thus very resourcefully construed to suit these reservations

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3 न ह्यर्थादिक विना ज्ञानाभावो नापि तेन नियत्या भवति (*TP* iii 3 62)

4 यदृच्छालाभसतोषादिमता एकाकिनापि तत्सभवादिति भाव (Ragh *TPB*)
There is an autobiographical allusion behind this statement

5 काम्यगुणोपासनाप्रवृत्तौ हि कारणद्वय, फलकामना प्रसादकामना चेति। मुमुक्षो फलकामनाभावात प्रसादकामना हेतुरिति सिद्ध्यतीति भाव (*AC* iii 3 62)

6 यस्य तीव्रबिम्बोपासना वर्तते न कार्यमेव तेन काम्यगुणोपासनम । यस्य तु नास्ति तेन कार्यमेवेति भाव (*AC* iii 3 62)

CHAPTER LXIII

NATURE OF ANGADEVATOPĀSANĀ BY DEVAS

41. *Yathāśrayabhāvādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.63-67)

'Aṅgadevatopāsanā' is of two kinds. The first one common to all the Aṅgadevatopāsanā to be carried out *exclusively* by the gods themselves. This is dealt with in the present *adhi.*[1] Tho' this *adhi.*, therefore, ought to have been taken up immediately after *adhi.* 36, its separation by a gap of four adhis. is to highlight its distinction from the earlier form of Aṅgadevatopāsanā. As each of the four *adhi.s* beginning with the Bhūmādhi, has a close interconnection, that group of four *adhi.s* has had to be completed before turning to this one. This has been well-brought out by Raghūttama in his TPB.[2]

The sequence of thought with the preceding *adhi.* is that while Kāmyopāsanā may be carried out on account of the existence of suitable Adhikārins for it, there are no such Adhikārins in respect of Aṅgadevatopāsanā as contemplated in this *adhi.*[3]

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1 द्विविधमङ्गदेवतोपासनम्—परिवारत्वेन भगवदुपाश्रितत्वेन चेति। तत्राद्य सर्वमुमुक्षुसाधारणमङ्गावबद्धाश्रित्योपासनम्। द्वितीयं देवतामात्राधिकारिकमत्र समर्थ्यते इति विवेकः (*BD.* iii.3.63)

2 यद्यपि 'अङ्गावबद्धा' इत्यनन्तरमेव कर्तव्यं तथापि तत्र सर्वाधिकारिसाधारणस्य भगवदुपसर्जनतया अन्यदेवतोपासनमहिम्नस्य भगवदुपासनस्य कर्तव्यत्वसमर्थनम्। अत्र पुनः प्रकारेण देवतानां तत्तदुपास्यभगवदुपाश्रितत्वेन प्रकारेण देवैरेव कर्तव्यत्वसमर्थनमिति वैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनार्थं भूमाद्यधिकरणचतुष्टयस्य उक्तरीत्या पूर्वपूर्वसङ्गतत्वेन प्राप्ते तदधिकरणचतुष्टयेन व्यवधानं कृतमिति ज्ञेयम्. (Raghu. *TPB.* iii 3 63)

3. पूर्वत्र काम्योपास्तेरधिकारिसत्त्वेन कार्यत्वेऽपि इहाङ्गदेवतोपास्ते तदभावेनाकार्यत्वमिति शङ्कनात् सङ्गतिः

(Ragh. *Ny. Muktāvali*)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that no such Upāsanā is to be undertaken as there is no justification for it It cannot be said that (i) the Śruti "Brahmā abides in the head, Rudra in the forehead" refers to the various gods abiding in the respective limbs of B , (ii) that the Sūtra Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt (iii 3 15) recognizes all such attributes given in the Śruti are verily meant to be meditated upon, (iii) that the Māṇḍavya Śruti teaches that as for the gods their meditation should have reference to that particular limb of B which is stated to be the abode from which they have been created (R V x 90 13) and (iv) that the Pautrāyana Śruti says the respective attributes of B such has having eyes, ears, head, etc as the abode and place of origin of different gods are to be meditated upon, just like the other attributes of B such as jñāna, ānanda, etc

The Pūrvapakṣa objects to these contentions on the following grounds If such Upāsanās of the gods as abiding in the respective limbs of B is open to all Adhikārins, it will conflict with the Sūtrakāra's specific recognition of only four attributes of ānanda, etc , as the ones to be meditated by all Mumuksus (iii 3 12) For, the attributes of B 's head being the abode of the fourfaced Brahmā and so on are not adjuncts or adjectival to the attributes of ānanda, jñāna and others like the attribute of Bhūmatva, so that there will be no difficulty of the specific number of four attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumuksus being exceeded and contradicted by recognizing these attributes also amnog the ones to be meditated upon by all

Nor is there any clear evidence that these attributes are solely meant to be meditated upon by the gods and *not* by other Mumuksus in general For unlike in the Vedic text 'A king shall offer Rājasūya' there is no clear indication in the text relied upon by the Siddhāntin "Brahmā abides in the head and Rudra in the forehead" that such attributes of B are to be meditated upon exclusively by the gods If in spite of the absense of such an express statement, the Devas alone are to be considered as the Adhikārins for such Upāsanā, the spirit of the Sarvavedāntapratyayādhi that different Adhikārins need not be posited in respect of the Upasanāvidhis will be violated

Since there is thus no basis for restricting this sort of Angadevatopāsanā to the gods and as throwing it open to all the Adhikārins will conflict with the other fact that the number of attributes to be meditated upon by all Mumuksus has been fixed at four, the Angadevatopāsana in question here is absolutely pointless Therefore, no reference to any such Upāsanā can be accepted as being competent to establish that it should be carried out

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Angadevatopāsanā as contemplated in the text "From the eyes of B the Sun was born, from the face Indra and Agni" ought to be carried out (Sūtra 63) [4] The very fact that such Upāsanās have been spoken of in the Śrutis is competent to establish that they *are* to be carried out [5] (Sūtra 64)

The objection that there is no evidence to establish suitable Adhikārins for such Upāsanā is met in Sutra 65 'Samāhārāt', where the keyword in the Śruti intended by it—viz '(upa) samahareta'[6] is shown to presuppose the gods alone as the Adhikārins for such Upāsanā The Śruti quoted runs whoever is desirous of Moksa should comprehend in the Supreme B the attributes of the several gods who have been created from the different limbs of the Supreme and by contemplating those gods as abiding in those limbs he attains the highest place (*paramam sthānam*)[7] Ragh *TPB* brings out the point that the expression 'samā hāra' referring as it does to the Śruti containing the expression Samhareta' furnishes proof of the fact that not only are the attributes in question to be made the subject of 'Upasamhāra' but that the Devas alone are the proper Adhikārins to do so for if the purport of the Śruti 'Angaih parad ye visrstas tattad gunan parame samhareta' were merely to enjoin the (upa) samhara of such attributes, there is no necessity for the Śruti to refer to the Devas as the Adhikārins thereof in the second half of the verse It follows from the second half of the same Śruti that the purport of the Śruti is to indicate the gods alone as the proper Adhikārins for the said Upāsanā [8]

4 अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभाव The term angeșu here gets repeated (*avartate*) in construing The first angeșu is suitably changed to the genitive to denote the Angadevatas The second angeșu contextually refers to the respective limbs of B from which they are created 'Yatha in the Sutra is similarly re peated (*avrtti*) and tatha follows consequently 'Bhava in the Sutra stands for 'bhavana or upasana. The whole Sutra thus yields the meaning. The meditation (*bhava*) of Angadevatas (*angānam*) is to be carried out in accord ance with (*yatha tatha*) the nature of the abiding (*asraya*) of the respective gods in the different limbs of B as stated in the Śrutis
अङ्गदेवानां यथा यथा [illegible] तथा सूर्योऽजायत इत्यादि [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible] (M. BSB iii.3 63)

5 यस्मिन् यस्मिन् [illegible] निविष्टः परस्य चिन्त्यः स तथा तथैव ॥
इति पौत्रायण श्रुतिः (M. BSB iii.3.64)

6 अत्र [illegible] । सम्पदेव च (BS iv.2.11) [illegible]

7 'अङ्गैः पराद् ये देवा विसृष्टाः तत्तद्गुणान् परमे संहरेत । (BD iii.3.65)
[illegible] स्थानं मुमुक्षुः परमं व्रजेत् ।
इति [illegible] श्रुतौ समाहारवचनात् (M. BSB iii.3.65)

8 [illegible] (Ragh TPB iii.3 65)

It should be noted that in the Śruti quoted, the term 'Mumukṣu' refers only to the Devas as they alone are entitled to Sāyujyamukti' which has been referred to by the words 'paramam sthānam' This reference to the nature of the fruit of Sāyujyamokṣa attained by this Upāsanā shows that the Devas are the Adhikārins meant here—just as in the Madhuvidyā of the *Chān Up* (iii, 1—10) the reference to the Upāsakas attaining the status of Vasu, Rudra, etc (iii 6,3,7,3) goes to establish that the Devatās are the proper Adhikārins for Madhuvidyā

The last Sūtra (66) establishes that the attribute of having the eye as the abode and place of origin of the Sun, of the mind as the place of origin and abode of the moon referred to in the Śruti are on a par with the other attributes like jñāna and ānanda *(gunasādhārnya)* and are, therefore, entitled to be meditated upon by the appropriate Adhikārins for such Upāsanā viz the Devas It should be understood that the Upasamhāra of the attributes of the Angāśritadevatāgunas in B signifies the Upāsanā of such attributes as supreme effulgence (*mahāprakāśa*) supreme power to gladden all (*mahāhlādakatva*) and so on which are the archetypes *(bimba)* of the attributes of effulgence etc found in the gods who are the ectypes *(pratibimba)* of the Supreme

CHAPTER LXIV

ANGADEVOPĀSANĀ OPEN TO NONE BUT DEVAS

42. *Sahāśravaṇādhikaraṇam* (iii.3.67-68)

This adhi establishes that the Angadevatopāsanās taught in the preceding one is not open to all Mumukṣus, but only to Devas. It stands related to the preceding one thro' an ākṣepasaṅgati, in that it affirms the finding of the previous *adhi.* by disposing of an objection that may be brought up against it The *adhi.* is not, therefore, superfluous.[1]

The objection is that such Aṅgadevatopāsanā need not at all be undertaken by any Mumukṣu as it has not been enjoined in all the Vedic Śākhās like the Agnihotra and other acts[2] We have therefore, to find out if this type of Upāsanā's not being found enjoined in all the Śākhās is not explainable except on the assumption that it is not at all to be practised by any one, or is otherwise explainable.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it is not at all to be undertaken by any one as it has not been taught in all the Śākhās. If it were obligatory for all Mumukṣus, it is sure to have been taught alongside of other Upāsanās enjoined in all the Śākhās This Upāsanā is found enjoined only rarely in a few Śākhās. The absence of its general mention is not, therefore, compatible with any other conclusion than that it is not to be practised.

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1 (अत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानसाधनत्वाभिमतत्वेन देवतोपासनस्य) सर्वशाखास्वनुक्तत्वेन प्राप्तानुष्ठेयत्वशङ्कानिरासेन कर्तव्यतासमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसङ्गतिः । तेन न पूर्वेण पौनरुक्त्यम् । पूर्वोक्तप्रमेयसमर्थनात् पूर्वसङ्गतिश्च

2 होत्रादयोऽवश्यनियामकतया क्रियात्वादुपासनाक्रियायाः अग्निष्टोमादिवत् प्रतिशाखं वक्तव्यता इत्यत्रोक्त पौनरुक्त्यं — सत्यम् इति (ibid) (Ragh. *TPB.* iii.3 67)

One need not, therefore take the trouble of formulating the existence of Adhikārins specially eligible for it. The stray references to this Upāsanā may, therefore, be dismissed as an arthavāda. The purposelessness of these stray references has, therefore, to be conceded. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain why it has not been mentioned alongside of several others of universal application to all Adhikārins.

The Siddhānta is that if this Upāsanā, enjoined albeit rarely in a few Śākhās only, is to be summarily rejected as not at all intended to be practised, even the stray references to it will be in vain. As the Śruti does not indulge in vain prescriptions, it follows there are special Adhikārins eligible for it—to whom it is addressed. The absence of reference to such Upāsanā alongside of others of universal application to all Mumukṣus merely confirms the position that it is *not addressed* (na) to all Adhikārins, but only to some special ones—viz. Devas[3] This inference is authenticated in the next Sūtra 'Darśanācca' which refers to the appropriate authority on the point.[4]

The overall meaning of the first Sūtra 'Na vā atatsahabhāvaśruteḥ' is ; The Upasamhāra of Aṅgadevatopāsanā in the limbs of B.[5] is *not* to be carried out *(na)* by all Adhikārins; but only by some of them *(vā)* —because it is *not enjoined* alongside of other Upasamhāras prescribed in all the Śākhās *(tatsahabhāvāśruteḥ)*.

For purposes of this interpretation, the words, 'aṅgeṣu yathāśrayabhāvah' follow by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra 63. It should be noted that according to M.'s interpretation, the negative prefixed to 'tat' 'atatsahabhāvaśruteḥ' is to be syntactically separated from 'tat' and construed with the predicative element 'śruteḥ' (as *aśruteḥ*[6]) in the sense of 'tatsahabhāva-aśruteḥ'.[7]

Interpretations of Saṁkara and Rāmānuja
(Yathāśrayabhāvādhi. iii.3.61-66).

According to S. and R. the topic discussed here is whether the Pratikopāsanās in the three Vedas resting on the aṅgas of sacrificial

3 देवान्यापेक्षया वाशब्द (*TDP.* iii.3.67)

4 मत्यो ज्ञान परमानन्दरूप आत्मेत्येव नित्यदोपासन स्यात् ।
नान्यत्किंचित् समुपासीत धीर सर्वैर्गुणैर्देवगणा उपासते ॥
इति कमठश्रुतौ (M. *BSB.* iii.3 68)

5 सूत्रे अंगेषु यथाश्रयभाव इत्यस्यानुवृत्तिः (*BD*)

6 अतत्सहभावश्रुते' सर्वशाखागतोपासनेन सहभावेन सहमत्वेन अश्रवणादिति नञो व्यत्यासेनान्वयः (Ragh. *TDP*). Cf. अतद्धर्माभिलापात् in *BS.* 1.2.19.

7 S. and R., however, read 'Tatsahabhāvāśruteh'.

actions like the Udgītha taught in 'Om ityetad aksaram udgītham upāsīta' (Chān Up i 1.) are invariably to be combined with them or may be proceeded with as one pleases[8]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that if these upāsanās are to be treated as independent of the sacrificial members they would, as falling outside the pale of kratvartha (being subservient to the purpose of the sacrifice), have to admit of performance outside the sacrifice also. That is not possible. On the strength of the Prayogavacanas which cover the aṅgas, these upāsanās are subordinate to the aṅgas and are invariably to be combined with them The Prayogavacanas also determine the fruits of such meditation The circumstance referred to in Chān. Up. (1.5.5) that "from the Hotṛ's seat he (the Hotr) corrects any mistake committed in the udgītha" shows the unity of the Pranava (of the Hotrveda) with the udgītha of the Udgātā (of the Sāmaveda). This in its turn makes it clear that the upāsanās connected with the different aṅgas of the sacrifices freely admit of being combined on account of such unity. The Śruti also declares the syllable 'Om' which is the common feature (*gunasādhāranya*) of the udgītha to be common to all the Vedas and all the upāsanās in them It follows from this that as the abode of all the vidyās (*vidyāguna*) is the same, the vidyās that abide in it are all of them to be combined in meditation.[9]

The Siddhānta is that the dependence of the upāsanās on their abode (*āśraya*) simply means that they are present only when their abode is present and not in its absence—but not that they are invariably present and never absent when the abode is there. Thus the dependence of the upāsanās on their āśraya is conceivable even when they are not invariably present with their āśrayas[10] It is not necessary, therefore, to associate the upāsanās invariably with the sacrificial acts in order to secure their dependence on them on the strength of the Prayogavacanas The rule for combining instructions regarding sacrifices given in different Vedas cannot be applied to the upāsanās connected with them. For the sacrifices cannot be accomplished without their aṅgas. But there will be no breakdown of the sacrifice if the upāsanās are not combined or practised They are, therefore, not insepar-

8 कर्मांगादुद्गीथादिषु य आश्रिता प्रत्यया वेदत्रयविहिता किं ते समुच्चीयेरन् किंवा यथाकामं स्युरिति संशये यथाश्रयभाव इत्याह (S BSB iii 3 61)

9 यद्यपि हि काम्या एता उपासना तथापि न स्वतन्त्रा भवितुमर्हन्ति। तथा सति हि क्रत्वर्थाश्रिततया क्रतुप्रयोगाद् बहिरप्यनुष्ठा प्रयोग प्रसज्यते। न च प्रयुज्यन्ते। तत्कस्य हेतो ? क्रत्वर्थाश्रितानामेव तासां तत्प्रयोगेन विधानादिति। एव चाश्रयतन्त्रत्वात् आश्रितानां प्रयोगवचनतायप्रयोगाः समुच्चयनियमा युक्त • • • • • इति पूर्वं पक्ष (*Bhāmati* iii.3 61)
विद्यागुण च विद्याश्रय सन्नोंकार वेदत्रयसाधारण्य श्रावयति (S *BSB* iii.3.64)

able from the sacrifices or their angas (*tatsahabhavāśruteḥ*). Hence, they may or may not be practised.

Moreover, the Śruti—"the Brahmā priest who knows this protects the sacrifices, the sacrificer and all other priests (*Chān. Up* iv.17.10) shows that it is not intended that the meditations should be combined Otherwise, all the Rtviks would be knowing all of them and there will be no point in the Śruti distinguishing the qualified Brahmā-priest from the others (Sūtra 66).[11]

Criticism

S and R have already established in the Tannirdhāranādhikaranam (iii.3.42) the independence of upāsanās such as of Udgitha connected with particular sacrificial acts as subserving Puruṣārtha Hence no Pūrvapakṣa can again arise in regard to the same question The Pūrvapakṣa cannot be sustained on the ground of a supervening objection that upāsanās cannot claim independence from the sacrificial acts on account of their subserving Purusārtha, as in that case they would not fall outside the scope of the sacrifices, for the 'Godohana' pot used for milking the cow in the sacrifice, tho' subserving Purusārtha, does not on that account fall outside the sacrifice All the same, it is deemed to be independent and not a constituent of the Prayogavacana In the light of this, no supervening objection of the kind referred to can be entertained here in support of the Pūrvapakṣa If the objection is to be extended to the status of 'Godohana' also as established in the Pūrvamīmāmsā, the present adhi should find its place in the Pūrvamīmāmsā rather than here

The interpretation of Sūtra 61 "as the abiding places of these upāsanās viz the Stotras etc are combined in the performance of the sacrifice, so also the meditations" is inadmissible For the divergence of scope between the abode and the abiding thing in regard to what is Kratvartha and Puruṣārtha has already been pointed out.

The interpretation of Sūtra 63 is also beside the point The mere fact that the upāsanā of Pranava from the seat of the Hotr has the power of correcting errors, if any, in the Udgītha does not necessarily establish the point that *the two upāsanās are to be combined Otherwise,*

10 आश्रयतन्त्राण्यपि ह्युपासनानि कामं आश्रयाभावे मा भूवन्, न त्वाश्रयसहभावेन सहभावनियममर्हन्ति, तत्सहभावाश्रुतेरेव (S BSB iii.3 65)

11 दर्शयति हि श्रुतिरसहभावं प्रत्ययानाम्– एवंविद्ध वै ब्रह्मा यज्ञं यजमानं सर्वांश्च ऋत्विजोऽभिरक्षति ' इति। सर्वप्रत्ययोपसंहारे हि सर्वे सर्वविद इति न विज्ञानवता ब्रह्मणा परिपाल्यमानत्वमितरेषां संकीर्त्येत (S BSB iii.3 66)

the text 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti śraddhayā upaniṣadā tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati' (*Chān Up* i i 10) may also be taken to establish as its corollary that all the upāsanās are to be combined with all the karmas taught in all the Vedas The interpretation of the term 'guṇa' in Guṇasādhāranya (Sūtra 64) in the sense of 'āśraya' or abode by S and R is unusual The argument that as the abode of the vidyā (omkāra) is common the Vidyās which abide in it are also common, suffers for want of invariable concomitance[12] in respect of pranayana and godohana

The interpretation put on Sūtra 65, as a Siddhānta Sūtra is also open to question As this Sūtra categorically negates the combination of upāsanās (*samuccaya*), there is hardly any need for the use of the two distinct particles '*na*' and '*vā*' in the Sūtra[13] If 'na vā' is to be treated as an aggregate of negation (*nipātasamudāya*) it will amount to a needless breach of the principle of brevity of expression (*alpākṣaratva*) in the wording of the Sūtra

The interpretation of Sūtra 65, is also open to question, for according to the position taken by S under B.S iii.4.45, the Brahmā priest is not entitled to udgāna Hence the mark of the other Rtviks being protected by him will not suffice to establish the inference of the going together (sahabhāva) of the upāsanās with the sacrifices for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa refuted in Sūtra 65 The mark of saving and protecting the other priests would at the most serve to establish the title of the Brahmā-priest alone to the combination of all the Karmān-gopāsanās as part of the sacrifice but not in respect of all the other Rtviks, for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa The fact of the other Rtviks being saved by Brahmā can quite reasonably be explained from the point of view of upasamhāra whereof the Brahmā priest alone happens to be the upāsaka and the others are not The Pūrvapakṣa would thus stand stultified

12 आश्रयस्य व्यापकत्वस्याश्रितस्य व्यापकत्वादर्शनात् (*STC*)

13 Contrast in this connection the distinctive purposes served by *na* and *vā* in M's interpretation.

IV. (APAROKṢA) JÑĀNAPĀDA

INTRODUCTION

The fourth Pāda of the Sādhana Adhyāya deals with the power and greatness of Aparokṣajnāna in conferring all the benefits coming under the scope of 'Puruṣārthas' or the valued and desirable ends of life—including Mokṣa. Tho' the intrinsic power of Aparokṣajnāna to bestow Moksa has been established in the Vidyādhikaraṇa (iii.3.48-49), it has other manifold powers and potencies—such as bestowing other Puruṣārthas, mitigating the rigors of Prārabdhakarmas, destroying previous sins and dissociating future ones, enabling the Jñānin to work out quickly the reserves of Prārabdhakarmas by taking several bodies at a time (*kāyavyūhasampādana*) and so on. These are as much intrinsic to Aparokṣa as the power to give heat and light is intrinsic to fire. Their elucidation is sure to arouse and sustain the interest of Mandādhikārins also in the pursuit of Aparokṣajñāna.

There are eleven adhi.s in this Pāda and they make seven units (peṭikās). The opening adhi. as has been shown, highlights the widest powers of Aparokṣajñāna in respect of *all the 'Puruṣārthas'*—the chief and the minor ones. The second and the third adhi.s deal with the eligibility for Aparokṣa in terms of possession of Adhyayana and other assets and with the presence of gradation of such Adhikāra. The next adhi. makes out the Aparokṣajñānins are assured of Mokṣa even if they sometimes deviate from the approved path of the religious and ethical code. Such is the condoning power of Aparokṣa. The fifth adhi. maintains that Aparokṣajnāna is not attainable by all and sundry but only by recognized Adhikārins. Such Adhikārins, the next adhi. points out,

scrupulously refrain from entertaining underserving ambitions to attain to the rank and status of any of the Ādhikārikas among the gods—not to speak of ambitions of acquiring the sovereign status of B as such The seventh adhi shows how the fruits of Aparokṣa accrue in different measures to the Tattvābhimānidevatās and the actual Adhikārins The next adhi throws light on the greatness of Jñāna by showing that ascetics among Jñānins are entitled to superior eligibility over householders The ninth adhi cautions the Aparoksajñānin to safeguard instruction leading to Aparokṣajnāna, from being given to undeserving persons The tenth and the eleventh adhis point out that the dawn of Aparokṣa is bound up with the completion of one's Sādhanas and the destruction of impediments caused by Prārabdhakarmas in whichever life these conditions come to be fulfilled and *not earlier* The same applies to the attainment of Mokṣa

CHAPTER LXV

APAROKṢAJÑĀNA CONFERS ALL PURUṢĀRTHAS INCLUDING MOKṢA

(i) *Puruṣārthādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.1-9)

This adhi. demonstrates that Aparokṣajñāna is competent to bestow all the desirable ends of human pursuit (*puruṣārtha*) from worldly prosperity and heavenly rewards to the eternal bliss of Mokṣa. Unless the power of Aparokṣa is shown to be so wide and comprehensive, Adhikārins will not be induced to take to its pursuit with all-absorbing devotion and with a full sense of awareness of its supreme excellence among Sādhanas.[1]

The adhi. deals *inter alia* with the question whether Aparokṣajñāna has primacy in bestowing the benefits of this world, Svarga and Mokṣa or is subservient to the role of karma in doing so. We have thus a two-pronged inquiry here. Tho' the opening Sūtra alone establishes the wide powers of Aparokṣajñāna to confer all the Puruṣārthas inclusive of heaven and mokṣa, and the following six beginning with śeṣatvād***' are concerned with discussing the primacy of Aparokṣajñāna over karma and the last two set aside the view that Aparokṣajñāna is subordinate (*śeṣa*) to karma in the accomplishment of the Puruṣārthas, there is no necessity to break the present set up of these Sūtras as a single adhi. into two. For, it will be seen that the Sūtra 'Adhikopadeśāttu * * * *

1. उपासनाफलीभूतापरोक्षज्ञाने मोक्षसाधनत्वस्य मन्दाधिकारिणामपि रुच्युत्पादनाय प्रसंगसंगत्या प्राक् निरूपितत्वात्, इदानीं तु तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य मोक्षेतरपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वमप्यस्तीति ज्ञानमाहात्म्यप्रतिपादनाय सूत्रम् (Vādirāja *TPG.* iii 4 1)

(iii 4 8) discusses the issue whether Aparokṣajñāna is the principal Sādhana or is subordinate to karma and endorses its primacy in effect by upholding its all-embracing powers to confer the benefits of this world, Svarga and Mokṣa, as envisaged in the first Sūtra itself and converges on the same topic There is thus sufficient reason to constitute all these Sūtras and the two-pronged inquiry into a single adhi as has been done The consideration of the question whether Aparokṣajñāna is primary or subordinate to karma can arise only after it is first established that it has the unlimited power of bestowing all the Puruṣārthas —the primary and the secondary It is for this reason that the opening Sūtra takes up the general question of the nature and extent of the powers and potencies of Aparokṣajñāna

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa with regard to the opening Sūtra is that Aparokṣajñāna does not bestow any other Puruṣārtha than Mokṣa (thro' the grace of B) For, the purpose of achieving Aparokṣa being the attainment of Mokṣa and nothing else, the Mumukṣu as a rule will have no interest in or desire for any other fruits than of Mokṣa For the Jñānin is expected to be a 'Virakta' (without attachment to impermanent rewards) and to have risen above all their attractions If such temporary rewards should accrue to him without his desiring them, they cannot be regarded as 'Pusuṣārtha's for they would, like the unwelcome merits (*aniṣṭapuṇyas*), in the life of the Jñānin delay and retard his attainment of Mokṣa

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra Puruṣārtho ataś śabdād its Bādarāyaṇāh. The expression 'atah' here refers to the direct vision of B (See B S iii 3 49) for whose attainment the whole scheme and pattern of upāsanā and Gunopasamhāra have been set forth in the preceding Pāda. 'Puruṣārtha' is a capsulated term which includes all the desirable ends of human pursuit and not only Mokṣa—the highest of such ends Tho' the expression 'all' (*sarva*) is not used in the Sūtra to qualify 'Puruṣārtha', it follows from the very conno-denotative power of the term Puruṣārtha as such that *all* the desirable ends of human endeavor are to be taken into account[2]

यद्दर्शनार्थमुपासना उक्ता तस्मात् दर्शनात् सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति बादरायणो मन्यते

(M. *BSB* iii 4 1)

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2 यद्यपि सूत्रे सर्वशब्दो न श्रूयते तथापि पुरुषार्थ्यमानत्वरूपधर्माक्रान्तसर्वपुरुषार्थवाचिपुरुषार्थशब्दपर्यालोचनया तल्लाभ इत्याशयेन (भाष्ये) सर्वेत्युक्तम् (*BD* iii.4.1)

यस्य दर्शनस्यार्थं पूर्वमुपासना उक्ता, ततो दर्शनतः पुरुषैरर्थ्यमानं यावच्छुभं तावत् सर्वमाप्यत एव, न तु मोक्षमात्रम् (*TP.* iii.4.1)

The Sūtra adduces the authority of the Śruti (*śabdāt*) in support of this. The text cited by the Bhāṣyakāra is from *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii.1.10): "Whichever heavenly regions and other desirable ends (*kāmam*) the Brahmajñānin (*visuddhasattvaḥ*) desires to attain (saṃvibhāti) he attains them all (*jāyate*). Let the seeker of prosperity then worship such a knower of B."

Tho' Brahmajñānins as a rule have no desires for heavenly rewards and the like, it is on record in the Purāṇas that such of them like Saubhari and Kardama as entertain such desires have them fulfilled thro' the power of Aparokṣajnāna itself.[3] There is thus no conflict between the spirit of the Vairāgya Śrutis and the power of Aparokṣa to bestow not only Mokṣa but other worldly or heavenly rewards upon the knowers of B.

THE PLACE OF KARMA AS JÑĀNAŚEṢA

The next six Sūtras put up the Pūrvapakṣa for reversing the primacy of Aparokṣajnāna as the bestower of all Puruṣārthas in favor of Karma by making, Jnana play the subordinate role to karma (*jnānasya karmaśeṣatvam*) from the point of view of Jaimini, as superficially understood.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that granting that Aparoksajnāna plays the primary role in the bestowal of Mokṣa, it is not proper to hold that it does so even in the bestowal of Svarga and other fruits. For, there is evidence to show that these other Puruṣārhas are achieved mainly thro' karma. This is not, however, in conflict with the statement of the *Mund. Up.* quoted earlier. For we can readily admit that in the bestowal of Svarga and other benefits, Aparokṣajnāna plays the role of a subsidiary factor (*śeṣa*). The Pūrvapakṣa anticipates the objection that if Jnāna is made subordinate to karma, it will conflict with the reference to its primary role in the Muṇḍaka. It answers that in statements like "Only the wise ones obtain Svarga by the gift of their wealth,

3. नच श्रुत्यादिना ज्ञानिनां मोक्षेतरपुरुषार्थेच्छासम्भवान्न ज्ञानात् सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिरिति युक्तम् । श्रुत्यादेः प्रायेण ज्ञानिनामन्येच्छाभावपरत्वात् । अस्माभिस्तु श्रुत्यवलम्बनेन यस्य सौभरिकर्दमादिवत् भवतीच्छा तस्य ज्ञानादेव सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिर्भवतीत्यभ्युपगमात् (*TP.* iii.4.1)
For the references to Kardama and Saubhari see *Bhāg.* iii 24 and ix.7.

by bodily austerities and discharging the householders' duties", even these admittedly subordinate factors like wealth, body, etc are spoken of as if they are playing the primary role[4]

The Pūrvapakṣa pleads further (Sūtra 3) that the Śrutis refer to the performance of sacrifices by the Devas Yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāh. This cannot be for the attainment of Jnāna as the Devas are deemed to be born Jnānins[4a] Nor can it be for the attainment of Mokṣa as it is unattainable by karma (Cf *Nānyah panthā ayanāya vidyate*) Moreover, the Devas are sure to secure Mokṣa irrespective of their performing karmas or not under the ruling given in the Sutra Aniyamas sarveṣām (iii 3 32) The only possible conclusion then to be drawn from the fact that the Devas resort to karmas is that they do so for the attainment of Svarga and other benefits, which disproves the contention of the Siddhāntin that it is Aparokṣajnāna that bestows all Puruṣārthas, including Svarga and other lesser ones

Moreover, the Śruti What one performs with knowledge, and faith according to one's fitness becomes more powerful (*Chān Up* i 1 10) clearly shows that Aparokṣajnāna contributes to the greater fulfilment of the karmas (*adhikaphalasādhanatva*) and is as such subordinate to them The use of the instrumental case (*tritīyāsruti*) with reference to Jñāna (See vidyayā, sraddhayā, etc) in this text confirms its subordinate role (*seṣatva*).[5]

Sūtra 5 rejects another plea that in the absence of decisive evidence regarding the primacy of karma, it may either be regarded as of equal importance with Jnāna or else subordinate to Jnāna It shows there is such evidence from the Māṭhara Śruti

कर्मैव देहं दैविकं मानुषं वाप्यन्वारमेन्नापरस्तत्र हेतु ।
भोगांस्तदीयांश्च यथाविभागं ददाति कर्मैव शुभाशुभं यत्[6] ॥

In this Śruti, the emphatic particle 'eva' after the 'karma' confirms its primacy role in the attainment of Svarga and other worlds The words of the Śruti 'nāparas tatra hetuh' makes it clear that Jnāna is at the best only a subordinate factor in the attainment of Svarga[7] The

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4 दृष्टस्य स्वर्गस्यापि साधनत्ववाद 'स्वर्गं धनाद् देहाद् वै गृहाच्च' इत्यादौ । नहि धनादय कर्मवदन्यापेक्षया स्वर्गसाधनम् (*STC*)

4a Cf. नैव देवानां प्राप्ता ब्रह्मज्ञानवर्जिता (*STC*)

5 ज्ञानस्य तृतीयया निर्देशेन करोतीत्युक्तकर्मशेषत्वस्य स्पष्ट श्रवणात् (*STC*)

6 "It is only karma that generates the body of the gods and men and there is no other cause thereof Karma itself apportions to each according to his deserts—good or bad (Tr)

7 'नापरस्तत्र हेतु' रिति कर्मणस्तत्रैव हेतुमवति न प्राधान्येन हेतुरस्तीत्यर्थ (*TP* iii.4.5)

use of the prefix 'sam' (in Sam-anvārambhana in the Sūtra) underlines the major role of karma [8]

It cannot be argued that the Śruti "Karmaiva deham daivikam mānuṣam ca anvārabhet" is not decisive as the particle 'eva' can be understood in the sense of inseparable connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) or that the reference to the performance of sacrifices by the gods (who are born Jnanins) may be explained as undertaken purely for sport (*līlārtham*) For the Śruti 'Jñānī ca karmāṇi sadotitāni kuryat' (*Kamaṭha Śruti*) *enjoins* such performance on the Jñānin as a matter of *duty* and not for sport [9] Further, the second half of *Isa Up* 2

एव त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे

expressly says the Jñānin (*nara*)[10] who fails to perform his karmas incurs sin (*pratyavāya*) [11]

The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that even tho' Aparokṣajnāna may be regarded as the principal means of Mokṣa, it cannot be accepted as the principal means in bestowing Svarga and other Purusārthas as contended by the Siddhānta and that it will, therefore, be proper to concede that in respect of Svarga and other lesser Puruṣārthas, Aparokṣajnāna can only be recognized as being subordinate to karma (*karmaśeṣa*) in the sense of causing an appreciable increment or enhancement in the joys of Svarga etc produced by those karmas [12]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the position stated in the opening Sūtra 'Puruṣārtho atah'—that all Puruṣārthas flow from Aparoksajnāna alone, *stands as it is* (*evam*)[13]

(पुरुषार्थोऽत इति) बादरायणस्य एवम्[14]

The position is that Aparoksajnāna remains the primary Sādhana of all Puruṣārthas and is never to be regarded as subordinate to karma (*karmaseṣa*) in the bestowal of all Puruṣārthas, principal or secondary

8 सशब्द प्राधाय दर्शयति (M BSB iii 4 5)

9 विहिताचरणस्य लीलात्वाभावात् (TP iii 4 6)

10 न क्षीयत इति नर ज्ञान तद्वानपि नर ।
इतोऽन्यथा = अकरण नरे ज्ञानिन्यपि पाप कम (BD iii 5 7)

11 न लिप्यत इति नास्तीत्यथ (TP iii.4 7)

12 तच्छपत्व च न देवतास्वरूपज्ञानवत कमस्वरूपनिवर्तकतया किंतु प्रयाजादिवत कर्मणैव सिद्धपत्स्वर्गादौ सुखाधिकत्वाद्यतिशयाधायकत्वेन फलोपकायगतयैव । अत एव वीयवत्तर भवति ' इति श्रुतौ वीर्यादिशब्दप्रयोग (STC iii 4 1 9)

13 एवमिति पुरुषार्थोऽत इत्युक्तपरामश (TDP)

14 यदुक्त ज्ञानादेव सवपुरुषाथप्राप्तिरिति तत्तथम तथैव । नतु ज्ञान कमशपतया पुरुषार्थसाधनम् (TP iii 4.8)

There is no need to fear that in that case there will be any futility in the performance of karmas by Aparokṣajñānins like the Devas or purposelessness of injunctions in respect of such karmas as in 'Jñānī ca karmāṇi sadoditāni kuryāt, kurvan eveha karmāṇi jijīviṣet'. For it can be admitted without prejudice to the purposiveness of karmas that they entail some excellence in the Puruṣārthas bestowed by Aparokṣajñāna and as such are contributory to Jñāna [15]

The expression 'adhikopadeśāt' in the Sūtra points to the fact that the Puruṣārthas are attained primarly by Aparokṣajñāna and that karmas act as factors inducing excellence in the fruits of Jñāna itself [16] This is to be accepted on the authority of the Śruti[17] as well as of indications to the effect (*linga*) in the words addressed to Yudhiṣṭhira by Indra in the Svargārohaṇa Parvan of the *Mahābhārata*·

अश्वमेधजितान् लोकान् राजसूयाभिवर्धितान् ।
प्राप्नुहि त्व महाभाग तपसश्च फल महत् ॥

(*Mbh* xviii 3 23)

"Be pleased O mighty king to enjoy the surfeit of the fruits of your intensive knowledge (*tapasah*)—the worlds conquered by Aśvamedha and extended by the performance of Rājasūya".

The next Sūtra hastens to dispose of another objection that there is still no harm in holding that notwithstanding the acceptance of Aparokṣajñāna as the source of all Puruṣārthas and of karma as its 'anga' or 'seṣa' the subordinate role (*seṣatva*) of karma may yet be interpreted in terms of its imparting to Aparokṣajñāna the necessary competence to confer such fruits as it is intended to accomplish·

कर्मणस्तु तच्छेषत्व ज्ञानेन फले साधयितव्ये सामर्थ्यसपादकतया ज्ञानेऽतिशयाधायकत्वेन इति किं न स्यात् ? इत्याशङ्का परिहरत् सूत्रमुपन्यस्यति–'तुल्य तु' इति

(*BD.* iii.4 9)

This point is answered by the concluding Sūtra It clinches the issue by pointing out that Aparokṣajñāna remains at the same level irrespective of the performance or non-performance of karmas, by the Jñānin, *Tulyam tu darsanam* (iii 3 9)

Applying this test to the case of Yudhiṣṭhira and others in point, M. points out that their perception of B (*darsanam*) is but the same-

15 ज्ञानादेव जायमाने पुरुषार्थे कर्मणोऽतिशयाधायकत्वेन ज्ञानाङ्गत्वात् (*TP* iii.4.8)

16 ज्ञानादेव फलप्राप्तिः कर्मणस्तु फलातिशयाधायकत्वेन शेषत्वम् (*ibid*)

17 'ज्ञानादेव स्वर्गो ज्ञानादेवापवर्गो ज्ञानादेव सर्वे कामा भवन्ति । तथापि यथा कर्म कुरुते तथा तथाधिका भवति'

(Q M *BSB* iii.4.8)

i.e. is always equal and remains unaltered whether the Aśvamedha or the Rājasūsya have been performed or not performed.[18]

That must suffice to make it clear that the karmas of Aparokṣajnānins *do not* make any difference to or cause any excellence *in the content and power* of their Jnāna as such; but have a bearing only on the fruits thereof by way of enhancing or intensifying the joys derived from those fruits.

In this connection, M. takes the opportunity to elucidate how there is no conflict of views between Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini and others on the Aṅgāṅgibhāva relation between Karma and Aparokṣajnāna. Jaimini and others are in fact disciples of Bādarāyaṇa. They are, therefore, all of them in agreement with him so far as the general proposition is concerned that Mokṣa is attained only by Aparokṣajnāna. Where they hold different shades of opinion from Bādarāyaṇa is only with reference to the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna *other than Mokṣa*. Here, Bādarāyaṇa's view as set forth in iii.4.8 holds true of the Devas among the Adhikārins:

ज्ञानिनामपि देवानां विशेषः कर्मभिर्भवेत्
चीर्णेऽकृते वा ज्ञानस्य न विशेषोऽस्ति कर्मणि

"The Devas are born—Jnānins. Still there is appreciable enrichment in the fruits of their Jnāna thro' karmas performed such as Rājasūya or Aśvamedha, as in the case of the Pāṇḍavas. Such karmas have the power to enrich only the fruits of their Jnāna and not their Jnāna as such which remains constant with or without performance of karmas".[19]

The views of Jaimini and others are applicable to Adhikārins other than Devas. Hence there is no conflict between them. The different shades of views held by Jaimini and others are again with reference to different Adhikārins of the uttama, madhyama and adhama orders among men. Here some hold that Svarga and other worlds are attained by Karma alone with Jnāna acting as its śeṣa. This is with reference to the uttamādhikārins among men. Jaimini holds that Aparokṣajnāna acting as the śeṣa of karma enriches both the seen and unseen fruits of karma in the case of Uttamādhikārins among men. Some others think that acting as the aṅga of karma, Aparokṣajnāna enriches the fruits of Svarga and other unseen objectives but not of mundane fruits

18. राजसूयादिकृतावकृतौ च सममेव तेषां दर्शनम् (M. *BSB*. iii.4.9)

19. यद्यपि देवा ज्ञानिनः तथापीत्यपिशब्दः । ज्ञानिना देवाना ज्ञानेन सर्वफलसिद्धावपीति वा । विशेष आधिक्य ज्ञानफल एव, न तु ज्ञाने । कर्मणि चीर्णेऽनुष्ठितेऽकृतेऽननुष्ठिते वा ज्ञानस्य ज्ञाने विशेषोऽतिशयः पुरुषार्थसाधनसामर्थ्यासामर्थ्यरूपो नास्तीत्यर्थः (*BD*. iii.4.9)

like progeny and wealth This applies to Madhyamādhikārins Yet others hold that Svarga and other goals are attained solely by Karma and not with the aid of Aparokṣajnāna acting as its anga in any sense This applies to the lowest order of Adhikārins among men [20] All these come under the purview of Jaimini's position in that they are committed to the stand that Aparokṣa by itself, that is unaided by karma as its śeṣa, is never the means of bestowing Svarga or other lesser Puruṣārthas

Bādarāyana holds that in respect of all Adhikārins, Aparokṣajnāna alone is the principal means of bestowing all Puruṣārthas This general principle has been applied by his disciples, so far as the lower Puruṣārthas are concerned to suit the different orders of Adhikārins among men by indenting on the auxiliary of Jnāna in some cases and dispensing with it in some others [21]

The difference may also be explained from another angle Bādarāyana holds the general position that Aparokṣajṇāna is the means of realizing all the the Puruṣārthas Jaimini and others are of opinion that when impeded by obstacles of Prārabdhakarma, Aparokṣajnāna is not able to bestow all the lower Puruṣārthas Thus, while Bādarāyaṇa's position is with reference to unimpeded jnāna, Jaimini's view applies to cases of impeded Aparokṣa The objection that impediments will equally nullify the power of karma to bestow the lower Puruṣārthas is not valid The obstruction to Aparokṣajnāna comes from Prārabdhakarma which does not necessarily operate as an obstacle in the performance of karmas There are persons subject to adverse adṛṣṭas who still carry out their plans to construct houses, tanks and parks The two cases are not, therefore, on a par

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S constitutes Sūtras iii 4 1-17 into one adhi and R Sūtras iii 4 1-20 S discusses the question whether the knowledge of B is connected with and subordinate to ritualistic works thro' the agent or whether it

20 स्वर्गादिं कर्मणैव नान्यनेयपरं विदुः ।
ज्ञानाधिक्यमित्याहुः जैमिन्याद्यास्तु केचन ।
अदृष्टमेव ज्ञानेन दृष्टं नैवात्र लभ्यते
इति केचिद्विदः प्राहुः व्यासशिष्या इमे स्थिताः ॥

21 विज्ञातब्रह्मतत्त्वानां मुनीनां ब्रह्मदर्शनात्
स्यादेव मोक्षो नान्यस्मादिति तत्रापि चिन्तिता
स्वयं तु भगवान् व्यासो व्याप्तज्ञानमहांशुमान् ।
अनन्याश्रयवान् पश्यन्निति पुरुषोत्तमः ॥
ज्ञानेनैवाप्यते सर्वं क्रमशः स्वधिकं भवेत्
इति प्राह महायोगी पुमर्थानां विनिर्णयम् ॥ इति भविष्यत्पर्वणि (M BSB III.4.9)

serves the purpose of man independently of works.[22] R. raises the issue slightly differently whether the benefit to man resulting from the Upāsanās set forth n Pāda 3, accrues to him directly from them or from the karmas of which the meditations are subordinate members,—the Siddhānta being in terms of the first alternative.

Criticism

As the power of knowledge to lead to Mokṣa directly has been accepted both explicitly and by implication earlier, it would be more proper to let this adhi. explore the manifold powers of Aparokṣajnana itself. The Pūrvapakṣa attributed to Jaimini is fundamentally opposed to his acceptance of B. as the highest principle and the actual existence of gods, both worshipped thro' various sacrifices.[23]

As a disciple of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini is least likely to have seriously advocated the theory that Brahmajñāna is subordinate to karma. The entire Pūrvapakṣa thus suffers from an unfortunate misconception of Jaimini's true Siddhānta in respect of the acceptance of B. as the supreme reality to which all sacrificial acts are ultimately directed thro' different deities, as elucidated in the Samākarṣādhikaraṇam (i.4.16.23). This is confirmed by the reference to Jaimini's acceptance of B. as a principle, other than (*anya*) the Jīvātman in B.S.i.4.18. It does not stand to reason that while Jaimini may admit B. to be other than the Jīva, such is not Bādarāyaṇa's view in that context. For the fact remains that the Śutrakara has not set aside the said view of Jaimini that Jīva is different from B. The supposition that Bādarāyaṇa accepts the doctrine of Kāśakrtsna which is untouched by any breath of difference between Jīva and B. is mere wishful thinking; for the wording '*avasthithi*' of the Sūtra 'Avasthiter iti Kāśakrtsnaḥ' is repugnant to a sense of identity. This point has been made clear in Vol. I, pp. 301-02.

The other view that Jaimini is averse to the acceptance of the existence of the gods as individuals having their own bodies and organs is against the internal evidence of his Sūtras which does not favor any such deduction. The hypercriticism of the separate existence of the

22. इदानीमौपनिषदमात्मज्ञान किमधिकारिद्वारेण कर्मण्येवानु प्रविशत्याहोस्वित स्वतन्त्रमेव पुरुषार्थसाधनमिति मीमांसमान उपक्रमते (S. *BSB*. iii.4.1)

23 नहि परमात्मज्ञानार्थं कर्मादिकं वदन् जैमिनिः तज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वत्र कर्मशेषत्वं ब्रूयात्। उक्त हि समाकर्षाधिकरणे अन्यार्थमिति सूत्रे जैमिनिना परमात्मज्ञानार्थं कर्मदेवतादिकं जगत् वदति वेदराशिरिति (*TD*. iii.4.1)

gods *is* a *tour de force* of Śabara and other commentators which does great injustice to Jaimini as a spokesman of Vedic philosophy.[24]

In the light of the indications given in the Samanvayādhyāya itself it would be more proper then to attempt to reconcile the surface interpretation of Jaimini's view of Śeṣaśeṣibhāva between Jnāna and karma, by accepting the validty of Jaimini's position in the larger set-up of Bādarāyaṇa's Samanvaya of the two, than as a doctrne to be rejected and thrown out as utterly irreconciliable.

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24 ईश्वरादिदेवतानभ्युपगमे उद्देश्याभावात् तत्तदुद्देशेन यागासंभवात् तद्विरोधेनानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्। अभ्युपैति च जैमिनि. देवतास्वरूपादिकम्। तत्प्राधान्यं च सप्रमाणकं नवमाध्याये सूत्रयामास।

ननु पूर्वपक्षसूत्राण्येतानि * * * मैवम्। वक्ष्यमाणोपन्यासात् देवताप्राधान्यपक्षे 'अपि वैत्यन्यपक्षोऽरुचिसूचनाच्च देवताप्राधान्यपक्ष एव श्रेयानिति गम्यते।

अन्योऽपि पक्षो दर्शित कर्मैव भवतप्राङ्तजनच्छन्दानुवृत्त्या। न च विग्रहादिकं तत्प्रमाणानि चोपन्यस्तानि प्रत्याचख्यौ। मतं प्रत्याचख्यावुत्तरभाष्य इति चेत्। उत्सूत्र प्रत्याख्यानप्रयत्नेऽपि न महर्षि. प्रामाणिकं स्वसिद्धान्तं हन्त परित्यजति (*TD.* iii 4.1)

CHAPTER LXVI

FITNESS FOR APAROKṢA DEFINED

(2) *Asārvatrikādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.10-12)

The greatness of Aparokṣajnāna as compared with karma has been explained in the previous adhi. This greatness will be compromised if the fitness for Aparokṣajnāna were to be open to one and all as in respect of karma. The present adhi., therefore, makes it clear that fitness for Aparokṣa is not universal but is determined by intrinsic nature of Souls.[1]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that such fitness cannot consist in anything more than the usual requirements of aspiring for the benefits of Aparokṣa, having the necessary competence and learning to carry out the programme of Śravaṇa, manana and other sādhanas. As the desire for Mokṣa which is a state of freedom from misery and unalloyed happiness is bound to be universal and the requisite learning and readiness to go thro' the Sādhanas may also be expected to be within the reach of all, it would be both baseless and unfair to restrict the fitness for Aparokṣa to some and deny it to others. We cannot draw the line anywhere. The consequence would be that Aparokṣajnāna will be left without any Adhikārin in the end.

The Siddhānta is that there are well-defined qualifications governing the fitness for Aparokṣa which is not open to all (*asārvatrikī*). The

1. अत्र भगवत्प्राप्तिसाधनज्ञाने सर्वेषामधिकाराभावमहिम्नो वर्णनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसंगतिः। सर्वाधिकारित्वे न तस्य मार्गाद्यतिशय सिद्ध्यतीत्येतत् वर्णनीयम (*TP.* iii.4.10)

mere desire for Mokṣa or having the learning and ability to practise the disciplines are not enough to guarantee fitness for Aparokṣa The case of Virocana from the *Chān Up* (vii 7-9) is in point[2] There is selective distinction in respect of such fitness, notwithstanding the presence or fulfilment of the general considerations referred to, just as there is the distinction among the Devas as regards fitness for receiving the Soma offerings Tho' there are nine crores of Devas, only a hundred and two among them are recognized to be fit for a share in the Soma libations poured out in the sacrifices[3] Even so, innumerable as may be the beings of the world, only an infinitely small number of them, devoted to the Supreme B, is and can be recognized to be fit for Aparokṣa[4] The third Sūtra points out that such fitness consists, besides the general considerations, of *complete study of the entirety of the Vedic lore* together with its angas, according to one's ability under proper Gurus[5] Such study to be purposeful in conferring fitness for Aparokṣa has to be intimately associated with absorbing love and devotion to the Supreme Being of infinite perfection,[6] absolutely free from all blemish, the author of the eightfold dispensation of the world of matter and souls

It may be noted that in the Yāvadadhi (iii 3 33-34) only a broad reference had been made to the difference of fitness among Adhikārins without defining the nature of such Adhikāra which is done here The elucidation of the nature and distinctive aspects of such Adhikāra by the Bhāṣyakāra while explaining the term 'atha' in BS i 1 1 is based on the Sūtrakāra's own pronouncements here and in the next adhi.

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2 न चाभक्तस्यानधिकारित्वे चतुर्मुखस्य विरोचनाध्यापने कथं प्रवृत्तिरिति चेत् । अभक्तानामनधिकारितया तदध्ययनस्य वैफल्यमेवेति ज्ञापनायाध्यापनोपपत्ते (*BD* iii 4.12)

3 नवकोट्यो हि देवानां तेषां मध्ये शतस्य तु ।
सोमाधिकारो वेदोक्तो ब्रह्मणो द्वे शताधिके ॥ (M *BSB* iii 4.11)
The hundred and two are the Supreme B, four faced Brahmā, Mukhya Prāṇa, eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, forty-nine Maruts twelve Ādityas including Urukrama ten Visvedevas, Bṛahaspati, three Pitrs, two Asvins, Rbhugana and Dyava Prithvī (*TD*)

4 यथा तथैवासङ्ख्येयाः प्रजास्तासु कियान् जनः ।
ज्ञानाधिकारी सम्प्रोक्तो विष्णुपादैकसंश्रय ॥

5 अध्ययनमात्रवत (*BS* iii.4.12) मात्रशब्द कार्त्स्न्यावधारणे च (*TD*)

6 अवैष्णवस्य वेदेऽपि ह्यधिकारो न विद्यते
गुरुभक्तिविहीनस्य शमादिरहितस्य च (M. *BSB* iii.4.12)
Cf यस्तित्याज सचिविदं सखायं
न तस्य वाच्यपि भागोऽस्ति (*R V.* x.71.6)
See M.'s C on *AA* iii 4

CHAPTER LXVII

FITNESS FOR APAROKṢA NOT UNIFORM AMONG SĀDHAKAS

(3) *Nāvıseṣādhıkaranam* (ııı 4 13)

In the prevıous adhı the content of fitness for Jnāna had been defined ın general terms The present adhı goes ınto the deeper aspects of the problem [1]

The Pūrvapaksa ıs that fitness for Aparokṣaȷnāna must be unıform ın all Sādhakas,—be they gods, Rṣıs or men, It cannot be argued that gradatıon has been accepted ın prıncıple ın respect of theır content of knowledge (aparoksa) of dıfferent Sādhakas of Upāsanās ın the Praȷñāntarādhı (ııı 3 52) and that such gradatıon (*tāratamya*) would naturally presuppose a correspondıng gradatıon ın theır fitness for acquırıng such Aparoksa The Pūrvapaksa contends that dıfference and gradatıon ın the content of Aparokṣa of dıfferent Sādhakas lıke gods, Rsıs and men and gradatıon of blıss ın Moksa can all be explaıned as beıng due to dıfference of mettle of the Sādhakas themselves and theır efforts, wıthout posıtıng any answerıng dıfference and gradatıon ın the fundamental fitness for acquırıng such Jnāna [2]

In so far then as the fundamental fitness for Aparokṣaȷnāna ıs unı form for all, ıt wıll not be proper to hold that the content of Aparokṣa of a Sādhaka whose fundamental fitness for Aparokṣaȷnāna ıs more or

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1 पूर्वं ज्ञानसामान्यतोऽधिकारस्वरूप विचार्येदानी तद्विशपविचारादनन्तरसगति (Ragh. *TPB* iıı.4.13)

2 न च वाच्यम्–प्रज्ञान्तरपृथकत्ववद दृष्टि ' इति ज्ञान तारतम्यस्योक्तत्वात तदधिकारेऽपि तारतम्य इत्यधिकारे विशपाभावेऽपि ज्ञानतारतम्यस्याधिकारिणामुच्चावचशक्त्यैव सभवात। अत सर्वेपा ज्ञानाधिकारसाम्येन सर्वं सौलभ्यात् पूर्णाधिकारस्य न ज्ञानमतिशयितमिति (*TP* iıı 4 13)

the highest excels the content of Aparokṣajnāna of all other Sādhakas whose fitness for Jnāna is less and less

The Siddhānta is—we cannot reduce to a stark uniformity the fitness for Aparokṣajnāna among different orders of Sādhakas like the gods, Ṛṣis and men, or even among members of *each of these orders*

न साम्येनाधिकारो देवादीनाम् (M BSB iii 4 13)
तथा तेषां प्रत्येकमपि न साम्येनाधिकारः (*BD*)

If this fitness for Aparokṣa is to be admitted as uniform for all, the same uniformity will have to prevail in the content of their Aparokṣajnāna also, as there should be a corresponding relation between them. It cannot be that notwithstanding uniformity of fitness for Aparokṣajnāna, among different Sādhakas, the variations in the final content or fruit of such Jnāna may be caused by other factors like difference in the intensity and quantum of effort put forth by different Sādhakas and their mettle For, in the last analysis, difference in mettle of Sādhakas and in the quantum of effort put forth by them will have to be grounded in the basic difference and Tāratamya in the fitness for Aparokṣajnāna of these Sadhakas There is no other way of explaining the relation between Sādhya and Sādhana [3]

The Bhāṣyakāra cites scriptural authority (besides the above reasoning) for the acceptance of Tāratamya in respect of fitness for Aparokṣajnāna at the starting point [4]

Raghu (*TPB*) explains that there is no overlapping between the Yāvadadhi. (iii 3 33) and the present one in respect of the conclusion. For in the Yāvadadhi., Badarāyana had established the need for admiting Tāratamya in Upāsanā to show that Tāratamya in Mokṣa posited in the Vṛddhihrāsādhikaraṇam (iii 2 20-21) cannot at all be satisfactorily explained on any other basis such as difference of measure of effort put forth by the Sādhaka or his mettle, to achieve Mokṣa. The present adhi. on the other hand is concerned with refuting the objection that the difference and gradation in the final fruit viz. the content of Aparokṣajnāna can also be accounted for on the basis of difference of mettle or quantum of effort of the Sadhakas themselves, without admitting

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3 न देवादिष्वेकरूपा साम्येन ज्ञानाधिकारः। यथात्र ज्ञानेऽपि साम्यप्रसङ्गात्, तस्याधिकारानुसारित्वात्। नचाधिकारसाम्येऽपि शक्तितारतम्येन ज्ञानतारतम्यमिति युक्तम् अधिकारसाम्ये शक्तितारतम्यस्यायोगात्। अधिकारस्य [illegible] (*TP* iii.4.13)

4 अथ पुनः साधनानि– श्रद्धा धर्मो ज्ञानमित्युत्तरोत्तरम्। तत्राधिकारिणो मनुष्या ऋषयो देवा इत्युत्तरोत्तरम् इति कौण्डिन्यश्रुतिः (M. *BSB* iii.4.13)

Tāratamya in Jñānādhikāra itself. The two adhi.s thus tackle different issues viz.

उपासनायामधिकारतारतम्यम् and अपरोक्षज्ञानेऽधिकारतारतम्यम् and not the same. They do not, therefore, overlap. The *BD* points out that in construing the Sūtra: Nāviśeṣād the expression 'adhikāra follows by logical anuvṛtti of ideas and 'aviśeṣād' gets repeated and nāviśeṣād understood subsequently as one word.[5]

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5 अनेन देवानां ज्ञानेऽधिकार अविशेषात् साम्येन न। तथात्वे 'अविशेषात्' ज्ञानेऽपि साम्यप्रसंगात्; किंतु 'नाविशेषात्' तारतम्येन इति सूत्रार्थ उक्तो भवति (*BD*. iii.4.13)

CHAPTER LXVIII

JÑANINS' CONFORMITY TO MORAL AND ETHICAL CODES EXPLAINED FROM ADHIKĀRIBHEDA

(4) *Stutyadhikaraṇam* (iii.4 14-33)

This is a very lengthy adhi, discussing the live issue of conformity to the moral, ethical and social codes in the life of the Aparokṣajñānin There is a deeper sense of responsibility and seriousness in the way M.'s bhāṣya discusses this problem in all its bearings and with reference to different orders of Adhikārins, than we find in the treatment of the problem by other commentators like S This strikes us in the very manner in which M poses the problem in what is obviously the most appropriate context for its discussion presented by the wording of the Sūtra: Stutaye anumatir vā and the others which follow—unlike other commentators who see in it nothing more than the permission to do work as a glorification of knowledge In M.'s bhāṣya, the discussion is closely related to and is consistent with the Pādārtha—the manifold glory and powers of Aparokṣajnāna by showing that conformity and non-conformity to the religious and ethical code have meaning and unquestionable repercussions on the life of the Aparokṣajñānin and his future tho' non-comformity may not prevent him from attaining Mokṣa[1] This is a sound and realistic reconcilation of Jnāna and Ācāra The adhi arises by way of disposing of a powerful challenge to the thesis of the preceding adhi, that Karma is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to Aparokṣajnāna. If a com-

1 ज्ञानिनां सदसत्प्रवृत्तिभ्यां सर्वथा शुभाशुभफले न स्त इति पूर्वपक्षाभिप्रायः । सिद्धान्तिनस्तु स्वप्रवृत्तेर्न मोक्षसाधकत्वं नाप्यसत्प्रवृत्तेर्मोक्षप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । मुक्तावानन्दवृद्धिह्रासप्रयोजकत्वात्, सर्वथा निष्फलत्वं च न इति विवेकः (Vadirāja *TPG* p 164)

pletely righteous conduct in conformity with the moral and ethical code is to be insisted upon in the life of the Aparoksajnānin, it will have to follow of necessity that Karma and duties enjoined in the social, moral, religious and ethical code of the Śāstras have to be strictly discharged by the Aparoksajnānin, without which he can never attain Moksa That would contradict the position arrived at in the Purusārthādhi (iii 4 1-9) that Aparoksajnāna itself is the prime means of Mokṣa and that it (Moksa) is in no way subordinate to, determined or influeenced by one's karma

Pūrvapaksa

The Pūrvapaksa is strongly perched on the Śruti (*Brh Up* iii 5 1) "Because Moksa is attained only thro' Aparoksa, whoever wishes to be fit to attain B (i e a "Brāhmana) should fully acquire (*nirvidya*) knowledge of B thro' Śāstra (i e by going thro' the discipline of Śravana) and then apply himself to remaining in the state of manana or logical reflection of Śāstrārtha (*bālyena tisṭhāset*) After fully attaining both these (*pāndityám bālyam ca nirvidya*) he becomes fit for meditation (*munih*) Thereafter the man of meditation fully attains (*nirvidya*) knowledge of B in the form of Upāsanā (*maunam*) and direct vision (amaunam) Then he emerges as a Jīvanmukta (*brāhmanah*) Such a Jivanmukta may act as he pleases (*Sa brāhmanah kena syād yena syād*), even then, he remains only such as he is[1a] (i e worthy of attaining the fruit of his own knowledge" (viz Moksa)[2]—(*īdrśa eva*)

These words of the Śruti "Sa brāhmanah kena syād yena syād tena īdrsa eva" (seem to) put a premium upon the Aparokṣajnānin's doing and living as he pleases—a complete non-conformist so far as moral and religious codes of 'Do's and don'ts" are concerned and not only approve of but enjoin an irresponsible defiance of moral and religious ways of life and leading a wayward life without the least fear of

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1a तस्मात ब्राह्मण पाण्डित्य निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत बाल्य च पाण्डित्य च निर्विद्याय मुनिरमौन च मौन च निर्विद्याय ब्राह्मण । स ब्राह्मण केन स्याद्येन स्यात तेन ईदृश एव (*Brh Up* iii.5 1)

2 Some modern scholars like Thibaut and Viresvarananda have misunderstood the meaning of 'nirvidya' in the above text of *Brh Up* quoted by S under BS iii 4 47 and have given it as having "done with' or 'finished with' learning The *Bhamati* and *Kalpataru* however give the correct meaning of 'nirvidya' according to S here as having definitively acquired (*niscayena labdhvā* or *sampādya*) M also understands 'nirvidya' here as having realised in full.' He has also held that similarly the term nirveda' in *Gitā* ii 52 cd should carry the same sense of complete realization of the fruits of sravana etc as it does in this upanisadic text which he quotes as authority He therefore takes strong exception to S s interpretation of 'nirveda' in *Gitā* II 52 as a vote of censure referring to the futility of the entire sacred lore acquired by the Jñānin before attaining Aparokṣa and what he may acquire after Aparokṣa श्रोतव्य श्रुतस्य च निष्फल प्रतिभाति । (S *GB*) See M *GB* II 52, and J on it)

forfeiting the chances of attaining Mokṣa—as conformity to the moral and religious codes has no longer any meaning or significance to one who has attained Aparokṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa goes on to argue that if conformity has any meaning or binding upon the Jnānin and should make any real difference to his future, the Śruti would have categorically stated that a Jnāni should always be faithful to these codes and should never transgress them. It would not have given him a *carte blanche* to do as he may. Apart from this, he argues that this is as it should be, for there is no point in binding the Aparokṣajnāni to a life of conformity to the religious and ethical codes Such conformity has no purpose to serve For, it is admitted that there is nothing excelling Mokṣa by way of the fruits of Aparokṣa which has to be attained by conformity to ethics Nor will it be correct to maintain that Mokṣa is to be attained by combining Jnāna and Karma (moral life) in parity Nor can it be asserted that non-conformity will mean forfeiture of Mokṣa, for Mokṣa is assured to all Jnānins once for all in the Aniyamādhi (iii 3 32) This makes it clear that the right or unrighteous conduct and behavior on the part of the Aparokṣajnāni makes absolutely no difference to him This renders the thesis of the previous adhi —which gives to karma an auxiliary role to play in the fulness of attainment of Mokṣa, unsustainable

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that following or not following right conduct is not without its effect on the Aparokṣajnāni and his future The words Kena syād yena syād are no injunction or invitation to him to do as he may, including doing wrong and living an unmoral life It is more a statement intended to glorify Aparokṣajnāna and its possessor, stemming from a complete and perfect confidence in his good sense and sense of right and wrong—just as a good master may say to his trusted servant "Gopal dear, do as you think fit" Or else it may be construed as a concession or a permission given in a rhetorical vein But it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as an injunction (*vidhi*)

Thus, the first Sūtra formulates an explanation of the Śruti (Kena syād yena syād) as a glorificatory gesture or concession which can apply to different orders of Adhikārins according to each one's disposition.

The second Sutra replies to an objection arising from the interpretation of the first Sūtra. If following of the right or the unrighteous way of life is to make a difference to the life and prospects of the Aparok-

sajnānin, it can only be in the sense that if he goes the wrong way or breaks the codes of religion and morality as laid down in the Śāstras, such conduct will have naturally to blunt the power of his Jnāna and prevent his attainment of Mokṣa But such a contingency has been set aside once for all in the Aniyamādhikarana by which Mokṣa has unconditionally been assured to all Aparoksajnānins If to get over this difficulty the Siddhāntin should suggest that Aparoksajnāna happily integrated with conformity to the moral and social codes is alone competent to bestow Mokṣa, it would be turning one's back on the acceptance of the sovereign role of Aparokṣa as the means of Mokṣa in the first adhikarana The reply to be given to this objection is that there is no such fear of forfeiting Moksa For a (Khila)—Śruti (quoted by M) assures Mokṣa to the Aparoksajnāni viz,—notwithstanding his doing "as he pleases", eating what he likes, speaking what he will" (The true meaning of this will be clear later) Moreover, sūtra 16 points out how the (Tura) Śruti provides for the mitigation of the unavoidable effects of a part of enjoyed Prārabdha by the sheer power of Aparokṣajñāna (see under Tadadhigamādhi (iv 1 13-19) as spells and medicines lessen the effects of poisoning It should thus be well within the power of Aparokṣa to render ineffective similar effects of any of the subsequent transgressions of the moral or other codes committed by the Jnānin That the Jnānin's future is assured and that there is no retrogression in his case येषा ज्ञान समुत्पन्न तेषां मोक्षो विनिश्चित is fully supported by the Purānas,

Sūtra 17 refutes another objection that if Aparokṣa should have no power to make any difference to the attainment of Mokṣa even if the Jnāni transgresses the moral and the ethical codes, it should be equally possible for ordinary mortals too on the road to Aparokṣa to disregard these codes and still be entitled to Aparoksajnāna It is pointed out that Śrutis insist on imparting instruction leading to Aparoksa only to those who observe continence and other virtues and strictly observe the moral and ethical codes When such rigorous qualifications are imposed for those who are to be fit to be given indirect upadesa qualifying for direct perception (Aparokṣa) of B, it goes without saying that such persons, when they attain Aparokṣa will hardly ever be tempted to break any of the time-tested codes of religion and ethics

It will be noticed that Sūtras 15-17 are closely connected with the point made in Sūtras 28 31, that in the case of the Aparokṣajnānin transgressions of the moral and religious codes are by nature rare and occur only in extremities under unavoidable circumstances and that Śrutis and Smṛtis discountenance and frown upon such errors of com-

mission and omission—which shows a clear recognition of the fact that transgressions of the law do have an adverse effect on the Jñānin For this reason, we may expect these Sūtras to be read after 15-17. However, the two groups of Sūtras stand separated here as they deal with different aspects of the problem The three Sūtras offer a suitable explanation of the difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣin that there will be no prospect of Mokṣa if the moral and other codes are transgressed The other set of four Sūtras (28-31) establish that the consequence of the Aparokṣajñānin's transgressions is a diminution, in the sense of a non-manifestation, of part of his Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa, to that extent Hence these two groups of Sūtras have been kept apart by intervening Sūtras

Sūtras 14-17 offers one explanation of the words 'Kena syād yena syād' without conceding that they *are* mandatory Sūtra 18 now offers a different explanation from the point of view of their *not* being mandatory, from Jaimini's point of view They hold that the Śruti 'Kena syād yena syād' neither enjoins the Jñānin to act without restriction or inhibitions in the matter of right and wrong nor have the words anything to do with countenancing or approving of *indiscriminate conduct* What they mean by freedom to act as the Jñānin pleases (*kāmacāra-vṛtti*) is that right conduct alone is to be followed as a rule To the question how such a limitation of sense can be taken to be equivalent to allowing freedom of choice, to do as one pleases, the answer is that the Jñānin is expected to act strictly in accordance with the laws, and does so—not by external compulsion but by his own free will To a further question as to why such freedom cannot be similarly extended to violating the laws, Jaimini's answer is that it is so because there is no express injunction that the Jñānin *must defy* the laws If the extention is to be made because there is no prohibition restraining him from choosing the wrong path, the answer is that the spirit of the general prohibition of immoral and unmoral acts (like killing a Brāhmaṇa or drinking liquor) is applicable to the Jñānin also and it should suffice to keep him away from breaking the laws

Sūtra 19 puts forward Bādarāyaṇa's own view on the question that freedom to act as one pleases referred to in the Śruti 'kena syād yena syād' is in terms of *choosing from among the approved acts themselves* —leaving out some others (from among the approved) This applies to the Devas, we are told. It is by interpreting the spirit of the words 'kena syād yena syād' in this way that we can secure for the Aparokṣajñānin full satisfaction of having accomplished what is expected of him as a Jñānin. For, the closing words 'Tena īdṛśa eva' refer to a

state of harmony *(sāmya)* attained by him, in acting "freely." Such harmony can be attained only when he moves within the framework of approved codes of conduct and chooses what he wants, leaving out what he does not want—*and not by choosing from both the good and from the bad, the right and the wrong.* In such a contigency, the harmony and satisfaction of having carried out all that is expected of him can hardly be attained with certainty to himself. To cite an example, while having one's meal one may of his own free will not go in for a second helping and feel equally satisfied that he has eaten a full meal like his friend who goes in for a second and a third helping. But where one takes forbidden food, he is likely to vomit if he has taken some indigestible or unwholesome stuff along with wholesome and palatable food. In that case, he will not have the sense of satisfaction of one who has had a good meal of wholesome food alone. He may try to console himself with a sense of wellbeing and harmony which he is far from likely to feel. The same is the case here in recommending a promiscuous combination of right and wrong for the Aparokṣajnānin as the purport of "kena syād yena syād tena īḍrśa eva."

In Sūtras 20-21, Bādarāyaṇa propounds another interpretation of the words: kena syād ***** as *mandatory,* as in tne case of aquisition of Vedic lore by adhyayana. This is only for Traivarṇikas and not for all. Similarly, the vidhi is for the highest order of the gods like the fourfaced Brahmā, Mukhya Vāyu, etc. The mandatory nature of the words 'kena syād yena syād' in their case arises from the unquestionable acceptance of the words of God by these higher order of beings as giving the insight into the interpretation of scriptural mandates. In the circumstances, these words cannot be construed as purely eulogistic to the exclusion of not falling within the sphere of mandates.[3] For, to be beyond the sphere of mandates of scripture is the prerogative of none but the Supreme B. All save the Supreme B. are *"apūrva"* i.e. dependent on B. *(paravaśa)*[4] and, therefore, subject to mandates

विधीनां विषयास्त्वन्ये ब्रह्मणः स्वेच्छया कृतौ।
परस्य ब्रह्मणो ह्येव सर्वविध्यतिदूरता ॥ (M. *BSB*.iii.4.22)

Sūtra 23 points out that there is no fluctuation *(pāriplava)* in the nature of these threefold explanations of 'kena syād yena syād' given

3 स्वेच्छयैव प्रवृत्तिस्तु ब्रह्मणो विधिचोदिता।
नाशक्य तन्मत क्वापि विष्णो प्रत्यक्षचोदना (M. *BSB.* iii 4.20)
एव कुर्विति प्रत्यक्षचोदना प्रेरणा विरिंचस्यास्ति अतोऽपि तन्मत नाशक्यम्। वेदस्तु विष्णो· परोक्षज्ञाप्य इति प्रत्यक्षाज्ञानुसारेण नेतव्य इति भाव (*BD*)

4 अपूर्वत्वात् परवशत्वात्। सर्वविध्यतिक्रमेण स्तुतिमात्रविषयत्व परब्रह्मण एव हि (M. *BSB.* iii 4.21)

in Sūtras 18-20 They are to be correlated to different orders of Adhikārins—ordinary mortals who are bound by mandates (*vidhiniyatāh*); Devas who are not bound by mandates (*aniyatāh*) in the sense of being allowed to choose from within the given framework of whatever is obligatory (*anuṣṭheya)* and not observing the others, the fourfaced Brahmā and others (*sveccāniyatāh*) whose freedom to do as they please is in absolute attunement with the command of the Supreme B and its cosmic purposes, in all cases[5]

Sūtra 24 points out that it is only by adopting this threefold standpoint of *adhikaribhedād vyavasthā* that a proper reconciliation can be arrived at between texts which seem to be mandatory in respect of good and bad alike and others which throw the choice open to the doer to do as he pleases

Sūtra 26 refutes the remaining objection that there is no harm in recognizing that adherence to right conduct has an active part to play in the attainment of Mokṣa and that this need not be denied out of deference to the Kāmacāra Śruti For even if transgressions of the moral code may not obstruct the Aparokṣajnānin's attainment of Mokṣa, it may still be true that his strict adherence to right can play on active part in the bestowal of Mokṣa and this power need not be surrendered exclusively to Aparokṣajnāna The Sūtra answers this by pointing out that the fulfilment of all righteous conduct is already reached when Aparokṣa has been attained (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) Righteous conduct and moral codes become *functus officio* after Aparokṣa is attained The only guiding principle for the Jnānin thereafter is his own judgment 'Kāmacara' without risk of erring on the wrong side[6]

Sūtra 27 explains the place and meaning of right and wrong way of conduct for the Aparokṣajnānin in his further progress towards Mokṣa

यद्यपि ज्ञानेनैव मोक्षो नियत, तथापि ज्ञानी शमदमाद्युपेत स्यात्

(M. *BSB.* iii 4 27)

These angas of Jñāna like sama, dama and karma contribute to the fulfilment of Mokṣa.

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5 Cf [illegible] ।
न एव धर्मो [illegible] ॥ (M. *BSB* iii.4.33)
[illegible] (*TP* ibid)

6 [illegible] (M. *BSB* iii.4.26)

Sūtra 28 goes back to meet the other objection, left over, that if right and unrighteous conduct have a meaning to the Aparokṣajnānin, how is it that in the Śruti 'Even if he should eat everything and anything he becomes just the same (i e released)" there is permission to eat all kinds of food including the forbidden The answer is that such permission is given in the dire extremities of life and death and that the medicine should not be made the daily food This is brought home to us from the story of Usasti Cākrāyana as well (*Chān Up* i 10 4) [7]

This is strengthened by Sūutra 29 which says right conduct becomes meaningful only when it is harnessed to avoid unrighteous conduct This is driven home with a solemn pronouncement from the *(Harivamśa) Smṛti* -

अतीतानागतज्ञानी त्रैलोक्योद्धरणक्षम.
एतादृशोऽपि नाचार श्रौत स्मार्त परित्यजेत्[8] ॥

This identifies the moral law with the categorical imperative

Sūtras 32-33 bring forward evidence of Śruti and worldly analogy on the point Sūtra 33 shows how the observance of Karma and right conduct are auxiliary to Jñāna without involving the risk of their co-ordination on an equal basis

Śamkara's Interpretation Examined

We have seen that S treats the eight Sūtras beginning with 'Asārvatriki' as part of the Puruṣārthādhi Sūtras 10 17 are accordingly interpreted by him as refuting the Pūrvapakṣa that Ātmajnāna is subordinate to Karma In this connection, he has tried to explain away the statement 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti' as restricted to the context of the Udgithavidyā and *not as a general pronouncement connected with all karmas* But then proximity is a much weaker proof than an express statement There is thus no reason to restrict its scope in the absence of some indication at the tail end as in 'Tejo vai ghrtam' Nor is S particularly consistent in explaining this Śruti in this restricted

7 During a famine in Kuru country Uṣasti Cakrayana while he ate the beans left over by Ibhya would not accept the water offered by him When Ibhya asks him how he could accept the beans without reserve he explains that he took the beans because he could not survive without eating and that he could manage to preserve his ceremonial purity without accepting the drink also from him

यदीमान कुल्माषा नाभक्षय न मे जीवन भवति । अत प्राणात्यय दोषाभावात ते भक्षिता । जलपान तु मम च्छा- धीनमिदानीमपि वर्तते । वृथोच्छिष्टस्वीकारे दोषप्राप्तेर्न तत पिबामीति (*TP* iii 4 28)

8 Even the wisest of men who knows the past and can foretell the future and is able to redeem the three worlds shall *not* give up the performance of duties laid down in the Śrutis and Smrtis (Tr)

sense For, in his bhāṣya on B S iv 1 18, where the same Śruti is found quoted, S agrees to associate it in *a more comprehensive sense* with the performance of one's Nityakarmas also whereby they are made more powerful so as to be able to contribute to liberation[1] The following observations of Trivikrama Paṇḍita on this point[9a] are worth noting against the inadequacy of S's interpretation of 'Yadeva vidyayā' under iii 4 10

Commenting on the statement in *Bṛh Up.* iv 4 2, that the departing soul's knowledge and works take hold of him at the time of his death, S says in Sūtra 11, that this is to be distributively understood to mean that knowledge takes hold of one (the jñāni) and works another (i e the Ajñānin)—just as when we say 'Give a hundred rupees to these two men,' the money is divided on a fifty-fifty basis

In the first place, the statement in the above Śruti merely refers to the departing Soul's being accompanied by both its knowledge *and* deeds (as well as its saṃskāras) But there is nothing in this text to suggest any śeṣaśeṣibhāva relation between the Soul's jñāna and its karma—which needs to be refuted at all Apart, from that, S's analogy is not applicable to the present instance For, whereas in the analogy there is a clear reference to the money having to be divided between two *different persons* (*ābhyām*) mentioned in the dual, the Upaniṣadic text clearly refers to the person accompanied by Vidyā and Karma in the singular (*tam samanvārabhete*) and not as tau samanvārabhete R has definitely improved upon S's interpretation by abandoning his analogy as inappropriate and has given a more suitable one suggesting that the same soul is accompanied by *both* Vidyā and Karma each conferring its own distinct fruits on him in due course, without necessitating the admission of any Śeṣatva of Jnāna in respect of Karma[9b]

According to S, Sūtras 13-14 say that in *Isa Up* 2 there is nothing to support the subordinate relation of Jnāna to Karma and there is no special mention of Jnāna in this context (*aviseṣāt*)[10] and that the injunction with reference to the knower of Ātman to do work is only by way of glorification of knowledge[11] This is surely blowing hot and

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9a नचेयमुद्गीथादिकर्माङ्गावबद्धोपास्तिविषयतया कर्मण एव फलाधिक्यार्थेति मन्तव्यम् । तदधिगम इत्यादि ब्रह्मदर्शिप्रकरण उदाहृतत्वात् न च 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत' इत्यादि कर्माङ्गोपास्तिप्रकरणाधीतत्वमस्या इति वाच्यम् । आप्राणमन्तरिणात इत्यादौ ब्रह्मण एव उद्गीथादिशब्दवाच्यत्वात् (*TD* iv 1 18)

9b Cf इतरे तथापि विभाग शतवत् इत्यनेन पुरुषभेदेन विभागपर इत्याहुः । तदयुक्तम् । तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते इत्येकस्मिन्नेव पुरुषे द्वयोरन्वारम्भणप्रतीतेः, तदविरोधेन विभागस्य दर्शनीयत्वात् (*Śrutaprakāś* iii 4.20)

10 न विशेष इति विशेषादस्ति (S *BSB* iii 4.13)

11 यद्यप्यत्र प्रकरणसामर्थ्यात् विद्वानेव कुर्वन्निति सम्बध्यते तथापि विद्यास्तुतये कर्मानुष्ठानमेतत् द्रष्टव्यम् (S *BSB* iii.4.14)

cold. If it is acceptable to S. that this text recognizes that Karma taints, he cannot very well say under Sūtra 14 that a knower of Ātman may work all his life but he will not be tainted by it. If S. does not recognize that Karma taints, what he has said under Sūtra 13 becomes untenable, for there will be no tainting of him. As the glorification alone would suffice to explain the association of Karma with Jnāna, there is no need to say anything more about any concession *(anumati)* in Sūtra 14. The use of the injunctive *(jijīviṣet)* would lose its point if Karma is *not* intended to be enjoined on the Jnāni. The double negative *(nānyathetosti na lipyate)* is not also satisfactorily explained by S.

Parāmarśādhikaraṇam (iii.4.18-20)

He construes Sūtras 18-20 as a fresh *adhi.* to discuss whether Sannyāsa has been enjoined as an āśrama to be gone thro'. For purposes of his Pūrvapakṣa he construes 'parāmarśa' as equivalent to 'anuvāda' which is unusual. However, his own admission under Sūtra 20, that the Jābāla Śruti *does recognize and enjoin* Sannyāsa as a stage of life to be gone thro' (Brahmacaryād eva pravrajet) and his remark that "our discussion here is carried on *without reference to that text*" makes the discussion very artificial and unrealistic.[12]

Pāriplavādhikaraṇam (iii.4.23-24)

S. and R. have an *adhi.* to discuss whether the stories in the Upaniṣads such as of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi, Śvetaketu and Uddālaka, Raikva and Jānaśruti, Indra and Pratardana are meant to subserve the performance of 'Pāriplava' or narrating stories like those of Manu and Yama to be recited at intervals during the celebration of the Aśvamedha; or are meant to introduce and enjoin the Vidyās standing in proximity to them.

The Pūrvapakṣa is : the statement "They narrate all the stories in the Pāriplava" establishes that these Upaniṣadic stories too are similarly to be made subservient to the same purpose. From this it would follow that the Vedānta texts do not aim at imparting knowledge of Ātman but merely subserve the performance of sacrifices like the Vedic mantras.

The Siddhānta is : the direction : 'Sarvāṇyākhyānāni pāriplave śaṁsanti' has to be qualified so as to apply only to the stories of Manu

12. सत्यमेतत् । अनपेक्ष्य त्वेता श्रुतिमय विचार इति द्रष्टव्यम् (S. *BSB.* iii.4.18)

and others, as may be seen from the iteration of the direction 'pāriplavam ācakṣīta.' followed by the reference to the stories of Manu etc. The scope of 'Sarvāṇi ākhyānani' in the opening statement here has, therefore, to be restricted to these stories alone and not extended to the stories of the Upaniṣads.

Criticism

It is far too remote a cry from the stories accredited to the Aśvamedha and other Karmakāṇḍa parts to the Upaniṣadic stories connected with Brahmavidyā to justify so wild a Pūrvapakṣa. The restriction of scope of the expression "sarva" in "Sarvāṇi ākhyānāni śamsanti" to a reasonable contextual limit has been well-established in the Pūrvamīmamsa itself and there is no need to permit oneself of the luxury of traversing the same ground here again.

Rāmānuja's Agnīndhanādhikaraṇa (iii.4.25)

R connects this adhi with the Ūrdhvaretasas i.e. those who observe chastity[13] referred to in Sūtra 17 and raises a discussion whether their meditations presuppose the knowledge of kindling of the fires.

The Siddhānta is that in their case the Vidyā is not in need of the lighting of the fire and so on

Criticism

This is open to difficulties It has got to be clarified who are all to be understood by the term 'urdhvaretas' There are three classes of such chaste ones the Naiṣṭhika (life long celibate) the Vānaprastha and the Sannyāsin. The question is if all these three are to be taken into account by the term 'Ūrdhvaretas' or only the last one. In the former case again, it needs to be clarified if the expression' agnīndhana' denotes such activities as are to be discharged with the help of the sacred fire or actual performance of 'ādhāna' and others. Tho' the Sannyāsin as such is without a fire, the Naiṣṭhika and the Vānaprastha are not so. The Vidyās can, therefore, be dependent on activity accompanying the fire and be connected with them in *their* cases. A word conveying a general sense *(agnīndhana)* cannot be pressed to express a special sense of 'ādhāna.'

If 'Ūrdhavaretas' is to be taken to mean only a Sannyāsin, it will be opposed to the inclusive sense in which the term has been used in the plural in Sūtra 17.

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13 [illegible] (*Śrutaprakāśa* iii.4.25)

Śaṁkara's Sarvānnānumatyadhi (iii 4 28-31)

S and R devote a separate *adhi* to discuss whether permission of all kinds of food to "one who knows this" (*Chān. Up* v 1 2) is enjoined as part of the Vidyā like the cultivation of virtues like śama and dama (Sūtra 27) or as eulogizing the Jnāni

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that it is a Vidhi, in spite of the indicative form of the verb The Śāstra relating to approved and prohibited foods is a general one which may be overridden by an exception as in 'Na himsyāt' *vs* 'Agnīṣomīyam paśum ālabheta' or as in regard to restrictions upon sex relations being overridden by the provisions in the Vāmadevavidyā

The Siddhānta is that an injunction to eat *all kinds of food* being practically and theoretically impossible of fulfilment and there being no express injunction but only an indicative verb and as there are also texts prohibiting forbidden food, the statement 'Na ha vā evamvidi kiñcana anannam bhavati' has to be understood as an arthavāda praising the meditation that everything is food for Prāna, for permission to eat any kind of food is given only when one's life is at stake

Criticism

As Sūtra 28 opens a new *adhi*, according to both S and R the presence of the conjunctive particle here is superfluous This favors its being read as part of the Stutyadhikarana itself and given a suitably *different interpretation*

S does not favor the observance of Karma *after* the attainment of realization "Dos" and "donts" have no meaning for such a Jñānin If the discussion about permissible and forbidden foods is pursued here with regard to state when Jnāna has *not* been attained, the topic will *not* be relevant to *this Pāda* and should be transferred to the Dharmasāstras

The opening Sūtra (28) itself clarifies in so many words *when* precisely forbidden food *is permitted* and *when it is disallowed* In the face of this, the third Sūtra *as interpreted by S* is superfluous for the same purpose The fourth Sūtra is similarly rendered superfluous by the third one which makes the same point as Sūtra 30 The words 'atah' and akāmakāre' are, in any case, superfluous in the wording of the fourth Sūtra 'Śabdasca' (iii 4 31)

CHAPTER LXIX

APAROKṢAJÑĀNA ATTAINABLE ONLY BY THE ELIGIBLES

(5) *Ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇam* (iii 4, 34-40)

This adhi establishes that Aparokṣajñāna is attained only by those three classes of Adhikārins[1] Manda, Madhyama and Uttama referred to in the Sūtra iii 4 23, viz the best among men, Devas and the four-faced Brahmā (and Vāyu) It is shown here that the fact of such fitness being accepted as an intrinsic asset of these souls marks the distinction (mahimā) of Aparokṣajñāna[2]

The Pūrvapakṣa is opposed to any kind of beginningless intrinsic fitness of souls whether for Upāsanā or for Jnāna or for Mokṣa It holds that these manifold differences of fitness among Jivas can be explained by other widely recognized reasons of differences among them such as of endowment, equipment, opportunities, time and place, effort and zeal and so forth without postulating a distinctive, intrinsic and beginningless nucleus of fitness in each Soul called anādisvarūpayogyatā upon which the other factors act and bring about each one's fulfilment in its own way[3] Given then equal opportunities of time, place and Guru and devotion to him and zeal and determined effort in the pursuit of Śravaṇa, manana, etc Aparokṣa must be within the reach of all who work for it. Even supposing that Aparokṣa is attained only by those

1 Cf मन्दमध्यमोत्तमत्वेन त्रिविधा ह्यधिकारिणः । तत्र मन्दा मनुष्येषु उत्तमगुणा मताः ॥ (M. BSB i.1.1)

2 अत्र [illegible] (TP iii.4.34)

3 [illegible] (अनन्तो माधवितुमाह) (NS iii.4.adhi.5 p 584)

who are fit for it, such fitness may be attained even by those who are now wanting in it by putting forth supreme effort with zeal and perseverance. The story of Viśvāmitra attaining Brāhmaṇhood is in point that Yogyatā can always be acquired by sufficient and tireless effort. It cannot be said that Viśvāmitra's Kṣatriyatva was not intrinsic but adventitious and, therefore, not irreversible while the fitness for Aparokṣa is intrinsic and unalterable. There is no evidence of its being so. There is, therefore, no need to go beyond the point of difference of opportunities, and effort and posit anything like a beginningless, intrinsic and unalterable fitness for Aparokṣa which is to be realized in due course by Sādhanas in accordance with such fitness.

The Siddhānta is that those who are not intrinsically fit for Aparokṣa will never get it by any amount of zeal or effort, or opportunities. The story of Indra and Virocana in the *Chāu. Up.* (viii.8, 4) is an instance in point :

Sarvathāpi tu ta evobhayaliṅgāt

(*BS.* iii.4.34)

The words 'sarvathā api' in the Sūtra emphasize that in spite of all other factors of the advantages of time, place, resort to Guru and practice of Śravaṇa, manana, etc. with zeal and intensity of effort, Yogyatā alone ultimately determines the attainment of Aparokṣa. The words 'ubhayalingāt refer to the story of Indra and Virocana which proves *both the rule and the exception* that only those who are intrinsically fit attain Aparokṣa and those who are not fit do not.

The *rationale* of Anādisvarūpagyogyatābheda in regard to Upāsanā, Jñāna and Mokṣānanda has been very well expounded by M. in his *AV.*[4] If merit which determines the disparities of Karma is inexplicable and devoid of a reason at any particular stage in history, the same excuse can be put forth at the very outset so that the very need for a previous birth and belief in metempsychosis can be dispensed with. If this unseen merit is not produced by a previous merit and that by another but is taken to have its *raison d'etre* in the intrinsic nature and worth of each soul, we accept the principle of intrinsic difference and gradation among souls without further ado.

The second Sūtra shows that in spite of temporary vicissitudes, the natural and intrinsic fitness is either way ultimate and cannot be

4. अनादियोग्यतां चैव कलिवाणीश्वरावधिम् ।
को निवारयितु शक्तो युक्त्यागमबलोद्धताम् ? (*AV.* iii.4. adh. 4-5)

changed or overcome[5] It cannot be argued that the Svarūpayogyatā for Jñāna too being dependent on the will of B it may sometimes be altered If B should alter the nature of the Āsuric souls and give them the Daiva nature eligible for Aparokṣa, it will mean that B favors them beyond their deserts and likes them more But the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell us that B treats the *three classes* of souls according to their natural fitness by uplifting the Muktiyogas, consigning the Āsuric-natured to eternal darkness and the middlings to continued transmigration[6]

Sūtra 36 goes to answer the objection that tho' the fitness of the two extreme types of persons (Devas and Asuras) cannot be overpowered or changed, it should be possible to modify the nature of the ordinary mortals who stand between the two extremes and grant them fitness for Aparokṣa The Madhyamas in the middle category are also subject to the same law of intrinsic Yogyatā which is unalterable and deep-rooted as in the other two cases

सम्यग्ज्ञानविपरीतज्ञानयोरन्तरा स्थितानामपि (मानवानां) देवासुरभावयोरन्तरास्थितेः (मिथ्याज्ञानत्वस्य) दाढर्यंदृष्टे (M *BSB* iii 4 36)

Sūtra 39 gives a supporting reason that there is no possibility of the nature of Asuras being converted into Daivīsvabhāva. For the Śrutis and Smṛtis tell that souls with the Āsuric temperament have been in a constant majority from eternity and those with the Daiva temperament have also been in a constant minority from eternity. This shows B is by no means partial to the Daivasvabhāvas Otherwise, It would not have let them be in a minority This confirms that there is no change in the intrinsic nature of Yogyatā[7] The last Sūtra (40) tells us that these views are acceptable to Jaimini also

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretations

Āśramakarmādhikaranam (iii 4 32-35)

S and R consider here whether works enjoined on Āśramites as being useful means of knowledge in *Brh Up* iv 4 22, are to be carried out by one who sticks to an āśrama but has no desire to acquire knowledge or mokṣa.[8]

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5 'दैवीमेव मतिं देवा अधिगच्छन्ति आसुरीमेवासुरा नैवैतद्व्यत्ययमिव कदाचित स्वभाव एवावतिष्ठन्त' इति स्वभावानतिक्रमं च दर्शयति (M *BSB* iii 4 35)

6 भूमे वीर उग्रमुग्रं दमायन्नन्यमन्यमति नेनीयमानः ।
एधमानद्विळुभयस्य राजा चोष्कूयते विश इन्द्रो मनुष्यान् (*RV* vi 47.16)

7 असुरज्यायस्त्वनिर्णयादेव स्वरूपानतिक्रमं सिद्धं (*STC*)

8 आश्रमकर्मणां विद्यासाधनत्वमवधारितम् । इदानीं किममुमारभ्याश्रममात्रनिष्ठस्य विद्यामकामयमानस्य तान्यनुष्ठेयानि नेति चिन्त्यते (S *BSB* iii.4.32)

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as works have been enjoined as means to knowledge (*vividiṣanti yajñena*) works of permanent obligation (*nitya*) are not to be performed by one who has no desire for knowledge of B and is interested in other fruits Or else, he may perform them but not as a means to knowledge as it would be contradictory to attribute to them a permanent as well as a non-permanent connection [9]

The Siddhānta is that permanent Karmas enjoined for the Āśramites who are not desirous of knowledge or mokṣa should, nevertheless, be performed. Difference of connection is possible even when there is no difference of works—as in the case of Khādira (wood) which thro' a permanent connection serves kratvartha and thro' a non-permanent connection serves puruṣārtha One need not hesitate to put excessive weight on a text where it can safely carry it

Replying to the objection that but then these duties cannot be a means to knowledge, the next Sūtra says they can be and are to be performed as a means to knowledge (*sahakāritvena ca*) S points out here that what is meant by saying that these Karmas are cooperative (*sahakāri*) with knowledge is that Vidyā alone is operative in the production of its fruit of Mokṣa while the āśramakarmas referred to merely stand by[10] :

सत्सु कर्मसु विद्यैव स्वकार्ये व्याप्रियते (*Bhāmatī*)

just as we say "the mother-ass carries the load with all her ten children"—meaning thereby that the mother alone carries the entire burden, tho' the children are there just trotting afer her[11]

According to S the next Sūtra discusses the question whether the works done as enjoined on the Āśramites and those performed as cooperative with knowledge are of different kinds (*karmāntara*) The answer is that whether as pure duties of the Āśrama or as cooperative with knowledge, the same duties are to be carried out as is seen from both the Śrutis and Smṛtis (*ubhayaliṅgāt*) R gives a different explanation of the words 'ubhayaliṅgāt' that the duties are the same whether they are viewed as incumbent on the āśramite or as cooperative with Vidyā

9 अथ तान्यनुष्ठेयानि न तर्हि एषां विद्यासाधनत्वम्। नित्यानित्यसंयोगविरोधात् इति प्राप्तौ (*ibid*) यथैकस्यापि खादिरत्वस्य नित्येन संयोगेन क्रत्वर्थत्वमनित्येन संयोगेन पुरुषार्थत्वं तद्वत् (S *BSB* iii 4.33) नहि वचनस्यातिभारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति (*Op cit* iii.4.32)

10 न चेदं विद्यासहकारित्ववचनं आश्रमकर्मणां विद्याफलविषयम्। अविधिलक्षणत्वात् विद्यायाः। असाध्यत्वाच्च विद्याफलस्य उत्पत्तिसाधनत्वं एवैषां सहकारित्ववाचायुक्ति (S *BSB* iii 4 33)

11 यथा 'सह दशभिः पुत्रैः भारं वहति गर्दभी' इति सत्स्वेव दशपुत्रेषु सैव भारस्य वाहिकेति (*Bhāmatī* iii.4.33)

The last Sūtra gives a further indicatory mark supporting the conclusion that works cooperate with knowledge of B by pointing out how persons who perform them are not overpowered by passion[12]

Criticism

The question of 'Nityānityasamyogavirodha' has been set at rest in the Samyogaprthaktvādhi (iv 3,3,5) of the Pūrvamīmāmsā which precludes the present discussion from arising Vācaspati's plea that it arises by way of challenging the Samyogaprthaktvānyāya itself[13] goes too far It is not incumbent on the Uttara mimāmsā to consider and review objections against the technical points and nyāyas of the Purva Mimamsā and answer them. The *adhi* is, therefore, uncalled for

The *Kalpataru* has tried to justify the opening of the *adhi* on the ground that it may be felt that just as the permission to eat anything as an auxiliary to Vidyā in *Chān Up.* v 2 1 is opposed to the Śāstras and is, therefore, to be treated as an arthavāda, texts enjoining performance of āsramakarmas for purposes of knowledge of B being in conflict with the obligatory character of such texts as Tam etam vividiṣanti yajñena (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) should be explained away as glorificatory and not taken as mandatory *(vihita)* The present *adhi* is, therefore, necessary to dispose of this contention.[14]

This explanation of the *Kalpataru* overlooks the point that in his commentary on B S iii 4 27, S has himself taken the position that the passage Tam vividiṣanti yajñena (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) *should be accepted as a vidhi* because the connection of 'vividisā' with the sacrifices is something altogether new and not met with before and cannot, therefore, be treated as an anuvāda, or a praise We have the authority of Jaimini in deciding a similar issue in the Pūrva Mimāmsā (iii 3 34) in regard to the statement "Therefore, Pūṣan receives a well crushed share of the food as he is without teeth" In the Darsapurṇa māsa where we get this statement there is neither the deity Pūṣan nor the offering of crushed food Yet the statement, being unique *(apūrva)*, is construed as having its application in all other sacrifices which are

12 अनभिभवं च दर्शयति श्रुतिः ब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनसम्पन्नस्य रागादिभिः क्लेशैः 'एष ह्यात्मा न नश्यति यं ब्रह्मचर्येणानुविन्दते' (*Chan Up* viii 5 3) इति (S *BSB* iii.4.35)

13 एतेन तस्य नु मीमांसकस्य संयोगपृथक्त्व इत्यपि प्लुतम् (*Bhama* : iii 4.32)

14 यथा शास्त्रार्थविरोधात् सर्वान्नानुमतवचनं स्तुतिरेव यज्ञादीनां नित्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधात् विद्यार्थत्ववचनं स्तुतिरिति शङ्कानिरासाय प्रकरणमाह (*Kalpataru* iii.4.32)

Vikrtis of Darśapūrnamāsa A similar ruling has also been given in the Brahmasūtra Vidhir vā dhāranavat (iii 4 20) [15]

In so far then as the injunctive character of 'vividisanti yajñena' (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) has the support of both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāmsā ruling as accepted by S himself, there is no point in proposing to treat Vidyā as having a purely contingent and non-permanent (*anavaśyambhāva*) connection and thereby lead to a conflict in terms of 'Nityānitya-samyogavirodha' giving scope for the opening of the adhi The difficulty precludes the Pūrvapakṣa from arising

The Siddhānta too is untenable If the obligatory and non-obligatory character of the āśramakarmas are to be accepted on the basis of vidhi, the resolution of the conflict will have to be on the basis of Vikalpa, as in the case of the Soḍasis But the acceptance of Vikalpa would absolve the non-performance of āsramakarmas from all consequence of sin, which is inadmissible

S's interpretation of the *opening sūtra suffers* from the need to import the words vividṣāsūnyenāpyamumuksunā' into the Sūtra to get the desired sense and the conjunctive 'ca' serves no purpose therein

The next Sūtra as interpreted by him is superfluous as the point conveyed by it has been established in 'Sarvāpeksā ca yajñādiśruter asvavat' (*B S* iii 4 26)

That apart, his interpretation of this Sūtra to the effect that the āsramakarmas ought to be performed by one who is desirous of knowledge also, as they are enjoined as cooperative with knowledge is clearly opposed to his Siddhānta as it is hardly possible for such karmas, which will come to be discovered as mithyābhūta as soon as knowledge arises, to coexist and cooperate with vidyā!

It is hardly possible for S to treat āśramakarmas as vidyāsahakāri' in any serious, meaningful way An auxiliary *(sahakāri)* is that which is needed of necessity in the production of the desired effect An auxiliary can, therefore, be thought of only with reference to something that is enjoined to be produced or is to be accomplished. But in S's philosophy, Vidyā or knowledge of Ātman is not an object of any Vidhi It has been established by S and his commentators in the Jijñāsādhikarana

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15 Read ननूक्त-यज्ञादिभि विविदिषन्तीत्यत्र न विधिरुपलभ्यत इति । सत्यमुक्तम् । तथापि त्वपूर्वत्वात् संयोगस्य विधि परिकल्प्यते । न ह्यय यज्ञादीनां विविदिषासंयोग पूर्वप्राप्तो येनानूद्यत । तस्मात् 'पूर्वप्रविष्टमागात्' ... हि ' इत्यवमादिषु चाश्रुतविधिकेष्वपि वाक्येषु अपूर्वत्वात विधि परिकल्प्य षोडशि ... विद्दतो प्रतीयेत इत्यादि विचार प्रथमे तन्त्र प्रवर्तित । तथाचोक्तम्–विधिर्वा धारणवत ' इति (S *BSB* iii 4.27)

itself that knowledge arising from śravana, manana, nididhyāsana and sākṣātkāra is not amenable to Puruṣaprayatna and that as such the injunctive looking statements like Draṣṭayyas śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah, are all merely arthavādas parading in the guise of Vidhis (injunctions)[16]

S pleads that texts stating the cooperation of works with Ātmic knowledge are, therefore, to be interpreted as stating that works are the means of originating knowledge and not producing the fruits of knowledge—viz. Mokṣa[17] This is liberally diluting the word-sense of 'sahakāri' used in the Sūtra As long as āśramakarmas play no actual or effective part in producing the fruits of knowledge, it would be a euphemism to refer to āsramakarmas as 'sahakāri' of Vidyā

Vācaspati's bringing in the analogy of 'Sahaiva daśabhih putrair bhāram vahati gardabhī' in this connection to support S's position is equally unavailing For one thing, the words 'sahaiva' merely refer to the coexistence of the children of the she-ass with their mother It says nothing about their cooperation to their mother Or, for aught we know, the children may also be carrying some small loads suited to their strength. If not, they may presumably be referred to as cooperating by merely accompanying the mother carrying the entire burden But, in S's philosophy, there is absolutely no possibility for the āsramakarmas to *coexist* or be associated with knowledge, once vidyā has dawned!

The interpretation of the phrase 'ubhayalingāt' given by S is far from satisfactory It is evidentally for this reason that R. has parted company with S in interpreting that phrase Be that as it may, the meaning assigned to 'Sarvathāpi ta eva' (*B S* iii.4 34) by both S and R. "that in any case, whether viewed as duties incumbent on the āśramas or as cooperative with knowledge, the very same Agnihotra and other karmas are to be performed" suffers from redundancy as this is a repetition of what has already been stated[18] under Sūtra 32

As the subject 'āśramakarma' is bound to follow by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra 32, there is no need to put in the words "ta eva" in Sūtra 34 The case for karmabheda is too weak to call for a serious consideration and rebuttal by the words 'ta eva' The last Sūtra 'Anabhibhavam ca darsayati' as interpreted by S that it points out a further indicatory mark

16 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii 4.33)

17 तस्मादुत्पत्तिसाधनत्व एवैषां सहकारित्ववाचोयुक्तिः (S *BSB* iii.4.33)

18 न [illegible] (*STC*)

fortifying the position that works cooperate towards knowledge and that the Śruti also shows that one who observes continence etc is not destroyed[19] by passions, should logically precede Sūtra 34 The construing of 'abhibhava' in the sense of '*destruction*' (*nāśa*) is unusual

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmanuja
Vidhurādhikaraṇam (iii.4 36-39)

S and R. discuss here if persons who are left without any āśrama, such as widows and widowers and the indigent who cannot afford to perform āśramic karmas are eligible for Vidyā The Pūrvapakṣa is that as Āśrama-karmas are the cooperative cause of knowledge, such persons are not eligible for vidyā The Siddhānta is that these Anāśramins like widowers and men and women like Raikva, Bhīsma and Vācaknavī are not entirely without karmas like prayer, fasting and worship of the gods By upalakṣana, the word āśramakarma denotes these also The Itihāsas and Smṛtis refer to Samvarta and others who paid no heed to Āśramic duties, practised nudity and so on and attained celebrity as great Yogins (Jñānins) all the same The Smṛtis also show that knowledge is bestowed (anugraha) on such persons thro' these special acts like prayer, fasting and worship of the gods, which are not opposed to their Āśramaless condition and may be performed by all men and women Moreover, as has already been pointed out, Āśramakarmas merely produce the vidyā by kindling the desire to know B Those who have attained such desire can dispense with the karmas Tho' such persons are not in a position to carry out the Āśramakarmas which go to kindle the desire to know B in this life, for reasons already stated, it can be inferred from their irrepressible desire to know B that *they have practised these karmas in their previous lives*[20] and such performance also promotes knowledge in this life All the same, the last Sūtra points out that the state of belonging to an āśrama is indeed *better* than belonging to no āśrama, for the Śruti commends one's belonging to some āśrama and the Smṛtis deprecate remaining unattached to any stage of life (*āśrama*) as ruinous

Criticism

The consideration of the right to Vidyā has no contextual connection. The explanation given in the *Bhāmatī*[21] is that if āśrama-

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19 Cf एष ह्यात्मा न नश्यति (*Chan Up* viii.5 3) quoted in support

20 यद्यपि चेह जन्मनि कर्माण्यननुष्ठितानि तथापि विविदिषातिशयदर्शनात् प्राचि भवेऽनुष्ठितानि तै इति गम्यते (*Bhāmatī* iii 4.36)

21 यदि विद्यासहकारीण्याश्रमकर्माणि विधुरादीनामनाश्रमिणामनधिकारो विद्यायामभावात् सहकारिणामिति प्राप्त उच्यते (*Bhāmatī* iii 4.36)

karmas are to be recognized as cooperative with Vidyā the question is bound to arise as to what is to happen to Anāsramins like widowers But then, as it has already been enjoined in *B S* iii 4 27 that Śama, dama etc are obligatory as auxiliaries on all Adhikārins, the question of Anāsramins being without such Sahakāris can hardly arise

The explanation that such persons can be considered eligible for Vidyā now, thro' āsramakarmas carried out in previous lives would land us in serious difficulties For, by the same token, a Śūdra may now be considered eligible for Vedavidyā thro' upanayana and other rites undergone by him in a previous life which would contradict the stand taken by the Sutrakāra in *B S* i 3 34, 38 Leaning back upon the āsramic duties performed in a *previous life*, one may give up his āsramic duties now and still be eligible for Vidyā. The argument of the *Bhāmatī* that persons in whom the desire to know B (*vividiṣā*) has already been awakened, have no use for Āsramakarma[22] is unsustainable, for even such persons have been required in Sūtra iii 4 32, to perform their Āsramic karmas to avoid the risk of sin in the event of non performance And Sacchūdras like Vidura (of the *Mahābharāta*) manifest a keen desire to know B and are possessed of calmness, subjugation of senses, patience, contentment etc The Anāsramins in question are naturally expected to have these assets if they wish to know B and can do so, thro' such means without troubling about their enforced inability to perform the other Āsramic karmas like others These virtues of sama, dama, etc are not the exclusive right of any (one) āsrama but common to all men—be they Āsramites or Anāsramites

Moreover, the discussion of the question as to how those who stand in the middle without any āsrama should acquire Vidyā should, if at all, have been taken up immediately after 'Sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādisruter (iii 4 26) and *not at this stage*

However that may be, it needs to be clarified if S's Siddhānta here is arrived at by accepting that (*all*) karmas as such are auxiliary to vidyā or only Āsramic karmas are so The former cannot be—as forbidden karmas too will in that case be entitled to become auxiliary to vidyā which is opposed to the pronouncement made in Sūtra iii 4 32 For the same reason, the word āsramakarma cannot be stretched to include all karmas within its scope If Sahakārikarma should connote only Āśramakarmas, the discussion whether Vidhuras and Anāsramins

22 उत्पन्नविविदिषाणां पुरुषधौरेयाणां विधुरप्रभृतीनां इव कर्माणि (*Bhāmati* iii.4.36)

are entitled to know B would be irrelevant as one can infer their having performed the Āśramite karmas in a former life and concede them the right to Vidyā now If this is not permissible because there is a prohibition against it, the Anāśramins and widowers may surely be allowed the right to vidyā for the simple reason that there is no express prohibition in their case—without raising the issue here

S's and R's reference to Raikva, Vācaknavī and Bhīsma as Anāśramins is not warranted The equation of 'āśrama' with Gṛhasthāśrama is surely unwarranted If the householder's state is the only recognized āśrama, change of one's āsrama from Gārhasthya to Sannyāsa will have to be disallowed in view of the prohibition

Anāśramī nā tisthet tu dinam ekam api dvijah

We have evidence of the existence of life-celibates in the Epics and Purānas and this state has Śāstric sanction. Such life-celibates are known to be eligible for vidyā and to have attained high recognition as Brahmajnānins (See Bhīṣma's discourses about Nārada's visit to Śvetadvīpa in Mbh xii Moksadharmaparvan) They cannot be labelled as 'Anāśramins' For the same reason, S's characterization of Samvarta and other sages as Ānāśramins practising nudity and being bereft of āśramakarmas is also misplaced The Gītā (iv 28) speaks of many kinds of Yajñas besides dravyayajñas and such Avadhūtas have certainly their own distinctive dharmas to which they adhere—like living in seclusion, staying not more than one night in any place and so on The nudity practised by Avadhūtas is permissible to them, as there are many orders of ascetics (*sannyāsabāhuvidhya*) There is no need to have a separate Sūtra to record cases like those of Samvarta, as they could be brought under the words 'taddṛṣteh' in iii 4 36

S's reference under Sūtra 38, to prayer, fasting and propitiation of deities "which may be performed by all men (*puruṣamātrasambandhi*) as "special acts" (*dharmaviseṣa*) shows a contradiction in terms As such disciplines are themselves competent to produce vidyā as well, it is an understatement to describe them as merely *favoring* the generation of Vidyā (*anugrāhaka*). The deep Theistic nuances of the phrase 'Viśeṣānugraha' seem to have been missed by S and R. owing to their not seeing the adhikaranas of the Sādhanādhyāya in their right perspective

Lastly, the fruits of Vidyās attained by different Adhikārins—whether Āsramins or Anāśramins thro' different Sādhanas appropriate to their states are in essence nothing more than the intuitive perception of the nondual B—so far as S is concerned This is necessarily and uniformly the same for all without any distinction or gradation (See his commentary on Sūtra iii 4 52) That being so, the talk of some Āsramas and Varnas being higher or better than some others (*itarat jyāyah*) in Sūtra iii 4 39, turns out to be empty sound without robust sense

CHAPTER LXX

APAROKṢA ATTAINED BY THOSE WHO ENTERTAIN NO ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS STATUS OF THE GODS

(6) *Ādhikārikādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.41-43)

In the previous adhi., it was established that Aparokṣajnāna is attained only by those who are fit for it—viz. the Devas and the best among men. The present adhi. highlights another distinction of Aparokṣajnāna that it is attained only by those Adhikārins who are free from the ambition to achieve the special status and rank of Ādhikārikas[1] among Devas *to which they are not eligible.*[2] Such freedom from this sort of ambition is also part of the qualification for the attainment of Aparokṣa.[3] The discussion of this topic in this Pāda is thus in order.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it appears from Śrutis and Smṛtis that the status and position of Ādhikārikas among Devas like Brahmā and Rudra are attained by putting forth the necessary effort:

वया विष्णोरेपस्य प्रभृये हविर्भिः। विदे हि रुद्रो रुद्रियं महित्वम् (*RV.* vii.40.5)

स्वधर्मनिष्ठः शतजन्मभिः पुमान्
विरिंचतामेति ततः परं हि माम् (*Bhāg.* iv.24.29)

These show that the rank or status of particular Devas is open to all those who are ready to work for it and that such eligibility to attain

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1. उत्तमाधिकारिणा देवाना यस्य यस्मिन्नधिकार श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रसिद्ध, तत्पदमाधिकारिकम् (*TD.* iii.4.41)
2. देवादिपदाकाक्षाशून्यैरित्यस्य स्वायोग्यपदाकाक्षाशून्यैरित्यर्थ (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 160)
3. (मूले) चशब्दस्तु ज्ञानार्थिना पूर्वोक्तादित्यभावान्तरसूचक: (*M. BSB.* iii.4.41)
अत्र ज्ञानस्य देवादिपदाकाक्षाशून्यतालक्षणेत्यभाववद्भिः अधिकारिभिः प्राप्यत्वसमर्थनात् (Raghu. *TPB*)

these ranks of Ādhıkārıka Devas cannot, therefore, be ıntrınsıc lıke the attrıbute of sentıency ın the Jīvas There ıs, therefore, no harm ın one's entertaınıng a desıre for such posıtıons of partıcular gods and makıng sustaıned effort to achıeve them Otherwıse, one may not even be free to desıre to attaın Jnāna, Bhaktı and other Sādhanas and work for them.

Indeed, the Pūrvapakṣa stretches the argument further that ın the same way there ıs nothıng to prevent one from entertaınıng the desıre to attaın the powers of B such as remaınıng smaller than the atom and at the same tıme beıng greater than the greatest, thro' supreme effort In the same way, Aparokṣaȷñāna too can be attaıned, even by those who are consıdered to be outsıde the pale of those who are deemed to be ıntrınsıcally fit for ıt by anādıyogyatā [4]

The Sıddhānta ıs that such desıres and ambıtıons to attaın the specıal rank of partıcular Ādhıkārıkas among the gods (and partıcular Ṛṣıs) and of the powers of B are sternly dısapproved ın the Śrutıs and Smṛtıs The Śrutı and the Bhāgavata text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa are not, therefore, to be understood as general statements applıcable to all but as statements made wıth specıal reference to those among the gods who alone are elıgıble to attaın and hold the rank of Rudra or Brahmā [5]

No true Jñānın would, therefore, entertaın such forbıdden aspıratıons The term 'apı' ın the Sūtra emphasızes how utterly preposterous ıt would be to entertaın ambıtıons to attaın the sovereıgn powers of B

Sūtra 41 shows that ıt can be ınferred from the facts referred to ın the Śrutıs and Smṛtıs that any one who ıs ambıtıous beyond hıs deserts, to attaın the posıtıon and status of Ādhıkārıkas or Ṛṣıs to whıch he ıs ınelıgıble ıs doomed to fall

मायाभिरुत्सिसृप्सत इन्द्र द्यामारुरुक्षत
अव दस्यूनधूनुथा * * * (*RV* vııı 14 14)

न देवपदमन्विच्छेत् श्रुत एव हरेर्गुणान्।
इच्छन् पतति पूर्वस्मादधस्तात्तत्र नोत्थितिः (M *BSB* ııı 4 41)

The next Sūtra (42) forbıds the entertaınıng of any ambıtıon to attaın the partıcular ranks of those ımmedıately next to the aforesaıd (*pūrve*)

4 [illegible] (*TD* ııı.4 41)

5 [illegible] 'पुमान ब्रह्मपदयोग्य पुमानित्यत्र सुगम (*Vādırāja* TPG p 167)

gods (*Ādhıkārıkas*)—ı e to say Gandharvas, etc even as ın the case of partıcular Ṛṣıs lıke Vasıstha or Vıśvāmıtra[6] (*bhāvaśamana (pada) vat*) Thıs does not, however, rule out the ambıtıon ın general terms to become enlıghtened lıke a Ṛṣı[7] The expressıon 'pūrva' ın Sūtra 42 refers to the Devas[8] spoken of already as Ādhıkārıkas 'Upa' refers to those very near ın rank to the gods[9]—vız the Gandharvas and Bhāvaśamanas or Ṛṣıs[10] lıke Vasıstha and Vıśvāmıtra

The last Sūtra says that save for the rank and posıtıon of the gods, Ṛṣıs, etc , the aspırant for Jnāna ıs free to cherısh and entertaın salutary ambıtıons and desıres to acquıre all other desırable assets that can promote Jnāna, Bhaktı etc Ambıtıons and desıres as such are not, therefore, ruled out The desıre to promote one's spırıtual well-beıng ıs not forbıdden So too aspıratıons whıch are ın harmony wıth spırıtual advancement

· *Śamkara's Tadbhūtādhı* (ııı 4 40), *Ādhıkārıkādhı* (ııı 4 41-42) and *Bahıradhı* (ııı 4 43)

Accordıng to S thıs group of four Sūtras represents three separate adhı s as above The first deals wıth the questıon whether there ıs scrıptural approval to those whe have taken to the ascetıc āśrama to slıde back to the lower one due to passıon or wıth a vıew to dıschargıng those karmas *much better* The second one consıders, wıth a vıew to establıshıng elıgıbılıty to Vıdyā, whether there ıs expıatıon for lıfe-celıbates who transgress theır vow The last one establıshes that those who have broken the vows of lıfe-celıbacy but have not expıated for theır lapse are *not* entıtled to Vıdyā

Apart from the fact that thıs ıs maınly a questıon for Dharmaśāstras and has been consıdered ın the *Manusmrtı* and other sources, the rıght place to dıscuss ıt would be ın the Pūrva Mīmāmsā *and not here*

However that may be, there seems to be no possıbılıty of a doubt whether the descent of Sannyāsıns to a lower state can occur and ıs

6 ऋषिगन्धर्वादिषु विशेष आकाङ्क्षमाणे दोष । यथा वसिष्ठ स्या विश्वामित्र स्यामिति (*TD*)

7 अविशेषण ऋषित्वस्य आकाङ्क्षमाणेऽदोष – यथाह कश्चित ऋषि स्यामिति। अस्य विशषस्य प्रदर्शनार्थमेव इत्युक्तम (*TD* ııı 4 42)

8 पूर्वपद च पूर्वसूत्रे आधिकारिकपदेन प्रकृतदेवपरामर्शकम (*BD* ııı 4 42)

9 उपशब्दोऽत्र समीपवर्तिवाची । सङ्ख्याव्ययासन्न (Pan ıı 2 25) इत्यत्र भजर्या मर्मोपसमीपिरूपद्रूपयत्वस्योक्ते (*TDP* ııı 4 42)

10 भावे चिरते चेष्टाया च शमनात भावशमना ऋषय (*TD* ııı.4 42)

opposed to the rules of Śāstra. When there are Smṛti texts which prescribe severe punishment for such transgression and when there is no room for doubt regarding the impossibility of expiating such transgressions, how can the existence of such lapses and their being opposed to Śāstric norms be open to doubt necessitating a discussion?

The next adhi (iii 4 42) according to S considers whether those who have lapsed from their vow of lifelong celibacy can be readmitted to complete social intercourse as before, after expiation If their sins have been washed off by expiation, there should be no difficulty in restoring social intercourse If they do not get washed off, it is useless to go in for expiation Either way they should be free to be readmitted —argues the Pūrvapakṣa [11]

The Siddhānta is that there are two kinds of sins engendered by the commission of forbidden deeds Some expose the sinner to impurity both in this world and in the next while some others cause impurity in this world alone which cannot, however, be wiped out by Prāyaścittas as in the case of the slaying of children and women Persons guilty of such offences are to be kept out of social intercourse *even after expiation*

As this question of lifting or not lifting the ban on social intercourse in respect of Naiṣṭhika Brahmacārins who have broken their vow has nothing to do with the subject of Vidyā or its angas, its consideration is quite irrelevant in the Sūtras

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Tadbhūtādhikaraṇam (iii 4 40-44)

R holds that it is against the spirit and letter of the Śāstras to concede the right to Brahmavidyā, as S has done, to Parivrājakas, Vaikhānasas and Naiṣṭhikas *who have broken their vows and fallen from them.*

He constitutes all the four Sūtras into a single adhi which he interprets as denying the right to Brahmavidyā to such persons

Tho' R's conclusion is right, the matter raised by him has been settled by the pronouncements made by the authors of Smṛtis and Dharma-

11 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iii.4 43)

śāstras like Manu by denying the right to participate in Yajñas and receiving instruction in Brahmavidyā to such persons. As it is thus a settled matter there is no need for any fresh discussion of it here in the Brahmasūtras. Should a discussion be still necessary, the proper place for it would be in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā Śāstra which deals with questions of social custom and religious laws and their infringement *especially so as S. and R. have* both interpreted the term ādhikārika in Sūtra iii.4.41 as a reference to the sixth chapter of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā (vi.8.21) *which is known as* 'Adhikāralakṣaṇa'.

CHAPTER LXXI

FRUITS OF APAROKṢAJÑĀNA ACCRUE MAINLY TO TATTVĀBHIMĀNIDEVAS

7. *Phalaśrutyadhikaraṇam* (iii.4 44-46)

In the previous adhi, the Sūtrakāra had discussed how Aparokṣajñāna is to be carefully tended along safe and sound lines The present adhi explains the difference of measure in which the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna accrue to the Tattvābhimānidevas who impel the senses of men and enable them to attain Aparokṣa and to the human beings (Adhikārins) who benefit by their impulsion.[1]

The question discussed is whether the fruits of Jnāna accrue only to those who have actually attained Jnāna thro' their own tireless efforts or to the Tattvābhimāni Devatās who impel the senses of the Sādhakas along right ways of attaining Jnāna and thus play the major role in the attainment of Aparokṣa by the Sādhakas The opening Sūtra introduces the Pūrvapakṣa from the point of view of Ātreya—who argues that if on the ground of putting forth active effort for the attainment of Jnāna the fruit of it is to go to the Sādhaka, it must be so in an equal measure to the Devas who impel his sense organs and make it possible for him to attain Aparokṣa But that is opposed to the teaching of the Śruti which says "Whatever good men do, the gods alone do it, whatever the men understand that the gods alone understand in full. All this belongs to the gods For only the master enjoys the

1 अत्राधिकरणे ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य सन्निधिमात्रेण अस्वामिनोऽपि पराधीनस्य ज्ञानिनः कर्तृ फलानुत्पत्तिमहिमा वर्ण्यते (BD iii.4.44)

fruits of work done—not he who is not the master but does the mere toil".[2] *Moreover, we see in the world that a workman acting under* the orders of his employer does not get the entire benefit of his work. He is disposed of with a small wage in return and the master gets the major part of the profits of the turnover. The Sādhakas too, in the same manner, get from the gods who actuate them in their Sādhanas, incidental benefits of food, clothing, and other necessaries of life, protection from misfortune, and grant of long life—while the gods get the lion's share of the fruits of Jnāna attained by the Sādhakas Such a position is in agreement with the Śrutis—as has been pointed out The full fruits of the Śravana, manana and other Sādhanas and of the Aparoksajnāna attained by the Sādhaka must, therefore, be deemed to belong only to the gods who are known to impel the senses of the Sādhakas in the attainment of Aparoksa[3] Ragh *TDP* points out that the expression "Svāmin" (master) has been used by the Sūtrakāra to refer to the Devas suggesting thereby the reason in favor of the Pūrvapaksa derived from the Śruti 'Svāmī hi phalam aśnute'

Siddhānta

Admitting the force of Ātreya's view to the extent that the Devas have the largest share in the fruit of Aparoksajnāna which they help the Sādhakas attain, the Siddhānta holds that the latter too have a limited share of the fruits of Aparokṣa sufficient to enable them to attain Moksa Their case is similar to that of the Rtviks in a Sattrayāga wherein a modicum of the fruit of the Sattra accrues to them even tho' they do not have the same *locus standi* therein as the Yajamānas or Grhapatis This point is brought out by the expression 'ārtvijyam' in the Sūtra which, as Rāghavendra points out in his *TDP*, embodies an elliptical simile (*luptopamā*) The idea is that the Sādhakas are not to be entirely shut off from the fruits of the Aparokṣajñānayajña conducted by the gods For, it is for their benefit (tasmai hi) that the Tattvābhimānidevatās bring about (*parikriyate*) Aparoksa by impel-

2 यदु किंचेमा प्रजा शुभमाचरति, देवा एव तदाचरंति यदु किंचेमा प्रजा विजानते देवा एव तद्विजानते, देवाना ह्येतत भवति स्वामी हि फलमश्नुते नास्वामी कर्म कुर्वाण
(Madhyandinayana Śruti q by M. *BSB* iii 4 44. Cf *Chan Up* iv 1 6)

3 पूर्वपक्षस्तु–कर्तृत्वस्यापि प्रयोजकत्वे सकोचकमानाभावेन, स्वामिफलसमफलमेवावश्य वाच्यम्। तच्च श्रुत्याचार्यमतेन च विरुद्धम । लोके तक्षादे प्रयोजकाधीनकर्तुरपि क्रियाजन्यफलादृष्ट । श्रुत्यादिविरोधरूपबाधकाभावात साधकाभावाच्च, न कर्तृत्वमपि प्रयोजकम । किंतु, प्रयोजककर्तृत्वरूपस्वामित्वमपि। सर्वेन्द्रियप्रेरकाणा देवतानामेव प्रजाकृतश्रवणादिजन्यफल न प्रजानामिति (Ragh *Ny Muktavali*)

ling their sense organs and buddhi along right lines to help them attain Aparokṣa[4]

The next Sūtra answers the objection that if the purpose of the gods in impelling the senses of the Sādhakas along right lines is to benefit them, the fruit of Aparokṣa as a whole should go to the latter and nothing of it to the former The Sūtra 'Sahakāryantaravidhih pakṣena tritiyam tadvato vidhyādivat' (iii.4 46) meets this objection It points out that, as in the case of kings who are required by law to rule over their subjects with justice and of teachers who are similarly required to impart spiritual instruction to their disciples (*tadvatah*), the primary fruits of the king's rule and the teacher's exposition accrue to them, while the king's subjects and the teacher's pupils derive only a small portion of the benefit on account of their being auxiliaries (*sahakāri*) in the business of good government and imparting of knowledge[5] Similarly, in regard to the cosmic duty enjoined upon Tattvābhimānidevatās of helping deserving souls to attain Aparokṣajñāna, the men are auxiliaries in the discharge of the cosmic responsibility of these gods[6] Hence, the fruit of Jnāna accruing to the Sādhakas is very much less than what goes to the share of the gods themselves

The adhi. thus puts up three different views on the question. The first view of Ātreya[7] that the fruits of Jnāna accrue for the most part to the gods themselves as masters of the deal is to be understood from the point of view of the plenitude of the fruits accruing to them[8] The second view of Audulomi that the fruits go with good reason to the Sādhakas themselves refers to the small part of the fruit which accrues to them as toilers at Aparokṣajñāna[9] The third view (*pakṣena tritiyah*)

4 यत्र मार्गप्रवृत्तस्यैव न केवलं फलम् सर्वमुख [illegible] यजेरन् सर्वे दासरन् सर्वे मुनयः " इत्यादि श्रुत्यर्थविचारमित्यप्रयमयत्ना स्वान स्वानन्तीन तदन्ति समाराध्य दाक्षिणानामन्तदक्षिणाना अल्प फल [illegible] गृहस्त इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्तमन्वर्थ । तथा पालयन्त्य देवं क्रियमाण्यर्थविन्य प्रजाभि क्रियते तदल्पफल भवत्येव । प्रजानामपि फलमिदमर्थं हि तासु स्थिता तत्करणानि व्यापारयन्ति देवं क्रियत

(Trivikrama, *TD.* iii.4.45)

5 सहकारी विद्यान्वितेत्यर्थः प्रजानामधिकारा शिष्याणां चाप्यन्त । प्रजावता राज्ञा शिष्यवता गुरुणा विद्यान्वित आर्जितम् फलम् । यथा प्रजाशिष्याणां राजगुरुसहकारित्वेन विधानं फलं च स्यादेव मुख्य तदर्थम् । यथा राज्ञा गुरोश्च पालने व्याख्याने च प्रजानां शिष्याणां च सहकारित्वेऽपि स्यादेव मुख्य पालनादिफलं तथा देवेन्द्र, तथा देवानां विहित ज्ञानार्थे प्रजानां सहकारित्वात् देवानां मुख्य फल प्रजानामल्पमिति भाव

(Ragh. *TDP* iii.4.46)

6 'ज्ञानेनैव देवाना विहित नर एवर्णिता आचार एव मनुष्याणां स्वविराधना मानि' इति विधिविभाग

Also फलन्ति देवा विहित [illegible] (ibid) (M. *NV* iii.4.adh.5-6)

7 Read आत्रेयमतस्य वचनन पूर्वपक्षित इत्यत्र बहुत्वाक्षेपन स्वामित्व एव बहुत्वेन च स्वर्गवास्तव्या आत्रेयमतस्य मातानन मतया बहूना फल नास्तीति पूर्वपक्षित मताश्च (Vadiraja *TPG* p 167)

8 देवानामेव फलमिति मुख्यत्वात् मत पूर्णत्वापेक्षया (Ragh. *TDP* iii.4.46)

9 प्रजानां फलमिति मुक्तपक्ष द्वितीय मतमल्पत्वापेक्षया (ibid)

is Bādarāyaṇa's view that there are two good reasons to hold that the largest share of the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna attained by the Sādhakas goes to the Tattvābhimānidevatās One reason is that these Devatās thro' their entry into and presence in the Gurus themselves make them impart instruction to their pupils The other is that they enable the Sādhakas in their turn to attain Aparokṣa by being present in their bodies and by impelling their sense organs and buddhi on right lines.[10] These three views thus admit of harmonization from the point of view of major or minor roles of gods and the Sādhakas The term 'antara' (another) is added to 'Sahakārī' in the Sūtra to bring out the point that the Guru and the pupils (as well as the king and his subjects) act as auxiliaries with respect to each other in the final accomplishment of the act of giving and receiving the benefits of good government and effective spiritual instruction[11] The same mutual auxiliary relationship holds as between the Devas and the Sādhakas also[12]

These three views are thus complementary and not contradictory The purpose of establishing here that the Sādhakas also are entitled to the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna is to reinforce the position taken in iii 3 32 that all Aparokṣajnānins are entitled to attain Moksa—which they will not be, if the fruits of Jñāna were not to accrue to them—as it appears from the Śruti 'Svāmi hi phalam aśnute' Hence the need to discuss the matter in all its bearings and settle the purport of the relevant Śrutis on the issue

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Svāmyadhikaranam (iii 4 44-46)

According to S. and R this adhi considers if the upāsanas connected with the subordinate members of sacrificial acts—such as the meditation on the syllable om as the udgītha (*Chān Up* 1 1 1) are to be done by the Yajamāna or by the officiating priests R and M do not read the Sūtra 'Śruteśca' of S

The Pūrvapaksa is that these upāsanās are to be carried out by the sacrificer himself as he is the recipient of the fruit of the sacrifice together with its subordinate elements and because such upāsanās fall within the sphere of what he is entitled to (*adhikrtādhikāra*) The objection that the Śruti declares a fruit for the priests also (*Brh Up*

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10 आचायप्रवेशेन प्रवक्तृत्व प्रजासु स्थित्वा तदिन्द्रियप्रवर्तनेन ज्ञापनमित्येतदुभय देवाना फलाधिक्ये (मुख्य) कारणम (*TD* iii 4 46)

11 आचार्य सहकारी प्रजास्तु सहकार्यन्तरमिनि द्योतयितुम तरेत्युक्ति (Ragh *TDP*)
Cf आचार्य पूर्वरूपमन्तेवास्युत्तररूपम (*Taitt Up*)

12 Cf सह वीर्यं करवावहै तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु। (*ibid*)

i 3 28) is not serious The fruit so referred to is said to accrue to the priest in a special case only The Pūrvapakṣa concludes, therefore, that the sacrificer himself is the agent (*kartā*) of the upāsanās This view is sponsored by Ātreya

The Siddhānta is ascribed to Audulomi that the upāsanās are to be carried out by the priests themselves as they are the ones rewarded for the entire work together with its subsidiaries among which the upāsanās are included Like the use of the Godohana vessel in the sacrifice, these upāsanās also are to be performed by the priests The reference to the fruit in "there is rain for him and he brings rain to others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold Sāman (*Chān Up* ii 3 2)—going to the agent of the upāsāna is not inconsistent with this finding, for the Ṛtviks do the upāsanās for the benefit of the Yajamāna and, therefore, their fruits go to him while the *agency* of the upāsanā rests with the priests

Criticism

It is a guiding principle accepted in both the Pūrva and Uttara Mimāmsā, that where a seen fruit (*dṛṣṭaphala*) is possible no unseen fruit (*adṛṣṭaphala*) is to be assumed for any performance Now, sravaṇa, manana and upāsanā have their own drstaphalas The dṛṣṭaphala of upāsanā is sākṣātkāra (*direct vision*) of B However, where certain miscellaneous fruits are ascribed to the upāsanās they are to be treated as surplus benefits other than the primary ones Adhering to this basic principle, if the priests are to be accepted as agents of the upāsana of udgītha its chief fruit of Brahmasākṣātkāra will have to go to them and not to the Yajamāna That will lead affluent persons to engage the services of priests to carry out the various upāsanās taught in the Upaniṣads in the proximity of sacrificial rites, on their behalf and for their benefit and save themselves from the bodily and mental trouble of personally undertaking any of the arduous upāsanās as Sādhanas for realization. The result would be that the sādhanas would become commercialized and become a dead letter so far as the actual sādhanas are concerned Tho' as in the Jāteṣṭi certain fruits accruing by adṛṣṭa are credited to persons other than the actual agent (as the rainfall referred to in the context—*Chān Up.* ii 3 3) this cannot be applied to cases of dṛṣṭaphala The taking of medicine or the drinking of water by one person cannot cure another or quench his thirst The use of the Godohana is made by the priest because it is connected with the 'praṇayana' which has got to be done by him and not by the Yajamāna But in respect of the udgītha chanted by the Udgātā, it is well within the com

petence of the Yajamāna to contemplate on the 'rasatama'-aspect of Udgītha (*Chān Up* 1.1 3) while the chant of udgītha is done by the priest. There is clear authority and evidence of competent Yajamānas being in a position to carry out the upāsanā of B thro' all the subsidiaries of the sacrifice such as the chants, their meanings, the deities and the oblations while the routine performance of the sacrifice and its different parts are being carried on according to prescription by the priests themselves The *Bhāgavata Purāna* tells us about the inner upāsanā of the Supreme B by Emperor Bharata in and thro' the various sacrifices like Agnihotra, Darśapūrnamāsa, Cāturmāsya, Paśuyagas and Somayāgas together with their vikṛtis with the help of priests

स महीपतिः ईजे भगवन्तं यज्ञक्रतुरूपं क्रतुभिरुच्चावचैः प्रकृतिविकृतिभिरनुसवनं चातुर्होत्रविधिना। सम्प्रचरत्सु नानायागेषु विरचिताङ्गक्रियेष्वपूर्वं यत्तत्क्रियाफलं धर्माख्यं परे ब्रह्मणि यज्ञपुरुषे सर्वदेवतालिङ्गानां मन्त्राणामर्थनियामकतया साक्षात्कर्तरि परदेवतायां भगवति वासुदेवे एव भावयमान आत्मनैपुण्यमृदितकषायो हविष्वध्वर्युभिः गृह्यमाणेषु स यजमानो यज्ञभाजो देवान् तान् पुरुषावयवेष्वेवाभ्यध्यायत्[13] (*Bhāgavata* v 7 4-6)

S's argument that in a way the sacrificer too may be held to be the agent of the chanting of udgītha in virtue of the fact that the priests who chant the udgitha receive their reward for it from him is not sustainable For according to S the upāsanās mentioned in the proximity of the sacrificial members are separate from and independent of the Kratu The Parikraya, on the other hand, is connected only with the Kratu and its organic parts Not being kratvanga or subordinate to the kratu, the udgitha and other upāsanās cannot be subject to the sway of Parikraya of the Ṛtviks The Parikraya cannot, therefore, serve as the medium of conferring any indirect agency in regard to the chanting of the udgitha to the sacrificer and thereby entitle him to the fruits assigned to him by the Siddhāntin Moreover, if the point discussed in

13 'That king who had extensive knowledge was like his father and grandfather, very loving to his subjects and strictly adhering to his righteous course protected his subjects who were engaged in their respective duties

And in full faith he worshipped the Lord who is Yajna and Kratu by means of various sacrifices great and small and in their main as well as modified forms such as Agnihotra, Darsapurnamasa, Caturmasya, and others Various other sacrifices were conducted at due hours at morning midday and evening according to the rules of Caturhotra All the accessory rites being duly performed the fruit of the sacrificial acts, which was yet to arise out of it and called Dharma was considered by him as resting in Brahman, the Lord of Sacrifices the Supreme Deity, and the glorious Vasudeva who is really the doer, because He rules and regulates the objects (deities) of all mantras descriptive of all the gods Having cleansed his mind of all impurity by his own skill the sacrificer Bharata contemplated as resting on the various members of the Lord s personality—the gods who were invited to accept the offerings (from the hands) of the priests called Adhvaryus in his sacrifices"

the adhi. is whether the fruits of the secondary material referred in 'Varṣati ha vā asmai' goes with the Yajamāna or the Ṛtvik the matter has already been made the subject of a ruling with reference to a similar text 'Yadi kāmeyeta varṣet parjanya iti nīcais sado minuyāt' in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā (iii.8.13) and it can be extended to the present case of upāsanās connected with the aṅgas in the same way. No further doubt can, therefore, arise as to whether the Guṇaphala goes with the Yajamāna or the Ṛtvik. If it should, it would be in conflict with the ruling of the Mīmāmsā and the Siddhānta arrived at here that the guṇaphala goes with the Ṛtvik will be untenable. If the point at issue is whether upāsanās connected with the subordinate members of the sacrifice are to be carried out by the Yajmāna or the Ṛtvik that point too has been set at rest in favor of the Ṛtviks by the Sūtra: Anyo vā syād parikrayāmnānāt' (iii.7.20).

CHAPTER LXXII

TATTVĀBHIMĀNIDEVAS CARRY OUT DUTIES OF ALL VARNĀŚRAMAS

(8) *Kṛtsnabhāvādhikaranam* (iii 4 47-48)

The previous adhi had shown that the Devas are entitled to the fullest measure of the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna which they help mortals to achieve The present adhi. shows how these Devas are similarly to be recognized as carrying out to the fullest measure the duties and responsibilities of all the Varnas and āśramas and for the greatest length of time as part of their spiritual Sādhana in the economy of the universe and its moral order.

The purpose of the discussion is to bring out the glory and greatness of Aparokṣajnāna by showing how among Jñānādhikārins the Devas stand supreme as participants in the duties and responsibilities of all the varṇas and āśramas for the longest possible periods of time

The Pūrvapakṣa seeks to undermine the supreme position of Jnāna as established earlier by playing up the importance of Karmayoga of which the householders (Grhasthas) are the chief exemplars As the ascetic state is considered to be best suited for the realization of Jnāna the Purvapakṣa naturally tries to exalt the Grhastha-sādhanās by arguing that in Mukti the members of the Grhastha order (Svarūpagṛasthas) stand higher in rank than the ascetics (Svarūpayatis) For the Grhastha is authorized to perform all the various karmas and sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas [1] The carrying out of these numerous karmas will

1 (न च) गृहस्थानामशपकमविशेषयोग्यत्वात आधिक्य मुक्तौ (M. *NV* iii 4 adh 8)

naturally be spread over a great length of time The fruit of Moksa attained by karmas carried out thro' a great length of time must needs be superior to the one attained by Jnāna The exalted position of the enlightened householder in Mokṣa has been recognized and given expression to in the *Chān Up* (viii 15 1) where the student who has completed his service to the Guru is asked to enter upon the householder's life 'Here living in holy surroundings he is asked to study the Vedas, perform religious acts, righteously beget children, maintain them, and concentrate on B, refrain from injury to living beings except in sacrifices Spending his days in this way he attains the world of B and thence he never returns, never returns" That this concluding passage should end with a reference to the Grhastha's attaining Mokṣa proves that there is no one who enjoys a superior status there than he Had there been one, the Śruti would have mentioned it

The Pūrvapakṣa rejects the plea that this tribute to the householder-Jnāni is not with reference to ordinary mortals who have attained Mokṣa but to the order of the gods themselves It contends that it cannot be argued that it is the Devas who are hailed in the Pautrāyana Śruti as the perfect Grhasthas in the sense that they are in a position to carry out all the duties and responsibilities of the order of Grhasthas and that it is to the Devas who are Grhasthas in this sense, that the *Chān Up* text has reference The Purvapakṣa argues that such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the Siddhānta position that as between the householder who attains Siddhi after a comparatively shorter period of effort and the ascetic who attains perfection after a very protracted interval of Sādhanas, the former is of inferior status to the latter It would undermine the superior status given to the gods in the released state over other released souls of the ascetic order from among human souls

The Siddhānta is that in the state of Mokṣa ascetics by natural distinction (*svarupayatis*) are to be assigned a superior status over householders by natural distinction (*svarupagrhinah*) The reason for this is that it takes a longer time for the aforesaid ascetics to attain Mokṣa than the aforesaid Grhasthas according to the evidence of Śruti[2] Moreover, even tho' the Grhasthas are entitled to carry out so many karmas they are not obliged to carry out all of them as they can attain Aparokṣa by carrying out a few of them alone properly The exalted

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2 मनुष्यात्तमेषु स्वरूपगृहिभ्य स्वरूपयतीनामेव उत्तमत्व स्वरूपयतीनां साधनकाले कदाचित् गृहस्थत्वप्राप्त्यादि यतित्वमेवानुवर्तते ततेव । मनुष्येतरेष्वपि देवानामेव उत्तमत्व साम्यम (*BD* iii 4 47)
'स्वर्गेषु गृहिण साधयन्ति मुक्तिम् वर्णेषु यन्ति तथा देवा तपु ब्रह्म तेषु लोक'
(Q M. *NV* iii 4 adh 8)

position of the ascetic order is not at all contradicted by the manner in which the passage quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa from the *Chān. Up.* is concluded in favor of the superiority of the Gṛhastha. *For this passage is intended to refer to the gods.* The superiority of Devas to the ascetics stems from the fact that they are exemplars of all the duties and responsibilities of the ascetic order. The evidence in this respect is furnished by the Pautrāyaṇa Śruti which says—"the Devas are the most perfect householders and the most perfect ascetics. Their progeny does not inherit their assets. They do not give up their homes. They are free from attachment, hate and greed. They have all enjoyments, they are all-knowing and do everything". By accepting the Devas, in this way, as primary Gṛhasthas, the apparent contradiction with the upasamhāra in the Chān. Up. text is got over.[3]

There is no need to fear that this way of overcoming the conflict with the statement in the *Chān. Up.* would expose the Siddhānta to a fresh difficulty that the exaltation of the Devas, viewed as perfect householders (*kṛtsnagṛhastha*) in Mokṣa, over ascetics there, of the human order,—admitted by the Siddhānta—will be open to question. The second Sūtra resolves this difficulty by pointing out that apart from the Pautrāyaṇa Śruti which refers to the Devas as perfect Gṛhasthas and perfect ascetics—which is itself sufficient to elevate them above ordinary ascetics, who can profess but one āśrama—the Kauṇṭharavya Śruti speaks of the intimate connection of the Devas with all Varṇas and Āśramas and their duties and responsibilities. The very fact that the ascetic state has been made the starting point of an analogical assimilation of all other varṇas, āśramas and their duties and responsibilities with respect to the gods confirms the unquestionable superiority of the ascetic state to the rest[4] and thereby the preeminent glory and greatness of Aparokṣajñāna.[5]

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

Sahakāryantaravidhyadhikaraṇam (iii.4.47-49)

Bṛh. Up (iii.5.1) reads[6]: 'Therefore, a Brahmin who has acquired learning shall desire to attain strength of reasoning (bālya) and

3 कृत्स्ना ह्येते गृहिण' इत्यादौ देवानामेव कृत्स्नगृहस्थधर्मवत्त्वेन मुख्यगृहस्थत्वोक्त्या छान्दोग्यवाक्येऽपि मुख्यगृहस्थदेवपरत्वस्य मुख्यामुख्यन्यायप्राप्तत्वात् (*Ny. Muktāvali*)

4 न चाश्रमद्वयमेव देवानाम् । देवा वाव ब्रह्मचारिणो देवा वाव गृहस्था देवा एव वनस्था यथा ह्येते मुनयः । एव सर्ववर्णा सर्वाश्रमाः सर्वं ह्येते कर्म कुर्वन्ति' इति कौण्ठरव्यश्रुतौ यतित्वदृष्टान्तेनान्येषामप्युपदेशात् (*M. BSB.* iii.4 48)

5 अतोऽधमाधिकारिषु ज्ञानप्रचुराणां यतीनामेव उत्तमत्वोक्तौ मुक्तौ ज्ञानस्यातिशय इति (*TP* iii 4 48)

6 तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः (*Bṛh. Up* iii 5.1)

having attained both learning and strength of reasoning shall enter into 'mauna' (meditation) and *having attained* mauna and the others he shall become a knower of B "[7]

The words *pāṇḍitya, bālya* and *mauna* in this upaniṣadic text signify śravana, manana and nidihyāsana S and R discuss whether in this passage 'maunam' or meditation is 'enjoined' or *not*

The Pūrvapakṣa is that an injunction is admissible only in respect of the acquisition of learning (*pāṇḍitya*) and strength (*bala*) of reasoning—or the innocent simplicity of a child (bāla), according to another interpretation of the word *bālya*, but not of 'maunam' or silent meditation, as no injunction is heard in the text with regard to it It cannot be argued that meditation is enjoined because it is something new (*apūrva*)—i e not made known before, for 'maunam' is the same as learning (*pāṇḍitya*) and is included in it The reference to maunam, then, can only be treated as an 'anuvāda' and not as a vidhi [8]

The Siddhānta is that there is injunction (*vidhi*) of 'maunam' as another cooperative factor (*sahakāryantaram*) as in the case of the anga of a pradhānavidhi (*vidhyādivat*[9]) in the case of such a Sannyāsin (*tadvatah*) as is engaged in the practice of vidyā but has not yet fully attained it [10] The fact is that 'mauna' or 'nididhyāsana' is a different state from pāṇḍitya, representing preeminence of knowledge (*jñānātiśayarupam*) on etymological grounds also Tho' 'muni' sometimes signifies a member of the last order of life (ascetic) it is only in the context where other āśramas are mentioned. That is not the case here We have, therefore, to supplement the clause 'atha munih' with 'then he is to become a muni"—in an injunctive sense That the state of 'muni' is something to be enjoined in the same way as bālya and pāṇḍitya, follows from its being referred to as something to be acquired like them and retained Such meditativeness has a value for the Sannyāsin who

7 षडाध्यायनजा ब्रह्मार्थी तद्वान् पण्डित । तस्य कृत्य पाण्डित्य श्रवण तन्निर्विद्य वाल्येन ज्ञानबलभावेन युक्तितोऽसमावनानिरासमन्यपननेन वा (शुद्धहृदयत्वेन वा) तिष्ठासेत स्थातुमिच्छेत । मुनिर्मननशीलो निदिध्यासक स्यात् । निदिध्यासन निर्विद्याय ब्राह्मण साक्षात्कृतब्रह्मा भवतीत्यर्थ (*Kalpataru* iii 4.47)
Strangely enough Thibaut in his translation of S.'s and R 's bhasya and Viresvarananda render 'nirvidya as having done with" or 'finished with" learning etc Radhakrishnan alone gives the correct sense of 'nirvidya' as "remaining endowed with' The *Bhamati* gives the correct meaning as 'niścayena' labdhva There is no having 'done with' or being fed up with panditya, bālya and mauna as the phrase "having done with" tends to suggest

8 न चापूर्वत्वात् विधेयम् । पाण्डित्यविधानादेव मौनमिद पाण्डित्यमेव मौनमिति (*Bhāmati* iii 4 47)

9 R. understands the expression 'Vidhyadivat' differently as 'in respect of āsramadharmas like yajña, śama, dama and sravaṇa, manana etc.'

10. तद्वतो विद्यावत सन्यासिन (*S*) विद्यावानिति न विद्यातिशया विवक्षित यदि तु विद्योदयायाभ्यासे प्रवृत्त न तूत्पन्नविद्य इति (*Bhāmati*)

is not yet well-established in the knowledge of oneness, on account of being *tossed by erroneous notions of duality* [11]

The next Sūtra goes to answer the question as to why since the ascetic order distinguished by 'mauna' etc, is actually established by scripture, the *Chān Up* (viii 5 1) should extol the householder's state by concluding with a recital of his onerous duties and responsibilties without any reference to the existence of the ascetic order Sūtra 48 says that it is in order to lay stress on the householder's life to show its importance and not because Sannyāsa is not one of the prescribed āśramas The householder's life is important because he has to perform besides the duties of his own station, those of the other āśramas too like study, control of the senses—in other words, more or less the duties of all āśramas

The next Sūtra (49) is intended to correct the impression that as only the two āśramas of Muni and Gṛhī have been spoken of the two others viz Brahmacarya and Vānaprastha have no *locus standi*

एव तावदाश्रमद्वयोपन्यासेन क्वचित् कदाचित् इतराभावशंका मन्दबुद्धे' स्यादिति तदपाकरणार्थं सूत्रम्–मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात्' इति (*Bhāmati* iii 4 49)

Criticism

As the three disciplines of Śravana, manana and nididhyāsana are of the same importance and are to be carried out by the same persons, there is no reason to take it for granted that the first two are enjoined and raise an inquiry with regard to nididhyāsana alone as to whether it has been 'enjoined' or not The competency of nididhyāsana to lead to direct vision of B thro' śabdāparokṣa (as admitted in S's system) is not knowable thro' any empirical means It can only be known thro' Śruti in the form of an Apūrvavidhi There is thus no room for any doubt on the point Hence the inquiry is not called for

In the Samanvayādhi S has taken the position that no vidhi or injunction lies in respect of nididhyāsana. It is palpably contradictory to maintain here that there is vidhi in respect of nididhyāsana

The *Kalpataru* has, however, tried to put in that tho' the competency of nididhyāsana to lead to vivid comprehension of the object of meditation thro' anvayavyatirekapramāna does not permit an Apūrvavidhi to be thought of for the purpose, such Apūrvavidhi may still be recognized

11 ननु विद्यावत्त्वे प्राप्नोत्येव तत्रातिशय । किं मौनविधिनेत्यत आह - पक्षेणेति । यस्मिन् पक्षे भेददर्शनप्राबल्यान्न प्राप्नोति तस्मिन्नेव विधिरिति (S *BSB* iii 4 47)

in connection with nididhyāsana in respect of one who may feel fully satisfied with the knowledge of B derived thro' Śabdapramāna and who shows no inclination to turn to Dhyāna which consists of preeminent knowledge of B With respect to such a person an Apūrvavidhi will be perfectly in order and this is what is intended to be established here[12]

The argument, if accepted, will lead to awkward results For by the same token it may be argued that tho' the competence of 'avaghāta' or pounding of grains to dehusk them for preparing the sacrificial cake is indeed borne out by anvayavyatirekapramāna, and, therefore, no Apūrvavidhi is to be recognized in this case, still the text 'Vrīhīn avahanti' may be construed as an Apūrvavidhi (instead of as a niyamavidhi, that it is) in so far as it concerns a person who is fully satisfied with having done what is required—viz removing the husk from the corn with his own nails and who is disinclined to adopt the normal method of 'avaghāta' or pounding the corn as required by the text 'Vrīhīn avahanti' If such freedom of interpretation is to be allowed —as contemplated by the *Kalpataru* to suit its convenience, there will be no scope at all for other forms of Vidhi such as niyama and parisankhyā to operate and only Apūrvavidhi will come to monopolize the field.[13]

The other explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the element of apūrvatā in respect of nididhyāsana is to be interpreted in terms of its not being derived from pāṇḍitya and such other expressions and the injunctiveness consisting in the statement relating to 'maunam' conferring special motivation in turning to meditation by virtue of the arthavāda itself being tinged with the power of a Vidhi sets at naught all our accepted views of what makes an Apūrvavidhi

Sūtrārtha Examined

In his commentary on the first Sūtra, S interprets the words of the Śruti 'Atha munih' as an injunction of something which cooperates with knowledge *(sahakāryantaravidhh)* He does not, however, explain the need for the additional expression 'antara' (another) after 'sahakāri,' in the Sūtra. We have already seen how the expression

12 [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iii 4.47)

13 [illegible]

(*STC* iii.4 47-48)

'vidhi' in the Sūtra is far from consistent with his position that no apūrvavidhi is acceptable in regard to nididhyāsana The presence of the term 'tṛtīyam' seems to be similarly unnecessary If 'pakṣena' in the Sūtra refers to a restriction in the operation of the vidhi as explained by S ,[14] it will have to make way for a 'niyamavidhi' which will be inconsistent with the wording of the Sūtra signifying an Apūrvavidhi His virtual rendering of the expression 'vidhyādi' as equivalent to 'vidhyanta' is taking more than a permissible liberty with the text.[15]

S 's interpretation of the next Sūtra that the *Chān Up* concludes with a recital of the Grhastha's duties as he performs those of all (other) āśramas is not very satisfactory The Sannyāsin also performs 'Yajñas' tho' they may not be 'dravyayajñas' (See *Gita* iv 28) He also observes brahmacarya and other sādhanas As for his not performing animal sacrifices like a Grhastha, the latter in his turn does not go about begging for his food like the Sannyāsin These differences prove nothing As S is a believer in the pre-eminence of the Sannyāsāsrama over the others, it is difficult to see how he can so easily give up the position and raise the Grhastha to such supreme heights here

The existence of the two other āsramas besides that of the Grhastha and the ascetic has been established in earlier adhikaranas (Vide iii 4 20 and iii 4 40)[16] by S himself The doubt sprung by him and his commentator in their preamble to the interpretation of Sūtra iii 4 49 (See *Bhāmati*) is, therefore, unsustainable The use of the plural 'itaresām' in the Sūtra in referring to the remaining two āsramas as S and Vācaspati would have it, creates another serious difficulty Their explanation that the plural has been used in the Sūtra with reference to the numerous subdivisions of those two āsramas or their different duties,[17] is no more than a quibble and a desperate remedy

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14 See f.n 11

15 Cf प्रधानविधि विध्यादि न पुनर्विध्यतिरिक्त कश्चित आदिशब्दार्थ इत्यर्थ (*Kalpataru* iii 4 52)

16 Cf ब्रह्मचर्यं परिसमाप्य गृही भवेत गृही भूत्वा वनी भवेत वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजत । यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजत गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा (Jabala 4) Q S *BSB* iii 4 20 and

आचार्येणाभ्यनुज्ञात चतुर्णामेकमाश्रमम ।
आविमोक्षाच्छरीरस्य सोऽनुतिष्ठद्यथाविधि ।। (S *BSB* iii 4 40)

17 इतरेषामिति द्वयोरप्याश्रमयो बहुवचन वृत्तिभेदापेक्षयानुष्ठातृभेदापेक्षया वेति द्रष्टव्यम (S *BSB* iii 4 49)

CHAPTER LXXIII

PAROKṢAJÑĀNA NOT TO BE INDISCRIMINATELY PUBLICISED

9 *Anāviskārādhikaraṇam* (iii.4.49)

This *adhi* underlines the worth of Aparokṣājñāna[1] by insisting that instruction in Vedavidyā leading to Aparokṣajnāna[2] should be imparted to deserving persons alone and in privacy in keeping with its esoteric character *(gopyatva)*

Seeing how precious an asset Aparokṣajnāna is, it may be felt that it will raise its worth and bestow greater reward on the Jnānin[3] to disseminate the Vidyā leading to illumination to as large a number of persons as possible of his fellowmen.[4]

The Pūrvapakṣa accordingly argues that the Jnānin should communicate the Vidyā thro' public discourses so that it may reach and benefit the largest number of people who may be in need of it The Śruti also advises such wide dissemination of knowledge

The Siddhānta is that the Aparokṣajnānin should impart the Vidyā leading to illumination in strict privacy to deserving persons alone and

1 अत्रापरोक्षज्ञानस्यातिगोप्यत्वप्रमाहात्म्यमिदमर्थं तज्जनकपरोक्षज्ञानानुकूलोपदेश अनाविष्कुर्वन्नेव कर्तव्य इति समर्थ्यते (*STC* iii 4.49)

2. ननु, परमत इव नास्माकं अपरोक्षज्ञान शब्दजन्य यत तदुच्चारणमात्रादेव आविष्कारेण कर्तव्या भवति चिन्ता स्यात्, किन्तु परोक्षज्ञानजन्यम । तत्र च चिन्ता प्रवर्तते इत्यत आह—अत्र तावदपरोक्षज्ञानगत परोक्षज्ञानमत्र विषय इति (*STC*)

3 'यथा यथा ह्यैवं बूयात्तथा तथाधिका भवति' इति माठरश्रुतौ विद्यादान श्रूयते (M. *BSB* iii 4 49)

4 (न च) आविष्कारेण वचनादर्शयतामपि माध्या ज्ञानिनो भवन्तीत्याख्यानश्रवणादिषु निगूढैव प्रकटनीयम (M. *NV.* iii 4 adh 9)

should not broadcast it in public lest it should reach undeserving persons[5] and entail sin upon him. For the Śrutis[6] and Smṛtis[7] deprecate indiscriminate propagation of the sacred lore. Spiritual realization is not a matter of quick large scale production.[8] The Jnānin should, therefore, satisfy himself about the fitness of the persons by close association with and observation of them, and take into account the proper time and place and initiate them by stages.[9]

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja (iii.4.50)

S. and R. consider in this *adhi.* whether the childlike state *(bālyam)* which the aspirant has been enjoined to acquire in *Brh. Up.* (iii.5.1) refers to freedom from guile and egoism or being without any idea of purity and impurity of conduct, eating and drinking whatever one chooses and so on.

Explaining the 'saṅgati' or sequence of thought of the present *adhi.* with the preceding one, the *Kalpataru* makes out that the Pūrvapakṣa here draws support for its contention that 'bālyam' or the state of the child enjoined upon the aspirant refers to the unrestricted way of life *(kāmacāra)* from the fact that it is the wellknown sense in which it is used and understood in the world, even as the term 'maunam' has been taken in the previous *adhi* in the sense of preeminence of knowledge *(jñānātiśaya)* which is the sense widely associated with it.[10]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that 'bālyam' or being childlike means talking and eating according to one's liking and freely attending to one's calls of nature without any respect to place as generally understood.

The Siddhānta is that as 'bālya' or the state of a child has been enjoined in the Śruti as a subsidiary element *(aṅga)* of Vidyā, that pur-

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5 आविष्नारेऽयोग्यानामपि स्वीकारप्राप्ति (M. *BSB.* iii 4 49)

6 तच्च निषिद्धम्—
मा न स्तेनेभ्यो येऽभिद्रुहस्पदे निरामिणो रिपवोऽन्नेषु जागृधु (*RV.* ii 23 16)
येषां नैतन्नापर किं च नैक कदाचित् ब्रह्मणस्पते ब्रूहि तेभ्य कदाचित् ॥
'विद्या ह वै ब्राह्मणमाजगाम गोपाय मा शेवधिष्टेऽहमस्मि ।
अनार्यकायानृजवे शठाय न मा ब्रूया ऋजवे ब्रूहि नित्यम्' ॥ इति च
(Q Yāska) (M *BSB* iii 4 49)

7 *Gita*, xviii 66-67.

8 न ह्येव त्वरमाणे सिद्धिर्भवति (M. *NV.* iii 4 adh 9)
तस्माद्विचार्य योग्यानामेवात्वरया कथयित्वा सिद्धिर्भवति (*ibid*)

9 सहवासादिना तल्लक्षणै तदीययोग्यता सम्यगवबुद्धय तदीययोग्यतानिश्चयदार्ढ्यानुसारेणैकस्मिन् दिने सामान्यतस्तत्त्वोपदेश ततोऽन्यस्मिन् किंचिदुपपादन तत परस्मिन् इत्यादिक्रमेण (*STC*)

10 यथा पूर्वत्र मौनशब्दस्य ज्ञानातिशये प्रसिद्धिमाश्रित्य प्राप्तमौनविधिराश्रित एवमत्रापि बाल्यशब्दस्य कामचारादौ प्रसिद्धे तदेव बाल्य नहि शुद्धभावेऽपि तपस्विनि बाल्यशब्द वृद्धा प्रयुजत इत्यभिप्रेत्याह
(*Kalpataru* iii 4 50)

pose cannot be served by adopting the entire conduct of a child as having been enjoined on the aspirant The proper sense which can further the interest of the aspirant can only be 'bhāvaśuddhi' or the natural inward purity and innocence of a child characterized by absence of strong sensual passions and the like Tho' the term 'bālya' is not widely used in the sense of mere purity of heart, there is purity of heart in the child which acts as it pleases, without inhibitions We are, therefore, justified in restricting the sense of 'bālyam' to the former and take it that 'bhāvasuddhi' or childlike purity of heart is the object of the injunction conveyed by the words of the Śruti Bālyaena tiṣṭhāset."[11] The interpretation has the support of Smṛti passages like the following —"He whom nobody knows as noble or ignoble, ignorant or learned, well or ill-conducted is a Brāhmana" (quoted in S *BSB* iii 4 50)

Criticism

Promiscuous or unrestricted way of life *(kāmacāra)* in the case of the seeker of B *(jijñāsu)* has already been condemned in no uncertain terms in the Sarvānnānumatyadhi (iii 4 28-31). That should suffice to prevent a recrudescence of the doubt and the Pūrvapakṣa raised by S and R here

As for the Aparokṣajnānin, S has already established under the Sūtras iii 4 13-15 that the Jnānin is not affected by good or bad karmas Having thus countenanced Kāmacāra as the Siddhānta therein, it is difficult to see how he can now bring it up as his pūrvapakṣa

There is no conflict with any other statement of the Śruti in assigning to 'mauna' the sense of preeminence of knowledge *(jñānātisaya)* in the interest of establishing an apūrvavidhi in regard to the acquisition of 'mauna' But it has beeen shown in earlier adhikaraṇas (iii 4 41-42, 43) that the highest of Adhikārins, viz the Sannyāsin is liable to become a fallen man whose transgressions cannot be atoned for by expiations There is, therefore, sure to be opposition from other texts if 'bālyam' were to be understood in its general sense of unrestricted behavior of a child. That will naturally oblige us to go in for a more compatible sense of 'bālya' in the interest of justifying the injunction 'Balyena tiṣṭhāset' as conducive to the attainment of B It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the explanation of the *Kalpataru* that the Purvapakṣa of this *adhi* arises by way of an objection drawing support from the Siddhāntanyāya of the previous *adhi* If such conflict with

11 यद्यपि बालभावे भावशुद्धौ बाल्यशब्दो न प्रसिद्धः तथापि कामचारादिमति बाले भावशुद्धिरप्यस्ति तावन्मात्रलक्षणया बाल्यशब्दः [illegible] । [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iii 4 50)

other texts may not prevent the Pūrvapakṣa from arising, there will be no need to put up the Siddhānta by adopting a different or restricted interpretation of 'bālyam' in terms of bhāvaśuddhi. Moreover, in his bhāṣya on the *Bṛh Up.* (iii.5.1) wherein the term 'bālyam' figuring in the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.*, according to S., occurs, he has construed it in the sense of (the state of) strength (born) of knowledge *(jnānabalabhāva)*.[12] It is difficult to see how S. can come forward with a Pūrvapakṣa here, by ignoring that meaning and adopting a different one of 'the state of pristine purity of a child.' Unlike S., R. has adhered to the same sense of the word 'bālyam' the child's nature of not being given to pride, arrogance and sensual passions.[13]

This other sense of 'bālasya bhāvaḥ karma vā bālyam' adopted by S. in the present adhi. cannot be taken to represent an alternative tradition of textual interpretation *(prasthanāntara)*. The Śruti and Sūtra here can represent but one identical tradition of interpretation subsisting between the original and its commentary. It would be very strange if the Śruti and the Sūtra should represent different traditions of interpretation.

The Smṛti texts quoted by S. under Sūtra iii.4.50 mention the attributes of an ideal Brāhmaṇa. But they afford no proof of the point that the term :bālyam' necessarily connotes those qualities.

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12 ब्राह्मण. पण्डितभाव एतदात्मविज्ञात निर्विद्य नि शेप विदित्वा ० ० ज्ञानबलभावेन बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्
(S. *Brh. Up.* c.111 5.1)

13. बाल्यस्वरुप च वक्ष्यते (*Śribhāsya* iii 4 46)
बालस्य यत्स्वभावानाविष्करणरूप कर्मं (*Op. cit.* iii 4 49)

CHAPTER LXXIV

APAROKṢA MAY BE ATTAINED IN SUBSEQUENT LIVES ALSO

10 *Aihikādhikaraṇam* (iii 4 50)

This adhi justifies the relation of means and end between Parokṣajñāna (born of Śravana manana and other disciplines) and direct vision of B (Aparokṣajñāna)—implicit in the argument of the preceding *adhi*[1] The point at issue here is whether the completion of the Sādhanas in a given life of the Jñānin is able to bring about direct vision of B *in that same life or may do so in a subsequent one* If it should so happen that in a given life wherein the Sādhanas have been completed there is or should be no dawn of Aparokṣa, it may either mean that there is no invariable causal relation between the completion of one's Sādhanas and the birth of Aparokṣa—unless there is some other factor to explain the absence The problem then requires to be thrashed out as it concerns the reputation of Aparokṣajñāna about whose merits and powers so much has been said in the previous *adhi* s[2]

The Pūrvapakṣa is—like agricultural operations, the means of Aparokṣa such as Śravana and manana should fructify in the very same life in which their *quantum sufficit* is completed If these means of Aparokṣa should, however, be vitiated by obstacles—as in the case of seeds sown being eaten up by insects, there can be no fructification of the Sādhanas in any future life also,—even as seeds so vitiated will

1. पूर्वाधिकरणे 'अन्यथात्व' इत्यनेनाधिगतस्य परोक्षज्ञानापरोक्षज्ञानयोः साध्यसाधनभावस्येह समर्थनादनन्तरसंगतिः । अत एव साध्यसाधनभावांशेन पूर्वसंगोपसंहारः (Raghu *TPB* iii 4 50)
2. इत्यादि, प्रागुक्तमपरोक्षज्ञानसामर्थ्यौक्तिकत्वं सर्वमप्युक्तमिति भावः (Ragh. *TPB*)

not sprout afterwards The analogy of Vedic sacrifices performed in one life bearing their fruits of heavenly rewards in another is inapplicable here For sacrifices are admittedly associated with unseen merit and other-worldly rewards in a future life Such is not the case with the means of Aparoksa [3] *In so far then as Aparokṣajñāna has to be realized here and now,* it will never be realized even in a future life in cases where it is prevented by obstacles The means and end relation between Parokṣajnāna and Aparoksa presupposed in the previous *adhi* is thus baseless

The Siddhānta is that there is no invariable rule that Aparoksa jñāna arises in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhanas is completed It may arise in another life also—depending on circumstances That does not nullify the relation between Paroksa and Aparokṣajnānas For it is admitted that Aparoksa arises in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhanas is completed—provided there is no obstacle or resistance offered by remnants of Prārabdhakarma [4] If there is such residue of Prārabdhakarma to be worked out, Aparoksa arises only in a subsequent life after the remnants are exhausted. The existence of Prāradhakarmas as obstacles to the birth of Aparoksa in the same life in which the quantum of Sādhanas is completed, does not completely nullify the power of Sāhanas to lead to Aparokṣa It only retards its birth [5] We have to accept this on the authority of Śrutis and Smrtis which enables us to get over the difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣa The relevant Śruti and Smrti texts (*taddarsanat*) have been quoted by M "Having gone thro' sravana, manana and meditation on Supreme B it is possible to have its direct vision in this very life provided Prārabdhakarma does not stand in the way If it does, the Sādhaka shall see the Lord in another life by practising the same means to the extent necessary[6] (*yogam*[7] *anvaveksyaiva*) " This is corroborated by the folloiwng from the *Brhatsamhitā* "Efforts must certainly be made to the extent necessary to break thro' the cage of past karma and sins in which the Jīva finds himself from immemorial past For, whether

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3 न च स्वर्गादिवदुपपत्ति तस्यैतच्छरीरेण भोगायोगात पातानन्तर प्राप्त्युपपत्त न चात्र तादश कारणमस्ति (*TD* iii 4 50)

4 The subject of the Sautra proposition is 'tad referring to Jnana 'Aihikam is what takes place in this same life — तच्च दशनमैहिकमेव प्रारब्धप्रतिबन्धाभावे (M. *BSB* iii 4 50)

5 श्रवणादिप्रतिबन्धक न पण्ढत्वापादक अपितु तात्कालिककार्योत्पत्तिविरोधीति भाव (*AC* iii 4 50)

6 श्रुत्वा मान मतिपूर्वं ह्युपास्य इहैव दृष्टि परमस्य विन्देत ।
यद्यारब्ध कर्म निबन्धक स्यात् प्रत्यैव पश्येत योगमेवान्ववेक्ष्य ॥
(*Sauparna Śruti* Q M. *BSB* iii 4 50)

7 योगशब्दार्थमाह—श्रवणादिक इति (Ragh. *TPB* iii 4 50)

one likes it or not, one has to travel the entire distance to reach his destination "[8]

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

Aihikādhikaranam (iii 4 51)

According to S this *adhi* considers whether the fruit of Brahmavidyā is realized by Śravana, manana and other means in this very life—or sometimes now and sometimes in another life, indefinitely R restricts the discussion to Upāsanās which have for their fruits exaltation in the sphere of Samsāra—the next *adhi* being devoted, in his view, to a similar discussion in regard to Paravidyā which has final release for its fruit His interpretation misses the point that all Vidyās taught in the Vedanta texts have to be viewed as Brahmavidyās in their unexpurgated sense

The Purvapakṣa according to S is that Karmas like sacrifices referred to in *Brh Up* iv 4 22, are liable to yield their fruits not invariably in the same life When such karmas are harnessed to Vidyā as auxiliaries in producing the desire to know B (vividiṣā) some variability in their fructification in this or in a subsequent life is to be expected. But in far as such sacrifices partake of the nature of 'prameyas' they are not of the nature of means of knowledge They, therefore, differ from sravana, manana and other direct means of knowledge in the matter of bringing their results into being As the sacrificial acts make for the cleansing of mental impurities or mitigating obstacles in the way of the unfettered movement of sravana, manana and other means of knowledge in the production of Vidyā, they cannot be said to be the direct means of the production of Vidyā. Śravana, manana and other sādhanas, on the other hand, are competent to produce their fruit of Vidyā independently, in their own right A person using his eye as a direct means of perception expects to see the object of his interest then and there and not after a long delay—much less in another world. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that Brahmavidyā must be realizable in this very life and not indefinitely in this or in a future life The śrutis and Smṛtis like *Katha Up* II 7 and *Gītā* vi 45, which refer to Brahmavidyā fructifying in another life are to be understood as praising its greatness—to the effect that śravana and other means of knowledge never fail to produce enlightment—which holds good even in the lives to come

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8 अनर्थिन्त्र मसबन्ध निर्मेन् पारमन्तरम ।
यावन्मा मवसा न्वप तावन्वाय न गमय ।
यावद् दूर स्थिता गम्यात तावद गन्तव्यमव हि ।
इह जन्मान्तर वापि तावयेव तु दशनम ॥ (M. *BSB* iii 4 50)

The Siddhānta points out the competence of Śravana, manana and other Sādhanas to bear fruit here and now is conditioned by the limitations incidental to their auxiliaries in the form of sacrifies and other acts referred to in *Brh Up* (iv 4 22) These latter pave the way for Śravana, manana and other means to produce Vidyā by either cleansing the mind of the seeker of its impurities or overcoming obstacles to the dawn of Vidyā The power of these auxiliaries to aid śravana, manana and others to achieve their objective without delay depends on the absence of obstacles in the form of other good or bad deeds and is, therefore, variable The Sādhanas of sravana, manana, etc which are thus dependent on the efficacy of the auxiliary karmas are, therefore, in their turn subject to delay in bearing fruit if there are such obstacles If there are no such obstacles they bear their fruit quickly in the same life It is not, therefore, unreasonable to expect sravana, manana and other means of Vidyā to bear fruit in the same life if obstacles have been overcome or the aspirant has been thoroughly cleansed—but not otherwise The variability of sravana, manana, etc, in bearing their fruit sometimes in the same life and sometimes in another has, therefore, to be admitted as a fact and need not be explained away as an arthavāda

Criticism

It is difficult to see how Śravana, manana and other sādhanas which in S's view, are *not* subject to injunction (*avidheya*) can be regarded as subject to variation in producing their fruit It is only when something is open to injunction that subject to adrsta and other contingencies its fructification may be admitted to be delayed—as in the case of sacrificial performances The correct Siddhānta would, therefore, appear to be that as sacrifices and sravana, manana etc alike are the direct mens of vidyā their fruits too will have to be recognized as realizable only in the hereafter In the case of the Jnānin, no injunction in regard to the performance of sacrifices is admitted by S[9] From another point of view, no vidhi has been admitted in regard to sravana, manana, etc It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Siddhānta in favor of variability of sādhanas in bearing the fruit of vidyā can be sustained

Moreover, sravana, manana etc which are undertaken for the sake of 'dṛṣtaphala' have naturally to be connected with their fruit in the same life The analogy of the practice of the science of music being able to produce an intuitive perception of the nature of different svaras

9 Cf कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि इत्यविद्यावद्विषयमिति यथा । विद्यावद्विषयत्वेऽप्यविरोध विद्यास्तुत्यर्थत्वात
(*Bhamati* iii 4 14)

like ṣadja, madhyama, etc, introduced by the *Kalpataru* is not in order For the practice of music falls under the scope of Śabdapramāna The theory of Śabda producing intuitive perception (sabdāparokṣa) of things is not accepted outside the Advaita school and is not, therefore, a conclusive argument At the most, the practice of the science of music may be regarded as an auxiliary to the intuitive perception of svaras (*svarajñāna*), but it cannot, on that account, be held to be the *direct means* of such perception

CHAPTER LXXV

FRUIT OF APAROKSA MAY LIKEWISE BE ATTAINED IN ANOTHER LIFE

(11) *Muktiphalādhikaraṇam* (iii 4 51)

This adhi establishes the mighty power of Aparoksa to confer Mokṣa [1] By way of analogical extension (*atideśa*) of the Siddhānta of the previous adhi it shows that here again there is no invariable rule that the fruit of Mokṣa is attained in the same life in which Aparoksa is attained.

The tenor of the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta run on parallel lines in these two adhis with this difference that the present adhi., arises on the basis of a supervening doubt (*viśesāśankā*)[2] that unlike in the case of the birth of Aparokṣa in the same life in which the Sādhanas are completed being dependent on there being no impediment in the form of Prārabdhakarma, there is no evidence of the power of Aparokṣa to give rise to Moksa being similarly tied to the absence of any such conceivable obstacle—as there is no explicit textual authority of Śruti pointing to the existence of such a counter-influence restraining the power of Aparoksa to lead to Mukti immediately.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no proof to establish that Aparokṣajnāna has the power to give rise to Mokṣa The text, 'Jñānena amrtī-

1 अत्र पूर्वाधिकरणे श्रवणादिजन्यत्वेन निर्णीतापरोक्षज्ञानस्य मुक्तिसाधकत्वसमर्थनादनन्तरसंगति (Raghu *TPB* iii 4 51)

2 अत्र पूर्ववदेव चिन्तापरपरा, पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तश्च ज्ञेया विशेषस्तु * * * * (Ragh *Ny Muktavali*)

bhavati' is insufficient for the purpose The purport of this text is uncertain—whether it is that Jnāna produces Mokṣa immediately after the disintegration of the body with which the Aparokṣa is attained or that it may do so much later in another life[3] The former is disproved by the examples of Indra and other gods who tho' they are Brahmajñānins, according to all accounts,[4] do not attain Mokṣa on the destruction of that body of theirs in which they attained Aparokṣa There is no decisive evidence that in such cases Mokṣa is delayed by the obstacle created by Prārabdhakarma For, in the case of Sādhanas like Śravana, and manana and Aparoksa there is textual evidence of the existence of obstacles interposed by Prārabdhakarma[5] We have no such evidence of the causal relation between Aparokṣajnāna and Moksa being subject to variability (*aniyama*)—as in the other case In the absence of such evidence, we have to agree that Aparoksajñāna brings about Mokṣa immediately or else never at all The 'aniyamapakṣa' (principle of variability) pressed into service in the earlier adhi. cannot be extended to the present topic[6]

The Siddhānta establishes that there is scope for the principle of variability (*aniyama*) being applied to Aparokṣajnāna leading to Mokṣa with special reference to the presence or absence of remnants of Prārabdhakarma This predicable factor is inferred by presumptive reasoning (*arthāpatti*) applied to the wording of the text 'Brahmasamstho amrtatvam etyeva' carrying the emphatic particle (*eva*).[7]

The *STC* brings out the nature and drift of the Śrutārthāpatti implicit in the *avadhṛti* or *avadhārana* very clearly

न च तात्पर्यनिर्णायकवचनाभाव इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम्। न च वचनमेव तन्निर्णायकम्। युक्तेरपि तन्निर्णायकत्वाङ्गीकारात्। अन्यथा मीमांसावैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः।

तथाहि–ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेत्येव, इति ज्ञानिनो मोक्षावधारणात् तत्र तात्पर्यं सिद्धम्। ज्ञानिना च तच्छरीरपातानन्तरमेव मोक्षानुपलम्भश्च प्रामाणिकः तदुभयान्यथानुपपत्त्या किंचित् प्रतिबन्धकं कल्पनीयम्। अन्यथा वाक्यप्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः। तच्च ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वं प्रारब्धकर्मणः क्लृप्तमिति इहापि तस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वं कल्प्यते (*STC* iii 4.51)

3 न ज्ञानस्य मोक्षजनने विलम्बमानत्वमस्ति प्रमाणाभावात्। न च ज्ञानेनामृतीभवति इत्यादि प्रमाणम्। तस्य तात्पर्यानिर्धारणात् (*STC* iii 4 51)

4 'नैव देवाः प्राप्ता ब्रह्मदर्शनवर्जिताः'

5 Cf. यद्यारब्धं कर्म निर्बन्धं स्यात्
प्रेत्यैव यत्नेन यावत्तावदस्य ॥ (*Sauparna Śruti* Q M *BSB* iii 4 50)

6 यथा ज्ञानेऽनियमः तथा मुक्तावपि तच्छरीरपातानन्तरमेव मोक्ष इति नियमो नास्ति किंतु शरीरपातानन्तरं जन्मान्तरे प्राप्यं वा। न च निष्कारणमनियमः कदापि मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्ग। प्रारब्धप्रतिबन्धभावाभावयोर्नियमकारणत्वात् (*TP* iii 4 51)

7 श्रुतान्न प्रतिबन्धकल्पनम्। श्रुतौ हि ब्रह्मसंस्थस्य मोक्षावधारणात् प्रतिबन्धाभावे तदनुपपत्तेरिति भावः (*TP.* iii 4 51)

The above Śrutārthāpattipramāna is supported by a clear evidence from the Smrti quoted by the Bhāsyakāra —

"He who knows B attains Moksa There is no doubt about it But he attains Mokṣa after the fall of the same body if his Prārabdhakarma is exhausted If not, he goes thro' several births and in the end attains Moksa"[8]

The *TP* points out that the use of the expression 'phala' (in muktiphala') in the Sūtra (being otherwise superfluous) is intended to suggest the secondary and concomitant nature of the other powers of Aparokṣajnāna in the conferment of the other Purusārthas, dealt with earlier[9]

Śaṃkara's Interpretation

According to S this adhi discusses whether as in the case of the *birth of knowledge* in this life or in another depending on the absence or presence of obstacles or the intensity of Sādhanas, there is possibility of similar variation *in the fruition of this knowledge* For it has been shown in the previous adhi that there is distinction in the nature of vidyā according to the quality or intensity of the Sādhanas and that its birth may take place in this life or in another depending on those extraneous factors A doubt may arise if in the same way, the fruit of Vidyā viz Moksa also carries similar distinctions But then the difficulty is that we cannot think of a Moksa which takes place in this life and another in a subsequent life after the birth of Vidyā For, it is absolutely necessary to recognize Jivanmukti or Mukti in the very life in which Brahmajnāna ripens, all the more so when Prarabdhakarma has been worked out[10]

Therefore, the only relevant distinction that can be recognized in the case of the fruit of Vidyā (viz Moksa) is some kind of natural distinction in the very essence of Mokṣa itself There is ample evidence of distinction in the fruits of Sagunavidyā Since Moksa is also the

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8 तत्र प्रतिबन्धकमदभावे एषा श्रुतिरर्थापत्त्युपस्थापनद्वारा प्रमाणमित्यर्थ (Satyanatha *AC* iii 4 51)

विद्वानमृतमाप्नोति नात्र कार्या विचारणा।
अवसाने यदारब्धं कर्म तत्रैव गच्छति
न चेत बहूनि जन्मानि प्राप्यैवान्ते न संशय ।
इति नारायणाध्यात्मे (Q M *BSB* iii 4 51)

9 सर्वपुरुषार्थप्राप्तिदर्शनात् इत्युक्तेऽपि इतरेषामानुषङ्गिकत्वं माभात्फलत्वं मुक्तरवेति फलशब्द इति (*TD* iii 4 51)

10 यथा साधनोत्कर्षनिकर्षाभ्यां तत्फलस्य विद्याया उत्कर्षनिकर्षावेवं विद्याफलस्यापि मुक्तेरुत्कर्षनिकर्षौ संभाव्येत न च मुक्तावैहिकामुष्मिकलक्षणो विशेष उपपद्यते ब्रह्मोपासनापरिपाकलब्धजन्मनि विद्याया जीवतो मुक्तेरवश्यंभावनियमात् नाप्यारब्धविपाककर्मापेक्षाय (*Bhamati* iii 4 52)

fruit of Vidyā, there is no difficulty in admitting similar natural distinctions of abundance or deficiency in its nature[11]

The Siddhānta is that no such inner distinctions in the nature or essence of Mokṣa can be admitted as it is of uniform essence for all—as established in the Śrutis For Mukti is nothing but the essense of B's eternal being It is not something which can be brought into being by effort or means The birth of Vidyā consisting as it does in the annihilation of all the ills of samsāra together with their impressions (*vāsanās*), does not admit of any distinction of degrees or of special features, on the basis of which we may think of distinct forms or degrees of Moksa Even in the case of Nirgunavidyā, there is no intrinsic difference apart from the only consideration of its being produced in the same life in some cases or after one or more lives in some others As for the Sagunavidyās such distinctions are conceivable, based on the inclusion or exclusion, addition or subtraction of certain attributes for meditation[12] The acceptance of distinctions in the nature of Moksa is riddled with logical difficulties Such distinctions, if accepted, cannot be held to be different from the essence of Mokṣa for that would offend against the oneness of Mokṣa established by the Śrutis If they are identical with the essence of Mokṣa, they cannot be distinct from one another To admit such distinctions to be both different from and identical at the same time with the essence of Mokṣa is to invite a palpable logical contradiction. It follows then that the state of Mokṣa is without any distinction and cannot be delayed after knowledge is attained for knowledge of B is itself liberation[13]

Criticism

The wording of the Sūtra 'Evam muktiphalāniyamaḥ' indicates an extension of the principle of 'aniyama' or variability established in the preceding adhi In the light of this incontrovertible fact, S's interpretation which *denies* such variation and affirms uniformity that the fruit of Vidyā viz. mokṣa is realzed without delay or default caused by other causes is off the track.

11 तस्मात् मुक्तावप्यस्य निकर्षोत्कर्षौ स्याताम् । अपि च सगुणानां विद्यानामुत्कर्षनिकर्षाभ्यां तत्फलानामुत्कर्ष निकर्षौ दृष्टाविति मुक्तावपि विद्यायत्तत्वात् स्यातामुत्कर्षनिकर्षौ स्यातामिति प्राप्त उच्यते (*ibid*)

12. मोक्षेऽप्युत्कर्षविशेषं भवाभेदविकल्पासहत्व युक्ति (*Kalpataru*)

13. न । मुक्तेः तत्र तत्रैकरूप्यस्यावधृतत्वात् । साध्यं हि साधनविशेषात् विशेषवत् भवति । न च मुक्तिर्ब्रह्मणो नित्यस्वरूपावस्थानलक्षणा नित्या सती साध्या । न च सत्यामपि शेषविशेषसमारोपप्रसक्तौ विद्याया अविशेषात् येन तद्गता माना विशेषवान् । न च चिराचिरोत्पादानुत्पादन तस्य विद्यायामपि स्वता भेद कश्चिदुपलभ्यते । तस्मात् अप्रकर्षप्रत्वेन शुद्ध । सगुणास्तु विद्यास्तु तत्तद्गुणावापोद्वापाभ्यां फलस्योत्कर्षनिकर्षौ युज्यते

(*Bhāmatī* iii 4 52)

As the question discussed in the previous adhi is whether the effect of Vidyā is 'aihika' or 'āmuṣmika', the point to be discussed with reference to the fruit of such Vidyā should also be whether its attainment in aihika or āmusmika to be realized in this world or in the next The *Bhāmatī* has, as we have seen already, dismissed such a line of inquiry as untenable as it conflicts with the concept of Jīvanmukti The only other alternative open to discussion is whether there is any scope for any such discussion whether Mokṣa is attained in this or in another life. But in so far as no natural or intrinsic difference in the nature of Sādhanas as such has been recognized, the objection that there is or may be distinctions in the nature and essence of Moksa itself cannot be raised If such an objection is to be raised on the ground that as such distinctions are found to exist in the fruits associated with Sagunavidyās, similar distinctions must exist in Moksa which in also the fruit of Vidyā, it will disrupt the Sangati (connection) with the topic of the previous adhi which is concerned with the question of the aihikatva or anuṣmikatva of the birth of knowledge and *not* with distinction subsisting among the fruits of Sagunavidyās

Coming to the Siddhānta, if it is set forth by admitting the mere dissolution of Avidyā to be the essence of Moksa, the state of Jīvanmukti too will come under the purview of Moksa But it is found that persons in that state do exhibit passions and prejudices in different degrees This would belie the fact that there are no distinctions in the released state

Apart from this, there is wide difference in the Sādhanas to be observed by Mumuksus belonging to different varnas and āśramas as prescribed in the Śāstras It would be an unconscionable waste of time, effort and tiresome Sādhanas in preference to the simpler and easier ones, if their net result—the fruit of all their Sādhanas, is to be the same and not in proportion to the quantum of their Sādhanas A sound theory of Mokṣa should respect the law of proportionate return

The Advaita theory recognizes the existence of many layers of upādhis which obscure the nature of Ātman such as avidyā, kāma, karma, *et hoc* It is admitted that as each of hese 'āvaranas' gets disrupted, the shining forth of the self becomes more and more vivid Why then can it not be true that even after all the āvaranas have been disrupted the intensity and vividness of realization of B may vary and differ among the Muktas in proportion to their intuiting power and mettle ?

The logical antinomies raised by the *Kalpataru* is defining the relation between the natural distinctions in the nature of Mokṣa, if any are accepted, with the essence of Mokṣa as such, can be resolved satisfactorily with the help of the concept of Svarūpaviśeṣas functioning thro' the relation of Saviśesābheda The place and importance of this concept of Saviśesābheda in explaining the rationale Dharmadharmibhāva have been elucidated in earlier contexts One need not, therefore, be deterred from accepting a wide range of distinctions borne out by Pramānas, in the nature and essence of Moksa attained by different persons and orders of Adhikārins or the possibility of some persons attaining it in this very life or in some other life

S's consideration of the question whether there are natural distinctions in the essence of Moksa is pertinent to the next Adhyāya and not to the present one If the distinctions intended to be refuted here are those pertaining to the question of the delay or expeditiousness in the attainment of the fruit of Brahmavidyā, S will be hardly justified in dismissing the presence of such distinctions which have been set forth in the case of eminent Jnānins like Vasistha, Apāntaratamas and others in the Yāvadadhikārādhikaranam (iii 3 32)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R restricts the present and the preceding adhi to the topic of upāsanās—the first one relating to upāsanās which are 'abhyudayaphalas' or those whose fruits are exaltation in the sphere of Samsāra and the present one to upāsanās connected with the fruit of Mokṣa

Unlike S he adheres to the principle of 'aniyama' or variability in the attainment of the fruit of Paravidyopāsanā as depending on the presence or absence of obstacles[14] This justifies the extention (atideśa) of the ruling of the previous adhi to the present one The 'adhikāśamkā' here justifying the opening of a fresh adhi, is that Nivrttakarmas which are the means of attaining Mokṣa are powerful enough to counteract obsatcles delaying the realization of the fruit of Mokṣa in the same life and that, therefore, there is no need to recognize any delay in the attainment of the fruit of Paravidyopāsanā[15] This 'adhikāśankā' is overruled by the consideration that even in the case of the upāsanā of Paravidyā there is the possibility of certain transgressions being committed which have such overpowering strength as may considerably delay and put off the attainment of the fruit of upāsanā to a subsequent life[16]

14 [illegible] (*Śrībhāsya* iii 4 51)
15 [illegible] (*ibid*)
16 [illegible] (*ibid*)

Criticism

It may be pointed out that if the discussion in these two adhis is to be restricted to the period of completion of the upāsanās, it would conflict with the Pādārtha as defined by R For, he has stated that the present Pāda discusses the angas of upāsanā and *not* the fruits of upāsanā or *when* they are to be realized[17]—whether in the same life or later However, as the only question discussed in this adhi, according to R, is whether there is any time definitely fixed (viz the same life or a later one) for the realization of the fruit of upāsanās which have Mokṣa for their fruit, the present Sūtra could more pointedly have been worded as "Evam āmuṣmikāniyamah"

17 उपासनाचिन्तनानन्तरं अङ्गचिन्ता क्रियत इति पादसङ्गतिरर्थसिद्धा (*Srutaprakasa* iii 4 1)

IV PHALĀDHYĀYA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The concluding Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras deals with the fruits of Brahmajñāna—viz, (i) the destruction of Karmas which have accumulated till the attainment of Aparokṣa This is the state of Jivan mukti, (ii) Utkrānti or the ascent of the Soul from its last physical body in transmigratory life thro' the Brahmanāḍi, (iii) Mārga or its journey to Brahmaloka thro' different stages of the path of light and (iv) Bhoga or final experience and enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa after the dissolution of the Lingasarira on the way to Brahmaloka

Tho' the fruit of Mokṣa in the sense of eradication of Bhāvarūpājñāna and the experience and enjoyment of one's own selfhood in all its fulness, is uniform for all Jivas, the destruction of karmas has also been recognized in the Śrutis as one of the fruits of Jñāna

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे

(*Mund Up* ii 2 8)

Hence it falls within the scope of this Phalādhyāya and constitutes the main subject matter of the first Pāda There is organic relationship between Karmakṣaya and the subsequent phases in the unfoldment of Mokṣānubhava This entitles it to be recognized as the Pādopādhi and determine its designation as Karmakṣaya Pāda

The fruit of Jñāna has naturally to be understood in terms of one's ridding oneself of all ones disabilities and encumbrances and being able to attain one's most cherished spiritual objectives The eradication of

Sañcitakarma and exit thro' one's Suṣumnānādi are both of them in the nature of getting rid of unwanted encumbrances As such, they are entitled to be regarded as the fruits of Jnāna The Jnānin's passing thro' the realms of the deities of Arcirādi route after Karmaksaya, as described in the Śrutis and Smṛtis, is a source of expanding revelation which reaches its consummation in the ineffable experience of Svarūpānanda This expanding joy of the Mārga also, therefore, deserves to be brought within the scope of Jñānaphala and elucidated in a separate Pāda The attainment of complete bliss of Svarūpānanda after the dissolution of the Linga-śarīra before landing in Brahmaloka is described here Other interesting side-lights thrown on the different facets of the life of Muktajīvas and the relationship in which they stand to the Supreme Lord of Moksa deserve to be treated as coming within the scope of the fruits of Aparokṣajnāna Thus all these four phases of the unfoldment of the released state come within the scope and meaning of 'Phala' and are, therefore, taken up in their logical order of ascent in the four Pādas of this Adhyāya

कर्मक्षयस्तथोत्क्रान्तिर्मार्गो भोगश्चतुष्टयम् ।
फल मोक्ष इति प्रोक्त क्रमात् पादेषु चोदितम् ॥ (*AV* iv 2)

However, out of the eight adhis of in the first Pāda, only the last one actually deals with the subject of Karmaksaya The other seven are concerned with laying renewed emphasis on the essential and indispensable nature of some of the Sādhanas set forth in the third Adhyāya which, the Sūtrakāra wishes every Sādhaka to understand, *should be carried out as far as it lies within his power, with the utmost zeal, devotion and perseverance—even in the midst of the gravest difficulties* [1] It is to drive home this point that the Sūtrakāra has chosen to advert to them again and lay special emphasis on them at the very commencement of the Moksa-Adhyāya [2] For these have an inward bearing on the question of one's attainment of Mokṣa Default or defiance of them is sure to mar the chances of Mukti They are, therefore, specially *emphasized* here, instead of in the Sādhana Adhyāya, as they should otherwise have been This special treatment accorded to them shows that among Sādhanas they are most intimately connected with the fruit of Mokṣa (as *antarangasādhanas*) and, therefore, are of crucial importance to the unfolding of Mokṣa[3] The broad division of Pādas on the basis of the schematic arrangement of the four phases of

1 तृतीयाध्याये यानि साधनानि विचारितानि तेष्वेव केषाचित परमादरेणैतर्याम्या अनुष्ठेयत्वमादौ प्रतिपाद्यते तथानुष्ठान एव मोक्षस्य भावाद्‌यथा अभावात (*NS* p 613)

2. एतज्ज्ञापनार्थंव तृतीयऽनुक्त्वा अत्रेदमुच्यत (*ibid*)

3 तत्रानुष्ठानाहि ततो वैलक्षण्य ज्ञायत । फललक्षणे चावस्था फलान्तरङ्गत्वम (*VS p 613*)

IV PHALĀDHYĀYA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The concluding Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras deals with the fruits of Brahmajñāna—viz, (i) the destruction of Karmas which have accumulated till the attainment of Aparokṣa This is the state of Jivanmukti, (ii) Utkrānti or the ascent of the Soul from its last physical body in transmigratory life thro' the Brahmanāḍi, (iii) Mārga or its journey to Brahmaloka thro' different stages of the path of light and (iv) Bhoga or final experience and enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa after the dissolution of the Lingaśarīra on the way to Brahmaloka

Tho' the fruit of Mokṣa in the sense of eradication of Bhāvarūpājñāna and the experience and enjoyment of one's own selfhood in all its fulness, is uniform for all Jīvas, the destruction of karmas has also been recognized in the Śrutis as one of the fruits of Jñāna

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे

(*Mund Up* ii 2 8)

Hence it falls within the scope of this Phalādhyāya and constitutes the main subject matter of the first Pāda There is organic relationship between Karmakṣaya and the subsequent phases in the unfoldment of Mokṣānubhava This entitles it to be recognized as the Pādopādhi and determine its designation as Karmakṣaya Pāda

The fruit of Jñāna has naturally to be understood in terms of one's ridding oneself of all ones disabilities and encumbrances and being able to attain one's most cherished spiritual objectives The eradication of

Sañcitakarma and exit thro' one's Suṣumnānāḍi are both of them in the nature of getting rid of unwanted encumbrances As such, they are entitled to be regarded as the fruits of Jnāna The Jnānin's passing thro' the realms of the deities of Arcirādi route after Karmaksaya, as described in the Śrutis and Smrtis, is a source of expanding revelation which reaches its consummation in the ineffable experience of Svarūpānanda This expanding joy of the Mārga also, therefore, deserves to be brought within the scope of Jñānaphala and elucidated in a separate Pāda The attainment of complete bliss of Svarūpānanda after the dissolution of the Linga-śarīra before landing in Brahmaloka is described here Other interesting side-lights thrown on the different facets of the life of Muktajīvas and the relationship in which they stand to the Supreme Lord of Mokṣa deserve to be treated as coming within the scope of the fruits of Aparoksajnāna Thus all these four phases of the unfoldment of the released state come within the scope and meaning of 'Phala' and are, therefore, taken up in their logical order of ascent in the four Pādas of this Adhyāya

कर्मक्षयस्तथोत्क्रान्तिर्मार्गो भोगश्चतुष्टयम् ।
फलं मोक्ष इति प्रोक्तं क्रमात् पादेषु चोदितम् ॥ (*AV* iv 2)

However, out of the eight adhis of in the first Pāda, only the last one actually deals with the subject of Karmaksaya The other seven are concerned with laying renewed emphasis on the essential and indispensable nature of some of the Sādhanas set forth in the third Adhyāya which, the Sūtrakāra wishes every Sādhaka to understand, *should be carried out as far as it lies within his power, with the utmost zeal, devotion and perseverance—even in the midst of the gravest difficulties*[1] It is to drive home this point that the Sūtrakāra has chosen to advert to them again and lay special emphasis on them at the very commencement of the Moksa-Adhyāya[2] For these have an inward bearing on the question of one's attainment of Mokṣa Default or defiance of them is sure to mar the chances of Mukti They are, therefore, specially *emphasized* here, instead of in the Sādhana Adhyāya, as they should otherwise have been This special treatment accorded to them shows that among Sādhanas they are most intimately connected with the fruit of Mokṣa (as *antaraṅgasādhanas*) and, therefore, are of crucial importance to the unfolding of Moksa[3] The broad division of Pādas on the basis of the schematic arrangement of the four phases of

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1 तृतीयाध्याये यानि साधनानि विचारितानि तेष्वेव केषाचित परमादरनैरंतर्याभ्या अनुष्ठेयत्वमादौ प्रतिपाद्यते तथानुष्ठान एव मोक्षस्य भावाद्‌ यथा अभावात (*NS* p 613)
2. एतज्ज्ञापनार्थेव तृतीयऽनुक्त्वा अत्रेदमुच्यते (*ibid*)
3 तत्रानुक्त्याहि ततो वैलक्षण्य ज्ञायते । फलनक्षणे मोक्त्या फलान्तरङ्गत्वम (*VS* *p* 618)

jñānaphala thus remains unaffected by the consideration of these ancillary topics[4] for the most part, which form "a supplement to the preceding Pāda"—as Ghate puts it (*Op cit* p 135)

Among such indispensables are (i) the *āvṛtti* or constant and repeated practice of sravana, manana and dhyāna, (ii) the contemplation of B as the Antaryāmi-(Ātman) of one's own Ātman, (iii) never identifying B with any physical or mental construct or configuration of the object of dhyāna, (iv) that B is always to be looked upon as the Being of highest perfections, (v) the continuation of meditation right up to the actual attainment of Mokṣa—i e to say *even after the attainment of Aparokṣajñāna as mandatory* and so forth

The second Pāda deals with the subject of Utkrānti and its counterpart of Laya The former is for the human souls and the latter for the gods Utkrānti in its accepted sense is the ascent of the soul from the last physical body in Samsāra, thro' the Brahmanādi, at the time of death This is not conceivable in the case of the gods (Abhimānidevatās) If it is, therefore, understood in its more inward sense of destructnon of the last physical body at death preparatory to the attainment of Mokṣa, it will apply both to the gods and the human souls,—as the last physical body is disintegrated in both the cases, tho' in different ways as provided in the Śāstras This is how the opening words of M's bhāṣya on Pāda II

देवानां मोक्ष, उत्क्रान्तिश्चास्मिन् पाद उच्यते

are to be construed If, however, Utkrānti is understood in a restricted sense as distinct from Laya, the general statement of the Bhāṣya can be suitably split up and construed to suit each case separately[5]

The *STC* is the only commentary which explains the precise reason why and how it is not possible to conceive of actual exit (*utkrānti*) of the selves from their last physical body in the case of the gods—after they have fulfilled their responsibilities in the maintenance of the world-order For, by hypothesis, the gods are previleged to merge their last physical body in that of their immediate higher-ups in the hierarchy In the circumstances the existing bodies of each of the gods at the time of their Aparokṣa will be their last ones and as these

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4 अध्यायादिव्यवस्था च प्रासङ्गिकत्वादुपपद्यते (*ibid*)

5 देवानां [illegible] पाद उच्यते (*TD* iv 1 1)

V S Ghate unable to realize the nicety of this statement of M., has misconstrued it to say that (even) the Devas are subject to Utkranti from the physical body (*Op cit* 138)

get dissolved in the body of their superiors when these deities merge in them—(Cf *Van manasi sampadyate* iv 2 1) there is no question of their *exit* from their physical bodies thro' Brahmanādi The subject of their Laya and the exit of the human souls has, therefore, to be *separately dealt with This is done in Pāda II*

As applied to the gods, the expression Mārga (route) can likewise be construed in the sense of their moving towards the fourfaced Brahmā, with a view to entering him, as provided in the Śāstras, when the time for *his* attaining Laya draws near This will make it possible for the movement of the gods to be brought under the caption of Mārga and dealt with in Pāda III, together with the subject of the transit of the other selves

With one more Pāda set apart for the description of the nature and ways of Bhoga or experience and enjoyment of the bliss of Moksa applicable to all Muktas the number of Pādas in this Adhyāya is also kept within the schematic division into four only, as in the case of the other Adhyāyas

PĀDA I KARMAKṢAYA

CHAPTER LXXVI

REPEATED PERFORMANCE OF ŚRAVANA, MANANA ETC NECESSARY

(i) *Āvṛttyadhikaraṇam* (iv 1 1-2)

This first adhi enjoins that sravana, manana (and dhyāna) are all to be constantly and repeatedly gone thro' and not only once (to yield their fruit) as in the case of the performance of rites and sacrifices like the Agniṣṭoma or Darśapurṇamāsa enjoined in the Śrutis for the attainment of their fruits For, the competency of sacrifices to lead to heaven is ascertainable only on the authority of the Śrutis and is not amenable to ascertainment by anvayavyatireka, as the fruit of the sacrifices is supersensuous It is, therefore, accepted on the authority of Śrutis as being attainable by once performing the prescribed sacrifice The fruit of Jnāna on the other hand is to be experienced here (*dṛṣṭa-phala*) The competency of sravana, manana etc to give birth to Jnāna is, therefore, ascertained by anvayavyatireka, aided by the Śrutis By such anvayavyatireka it is established that Aparokṣajnāna is attained only when sravana, manana and dhyāna are practised continuously and repeatedly for a long period.[6] Moreover, Mokṣa is the highest of man's spiritual aspirations It cannot be expected to be attained just by a single act of Śravana or manana etc Otherwise, Mokṣa should be

6 Cf बहूना जन्मनामन्त ज्ञानवान् मा प्रपद्यत (Gita vii 19)

within the reach of almost everybody who goes thro' śravana, manana, etc once But we know it is not to easy Even the Devas have to put in prolonged and continuous Sādhanas of śravana, manana, etc and most intensive forms of penance[7] S, however, thinks that *āvrtti* is not necessary in the case of advanced souls in whose case a single hearing of 'Tattvamasi' may result in knowledge! *M holds that the more advanced the Adhikarins, the more intensive and continuous are their Sadhanas*

The intention of the Sruti in respect of the āvrtti of sravana, manana and dhyāna in the case of all classes of Adhikārins is clear, from the manner in which such precepts as those of Uddālaka to his son like Aitadātmyam idam sarvam Tattvam asi' have been given a number of times and can be deduced from the repeated reflections (*tapah*) and meditations (See *vyājānāt*) of Bhrguvāruni Vidyā described in the Taitt Up (iii 1-2) The NS points out tha tthe repetition of śravana, and manana is not only in terms of hearing or listening to the same texts or reflecting on their logical implications with the very same reasonings as may be implicit in them and going beyond them They involve the reception of the truth communicated by several other texts and reflections upon them with the help of fresh reasonings also[7a]

Tho' the repeated hearing of Śāstrārtha and its reflection are achieved under the terms of Sarvasākhāpratyaya taught in *B S* iii 3 1, the present *insistence* on their *āvrtti* is not rendered superfluous, for the purport of the present teaching is that one should acquire the truth not only from several texts but from the same ones too, repeatedly and reflect on their logical impregnability Moreover, as already pointed out the topic deserves reiteration on account of its intrinsic importance and indispensability

The evidence of Sāstra shows further that some of the Uttamādhikārins like the Devas put in most intensive forms of sravaāa, manana and other sādhanas, extending over eons under the guidance of their superiors There are also, other texts like 'Nityasas sravanam kāryam'

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7 For details see f.n 8

7a एकेन वाक्येनावगतस्य तत्त्वस्य पुनः पुनः तेनैव अवगमनं वा भवति श्रवणावृत्तिः । एवमनया युक्त्यानुमितस्य अर्थस्य तयान्यया वानुसन्धानं मननावृत्तिः इत्यभिप्रेतत्वात् (*NS* p 614b)

which go to establish that śravana, manana, etc , are to be carried out repeatedly.[8]

Saṁkara's Interpretation

S holds that as the subject of direct vision of B and its means such as upāsanās have been dealth with Adhyāya III attention is now turned to the inquiry into the fruits in the next Adhyāya along with some other incidental matters The opening Pāda deals with Jīvanmukti. The first adhi is, however, concerned with the repeated performance of śravana, manana, etc set forth in the preceding Pāda

Criticism

To S the direct intuitive perception of B is in itself the fruit—*Brahmāvagatir hi purusārthah* He is not, therefore, justified in making any distinction between the goal or fruit and its means Nor does he admit the presence or possibility of any experience and enjoyment of the bliss of selfhood in Moksa There is, therefore, no substance in his talking about the fruits of Brahmāparoksa.

It cannot be held that by Sādhana is meant the means of meditative experience of B in the form of Upāsanās while the intuitive perception of B is its fruit For Upāsanā in S's system is founded upon superimposition of attributes on the Nirguna-B While it may lead to the Sākṣātkāra of Saguna-B , such Upāsanā cannot possibly be regarded as the means of direct experience of the Nirguna Moreover, "fruit" is what comes to be *accomplished* thro' sādhanas In so far as the *experience of Nityasuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva-B is identical with the* nature of B itself, it makes no sense to talk of Sakṣātkāra as the *means* of Brahmānubhava

8 [illegible] । [illegible] (*AV* iii 4 *adh.* 4)
निगान्तानन्त पूर्वमुखाबह्वस्त ममान ।
मुख्यावाप्तता नाम याग्या [illegible] य ॥
मार्धं परार्धं विन्यान्तु गुणात मनसा [illegible] ।
तद्विभागमुपामा च चक्र [illegible] ॥
[illegible] ।
पद्मान्यान गुमनम गुनन्दा नाम चायुगान ॥
[illegible] मन्वन्तरचतुष्टयम ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible] मन्वन्तरचतुष्टयम ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible] न सर्वं [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ (*AV* iv 1, 2)

No useful purpose can be served by insisting on the repetition of śravana, manana, etc as has been done in the opening Sūtra S can hardly afford to accept that Brahmanhood comes to be experienced as the objective content of such experience For to him the subject of all experience can never be presented as the object of its own experience What then is to be gained by the needless repetition of śravaṇa manana, and dhyāna in such a predicament?

If Jīvanmukti is the fruit of direct perception of Saguna B. it will have to be shunned like the fruits of the udgītha and other upāsanās by the true seeker If it is the fruit of Nirguna-realization such realization being the source of liquidation of the entire panorama of world-appearance thro' the power of the final Vrtti in terms of worldless, aspectless and contentless cognition (*niṣprapañcaniṣprakāraka-Jñāna*), the state of Jīvanmukti would be equally swallowed up and there will be left neither the Jīvanmukta as such nor Jivanmukti to be made the subject of elucidation in the first Pāda

In this connection, it is interesting to read the ff statement in refutation of Svami Agehananda's criticism of Hinduism and Vedānta by a believing Advaitin Dr P Narasimhayya "Bare feeling and bare consciousness are not real but illegitimate abstractions There is no contentless or zero consciousness The pulse beat of all consciousness is the awareness that 'this is not that'—a cognition however dim of an identity in difference, as Indian and Western logicians and modern writers have pointed out" (*Bhavan's Journal*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, Jan 16, 1977 p 41 col 2) Cf also विषयवर्जितः प्रकाश एव न भवति, घटवत् । तत्प्रमाणाभावात् (*M Tattvodyota*)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R the first two Pādas of the Sādhana Adhyāya have dealt with all such matters as are connected with detachment towards external objects of enjoyment and creating in their place a consuming thirst for God The third Pāda has dealt with the question of unity or difference of Vidyās and the last one with the question whether the fruit of Vidyā accrues directly from meditation on the Vidyās *or* from works (karma) of which the meditations are subordinate members [9]

The fourth Adhyāya, therefore, turns to the fruits of Vidyā after a preliminary clearing up of the nature of this meditation The second Pada treats of the souls' departure from the body These two Pādas are introductory in scope The third Pāda determines the road which

9 इदानीं विद्यात पुरुषार्थ उत विद्याङ्गकात कर्मण इति चिन्त्यते (*Śribhasya* iii 4 1)

the soul of the wise one follows and the last Pāda deals with the kind of superior existence (*aiśvarya*) which the souls enjoy in the released state.

We have to draw attention to one prominent fact that while giving the outline of the contents of the four Pādas of the Sādhanādhyāya, R's bhāsya fails to make room for the direct vision of B (*bhagavad-darśanam*) as the theme of one of the Pādas—preferably the last. It is premature to go into the question of the fruits of Vidyā in the Phala Adhyāya without giving a proper place to the direct vision of B as the final means, in Adhy III It cannot be said that God-vision is the fruit itself and not the means of Moksa The presence of such texts as 'Jnānena amrtībhavati' 'Jñānād eva tu kaivalyam' shows that direct vision of B is the means of attaining Mokṣa It cannot be said that these texts merely refer to the indirect knowledge of B in the form of upāsanās described in the Sādhana Adhyāya Texts like 'Dṛṣṭvaiva tam mucyate' 'Jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca' (*Gita* XI 54) show that there is a clear distinction between 'Jñānam' and 'Darśanam'.

If Vedana as a mental psychosis is itself to be regarded as Mokṣa, the mind being liquidated in Mokṣa, its transformed state of Parokśa-vrtti is also liable to be liquidated in Moksa with the result that no Brahmajnāna will survive in that state If Mokṣa is the experience of B by the Jiva thro' his substantive intelligence (*dharmibhūtajnāna*) what harm is there in recognizing in accordance with texts like 'Dṛṣṭ-vaiva tam mucyate' that knowledge of B gained thro' the disciplines of śravana, manana and upāsanā or dhyāna is the means of the direct vision of B ? The distinct place given to Aparokṣadarśana of B in M's philosophy shows the mystic quality of his teaching

It is not proper for R to make the fourth Adhyāya go into the fruits of Jnāna without giving adequate importance to the crowning point of Sādhanas viz direct vision (Aparokṣajnāna) of B in the concluding Pāda of Adhy III

The opening adhi of the first Pāda of Adhy IV according to R. discusses the question whether the act of knowledge of B indicated in the Vedānta texts, is to be performed once only or is to be repeated more than once The conclusion is that it is to be performed repeatedly

Criticism

R persistently disregards the fact that the meditative knowledge of B (*vedanam, upāsanā*) is not the same as the direct vision (*darśanam*) of B But the very text quoted by him

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (*Brh. Up.* iv, 5.6)

recognizes 'darśana' as something distinct from the means thereof—viz. śravaṇa, manana and 'dhyāna' (of R.).

R.'s Sūtrārtha of Āvṛttyadhikaraṇam

To suit his views on the place and role of 'Vedana' in the scheme of Sādhanas, R. has to *import* the words: the act of knowing or meditation is the meaning of the Śāstra": Vedanam śāstrārthaḥ (*Śrībhāṣya* iv.1.1). The subject of the Sautra proposition according to R. is thus 'vedanam' which is brought in thro' adhyāhāra. However, as *āvṛtti* (repetition) is the attribute of the subject of the proposition (viz. *vedanam*) it is not possible to construe *āvṛtti* in apposition with *vedanam.* To get over this difficulty R. has to turn the nominative 'vedanam' into the genitive case to get at the meaning: Vedanasya āvṛttiś śāstrārthaḥ or असकृदावृत्तवेदनमेव शास्त्रार्थः as R. puts it. However, as *āvṛtti* itself carries the sense of repetition there seems to be no point in treating *'asakṛt'* also as part of the Sautra predicate *'āvṛttiḥ.'* As 'upadeśāt' admits of a smooth syntactic connection with 'asakṛt', there is no point in disregarding it and turning to the imported idea of the synonymous character of vedana, upāsanā and dhyāna as the gist of the upadeśa referred to by the Sūtrakāra:

ध्यानोपासनपर्यायेण वेदनशब्देनोपदेशात् असकृदावृत्तमेव वेदनं शास्त्रार्थः

(*Śrībhāṣya*)

CHAPTER LXXVII

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED AS ONE'S RULER

(2) *Ātmopagamādhikaranam* (iv 1 3)

This adhi arises by way of an objection against the insistence on the repeated performance of sravana, manana and dhyāna of the attributes of B in the previous adhi

The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that it appears from the text enjoining śravana, manana, etc, viz. 'Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyas srotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah' (*Brh Up* iv 4 6) that the attribute of Ātmatva mentioned therein is to be made the subject of sravana, manana, etc, only once and not repeatedly For 'Ātmatva' understood in the (Siddhānta) sense of one's own and everybody's Supreme Lord (Svāmī) and Ruler is quite a well-known concept and attribute Its configuration in the mind of the upāsaka can be accomplished easily without the need for repeated hearing or reflection or meditation So, there is no need to insist upon *avṛtti* in this case It cannot be said that the need for repetition of sravaṇa, manana and dhyāna will hold true of the attribute of Ātmatva just as much as in regard to several other attributes of B by virtue of the injunctive force of the Śāstra in respect of repeated performance[1] For the necessity for repeated sravana, manana and dhyāna is likely to be felt only in respect of such attributes of B as are obscure, indistinct or extremely difficult to comprehend.[2] The concept of B as the universal Lord is quite a striking one An injunc-

1 न च शास्त्रबलाच्च तत्राप्यावृत्तिरास्थेयेति (*TP*)

2. स्वामित्वस्य सकलनिश्चितत्वात्। अप्रसिद्धगुणानामनन्य व्यापस्त्वेन तस्यैव नियम कार्यम् (*TP* iv 1 3)

tion in the Śāstra is open to restriction in scope when there is no point in extending its scope Insistence on repeated performance is opposed also on the ground of general incompetence and liability of the human mind to distractions Since there may be many attributes which one is entitled to meditate upon, it will be impossible to resort to repetition in respect of all of them Nor is there any particular reason to choose only one of them like Ātmatva and exclude the others Moreover, for reasons already stated, it will be pointless to pitch upon Ātmatva as the one to be made the subject of repeated śravana, manana and dhyāna The same principle can be extended to the other attributes also It is, therefore, unnecessary to accept āvrtti in principle or in particular with reference to Ātmatva

The Siddhānta is that the Supreme B (Ātmā) is ever to be scrupulously repeatedly known reflected upon and meditated as one's own and everybody's Supreme Lord (Ātmā=Svāmi) without fail For the wise ones teach and make their disciples understand that all Mumuksus must, at all times, bear in mind that the Supreme B is the Lord of all selves[3] The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra conveys emphasis and the term 'Ātmā' is to be read twice for syntactic purposes[4] The first "Ātman" as the subject of the proposition will have its conventional sense (*rudhārtha*) of B and the second "Ātman" representing the predicate will have the radical sense of one who gathers the souls unto Himself[5] as his dependents[6] For reasons already made known, the meditation on the attributes of Ātmatva, tho' referred to earlier, in iii, 3, 12-16-17 is emphasised here (सर्वयोपास्यत्वज्ञापनाय पुनर्वचनम्)

Moreover, the worthiness of an attribute of B for meditation has nothing to do with its not being very well-known but on its inherent value and importance[7] It has been made clear in Pāda 3 of the third Adhyāya that Ātmatva epitomizes all other attributes of B Its potentialities are vast[8] Hence, the Sūtrakāra's special interest in recommending and enjoining its meditation under all circumstances—even

3 आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च (iv 1 3)

4 अनेनात्मेति शब्दस्यावृत्ति तुशब्दश्चावधारणाय इत्युक्त भवति (*NS* p 614)

5 अत्र सूत्रे द्वावात्मशब्दौ। एकोऽनुवादार्थो द्वितीयो विध्यर्थं । आद्योऽविवक्षितावयवार्थं ब्रह्मत्वेन वर्तते। द्वितीयो विवक्षितावयवार्थं स्वामिन वदति (*NS* p 615b)

6 आदत्ते भृत्यनिति स्वामिवाची। आङ्पूर्वाद दात्र आतो मनिन इति मनिन प्रत्यये दस्य तत्वे आतो लोपे चैवरूपत्वात। यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह।
यच्चास्य सन्ततो भाव तस्मादात्मेति भण्यते॥ इत्यादिनिरुक्ते (*TDP* iv 1 3)

7 उपासनस्य फलायस्य प्रसिद्धयप्रसिद्धिभ्यां कर्तव्यत्वाद्यसिद्धे । आत्मत्वोपासनस्य मुक्तिहेतुत्वात सर्वथा कर्तव्यत्वम् (*TP* iv 1 3)

8 सर्वाधिकारिणां नानात्वेनाऽप्येतावदुपासन कार्यमेव। ततन्गुणानां तत्रान्तर्भावात 'अत्र ह्येते सर्व एक भवन्ति' इति श्रुते (*TD* iv 1 3)

when one is beset with calamities and in no mood to meditate on any of the other attributes of B known to him

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S this adh, discusses the question if B is to be comprehended as identical with the individual self or as distinct from it The Purvapakṣa is that it must be comprehended as different from B, on account of the essential differences between the two The Sūtrakāra refutes this view and establishes that Īsvara is to be comprehended as being identical with one's own self (ātmā) The differences referred to do not matter as they are the outcome of Avidyā and have no reality The authorities quoted are Jabāla Śruti "You are indeed I, O diety, I am indeed you", Eṣa *te atmā Sarvāntarah* (Brh iii 4 1), and 'He is thy self—the ruler within" (Brh Up iii 7 3)

Criticism

The mere citation of a few texts apparently favoring identity between Jīva and Isvara is not going to help us as such identity is opposed to reason, experience and other Śrutis too In the circumstances, the purport of the Śrutis as a whole has to be settled in conformity with reason and other Pramānas Jīva and Isvara are characterised by widely differing and conflicting attributes of imperfection vs perfection, limited intelligence vs omniscience, limited power vs unlimited sovereignty and so forth. If their identity is to be pressed in the face of such fundamental differences there is nothing to prevent us from taking other statements in the Śrutis like 'Mano brahma ityupāsita' 'Ākāso Brahma' at their face value But the Sūtrakāra himself according to S's own showing frowns upon the identification of the higher with a lower principle or being[9] If such identity is, therefore, to be treated as purely metaphorical as there can be no factual or essential identity between an intelligent being like B and an unintelligent tattva like the mind or Ākāsa, the identity between Jiva and Īsvara too is fundamental enough to be respected and not to be trifled with.[10]

If their difference of nature and attributes is to be dismissed as unreal, Īśvara will lose his status and he reduced to a nullity If Īśvara's existence is to be accepted on the authority of Śrutis, the fact of his being endowed with sovereign attributes which distinguish him from the Jiva have also got to be accepted out of equal regard for the authority of Śrutis.

9 नहि क्षत्तृदृष्ट्या परिगृहीतो राजा निकर्षं नीयमान श्रेयसे स्यात (S *BSB* iv 1 5)
10 [illegible] (*STC* iv 1 3)

S pleads that the identity texts seek not so much to pull down Īśvara to the level of the Jiva as to raise the latter to Īśvarahood by stripping him of his unreal associations with the limitations of transmigration [11] But then the Jīva cannot possibly be metamorphosed into Īśvara by merely outgrowing transmigration (*samsāryātmatvam*) The Muktas have admittedly transcended transmigration But they do not on that account become identical with Īśvara even in S's philosophy, for in so far Īsvara is still endowed with omniscience and other lordly attributes he is still to be looked upon as an unreal quantity while the Jivātman who has outgrown samsāra is pure consciousness and, therefore, a real being As such, there can be no real identity between the two

If the Śrutis are to be taken at their face value one should be prepared to concede that that part of the Jābāla text which says 'Aham vai tvam asi devate' does certainly pull down the deity to the level of the Jīva while the other part raises the worshipper to the level of the deity One will thus find himself in a blind alley by falling for the identity relationship The proper way of understanding the 'Tattvam asi' text without violence to the difference between Jīva and B has been explained under the Pṛthagupadeśādhi (ii 3 28-29) See also my *Lectures on Vedanta* Chap III

S's renders the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tu upagacchanti grāhayanti ca' to mean that the individual soul should be treated as being the same as Parameśvara and taught to others likewise, on the authority of texts like '*Tvam vā aham asmi bhagavo devate aham vai tvam asi*' (Jābāla Śruti), '*Tattvam asi*' and others This cannot be considered a proper interpretation of this Sūtra For the keyword of the Sūtra 'Ātmā(iti)' is nowhere to be found in the Visayavākyas cited by S where we find only such words as Tvam, aham and Tat This makes it doubtful if S is right in the choice of his Viṣayavākya There are also other reasonable ways in which the see-saw assertion 'Tvam va aham asmi Aham vai tvam asi devate' can be understood as giving expression to the bond of intimacy that exists between the Supreme B and the Jīvātman which is echoed thro' passages like Tava vayam smah Tvam asmakam asi, (*AĀ* ii 1 4) 'Mayi te teṣu cāpyaham' (*Gita* ix 29) 'Tasyāham na praṇasyāmi sa ca me na pranaśyati (*Op cit*, vi 30) There is no reason why the statement of the Jābāla Śruti also cannot be understood in terms of such intimate bond of loving relationship between the Jīva and

11 नहीश्वरस्य संसार्यात्मत्वं प्रतिपादनमभ्युपगच्छामः, किं तर्हि संसारिणः संसारित्वापोहेनेश्वरात्मत्वं प्रतिपिपादयिषितमिति (S *BSB* iv 1 3)

Īśvara[12] instead of in terms of an impossible identity of essence between the two.

S.'s attempt to find the keyword of the Sūtra viz. "Ātman", *which is absent in his Viṣayavakya from the Jābāla Śruti* in such *other* texts like Eṣa te ātmā sarvāntaraḥ (*Brh. Up.* iii.4.1) and Eṣa te ātmā antaryamī amṛtaḥ (*Brh. Up.* iii.4.1) is far from helpful or satisfactory in establishing any identity between Jīva and Īśvara, which he seeks to do. In the first place, the internal evidence of *BS.* i.3.1; 4 shows that the Sūtrakāra is decidedly against the application of the term Ātman in its primary sense to the Jīvātman and reserves it to denote the Supreme B. alone. *This has been conceded by S. too under the same Sūtra.* It stands to reason then that when the Sūtrakāra says: 'Ātmeti tu upadiśanti * *' he cannot possibly be holding the Jīvātman to be the predicate of his proposition: 'Parameśvaram Jīvātmā iti upadiśanti'.[13] He must evidently be having in mind a Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya relation between 'Ātmatvam' and the subject of the proposition—viz. "B" understood in its 'rūḍhārtha' and the predicate 'Ātmā' signifying the Supreme B., in the plenitude of its etymological sense.

S., however, seeks to interpret the term 'Ātmā' used by the Sūtrakāra, here, in the sense of the individual soul with a view to establishing its identity with the Supreme B. in the interests of "Ahamgrahopāsanāa."

Coming to the other Viṣayavākya quoted by him we find it declared in one of them—which is from the famous Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the *Brh. Up.* (iii.7.22) that B. is the Ātman's (individual soul's) 'Ātman' and *not that B. is the individual soul itself.* For, the full of this upadeśa runs: 'Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmano antaraḥ yam ātmā na veda yasya ātmā śarīram ya atmānam antaro yamayati eṣa te ātmā antaryāmī amṛtaḥ" (*Mādhyandina version*). It will be recalled that this very text

12. Read: तद्योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहम् (AA. ii.2.4) जीवेश्वरैक्यांगीकारे योऽहं सोऽसावित्येव पूर्यते । पुनः योऽसौ सोऽहमिति व्यर्थम् । न ह्यस्य तेनैक्ये तस्यानेन भेदशङ्का भवति । अस्य तस्येति भेदांगीकारे नाभेदो मुख्यः किन्तु तदधीनत्वमेवास्यस्य भवति । स्नेहविशेषो वा — चैत्रो मैत्रो, मैत्रश्चैत्र इतिवत् । तत्र सुमयस्नेहार्थतया पुनर्वचनं युज्यते । अस्यासि ह्येकप्रकारेण प्रयोगो दृष्टः । अत्र हि प्रयोगद्वैविध्यं दृश्यते । अहंशब्दस्य 'तस्योपनिषदहमिति' विष्णोरेवाहंनामत्वप्रसिद्धेः (*M Ait Up. bhāsya* ii 2 4)

13 नात्मेति सूत्रमीशस्य जीवत्वप्रतिपादकम् ।
आत्मशब्दं यतो हेतुं कृत्वा जीवं न्यवारयत् ॥
स्वशब्दात् प्राणभृच्चैव नोवत इत्येव वेदराट् ।
यद्यात्मशब्दो जीवेऽपि कथं स विनिवारयेत् ॥
आत्मशब्दोऽपि तस्माद्विष्णुरेव न चापरः ।
आत्मशब्दादय सर्वे तमृते विष्णुमव्ययम् ।
न वर्तन्ते यतो नान्यत्र क्वापि संपूर्णतः ॥ (*AV.* iv 1 5)

has been made the Viṣayavākya of his Sūtra Śārīraścobhaye' pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate (*B.S.* i.2.20) by the Sūtrakāra himself, where he has expressly held that the individual self is different from the indwelling spirit called Antaryāmī. This makes it clear that so far as the Sūtrakāra's siddhānta is concerned, the 'Ātmā whose Antaryāmi is B. is not identical with B. How then can we now make the Sūtrakāra go back on his own stand and pronounce the Ātman (individual soul) to be the same as B.? As usual with him, S. tries to get out of this tight corner, in his commentary on i.2.20 by putting in his plea that the declaration of difference between the individual Soul and the Antaryāmi-B. has its reason in the limiting adjuncts presented by Avidyā and is *not absolutely true.* Consistency in thought and interpretation may not be S.'s strong point. But the author of the Nirṇāyaka Sūtras never commits a *volte face.* S. attempt to construe the words 'Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi' as a proposition of the individual soul's identity with B. is also out of tune with the presence of the genitive pronoun (*te*) which refers to the Ātman (individual soul) himself; for the 'you' and the 'Ātman' are the same in S.'s position—whereas in the opinion of the Śruti where the words are used, "te" refers to the individual self and "Ātmā" to B., who *indwells in the individual.* It is not Ahamgrahopāsanā in S.'s sense that is taught in *BS.* iv.1.3 but the upāsanā of the Supreme B. as one's own and everybody else's Antaryāmī.

The other text from *Brh. Up.* (iii.4.1) 'Eṣa to ātmā sarvāntaraḥ' is equally inconsistent with the doctrine of identify of Jīva and Īśvara. For here "your Ātmā" is stated to be "the innermost being in all" (*sarvāntarah*). If the predicate 'te ātmā' is to be construed from S.'s point of view as the essence of being (*svarūpam*), it will be self-contradictory to say that the innermost principle in every being is identical with every being.[14] If the expression Sarvāntara should mean 'the being of all' (*sarvasvarūpam*) the other two words n the sentence 'te ātmā' before 'Sarvāntaraḥ' become redundant as the meaning conveyed by both turns out to be the same. Nor is 'Sarva' the same as 'Sarvāntara'—what is 'inside' (*antara*) of every being must be *different from those beings!*

S. adds to the confusion created by his distortion of the teaching of the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa, while interpreting this Sūtra in another way also. Throughout his comments on this adhi. he keeps on telling us that the Śrutis seek to establish the Īśvarahood of the Jīvatman after freeing him from the meshes of transmigration created by his ignorance.

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14 नहि सर्वात्मक. सर्वान्तरो भवति (*STC*)

ससारिण. ससार्यात्मत्वापोहेन ईश्वरात्मत्व प्रतिपिपादयिषितम्
(S *BSB* iv.1.3)

This cannot be accepted as a correct statement of his Siddhānta position. For even after the embodied self is liberated from his Samsāric upādhis and becomes Cinmātra, 'Iśvara' of Śāmkarite philosophy continues to be qualified by Prapañcopādhis In the circumstances, the liberated spirit cannot attain Īśvarahood as S holds forth. *His statement of the Sūtrārtha is thus not in order* If the intended meaning is the identity of the self with B (the Nirguna) and not with Īśvara, the way in which the Bhāṣyakāra has persistently been placing the image of Parameśvara (instead of Nirguna-B) before the reader, at the beginning the middle and concluding part of his Bhāṣya on this adhi [15] makes his interpretation of the Sūtra all the more misleading

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this adhi determines the true nature of the said meditation by defining the precise terms in which the upāsanā is to be clothed, with reference to the relation of the upāsaka to the object of his meditation The question raised is, therefore, whether B is to be meditated upon as a different entity (*arthāntara*) from the self of the upāsaka or as being the very self of the upāsaka himself [16]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that B is to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating devotee For it has been shown earlier under Sūtras i 1 15, ii 1 22 and iii 4 8 that the individual soul is something different from B whch is superior to it (ii 1 22) B must be meditated upon as it truly is If it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attainment of B will not be real

The Siddhānta is that B is rather to be meditated upon as being the self of the meditating devotee As to how the devotee can claim B , which is a different being, to be his ego is to be understood, without giving room for contradiction, in the light of the teaching of Śarīra-śarīrabhāva relation propounded in the Antaryāmi Brāhmana and other texts—i e to say, just as on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to *his* body the position of a self—so also, our own ego is to be regarded as 'belonging to the highest Self' In this

15 य शास्त्रोक्तविशेषण परमात्मा * * * * अपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणश्च परमेश्वरः, तद्विपरीतगुणस्तु शारीर * * * * आत्मेत्येव परमेश्वरः प्रतिपत्तव्य * * * * तस्मादात्मेत्येव ईश्वरे मनो दधीत
(S *BSB* iv 1 3)

16 इदमिदानीं चिन्त्यते–किमुपास्यं ब्रह्म उपासितुरन्यत्वेनानुसन्धेयम् उत उपासितुरात्मत्वेनेति। अन्यत्वेनेति। कुतः? उपासितुः प्रत्यगात्मनः अर्थान्तरत्वात् ब्रह्मणः (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 1 3)

sense B will be the Ātman' "Soul" of one's soul which constitutes the 'body' of B—so to say [17]

Criticism

We have to ask R for a clarification of the nature of the doubt raised by him Do the words ब्रह्म उपासितुरन्यत्वेनोपास्यम्, उत आत्मत्वेन इति (*Śrībhāṣya* iv.1 3) mean whether (i) B is to be meditated upon as placed in apposition with Jīvātman, or in an oblique relation (*vaiyadhikaranya*) or (ii) whether B is to be meditated upon as *not* standing in the relation of soul and body towards Jivatman or should be meditated upon as having the soul for its body and, therefore, standing in the relation of a soul to such a body viz the Jivatman, in view of the fact that "Ātman" generally suggests the idea of possessor of a body to which it stands correlated?

The opening words of the Sūtra 'Ātmeti tūpagacchanti' are competent to suggest a doubt only in terms of whether B is to be meditated upon as "Ātman" or as "not-Ātman" It is not relevant, therefore, to discuss the question of appositional or non-oppositional relation between Jīva and B As R. accepts the position that the Jīvātman is different from B., the Jīva's having any apposite relation with B will be inconsistent with it Tho' such apposition appears in texts like "Aham vai tvam asi, tvam vā aham asmi" it is not possible for R who is committed to the upāsanā of B on the basis of its śarīraśarīribhāva relation with Jīvātman to admit upāsanā in terms of an appositional relation between them He holds further that the upāsanā of B is to be in its true aspect and is not merely a matter of looking upon the object of meditation in a particular light for the time being.[18] It is not possible to accommodate apposition (*sāmānādhikaranya*) within the set-up a Śarīraśarīribhāva relationship The statements— "B is the Ātman of the Jīva and should be so meditated upon by him" mean to R only this much that B is the "Śarīri" (owner of the body) as it possesses Jīvātman for its 'body' These are not at all inconsistent with B being a different entity from the Jīvātman (*arthāntara*) The Pūrvapaksa that B should be meditated upon as being different from Jivātman does not get refuted by R's taking up the position that B is to be meditated upon and worshipped by the Jivātman as his "soul" (Ātman)—the Jivat-

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17 यथा प्रत्यगात्मन स्वशरीर प्रत्यात्मत्वात देवोऽह मनुष्योऽहमित्यनुसधान, तथा प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि आत्मत्वात परमात्मन , तस्याप्यहमित्यनुसधान युक्तमिति (*Śrībhasya* iv 1 3)

18 Read —
यत्र सामानाधिकरण्योपासने दृष्टिविधित्वशका सभवति, 'विज्ञान ब्रह्म चेद्वेद' 'येऽन्न ब्रह्मोपासते' इत्यादिषु जीवे ब्रह्मदृष्टिविधिदशनात। आत्मेत्येवेति वाक्ये इतिकरणदर्शनाच्च तस्य दृष्टिविधित्वशकाव्युदासाय-मारभणीयत्वमिति (*Śrutaprakasa* iv 1 3)

man himself being conceived in such upāsanāa as the "body" of B with its implications of dependence on B for its sustenance etc

Since the Pūrvapakṣa has taken the firm stand that as B is a different entity (*arthāntaratvāt*) from Jīvātman, it should be meditated upon by him as something different from him, we expect the Siddhānta to be equally forthright in maintaining that as Jiva is *not a different entity from* B the latter is to be meditated upon as the self of the Jīva Where then is the relevance in pronouncing it as the Siddhānta that as B is the Śarīrī (owner of the Jīva) as its 'body' it should be meditated upon as the Soul of the Upāsaka?

It is no use putting in that to look upon B as one's own soul is to virtually negate looking upon it as a different entity from B B's otherness of entity (*arthāntaratva*) to the Jīvātman can be negated only thro' affirmation of its identity with Jivatman. But the affirmation of B's being the soul of the Jivātman on account of their śarīra-śarīribhāva relation can only *strengthen* the fact of their being different entities This is conceded by R when he says "in so far as the highest self differs from the individual soul, in the same way as the Soul itself differs from its own body, the injunction to meditate on B as different from Jīvatman (Śvet. Up i 6) *is well-preserved and protected*"[19]

R.'s theory that words expressive of the body run up to the possessor of the body cannot be pressed too far The word 'aham' or 'Ātman' which denotes the individual self is not found used to denote or is understood in the sense of another sentient being who is qualified by one's own self Such usages as 'Devo aham', 'manuṣyo aham' may be treated as Gaunaprayogas or metaphorical extensions or as a mode of speech But in the present case, the upāsanā of B as "Ātman" is not to be treated as a 'Dṛṣṭividhi'—as R. himself has agreed. It is a meditation enjoined in all seriousness and truth. Hence, the purport of such a vidhi ought to be such as will be consistent with the fact of B being a different entity from the Jiva and superior to it—as admitted by R himself The only way of untangling the web of Sāmānādhikaraṇyanirdesa into which R. has allowed himself to be drawn is to take the help of the grammatical principle of interpretation of such passages enunciated in the Sūtra 'Saptasu prathamā'[20] so that the fundamental fact of B's being a different entity from Jivātman is retained as the basis of its upāsanā.

19 [illegible] स्वात्मनार्थान्तरत्वानुसंधानवत् स्वात्मनोऽपि परमात्मनार्थान्तरत्वानुसंधानात् पृथक्त्वानुसंधान विधानं च रक्षितम् (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 1 3)

20 See the discussion under Pratīkadhi (iv 1 4) and f.n. 2, therein P 530

CHAPTER LXXVIII

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED ONLY AS BEING *PRESENT IN* THE PRATĪKAS

3. *Pratīkādhikaraṇam* (iv.1.4)

There are Śruti texts like 'Nāma brahma ityupāste' (*Chān.* vii.1.5), Mano brahmetyupāsīta (iii.18, 1) Ādityo brahma ityādeśaḥ (iii.19, 1) which apparently sanction the meditation of these symbols as B. This is against the teaching of the previous adhi., that B. must always be worshipped and meditated upon as one's own and everybody's Lord and, therefore, different from everything finite. This adhi., therefore, sternly disapproves of such upāsanā and prescribes that B. should only be meditated upon as being *present in* the symbols and not as being *identical with them,* due to a mistaken notion of identity induced by the surface-sense of wording or by the presence of case-apposition (*vibhakti-sāmānādhikaraṇya*) as in 'Mano hi brahma' (*Chān. Up.* vii.3.1).

Tho' this adhi. does not directly lay down anything that is to be positively carried out, without fail, as in the case of the previous adhi., but only forbids the identification of Pratīkas in meditation with B., it serves, *in effect,* to emphasize that the temptation to identify the Pratīkas with B. should be most carefully and diligently avoided. Thereby it amounts to laying down that B. should, under all circumstances and conditions, be meditated upon as the supreme Ruler of all and never as being identical with the individual selves—much less with inanimate pratīkas like the mind or ether.

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that Pratīkas should be meditated upon as identical with B as the texts say so Such meditations carry their own fruit, as we see from the texts (Cf *Chān Up* vii 1 5) The principle has already been accepted in the previous adhi, that it is the fruitfulness of a particular form of meditation that makes it admissible and not that the attribute meditated upon should be fairly obscure and not well known. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in so far as such meditations based on the identity of the Pratīkas with B have their own promised fruits (*Chān Up* vii 1 5) they should be acceptable regardless of the fact that the Pratīkas are quite different from B [1]

The Siddhānta refutes the contention that texts like 'Nāma brahma ityupāsīta' do really contemplate or approve of the identification of the symbols with B in meditation Such an assumption, it points out, is due to interpreting literally the esoteric idiom of the upāsanāvākyas and other equally important doctrinal pronouncements wherein the nominative or the accusative case-forms are used in place of the locative or other case-forms [2] M quotes in this connection the authority of the Mahāvyākarana Sūtras

सप्तसु प्रथमा । षट्सु द्वितीया

and writes "In the series of Pratīkas from nāman to Prāṇa mentioned in the *Chān Up* (vii 2-15), both being referred to in the nominative (or the Pratīka in the accusative) the dull-witted are apt to mistake it for an identity-relation Only *the presence of B in the Pratīkas* is meant in such cases For words in the nominative and the accusative can stand for the locative and other cases"

It will be seen that in Sutra 'Na pratīke na hi sah' the predicate 'Ātman' has to be read by *anuvṛtti* from the preceding Sūtra in order to have a complete statement of the proposition And this word Ātman will have to be understood necessarily in the sense of Paramātman (as has already been shown in the interpretation of that Sutra) and not in the sense of the individual self of the Upāsaka—as S has held in his interpretation of this Sutra. *While there is every possibility of an average upāsaka falling into the grave error of meditating on the Pratīkas,*

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1 [illegible] (*TP* iv 1 4)

2 Examples are

[illegible] वै पुत्रको यथा ।
यथा [illegible] ॥
सप्तसु प्रथमा यस्मात् * * * * *
[illegible] द्वितीया सप्तमी मता ॥ (*TD* iv 1 5)

symbols or images as God or B. due to śabdabhrānti and, therefore, there is a real need to warn him against committing such an error, there is the least possibility of any upāsaka trying to identify the Pratīka with his own blessed self. There is, therefore, absolutely no need to forbid it in all seriousness. To suppose the possibility of one's being led into the meditation of the Pratīka as his own self (Ātman) on account of the self being identical with B. and, therefore, with the Pratīkas which are products of B. and, therefore, identical with it, is to let one's imagination run wild, as both the premises are invalid. Upāsanā, moreover, is concerned with B. and has B. for its object and never the individual self of the upāsaka. The question of the Pratīkas being identified with the self of the upāsaka does not, therefore, arise and the Sutra cannot be concerned with any such problem.[3]

Properly expanded with the *anuvṛtti* of the term ātman from the preceding Sutra, understood in its primary sense of B., syntactically connected with 'dṛṣṭi' drawn from the following Sūtra and with the word 'Pratīke' read twice (*āvṛtti*), we get two distinct propositions out of this Sūtra, on the subject of Pratīkopāsanā. The first one will be a negative proposition forbidding 'Brahmadṛṣṭi' or the identification of the Pratīka with B. (Na pratīke brahmadṛṣṭiḥ kartayā)—the reason being that the Pratīka *is not* B. (Nahi pratīkam saḥ=Paramatmā). In this proposition, the locative 'pratīke' will have the sense of Viṣayasaptamī' that there should be no Brahmadṛṣṭi in respect of the pratīka. Construed again as an 'adhikaraṇasaptamī' (bare locative), we get a positive pronouncement—that we should see and meditate on B. (as) *present in* the pratīka: (Pratīke) brahma asti iti dṛṣṭiḥ kartavyā.[4]) The Pūrvapakṣin's contentions that the fruitfulness of an upāsanā is the only criterion of its admissibility and that the Śrutis are interested, only in laying down such upāsanās and are not concerned with the question of their being true to the facts are alike inadmissible. The upāsanā of Pratīkas as B. will be in the nature of a perverted upāsanā (asad-upāsanā) which is forbidden by the Śāstras as leading to disastrous results.[5]

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3. प्रतीकेष्वात्मेति जीव इत्युपासना न प्रसक्ता। प्राप्तौ हि सत्या प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। न च प्रतीकेष्वुपासकस्यात्मदृष्टिः प्रसक्ता; प्रसजकाभावात्। यत्तु प्रसजकमुक्तम्-ब्रह्मण आत्मत्व, प्रतीकाना च ब्रह्मविकारत्व, तदुभयमप्रामाणिक प्रमाणविरुद्ध च। न ह्यत्यन्ताभासेन प्रसक्तिर्भवति। अतिप्रसगात् (*NS.* p. 619)
4. इदमुक्त भवति–न प्रतीक इत्यत्र तावदात्मेत्यनुवर्तनीय पूर्वसूत्रात्। अन्यथा प्रतिज्ञावाक्यस्यापूर्णत्वात् * * * प्रतीक इति सप्तम्यन्त पदमावर्तते। तत्राद्य विषयसप्तम्यन्तं नेत्यनेन संबध्यते। द्वितीयमधिकरणसप्तम्यन्तम्। उभयत्र "आत्मा" 'इति" इति पदद्वय पूर्वसूत्रादनुवर्तते (*NS.* p 619)
5. न चोपासनाविधावेव तात्पर्यं श्रुते, न वस्तुतयाभाव इति वाच्यम्। अविद्यमानोपासनस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात्–
   अचेतनमयोग्यं च तथैवातात्त्विक क्वचित्।
   नोपासीत परोऽनर्थः स्यात्तथोपासनाद्‌ृत.॥
   इत्युपासनालक्षणे (*TP.* iv 1.4)

It will be seen that M's stand on the question offers the best rational defence of true Pratikopāsanā as taught in the Śāstras While condemning in no uncertain terms and with no less fervor than any modern Christian missionary the identification of the Pratikas with the Deity for purposes of worship and upāsanā, M strove to create a healthier understanding of the truth underlying the supposed idolatrous forms of worship in Hindu society in the middle ages and thereby halt the iconoclastic fury of the invaders of Hindustan The encouragement given to Asadupāsanā thro' the acceptance of superimposition of Brahmadṛṣṭi on the Pratīkas in S's school and the dogma of Arcāvatāras in the Vaisnavism of Rāmānuja must have created widespread misunderstanding of the true meaning and significance of temple and image worship in the Hindu religion, in the minds of the crusaders of the invading faith, inciting them to acts of vandalism on temples and idols By opposing such misconceptions regarding Pratikopāsanā and their repercussions on image-worship M, has done a lasting service to Hinduism in restoring the doctrine of Pratīkopāsanā to its proper place in Theistic worship enabling both Hindus and others to look at it in its proper perspective

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S the question discussed here is whether the meditator is to see his own self (ātman) as the symbol The Pūrvapakṣa is that he should do so because the pratīka, such as the mind, given in the text 'Mano brahmetyupāsita' is a product of B and is as such identical with it The individual self or Ātman of the upāsaka is likewise identical with B As both the pratīka and the Ātman are thus identical with B they are also identical with each other Therefore, the upāsaka is perfectly entitled to meditate on the Pratīka as his own self

The Siddhānta holds that the Pratīka should *not* be perceived as one's own self For while the pratīka is comprehended as B in the first place, the former will cease to be a pratīka any longer—just as when we realise an ornament (of gold) as gold its individual character as an ornament is obliterated So when the pratīka itself is no longer extant how can its identity with the seeker's Ātman be established[6] or comprehended? The *Bhāmati* also puts in

'It is not proper to hold that texts like 'Mano brahmetyupāsita' convey that the mind and other pratīkas are to be viewed as the self (*aham*

6 यत्तु ब्रह्मविकारत्वात् प्रतीकानां ब्रह्मत्वं तत्श्चात्मत्वमिति तदसत् । प्रतीकाभावप्रसङ्गात् । विकारस्वरूपोपमर्दने हि नामादिजातस्य ब्रह्मत्वमाश्रितं भवति । स्वरूपानुपमर्दे च नामादीनां कुतः प्रतीकत्वमात्मग्रहो वा ?
(S *BSB* iv 1 4)

kārāspada) as in the case of some other texts like 'Aham brahmāsmi' where the self which is denoted by 'aham' is taught as being identical with B. The fact is that such texts teach that they should be meditated upon as B. (and not as the self). There is no point in contending that as the self denoted by 'aham' is in fact B. itself, there is justification for meditating on manas or other Pratikas—which are authorized to be meditated upon as B. as the self also; as there is no specific statement to the contrary effect. If mind and the other Pratikas are to be viewed as the self because of their being in their turn one with B. and, therefore, one with the self also, it would lead to the undesirable consequence that just as there is no objection to the self being viewed as B. because it is a reflection (pratibimba) of B. the other modifications (vikāras) of B. such as ether or water may have to be meditated upon as manas, vāyu, etc., by reason of their mutual oneness thro' being modifications of the same B.-stuff. But that will be exceeding the bounds of prescription. We have, therefore, to keep the upāsanā within authorized limits and have no right to import anything more.[7]

Criticism

If the Pratīka is not to be meditated upon as the self because there is no express injunction to that effect, the objection is not in order. For by the inherent force of the injunction that B. is to be regarded and meditated upon as one's own self on the basis of the identity texts, it is bound to follow that in as much as a pratīka which is one with B. which (latter) has been comprehended as one's own self—it can also be comprehended in its turn as one's own self. What is established by the inherent force or competence of a vidhivākya is equally entitled to be treated as coming within the scope of the injunction. The inherent competency of a Vidhi to express more than what is literally enjoined is admitted by the Mīmāmsakas too:

यथैव पाठः प्रतिपत्त्युपायः तथैव सामर्थ्यमपि श्रुतीनाम् ।
तेनैव चैतान्न समामनन्ति सहस्रभागं तु समामनेयुः ॥

A vidhivākya which is competent to lead to the comprehension of B. as identical with the self of the meditator cannot be devoid of competence to comprehend the Pratīkas which are not different from that

7. न तावदह ब्रह्मेत्यादिभि. यथाहङ्कारास्पदस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते एव मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत इत्यादिभिरहंकारास्पदत्व मन. प्रभृतीनाम् । किन्त्वेषा ब्रह्मत्वेनोपास्यत्वम् । अहकारास्पदस्य ब्रह्मतया ब्रह्मत्वेनोपासनीयेषु मन. प्रभृतिषु अहकारास्पदत्वेनोपासनमिति चेत्, न । एवमादिष्वहमित्यश्रवणात् । ब्रह्मात्मतया त्वहकारास्पदत्वकल्पने तत्प्रतिबिंबस्येव तद्विकारान्तरस्याप्याकाशादे मन प्रभृतिषूपासनप्रसग । तस्मात् यस्य यन्मात्रतयोपासन विहित तस्य तन्मात्रात्मतयैव प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । नाधिकमध्याहर्तव्यम् । (*Bhāmatī* iv 1 4)

B to be identical with the same self The plea that we have no direct or express statement to the effect is true of many other things like the falsity of the world which is taken by the Monists to be indirectly deduced from the force of the statements like 'Nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt'

If the meditation of the Pratikas as the self is not to be carried out because of compelling reasons against it, one may ask what precisely they are Is it a clear prohibition that nothing besides B should be meditated upon as the self or the difference that exists between the Pratīkas and the self in terms of one being the perceived and the other the perceiver? So far as we know, there is no text which expressly prohibits the identification of the Pratīka with the self The difference observed between the two can hardly matter as all such difference is purely vyāvahārika, to the Monist There can be no harm then in looking upon the Pratīkas as identical with the self *in the Pāramārthika sense* For, it is very necessary to posit an identify between B and the pratīkas in order to justify the meditation of the Pratikas as B According to Advaita philosophy Śrutis like 'Sac ca tyacca abhavat, vijnānam cāvijñānam ca' (*Taitt Up* ii 6) establish the relationship of the original stuff and its modifications between B and the Pratikas In the same way, the identify of Jiva and B is also conveyed by the Śrutis The identity of the Pratīkas with the self will be the natural corollary of the identity of both the Pratīkas and the self with B The existence of a vyāvahārikabheda between Pratikas and the self cannot come in the way of their identify even as the existence of vyāvahārika difference between the self and B does not affect their real identity

Vācaspati here rejoins that if the Pratīka and the self are to be treated as identical on the ground of both being the modifications of the same B we shall have to admit the mutual identity of any two Pratīkas like nāma and ākāsa for the same reason—which will lead to the adverse consequence of Ākāsa having to be perceived as nāma and vice versa

If such identity is posed from the point of view of pure consciousness which according to Advaita theory is the substratum of the appearances of ākāśa and nāma, it is verily to be admitted as true If it is posed from the point of view of both being modifications of the same stuff, such identity cannot be admitted as the identity of different modifications having different properties (*viruddhadharmādhikarana*) is opposed to perception and other Pramānas

If the Jīva can comprehend B as his own self by laying aside the attributes of being a transmigrating self by resorting to rarefied iden-

tity of pure consciousness (*cinmātralaksana*), for purposes of ahamgrahopāsanā, the pratikas too can be so identified with the self by denuding them of their specific attributes of nāmatva, ākāśatva, etc. and recognizing their identity with the unchanging, underlying substratum of pure consciousness Vācaspati's rejoinder is not, therefore, very much to the point

S has argued that no identity of the Pratika with B can be comprehended in the first place without first rescinding the character of the Pratika as a vikāra and that as the Pratika would cease to be while being so rescinded in the process of its identification with B, there is no possibility whatsoever of the Pratika as such coming to be further identified with the self (*ātman*) of the upāsaka

His argument is a double-edged weapon which can similarly be turned against the comprehension of B as the upāsaka's own self—approved by S under the terms of 'atmeti tūpagacchanti' (*BS* iv 1 3), as interpreted by him For in this case also, the comprehension of B as one's own Ātman cannot be achieved without first rescinding the delimited nature (*avacchinnasvarūpa*) of the Jivātman In that process, the Jivasvarūpa as such has got to be rescinded before B can come to be comprehended as the upāsaka's 'Ātman' For, as long as the delimited nature of the "Jiva" is not rescinded, B cannot possibly come to be identified with the ahamkārāspada-Ātman or the self of the Upāsaka Thus S's argument brings down the edifice of his own interpretation of Sūtra iv 1 3, like a house of cards

The *Bhāmati* swears by the dictum Yāvad vacanam vācanikam'—that a proposition should not be pressed beyond its expressed sense One is left to wonder how, then, it holds that texts like "Yas sarvajñah" are *not* to be taken as predicating real attributes of B or reconciles itself to the necessity to go in for double laksanā in the interpretation of 'Tattvam asi' instead of boldly accepting 'Viśiṣṭaikya' of Jīva and B out of supreme regard for 'Yavad vacanam vācanikam'!

CHAPTER LXXIX

BRAHMAN TO BE CONTEMPLATED AS THE EVER-PERFECT

4 *Brahmadṛṣṭyadhikaraṇam* (iv.1.5)

This adhi emphasizes the integration of all other attributes chosen for meditation, at all times with the concept of Brahmatvam consisting in supreme and universal transcendence (*sarvotkṛṣṭatvam*) as most indispensable Hence it is not rendered superfluous by the Bhūmādhikaraṇam (i.3 8-9) and is also rightly placed here[1]

It will be seen that the Sūtra Brahmadṛṣṭir utkarṣāt' while it enjoins the bringing to bear Brahmadṛṣṭi in upāsanās does not specify the locus where it is to be done It may seem by vicinity of context that it is in the case of the pratīkas But that has already been repudiated for good reasons Hence it follows that it must be in respect of the Supreme Lord Himself denoted by the term Ātman in iv.1.3. We have, therefore, to take it that the locus of Brahmatvadṛṣṭi is the Supreme Lord 'Ātman' himself. Accordingly, the term ātman is syntactically taken in the locative sense This is well brought out in the opening words of M's *bhāṣya*

"In the Supreme Lord, the notion of supreme perfection should always be entertained"[2]

1 अत्र ब्रह्मत्वस्यात्मनस्य सर्वोपासनेष्वनुवृत्तिः समर्थ्यते । न चेदं भूमाधिकरणेन गतार्थम् । तदुक्तस्य सर्वत्र ब्रह्मत्वानुवर्तनस्य [illegible] समर्थनात् । नन्वेवं तदानन्तर्यमेव स्यात् । न स्यात् । [illegible] न विरोधेन इत्युक्तत्वात् (*STC* iv 1 5)

2 अत्र सूत्रे ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कर्तव्येत्युच्यते । सूत्रे [illegible] प्रतीक इति भ्रान्ताः । [illegible] । अत्र, [illegible] परमेश्वर इत्युक्तम् * * तथा च 'आत्मा' इति सूत्र[illegible] इत्युक्तं भवति (Raghu *TPB* iv 1 5)

ब्रह्मदृष्टिश्च सर्वथा कार्यैव परमेश्वरे

The Pūrvapakṣa arises by way of challenging the position established in iv.1.3 that the attribute of Ātmatva or being the Lord of all is always to be meditated upon in the interest of attaining the supreme felicity of Mokṣa It argues that ātmatva understood in the sense of lordship is after all a common attribute found even in the rulers of various kingdoms It does not, therefore, deserve to be raised to such exclusive eminence

The Siddhānta points out that the attribute of ātmatva or supreme rulership is to be meditated upon only in close integration with the concept of universal, transcendence denoted by "Brahmatva" and never isolated from it This applies to the meditation of the other attributes of ānanda and others prescribed already in iii 3 12 It should be noted here that by universal transcendence (*sarvotkrstatva*) of B is meant transcending all finite reality (*sarvatah utkrstatvam*)[3] as established in the Bhūmādhikaranam (i 3 8-9) See also Vol I, p 216-17

The conclusion established here does not in any way conflict with any established in the earlier adhikaranas as this adhi. does *not* say that the attribute of infinitude (*pūrnatvam*) the meaning of B—in terms of sarvotkrṣtatvam, indicated by the expression 'utkarsāt' in the Sūtra, is to be meditated upon by itself, i e in isolation, like 'ātmatvam', for instance, when one is in grave difficulties What it emphasizes is that even in grave difficulties one should never cease to meditate on the four principal attributes but only in their closest integration with the all-transcendence of B

In other words, all such meditations of B will have Brahmatvam in the sense defined above, as their principal content of which attributes like ātmatva, ānanda, etc will be the constituents

> आत्मेत्येव यदोपासा सदा ब्रह्मत्वसंयुता ।
> कार्यैव सर्वथा * * * * * (M *BSB* iv.1.5)

ब्रह्मत्वस्यावश्यकत्वे चतुर्गुणोपासननियमभङ्गः स्यादित्यतो वा आह—आत्मत्वविशेषणत्वेनोपासनाददोषः (*TP* iv.1 5)

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S this adhi establishes that in the meditation on Pratīkas like the Sun, Prāna, etc prescribed in Śrutis like 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsita', the idea of B is to be *superimposed on them*

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3 सर्वतो महत्त्वेति – लक्ष्म्यादिभ्य सर्वेभ्य इति । पञ्चम्यास्तसि (Raghu TPB iv 1 5)

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that tho' the way in which the Pratīka and B have been put in apposition admits of either being meditated upon as the other, the right interpretation will be that B is to be meditated upon as Āditya etc For then B will remain the chief bestower of fruits as set forth in iii 2.38 and the chief object (*pradhāna*) as well to be oriented by such meditation as āditya etc[4] The rule that the superior should not be looked upon as the inferior cannot come in the way of what has actually been laid down in the Śruti[5]

The Siddhanta is that tho' it is B that makes for the fruitfulness of the Upāsanā carried out either way, the position that the text stands for the superimposition of the idea of B on the symbol is fully supported by the rule observed in practical life that the higher in value should be superimposed on the lower and not the other way about It enhances the prestige of the charioteer to look upon him as the king, but it will be an affront to the king to look upon him as his charioteer This is enough to settle the point at issue here[6]

Moreover in the vidhis 'Ādityo brahmeti', 'Prāno brahmeti upāsīta' the words Āditya, Prāna etc are given first and have naturally to be taken in the primary meaning The term 'brahma' which occurs after the words āditya, prāna, etc cannot obviously be coordinated with the literal sense of āditya and others as they are other than B The coordination can only be taken in a figurative sense that Āditya is to be contemplated "as if it were" B This is clear from the expression "iti" suffixed to "B", in these instances—which are analogous to statements like 'He considers the shell as silver Śuktikām rajatam iti pratyeti', 'Gaur iti me gavayo abhavad' The use of 'iti' will be pointless if the symbols āditya etc are to be literally contemplated as B in the opinion of the Śruti.[7] The term 'iti' thus makes the word B step down from its primary sense and stand for 'the idea of B or the word-form' (svarūpapara). As the word-form of "B" cannot be coordinated meaningfully

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4 यद्यपि सामानाधिकरण्यमुभयथापि घटते तथापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वाध्यक्षतया फलप्रसवसामर्थ्येन फलवदाय प्राधान्येन तदादित्यादिदृष्टिभिः संस्कर्तव्यमिति आदित्यादिदृष्ट्या ब्रह्मैव वक्तव्यम् । न तु ब्रह्मदृष्टिरादित्यादिषु

(*Bhāmatī* iv.1.5)

5 न चैवंविधस्थले शास्त्रार्थे 'निकृष्टदृष्टिर्नोत्कृष्टे' इति लौकिकन्यायोऽपवादाय प्रभवति, आगमविरोधेन तस्याभासत्वात् (*Bhāmatī*)

6 यद्यपि वस्तुतो ब्रह्मैव फलं प्रयच्छति तथापि शास्त्रं ब्रह्मबुद्ध्या आदित्यादौ प्रतीके उपास्यमाने ब्रह्म फलाय कल्पत इत्यभिवदति किंवा आदित्यादिबुद्ध्या ब्रह्मैव विपरीतं फलाय इत्युभयथापि ब्रह्मणः फलदानोपपत्तेः शास्त्रार्थसन्देहे लोकानुसारतो निर्णीयते (*ibid*)

7 न केवलं लौकिको न्यायो निश्चये हेतुरपि तु आदित्यादिशब्दानां प्राथम्येन मुख्यार्थवर्तित्वात् — प्राथम्यादिति । इतिपरत्वमपि ब्रह्मशब्दस्यामुमेव न्यायमवगमयति । तथाहि स्वरसवृत्त्या आदित्यादिशब्दा यथा स्वार्थं वदन्ति तथा ब्रह्मशब्दोऽपि स्वार्थं वदति यदि स्वार्थोऽस्य विवक्षितः स्यात् । तथा चेतिपरत्वमनर्थकम्

(*Bhāmatī* iv 1 5)

with the sense of āditya and other symbols, we have to take it that the expression "B" followed by the "iti" stands for the "idea of B" (*pratītiparah*) Thus, the import of the statement 'Ādityo brahma iti upāsīta' will be that symbols like Āditya are to be meditated upon as B—i e. to say the idea of B is to be superimposed upon it for purposes of meditation [8]

Criticism

S interprets Sūtra iv.1.5 that the contemplation of B is to be superimposed on the Pratikas as it conduces to the exaltation of the Pratīkas This is in sad conflict with his earlier stand under iv.1 4 that the Pratīka is *not* to be contemplated as the Self of the upāsaka The only proper ground on which the upāsanā of Pratīkas as one's own self can be condemned is that there is a yawning difference between the Pratīka and the object of meditation This must be the natural drift of the words of the Sūtra 'Na hi sah' (*pratīkam*) S's bhāṣya, however, seeks to construe the words Nahi sah in a somewhat different way:

नहि स उपासकः प्रतीकानि आत्मत्वेनाकलयेत्

This, besides being a mere paraphrase of the opening words 'Na pratīke' (atmamatim badhnīyāt) and, therefore, redundant, fails to locate the reason for disapproving such upāsanā, *within the wording of the Sūtra* and is forced to supply it *from outside* It is to be noted that Radhakrishnan avoids this redundancy by giving the meaning of the words of the Sūtra Na hi sah as "because he (the upāsaka) is not (that)—viz the Pratika

The reason why the Pratika is not to be meditated upon as the Self of the Upāsaka can only be the absence of tādatmya or identity between the Pratīka which is an insentient object and the upāsaka who is a sentient being For the very same reason, then, the contemplation of B should *not* also be superinduced on the Pratikas *It is thus highly* inconsistent for S to approve of the Pratikas being viewed as B, in meditation B and the Pratikas can never be identical, for B is real and the Pratikas are 'kalpita' (unreal) It is no use to put in that there is no ultimate difference (*paramārthikabheda*) between B and the Pratīkas If it comes to that, there is equally no ultimate difference between the Pratikas and Ātman too

8 तस्मान्नितिना स्वार्थात प्रच्याव्य ब्रह्मपद ज्ञानपर स्वरूपपर वा कर्तव्यम्। न च ब्रह्मपदमादित्यादिपदार्थं इति प्रतीतिपर एवायमितिपर शब्दो, यथा गौरिति मे गवयाऽभवदिति तथा च आदित्यादयो ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपत्तव्या इत्यर्थो भवति (*Bhamatī* iv 1 5)

The position cannot be improved by arguing that the reason given by the Sūtrakāra that Pratīka is not the self is not their bare difference alone but such difference as adversely affects the status and glory of the object of meditation The contemplation of Pratīkas as B *raises* their status Hence, notwithstanding absence of identity between them, the contemplation of the Pratikas as B is worthy of approval—observes S But he fails to see that the argument would apply with equal force to the contemplation of the Pratīkas as the self of the Upāsaka! For the Ātman or self of the upāsaka, as a sentient being, is *undoubtedly superior* to the Pratīka, which is an insentient thing!

The attempt to qualify the reason for the approval of Brahmadṛṣṭi on Pratīkas is thus bound to upset the interpretation of the Sūtra: Na pratike, according to S We have, therefore, to admit that in all cases of upāsanā that which is different from a given thing ought not to be meditated upon as being identical with it

यद्यन्न भवति न तत् तत्त्वेनोपास्यम्

In the light of this basic principle, a more satisfying explanation of the apparent Sāmānādhikaranya in the wording of the Pratīkopāsanāvidhis has to be found thro' 'Saptasu prathamā' and such other grammatical sanctions

The sense of superimposition of one on the other or of the idea of the one on another which S tries to read into the Sāmānādhikaraṇya-prayoga in the Pratikopāsanāvidhi, cannot, however, be derived from the direct significative power (*śabdaśakti*) of the words 'Brahma' or 'Āditya' If derived thro' Lakṣanā, it would come in the way of their coordination For the 'pratīka' 'āditya' is not indeed coordinate with "the *idea of* B" It is merely the object (*viṣaya*) pertaining to "the (superimposed) idea of B" If Laksanā is to be pushed up so far, the coordination between Āditya and B as set forth in the Vidhivākya would recede further, for Āditya and other Pratīkas as such can never be the object underlying "the idea of B" It is only B that can be the object (*viṣaya*) of "the idea of B"

There is not much force in the contention that Lakṣaṇa is admissible only in respect of the term 'Brahman' in 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsīta', because it is the final word in the sentence Cases of Lakṣanā on the first word of a sentence are also known as in 'Somena yajeta' The proper ground for Lakṣanā to be put upon any word, first or last, is the incompatibility of the literal sense Where the literal sense of Vidhis like 'Ādityo brahma ityupāsita' can be understood in the light of grammatical rules like 'Supām suluk' (*Pān* vii i 39) or 'Saptasu prathamā',

the need for resort to Laksanā will no longer be there The statement 'Ādityo brahmetyupāsīta' would accordingly convey the meaning that B should be meditated upon as *present in* Āditya Even the direct co-ordination between Āditya and B can be accepted without going in for Lakṣanā, if the term Āditya is understood as a descriptive epithet of B in its etymological sense of 'ādau sthitatvād ādityah,' 'ayurādyā-dānād ādityah' We have already seen how the construing of the word 'B' in the metaphorical sense of "the idea of B" so as to legitimize its coordination with Āditya is inadmissible on account of the difficulty in establishing any coordination between 'āditya' and 'the idea of B' as such For just as 'āditya' is not the same as 'B'—as conceded by S himself, it is not also "the idea of B" How then can it stand in a coordinative relation with 'B' in the statement 'Adityo brahma'-[9]?

To get over this difficulty S and his commentators have suggested that the coordination between Āditya and B in the upāsanāvidhi be treated on a par with the coordination of shell and silver found in the statement of an illusory perception of silver in shell—in terms of 'Śuktikām rajatam iti pratyeti [10] But then, the former type of coordination has all the sanctity and respectability of *a Śāstric injunction* while the later is in the nature of a pure illusion which subserves no Puruṣārtha' A coordination partaking of the nature of an illusory cognition cannot, in all conscience, be regarded as intended to be the subject matter of a regular scriptural injunction

The other contention that the expression B followed by iti' would refer to 'the idea of B' rather than to the entity as such is also open to question We have seen the difficulty which exists in the proper coordination between the terms āditya and B even if the latter is construed in the sense of "idea of B" (partitilaksanārthah) As against this, there is no difficulty in taking B followed by 'iti' in the sense of the entity of B itself, if the expression āditya is understood obliquely as 'Āditye (sthitam) brahma' 'iti' as provided under the rule Saptasu prathamā

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R reads Sūtras iv 1 4-5 as one adhi and raises the question whether the upāsanā in terms of the upāsya being one's own Ātman is to be extended to the Pratīkas also The Pūrvapaksa is that as the Upāsanā

9 यथा ह्यादित्यादिपदार्थो न ब्रह्मपद तथा न ब्रह्मज्ञान च । तथा च ज्ञानपरत्वेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्त्यपरिहार (*STC*)

10 ततश्च यथा शुक्तिका रजतमिति प्रत्यतीत्यत्र रजतशब्दस्तु रजतप्रतीतिलक्षणार्थ एवमत्राप्यादित्यादीन ब्रह्मेति प्रतीयादिति गम्यते (S *BSB* iv 1 5)

enjoined by texts like 'Mano brahma' is an upāsanā of B and as B is the Ātman of the Upāsaka as has been established in iv 1 3, the Pratīkas also are to be meditated upon as one's Ātman The Siddhānta refutes this on the ground that in Pratīkopasanā it is the Pratīka which is the object of meditation and not B B merely enters into such Upāsanās as qualifying its aspect (*dṛṣṭiviśeṣaṇa*) The second Sūtra is taken to rebut the objection that where B may be viewed as the object of upāsanā, it is not proper to assume unintelligent things of small power such as the mind to be upāsya The object of meditation being thus B, it may be viewed under the aspect of the mind etc This objection is refuted pointing out that tho' the notion of B may appropriately be superimposed on the mind and other Pratīkas, it will not be proper to look upon B (the object of meditation) as the Pratīka. For B is something superior to the mind and other Pratikas while the latter are inferior to B To view a superior as inferior is lowering its position while to view a servant as his master will be exalting

Criticism

There is no possibility of any doubt arising on the point whether Pratīkas are to be meditated upon as 'one's own Ātman' For the Viṣayavākyas relating to Pratīkopāsanā do not at all contain any reference to 'Ātman" The inquiry is thus unwarranted by the wording of the Pratīkopasanāvidhis

We may ask for a clarification if the words nāma, manas, etc, referring to Pratīkas denote sentient beings or insentient tattvas of those names In the former case, as sentient beings denoted by the words nāma manas, etc can very well be deemed to be the "Ātman" of the upāsaka and as such Pratīkas can without difficulty be admitted to be the object of meditation To treat them as inanimate is also to do violence to the Abhimānyadhikarana.

Moreover in the text 'Mano brahma ityupāsita' it would be proper to recognize B itself as the object of meditation in view of B's primacy and its being the chief bestower of fruits of upasanā and such upāsana being part of Brahmavidyā. If Pratīkas as such are to be made the objects of meditation, such Upāsana will have to be put down as Pratīkavidyā and never Brahmavidyā in which case the reference to B in these texts will turn out to be a mockery

It is no use taking a leaf from the Advaitic interpretation and arguing that as the word B has the particle 'iti' added to it, the injunction points only to a superimposition of the notion of B on the

Pratika for the time being without B being the upāsya It will be in the nature of an erroneous knowledge to superimpose the notion of B on the Pratīka We cannot expect the Śrutis to be dallying with such superimpositions in respect of their vidhis For the notion of B entering into the Upāsanā of Pratikas as its qualifying aspect will not be true to facts The Pratika not being B like B, these Pratīkas too can come to be meditated upon as one's own "Ātman" For, to R the term "Ātman" does not signify a being which is *not other than oneself,* but the Antaryāmi of the Jivātman who possesses the Jīvā as his body The Abhimanidevatās of the Pratīkas can similarly be deemed to be the "Ātman" or Antaryāmi of the upāsaka, *besides* the Supreme B Antaryāmin is that which impels the indriyas etc to activity by its presence within the body Tho' B is the supreme Antaryāmi, there is no difficulty in admitting other deities too as lesser Antaryāmins

Candramā mano bhūtvā hrdayam prāviśat (*AA* ii 4 2-4) The upāsanā of such lesser Antaryāmins is also commended in the Śāstras

> 'Yas tvām dveṣti sa mām dvesti
>
> Yas tvām anu sa mām anu'
>
> 'Tair dattān apradāyaibhyo
>
> Yo bhunkte stena eva sah (*Gītā*—iii 12)

There is no violence to the Siddhānta then if the Pratikābhimānidevatās are meditated upon as one's "Ātman" in the sense of 'Antaryāmi'

If the Pratīkas represent only inanimate things they cannot be treated as objects of meditation No notion of its being B or having B for its mode or qualifying aspect can be conceded as valid knowledge The suffix 'iti has, therefore, to be suitably shifted from its place and read with manah, etc —meaning that B which is present in the mind is to be meditated upon Brahma manasi tisthati ityupāsīta—which will be seen to be in harmony with the truth 'Yo manasi tiṣṭhan mano antaro yamayati * * *' (*Brh Up* iii 7 20)

CHAPTER LXXX

THE GODS SHOULD MEDITATE ON B.'S LIMBS AS THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN

5. *Ādityādimatyadhikaranam* (iv. 1. 6)

The two preceding adhi.s had set forth the indispensability at all times of the upāsana of B. as one's Ruler ('ātman') and as the ever-perfect being ('Brahman'), by all Mumukṣus. The present insists on the indispensability of a similar item of upāsanā to be carried out by the gods who have sprung from the different limbs of the Supreme. From its eye the Sun was born and from the face Indra and Agni (*RV* x. 90. 13). Tho' such Upāsanā has been enjoined for them in B. S. iii. 3. 63, the topic is reopened to dispose of an adhikāśankā that such upāsanā is not absolutely necessary or always possible as the cosmic duties of the gods are such that they generally move about away from their place of genesis. In the circumstances, such upāsanā will not be true to the fact when they do not abide in those limbs and thus turn out to be wrong ones.[1] There is also no particular reason to insist upon the meditation of this attribute when there are ever so many other attributes of B. like its fatherhood in regard to the gods and men alike, which hold true for all time and deserve to be chosen and insisted upon. The Pūrvapakṣa goes to the length of challenging even the insistence on the upāsanā of the attribute of "Ātmatva" on the ana-

1. [illegible] (*TP.* iv. 1. 6)

logy of the difficulty in pressing the claims of the present attribute of Svasvotpattyangatāgunavattvam'[2]

The Siddhānta is that the gods must always meditate on the respective limbs of B whence they have their genesis because they enter into them at the time of their Mukti and such entry cannot be achieved without their meditating on the Lord as the possessor of such limbs as His essential attribute[3] Tho' moving away from the limbs wherefrom they have had their genesis, while discharging their cosmic duties, these gods manage to remain in those limbs of the Lord whence they have their genesis, by virtue of another form of theirs (rupāntarena) This disposes of the objection that Angāsrayopāsanā by the gods runs the risk of being becoming 'Asadupāsanā'[4]

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to S and R the adhi discusses whether the Chān Up text (i 3 1) Let him meditate on the Udgitha as the shining one (Āditya) connected with the subordinate parts of sacrificial performances the udgītha and others are to be superimposed on Āditya and others in contemplation or vice versa

The Pūrvapaksa holds there is nothing to choose between them either way For both udgītha and Āditya are modifications of the same B and neither can be deemed to be superior to the other, so that we may go in for the superimposition of the superior on the inferior, as in the meditation of the Pratikas as B[5] Moreover only the sacrificial acts can generate fruits It would thus be proper to hold that udgītha and others are to be superimposed on Āditya and others The former are parts of the sacrifice and carry fruits[6]

The Siddhānta is that the idea of Āditya (and others) is to be superimposed on the udgitha (and others) For in the passage 'Let meditation be made on 'OM', 'the udgītha', the udgītha is indicated prominently as the predicate and placed in the second case This shows

2 पूर्वत्र यद्विशेषणतया ब्रह्मत्व ध्येयमित्युक्त, तदात्मत्वमेव अगाश्रितत्ववत न ध्येयमिति शक्नात सगति
(*Ny Muktavali* iv 1 6)

3 स्वोत्पत्तिस्थानत्वात स्वाश्रयत्वा मुक्तौ तत्र लयस्यापेक्षितत्वात चोपपन्न तेषा तयोपासनम
(M *BSB* iv 1 6)

4 न चायथोपासनप्रसगादेनदयुक्तम । नित्य रूपान्तरेण अगाना स्वाश्रयत्वादिति भाव (*TP* iv 1 6)

5 तत्रानियमो नियमकारणाभावादिति * * न त्वादित्योद्गीथादीना विकारत्वाविशेषात किंचिदुत्कर्षविशेषावधारण कारणमस्ति (S *BSB* iv 1 6)

6 सत्स्वप्यादित्यादिषु फलानुत्पादात उत्पत्तिमत कर्मण एव फलदर्शनात कर्मैव फलवत । आदित्यादिषु पुनरुद्गीथादिदृष्ट्या उद्गीथादिबुद्ध्योपास्यमाना आदित्यादय कर्मात्मका सन्त फलाय कल्पिष्यन्त इति
(*Bhāmati* iv 1 6)

Āditya and others are to be superimposed on udgītha The latter possesses inward strength which is rightly spoken of as being enhanced by the Vidyā—the exaltation resulting from the superimposition of the idea of Āditya upon it The superimposition of the idea of Āditya will not eclipse the essential character of udgitha as something which is to be brought into being by some activity The imposition of the idea of Āditya on udgītha may be treated as metaphorical (*gaunadṛṣṭi*) as in 'Agnir mānavakah—when we speak of a brilliant pupil as "fire". In this usage, the 'pupil' is not superseded as in the superimposition of the idea of silver on shell—where the 'shell' comes to be completely superseded [7]

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here if in the Pūrvapakṣa the terms udgitha and āditya are to be understood in the sense of Devatās or inanimate principles In the former case, it will be inappropriate to describe udgītha as an 'act' As a Devatā, udgītha too will be an established reality (*siddhavastu*) like Āditya and there will be nothing to choose between agreeing to look upon udgītha as Āditya or Āditya as udgītha 'Udgītha' as a song may be associated with a fruit But udgī tha in its aspect of a cetana (deity) cannot be so associated in the Pūrvapakṣa To treat both udgitha and Āditya as inanimate principles will be repugnant to the true spirit of upāsanā, for upāsanā has to be of some sentient being—as has been pointed out in earlier contexts

We also need another clarification of S's position whether the notion of Āditya enjoined on Udgītha should be meant to be recognized as a piece of valid knowledge (*pramitirūpa*) or as nothing more than a superimposition in the sense in which (the idea of) silver is imposed on shell in the example 'Śuktikām rajatam iti pratyeti' S cannot agree that Āditya and others are *present in* udgītha and others The only alternative left to him is to treat it as a case of 'tādātmyadṛṣṭi'. But as Āditya and udgitha are established beyond doubt to be absolutely different entities, their equation or identification enjoined by the text cannot possibly be treated as a valid proposition Otherwise, by the same token one will be forced to give assent to the meditational equation of 'nāma' and other Pratīkas with the 'Ātman' (as with B) If such equation is admitted as a valid piece of knowledge to be enjoined for medi-

7 [illegible]

(*Bhāmatī* iv 1 6)

tation, there is hardly any need for S. to plead that the Pratīka (symbol) will lose its character as a symbol and so will not be useful for the purpose of meditation and consequently, there will be no room for the meditation of the symbol as 'I am the symbol' (Pratīkam aham iti). For the adverse consequence of the Pratīka ceasing to be will arise only when the equation of the Pratīka with Āditya is made analagous to the identification of shell with the notion of silver—but not when it is to be treated as a valid knowledge. The *Bhāmatī* itself concedes that the adhyāsa of āditya on udgītha does not take away the essential character of udgītha as a karman (act). This admission of the *Bhāmatī* contradicts the Siddhānta in the 'Na Pratīkādhi' (iv.1.4).[8]

If the idea of Āditya is merely superimposed on udgītha, it cannot be a subject of serious injunction in the Śruti. It is not as if the udgītha has no power to bring in the fruit; for the presiding deity of udgītha (Vāyu) can be trusted to do so, just as Āditya can do so on the other view—for Vāyu is the deity to be attained by the chanting of Udgītha (along with B.). The accusative case is not a decisive proof of the prominence given to udgītha as the subject. Āditya too is referred to by the accusative (Ya evāsau tapati) 'tam' which can be construed as 'Tam ādityam udgītham upāsīta'. In most upāsanāvākyas, it is common to find the free use of the accusative in referring to both the aspects of the prakāra and the prakāri in meditation.

8 यत्पुनर्ब्रह्मविकारत्वात् प्रतीकाना ब्रह्मत्व, ततश्चात्मत्वमिति तदसत् । प्रतीकाभावप्रसगात् विकारस्वरूपोपमर्देन हि नामादिजातस्य ब्रह्मत्वमेवाश्रित भवति। स्वरूपोपमर्दे च नामादीना कुत प्रतीकत्वमात्मत्वग्रहो वा ?

(S. *BSB.* iv 1 4)

CHAPTER LXXXI

IMPORTANCE OF ĀSANAS IN DHYĀNA

6 *Āsīnādhikaraṇam* (iv 1 7-11)

The importance of Dhyāna had been brought out in the previous adhis The present one deals with the importance of its 'angas' like 'āsanas' Tho' this topic will be relevant after the Āprāyanādhi (iv 1 12) where it is insisted that Dhyāna has to be carried on even after the attainment of Jñāna, till one attains Mokṣa,—still it is taken up here for the following reason There is need for observing regulations regarding āsanas etc to facilitate Dhyāna in order to attain Aparokṣajñāna in the case of seekers in the early stages—where the chances of mental distraction are more But Jñānis who have reached some advancement have not much need to adopt āsanas etc as they will not be subject to distractions of the mind like the Jijñāsus It is to indicate this difference that the topic of āsanas is dealt with before entering on the Āprāyanādhi [1]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that āsanas are not essential for upāsanā which consists in śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna These can be attained by mental effort and concentration It is possible to keep the mind steady and concentrated on something even when we are walking or in a standing position The Smṛti texts say 'The Lord is at all times

1 [illegible] (Raghu *TPB* iv 1 7 11)

to be kept ın mınd and never to be forgotten ın sıckness or health[2] Thıs shows āsanas are by no means always necessary ın upāsanā The dıstractıons of the mınd whıch are lıkely to arıse ın Dhyāna can be easıly got over by means of Pratyāhāra or wıthdrawıng the mınd from external sense objects

The Sıddhānta ıs that whıle āsanas and other angas may not be necessary or ındıspensable for the pursuıt of upāsanā, consıstıng of śravana and manana, they are very necessary especıally for Jıjñāsus ın the pursuıt of Dhyāna The reason for thıs lıes ın the nature of Dhyāna —as dıstınct from upāsanā consıstıng of śravana and manana Dhyāna ıs the unbroken contınuıty of thought (*akhandasmrtı*) centred on B The slıghtest dıstractıon of the mınd ıs detrımental to the contınuıty of dhyāna When some other thought-current breaks ın upon the mınd there can be no contınuıty of Dhyāna of the supreme B Such break of contınuıty ıs more often than not lıkely to occur[3] when one ıs walkıng or standıng or movıng about But not when one ıs seated ın a comfortable posture prescrıbed for Dhyāna Āsanas, therefore, prevent or mınımıze the chances of dıstractıon of the mınd It ıs a matter of experıence that even Pratyāhāra becomes successful ın wıthdrawıng the mınd from external objects when assısted by āsanas The last Sūtra says that other regulatıons referred to ın the Smrtıs regardıng tıme and place suıtable for Dhyāna have no ıntımate bearıng on the questıon Theır choıce or adoptıon may be left to ındıvıdual taste and convenıence.

Śamkara's Interpretatıon

S constıtutes Sūtras 7-10 as one adhı dealıng wıth the Āsanas and Sūtra 11 as a separate adhı dısmıssıng restrıctıons of place ın regard to medıtatıon whıch can all be brought under one sıngle adhı

Crıtıcısm

As thıs adhı follows, ın S's vıew, ın the wake of Karmāngāvabaddhopāsanās lıke that of udgītha, the ınsıstence on āsanas for the purpose

2 आधिव्याधिनिमित्तेन विक्षिप्तमनसोऽपि तु ।
गुणाना स्मरणाशक्तौ विष्णोर्ब्रह्मत्वमेव तु
स्मर्तव्य सतत तत्तु न कदाचित तत्परित्यजत ।। (*M BSB* iv 1 6)

3 उपासन हि द्वधा भवति–स्मरण ध्यानमिति । तत्र स्मरणस्य सवदा योग्यत्वात सर्वदोपासनविधे तद्विषयत्वोपपत्ते । उपासनाविशषस्य च ध्यानत्वात् तस्य चासनम तरेणासमवात आसनस्य वश्यकत्व च सिद्धयति । न च स्मरणे नैवालम । ध्यानस्य ततोऽधिकत्वात । कुत ? स्मृतावुक्तमत एवेति (*TP* ıv 1 8)
स्मरणोपासनस्य नित्य कार्यत्वेन तत्रासनानियमेऽपि कादाचित्कध्यानरूपोपासन तदावश्यकत्वे विरोधाभावात
(Ragh *Ny Muktāvalı*)

does not seem to be justifiable. Such aṅgopāsanā is to be carried out either sitting or standing according to the directions given in regard to the performance of the main ritual. The insistence on āsanas in all such aṅgopāsanās would, therefore, be unsustainable. Moreover, these aṅgopāsanās have been held to be carried out by the Ṛtviks themselves as part of the sacrifices, in *BS.* iii.4.45, according to S. This takes away the need for going into the question of āsanas to be adopted by the upāsakas. The *Bhāmatī* and S.'s bhāṣya have, therefore, to restrict the consideration of āsanas to other strenuous forms of upāsanās such as of pratīkas and true knowledge produced by the identity texts.[4] The Pratīkopāsanās cannot indeed be treated as so very arduous. As for true knowledge produced by the identity texts like "Tattvamasi" it has been described as determined only by Pramāṇas and self-shining like a burning flame of light[5]—which eliminates the need for āsanas to overcome distraction of the mind. Thus the whole topic seems to be pursued without substance.

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4 यन्महता प्रयत्नेन विनोपासितुमशक्यं यथा प्रतीकादि, यथा वा सम्यग्दर्शनमपि तत्त्वमस्यादि, तत्रैषा चिन्ता (*Bhāmatī* iv.1.7)

5. ध्यानादिसंस्कारमप्रतिबद्ध चित्त प्रदीपवत् स्वयमेव प्रमा करोतीत्यर्थ. (*Kalpataru* iv.1 7)

CHAPTER LXXXII

APAROKṢAJÑĀNINS SHOULD CARRY ON UPĀSANĀ TILL MOKṢA IS ATTAINED

7 *Aprāyanādhıkaranam* (ıv 1 12)

In the previous adhı ıt was shown that unlıke āsanas, other regulatıons regardıng the tıme and place for Dhyāna are not ındıspensable The present adhı consıders the questıon ıf there ıs any specıal reason to show that Dhyāna ıs to be carrıed over and kept up even after the attaınment of Aparoksaȷnāna or ıf ıt ıs to be practısed as ın the case of āsanas only tıll Aparokṣa ıs attaıned and not beyond

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there ıs absolutely no need to carry on Dhyāna whıch has been enȷoıned only for the attaınment of Jñāna even after such Jñāna has been attaıned For such contınuatıon of Dhyāna after Aparokṣa has no bearıng on Moksa Jñāna alone ıs suffıcıent to lead to Moksa and there ıs nothıng to be gaıned by contınuıng the Dhyāna after such Aparoksa It cannot be that Dhyāna ıs neces sary after Aparokṣa to realıse the exhuberance of the blıss of Moksa Such exuberance arısıng from the wellıng up of Svarupānanda may be achıeved by means of sravana and manana as well, after the attaınment of Aparoksa It ıs not, therefore, rıght to ınsıst upon the contınuatıon of Dhyāna after Aparoksa tıll one attaıns final release Moreover Dhyāna has the power to lead to Jñāna alone Its power cannot be extended beyond ıts legıtımate sphere ın other dırectıons such as makıng for the wellıng up of one's Svarūpānanda ın Moksa The unabated contınuatıon of Dhyāna by emınent Jñānıns lıke Śuka even after

they had attained perfect enlightenment, as reported in the Purāṇas has, therefore, to be dismissed as fruitless

The Siddhānta is that Dhyāna has to be carried on even after the attainment of Aparokṣajnana in order to experience the full measure of one's Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa For, Mokṣa has two aspects—the disruption of all the bonds of Prakṛti and the complete manifestation of the innate bliss of selfhood Aparokṣajñāna in due course puts an end to bondage But the experience of the full measure of the bliss of selfhood has to await the grace of B This grace is earned thro' continuing Dhyāna of B after Aparokṣa

Dhyāna is thus absolutely necessary till the attainment of Jñāna, for it is thro' Dhyāna that one obtains the grace of B and thro' grace the direct vision of B None can ever hope to attain Aparokṣa thro' his own power or the power of Jñāna or other Sādhanas without the crowning grace of B This point has been made crystal clear earlier in *BS* iii 2 23, 27, iii 3 54 See also Vol. I p 59

If then, Dhyāna were to be dispensed with *after* one has attained Aparokṣa as being unnecessary thereafter, the Jñānin will have given up his contemplation of B That would mean he has no longer any regard for B by whose grace he has attained enlightenment An intelligent being like B with sound judgment can hardly be expected to reveal itself to any one and bestow illumination on him, if it knows the recipient will be ungrateful enough to stop thinking about his benefactor That should be enough to prove that no true and sincere Aparokṣajñānin will ever for a moment dream of abandoning his absorption in B which is what Dhyāna signifies

This recognition of and insistence on the continuation of Dhyāna even after the attainment of Aparokṣa and till the final attainment of Mokṣa—as conceived by M here, places his whole philosophy of Bhakti, Jñāna and prasāda (grace) on the supreme heights of mysticism in Vedāntic thinking In refusing to let any Mumukṣu turn his back upon B and bid good bye to the contemplation of B after he has attained Aparokṣa by the very grace of that B and in recognizing the existence of further incentives for the Jñānin to continue with his contemplation of B and remain in the full realization of his own blissful nature, M. has indeed blazed a new trail in history of Theism and Mysticism alike

It is a pity that in the circumstances V S Ghate should find M.'s interpretation of the words of the Sūtra "ā prāyaṇāt" as 'Yāvan mokṣam' (till Mokṣa is attained) to be "without doubt unusual" (*Op. cit.*

p 135) We have seen M 's cogent reasons for going beyond the usual sense of 'prāyana' ('ā prāyanāt') as "till death" or the exit from the body Nor is there any etymological or semantic difficulty in accepting M 's interpretation of "ā prāyanāt" as 'till Moksa is attained'—an interpretation which takes us to a much higher plane of thinking about the place of Dhyāna in man's spiritual life and its fulfilment It cannot be denied that if, as is fairly certain, the Viṣayavākya of the Sūtra is Praśna v 1, the 'ā' in 'ā prāyanāt' will have to be taken in the sense of "inclusiveness" (*abhividhi*) to mean "till the journey's end" which is the actual attainment of Mokṣa—exit from the body at the time of death being just the beginning of the journey and not the end of it[1] And it is a long long journey too,—as may be seen from the stages of it outlined in the text of *Prasna Up* v 1 such as (i) going to Brahmaloka, (ii) receiving further instruction in Dhyāna from Brahmā and (iii) attaining the highest Purusa The *TD* sums up the whole point, behind M.'s interpretation impressively as follows

स यो ह वै मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोकार अभिध्यायीत कतम वाव स तेन लोक जयतीति प्रश्ने, 'य पुनरेत त्रिमात्रेणोमिति एतेनैवाक्षरेण परपुरुषमभिध्यायीत' इत्यारभ्य, तस्य परमध्यातु. विरिंचलोक नीतस्य 'स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्' इत्यादिभि ततोऽप्युपदेश प्राप्य, पुनरभ्यस्यात पर पश्यतोऽपि 'ओकारेणैवायनेनान्वेति विद्वान् यत्तत्शान्तमजरममृतमभय पर च' (*Praśna*, v 7) इत्यामोक्षात् उपास्तिकर्तव्यताया प्रमाणदर्शनात् (*TD.* iv 1 12)

Expatiating on the subject of Jñānottaradhyāna or the continuation of Dhyāna after Aparoksa, M draws special attention to the fact that even the Muktas continue their meditation on B with increased zeal[2]—which shows there is all the more reason for Jñānins to continue their Dhyāna of B after they have attained Jnāna till their release from bondage Muktā api hyenam upāsate (*Śruti*) The correct position is that one should resort to Śravana till his nescience is eradicated, reflect upon what he has studied till his doubts are set at rest, and meditate on B till he attains direct vision of B The direct vision of B never fails to accomplish Mokṣa It is in the nature of an end in itself and not a means to an end Hence, continued contemplation of B is the law of the inner spiritual life of the Jnānin and the Mukta This continued contemplation of B after the attainment of Jñāna is second nature to the Jñānin and the Muktas Prior to attainment of

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1 जीवघनो जीवसारो ब्रह्मा तस्मात तदुपदेशात् इत्यय (*TD* i 1 5)

2 आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्रमे ।
कुर्वन्त्यहैतुकी भक्तिमित्थम्भूतगुणो हरि (*Bhāg* 1 7 10)

Mokṣa such Dhyāna of B is *mandatory*. When Mokṣa has been attained, the same contemplation of B becomes a self-expression of the Mukta[3]

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

S discusses under this adhi whether the upāsanās which result in the attainment of prosperity (*abhyudayaphala*) and of Pratīkas are to be repeatedly carried on till death (*ā prayāṇāt*) or only for some time[4] According to his Pūrvapakṣa, such meditations may be repeated for some time only which will satisfy the spirit of the injunction of the Śruti that they should be repeated The Siddhānta is that such upāsanās must be carried on till the end of one's life for it is by means of what is finally remembered that unseen results (*adṛṣṭaphala*) of actions come to be realized in the next life as may be seen from the illustration of the caterpillar (*Bṛh. Up* iv.4 4).

R and Nimbārka consider whether the meditations leading to the realization of B are to be carried on till death or only for a time[5] It will be seen that R.'s interpretation of this Sūtra almost coincides with his explanation of Sūtra iv 1 1

Criticism

We have already seen that for a true and sincere Brahmajñānin a more sublime phase of Brahmopāsanā commences from the time of his first attaining Aparokṣa and such upāsanā is thenceforward naturally carried on by him till he attains release, nay—that even after release is attained and for ever afterwards, he carries on the upāsanā of his 'Animittabandhu' and the Saviour of his soul—not in obedience to a mandate, but in a spirit of spontaneous attraction of love regard and eternal gratitude to his great benefactor Unfortunately, R's interpretation falls short of this highest reach of the Theistic conception of upāsanā of Brahman and its continuation (after the attainment of Jñāna) as a form of self-expression on the part of the Mumukṣu and the Mukta If its continuation is acceptable to R. he has not spelt it out anywhere in this context

3 शृणुयाद्यावदाप्नोति मतिर्यावद्युक्तता ।
ध्यानं च यावदीक्षा स्यान्नेक्षा क्वचन बाध्यते ॥
दृष्टतत्त्वस्य च ध्यानं यदा दृष्टिर्न विद्यते
भक्तिश्चानन्तकालीना परमे ब्रह्मणि स्फुटा ।
आविमुक्तेर्विधिर्नित्य स्वत एव ततः परम् ॥ (M. *BSB* iv 1 12)

4 यानि पुनरभ्युदयफलानि तेष्वपि चिन्त्यते किं कियन्तं चित् कालं प्रत्ययमावर्त्योपरमेत उत यावज्जीवमावर्तयेदिति (S *BSB* iv 1 12)

5 अपवर्गसाधनमुपासनमनेकाह एव समाप्यमुताप्रयाणात् प्रत्यहमनुवर्तनीयमिति विशये (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 1 12)

S.'s interpretation involves a self-contradiction. For, in the opening adhi. of this Pāda, he has held that all meditations being dṛṣṭaphala and enjoined by such texts as 'Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' with reference to the same knower of Ātman, are to be performed till intuitive vision is gained—just as the act of pounding rice is to be carried on till the husk is removed.[6] But here in this adhi., he speaks of supersensuous results (*adṛṣṭaphala*) accruing from such meditations:

अन्त्यप्रत्ययवशाददृष्टफलप्राप्तेः (S. *BSB*. iv.1.12).

He has sought to get over this contradiction by introducing a distinction between two kinds of upāsanas—(i) those concerned with right knowledge (*samyagdarśanārthāni*) like 'Tat tvam asi' and (ii) Nāma brahmetyupāsīta' and describes the former type of upāsanās as 'dṛṣṭārtha' and the latter as 'adṛṣṭārtha'.

Such a distinction of upāsanās into Samyagdarśanārthāni and abhyudayaphalāni is itself unsustainable. By 'abhyudaya' S. understands fruits other than Mokṣa. Now, we may ask whether such upāsanās as have been described as abhyudayaphala produce comprehension of their objective content or not. If such comprehension is a valid knowledge, such meditations will have to be recognized as equally 'Samyagdarśanārthāni (intended for the attainment of right knowledge)—in which case, the distinction made by S. between the two kinds of meditations will be unsustainable. If the knowledge produced by the other type of meditations (known as abhyudayaphalas) is not a valid or right knowledge, those meditations can hardly be competent to bestow prosperity (abhyudaya), heavenly rewards and Brahmaloka, etc., on the upāsaka. For no worldly or other-worldly prosperity is seen to accrue from erroneous knowledge. It would be preposterous to treat such upāsanās enjoined by the Śrutis in all seriousness as erroneous ones.

We have already seen (vide P. 606 f.n. 7) that even in regard to Pratīkopāsanās, the *Bhāmatī* has taken the bold stand that the imposition of the idea of B. on the Pratīkas has to be regarded as a metaphor —as in the description of the brilliant pupil as fire (Agnir māṇavakaḥ).

If the meditations leading to abhyudayaphalas do *not* give rise to any comprehension of their objective content, they can hardly be carried out by the upāsaka. For prosperity and other unseen benefits to be derived from such upāsanās can only be secured by the favor of the deities connected with such upāsanās which depends on their being per-

6 दर्शनपर्यवसितत्वादेषाम् । दर्शनपर्यवसानानि हि श्रवणादीन्यावर्त्यमानानि दृष्टार्थानि भवन्ति, यथावघातादीनि ·
(S. *BSB*. iv.1.1)

ceived thro' such meditations Thus, the distinction of meditations into 'Samyagdarśanārthāni' and 'Asamyagdarśanārthāni'—which latter are euphemistically called 'abhyudayaphalāni' is altogether baseless

Granting such a distinction, there is still no valid reason to hold that only the latter are to be carried out till death and that the former may be discontinued after a time S has, however, argued that meditations which are 'abhyudayaphala' are in need of repetition till the last moment of life in order to be able to originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future life which presupposes at the time of death a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced This is confirmed by the Śruti Followed by knowledge of the fruit to be attained he goes after it (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) and by the illustration of the caterpillar[7] (*Brh Up* iv 2 10) But in the case of meditations directed towards the attainment of perfect knowledge, as soon as such knowledge is obtained, no further effort can be considered as no scriptural injunctions can any longer be applied to the upāsaka who has come to know that B, which is not the object of any injunction, constitutes his own self [8]

This is not a convincing explanation If it means that no further effort can be commanded because after correct knowledge is attained, the upāsaka becomes a 'krtakrtya' (fulfilled) and that, therefore, there is no possibility of enjoining further effort in his case, we cannot subscribe to this position. For even to S, the Aparokṣajñānin is not yet free from Prārabdhakarmas Such a person can hardly be described as being outside the purview of further efforts to be undertaken by him. So far as we know, even the Śruti recognizes such a Jnānin to be still open to injunctions Cf kurvan eveha karmāni (*Isa Up* 2) to carry on the legitimate works of his āsrama which will not, however, be a source of further bondage to him.

If it, however, means that as Avidyā and its effects come to be destroyed root and branch by the understanding of the identity of Ātman and B and that, therefore, no injunction of Śāstra about repetition of upāsanā can be thought of in regard to a Jnānin who has gone out of the purview of injunctions, it would be equally unsustainable

For, so long as it is admitted that the Jnānin is not rid of Prārabdhakarma till he actually attains Mokṣa, it would be idle to talk of the com

7 कर्माण्यपि हि जन्मान्तरोपभोग्यं फलमारभमाणानि तदनुरूपं भावनाविज्ञानं प्रायणकाल आक्षिपन्ति 'सविज्ञानो भवति सविज्ञानमेवान्ववक्रामति' इति चैवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः तृणजलूकानिदर्शनाच्च प्रत्ययास्त्वेते स्वरूपानुवृत्तिं मुक्त्वा किमन्यत् प्रायणकालभाविभावनाविज्ञानमपेक्षेरन् ? (S BSB iv 1 12)

8 नहि सम्यग्दर्शने कार्ये निर्वृत्ते यत्नान्तरं किंचित् शासितुं शक्यम्। अनियोज्यब्रह्मात्मत्वप्रतिपत्तेः शास्त्रस्याविषयत्वात् (ibid)

plete eradication of Avidyā and its effects in the life of the Jnānin Otherwise, there should be an immediate and complete falling off of the body as soon as Jnāna is attained—and the state of Jīvanmukti cannot also be satisfactorily explained and accommodated on this view If the survival of a fraction of Avidyā is admitted in the case of such upāsakas as have attained perfect knowledge, to explain such difficulties, it will automatically leave room for the Jnānin to remain amenable to injunctions in regard to the continued performance of his upāsanā till the last day of his life Why not face the facts instead of trying to sidestep them?

Moreover, there is no reason why perfect knowledge too cannot be taken to bestow its fruit of a supersensuous result by the power of the final meditation at the time of death itself, like the other upāsanās which have prosperity for their fruit? This should be perfectly in order as the two types of upāsanās are alike and share the common feature of comprehending their content as a valid experience—as has been made clear before The *Bhāmatī* itself concedes as much when it says—"When it is clear from the Śrutis like Savijñāno bhavati (*Bṛh Up* iv 4) that karmas which have for their reward the attainment of heavenly fruit have necessarily to depend on the cognition of the fruit to be attained, at the time of departure from the body, it goes without saying that upāsanās which have supersensuous fruits to be attained in the lives to come are also to be repeatedly carried out till the end of one's life and are not to be performed once or twice and abandoned afterwards[9] It can hardly be disputed that the fruit of meditations which have for their object the realization of B is not supersensuous in its nature The Śrutis which describe 'Prasāda' or the grace of B as the fruit of such meditations are sufficient to show that such upāsanās are also associated with supersensuous reward—the grace of B As Pratikopāsanās have been shown by the *Bhāmatī* to be Brahmopāsanās in metaphorical garb (*gaunavṛtti*), they too can very well be brought within the category of upāsanās pursued for the sake of samyagdarśana

That being so, there is no point in insisting that Pratīkopāsanās alone should be carried on till the end of one's life and not such others as are covered by the Tattvam asi text and others If the socalled 'Pratikopāsanās' are not in substance and in principle 'Brahmopāsanās', there can be no justification for devoting so much space to their discussion in the Brahmamīmāmsā Śāstra The explanation that they are being discussed here only casually and incidentally (*prāsangikavicāra*) like

9 सविज्ञानो भवति' इत्यादिश्रुते यत्र स्वर्गादिफलानामपि कर्मणां प्रायणकाले स्वर्गादिविज्ञानापेक्षत्वं तत्र कैव कथा अतीन्द्रियफलानामुपासनानाम ? (*Bhāmatī* iv 1 12)

the discussion on the validity of Buddhist and other heretical Smṛtis in the Pūrvamīmāsā or the subject of upāsanās to be undertaken by the gods as in (M's interpretation of) the Brahma Sūtras, cannot be taken seriously For in the whole of this Pāda which contains fourteen adhi s according to S as many as eight deal with Pratīkopāsanās and the rest with how the knower of B is freed from the effects of past and future deeds, how good deeds cease to affect him, how works which have not begun to yield results are alone destroyed by knowledge and not those which have already begun to bear fruit, how sacrificial works not combined with knowledge or upāsanā also help in the origination of knowledge and how on the exhaustion of Prārabdha the knower attains B There is not a single adhi which actually discusses meditations which have perfect knowledge of B for their fruit—a circumstance which puts us in mind of the saying Sārthād api taskarā bahavah!

It needs to be further clarified if the upāsanās said to be undertaken for the attainment of 'samyagdarśana' have an objective content or not. It is difficult to treat B which is 'nirdharmaka' (characterless) as the objective content of any upāsanā. As B is conceived by S as the essence of intelligence it cannot be held to be reflected in intellection (*vṛttivyāpya*) and thus objectified, for what is reflected is unreal If Saguna B is to be conceived as the objective content of Samyagdarśanārthopāsanā, it will still be unable to lead to samyagdarśana as the Saguna B is also unreal. If the Upāsanās undertaken for the purpose of samyagdarśana have no objective content (*nirvisaya*), they can hardly be called 'upāsanās' For upāsanā is an intellectual-cum-emotional build up Without a content going into it there can be no build-up

The use of the keyword (ā)—'prāyana' in the Sūtra would naturally suggest the viṣayavākya for discussion to be Sa yo ha vai manuṣyesu prāyanāntam omkāram abhidhyayita katamam vāva sa tena lokam jayati (*Prasna Up* v 1) and its sequel (Sa sāmabhir unnīyate brahmalokam' According to S's own showing, the above texts deal with the upāsanā of the Supreme B *and* not with the Saguna or with any Pratīkopāsanā (See his commentary on the Sūtra Īkṣatikarmavyapadeśat sah—B S 1 3 13 of which the Viṣayavākya is *Prasna* v 1 quoted above) As the term 'āprāyana' in the Sūtra is an unmistakable pointer that the theme of the Sūtra is one of actual Brahmopāsanā till the end of one's life (and even afterwards by the logic of necessity) and not whether

Pratīkopāsanās and other abhyudayaphalopāsanās are to be carried out till the very end of one's life, it would be sufficient, apart from any other reason or argument, to show that S.'s interpretation of the Sūtra iv.1.12 is a misfit. As R. and his commentator point out texts like: Sa khalvevam vartayan yāvad āyuṣam brahmalokam abhisampadyate (*Chān.* Up. viii.15.1) and Sa yo ha vai manuṣyeṣu prāyaṇāntam omkāram abhidhyāyīta (*Praśna* v.1) clearly establish that the upāsanā of B. for purposes of samyadgarśana is to be carried on till the end of one's life. S. has tried his best to reject this position and has failed.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

DIFFERENT WAYS PAST AND FUTURE KARMAS OF APAROKSAJNĀNINS ARE LIQUIDATED IN THE END OR ARE OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR

8 *Tadadhigamādhikaranam* (iv 1 13-19)

Having concluded the discussion of the incidental topics raised in the previous adhis, the Sutrakāra now turns to the main theme of the Pāda, viz, Karmaksaya—the first phase of Mokṣa

The adhi arises by way of disposing of the objection against the *conclusion established in the Muktiphalāniyamādhikaraṇa (iii 4 51)* of the last Adhyāya that Moksa is assuredly attained thro' Aparokṣajnāna in the same life or later, provided there are no impediments caused by Prārabdha and other Karmas[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapaksa challenges this claim by pointing to the formidable obstacles presented by the heavy load of karmas performed by the Jnānin both *before* and *after* Aparokṣa There is no possibility of destruction of these karmas They cannot all of them be exhausted by enjoyment in that very life in which Aparokṣajnāna has been attained. For, by all accounts, the karmas are of such a nature as to entail several births and bodies upon the individual for their being worked out It is not

1 [illegible] (Raghu TPB iv.1.13)

possible to say that all of them can be exhausted one after the other, however long it may take to do so There is every likelihood of the Aparokṣajñāna which has been attained with so much effort becoming blunted and losing its power and potency while the individual goes on thro' so many lives in the process of trying to liquidate his heavy load of karmas which in the meanwhile will most certainly go on piling up and increasing in its dimensions with each new life added which will contribute its own share to the original capital or its balance The light of Aparokṣa is thus sure to grow dimmer and dimmer and flicker away and die out as the individual plods his weary way thro' an interminable series of lives like a seed losing its germinating power thro' sheer passage of time[2]

There is no hope of such increasing load of karmas becoming exhausted thro' 'Kāyavyūha' or the power to take over numerous bodies at the same time, attributed to Yogins For the fruits of such karmas cannot always be expected to be such as could be worked out thro' enjoyment at the same time and in one place only Their venue and the appointed time for their being worked out, may conceivably be different in each case[3]

It cannot be that all these difficulties could be overcome by the Yogic power of the Aparokṣajnāni irrespective of the venues and appointed time of enjoyment of all such Karmas This fails to take note of the fact that when the Jnāni goes thro' the process of thus working out these loads of karmas he will also be building up fresh stocks of them[4] in almost geometrical proportion each day of his life[5] For, the Jnāni can hardly be sitting idle with folded hands, while he lives It is not of much avail to argue that all previous loads of karma are destroyed by the power of Jnāna and all future ones are prevented from clinging to him by the merit of Jnāna Such a supposition is against the accepted principle of the Śāstra

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2 न ज्ञानेन मोक्ष प्रागापादितकर्मणा भावात । न च तानि ज्ञानजन्मनि भुज्यन्ते बहुशरीरफलकर्मणा भावात । न च तानि क्रमेण भुज्यन्ते । तथा सति बहुकालान्तरितज्ञानस्य जीर्णबीजवदमोक्षहेतुत्वापातात (*TP* iv 1 13)

3 न च युगपत कायव्यूहेन भोगसभव अनियतदेशकालविपाकत्वात् (*TP* ibid)
Cf अनादिकालप्रवृत्ता हि कर्माशया अनियतकालविपाका क्रमवता तावत भोगन क्षेप्तुमशक्या । भुजान खल्वयमपरानपि सचिनोति कर्माशयानिति । नाप्यपर्यायमुपभोगेनासक्त कर्मान्तरण्यसचिन्वान क्षेप्स्यतीति साम्प्रतम् । कल्पशतातिक्रमकालभोग्याना सप्रति भोक्तुमसामर्थ्यात दीर्घकालफलानि च कर्माणि कथमेकपदे क्षेप्स्यति ? तस्मान्नान्यया मोक्षसभव (*Bhamati* iv 1 13)

4 न च योगप्रभावेन तादृशानामपि भोग । तथा सति भोगस्याप्यभावप्रसगात । तद्भोगकाले च पुन कर्मान्तरसभवेनासमाप्तेश्च (*TP* iv 1 13)

5 Cf

जीवश्चतुर्दशादूर्ध्वं पुरुषो नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणा देहाना कारणानि करोत्ययम ।
स्त्री वाप्यनूनदशक देह मानुषमार्जयेत ।
अत कर्मक्षयान्मुक्ति कुत एव भविष्यति ?

नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि

'Karma can never be wiped out, even with the passage of hundreds of crores of eons, without being personally enjoyed and requited'[6]

It cannot be said that all such karmas are burnt out by Jnāna, like sins thro' expiation The Prāyaścittavidhis are purely 'naimittika' (laid down in some contingency) like the 'Ksāmavatīṣṭi' Their analogy cannot be extended to the exhaustion of the Jnānin's unexhausted karmas Nor is there any satisfactory evidence that Jnāna is capable of destroying all these karmas If it has such power we should expect the Jnānin to be freed from bondage then and there and once for all. If Mokṣa does not result immediately after the attainment of Jnāna, there will be no chance of the karmas becoming wiped out For, if Jnāna should destroy all the load of karmas, there is no reason why the Jnānin should continue to live in the same body, for no reason, after the karmas have been thus destroyed.

It is no use to contend that Aparokṣajnāna takes time, after it is born, to destroy the load of karmas For it is admitted on all hands that the nature of Jnāna is such as to act in one sweep and not intermittently by stages, in producing its results[7]

For all these reasons, the Pūrvapakṣa holds that the claim of the Siddhānta that Aparokṣajñāna is the cause of Moksa is unsustainable

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is given in the opening Sūtra that notwithstanding the fact that (i) the mounting stock of karmas cannot be exhausted thro' actual enjoyment (for reasons stated by the Pūrvapakṣa) the position that Aparokṣajnāna brings about Mokṣa is perfectly sustainable For, when there arises the direct vision (*adhigama*)[8] of B (*tad*)[9] the entirety of the stock of accumulated sinful deeds of the past (*pūrvāgha*) —which has not yet begun to fructify—is entirely burnt out (*svarūpeṇa vināsa*) "like a bundle of grass or a ball of cotton falling into the fire" (*Chān Up* v 24 3) and the sinful acts that may be committed by the Jnānin subsequent to Aparokṣa (*uttarāgha*) do not cling (*asleṣa*) to

6 न च ज्ञानी न करोति। न च वाच्यम्—ज्ञानेनैव प्राचीनकर्मणां नाशः। पश्चात्तनानामलेप इति। 'नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म' इति स्मृतिविरोधात् (*TP* iv 1 13)

7 न च प्रायश्चित्तवत् ज्ञानेन कर्मक्षयः। विप्रतिपत्तेः। दग्धगेहेष्टिवदुपपत्तेः। किं च ज्ञानेनैव कर्मक्षये ज्ञानादनन्तरं मोक्षः स्यात्। अथ न ज्ञानानन्तरमेव मोक्षः तर्हि कर्मक्षय एव न प्राप्नोति। निष्कारणावस्थानायोगात्। न च वक्तव्यम् – उत्पन्नं ज्ञानं न तदैव कर्म विनाशयति। तथा सति कर्मक्षयाभावप्राप्तेः। नहि ज्ञानस्य विलम्ब्य व्यापारः सम्भवति (*TP* iv 1 13)

8. दृष्टत्वादित्युक्त्या ज्ञानलाभाय 'अधिगम' इत्युक्तिः (Ragh. *TDP* iv 1 13)

9 सूत्रस्थतच्छब्दः 'ब्रह्मदृष्टि' (*BS* iv 1 5) इति प्रकृतब्रह्मपरामर्शी (*BD*)

him, by the grace of B —"even as water does not cling to the lotus leaf" (*Chān Up* iv.14.3). The Smrti text 'Nābhuktam ksīyate karma' quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa is to be explained with special reference to the load of karma lying to the credit of those who have *not* attained Aparoksa or to the karmas of Aparokṣajnānins falling under the category of 'Prārabdhakarmas'—whereas the karmas which, according to the Sūtrakāra, are destroyed or do not cling to the Jnānin are those which belong to the other category of Aprārabdhakarmas (karmas which have not yet begun to yield their results)

Tho' as a matter of fact the same principle of vināśa and aślesa applies to accumulated good deeds and future good deeds as well of the Aparokṣajnānin and for this reason their liquidation too could have been brought within the scope of the opening Sūtra itself by a suitable emendation of the words "agha" into karma and reading "uttarapūrva-karmaṇor aślesavināśau", it is to be noted that the Sūtrakāra has preferred to use the term "agha" (sins) to exclude the 'good deeds'.[11] For he wishes to make a special distinction in regard to the good deeds in terms of 'iṣta'-(punya) and 'anista'-punya—or desirable and undesirable good deeds—which are to be "diverted" or disposed of in appropriate ways to be indicated in a subsequent Sutra (iv.1.17) [12] Under Sūtra iii 4 16 the mitigation (*upamarda*) of the rigors of Prārabdhakarma had been indicated in respect of the Aparoksajnānin Here in Sūtra iv.1 13, the total destruction of sinful karmas falling under the category of "Aprārabdhakarma" is indicated There is thus no overlapping between these two Sūtras

The next Sūtra Itarasyāpyasamslesah pāte tu (iv 1.4) takes note *inter alia* of the nature of karmakśaya applicable to Mithyājnānins who have duly qualified themselves for their destiny of entering into Andhatamasa thro' the ripening of their evil nature It will be remembered that the Sutrakāra has admitted the existence of both permanent and impermanent hells in his system It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with his system that he should, while describing the details of karmaksaya of Aparoksajnānins eligible for Mokṣa, allude to the kar-

10 According to the commentators, this holds true only of 'sins' which may be committed after Aparokṣa entailing punishment in hell and others entailing physical or moral impurities meriting social disesteem It does not affect the possibility of slight diminution of the expression of Svarūpananda in Mokṣa owing to certain other kinds of transgressions committed by the Jnānin. See Ragh *TDP* and *BD* on iv 1 13

11 पुण्यस्याप्येवंभावेन कर्मणोरिति वाच्ये अघयोरित्युक्ति पुण्ये विशेषसूचनाय। स च वक्ष्यते

12 Cf अनिष्टमिष्टं मिश्रं च त्रिविधं कर्मणः फलम् (*Gita* xviii 12)
कर्मक्षयश्रुतिर्ज्ञानिविषया सर्वत्र। उभयनाशश्रुतिरप्यनिष्टविषया। न हीष्टपुण्यक्षये किंचित् प्रयोजनम्। न चेष्टनाशो ज्ञानिना युक्त (M. *G B* ii 50)

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him, by the grace of B —"even as water does not cling to the lotus leaf" (*Chān Up* iv.14.3) The Smrti text 'Nābhuktam ksīyate karma' quoted for the Pūrvapaksa is to be explained with special reference to the load of karma lying to the credit of those who have *not* attained Aparoksa or to the karmas of Aparokṣajnānins falling under the category of 'Prārabdhakarmas'—whereas the karmas which, according to the Sūtrakāra, are destroyed or do not cling to the Jnānin are those which belong to the other category of Aprārabdhakarmas (karmas which have not yet begun to yield their results)

Tho' as a matter of fact the same principle of vināśa and aślesa applies to accumulated good deeds and future good deeds as well of the Aparoksajnānin and for this reason their liquidation too could have been brought within the scope of the opening Sūtra itself by a suitable emendation of the words "agha" into karma and reading "uttarapūrvakarmanor aslesavināśau", it is to be noted that the Sūtrakāra has preferred to use the term "agha" (sins) to exclude the 'good deeds' [11] For he wishes to make a special distinction in regard to the good deeds in terms of 'iṣṭa'-(punya) and 'anista'-punya—or desirable and undesirable good deeds—which are to be "diverted" or disposed of in appropriate ways to be indicated in a subsequent Sutra (iv 1 17) [12] Under Sūtra iii 4 16 the mitigation (*upamarda*) of the rigors of Prārabdhakarma had been indicated in respect of the Aparoksajnānin Here in Sūtra iv.1 13, the total destruction of sinful karmas falling under the category of "Aprārabdhakarma" is indicated There is thus no overlapping between these two Sūtras

The next Sūtra Itarasyāpyasamslesah pāte tu (iv 1 4) takes note *inter alia* of the nature of karmaksaya applicable to Mithyājnānins who have duly qualified themselves for their destiny of entering into Andhatamasa thro' the ripening of their evil nature It will be remembered that the Sūtrakāra has admitted the existence of both permanent and impermanent hells in his system It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with his system that he should, while describing the details of karmaksaya of Aparoksajnānins eligible for Mokṣa, allude to the kar-

10 According to the commentators, this holds true only of 'sins' which may be committed after Aparokṣa entailing punishment in hell and others entailing physical or moral impurities meriting social disesteem It does not affect the possibility of slight diminution of the expression of Svarūpananda in Mokṣa owing to certain other kinds of transgressions committed by the Jnānin. See Ragh *TDP* and *BD* on iv 1 13

11 पुण्यस्याप्येवंभावेन कर्मणोरिति वाच्ये अघयोरित्युक्तिः पुण्यविशेषसूचनाय । स च वक्ष्यते

12 Cf अनिष्टमिष्टं मिश्रं च त्रिविधं कर्मणः फलम् (*Gita* xviii 12)
कर्मक्षयश्रुतिरज्ञानिविषया सर्वत्र । उभयक्षयश्रुतिरप्यनिष्टविषया । न हीष्टपुण्यक्षये किंचित् प्रयोजनम् । न चेष्टनाशो ज्ञानिनो युक्तः (*M G B* ii 50)

makṣaya relevant to the Tamoyogyas whose bad deeds thro' Sādhanas in keeping with *their* ultimate destiny have ripened.

Accordingly Sūtra iv 1 14 conveys that in the case of these others (*itarasya*) (who are haters of B) there is similarly (*evam*) no clinging (*asamśleṣah*) of the past and future (*uttarapūrvayoh*) deeds which are other (*itara*) than sinful (*agha*)—in other words their "good deeds" (*puṇya*), at the time of their falling (*pāte*) irrevocably (*tu*) into *Tamas*[13]

The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra is suggestive of the fact that in the case of the Tamoyogyas (*itarasya*) the fall being irretrievable, there is no possibility of their good deeds (*punyakarma*) being enjoyed after completing their punishment in Tamas Tho' in respect of the Tamoyogyas the non-clinging of their future good deeds to them could have been conveyed by the use of the term 'evam' (on the analogy of the destruction and non-clinging of the former and subsequent sinful deeds of the Jnānin) still the Sutrakāra has repeated the term 'a-śleṣa' (with an intensive particle 'sam' prefixed to it) to convey that in the case of the Tamoyogyas, there is no hope of even the slightest happiness in Tamas, whereas in the case of Aparoksajnānins the level of manifentation of the bliss of Moksa may slightly be diminished for a while on account of the sinful deeds, if any, committed after Aparokṣa The general sense of the Sūtra (iv 1 14) is thus explained by M

पुण्यस्याप्यसंश्लेष पाते । तुशब्दोऽनुत्थानवाची

That the above predication is made with reference to the Tamoyogya (and not with reference to the Aparoksajnānin) is brought out more clearly by the verse quoted by way of elucidation of 'Svapada' —

यथाश्लेषो विनाशश्च मुक्तस्य तु विकर्मण. ।
एवं सुकर्मणश्चापि पततस्तमसि ध्रुवम् ॥
इति चाग्नेये (*M. BSB* iv 1 14)

The next Sūtra replies to a difficulty arising out of the statements made earlier If the Aparokṣajnānin and the Tamoyogya completely shed and are rid of their sinful deeds and their good deeds respectively thro' the power of Jnāna and the ripening of their evil nature, as suggested in Sūtras 13 and 14, they should be able to attain Mokṣa or Tamas, as the case may be,—straightway without any further delay as

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13 इतरस्येति तन्त्रम् (*TDP*)
अत्र इतरसंश्लेष इत्यत्र तन्त्रावृत्त्या अघनिष्पन्नेतरश्लेषार्थपर, अघेतरपुण्यस्येत्यत्र (*BD*) पाते इति विषयसप्तमी । तमस्ये वा । तुरनुत्थानरूपविशेषवाची सन् पातविशेषणम् । अनुत्थानपाते आसन्ने मिथ्याज्ञाने पूर्णे सति तमसि तादृशपातार्थं वा (*TDP*)

stated ın Sūtra ııı 4 51 The posıtıon ıs cleared by Sūtra ıv 1.15 It poınts out that the loss eıther on account of destructıon of the bad deeds of the Jnānın and the good deeds of the Mıthyājnānın spoken of ın the two previous Sūtras wıth reference to the Jnānın and the Tamoyogya ıs only of such bad karmas whose fruıts of mısery have not yet been begun to be actually enjoyed ın the case of the Jnānın at the tıme of hıs attaınıng Aparoksa and the destructıon of the merıts of joy of such good deeds of the Tamoyogya as have not yet been begun to be enjoyed by the Mıthyājnānın at the tıme of the rıpenıng of hıs mıthyājnāna and not the entıre stock of theır karmas[14] In other words, there ıs presence of Prārabdhakarma whıch poses a barrıer whıch ıs to be overcome before the Aparoksajnānın or the Mıthyājnānın can reach hıs respectıve destıny The exıstence of such a delay caused by the hurdles of Prārabdhakarma ıs ımplıcıt ın the terms of statement of the Śrutı

Tasya tāvad eva cıram (*Chān Up* vı 14 2)

The next Sūtra reverts attentıon to the Aparoksajnānın It raıses and answers certaın pertınent questıons about the destructıon or non-clıngıng of the past and the future good deeds of the Jnānın after Aparoksa, mentıoned ın Sūtra 14 Thıs ıs necessary to plug certaın loopholes ın the theory whıch may be taken advantage of by the Pūrvapakṣa to reject the fındıng arrıved at ın Sūtra 14

The poınt ıs thıs Is there a complete destructıon of the deeds of Jnānın and non-clıngıng of hıs future good deeds, or not? If there ıs such destructıon and non-clıngıng of hıs merıtorıous deeds, there ıs no poınt ın the Sūtrakāra sınglıng out only the sınful deeds (*agha*) past and future (*uttarapūrva)* of the Jnānın for destructıon or non-clıngıng If there ıs no such destructıon and non-clıngıng of the past and the future good deeds, there wıll be no prospect of mokṣa for the Jnānın as the merıts (punya) accruıng from the deeds are also as much bındıng ın theır nature as sınful deeds or theır fruıts

Thıs dıffıculty ıs smoothed out by the Sūtra Agnıhotrādı tu tatkāryāyaıva taddarsanāt (ıv 1 16) The questıon can be approached from two dıfferent alternatıves whether the destructıon of the merıts (punya) of the goods deeds (past and future) as posed by the objector ıs wıth reference to the merıts accruıng from the past and future 'Nıṣkāmakarmas" of the Aparoḥṣajñānın or of "Kāmyakarmas"

14 नास्माभि सर्वपापादिनाशो ज्ञानादिनोच्यते येन तदैव मुक्त्यादिप्रसङ्ग । किंतु यस्य पापस्य कार्यं दुःखादि भोक्तुमनारब्धं तस्यैव ज्ञानेन विनाशो, यस्य च पुण्यस्य कार्यं सुखं न भोक्तुमारब्धं तस्यैव मिथ्याज्ञानेन नाश' इति
(*TP.* Iv 1 15)

The Siddhānta answer to the first alternative is that the results of the good deeds past and future of the Jñānin's Niṣkāmakarmas like Agnihotra[15] are *not* destroyed nor do they fail to cling to him They are assets to Jñāna and do not at all come in the way of the Jñānin's attaining Mokṣa On the contrary, they make for the deeper experience of the bliss of Mokṣa brought about by Aparokṣa and are as such very much active and do not die out Nor do they entail bondage The merits of such Niṣkāmakarmas performed by Aparokṣajñānins before the attainment of Jñāna make for the attainment of B (*tatkāryāyaiva*) and those performed *after* contribute to the deeper enjoyment of the bliss of Mokṣa Thus both the types of Niṣkāmakarma have an intimate bearing on Mokṣa and its experience The words of the Sūtra 'Taddarsanāt' refer to the authoritative pronouncement on the subject in the *Brh Up* (1, 4, 15) "Just as the Vedas not properly studied under a Guru or duties not performed properly are not productive of fruit, so also the Lord if not known correctly does not permit the ignorant one to enjoy bliss If he who knows not the Lord performs any meritorious deed, it decays Therefore, he shall meditate on the Lord as the abode and the guide He who meditates on the Lord as his abode and guide his works are undecaying"[16] The first part of this text makes it clear that karma performed by persons ignorant of B yield but limited fruits The second part 'Sa ya ātmānam eva lokam upāste' shows that the fruits of karmas performed by a seeker of B confer the benefit of Mokṣa by leading to Aparokṣajñāna whereas the fruits of such Niṣkāmakarmas performed by the real knower of B after attaining Aparokṣa become inexhaustible in the state of Mokṣa As such karma of the Jñānin has been described as undiminishing (*na kṣīyate*) it is clear that the karma referred to cannot be anything other than niṣkāmakarma performed *after* the attainment of Aparokṣa

Sūtra 17 is in answer to the second alternative[17] The kāmyapuṇyas accumulated prior to Aparokṣa stand classified as prārabdha and aprārabdha in the sense already indicated. The former has to be exhausted by enjoyment The latter is distinguished into agreeable (*iṣṭa*) and disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*) The iṣṭapuṇyas are those conducive to the building up of sravana, manana and other sādhanas and aniṣṭapuṇyas are what conduce to heavenly rewards, kingly state, etc which are not wanted by the Jñānin The iṣṭapuṇyas are not lost The aniṣṭapuṇyas of kāmyakarmas of the Jñānin are, according to the *Kauṣ Up* (i 4) distributed among his spiritual friends As for his sinful deeds of the

15 Cf अन्यत्र विनाश हानि हविषस्मिन् इयकाम्यकर्मणामायेषय (Ragh. *TDP* iv 1.16)

16 स एनमविदितो न भुनक्ति यदि ह वा अप्यनेवंवित् महत्पुण्यं करोति तद्धास्यान्ततः क्षीयत एव स य आत्मानमेव लोकमुपास्ते न हास्य कर्म क्षीयते अस्माद्ध्येवात्मनो यद्यत्कामयते तत्तत्सृजते (*Brh Up* i 4 15)

past they are to be requited thro' enjoyment if they form part of his Prārabdhakarmas and if they fall under the category aprārabdha they do not cling to him any more

One more difficulty may linger Karmas are proverbially short-lived and their results are but temporary How then is it justifiable for the Siddhāntin to hold that the Niṣkāmakarmas performed by the Aparokṣajnānin after he has attained Aparokṣa are "carried over" to the state of Mokṣa and continue to be fruitful, thereby enriching the sense of enjoyment of the bliss of Mokṣa? The Sūtra 'Yadeva vidyayeti hi' cites the authority of the Śruti (*Chān Up* 1 1 10) by way of reinforcing the premises of Sūtra 16 Tho' the Śruti 'Yadeva vidyayā karoti' (*Chān Up* 1 1.10) had been cited under Sūtra iii 4 4, there is no overlapping of ideas between these two citations For in *BS* iii 4 4 this Śruti was cited to support the position that karma performed with knowledge is effective in producing heavenly rewards whereas in the present context its potency to enrich the experience of mokṣa is indicated [18]

The last hurdles to be got over are the Prārabdhakarmas of the Aparokṣajnāni and of the Tamoyogya before either can attain his respective goal of mokṣa and tamas The Sūtra (iv 1 19) says that it is only after the Prārabdhakarmas have been completely exhusted by enjoyment that either can attain his goal The liquidation of Aprārabdhakarmas has been provided for thro' different ways of disposition as already explained The particle 'tu' in the Sūtra (iv 1 19) alludes to the special provision for mitigation of the fruits of the Prārabdhakarmas part of which have already been enjoyed to some extent in the case of Aparokṣajnānins by the special grace of the Supreme B (Vide *B S* iii 4 16) There is thus no substance in Ranade's contention that Bādarāyana's belief in the inexorable nature of Prārabdhakarma leaves no room for God's grace in its destruction, as recognized by Ekanath and the Saint of Umadi (*Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought*, p 129) M has long before anticepated the position of these mystics—not withstanding Ranade's being unaware of it

The objection that the process of enjoyment or suffering of Prārabdhakarma may go on without end and without any hope of its complete liquidation and attainment of Mokṣa or Tamas by the Aparoksajnāni or the Tamoyogya is met by the Bhāṣyakāra who indicates the following

17 The words 'ato anyad' (of the Sutra) signify the kamyakarmas—which are other than' the Akamyakarmas earlier referred to in Sutra 16 Ubhayoh' in the Sutra refers to the past and the future deeds—good and bad

18 पूव स्वर्गादिसिद्धयर्थं वीयवत्वेन चोदितम ।
कर्म विद्यायुत पश्चात्मोक्ष वीयप्रद त्विति ॥ (M *AV* iv 1 adhi 8)

time schedule for the liquidation of Prārabdhakarmas of the gods and others, quoting for authority from the *Nārāyanatantra* —

ब्रह्मणा शतकालात्तु पूर्वमारब्धसक्षय
नियमेन भवेन्नात्र कार्या काचित् विचारणा। (M BSB iv 1 19)

ब्रह्मणस्त्वेव तावत्त्व पचशद् ब्रह्मणस्तथा।
रुद्रस्य विशदेव स्यादिन्द्रस्यार्कादिके दश।
अन्येषा ब्रह्ममात्रस्य त्वन्त आरब्धसक्षय॥ (Q AV iv 1 adh 8)

'Exhaustion of the Prārabdhakarmas of all Aparokṣajñānins is bound to take place before the completion of the life span of a hundred Brahmadevas The fourfaced Brahmā alone takes that much of time—i e a hundred Brahmakalpas to complete his arduous sādhanas and be ready to attain Mokṣa The god Rudra achieves the exhaustion of his Prārabdhakarma within fifty Brahmakalpas, Indra within twenty, Sūrya and others within ten Brahmakalpas Those whose Prārabdhakarmas have thus been exhausted and their Sādhanas completed get released along with the four-faced Brahmā" [19]

Saṁkara's Interpretation

S divides the seven Sūtras beginning with Tadadhigame * * * into six adhis and R into five According to S the first Tadadhigamādhi (iv 1 13 considers whether, when Brahmajñāna is attained, the sinful deeds which make for bondage of the self and which are opposed to the fruit of Brahmajñāna (viz Mokṣa) are destroyed or not.

The Purvapakṣa is that as karmas are prescribed for the attainment of definite results, it is not possible to believe that they would go without producing them, lest the Śāstra enjoining them should be falsified if the karmāpūrvas were to perish without bringing into being their stated results It cannot be argued that like the expiatory rites, Brahmajñāna also puts an end to karmāpūrvas The rites are associated with special occasions—like the Kṣāmavatiṣṭi prescribed when the house of the Agnihotrin is burnt down by fire The iṣṭi does not undo the damage done However, granting that expiatory rites have the power claimed for them, there is no such injunction associating Brahmajñāna with the destruction of evil deeds and their effects, as its fruit, as with Moksa. The destruction of evil deeds can well be held to take place like the fruit of works, depending on circumstances of time, place and cause, without reference to Brahmajñāna We hear of Yogins

19 The reason for the Devas taking such a long time to complete their sadhanas and exhaust their Prarabdhakarmas has been set forth in the Phalasrutyadhikarana (iii.4 44-46) and Krtsnabhāvadhi (iii 4 47-48) earlier

attaining Mokṣa after exhausting the fruits of their karma by taking numerous bodies and sense organs created by the power of their Yoga. That being so, the Śruti texts which allude to the past and future sinful deeds being destroyed or not clinging to the Jnānin are to be understood as eulogizing Brahmavidyā

The Siddhānta is there is no possibility of the Śāstra forfeiting its validity if the evil karmas of the Jnānin should perish without bearing their fruits The Śāstra merely affirms that particular karmas are competent to produce particular results It merely bears out the competency of karmas to produce their fruits when performed, but not also the non-obstruction, sometimes, of such competency by the interposition of some adventitious causes—with which it is not directly concerned[20] The validity of Śāstra which speaks of the competency of karma to produce its results remains true and unaffected so long as such competency is not obstructed by other causes The Śruti text 'Nābhuktam kṣīyate karma' is to be understood with reference to karmas whose competency to produce their effects has not been obstructed The power of Brahmajnāna to destroy the effects of sinful deeds and to confer tangible benefits on the Jnānin is true of Saguna Brahmavidyā In regard to Nirguna Brahmavidyā tho' there is no express association of the destruction of the sins of the Jnānin, such destruction may be seen to be implicit in the very character of Nirguna Vidyā and what it culminates in The Jīvātman who is freed from the illusions of his being the doer of deeds and the enjoyer of their fruits, as a result of the enlightenment arising from the meditation of the import of Tat tvam asi and other texts is never more implicated in the enjoyment or suffering of any fruits of actions The fright and trembling of the limbs caused by the superimposition of the snake on the rope do not dominate a person once he has vividly experienced the truth of the rope They may "hang over" him due to the lingering effects of the subconscious impression of the snake for a while and cease after a while, of their own accord.

Criticism

S has interpreted the expression Tadadhigama in the Sūtra as "knowledge of B" (and not as either the direct perception of B or the attainment of B—which he cannot afford to do, consistent with his system We have, however, to know in what 'precise' sense the term 'Brahmajnāna' is to be understood from his point of view It cannot be 'knowledge which is B itself' That being already existent and self-

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20 शास्त्रं हि फलोत्पादनसामर्थ्यमात्रं कर्मणामवगमयति। न तु कुतश्चिदागन्तुकान्निमित्तात् तदप्रतिबन्धमपि, तस्य तत्र औदासीन्यात् (*Bhāmati* iv 1 13)

evident, the destruction of sins would be taking place always Moreover, such a meaning of Brahmajnāna is inconsistent with the way in which he has broached the inquiry into the problem of the destruction of sinful deeds by the knowledge of B attained by means of the Sādhanas of Vairāgya and Upāsanā in Pādas 3 and 4 of the previous Adhyāya. If the knowledge (*adhigama*) under reference is the everexistent B itself, the compound 'Brahmajnāna' cannot be construed as a genitive Tatpurusa wherein the knowledge in question would stand for what is acquired thro' Sādhanas Nor can this 'knowledge' be the final Vṛtti in terms of negation of the world, arising from the import of the Vedāntic texts in terms of an impartite judgment of pure consciousness As such consciousness in S's philosophy annihilates the whole of world-experience there will be no point in launching an inquiry whether such knowledge is able to destroy the sinful deeds of the Jnānin

In S's philosophy both the past and the future sinful deeds (*duritam*) of the Jnānin are alike superimpositions on the self But the Sūtrakāra is seen speaking about the *destruction* of the former and the *non-clinging* of the latter to the Jnānin How is this distinction valid or warranted from S's standpoint? How could the Brahmajnānin who has had the knowledge of his true being as the niṣkriya B of pure consciousness commit any future sins at all? Such deeds have to proceed from Ajnāna When Ajnāna has been eradicated by 'Tadadhigama', there is no more any material cause which can produce future misdeeds of the Jnānin If future misdeeds can come into existence after 'Tadadhigama', they would need a Vṛtti which will have reference to the sādhanas with which such deeds are to be committed. If any such Vṛtti can succeed and survive Brahmādhigama, the latter will have to forfeit its claim to be regarded as the "final" Vṛtti The commission of future misdeeds after Brahmajnāna is attained would also require the existence of a body and sense organs and if all previous misdeeds have been destroyed by caramavṛtti or sākṣātkāra, there cannot be any continuation of the body and sense organs with which to commit further misdeeds If the body and the senses are not destroyed by Brahmasakṣātkāra, the world at large cannot also be destroyed by it—a fine tribute indeed to the unassailable logic of Advaita and its philosophical vindication by S!

The *Bhāmatī* has openly admittetd that there is no question of the Jiva who has just been emancipated from the feelings of being a doer and enjoyer on attaining enlightenment ever being associated with any fruits of his actions, to be experienced thereafter The reactions of fear and trembling caused by the superimposition of the snake on a rope

vanish as soon as the truth about the rope is realized. Some reflex acts due to the impressions left by the illusion may take place but they cease after a while. This may be so in the case of *past* experiences; but the deliberate commission of sinful deeds after having realized B. is something which cannot be placed in the category of 'Bādhitānuvṛttayaḥ' of the Advaitajnānin. No subconscious impressions too of what had been can survive the great illumination of Brahmasākṣātkāra. If Saṁskāras can survive the realization of B. nothing could sublate them afterwards and duality in terms of bhogya and bhoktṛ would continue to be for however short a period after Jnāna. But the difficulty is that the Advaitajnāna is not something which comes by bits and in stages. It is a partless single all-inclusive blinding illumination. To admit remnants of Saṁskāras to continue after sākṣātkāra will be damaging to the reputation of Advaita as the climax of thought. Part-destruction of past karmas and leaving the functioning of the body and the organs to go on after the attainment of Jnāna is conceivable in a Theism where everything is regulated by Divine will—but not in a Nirguṇa Brahmavāda.

R. holds that the adhi discusses the fruits of Vidyā in terms of the destruction of the past sins and non-clinging of the future ones. It would be more proper to ascribe these fruits to the attainment of B. in the first instance than to Vidyā which is only the means of attaining that B.

Saṁkara's *Itarāsaṁśleṣādhikaraṇam* (iv.1.14)

S. and R. devote a separate adhi. and Sūtra (iv.1.14) to establish that the Jnānin's past and future good deeds are indeed likewise destroyed and do not cling to him.

Criticism

There is no need to have an additional Sūtra to establish this point. The subject of both the Sūtras could be neatly conveyed by substituting the word karma for "agha" in Sūtra 13 and omitting Sūtra 14 if it is merely an extension of the idea of "aśleṣavināśa" to the good works also. That would also prevent the redundancy caused by Sūtra 17 as interpreted by S. and R. Sūtra 17 can be treated as an elucidation of Sūtra 14 only when no better interpretation of it is possible.

Having accepted the existence of seven hells including Nityatamas in Adhy. III. Pāda 1, the Sūtrakāra has got to say how the past and the future good deeds of the Tamoyogyas are to be accounted for so as

not to come in the way of their attaining their final goal Sūtra 14 can, therefore, be rightly utilized for this purpose The term 'pāte' in the Sūtra 14 could thus point meaningfully to the Tamoyogyas falling into Tamas As the destruction and nonclinging of the good deeds of the Jñānin can be expected to take place only at the time of his death and falling off of the body and *not* before, it is superfluous for the Sūtrakāra to say so in so many words 'pāte tu'

The term 'pāpma' which is synonymous with 'agha' is found used in a more comprehensive sense to include one's good deeds also which are as much binding (*bandhaka*) in their character and thus act as obstacles to Mokṣa. This has been accepted in principle by S and Vācaspati.[21] There is thus very good reason and no difficulty whatever in making a combined reference to the destruction and non-clinging of both the bad and the good works (past and future) of the Jñānin under Sūtra 13 itself—which would release Sūtra 14 for dealing with a different and more pertinent question of what happens to the good works of Tamoyogyas It cannot be maintained that 'pāpman' synonym of 'agha', can be extended to denote one's good works also only in the Śrutis and *not* in the Sūtras By taking the word 'agha' in its wider figurative sense of binding karmas, the Śrutis and the Sūtra can be brought into closer rapprochement and Sūtra 14 can be given a fresh deal.

R.'s interpretation of 'pāte' tu' that the good works (*itara*) which produce results favorable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body and *not before* the life time of the Jñānin, overlooks the fact that the fruits of such good works are sure to be useful to the Jñānin in practising upāsanās more effectively in subsequent lives also, for there is no assurance that the Jñānin attains Mokṣa in the same life in which he has attained Jñāna It has been recognized by both S and R in the Yāvadadhikāra Sūtra (iii 3 31) that *not* all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves of all their good and bad works at the time of death but only those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path—the first stage of which is light

21 दुष्कृतवत् सुकृतस्यापि प्रातिकूल्यात् । यद्यपि क्वचन एव पाप्मशब्दो दुष्कृते तथापि तेनैव पुण्यस्याप्युपलक्षितम् इष्टव्यम् । ज्ञानापेक्षया निकृष्टत्वात् । अस्ति च श्रुतौ पुण्येऽपि पाप्मशब्दः 'नैनं सेतुमहोरात्रे तरतः'

(*Chān Up* viii 4 1)

इत्यत्र सह दुष्कृतेन सुकृतमप्यनुक्रम्य 'सर्वे पाप्मानोऽतो निवर्तन्ते' इत्यविशेषेणैव प्रकृते पुण्ये पाप्मशब्दप्रयोगात्

(S *BSB* iv 1 14)

Śamkara's Anārabdhakāryādhikaranam (iv 1 15)

According to S this adhi considers whether the annihilation of good and evil works thro' knowledge applies without distinction to all karmas of the Jnānin—viz those whose effects have not yet begun (*aprārabdha*) as well as those whose effects have already begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*)

The Pūrvapaksa holds that knowledge of the soul's non-agency (*akartrātmabodha*) being the same in respect of Aprārabdha and Prārabdha karmas alike, it is proper to admit that both are destroyed when knowledge is attained The Śruti 'He thereby overcomes both' (*Brh Up* iv 4 22) confirms this It cannot be said that punya and pāpa continue for a time after attainment of Jnāna by the force of the Samskāras (impressions) left by those karmas Continuance is possible only for things which have a real existence To the Māyāvādin merit and demerit are products of māyā The destruction of Māyā by the attainment of the knowledge that Ātman is not at all a doer of anything good or bad (*akartrātmabodha*) will put an end to merit and demerit as well as the impressions left by them It cannot be said that the impressions left by the karmas may lend a further lease of life to punya and pāpa and keep them alive, just as fright and tembling of the limbs linger for a while after the illusion of the snake in the rope has passed For, tho' there has been no snake in reality in the illusory perception, of it, the knowledge of the rope in terms of a snake is real enough and the fright and trembling generated by such knowledge and the impressions left by the mental and physical reactions to such knowledge are real and continue to be felt for some time after recovering from the illusion But in the case of the Jnānin who has attained knowledge of the self there is neither Māyā nor karma nor the samskāras generated by it or the merits and demerits produced by such samskāras Thus it stands to reason that on the attainment of Jnāna all Karmas without distinction of their being Prarabdha or Sañcita will have to get liquidated It cannot be argued that the Śruti For him there is delay only as long as he is delivered (*Chan Up* vi 14 2) sets the death of the body as the upper limit for the attainment of Mokṣa It merely indicates that release takes place soon after Jnāna is attained, without necessarily having to wait till death takes place It would involve vākyabheda if a time limit ard the event of death as the upper limit are both to be predicated by the Śruti Tasya tāvad eva ciram'

The Siddhānta is that tho' Advaitabrahmasākṣātkāra, being absolutely hostile to the continuance of world appearance let loose by beginningless Avidyā, will naturally wipe out all traces of karma which

form part of the world-experience, still it acts differently in respect of the liquidation of Aprārabdharkarmas and Prārabdhakarmas It wipes out Aprārabdhakarmas immediately root and branch while it gives a little more lease of life to Prārabdhakarmas which have earned for the Jñānin his particular station and birth thro' which he has attained Jnāna For the Prārabdhakarmas have been roused to fruitful activity and are as such more powerful than the dormant forces of Aprārabdhakarmas But for this distinction in the behavior of Prārabdhakarmas, it will not be possible to explain the rich and manysided activities of great Brahmajñānins like Hiranyagarbha, Manu and Uddālaka who are known from the Śrutis, Smrtis and Itihāsas to have lived a life of many kalpas, mahākalpas and manvantaras after attaining Brahmajnāna These celebrated personages cannot be classed with ordinary run of humanity It must, therefore, be admitted that in accordance with the statement of the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram', the Jnānin needs, even after the attainment of direct vision of the truth, to await the complete exhaustion, by enjoyment, of the fruits of his Prārabdhakarmas which have begun to operate We have, therefore, to conclude that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' after recapitulating the fact made known by some other Śruti texts that it takes some time after the attainment of Jnāna for one to attain Mokṣa, defines the duration of this waiting period as ending with the fall of the body[22]

Criticism

The contention that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' recapitulates the information given by some other Śrutis that it takes some time for the Jnānin to get released after attaining Jnāna and goes on to define such interval in terms of falling off of the body is inadmissible For there is no such originative statement in the Śruti apart from the one prescribing the time limit in terms of the falling off of the body which can be supposed to be recapitulated by 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram'. The plea of recapitulation (*anuvāda*) cannot, therefore, be sustained. The wording of the Śruti 'kṣiyante cāsya karmāni tasmin dṛṣṭe (*Muṇḍ Up* ii,2,8) is far too general in its purport to be identified as the one whose purport can be supposed to be recapitulated for purposes of making the fresh predication prescribing the time limit in terms of falling off of the body As light removes darkness, then and there, the intrinsic power of knowledge to remove ignorance of the nature of the

22. यद्यप्येकतत्त्वज्ञानमाभारोधविद्यासदर्भिन्नत्रयमानविरोधितया न मध्यवर्तितमकलकर्मविरोधी, तथापि अनारब्धविपाक कर्मजातं दाहयत्येव समुच्छिनत्ति, न त्वारब्धविपाकम्। यदि समुदाचरद्वृत्तितया बलवत्। अन्यथा हिरण्यगर्भमनूद्दालकप्रभृतीनां न महाकल्पकल्पमन्वन्तरादिकालावधिता (स्यात्) न चैते महाधियो अल्पपुण्यमेधसो मनुष्याः। 'तावदेव चिरं' इति न चिरता विधीयते अपितु श्रुत्यन्तरसिद्धा चिरतामनूद्य देहपातावधिमात्र विधानम् (*Bhāmatī* iv 1 15)

self is known from worldly experience itself to be immediately operative. It is not, therefore, proper to try to derive such information from some textual authority and then treat it as being restated in 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' for purposes of predicating a definite time limit. As a matter of fact, even the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' predicates the mere fact that the attainment of release follows soon after the attainment of Jnāna and there is no reason to set aside its validity. The roundabout explanation of a restatement for purposes of a fresh predication is inadmissible on other grounds also. An anuvāda to be followed by a Vidhi in the Śrutis has to be founded on a previous scriptural text. In the present case, the idea that release follows the attainment of Jnāna is derived in the light of worldly experience that knowledge destroys ignorance. It cannot, therefore, be made the basis of an anuvāda in the Śruti.

It is difficult to see how knowledge of the self as the non-doer (*akartrātmabodha*) while it is competent to destroy the Jnānin's karmas, is held to be capable of destroying only Aprārabdhakarmas—leaving Prārabdhakarmas untouched. When a dozen seeds are fried in fire the germinating power of all of them is destroyed without exception.

The explanation that the origination of knowledge cannot take place without depending on an aggregate of works whose effects have already become operative and that when such dependence is there one has to wait as in the case of the potter's wheel, until the motion of that which has begun to move comes to an end—there being nothing to obstruct it in the interval, is untenable. For it happens that Prārabdhakarma itself draws its sustenance from Avidyā. When Avidyā itself is destroyed by Akartrātmabodha, Prārabdhakarma can offer no more resistance to Jnāna.[23] The rotation of the potter's wheel due to the momentum given by the potter's hand is understandable. But it is difficult to see how Prārabdhakarma can survive after the cessation of Avidyā which is partless. The momentum which causes the rotation of the potter's wheel, after the potter has ceased turning it, is a reality. But the karmas which go to build up the body thro' which the Jnānin attains enlightenment and the contnuance of remnants of Avidyā so as to make it possible for Prārabdhakarma or their momentum to continue are pure projections of Avidyā. When this Avidyā is destroyed by Ātmic knowledge, no trace of Prārabdhakarma can hope to survive and delay the attainment of Mokṣa till the falling off of the body. Otherwise, why should *not* accumulated good and bad karmas survive

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23. Cf. उपजीव्याया अप्यविद्यायाः ज्ञानेन बाधात् प्रारब्धकर्माण्याश्रित्य ज्ञानोदय. तदनिवर्तकत्वे स्वतन्त्रमुक्तिर्न भवति (*Kalpataru* iv.1 15)

after the attainment of knowledge, till the falling off of the body? If Prārabdhakarmas have an edge over Aprārabdhakarmas because of their having been enjoyed in part (*sāmibhuktaphala*), the Sañcitakarmas, by reason of their having been piled up and kept pending for a much longer period than Prārabdhakarmas, may legitimately be expected to offer stouter resistance to liquidation by Akartrātmabodha or the knowledge attained by the Jñānin

The very fact that Hiraṇyagarbha, Manu and others hold on to their bodies and offices shows they have *not* had Nirviśeṣabrahmasākṣatkāra which alone according to S is the cause of termination of all karmas The *Bhāmatī* hails them as persons of mighty intellect (*mahādhiyah*) and as such entitled to distinction from others This misses the point that there is nothing to distinguish between ordinary mortals and the mighty intellectuals so far as the content of Nirviśeṣabrahmasākṣātkāra is concerned as no Ātmabheda is admissible in Advaitā.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R also brings up the doubt and the Pūrvapakṣa of this adhi in the same way as S But unlike S, he holds that there is no proof of the existence if certain Samskāras (impressions) to account for the continuance of the body after the origination of Brahmajnāna His view is that it is the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by good or bad deeds which explains the continuance or discontinuance of the body's life[24]

Criticism

There seems to be no justification to do away with the role of Samskāras, in the continuance of the body after the attainment of Jnāna during the operative stage of Prārabdhakarmas and try to explain the continuance of the body on account of the Lord's pleasure or displeasure The role of Samskāras (past impressions) in the creation of objects of the dream-world has already been made clear in the Sandhyādhi. (iii 2 1-6)—tho' even there R. has not touched upon the role of Vāsanās or Samskāras in God's creation of the dream-objects Even admitting that dream-objects are the Lord's creation, they would still require a material cause—as in the case of external objects Nothing will be lost if the continuance of the body after the attainment of Brahmajnāna, is put down to the operation of Samskāras born of

24 [illegible] (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 1 15)

Prārabdhakarmas, doubtless at the pleasure of the Lord There is no point in the objection that if the continuance of the body is attributed purely to the influence of Samskāras there will not be any enjoyment of pleasure or pain in the Jnānin's life after he has attained knowledge because such enjoyment is due to the power of karmas as such The Aparokṣajnānin has no intensive enjoyment of bodily pleasures or pain like the ordinary man of the world He remains completely detached and maintains absolute equanimity in the midst of passing phases of pleasure and pain As a Jīvanmukta, his external activities flow purely from past impressions and are not premeditated His mental make-up is highly rarefied like the remains of a burnt out piece of cloth He moves in a completely detached way while participating in the normal activities of life like eating and drinking See *Gītā* (ii 70) and M.'s C on it.

The different ways in which the Aparoksajnānin's Sañcita and Prārabdhakarmas are liquidated as provided for in Sūtras iv 1 13 and iv 1 15 at the Lord's dispensation, for neither karma nor their samskāras have a free and independent hand in the matter as they are all inanimate and dependent realities

S's and R's Agnihotrādhikaranam (iv 1 16-17)

According to S this adhi consists of two Sūtras while to R the Sūtra Yadeva Vidyayeti hi (iv 1 18) forms part of this adhi In S's view Sūtras 16-17 exempt Nityakarmas like Agnihotra from destruction in the case of the Jnānin till death The Purvapaksa is that even such works performed before the dawn of knowledge are destroyed like (other) 'Kāmya' karmas, for from the point of view of the knower of B his non-agency with reference to both kāmya and nitya karmas is the same The Siddhānta is that 'Nitya-karmas' like Agnihotra are not destroyed Their results persist till death and help to produce knowledge as provided for in the Śruti (*Brh Up* iv 4 22)

Criticism

We have to ask for a clarification here—whether the exemption is in respect of Agnihotra and other Nityakarmas performed *before* the dawn of knowledge in terms of the self's non-agency (*akartrātma-bodha*) and the non-clinging of those performed after the attainment of knowledge or both?

Since according to *Brh Up* iv 4 22, Agnihotra and other Nityakarmas are meant only to lead to the knowledge of B (*jñānārtha*), they are bound to cease after they have fulfilled that purpose—just as

'apūrvas' produced by the sacrifices cease to be after their results have been produced The possibility of Agnihotra or their fruits remaining till death after the attainment if Jnāna is, therefore, illogical

The difficulty is that from S's point of view Mokṣa cannot be the regarded as the fruit of these Nityakarmas, for that would affect the character of Mokṣa as something that is 'uncaused' (*akāryatvān mokṣasya*) It would also be against the teaching of the Śruti which says that Mokṣa cannot be attained by karma S himself has recognized in his Bhāṣya that Nityakarmas like Yajña contribute to the birth of jnāna, thro' sravana manana etc, by creating the necessary climate of purity of mind (*cittaśuddhi*)[25] Hence, it will not be possible to regard these Nityakarmas as directly leading to Mokṣa Moreover, in S's system Mokṣa has no special characteristic which is not found in Jnāna and which the Nityakarmas may be supposed to bring about

Further, if in the context of this Sūtra (iv 1 16) the term Jnāna is to be understood as 'Nirgunavidyā' in terms of the self's non-agency (*akartrātmabodha*), the liquidation of all Nityakarmas also will have to follow as a consequence of the falsity of the entire external world and its values established by the dawn of knowledge How then, can one speak of or insist upon the Nityakarmas or their fruits alone persisting and surviving till the time of the Jnānin's death? That apart, the non-destruction of the Jnānin's Nityakarmas or their survival till death after he has attained Jnāna can only be construed meaningfully in the sense of his enjoyment of their fruits till death But the difficulty is that there cannot be any enjoyment of the fruits of karma after the birth of Jnāna for one who has realised the self and from whom as a consequence all sense of doership and enjoyership of the fruits of his actions have completely fallen off

On the other hand, if in the context of this Sūtra the term 'Jnāna' is to be taken in the sense of 'Saguṇa Vidyā' it will be out of tune with the subject matter of the Tadadhigama Sūtra (iv 1 13) wherein the destruction of accumulated bad karmas and the non-clinging of subsequent ones has been expressly associated by S with the attainment of Nirguna vidyā consisting in the knowledge of the self's non-agency (*akartrātmabodha*) The point is that while such destruction according to S may be consistent with Nirguṇavidyā, it will not be in keeping with Saguna Vidyā in which the Ātman is still conceived as a doer and an enjoyer If the Tadadhigamasūtra is contextually connected with the Saguna Vidyā, it cannot, be connected with the Nirguṇavidyā

25 ज्ञानस्यैव हि प्राप्तं सत् कर्म प्रणाड्या मोक्षकारणमित्युपचर्यते (S *BSB* iv 1 16)

as S would have it The commentary of Bhāratītīrtha, therefore, frankly admits that like kāmyakarmas, Agnihotra and other Nityakarmas also carried out before the birth of Jnāna in this life or in earlier ones, are all of them *destroyed root and branch* by the inherent power of the knowledge of the self as non-doer (*akartrātmabodha*)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R has rightly held that the Nityakarmas or the special works like Agnihotra incumbent on the different āśramas *must* be performed as there is no possibility of their results not clinging to the Jnānin For, such nityakarmas give rise to knowledge and as knowledge in order to grow and become perfect has to be practised continuously till death, these special duties of the āśramas also which help the rise of knowledge have to be performed without break Otherwise there is likelihood of the mind losing its clarify and of knowledge not arising

Criticism

It will be seen that this interpretation does not at all touch the question whether these nityakarmas have to be perfomed, also *after* the attainment of Jnāna and whether the fruits of such performance do cling to the Jnānin or not For according to R the destruction and nonclinging of the earlier and subsequent good works have been suggested in Sūtra 14 The term subsequent good works can only be taken to refer to such good works including Nityakarmas like Agnihotra performed *after* the attainment of knowledge If then, the Jnānin has to go on performing Agnihotra and other nityakarmas even after he has attained knowledge, we have to ask in what sense R 's assertion that there is no possibility of their results (other than the production of knowledge which has been attained already) not clinging to the Jnānin is to be understood The point is that while Agnihotra and other nityakarmas performed *before* the attainment of knowledge have knowledge as their exclusive fruit and help to bring it about, R has to entirely leave out the question of performance of such Nityakarmas after the attainment of knowledge or what may be known as Jñānottarakarmas For it is difficult for him to accommodate the performance of Jñānottarakarmas in his system as they can neither be treated as subserving the attainment of Mokṣa thro' Jnāna nor as contributing to the welling up of the joy of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa according to the Yogyatā of different Jnānins

Śamkara's Vidyajñānasādhanatvādhi (iv 1 18)

According to S , this adhi considers whether Agnihotra and other nityakkarmas have to be performed necessarily in association with the

Vidyās with which they stand connected or independently of them, as having the power to bring about knowledge For, Agnihotra and other works stand connected with special vidyās connected with the constituent members of sacrificial works as well as independently of them in the Śrutis This may be seen from texts like *Chan Up* iv 17 10, and from "therefore, both of them perform the work—he who knows this and he who knows it not" (*Chan Up* 1 1 10)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that such obligatory rites are to be performed as connected with the vidyās,[26] for works connected with knowledge are superior to those bereft of it This is seen from the Śruti (*Brh Up* i 5 2 and *Gita* ii 39, 40) The Siddhānta is that tho' it is true that Agnihotra and other karmas if performed with knowledge are superior to works without knowledge—just as a Brāhmana possessed of knowledge is superior to one without it, still Agnihotra etc, even *when not connected with knowledge* are *not altogether ineffective* By ascribing greater capability of originating knowledge to Agnihotra when it is accompanied by knowledge, the Śruti text (*Chān Up* i 1 10) concedes that works destitute of knowledge have still *some power* towards the same effect[27]

Criticism

The question whether Angāvabaddhopāsanās are to be carried out independently of the karmāngas or as part of them has been discussed and the ruling given in the Tannirdhāranādhikarana (iii 3 42) according to S's own interpretation. This makes the present discussion redundant.

The *Kalpataru* has tried to reinforce the Pūrvapakṣa with an argument that the censure of karmas performed by one who is ignorant of the Vidyā justifies the presumption that the performance of such karmas without the connected Vidyās is prohibited by the Śruti and that this makes the Vidyās once more subordinate to the karmas and, therefore, calls for the further consideration of the question already discussed, by way of disposing of this adhikāsankā[28]

This is not convincing A eulogy (of karma performed in association with Vidyās) cannot be taken as a censure of such karmas per-

26 तस्मात् 'विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इत्यविशेषश्रुतमपि विद्यारहितं यज्ञादिकर्म तद्धेतुरिति प्राप्तम् • • विद्यारहितमपि यज्ञादि सर्वविद्याधिकरणेनुष्ठेयमिति सिद्धम् (*Bhāmati* iv 1 18)

27 सर्वथापि विद्यारहितस्य वीर्यवत्तामात्रमवगम्यते। न च सर्वथा किञ्चित्करत्वं तदुपगम्यते (*Bhāmati* iv 1 18)

28 विद्यायुक्तस्य कर्मणः प्रशंसया विद्याविहीननिन्दा कल्प्यते • • • तत्र पुनरप्यधिकाशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थ आरम्भ इति (*Kalpataru* iv 1 18)

formed independently of them. The praise accorded to the sacrifice of cows and horses in 'Apaśavo vā anye go' aśvebhyaḥ' can hardly be construed as prohibiting the sacrifice of goats and other animals in a sacrifice The adhikāśankā is thus far-fetched While the question raised by S may be relevant to the Upasamhārapāda of Adhyāya III it cannot be said to be relevant to *this* Adhyāya

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Reading Sūtra 18 as part of the Agnihotrādhi (iv 1.16-18), R construes it as recalling (*smārayati*) the fact previously established that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed This is an indirect admission of redundancy

Śamkara's Itarakṣapanādhikaranam (iv 1 19)

According to S the Pūrvapakṣa here is—The fruit of vidyā viz, Mokṣa may be attained by persons whose Prārabdhakarmas have all been exhausted in the bodily existence in which their knowledge of B has originated But, there is not much of a possibility of others, whose Prārabdhakarmas continue to bear fruit thro' several lives afterwards, attaining Mokṣa For in the course of these subsequent bodily existences the Samskāras of the former life of enlightenment are bound to get weaker and get obliterated gradually in each succeeding life The Karmas performed in these lives in the absence of Vidyā are sure to tighten the strings of bondage shutting out all prospects of Moksa It cannot be said that the Śruti 'Tasya tāvad eva ciram' presupposes the possibility of Mokṣa being put off till Prārabdhakarmas are all destroyed—which may in some cases linger thro' many lives The Śruti 'Dhūtvā śarīram akrtam kṛtātmā' (*Chān Up* viii 13) which refers to the Jñānin tarrying in the same body till his Prārabdhakarma is destroyed indicates by the use of the singular number in referring to the body that in the case of Jñānins who are eligible for Moksa such karmas are exhausted in the life in which Jnāna has been attained This is indicated also by the use of the words asmāc charīrāt samutthāya'—meaning the body in which jnāna has been attained. Where the Prārabdhakarmas run thro' many lives after the attainment of Jnāna the possibility of continuing the pursuit of Vidyā in those lives becomes less and less[29]

29 येषां विद्यायोनिशरीरावसानं प्रारब्धं तेषां विद्याफलमस्तु नाम । येषां त्वनेकशरीरानुयायी तेषां तत्फलं न संभवति जन्मान्तरस्य पूर्वसंस्कारप्रमोषकतया शरीरान्तरे विद्याविहीनैः क्रियमाणानां कर्मणां बन्धहेतुत्वेन ततः जन्मपरम्पराया एव प्राप्तेः । न च 'यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये' इति प्रारब्धकर्मविमोक्षावधिश्रवणं संकोचकम् । 'धूत्वा शरीरम्' इति श्रुत्यन्तरानुसारेण तस्य शरीरविशेषावधिपरतया, येषां विद्यायोनिशरीरावसानं प्रारब्धं तद्विषयत्वोपपत्तेः । न च धूत्वा शरीरमित्यत्र शरीरग्रहणं प्रारब्धकार्ययावच्छरीरपरम् । एकवचनश्रवणात् । अस्माच्छरीरात् समुत्थायेति विशेषणेन विद्यायोनिशरीरस्यैव विवक्षितत्वाच्च (Appayya Dikṣita, *Parimala* iv 1 19)

The Siddhānta refutes this position by pointing out that so far as Ādhikārikas like Vyāsa are concerned there is no fear of any obliteration of their previous samskāras of Jnāna in the subsequent lives into which they may enter In the case of others also the emphatic particle 'Tāvad eva ciram' used in the Śruti makes it certain that sooner or later, depending on the exhaustion of Prārabdhakarmas in the same life or in subsequent ones, the Jnānin is bound to get liberated and that there is no fear of any one who has attained Jnāna failing to attain Mokṣa The Śruti 'Dhūtvā śarīram akratam krtātmā' can without any difficulty be understood to convey that the Jnānin continues to live thro' one or more bodies till the Prārabdhakarmas are destroyed and not thro' one single life alone, after enlightenment The words *asmāc* charīrāt' (*Chān Up* vii 12 3) do not refer to the body in which Jnāna has been attained but to the generally detestable nature of the physical body of the Jnānin as such [30]

Criticism

The provision made for the continuance of Prārabdhakarmas and their exhaustion in the same body till death or in subsequent bodily existences, as the case may be, after the attainment of Jnāna is inconsistent with the character of the saving knowledge of 'akhandārthaniṣthavedāntabrahmatattvasākṣātkāra' as conceived in S's philosophy—which by definition carries with it the immediate and complete sublation of the world and its values which includes the body in which the Jnānin has attained his knowledge, and the subsequent bodily existences, the karmas performed thro' them and the experience of pleasure and pain brought about by such karmas and the mind by which such experiences are taken note of From S's point of view no satisfactory reason can be given why the experience of multiplicity (*bhedajñāna*) will *not* continue after the death of the body in the case of the Jnānin as it did before the attainment of knowledge His explanation that there no longer exists any cause for such continuance, while upto death there is such a cause for its continuance—viz., the extinction of the remainder of the works to be enjoyed[31] and that a new aggregation of

30 देहान्तरे संस्कारप्रमोष आधिकारिकाणामपि कल्प्यते, अस्मदादीनां वा? आधिकारिकाणां तत्कल्पना न समवति आगमविरोधादियुक्तत्वात्। द्वितीये निरस्यति-भूयपर्यं विद्यानुष्ठानप्रतिपादकबहुशास्त्रप्रामाण्यात् तस्य तावदेव चिरं इति विवक्षितावधमाने भूयवस्यभावप्रतिपादकविधाग्यप्रामाण्याच्च यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये इत्यस्य प्रारब्धकर्मावधित्वं धृत्वा शरीरमित्यत्र शरीरपदस्य प्रारब्धकार्यपर्यावच्छरीरपरत्व अस्मादिति विशेषणस्यानुभवसिद्धहेयताप्रदर्शनार्थत्व विदुषा जन्मान्तरस्य संस्कारप्रमोषाभावस्य च कल्प्यम्

(*Op cit* iv 1 19)

31 ननु सत्यपि सम्यग्दर्शने यथा प्राग्देहपातात् भवन् भेददर्शनमेव पश्चादप्यनुवर्तेत। न, निमित्ताभावात्। उपभोगशेषक्षपणं हि तत्रानुवृत्तिकारणम्। न च तादृशमत्र किंचिदस्ति (S *BSB* iv 1 19)

works will *not* originate a new fruition as the seed of all such fruition has been completely burnt out and destroyed by the birth of knowledge[32] conveniently overlooks the fact that the seed of all fruition of karmas having been avowedly burnt out by the attainment of knowledge, there can be no room for any need to work out by retributive enjoyment any remainder of karmas as such; for these too are, in principle, to be deemed be extirpated by knowledge[33]

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32 नन्वपर कर्माशयोऽभिनवमुपभोगमारप्स्यते, न, तस्य दग्धबीजत्वात (S *BSB* iv 1 19)

33 दग्धबीजत्वादेव देहादिनोपभोगक्षपणकार्योत्पत्तेरप्यनुपपत्ते (*STC*)

II UTKRĀNTI PĀDA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In this Pāda, the Sūtrakāra explains how among Jñānins, the Devas and the human souls divest themselves of their final bodies after the exhaustion of karmas, as provided in the preceding Pāda The Devas have the prerogative of divesting themselves of their final bodies, after the attainment of Aparoksajñāna, by entering into their respective higher ups in the hierarchy and then merging their bodies in those of their superiors when Mahāpralaya draws near Such merger of the bodies of the gods after entry into their superiors has been referred to in *Mund Up* (*iii 2,7*) देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु

The human souls who have attained Aprokṣa make their exit from their final bodies thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi, as provided in *Kaṭha Up* (ii 6 16) and in *BS* iv 2 17

As divestment of the body is imperative and is common to both the orders of Adhikārins Devas and men for attaining Mokṣa, this Pāda has necessarily to deal with it in relation to both of them As the Devas are Ādhikārika-Jivas, precedence is given to the manner of divestment of their bodies (*dehakṣaya*) The divestment of the final body in the case of (other) Jivas thro' 'utkrānti' or exit by the Brahmanāḍi is taken up afterwards The main theme of this Pada is thus the divestment of their final bodies by the gods and the exit of the human souls from their final bodies thro' Brahmanāḍi Ghate dismisses M 's discussion of the topic of divestment of their final bodies by the Devas in the first five adhis of this Pāda as "fantastic, as usual" (*Op cit*, p 138) There is,

however, nothing fantastic in M.'s going into the question of how the gods divest themselves of their bodies. For the gods have been recognized by the Sūtrakāra (cf. *BS* i 3 26, 31, 33) as Brahmavidyādhikārins. Consistent with this, considerable space has been devoted—as has been made clear in M.'s interpretation—to the different forms of Upāsanā of B. to which the gods are eligible by their superior fitness, in the Gunopasamhāra Pāda. (See iii 3 10, 14, 18, 20-21, 24, 35-37, 63-66, 67-68.) The gods who have successfully completed their Upāsanās and attained Aparokṣa cannot be kept out of the fruits of their Jnāna. How could it be illogical then if the Utkrāntipāda should deal with the manner in which the gods divest themselves of their final bodies—just as the human souls do so thro' utkrānti?

The opening statement in M.'s bhāṣya

देवाना मोक्ष उत्क्रान्तिश्चास्मिन् पाद उच्यते

calls for an explanation. The predicative expression 'moksa' in this statement refers to the divestment of the body, and is to be read only with the word Devānām as its subject. The predicate 'utkrānti' similarly is to be read with 'Adhikārins *other than the Devas* supplied by adhyāhāra.[1] The reason for this split-up is that the Devas have no utkrānti from their final bodies thro' Suṣumnānāḍi. They divest themselves of their bodies by entering into their higher-ups in the hierarchy and merging their bodies in those of their superiors.[2] There is thus no possibility of their making an exit thro' their Bramanāḍi—which is 'utkrānti'.[3] As 'utkrānti' in its technical sense is not applicable to the gods, it is to be confined only to the human souls. That being so, the expression 'mokṣa' in the statement of the Pādārtha (देवाना मोक्ष) has naturally to be understood in the sense of divestment of the body (and not moksa in its larger sense). Ghate is thus definitely off the track when he translates 'mokṣa' in the above statement of M. as 'liberation' and ascribing 'utkranti' to the gods also.

There are ten adhi.s in this Pāda, according to M.'s interpretation. The first three deal with the manner of divestment of their final bodies by the gods, by entering into their higher ups in the hierarchy and merging their bodies in those of their immediate superiors. The next two adhi.s establish the merger of the gods other than those dealt with

1 भाष्य देवानामित्यस्य मोक्ष इत्यनेनैवान्वय मोक्षश्च प्रकरणात देहादिति गम्यते। उत्क्रान्तिश्च इत्यस्यान्यथा देवव्यतिरिक्तानामित्यध्याहृतेन सबन्ध (Raghu. *TPB* iv 2 1)

2 देवानां स्वोत्तमप्रवेशन तत्र देहलय (*TP* iv 2 1)

3 स्रष्टुस्तु ग्रासभूतस्य देहस्तत्र लय व्रजत ।
यत सृज्यस्य देवस्य नैवोत्क्रान्तिस्ततो भवेत ॥ (*AV* iv 2 1)

in the first three adhi.s, in the deities of the five elements. The ninth adhi. takes up the question of utkrānti of the human souls. Adhi. 6 deals with the special status of Cit-Prakṛti or Śrītattva and its non-merger. Adhi. 7 refers to the ultimate merger of all the gods in B. Adhi. 8 establishes the dependence of the released souls on B. by way of disposing of an incidental objection taken against the finding of the previous adhi. The tenth adhi. emphasizes the need for the knowledge and remembrance of the path (gati-smrti) and grace of B. earned thro' the knowledge, in reaching the goal.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

(A) DEITIES OF SPEECH MERGE IN THOSE OF THE MIND

1 *Vāṅmanasādhıkaraṇam* (ıv 2 1-2)

Thıs adhı establıshes the merger (laya) of the deıty of vāk (Umā) ın the deıty of the mınd (Rudra) The *TP* poınts out that by upalakṣana 'Umā' refers to the deıtıes Vāruṇī and Sauparṇī and 'Rudra' to Śesa and Suparṇa (Garuḍa) The *TD* explaıns that tho' Umā and Rudra are elıgıble for theır moksa only ın theır next lıfe of office as Vāruṇī and Śesa, they are stıll referred to ın the Śrutı text cıted, by the same old names, just as the Pāṇḍava brothers have been referred to as 'Arjuna' and so on, ın the Svargārohana Parvan even after they had gıven up theır bodıes

The merger of Vāk ın the mınd has the support of *Chān Up*[1] (vı 15 1) But such merger depends on the relatıon of controller and controlled subsıstıng between them The Pūrvapakṣa, however, raıses a dıfficulty here It poınts out that the *AĀ* (ıı 1 1) makes conflıctıng statements referrıng to the relatıon between speech and mınd—descrıb-

1 The *STC* has gıven a suıtable answer to the objectıon that the Chandogya text quoted here by M has no bearıng on the dıvestment of theır final bodıes by the gods as ıt ıs concerned only wıth the merger of speech ın the mınd and so on at the tıme of one s death It ıs poınted out ın reply that the text cıted by M may conceıvably be from another source than Chandogya bearıng on the topıc of Layakrama of the gods Thıs possıbılıty ıs strengthened by the cırcumstance that under Sutra ıv 2 4 M cıtes 'Pranah parasyam devatayam" whıch dıverges from the Chandogya text Tejah parasyam devatayam Moreover the merger of the Jadatattvas ın the dyıng man must needs be admıtted to follow the pattern of Laya of theır deıtıes at the tıme of Brahmapralaya when they are ready for moksa after the completıon of theır Sadhanas There ıs thus no dıfficulty even ıf the text cıted ıs from Chandogya

ing Vāk as the first part (*pūrvarūpam*) and mind as the subsequent part (*uttararūpam*) and again that mind is the first part and Vāk the subsequent one

'अयाध्यात्मम्–वाक् पूर्वरूप मन उत्तररूपं प्राणः संहिता' इति शूरवीरो माण्डूकेय । अयास्य पुत्र आह ज्येष्ठो 'मन. पूर्वरूप वागुत्तररूपम्'

while reporting the view of Māṇḍūkeya and his eldest son on the question This weakens the Siddhānta position taken in the Sūtra 'Tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ' (ii 4 5) and tends to make Vāk and Manas equal in status (*samapradhāna*) which nullifies the dependence of the one on the other

Moreover, retraction of tattvas and elements (and their deities) has to take place in the reverse order of their origination Unless the causal or other relation between speech and mind is settled, the merger of Vāk in the mind will be impossible of settlement If the deity of Vāk is not merged in that of the mind, the former cannot attain Mokṣa That in its turn will upset the ruling given in the Aniyamādhi (iii 3 32), that Jñānins without exception do attain Mokṣa

The Siddhānta is that the dependence of Vāk on the mind is a matter of our own direct experience and is supported by a sound reason given in the *AĀ* (iii 1 1) itself The question discussed by Māṇḍūkeya and his son in the *AĀ* is not the dependence of Vāk on the mind as such but the presence of the forms of B in Vāk and Manas bearing the same names and acting as the deities of the first and second parts of the hallowed name of 'Vi-ṣṇu' epitomizing the Samhitā and its esoteric teaching As the forms of the Lord in the first and second part of the word 'Vi-ṣṇu' are identical in essence there is no room for contradiction in the statements attributed to Māṇḍūkeya and his son regarding the position of Vāk and Manas As for the relation of chief and subordinate (*guṇapradhānabhāva*) between Vāk and Mind as such, the view of Māṇḍūkeya's eldest son is entitled to acceptance as it is supported by a sound reason and found to be in agreement with our experience that "one makes a determination by the mind and then expresses it in speech"

मनसा वा अग्रे सङ्कल्पयति अथ वाचा व्याहरति (*AĀ* iii 1 1)

This takes away the force of the Pūrvapakṣin's argument about the equality of status (*samaprādhānya*) assigned to Vāk and Manas in the statement of the Śruti The functional dependence of speech on the mind is to be traced to the corresponding dependence of the deity of speech on the deity of the mind—as the dependence of material prin-

ciples on one another has naturally to be accounted for thro' the agency of their Abhimānidevatās[2]

The next Sūtra shows that the Laya of the other deities about which there is no conflict of views takes place in due order (*anu*) in conformity with the relation of controller and controlled subsisting between the tattvas and their deities It may be felt that the question of Laya of the deities in general ought to have been taken up in the first place before passing on to the discussion about the Laya of particular deities like Vāk, Manas and Prāna However the Pūrvapakṣa against the Laya of deities like those of Vāk, Manas and Prāna are found to be quite strongly grounded while there is not much conflict of views in regard to the mode of Laya of most of the other deities Hence the Sūtrakāra has rightly chosen to give priority to the discussion of the Laya of the deities of Vāk, Manas and Prāna

The verb 'sampadyate' (following by anuvrtti from iv 1 19) is suitably read with Sūtras iv 2 1 and 2 'Sarvāni' in Sūtra 2, refers to all the other deities (*daivatāni*) and anu' read with 'sampadyante' signifies that the merger of the other deities takes place in conformity with their established order of dependence on their superiors[3]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S treats this Pāda as dealing in the main with the mode of utkrānti or the successive steps by which the knower of his Lower-B passes out of the body and travels to Brahmaloka thro' the path of the gods (*devayāna*) Tho' the mode of passing out of the body involving the merger of the functions of the organs in the mind, the mind in Prāna and Prāna in the self, is the same (*samānā*) for the knower of the Saguna-B and the ignorant (*avidvān*), such utkrānti is a necessary condition for the Vidvān's being able to attain the fruit of his Saguna-Vidyā, viz Brahmaloka Hence the Sūtrakāra's interest in it[4]

Describing what happens at the time of death the *Chān Up* (vi 8 6) says 'Speech gets merged in mind, mind in Prāna, Prāna in

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2 नन्वेतत व्यधिकरणम–वाग्वृत्तमनोवृत्त्यधीनत्व प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते न तु वाग्देवताया मनोदेवताधीनत्व तयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वात । तथा च कथ देवाना गुणप्रधानभाव प्रत्यक्ष इति चेन्न । अचेतनेऽन्योन्यवशत्वस्य देवता निमित्तत्वात देवतानाम योन्यवशत्वाभावे तदभिमन्यमानानामचेतनाना तदयोगात (*STC*)

3 अत एव शब्दात सर्वाणि दैवतानि यथानुकूल विलीयन्ते अग्नौ सर्वे देवा विलीयन्ते अग्निरिन्द्रे इन्द्र उमाया उमा रुद्रे विलीयते । एवम यानि दवतानि यथानुक्रमम इति गौपवनश्रुते (M *BSB* iv 2 2)
यथानुकूलम स्वनियम्यनियामकभावानुसारेण (*TP*)

4 अथापरासु विद्यासु फलप्राप्तये देवयान पन्थानमवतारयिष्यन प्रथम तावद्यथाशास्त्र उत्क्रान्तिम आचष्टे । समाना हि विद्वदविदुषोरुत्क्रान्ति (S *BSB* iv 2 1)

heat and heat in the highest deity' The doubt arises if speech itself together with its function is merged in the mind or only the function of the organ of speech

The Pūrvapaksa is that the Śruti expressly refers to the merger of the organ of speech and this should be accepted instead of going in for Laksanā to admit the merger of speech along with its function

The Siddhānta is that only the function of the organ of speech is merged in the mind at the time of death—but not the organ For the mind is not the material cause of the organ of speech, vision, etc. They cannot, therefore, get merged in it Unlike the organ of speech, its function can get merged in the mind even tho' it is not the cause of its function The burning property of fire has its start in the wood (*arani*) and is extinguished in water The Śruti text 'Vān manasi sampadyate' thus refers only to the merger of the function of speech. Tho' the text uses only the expression 'speech' this is to be understood in the sense of its function on the basis of the identity of the thing and its function accepted by convention The next Sūtra establishes that by parity of reasoning all the other senses too, i e their functions, merge in the mind

Criticism

S has stated at the beginning of his commentary on the preceding Pāda, under the Sūtra Tadadhigame (iv 1 13)—"Here ends the appendix to Adhy III. Now begins the inquiry into the fruit of the knowledge of B" As this evidently means the Nirguna Vidyā as the chief subject matter of the Sūtras, we should expect the Sūtrakāra to discuss questions which are directly connected with Nirguna Vidyā and not those which are out of keeping with it—such as Utkrānti and Devayāna. For according to S the knower of Nirguna B has nothing to do with Utkrānti or Devayāna.

If the words 'the fruit of Brahmavidyā' used by S in his introductory remarks under iv 1 13 are intended to embrace those of Saguṇa-Brahma Vidyā also, it will be inconsistent with his statement under iv 1 1 that the fourth Adhyāya describes the fruits of Brahmavidyā If that means the attainment of Saguna B is also meant to be included in it, it will be of no use to a true Mumuksu who has risen above attachments to the enjoyment of this and the other worlds including Brahmaloka which falls in the category of the false (*mithyā*) Moreover, the Sādhana-Adhyāya has addressed itself to the elucidation of the means of attaining Nirgunabrahmavidyā We should, there-

fore, expect the Phalādhyāya to describe the fruits of Nirguna Vidyā, instead of those of Sagunavidyā

But the irony of it all is that S has given away *the lion's share* of the discussion in this Pāda (as elsewhere) to the fruits of Saguna-vidyā, bestowing only passing attention upon the subject of the fruits of Nirguna Vidyā—as *incidental inquiry*, in three out of eleven adhis, telling us

समाप्ता प्रासंगिकी परविद्यागता चिन्ता (S *BSB* iv 2 17)

It will not do to explain that as S has stated under iv 1 1 that Adhy III has been taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge relating to both the higher and the lower Vidyās, it will be quite in order to go into the fruits of Saguna Vidyā in this Pāda For then, consistent with this the first two Adhyāyas too will have to make room for two Brahmans with the Saguna B getting the lion's share and the Nirguna-B some incidental attention, which would only pre vent the true Mumukṣu from turning away from its study as its effect would be to tighten the hold of Bhedajñana on him That would en throne the Saguna-B by and large as the object of Jijnāsā and realiza-tion in the Sūtrakāra's work—a conclusion which S has been trying, all along and by various means to obscure and defy without success

Granting that both the Saguna and the Nirguna Vidyās come with-in the scope of discussion here, where is the justification to digress and *dilate* upon the fruits of the lower Vidya without bestowing full and adequate attention on the fruits of the higher Vidyā which should be *of absorbing interest to the true Mumuksu*? The discussion of the attainment of the fruits of Aparavidyā and matters ancilliary to them can in so sense be considered a step (*dvāram*) leading to the attain ment of the fruits of Nirguna Vidyā and, therefore entitled to be dealt with here as a preliminary to them

Even conceding that Saguna Vidyā is the gateway to Nirguna Vidyā, by what logic can the details of the merger of the functions of speech etc (of the knower of Saguna B and) of *the ignorant man* who has *not cared to know the Saguna B* be deemed to be relevant to the reali-zation of the fruits of Nirguna Vidya in the end?

The *Kalpataru* has tried to explain that as the fruits of Saguna-Vidyā consisting in the attainment of the world of Brahmā by travel-ling thro' the path of the gods cannot be attained without the Vidvān submitting to utkrānti, it is necessary to deal with it It is also intend ed to serve the schematic purpose of showing that it is to be negatived

in connection with the attainment of the fruits of Nirguna-Vidyā which consists in realizing one's identity with the all pervading B[5]

But then by the same token we should expect the Sūtrakāra to go into the pangs of death which generally accompany the cessation of the functions of the senses and their merger at death Anyway, the plea that the exposition of Utkrānti is necessary for the purpose of negating it in regard to the realization of the fruits of Nirguna Vidyā requires clarification If the negation is of the path of Devayāna beginning with the deity of flame in respect of the knower of Nirguna-B, the description of Utkrānti in the case of the knower of Saguṇa-B can neither imply nor suggest the negation of Devayāna in respect of the knower of the Nirguṇa If it is 'utkrānti' that is sought to be negated, it cannot be as it has been held to be applicable to both the Vidvān and the Avidvān If the term 'knower of B' (Vidvat) is to be restricted to the knower of Saguṇa B alone so as to exclude the knower of the Nirguna-Vidya S's observation in the preamble to his commentary on iv 2 1 that the fruits of Saguna and Nirguṇa Vidyās are *both* of them contextually relevant to this Pāda would be unsustainable

Moreover, the phenomenon of Utkrānti and travel thro' Devayāna being of a supersensuous nature, their association with Saguna-Vidyā as its fruits is to be known only on the testimony of the Śrutis and Sūtras If then, in the act of making known such a connection of the Saguṇa Vidyā with utkrānti and Devayāna as its fruits, they should in the same breath negative those fruits in regard to Nirguna Vidyā, they would be heading towards a 'Vākyabheda' The attempt to deny utkrānti in respect of the knower of the B, in principle, on the basis of a distinction between the two vidyās is therefore, unsustainable

S understands 'sampatti' in the sense of merger but insists that it is only the function of speech (and other organs) and not the organ that is merged in the mind, as there is no material-cause and-effect relation between the senses and the mind R on the other hand understands by 'sampatti' a combination or 'going together' However the use of 'sampatti' in the sense of merger is authenticated by the words Satā sampanno bhavati' (*Chān Up* vi 8 1) which has again been rendered as ' Svam apito bhavati" (*ibid*) and 'api i' has the accepted sense of 'laya' The *Srutaprakāsa* concedes as much when it admits that there is resort to lakṣaṇā in R.'s interpretation[6] The causal relation

5 [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iv 2 1)

6 [illegible] (*Op cit*)

between mind and Vāk has the support of the Śruti Manasā vā agre sankalpayati atha vācā vyāharati, Tasmān mana eva pūrvarūpam vāg uttararūpam (*AĀ* iii 1 1) There is thus no difficulty in holding that Vāk is merged in the mind. The real difficulty lies in holding that the function of speech is merged in the mind For the function of speech being a modification of the organ of speech, its merger will have to take place in its own source rather than in the mind The way in which S has explained the word 'sabdāt' in Sūtra iv 2 1 involves a heavy dose of laksanā As the second Sūtra itself as interpreted by S and R contains a comprehensive statement based on *Prasna Up* (iii 9) regarding the absorption of all the organs or their functions in the mind, there seems to be no need for the first Sūtra to make a partial predication in respect of the merger of the function of the sense of speech *alone* The explanation that the special mention of speech made in Sūtra iv 2 1 is out of deference[7] to the special reference to its merger in the mind in the Śruti text Vān manasi sampadyate (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) exposes the Sūtrakāra to the risk of needlessly sacrificing the principle of brevity of thought and expression in bringing together all the relevant data under a single predication, wherever possible by upalaksana or other means without multiplying Sūtras The particle 'anu' in Sūtra iv 2 2 is also superfluous to their interpretation, for all the indriyas or their functions merge in the mind according to the Śrutis, at the same time *and not one after the other*

These difficulties are avoided in M's interpretation envisaging the merger of the deity of speech, in the deity of the mind

7 सर्वेणा करणाना मनस्युपसहाराविशष सति वाच पृथग्ग्रहण वाङ्मनसि सपद्यत इयुदाहरणानुराधन
(S *BSB* iv 2 2)

(B) DEITIES OF THE MIND MERGE IN HIRANYAGARBHA

2 *Manahprānādhikaranam* (iv 2 3)

This adhi establishes the Laya of the deities of the mind Śeṣa and Suparna in the deity of Prāna (viz) Hiranyagarbha, thro' Vānī The Pūrvapaksa opposes the Laya referred to in 'Manah prāne' (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) on the following grounds (1) Laya is possible only of the weaker tattva in the stronger or of the effect in its cause The deities of the mind and Prāna are, however, of equal power We know from experience that the mind governs all our actions, seen and unseen The all-governing power of the mind is not less than[1] the great powers possessed by Prāna[2] Nor is there any conclusive evidence of the mind's genesis from Prāṇa which may justify its merger in Prāna For it has been established in B S ii 4 4 that the mind (deity) has its genesis from B The pronoun 'tad' prefixed to 'manah' in the Sūtra is intended to play a significant part in furnishing support to the Pūrvapaksa It alludes to the above grounds for resisting the Laya of manas in Prāna[3] to be admitted on the evidence of the Śruti 'Manah prāne sampadyate'

The Siddhānta is that there is decisive evidence in favor of the merger of the mind (deity) in Prāṇa The deity of Prāna is far superior to that of the mind The parable from *AA* ii 1 4 tells us how when the deity of the mind went away from the body (of Brahmā) and

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1 (न च) मनः पूर्वप्रवर्तिनियमात् अशक्यप्राणाभ्यागाराणां तस्य प्राणादनूनता (*NV* iv 2 3)

2 See Vol II p 141 fn 1 p 325

3 मनः प्राणे इत्यत्र पूर्वोक्त तत् इत्यनेन मनसः प्राणानुगतत्वेन वागादिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेन प्राणादनूनत्वात् न प्राणे लय इति सूचनात् (Ragh *TDP* iv 2 3)

reentred it, the body neither collapsed nor did it revive (before Prāṇa entered it) and how it collapsed when Prāṇa went away and rose back to activity when Prāṇa reentered the body.[4]

This shows that even the all-powerfulness of the mind (deity)—'dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaceṣṭakatvam' is in its turn derived from Prāṇa who is the all-energizer (*pra-ana*) by the grace of the Supreme B.[5] The genesis of the mind from Prāṇa is proclaimed in the Kaundinya Śruti.[6] The genesis of the mind from B. established in *BS.* ii.4.4 admits of being explained in the sense that it takes place thro' the medium of Prāṇadeva. This point has been clarified in the Tejo'adhi[7] (ii.3.10) and in this sense the genesis of the mind from Prāṇa is indisputable. These grounds of the superiority of Prāṇa to the mind in favor of the Siddhānta are alluded to by the force of the preposition 'pra' in 'Prāṇa' (vide fn. 5).

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4 मन उदक्रामन्मीलिताक्ष इवाश्नन् पिबन्नास्तय, प्राण उदक्रामत् तत्प्राण उत्क्रान्तेऽपतत * * मन प्राविशत् अशयदेव, प्राण. प्राविशत् तत्प्राणे प्रपन्न उदतिष्ठत् तदुक्थमभवत् (*AA.* ii 1 4)

5 समाधिस्तु–प्राणद्वारा ईशजत्वात् 'मन उदक्रामन्मीलिताक्ष इव प्राण उत्क्रान्ते अपद्यत' इत्यादे तद्गतत्वादिति प्रकृष्टाननवाचिप्राणपदात् सूचित (*TDP.* iv 2 3)

6 वायो वा एद्र उदेति, वायौ विलीयत तस्मादाहु वायुर्वै देवाना श्रेष्ठ (Q M *BSB* iv 2 3)

7. भगवदुत्पन्नत्वस्य वियत्पादीयन्यायेन प्राणदेवद्वारोपपत्त्या * * (*TDP*)

CHAPTER LXXXV

PRĀṆA (HIRAṆYAGARBHA) MERGES IN BRAHMAN

3 *Adhyakṣādhikaraṇam* (ıv.2.4)

Thıs adhı. establıshes the laya of Prāṇa *qua* Hıraṇyagarbha, in the Supreme B , whıch has been so fittıngly desıgnated here as 'Adhyakṣa'. The full etymologıcal sıgnıficance of thıs term has been explained by M. ın his comment on ıx.10 of the Rājaguhyayogādhyāya of the *Gıta* where the expressıon 'Adhyakṣa' ıtself ıs used.

मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगद् विपरिवर्तते ॥

as the Supreme Overlord whose cognıtıve senses play always upon the entıre world of beıngs—energızıng them to actıvıty:

अध्यक्षोऽधिपतिः प्रोक्तो यदक्षाण्यस्य चोपरि

It is not wıthout sıgnıficance that the famous creatıon hymn of the Ṛgveda, the Nāsadīya Sūkta, refers to the Supreme Beıng, the one wıthout a second, breathıng wındless by ıts own power on the waters of Mahāpralaya as 'Adhyakṣa'.

योऽस्याध्यक्षः परमे व्योमन् सो अङ्ग वेद यदि वा न वेद (*RV*. x.129.7)

It is ın such a Beıng that the present Sūtra seeks to merge (the final body) of Prāna qua Hıraṇyagarbha when hıs Sādhanas have been completed after a hundred Kalpas As Hıraṇyagarbha plays a decısive role in the orderly Laya of the gods, receıvıng all the Souls and leadıng them

on to final mokṣa, *a special adhı. ıs naturally to be devoted to hıs laya* Thıs poınt has been well brought out by J

अत्र प्राणस्य मोक्षसिद्ध्यर्थं परमात्मनि लयसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रादिसगति । अन्यथा कस्यापि मोक्षाभावप्रसगात्, समर्थनीयमेतत् (*TP* ıv 2 4)

For all Souls fit for mokṣa at the end of theır Sādhanas have to dıssolve theır 'Lıngasarıra' ın the waters of the Vırajā and rıse to the world of Brahmā, to be taken to the world of Moksa along wıth hım

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे सप्राप्ते प्रतिसचरे।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मान प्रविशन्ति पर पदम् ॥ (Q S *BSB* ıv 3 11)

The Pūrvapakṣa ıs there are several Śrutı statements representıng Prāna (who for purposes of thıs adhı, ıs to be vıewed ın hıs personal ıdentıty and status as 'Hıranyagarbha') as beıng wıthout an overlord above hım[1] Such texts are 'Prāna ıs *not* subservıent to any one, —He (Prāna) thro' whom all other beıngs get replenıshed' 'Whatever there ıs here and ın the heavens ıs all rooted ın Prāna'. 'By Vāyu as by a thread ıs thıs world and the other and all beıngs are held together' (*Brh Up* ııı 7 2)

These make ıt not only dıfficult for us to assert that he ıs dependent on the Supreme B but embolden us to affirm hıs ındependence of B The Pūrvapakṣa ıs, therefore, well set to argue that such a vırtually ındependent beıng as Prāna (Hıranyagarbha) cannot be conceıved as beıng subject to merger ın any other source[2] The Pūrvapaksa further argues that ıt cannot be saıd that the Śrutıs quoted for the Pūrvapaksa can be shown to admıt of a dıfferent explanatıon ın keepıng wıth Prāna's dependence on and subjectıon to the Supreme B ındıcated under the Caksurādyadhı (ıı 4 11-12) ın terms of

अनन्येश्वरता प्राणे तदन्येश्वरवर्जनात् (Q Vol II, p 330, fn 9)

For the Srutıs whıch speak to the pre-emınence of Prāna are numerıcally stronger and the solıtary text Ananyēsvaratā Prane tadanyesvaravarjanāt' cannot resıst theır ımpact It must submıt to theır suzeraınty Moreover, the descrıptıon of Prāna ın (*Chān Up* ıv 3 7).

महान्तमस्य महिमानमाहुरनद्यमानो यदनन्नमत्ति

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1 अनन्याधीनत्वे प्राणस्य श्रुतिबाहुल्यसद्भावात् बाहुल्यस्य प्राबल्यहेतुत्वात (*TP* ıv 2 4)

2 Cf तस्य तदधीनत्वानिश्चयात् (TP) अत्र नञो बुद्ध्या विवेकेनातदधीनत्वनिश्चयात इति सबन्धो बोध्य । एतेन तदधीनत्वनिश्चयाभावे तत्र लयसन्देह एव स्यात न तु न तत्र लीयत इति पूर्वपक्षसिद्धि स्यादिति परास्तम (*AC* ıv 2 4)

'They speak of his magnificance as very great indeed for without being eaten by any one else, he eats what could not be eaten by other gods'—as the undevoured devourer of everything else, conclusively establishes that Prāna is indissoluble and cannot be merged in any other source Unless Prāna-Hiranyagarbha has his merger no other soul can hope to attain mokṣa. That would disrupt the conclusion established in Sūtra iii 3 32 that all those who have attained Aparoksa are entitled to Mokṣa without fail. In the interest of upholding the promise held out in Sūtra iii 3 32, it is necessary to establish that Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) is (also) subject to Laya in B

The Siddhānta, therefore, points out that there are equally numerous texts testifying to the dependence of Prāna on the Supreme B — just as there are many texts apparently favoring Prāna's independent existence By way of example the following may be noted

प्राण: परमुपगच्छति, प्राण, परमनु प्राणिति, प्राण. परस्या देवतायाम्
(Q M. *BSB* iv 2 4)

It cannot be said that this places the two sets of texts on a par and, therefore, renders it impossible to assert that Prāna is dependent on B The texts which proclaim Prāna to be independent and not subject to any other Being can be explained in conformity with others like 'Praṇam devā anuprānanti, sarve prānam upagacchanti, Ananyesvaratā Prāne tadanyeśvaravarjanāt' in the sense that while being subject to the Supreme B, he (Prāṇa) is the Lord of all other mighty gods, like Rudra and is waited upon by them and has no other overlord save the Supreme B The undevourability and indissolubility of Prāna (*anadyamānatvam*) can similarly be explained in the sense that he cannot be merged or eaten up by any other Being *except the Supreme B* The Chāndogya text (vi 15 1) which refers to the merger of Prāna is Śritattva (*prānah parasyam devatayām*) is, however, to be understood in a restricted sense of Śritattva's being only the channel (*dvāram*) thro' which Hiranyagarbha passes on to his merger in the Supreme B on the authority of the relevant Smrti text

प्राणस्य तेजसि लयो द्वारमात्रमुदाहृतम् (Q M. *BSB* iv 2 4)

The reason for understanding the text 'Prānas tejasi' (*Chān Up* vi 15 1) in this way is that Prāṇa (Hiranyagarbha) is eligible to be directly merged in B It is, however, to be conceded that in his identity and status *as* "Prāna" and *prior to his attaining the status of Hiranyagarbha, Prāna is certainly subject to laya in Śritattva*[3] But we

3 [illegible] (TP iv 2 4)

are here concerned, in this Sūtra (iv 2 4) with the laya of Prāna *as* Hiranyagarbha The propriety of addressing Hiranyagarbha by his earlier name of Prāna for purposes of this Sūtra has been explained with reference to similar cases in the previous adhi Tho' the dependence of Prāna on the Supreme B has been established under Sūtra ii 4 11, the question has been reopened here and set at rest in view of the additional grounds of objection The establishment of Hiranyagarbha's laya thus leaves the prospects of Mokṣa of all other Muktiyogyas unimpaired

CHAPTER LXXXVI

MERGER OF OTHER BHŪTAS AND THEIR ABHIMĀNIS

4 *Bhūtādhikaranam* (iv 2 5)

This adhi. establishes the Laya of other deities than those spoken of in the first three adhikaranas in the Abhimānidevatās of the different elements, according to their fitness The plural 'bhūteṣu', which by context refers to the Abhimānis of the respective elements, is in tended to point out that all the other gods do not merge in one particular Bhūtābhimāni The merger takes place, according to fitness of different deities in different sources as determined by the Śruti (*tacchruteh*

The Pūrvapakṣa takes its stand on the Śruti 'Agnau sarve devā vilīyante' (Gaupavana Śruti) and argues that as some of the deities are subject to several controlling authorities over them, the principle of Laya in one's own controller cannot be applied satisfactorily as a given deity cannot be expected to merge in more than one source.

The difficulty is removed by the Śruti which clearly indicates the laya of the remaining deities in their accredited sources The deities of the earth and ether merge in Vāyu thro' Bṛhaspati, the deity of elemental air (Pravaha) thro' Indra and of the waters thro' Soma.

5 *Naikasminnadhikaranam* (iv 2 6)

This adhi arises by way of disposing of an objection to the conclusion of the previous adhi that the plural 'bhūteṣu' in "Bhūteṣu devā

vilīyante" is contradicted if all the other deities (than those referred to in the first three adhi.s) are taken to be merged in Agni. For even admitting the laya of the other gods in Agni, their merger in the different Bhūtābhimānis can be conceived thro' Laya of Agni in Vāyu, of Vāyu in Ākāśa and so on, without prejudice to the plural in 'Bhūteṣu tacchruteḥ'.

The Pūrvapakṣa contends that as the Laya of Jaḍatattvas like the earth has to take place in the reverse order of their creation and as mukti and laya do not differ in the nature of recession, it is proper to assume the merger of other deities in a single element viz. Agni (deity) as against the finding of adhi. 4.

The Siddhānta is the Laya of all the other deities in Agni alone cannot be accepted. For Śrutis state—"Ṛbhus merge in the deity of earth, Aśvins in Varuṇa, the sons of Agni in Agni, Indra in Umā, Rudra Sauparṇī, Suparṇa and Vāṇī in Hiraṇyagarbha. Soma merges in Hiraṇyagarbha thro' Aniruddha, Kāma, Vāruṇī, Śeṣa and Vāṇī. Sūrya merges in Hiraṇyagarbha thro' Bṛhaspati, Indra, Sauparṇī, Suparṇa and Vāṇī. Such is the outline of Laya of the gods thro' the 'Śeṣa' and 'Garuḍa' mārgas.

This does not contradict the rule that Laya of Tattvas takes place in the reverse order of Creation. That applies to Jaḍatattvas and *not* to the Abhimānidevatās whose merger in subsidiary creation may take place differently from the order of primal creation. The statement of the Śruti 'Agnau sarve devā vilīyante' has, therefore, to be understood in a restricted sense with particular reference to minor deities and such others as have been specifically listed in Śrutis as merging in Agni only and as not entering into the Abhimānis of any *other* element.

Saṁkara's Interpretation

(*Adhyakṣādhikaraṇam* iv.2.4-6)

S. reads Sūtras 4-6 as one adhi. establishing the merger of the function of Prāṇa or the vital force in the individual soul (*adhyakṣa*) on the ground of scriptural statements referring to the vital forces coming towards the Jīva (Brh. Up. iv.3.38) and following him at death (*Brh. Up.* iv.4.2). Sūtra 5 is introduced as showing how the apparently contrary statement of *Chān. Up.* (vi.8.6) about the merger of Prāṇa in Tejas, instead, is to be explained—to the effect that the Jīva joined by Prāṇa takes up his abode in the subtle elements of earth water, air and ether which accompany heat and form the seed of the gross body and not in only *one* of the elements viz. Tejas. The last

Sūtra explains the need for bringing up the other elements while the text speaks of merging only with 'heat'.

R. limits the adhi to the first Sūtra alone interpreting it as establishing that the Prāṇas get united with the Jiva. Thus according to him "Prānas tejasi" means Prāṇa joined with Jiva becomes united with Tejas The remaining two Sūtras are introduced as a fresh adhi establishing that the Prāṇas joined with the soul unite themselves not only with Tejas but with all the other subtle-elements combined The next Sūtra is taken to negative the idea that breath and soul unite them selves successively with each of the subtle elements They do so with the aggregate of all the elements, it is pointed out

Criticism

The main difficulty in S's interpretation is that he has either to resort to 'lakṣanā' (secondary signification) for taking "Tejasi" in the Śruti in the sense of the individual soul (*adhyakse*) or else to expand the statement of the Śruti 'Prānas tejasi' by intercalating the soul in the interval between Prāṇa and Tejas in transit, just as a man travelling from Srughna to Mathurā and thence to Pāṭaliputra may shortly be said to be travelling from Srughna to Pāṭaliputra But lakṣanā is not permissible in an injunctive statement like 'Prānas tejasi' and intercalation is allowed only where the sense is otherwise incomplete without the imported idea. Even if Tejas should mean the subtle body, as S and others have it, it is perfectly reasonable to hold that Prāṇa uniting with the subtle body and the Jīva who has attained such a body merge in the Supreme Being The term "adhyakṣa" or Ruler is hardly appropriate to a *creature* like the Jīvātman who has been *'caged'* in the body and senses—to put it in S's own words[1] Seen in its proper perspective, 'adhyakṣa' in the Sūtra would point unmistakably to the Supreme Ruler of the cosmos—as authenticated by its use in the famous passage of the Gita (ix 10) as has already been made clear (See P 656) The Brh. Up also is referring only to Mukhya-Prāna following the Supreme Lord when He chooses to quit the body of the Jīva The term 'Ātman' used there can hardly refer to the individual soul For the Śruti highlights how Prāna and other deities get ready to follow the outgoing Lord, with the illustration of a King being given a spectacular send-off by all his officers, courtiers and village headmen

तद्यथा राजानं प्रयियासन्तमुग्रा प्रत्येनस सूतग्रामण्योऽभिसमायान्ति, एवमेवेममात्मानमन्तकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायान्ति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति

(*Brh. Up* iv 3 38)

1 देहेन्द्रियपञ्जराध्यक्षस्य भार (S *BSB* iv 2 4)

This illustration of the royal personage returning to his kingdom is hardly appropriate to the *miserable plight of the individual self* parting from his life on earth in acute distress, gasping for breath (*ūrdhvocchvāsī bhavati*) The other words of the Śruti such as 'antakāle' and 'yatraitad ūrdhvocchvāsī bhavati' can be understood without difficulty as referring to the Prājna-Form of the Lord leaving the body of the Jīva mounted on the latter when his life on earth draws to his close and as he starts gasping for breath[2] The deity of Prāna follows the departure of the Supreme Lord (Prājña-Ātmā) from the body of the Jīva (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) Thus the whole text admits of a more satisfactory interpretation if 'Adhyakṣa' is understood in the sense of the Supreme Being in which Prāna merges thro' the deity of Tejas in transit

If Prāna is merged in the Jīva (*adhyakṣa*), it cannot be said to follow him, whereas after merging in heat first it can follow the Jīva when he makes his exit from the body The smaller bees 'following' the king-bee do not surely get merged in it The reference to the Jīva being 'furnished with intelligence' (*savijñāno bhavati*) holds true even when the merger of Prāna in Tejas is accepted as taking place first, for Tejas is conducive to the preservation of intelligence When Prānas unite with Tejas their union with the Jiva is also implied as the union with Tejas means union with the Lingadeha composed of all the subtle elements, and it is hardly possible for the Prānas to get united with the Lingadeha without becoming united with the Jīva also in the act—as the Lingadeha cannot sustain itself without the presence of the soul

As the merger of Prāna in Jīva is obvious in terms of Sūtra 4 (as understood by S) it should be proper to have raised the objection regarding the contradiction with the Śruti 'Prānas tejasi' under that very Sūtra along with the illustration of one's travelling from Srughna to Pāṭaliputra by stages S 's doing so under Sūtra 5 where there is no reference to Prānas being united with the Jīva is thus out of the context The wording of Sūtra 5 is not consistent with the Śruti Prānas tejasi' and has to be reconciled thro' the aid of lakṣanā, for which there is no adequate justification, as the statement 'Prānas tejasi' admits of a consistent explanation even as it is

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

As the topic of Sūtras 5-6 is basically connected with that of Sūtra 4, as interpreted by R there is not much justification for turning 5-6 into a separate adhi Sūtra 5 can be logically connected with 4 in the same adhi even as Sutra 6 stands connected with Sūtra 5

2 एवमेवाय शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सजत याति यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति (*Brh Up* iv 3 35)

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE GODDESS ŚRI HAS NO BODILY MERGER

6 *Samanādhikaranam* (iv 2 7-14)

The merger of Prāna-Hiranyagarbha's body, directly in B the 'Adhyakṣa' established in the previous adhi, can be justified *only by ruling out the possibility of laya of Śrītattva or Cit-Prakṛti in B* Otherwise, it may be contended that Prāna-Hiranyagarbha can have his bodily-merger in Śritattva itself after whose merger subsequently in B, it will be possible for him to attain his mokṣa—just as other Jivas who merge in Hiranyagarbha thro' their accredited superiors do so in the end thro' Hiranyagarbha's merger in B The present adhi, therefore, establishes that Tejas or Cit-Prakrti is *not* subject to laya (of the body) in B[1] The etymology of 'Tejas' as denoting Śrī is given by M —

तते स्थितेन रूपेण सा अजैव हि यत सदा ।
तेज इत्युच्यते तस्माज्जनिर्वा तत एव तु ॥ (M *Chān Up Bhāṣya* vi 2)

The reference to the laya of Tejas subsequent to the laya of Prāna in *Chān Up* (vi 8 6) Tejah parasyām devatāyām, naturally calls for a discussion at this stage For such laya, if admitted, would affect the status of Śrītattva (Tejas) as 'nityamuktā' (ever free from bondage)—as it emerges from the earlier adhis pertaining to the status of Śrītattva (*BS* iii 3 40-42) and the gradation of Adhikārins ending with Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) whence Śrītattva has been implicitly excluded

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1 चतुर्मुखस्य मातरिश्वनो देहत्यागस्य श्रियस्तत्र देहलयाभावसमर्थनं विना असिद्धेः तत्साधकत्वेन अस्य समन्वयत्वं (Raghu *TPB* iv 2 7)

(*BS* iii.3 35-36)[2] Hence it becomes necessary to establish that Śrītattva is exempt from Laya Rāghavendra (*TPB*) points out that the discussion covering an exception to Laya is not inadmissible in the context of Laya There is therefore, no difficulty regarding the Pāda-saṅgati here[3]

The criteria of Laya as determined in the previous adhi, are dependence on another controlling power and specific statements to the effect These are forthcoming in respect of the laya of Śrītattva also, according to the Pūrvapakṣa Hence the need for a discussion *to set aside such a contention*

It should be noted here that according to M, the reading of the opening word in the first Sūtra of the adhi is "Samanā" and not 'Samānā", as for S, R and others, including Baladeva It is a descriptive epithet of Śrītattva, construed as a Bahuvrīhi compound carrying the built-in reason (*hetugarbha*)[4] in support of the predication of "no laya" The explanatory derivation of the compound has been given by M as follows —

देशतः कालतश्च व्याप्त्या समो ना परमपुरुषो यस्याः सा " सम-ना "

"She to whom the Supreme Person (*nā*) is equal (*sama*) in point of pervasion in time and space is "Samanā"

The conjunctive 'ca' after 'Samanā' brings up the negative particle 'na' from the previous Sūtra[5] and connects it syntactically with the contextual predicate 'līyate' Thus we have the desired proposition '*Samanā na līyate' the Cit-Prakṛti (Samanā) is not merged* The probans in support of this conclusion are (i) anupoṣya ca[6] amṛtatvam (tasyāh) and (ii) asṛtyupakramāt (tasyāh) which are logically connected The first probans conveys the sense that immortality (*amṛtatvam*) or the state of being ever-free from samsāra is intrinsic (*svatah*) to Śrītattva and is *not the outcome of upasanā undertaken for the purpose of achieving such a state* The expression 'anupoṣya ca' is accordingly, understood in the sense of 'anupāsyaiva' (without having to carry out upāsanās for the purpose of achieving the state of 'nityamuktatva'— The form 'anuposya' is 'irregular' for anupāsya or due to samprasārana'

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2 अन्तराभूतग्रामवदिति चेत्तदुक्तम (*B S* iii 3 36) अन्तरेति सौत्र पद व्याचष्टे–परमात्मानमिति। श्रियोऽप्युपलक्षकमेतत। अनन सूत्रे अक्षरमितिपदानुपग सूचित । अन्तरा विना (*BD* iii 3 36)

3 लयापवादस्यापि लयोचितपरपादसगतत्वादिति भाव । सम्मतमेतत पूवतन्त्राद्यावित्ति (Ragh *TPB* iv 2 7) Vide *PMS* i 4 9

4 अत्र समनेत्येतत् हेतुगर्भविशेषणम । तदबलात प्रकृतिरिति विशष्य लभ्यत (*BD* iv 2 7)

5 अत्राद्य चशब्द पूवसूत्रान्नञोऽनुकषणाय (*TP* iv 2 7)

6 This 'ca' is construed emphatically anupoṣyaiva'

from Upa— √vas [7] The status of Śrītattva of being intrinsically free from Samsāra is due to the fact that she has at no time been subject to bondage (*asrtyupakramāt*) [8] The question of her merging her body in another source to attain mokṣa does not, therefore, arise It is in this sense she has been called 'Akṣara' in the Śrutis and Smṛtis [9]

Besides discussing the grammatical admissibility of the split-up of 'Sama-nā' with special reference to the operation of Sūtras enjoining the suffix 'kap' in respect of Bahuvrīhis coming under the scope of Nadyrtaśca (*Pān* v 4 153) and the feminine suffix ṅīp in the light of Rnnebhyo ṅīp (*Pān* iv 1 5), the *STC* has cited the following Vedic reference to 'Samanā' in support of its use in the present Sūtra

घृतस्य धारा अरुषो न वाजी अभिप्रवन्त समनेव योषाः [9a] (*RV* iv 58 7-8)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that on the rational ground of dependence supported by scriptural evidence of Śruti (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) it must be admitted that Śritattva merges its body in B If these two grounds are to be dismissed as inconclusive, even the merger of speech and mind established earlier will have to be called into question Nor can it be that Śrī is not subject to Laya as she is not at all liable to bondage That is an unproved assumption It cannot be that Śrī must be presumed to be not liable to bondage as she has already attained Mokṣa Her 'mukti' can well be an acquired state Freedom from bondage cannot be deemed to be intrinsic to her nature as that would place her on a par with the Supreme B For, if she were to be eternally free from bondage and transmigration there is nothing to prevent her from enjoying absolute parity with B in regard to all the attributes of the Supreme But such absolute parity of Śri with B cannot be accepted as it would be a gross violation of the Siddhānta position that there is no one who can be on a par with B in all respects

7 आत उत्वं छान्दसम् (Ragh. *TPB*)
यद्वा उपपूर्वस्य वसते ग्रस्तारणे रूपमेतत् ।
उपवासादिक्लेशमकृत्वा, अनुपास्येति यावत (*TDP*)

8 S R and others read 'a-srtyupakramat' interpreting it to mean "upto the beginning of the way"

9 Cf. अक्षरात् परतः परः (*Mund. Up* ii 1 2)
कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते (*Gita* xv 16)
ब्रह्मादय सर्वे शरीरक्षरणात् क्षरा
श्रीरक्षरत्वमन्वसिद्धिन् नित्यविग्रहत्वा मन (M GT xv 16)

9a Notwithstanding Sayana's interpretation of Samana here as "with one mind" or lovingly, the cpd is best split as Sama na in keeping with the comparison of the flow of different streams of ghee towards a single common fire

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is Śrītattva is *not* liable to Laya as she is on a par with B in respect of non-liability to bondage at any time, being pervasive in time and space, like B, in consequence of which she is to be put down as being ever-free from Samsāra In view of this, her freedom from Samsāra has to be accepted as being intrinsic to her being and not as something acquired thro' meditation and Sādhanas[10] as in the case of others Being intrinsically entitled to such a state of blessedness, for ever, she cannot be conceived as being subject to the merger of her body We are thus led to the inescapable conclusion that there is no merger of the body for her The inference that she must be considered liable to Laya as she is metaphysically dependent on B is not conclusive For, laya is concomitant only with bondage and is not necessarily so with one's metaphysical dependence on another The *Chān Up* text (Tejah parasyām devatāyām) has, therefore, to be explained in a manner consistent with Śrī's special position and relationship with B in terms of her closest and inseparable association with B for all time

हरेरत्यन्तसामीप्य लयो लक्ष्म्याः प्रकीर्तित[11] (M *BT* xi 24, 26-27)

Sūtra 8 goes on to rebut the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that because Cit-Prakṛti enjoys the status of being free from Samsāra for ever like B, it will have to be regarded as equal to B in every other respect also It points to one outstanding distinction between the two that while merger in Prakṛti involves the prospect of bondage over again, merger in B puts an end to it once for all In other words, Prakṛti is a source of bondage while B is the source of deliverance from bondage This means they differ fundamentally in their nature There can be no parity between two such beings

Sūtra 9 refers to another significant difference of nature between them B's subtelty is more than that of Prakṛti[12] The extent of the qualities of knowledge, bliss, power and authority is also incomparably greater in B than in Prakṛti (*See* M PL, *Dvādasa Stotra* vi)

Sūtra 10 meets the Pūrvapakṣin's objection that if Prakṛti has no parity with B she cannot also be regarded as being ever-free from Sam-

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10 See *BS* iii 3 41

11 Cf नित्यमुक्ता च सा भार्या नित्यमुक्त पतिश्च स ।
बाहुभ्यामेव बन्धोऽस्ति न तयोर्भवबन्धनम ॥ (Vadiraja *Yuktimallika* i 294)

12 Cf अव्यक्तोऽव्यक्तमात सनातन (*Gita* viii 20) सूक्ष्म तु तदर्हत्वात (*B S* 1 4 2) and Vol i p 264

sāra like B It points out that Prakṛti does enjoy a modicum of equality or parity with B in this respect without detriment (*upamarda*) to the supreme independence and other sovereign attributes of B which are *not* shared by Prakṛti

The 11th Sūtra adduces evidence of Śruti in favor of the position that Cit Prakṛti, the four-faced Brahmā and other beings do have a modicum of parity in some respects with B side by side with the wide difference between them, even within the range of the attributes which come within the scope of such modicum The Sūtra refers to the Sauparna Śruti which describes two orders of sentient beings—the 'Uṣmāvat' and the 'anūṣmāvat'—that which is possessed of 'ūṣmā' and that which has no 'ūṣmā' meaning 'power' (*sāmarthya*)[13] Of these B is the one possessed of "ūṣmā"—the power to remain inaccessible to the senses of smell, hearing, perception, and so on of others[14] The others like Prakṛti and Hiranyagarbha (*prākṛtam*) wanting in such power belong to the category of the 'ūṣmāvat' and the 'anūsmāvat" as they are partly inaccessible to the senses of others and partly accessible This Śruti explains the small measure of their parity—asyaiva kimcitsāmyasyaiva upapatter bhavati ūṣmāpadopeta srutih (*TDP*)

Sūtra 12 answers another objection that even the acceptance of limited parity of Prakṛti with B will be repugnant to the intentions of the Śruti which speaks of Him as "One without an Equal" "No other of this description is ever seen" "All these are indeed finite and imperfect The Lord alone is perfect" (*Caturvedaśikhā*) This Śruti, it is pointed out, denies *such parity* or equality of the Lord only with the individual soul (Śārira) and not with Cit-Prakṛti as such

The next Sūtra refers to a more clearly worded text which is free from the impreciseness of the previous utterance by categorizing the "equals" in point of all attributes and powers—the "not-equals" and the "equal-cum not equals" The equals are the manifestations of B (Avatārs) by whom creation sustenance, destruction order and activity are brought about The 'not-equals" are the gods, Ṛṣis, men and Asuras and whatever else remains of the animate and the inanimate world. Cit-Prakṛti is both equal and not-equal to B, for she is eternal, unaging and dependent on B[15] The last Sūtra cites an additional 'Smṛti" in support of the same

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13 ऊष्मनामा स भगवान् [illegible] प्रकीर्तितः (*M. Ait Up Bhāṣya*)

14 [illegible] (*BD*)

15 अथातः [illegible] समासमा च । समानि [illegible] • • [illegible] • • [illegible]

(*Mādhyandināyana Śruti* G M. *BSB* iv 2 13)

ब्रह्माद्यास्त्वसमा. प्रोक्ता. प्रकृतिश्च समासमा

While R's *Śrībhāṣya* has not given her rightful place to Śrītattva, in the body of the Sūtras M has made good the omission in the light of the position assigned to her in *Gita* (xii 1-4), *RV* ix 94, 4, x 114 3, 125, 1-8, *Mah N Up* xiii 2

Śamkara's Interpretation

Āsrtyupakramādhikaranam (iv 2 7)

S limits this adhi to one Sūtra while R extends it to seven Sūtras, combining the 13th Sūtra of S and M with the 12th as one

S considers in this adhi whether the utkrānti of the soul described hitherto applies equally to the "knower" (*vidvān*) and the ignorant man (*avidvān*) or whether there is a difference The Pūrvapaksa holds there is a differenec For the departing soul has for its abode the subtle elements and its abiding in them is for the purpose of a new birth But one who has true knowledge cannot be born again as the Śruti promises him immortality So only one who is without true knowledge departs in the manner described Moreover, in other texts, the departure is denied of him who knows It must, therefore, be applicable only to the ignorant man

The Siddhānta rejoins that this departure applies equally (*samānā*) to the knower and the ignorant man upto the beginning of the way There is, however, this difference that at the parting of the ways the ignorant soul taking its abode in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the new body and being impelled by its karma enters into a fresh body while the knowing soul enters the Suṣumnānāḍi thro' the light of knowledge and ascends the path of the gods

Criticism

It is pertinent to ask if the terms Vidvat and Avidvat so freely used by S in this context are intended to denote the possessor of Paravidyā and one who does not possess it, or one who possesses Aparavidyā and the one who does not possess it

In the first case, as utkrānti is intended for the purpose of reaching a particular place and as the possessor of Pravidyā has no need to reach anywhere,[16] the *absence of such departure in his case has naturally to*

16 अमृतत्व हि विदुषा प्राप्तव्यम् । न च तद देशान्तरायत्तम । तत्र कुतो भूताश्रयत्व सत्युपक्रमो वेति

(*Bhamati* iv 2 7)

be accepted by the Siddhāntin In the circumstances, the attempt to *establish the presence of utkrānti* in regard to the knower will be misplaced.

If 'Vidvat' and 'Avidvat' should denote the knower of the lower Vidyā and the one who is ignorant of it, the inquiry into Apara Vidyā, its rewards and goals are not the appropriate theme of the Phalādhyāya as it has been promised at the commencement of this Adhyāya that it will be dealing with the fruits of Parabrahma Vidyā

The *Bhāmatī* has tried to justify the excursion into utkrānti etc here on the ground that tho' the main purpose is to present the state of attainment of immortality thro' Paravidyā, the Sūtras try to provide a deeper insight into the nature of Paravidyā and its fruit with the help of the method of comparison and contrast—by introducing descriptions of the states like dreams and Suṣupti which have a deep kinship with the nature of the self in Paravidyā and of *other* states like the waking state which harbor elements of discord with the nature of the pure self The attention bestowed on Utkrānti etc are thus part of this technical device, of anuvāda, without intention to predicate[17]

This fine-spun theory does not agree with the fact that even on S's own interpretation of the Sūtras—discounting his innuendoes and parenthetical remarks, it is the Saguna B and his Vidyā that receive the largest share of attention, with the Nirviseṣa B and its Vidyā making but a few furtive appearances on the scene, only to withdraw themselves as quickly between the horns of the hare—never coming in sight *either at the beginning or at the end*

The *Bhāmati* and the *Kalpataru* have, however tried to overcome the difficulty about a satisfactory Pūrvapaksa for this adhi with the following explanation. The Daharavidyā which is an Aparavidyā and is the subject matter of this adhi, is associated with the fruit of 'amrtatvam' (*Chan Up* viii 6 6) But as amrtatva is the fruit of Paravidyā in reality and as utkrānti is (going to be) denied of the knower of Paravidyā in *Brh Up* (iv 4 6)[18] and *BS* (iv 2 12), the Pūrvapakṣa here is to be understood to emanate from one who thinks that utkrānti is incompatible with the knower of Sagunavidya[19]

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17 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iv 2 7)

18 This text has been explained by M. as having special reference to Ekagunopāsakas only

19 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iv 2 7)
[illegible]
(*Kalpataru* ibid)

इहामृतत्वफलश्रवणेन सगुणविदामुत्क्रान्त्यभाव. शङ्क्यते Appayya *Parimala* iv.2,7

But the difficulty is that the Upaniṣadic text here (*Chān. Up.* viii.6.6) after solemnly referring to the hundred and one arteries, concludes *in the same breath,* that the knower of Daharavidyā who makes his exit thro' the hundred and first nāḍī attains immortality:

तयोर्ध्वमायन् अमृतत्वमेति (*Chān. Up.* viii.6, 6)

How can any one who has read this clearly worded text come forward with such a Pūrvapaksa as the *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru,* following S have tried to put into his mouth that utkrānti is *not* at all necessary for the knower of Saguna or Aparavidyā (Dahara Vidyā)?

On second thoughts, the *Kalpataru* admits frankly that there is really no plausible Pūrvapakṣa here to suit S's convenience.

वस्तुतस्तु नास्ति पूर्वपक्ष इति द्योतित 'मन्वान' ग्रहणेन (*Kalpataru* iv.2.7)

As there can be no adhikaraṇa or a valid discussion without a Pūrvapaksa in a Vicāraśāstra like the Brahma-Sūtras, this is as good as saying that the present adhi has no *locus standi*

The *Kalpataru,* therefore, tries to supply a plausible Pūrvapaksa of its own on the following lines· The Saguṇa-B too is by hypothesis all-pervasive There is, therefore, no need for any going out of the body thro' any particular way to attain this all-pervasive Being—even as one has not to go anywhere to reach Ākāśa The knower of Dahara-Vidyā has thus no need at all to go thro' utkrānti in order to be able to attain the fruit of such a Saguṇa Vidyā. Hence the Pūrvapaksa denial of utkrānti[20]

But this is in conflict with S's statements in the Pūrvapakṣabhāṣya that getting into the subtle body is for the purpose of getting a new body, which is out of the question for the knower of Saguna-B As getting into a new body on earth is not the objective of the Dahara-Vidyā, the need for utkrānti must stand ruled out therein, if S is right in his assessment Daharavidyā and other Saguṇa Vidyās do not aim at the liquidation of the world (*prapañcanivṛtti*) and have only the fruits of sojourn and enjoyment in Brahmaloka and other worlds, as neither Brahmaloka nor these other fruits can be attained without going thro' utkrānti at death Thus, looked at from any point of view of Saguna Vidyā, there is no scope for any plausible Pūrvapakṣa for S to justify the opening of the adhi.

20 अथवा—सगुणस्यापि व्यापित्वात ब्रह्मणो न तत्प्राप्तुमुत्क्रान्त्यपेक्षेति पूर्वपक्षोऽत्र वास्तव (*Kalpataru* iv 2 7)

Śamkara's Samsāravyapadeśādhikaraṇam (iv 2 8-11)

According to S this adhi considers whether the merger of Tejas together with the individual self, the Prānas and the aggregate of organs and other elements in the Supreme B taught in Tejah parasyām devatāyām (*Chān Up* vi 8 6) is a complete absorption without a trace or one which allows their continuance in their source in a seminal condition or seed form (*bījabhāvāvasesasampattih*)

The Pūrvapaksa is that such Laya is complete and absolute because the effects have to merge in their cause completely and B is the causal matter of all things like Tejas[21] The Siddhānta is that this merging of Tejas etc is not an absolute one but like the one experienced in deep sleep Only the functions of the elements are merged and *not* the elements themselves, till final release is attained which occurs only when final union with B is achieved, after the destruction of Avidyā by right knowledge The succeeding Sūtras explain why the continuation of the elements in the form of the subtle body is not perceived and what the proofs of the existence of such a body are

Criticism

The merger of Vāk in the mind and of the mind in Prāna and of Prāna in Tejas has been established as one of functional absorption and not a dissolution of the organs or the tattvas as such As forming part of this series, the merger of Tejas in the supreme Deity must naturally be of the same kind and cannot be otherwise There is, therefore, no need for raising any issue on the point It cannot be said that on account of cause and effect relation subsisting between B and everything else there is a good case for accepting a total absorption For it has already been held by S that absorption of the substance is possible only where there is *direct* cause and effect relation between things—which is absent in the case of Vak and manas and of manas and Prāna[22] This holds true between Tejas and B too, for B is *not* the direct material cause of Tejas but only thro' Ākāśa Otherwise, the laya of Tejas in Vayu cannot take place in Pralaya in accordance with the principle of Laya laid down in *BS* ii 3 14 and as accepted by S himself

ज्योतिर्वायौ प्रलीयते (*Visnu Purāna* q by S *BSB* ii, 3, 14)

Moreover, the nature of Utkrānti of the Jiva as described in the Sūtra according to S is the Soul's subsistence in the subtle body com-

21 भवत्येव तन्निमित्तं प्रकृतिः परा देवतेति तस्यप्रविलय एवात्यन्तिकः स्यात् तत्र प्रभूतानामिति प्राप्ते (*Bhāmati* iv 2 8)

22 ननु श्रुतिसामर्थ्यात् वाच एवायं मनस्यप्ययो युक्त इत्युक्तं न पाद्–अत प्रकृतित्वात (S *BSB* iv 2 1)

posed of the subtle elements represented by Tejas etc. Unless the subtle elements do subsist in their seminal state, the Jīva cannot find lodgment there in the process of utkrānti. For to go up to Brahmaloka and other regions, the Saguṇa-Vidvān does require the help of a bodily vehicle and if the elements composing such a vehicle were to be completely merged in B. the process of ascent of the Vidvān towards Brahmaloka would be rendered impossible.

The total absorption of Tejas and other elements in their causal stuff of B. is, therefore, *an impossibility*. Their continuance in a seminal form is an *absolute necessity and a foregone conclusion*. The fact can hardly be disputed. *There is thus no provocation to reopen the question at all whether the merger of Tejas is complete or partial.*

The *Bhamati* has, however, tried to put in that the utkrānti of the knower of Saguṇa-Vidyā has been explained earlier taking it for granted that the said absorption of Tejas, etc. takes place only in terms of a seminal existence. What has been taken for granted is now being actually discussed in this adhi.[23]

This is not a satisfactory explanation. For, it has been well established in the Karmānusmṛtyadhi. (iii, 2.9) that the merger of the self in the Sat (B.) in deep sleep must be recognized to be of a partial nature only and not absolute on account of the impossibility of otherwise explaining the facts of one's taking up the work at the point where it had been left before, after waking from Suṣupti; the continuity of experience, before and after the state of deep sleep, and responsibility for discharging one's karmic obligations; and experiencing the fruits pertaining to them. The problem sought to be raised in the present adhi., in regard to the laya of the self together with Tejas and other subtle elements and prāṇas is in principle the same. For Utkrānti involves the merger of the soul together with the subtle elements in the case of both the knower of Saguṇa Vidyā and the ignorant man for whom different provisions have been made in the Śrutis regarding the Kramamukti of the former and return to rounds of earthly life for the latter. The fulfilment of these would be rendered impossible if the merger of the elements etc. which takes place at the time of death and utkrānti were to be absolute instead of being but partial in such a way as to let the aggregates of the elements etc., continue in a seminal condition (*bīja-bhāvāvaśeṣā*).

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23. सिद्धां कृत्वा बीजभावावशेषा परमात्मसंपत्ति विद्वदविदुषोरुत्क्रान्तिः समर्थिता । सैव संप्रति चिन्त्यते–किमात्मनि तेजः प्रभृतीनां भूतसूक्ष्माणां तत्त्वप्रविलय एव संपत्तिराहो बीजभावावशेषेति (*Bhāmati* iv 2.8)

The principle governing the Siddhāntanyāya of the Karmānuśayādhi is equally applicable to the laya of the elements proposed to be discussed in this adhi which does not, therefore, call for a fresh inquiry As the Sūtrakāra is hardly likely to indulge in a needless inquiry, the subject matter of the Sūtras here and their alignment may well be otherwise

Moreover, if the purpose of this adhi is to demonstrate that there is no case for a total merger of Tejas, etc, in the case of utkrānti, Sūtras 9-11, explaining the nature of the subtle body and evidence of its existence and why it is not perceived are *hardly relevant* The aggregation of the subtle elements in the form of the subtle body has already been established in the Pañcāgnividyā and the discussion carried out in the Tadantarapratipattyadhi (iii 1 1-7) The question as to how this subtle body can afford to remain invisible is too *naive* to call for any elaborate reply. If it needs any notice, such notice should have been taken by the Sūtrakāra in the course of the Tadantarapratipattyadhi itself and *not at this stage*

Śamkara's Pratisedhādhikaranam (iv 2 12-14)

While S beings a fresh adhi with 'Pratiṣedhād iti cenna' R treats it and the two other Sūtras following it as part if the Samānādhi (iv 2 9-13)

According to S the adhi refutes the position that the Prāṇas of the knower of Nirguna-B depart from the body at the time of his death. To S the Pūrvapakṣa is represented by the Sūtra 'Pratiṣedhād iti cenna śārīrāt' and the Siddhānta is given by the next Sūtra 'Spaṣṭo hyekeṣām' R who reads the words 'spaṣto hyekeṣām' in continuation with 'Śārīrāt' treats the entire latter part of the Sūtra beginning with 'Śārīrāt' as the refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa represented by 'Pratiṣedhād' S's Siddhānta view that there is no departure of the Prānas from the body of the knower of the highest B (Nirguna) becomes R's Pūrvapakṣa His Siddhānta is that the non-departure of Prānas simply means they are not dissociated from the knower of B at death

The discussion turns upon the passages from the *Brh Up* iii 2 11, 4 2, and iv 4 6 S's Pūrvapakṣa contends that the passage Na tasya prānā utkrāmanti (*Brh Up* iv 4 6) refers to the departure of Prānas only from the soul (*śārīrāt*) and not from the body, at death In support of this contention the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the genitive case 'tasya' in Na tasya prānā utkrāmanti' (*Brh Up* iv 4 6) should refer

to the possessor of the body as the starting point of the reported departure (*utkrāntyapādāna*) and not the body itself, as it is the self that is the subject of the discourse and the parallel text of the Mādhyandina recension uses the ablative case 'Na tasmāt prānā utkrāmanti' which means the possessor of the body is the starting point of departure

The Siddhānta relies on the Ārtabhāga section of *Brh Up* (iii 2 11) wherein Yājñavalkya replies to a question put by Ārtabhāga that when a man dies, his vital spirits do not depart from 'him' The reference to the inflation of the body in this context[24] shows that the reference is to the body and not the soul, altho' the chief subject of the passage is the soul S also supports his interpretation by contrasting this passage with another (*Brh. Up* iv 4 2) where, according to him, the knowers of Saguna B and other ordinary men are described, of whom it is said, their Prānas depart thro' the eye or the skull or other apertures of the body—"after him thus departing, all the Prānas depart" This must evidently refer to those other than the knowers of the Nirguna-B This conclusion is strengthened by what is said in a subsequent passage—"So much for the one who has desires Now for him who has no desires who is freed from all desires, whose desires are all satisfied, whose desire is the Ātman—his breaths do not depart Being B he goes to B" (*Brh Up.* iv 4 6)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R refutes this very position of S and establishes that there is no dissociation of the Prānas from the knower of B—the highest (and the only one) that there is He does this by connecting 'Śārirāt' in the Sūtra with the following 'Spasto hyekesām' treating the entire sentence as part of one Sūtra beginning with 'Pratisedhāt'—the former half upto 'Pratisedhāt' as voicing the Pūrvapaksa and Na sarirat * * * * as overthrowing it.

His arguments are—the antecedent of 'tasya' in 'na tasya prānā utkrāmanti' should naturally be the "Śārīra" or the one who has been referred to as the one who is Akāma, Ātmakāma, etc and not his "body" (*śarīram*) for it is the man who has actually been referred to and not his body as the starting point of the departure of the Prānas (*utkrāntyapādānam*) If the starting point is required for the departure, it can very well be the self of "him who has no desires"—rather than his body The Prānas are wellknown to be connected with the soul As there is no special point in emphasizing such a connection, the only pur-

24 स उच्छ्वयत्याध्मायति आध्मातो मृत शेते (*Brh Up* iii 2 11)

pose that can possibly be intended to be served by the reference to the case relation is to let the soul be understood as the starting point of the departure For it is much better to make the soul (*dharmī*) already given, as the starting point instead of substituting a fresh 'dharmī' (subject) and attribute to it the requisite connection of being the starting point of the departure of the Prānas The ablative 'tasmāt' in the Mādhyandina text clearly shows that it is the Jiva who is the starting point of the departure of the Prānas in the said denial.[25] Such a denial is called for in order to reach union with B by going thro' the path of the gods The soul must, therefore, be still in contact with his Prānas at the time of its separation from the body in order to be able to do so It is for this reason that the Brh Up text emphasizes that the prānas do not depart from the soul of the knower of B before that soul proceeds on the path of the gods to attain union with B

If the Ārtabhāga section (*Brh Up* iii 2 11) refers to the knower of B, the explanation of Yajñavalkya's answer that the Prānas do *not* depart should be on the above lines The fact, however, is that it refers only to the ordinary man who has no knowledge of B This is seen from the nature of the subject matter of that section which is mostly about the Grahas and Atigrahas, the deity for which death is food—conquest of which confers the conquest of further death (*apajayati punar mrtyum*) Therefore, the statement that the prāṇas of such a person do not depart must be understood to say that like the gross body, they do not abandon him at death but cling to the departing soul and accompany it like the subtle body[26]

Criticism

Tho' the subject matter of this adhi according to M is not the same as it is for S, R and others, his own stand in regard to the question debated by them in this context throws a decidedly new light on the interpretation of the relevant texts and deserves to be taken into account

M.'s position is that it is not an absolute rule that all knowers of B are necessarily subject to Utkrānti along with their prāṇas etc at

25 य आत्मा आप्तकाम न तस्मात् प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति (*Brh Up* Madhyandina)

26 [illegible] देवयानेन पथा ब्रह्म [illegible] नात्रयत इति न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति देवयानेन पथा ब्रह्मप्राप्तेः प्राक् जीवात् [illegible] प्राणा न विलीयन्ते [illegible] । [illegible] यदा [illegible] तदा [illegible]

(*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 12)

the time of final death. *Nor* is it true that there is no such departure of Prāṇas for knowers of B. The Devas, as we have seen, have no utkrānti and mārga. Among human souls Caturguṇopāsakas and above are subject to utkrānti. The texts which speak of utkrānti thro' Brahmanāḍī and the departure of the Prāṇas at the time of death (such as *Katha. Up.* ii.3.16, *Brh. Up.* iv.4.2, 9) and Smṛti texts like Yājñavalkya (iii.167) refer to these Caturguṇopāsakas. The Ārtabhāga section (*Brh. Up.* iii.2.11) on the other hand has particular reference to the Ekaguṇopāsakas[27] of whom it is said their prāṇas do not depart. Even in their case, it is to be understood that the prāṇas and the elements (and their deities) depart only in part and accompany the Jīva in part (See Vol. II, p. 373 and f.n. 16). The same thing applies to their "Saṁavanaya" (*Brh. Up.* iii.2.11). For the complete merger of the Prāṇas or their deities in the dead or dying body is unthinkable as the elements are subtle and the devatās are sentient beings. As swelling of the body and its getting inflated are natural to the body, there is no special point in the Upaniṣads referring to them unless it be to indicate a separate class of Souls whose release is attained in a different way from the Caturguṇopāsakas owing to the nature of their Prārabdha-karmas.[28]

The other passage beginning with 'Atha akāmayamāna āptakāmaḥ' etc. (*Brh. Up.* iv.4.6) which refers to the "Prāṇas not departing" from him can be seen to refer to the actual Mukta.[29] The words āptakāmaḥ, ātmakāmaḥ, can most appropriately refer (in their plenary sense) to one who has attained the actual state of release.[30]

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27 See P. 252, fn. 11. *ante*

28 केचित्तु मानुषा मुक्तिमनुत्क्रम्यैव देहतः
देहपाते तु देहस्य दोषान् मुक्त्वैव सर्वशः
मरणोच्छूनतादीस्तु स्वकीयारब्धकर्मजम् ।
देहे क्षीणे तु गच्छन्ति दृष्ट्वा विष्णुमनुज्ञया
पुनरत्रैव तिष्ठन्ति नित्यानन्दैकभोगिनः. (M. *Brh. Up. Com.* iii 2)

(एकगुणोपासकाना तु)—चरमदेहकर्मक्षये सजीवो देह· तत्रैव पतति भूम्यादौ। तत उच्छूनतादिदेहधर्मांश्च सजीव एव प्राप्नोति। तस्यो जीवस्तु वागिन्द्रियादिसूक्ष्मैः तद्देवैश्च भागतोऽनुगत उच्छूनतादिकृतक्लेशान् पूर्वकर्मशेषनिबन्धनान् भुजानो मृत इव शेते। ततोऽस्य प्राणा अत्रैव समवनीयन्ते, नत्वितरेषामिव ब्रह्मनाड्यादिना जीवेन सहवोत्क्रामन्ति। ततोऽर्चिरादिना श्वेतद्वीप गत्वा तदनुज्ञा प्राप्य यथायोग भूम्यादावेव समवनीयत इत्य-गीकारात् (*STC.* iv 4 14)

29 तस्यैवभूतस्य मुक्तस्य प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति पुनर्न म्रियत इत्यर्थः (Ragh. *Khanḍārtha*)

30 अथेत्यर्थान्तरे। सोऽकाम अकारवाच्यविष्णुकाम·, निष्काम: अयोग्यकामनारहितः. अकामयमान. योग्यकाम-स्यापि कदाचिदेव उद्भूतत्वेनासर्वकालीनत्वात् अकामयमानः। कामिताशेषप्राप्तेः आप्तकाम· चिदानन्दरूप आत्मैव काम. काम्यो यस्येत्यात्मकाम.। तस्यैवभूतस्य मुक्तस्य प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति पुनर्न म्रियन्त इति.
(Raghu *Brh. Up.* C)

The objection that if the Prānas should follow the Jnānı instead of being left behind, further embodiment will be inevitable is easily met by pointing out that further embodiment is liquidated by the very fact of the Jnānin's having attained freedom from desires (*aptakāmatā* and *ātmakāmatā*)

Review of Rāmānuja's Interpretation

So far as R's interpretation is concerned, it may be noted that as swelling and inflation of the body are attributes of the body and not of the soul, the departure of the prānas denied there would rightly be connected with the body Granted that 'tasya' would refer to the Jīva we can readily understand 'sarirāt' (by way of adhyāhāra) before 'na prānā utkrāmanti' Moreover, the words the "point of the heart becomes lighted up and by that light the Jīva departs either thro' the eye or the head or other apertures of the body" (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) leave no room for doubt that the body is the starting point (*avadhi*) of the said utkrānti and not the soul

R's idea that the denial of the departure of Prānas in the case of the knower of B simply means that the prānas do not become dissociated from the Ātman till the attainment of B by going thro' Devayāna is farfetched For 'utkrānti' is understood in the Śāstras purely in its technical sense of departure from the body thro' a particular 'nāḍi' in the case of the Jnānin It will not, therefore, be correct to understand or explain it as "dissociation from the Soul" Moreover, if the dissociation of the Prānas from the Soul would be incompatible with the Soul's journey thro' Devayāna to reach Brammaloka, it would be equally incompatible with the passage of the souls which have no knowledge of B thro' Pitryāna So much so there should be a denial of the departure of Prānas in their cases also But we do not find any such denial Since the dissociation of the self from the Prānas in R's sense has to be connected with both the knower of B and one who does not know B there is no point in beginning a fresh section with 'Atha akāmayamānah * * * * and predicate non-dissociation of the Prānas only of the knower of B

R.'s opinion that Ārtabhāga's question 'Yatrāyam puruṣo mriyate ud asmāt prānā niskrāmantyāho na' (*Brh Up* iii 2 11) is *not* connected with the knower of B (*avidvadviṣayah*) is open to question In this Brāhmana we have several questions addressed to Yājñavalkya Each with its answer may have a separate theme, and they may not all of them be connected with the knower of B But the reference to the fruit of conquest of redeath (*apajayati punar mṛtyum*, iii 2 10) in con-

nection with the knower of the devourer of death (*mṛtyor mṛtyu*) is sufficient to establish that the sections beginning with iii.2.10 till the end of iii.2.13 can very well be considered a unit dealing with the knower of B.[31]

It is interesting to note in this connection that R. himself has in this sense, recognized the possibility of regarding the Ārtabhāgapraśna as connected with the knower of Brahman. What R. has in mind in making such a statement is revealed by the following comments of Raṅgarāmānuja on *Bṛh. Up.* iii.2.10:—

'कास्वित् सा देवता' इति प्रश्नानुरोधात् अपामित्यस्य अप्त्वाभिमानिनारायणपरत्वेऽपि न दोषः। तस्मिन् पक्षे 'अग्निर्वै मृत्युः' इत्यग्निशब्दस्य कालाग्निरुद्रपरत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् 'अग्निर्वै रुद्र' इति प्रसिद्धेः ।

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्य भाष्यकारैः "आर्तभागप्रश्नस्य विद्वद्विषयत्वेऽपि" इति ग्रन्थेन प्रकरणस्य परमात्मविषयत्वमपि सूचितम्

In the circumstances, the denial of utkrānti and affirmation of utkrānti in respect of knowers of B. in different places in the Bṛh. Up. is best understood to refer to different orders of Brahmajñānins as elucidated by M. instead of entirely setting aside such utkrānti in respect of the knowers of B. or explaining the denial of utkrānti in terms of only non-dissociation of Prāṇas at the time of utkrānti.

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31 देहादुत्क्रम्य याताना देवा भागत एव तु।
स्वाधिदैव व्रजन्त्यद्धा भागतोऽनुव्रजन्ति तान् ॥
आकाशाख्य स्वरूप तु विष्णु तद्दृष्टिसस्थित
भागतो भागतश्चैतान् अनुयाति जनार्दन
ज्ञानिस्थितेन रूपेण देवाना मुक्तिदो हरि
पुण्यस्थितेन रूपेण स्वर्ग निरयमन्यग
रहस्यमेतद् देवाना विदु कर्मेति मानुषा
* * * * *
अत एव याज्ञवल्क्यो न जनेपूवाच—
कर्मनामा तु भगवान् फलकर्तृत्वतो हरि ।
पातनात् पापनामासौ पुनाते पुण्यनामवान ॥ (M *Bṛh Up. Bhāsya* iii 2)

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

LAYA OF HIRANYAGARBHA IN BRAHMAN

7 *Paralayādhikaranam* (iv 2 15)

Having established the laya of Prāna (Hiranyagarbha) in the supreme B in adhi 3, the present one establishes that of the other deities upto Vānī in the Supreme B in order to ensure their Mokṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that there is practically no hope of mokṣa for those other deities who have their merger as set forth earlier, in the (deities of the) elements or others in the ascending order of their hierarchy so long as they do not merge directly in B Tho' the other gods may all be merged in their specified sources and thro' those sources in Prāna-(Hiranyagarbha) the latter, while merging himself in B, may disgorge or leave them behind just as a minister going to have audience with his King may while taking with him some of his retinue leave them outside the royal chamber and go in alone to see the king[1]

The Pūrvapakṣa raises another difficulty In adhi 5, the Rbhus have been assigned laya in the deity of the element of earth, the Aśvins in Varuna, Indra in Vāyu, Vināyaka in Ākāsa and all the other gods in Agni This rules out the possibility of laya of the various deities in B It cannot be held that notwithstanding their laya in these deities, their laya in B is not gainsaid They cannot merge in B, if they are already merged in other deities Nor can it be insisted that in view of the Śruti 'Bhūtani pare viliyante" quoted under Sūtra iv 2 5, their merger must be accepted only in B and not in other sources The

1 This is known as the Amatyabhṛtyanyāya

whole trend of adhı.s from 1, 2 and 3 onwards of thıs Pāda wıll then stand flouted

Moreover, the prıncıple governıng laya ıs that Pratıbımba deıtıes merge ın theır Bımbas It cannot be saıd that all the deıtıes are dırectly Pratıbımbas of B For, the Srutı has ıt that Vāyu alone ıs the dırect Pratıbımba of B and all the rest are hıs Kalās Nor can ıt be argued that the condıtıon of beıng another's Pratıbımba ıs requıred to be fulfilled only ın respect of dırect merger But the laya contemplated here of the other deıtıes ıs thro' each one's hıgher-up ın the hıerarchıc order accepted Such an explanatıon cannot be accepted For we read Durıng Mahāpralaya all these deıtıes enter ınto B along wıth the four-faced Brahmā whıch seems to contemplate dırect entry ınto B

Moreover, ıt ıs only 'Pratıbımbas' defined ın terms of Tadadhīnatve satı tatsadrsāh, who can be expected to merge ın theır "Bımbas" The Śrutı represents Mukhya-Prāna alone as the dırect Pratıbımba of B and all the other Devas (Jīvas) as hıs kalās ın descendıng order and not as Pratıbımbas of B There ıs thus possıbılıty of moksa of Prāna (Hıranyagarbha) alone and none for the other gods Thıs falsıfies the conclusıon establıshed ın the Anıyamādhı (ııı 3 32) that all Jñānıns wıthout faıl and wıthout exceptıon attaın moksa

The Sıddhānta shows on the authorıty of the Kausārava Śrutı that on beıng released from the body all the gods enter ınto Prāna (Hıranyagarbha) and along wıth hım enter ınto the Supreme Beıng of ınconceıvable glory" thro' a socket-and-cylınder-system of laya ın theır ımmedıate superıors as fixed by the Śrutıs All the other gods get merged ın Prāna (Hıranyagarbha) and thro' hım ultımately ın the Supreme B and thus have theır Moksa There ıs no dıfficulty on account of theır not beıng the dırect Pratıbımbas of B For successıvely they are all Pratıbımbas of B thro' beıng the Pratıbımbas of Prana thro' *hıs* Pratıbımbas ın the descendıng order There ıs no authorıty sayıng that Laya ın B ıs determıned by the relatıon of dırect Pratıbımbatva alone to B The Śāstras have freely admıtted the laya of numerous deıtıes enterıng Hıranyagarbha thro' the Śesa and Garuḍa 'mārgas'—who are not ın realıty dırect Pratıbımbas of Hıranyagarbha Moreover, we may ask the Pūrvapakṣın to clarıfy what he means by hıs contentıon that the other deıtıes have no merger ın B—because they have merged ın other sources If he means that these other deıtıes do not merge theır bodıes ın the Supreme B dırectly, ıt does not affect the Sıddhānta posıtıon ın any way For the Sıddhānta does not hold that these other gods who merge theır bodıes ın those of theır respectıve hıgher ups as fixed ın the Śrutıs, do agaın merge theır bodıes ın B For there ıs no possıbılıty of

bodies already merged being merged over again If Laya in B, then, subsequent to the Laya in their own respective superiors, should mean, as it must, their entry into the Supreme B such entry is assured to them thro' Hiranyagarbha —

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे ।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति पदं परम् ॥

The *TD* points out that the term 'tāni' meaning Devatās here includes the Rsis and human souls also who come under the scope of Devabhāga Their entry into B (thro' Hiranyagarbha) has been suitably provided for —

सनादयो यतयः कामदेव विशन्ति शिष्टा अपि हव्यवाहनम्
वर्णाश्रमाचाररता मनुष्या धर्मं मनु सोऽपि समेति काले (M AV iv.2 15)

Samkara's Interpretation

S considers in this adhi what happens to the sense organs and the subtle body in which they abide in the case of the knower of B who dies The doubt arises whether these merge in their respective sources or in the Supreme B The Pūrvapakṣa holds the latter position on the authority of *Mund Up* (iii 2 7) The Siddhānta is that they are dissolved in the Supreme B

Criticism

There seems to be no room for any doubt here as the merger of the organs of speech etc in their sources, has been established in the initial adhis Even supposing that the merger spoken of there is purely functional, it is not opposed to the merger of the Tattvas in their own sources.

The *Bhamati* tries to find a more plausible reason for doubt on the point in the divergence of views between the 'Pratiṣṭhā' and the '*Vilaya*' *Srutis*—viz. *Mund Up* iii 2 7 and *Prasna Up* (vi 5) But while the *Chān Up.* (vi 8 6) passage is quite clear on the point of the merger of Tejas in B the *Muṇḍ Up* text does not clearly refer to the merger of the kalās in their sources On the contrary the concluding part of the same text expressly refers to the union of all of them, the karmas and the Vijñānamaya Ātman in the Supreme B This leaves no room for any doubt—on the question The adhi is, therefore, unnecessary

Is the self that is to be the locus of the merger of the knower's organs and the elements of the body, the conditioned or the pure one?

If it is to be the former, it will have to be clarified if the conditioning is by Māyā or Avidyā The knower of the Nirguna-B and his organs and the elements composing his subtle body can hardly be expected to merge in the Saguna-B If the merger is in the self conditioned by Avidyā it will go against the statement of S, in his Bhāsya on this Sūtra "Those sense-organs denoted by the term Prāna and the elements of him who knows the highest B are merged in that same highest B" It hardly stands to reason that the organs etc of the enlightened knower should merge in one conditioned by Avidyā—merger implying moreover a difference between the merged one and its locus A text which speaks of the merger of the organs and the elements of the knower of the highest B in a self conditioned by Avidyā can hardly be claimed to be speaking from the highest transcendental standpoint as S and his commentator would have it[2] It is equally impossible to regard the pure unconditioned self or Being as the locus of the said merger For this pure Being is by hypothesis, not causally efficient, cannot be the material cause of any of the organs or the Prānas or the elements of the body of the knower As only the material effects can be expected to merge in their material cause or source, the said merger of these elements etc in pure being cannot be sustained As for the merger of the individual self (of the Jñānin) such a self being limited by avidyā, antahkarana, etc, and, so, a product of Avidyā and anu and, therefore, open to liquidation by Jñāna, the acceptance of its merger in pure Being would be equivalent to its extinction which can hardly be the import of transcendental wisdom

Moreover, the pronoun 'tāni' in the Sūtra refers to the organs, the Prānas and the elements with particular reference to the merger of their functions referred to earlier Their final merger in B now predicated must similarly be functional and no more That would not be sufficient to establish the complete liquidation of the products of Avidyā in their entirety so far as the knower of B is concerned and the text which establishes such an incomplete merger can hardly be claimed to represent the highest reach of transcendental truth

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R raises the question whether the subtle elements united with the self at death go to produce their appropriate effects or merge themselves with the highest self The Pūrvapakṣa is they move towards some place where they can give rise to their appropriate effects The Siddhānta is they merge in B (*Chān Up* vi 8 6)

2 इतरातु 'एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टु' इत्यादिका विद्वत्प्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षा तात्त्विकप्रमाणापेक्षा (*Bhamati* iv 2 15)

Criticism

This inquiry cannot be restricted to the case of the knower of B or Vidvat as R is committed to the view that up to the soul's entering the Brahmanādi the mode of departure is the same for both the wise and the ignorant man The wise ones who have gone up thro' Suṣumnānāḍi and bide their time in Satyaloka have their merger only at the time of Mahāpralaya (*Mund Up.* iii 2 6) There is no merger of the souls, in the full sense, till then. If then the merger referred to here, at death, is in the nature of a brief union (*samyoga*) such as occurs in Suṣupti, *that is open to the ignorant man also If the merger is something* that is common to both the wise and the ignorant it has been clearly admitted in "Tejah parasyām devatāyām" and leaves no room for doubt. As the text 'Tejah parasyām devatāyām (līyate)' is linked with two others in the series which have been understood in a particular sense, the same should be true in the case of the last one too There cannot possibly arise any doubt as to the import of that particular statement alone[3] B qualified by subtle cit and acit being the material cause of the world of matter and souls, the merger of the effect in its cause should be self-evident and there can not possibly be any doubt on the point requiring a discussion If it is not that final merger of the effect in its cause that is contemplated here, but a *simple* 'samyoga' such a thing exists for all things in the world with the all-pervading Ātman and there is no need to strain oneself to establish such a relationship for the bhūtasūkṣamas alone[3]

3 अनुपपत्त्याभिधानवैयर्थ्य प्रमाणाभावात to quote R's own words (iv 2 15)

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE GODS AFTER LAYA DO *NOT* BECOME INDEPENDENT

8. *Avibhāgādhikaraṇam* (iv.2.16)

This is a Prāsaṅgikādhi. arising incidentally by way of disposing of an objection to the conclusion established in the previous adhi. It considers whether the gods, whose Laya preparatory to mokṣa had been set forth earlier, attain complete independence in Mokṣa or continue to be dependent on B. as before.

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that by virtue of being released, the Devas must be deemed to become independent. Otherwise, there is the contingency of their relapsing into Samsāra. In the description of the Muktas we read "They live in happiness as they please". It cannot be objected that it has been established before in the Tadananyatvādhi. (ii.1.15-21) and the Phalādhi. (iii.2.39-42) that B. is the only independent Being and dispenser of all and that there is, therefore, no possibility of any one becoming independent of B. in the released state. The Devas may be dependent on B. in their state of Samsāra (as Ādhikārikas) so also Jīvas who have to experience the fruits of their karmas in Samsāra. But once the yoke of Samsāra has been thrown off on entering into B. thro' laya what is there to prevent their becoming completely independent too? We read in the Gaupavana Śruti "These gods having entered into the Lord all their thoughts and desires come true. They go anywhere at their own pleasure within and without". These epithets of Satyakāma and Satyasaṅkalpa can be applied only to those whose thoughts and desires are not impeded or ever frustrated. If the

Devas are dependent on B in Mukti there is possibility of their thoughts and desires becoming frustrated if B does not choose to let them have their own way

The possibility of the Devas becoming independent of B would also cut at the root of the premise of the previous adhi that the Devas are the Pratibimbas of B and are as such entitled to merge in their Bimba "Pratibimba" has been defined as that which while having some resemblance to the Bimba is dependent upon it Such dependence is no longer possible after the Devas have thrown off their yoke of all traces of Samsāra

It cannot be said that it has been clearly established in the Karmā nusayādhi (iii 2 9) that all Jīvas for all time and in all places and states are dependent on B and that it has further been shown in the Sūtra 'Svāpyayasampattyor * ~ (iv 4 16) that the same kind of relation of dependence on B subsists in the states of Suṣupti and merger For aught we know, there may be a conceivable exception to this even as the general principle of merger of the dependent in its superior has been held to be inoperative in the case of Śritattva

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds the Devas are completely dependent on B in Mokṣa This does not contradict the Śrutis which describe them in release as Satyakāma and Satyasankalpa What is meant by those statements is that the Devas in Mokṣa are so in the sense that their thoughts and desires there are perfectly attuned to those of B and realized always in accordance with the Divine will and never in transgression of it This is endorsed by the following text

कामेन मे काम आगात् हृदयात् हृदय मृत्यो [1] (*T A* iii 15 4)

This rules out the possibility of frustration Frustration is possible only when something is aspired for in contravention of the Divine will The Muktas are so constituted as to think of and desire nothing out of harmony with the Divine will and pleasure

मुक्ताना सत्यकामत्व सामर्थ्यं च परस्य तु ।
कामानुकूलकामत्व नान्यत्तेषा विधीयते ॥ (*Brāhma* Q M *BSB* iv 2 16)

The term 'avibhāga' in the Sūtra is to be understood to signify complete harmony with the Divine Will in the case of the Muktas

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1 'My desire has proceeded from the desire of the Lord—the destroyer of all My will from His"

[illegible]

Vibhāga generally stands for separation[2] and 'avibhāga' means ('na prthaktvena')—i.e. in unison. Rāghavendra brings out the idea of harmony conveyed by the suggestive power of the word:

अविभाग: तादात्म्यम्। तेन विषयतादात्म्यं लक्ष्यते। इच्छाया एकविषयकत्वम्। तदिच्छानुसारित्वमिति यावत् (*TDP* iv.2.16)

The topic of dependence in Mokṣa is discussed here with special reference to the Devas who merge in B. as a corollary of the Pratibimbatva of the gods which determines their merger and which is challenged by the Pūrvapakṣa. The wider and more comprehensive question of the dependence of Muktas in general on B. is, however, reserved for Pāda IV. In Sampadyāvihāya śabdāt (iv.4.1) the point of discussion is not the dependence of Muktas as such but that the meed of their self-fulfilment is found in company with B. and never outside. There is, therefore, no overlapping of the topic discussed here with any of the above.

Śaṃkara's Interpretation

In this adhi. S. discusses whether the sixteen kalās (the ten external sense organs, the five elements and the mind) of the knower of Nirguna-B. merge in their entirety or do so leaving behind their potential forms undissolved and remaining behind.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the law of merger renders it necessary to assume the subtle essences of the parts of things merged being left over in their potential form undissolved. The Siddhānta is that the Śruti *Prasna Up.* (vi.5) favors absolute merger of the Kalās without leaving any subtle essence of theirs—when it says 'the name and form are destroyed. They speak of them as "Purusa" only.[3]

Criticism

The interpretation of the Śruti is open to question. The term 'bhidyate' is not synonymous with extirpation. When we speak of the pot as 'broken' (*ghato bhinnah*) the direct sense is the disintegration of its parts—the destruction of the entity as such being understood by implication. The use of the locative singular "Puruṣe" in the text is suggestive of the relation of abider and abode (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) which shows the subsistence of the kalās in their potential form. If we treat

2 Cf. the usage विभक्ता भ्रातर: (the brothers are 'divided'—i.e. have made a division of their ancestral property—which implies their mutual independence).

3 एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाः षोडशकलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते (ibid)

CHAPTER XC

HOW THE JÑĀNIN'S DEATH AND UTKRĀNTI DIFFER FROM THE ORDINARY MORTAL'S

9 *Tadoko'dhikaraṇam* (iv 2 17-21)

Dehakṣaya or divestment of their bodies by the Devas and some other connected matters have been dealt with in the seven adhis which have gone by—with another devoted to Śrītattva's immunity from Laya By implication, other Jñānins have been understood to be liable to actual utkrānti from their bodies, at the time of final death The present adhi, therefore, while describing their mode of utkrānti, focuses attention on the power of Aparokṣajñāna which confers on them the distinction of passing out of their bodies in a manner which is very much different and distinguished from the death of the ordinary mortals[1]

But the question would naturally arise as to how Jñāna can be credited with such power to make a striking difference in the manner of utkrānti of the knower of B when the Jñānin is still subject to his own Prārabdhakarma like the ordinary mortal. To get over this difficulty, it is held that Aparoksajnāna begins to bear fruit from the moment of its birth[2] स्वोदयात् फलद ज्ञानम् (XV)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that it cannot be accepted that Aparokṣajñāna has such power as has been sought to be attributed to it. Should it

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1 [illegible] (*TP* iv 2 17)

2 न तु [illegible] (*AC* iv 2 17)

have such power, it must be able to exercise it on the very first occasion of the Aparokṣajnānin's death and enable him to have utkrānti thro' Brahmanāḍi immediately after he has attained Jnāna, instead of waiting for the exhaustion of major part of his Prārabdhakarmas, in the manner provided in the previous Pāda, to bring about his mokṣa As the power of Aparokṣajnāna to liberate the Jnānin on the spot is obstructed and held in abeyance by the power of Prārabdhakarma, it follows that it has really no power to make any such vital distinction in the manner of the Jnānin's death and utkrānti, as distinguished from those of the ordinary mortal[3]

It cannot be said the Jnānin has no balance of Prārabdhakarma at the time of his final death The death of the Jnānin as much as that of the ordinary mortal is due to the action of Prārabdhakarma The complete eradication of Prārabdhakarma is known to take place, on the authority of the Śāstras, only when the Jnānin crosses the river Virajā which is a long long way off after his utkrānti and journey thro' Devayāna

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is stated by the opening Sūtra—the longest one in the entire work

तदोकोऽग्रज्वलन तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात् तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीत शताधिकया[4] (iv 2 17)

The Jnānin's death stands very much distinguished from that of an ordinary mortal The distinction lies in this that at the time of the Jnānin's exit from his last body, the top of his heart which is *the Lord's* abode (okas) becomes luminous with the power obtained by his vision of the Lord

There are a hundred and one nādis of the heart One of them is the Susumnā or Brahmanāḍi running straight from the mulādhāra to the aperture in the crown by which the soul of Aparokṣajnānin passes out at death. The gateway of this nādi near the top of the heart is set

3 ज्ञानिचरममरण प्रारब्धनिबन्धनत्वात तत्पूर्वमरणवत् पृथग्जनमरणसदृश, ततश्च ज्ञानिमरणस्याज्ञमरणवैलक्षण्याभावात न ज्ञानमतिशयवत इति (*AC*)

4 According to M s interpretation tat in tadokas carries three senses (i) B referred to in Sutra 15 (ii) at the time of Utkranti of the Jiva (*tadā*) and (iii) the Jnanin

तदिति पर इति प्रकृत ब्रह्मोच्यत । तत्वप्रदीपे तु तदेति विच्छेदेनोत्क्रान्तिकाल इत्यकोऽस्य उक्त तदिति च विच्छिद्य तस्य विदुष जीवस्य हृदयाग्रज्वलन भवतीत्ययोऽर्थोऽभिमत । (*TDP*)

तदोक इति व्यस्त समस्त च तन्त्रणापात्तम । तदित्यव्यय व्यस्त सप्तम्यर्थमिति (*STC*)

"Puruṣa" as the nominative form (Purusah iti) it will clash with the preceding reference to the kalās as 'Puruṣāyanāh' having their abode in Puruṣa This relation of ādhara-ādheyabhāva between Puruṣa and the kalās will not permit their identification as 'Puruṣah iti procyate'

It would moreover be preposterous to hold that the elements and indriyas which compose the physical body are dissolved out of existence, in their class-essence with each individual attaining knowledge of the Nirguna-B After all, the class-essence of these kalās have to subsist in order to provide embodiment to the unenlightened souls to enable them to attain Jnāna in due course So far as the enlightened one is concerned, there is no need to predicate the dissolution of the class-essences of the kalās for fear of involving him in future embodiment as such further embodiment in his case stands barred by the Śrutis The predication of 'niraveśaṣalaya' of the kalās thus serves no purpose

The sublation of everything other than B as the outcome of Avidyā, by right knowledge has already been fully established in the Tadananyatva Sūtra (ii 1 14) according to S The kalās being no less the products of Avidyā are bound to be completely liquidated when true knowledge arises Where then is the possibility of any doubt on the point justifying the opening of an adhikarana to discuss it?

The *Bhāmatī gives the whole case away* when it writes When the cause ceases to be, its effects also die out automatically The assortment of kalās is the outcome of nescience When this nescience is destroyed root and branch, seed and all, there is no possibility of their potential forms surviving Yet the adhi is introduced to correct the presumption of the survival of the kalās in their subtle essence which may be entertained by shallow witted persons on the ground that dissolution in its broad sense implies the survival of the potential forms[4] *This is a tacit admission of the futility of this adhi.*

R's Interpretation

R considers whether the merger of Tejas in the highest deity referred to in *Chān Up* vi 8 6 is, as in Prākṛtapralaya,[5] a refunding of the effect into the causal stuff as when a jar is reduced to the condition of the lump of clay, or a getting into a non-divisible state (from

4 निमित्तनाशाय नैमित्तिकस्य विनाशाय अविद्यानिमित्तश्च विभागः नाविद्यायां विद्यया [illegible] मर्हति । तथापि [illegible] इदं सूत्रम्

(*Bhāmatī* iv 2 16)

5 Thibaut's translation of the word 'Prakṛtapralayavat' used by R. as "ordinary" merging is far from accurate Tr of R.'s bhaṣya, p 737)

B) as has been accepted in respect of vāk and manas with reference to their causes The Pūrvapakṣa urges that as B is the causal stuff of all, the union with it posited in 'Tejah parasyām devatāyām' is in the nature of such refunding The Siddhānta opposes this and holds it to be one of non-division so as to be incapable of being thought of or expressed as separate from B This is shown by the preceding clauses and there is nothing to show that a different sort of connection is meant here, nor is there any reason to accept a refunding of Tejas etc, in B at this stage of utkrānti If the subtle elements are to be absolutely merged in B at the time of the utkrānti of the knower of B it would necessitate the recreation of Avyakta and the other tattvas which, according to the evidence of Śāstras, takes place only after Mahāpralaya and not before

Criticism

There is no room for any doubt on the point whether the laya of Tejas in the Paradevatā should be one of inseparable union or a refunding of the effect into the causal stuff The nature of laya accepted in the case of the earlier tattvas should suffice to show that the same thing applies here too It is far-fetched to argue that as the primary sense of "sampatti" is refunding of the effect in the cause such a doubt may arise That would depend on other proofs Such a sense would not hold water in a statement such as 'Devadatte gunasampattih' for example Otherwise why should not a similar doubt have been raised in the cases of vāk and mind? If the contingency of re-creation of the elements prevents such a doubt from arising in regard to the laya of vāk, manas and prāna, the same contingency exists in the case of the laya of Tejas also in so far as the mode of utkrānti and laya which forms part of it, is common to both Vidvat and the Avidvat according to R The explanation attempted by the *Śrutaprakāsa* showing the difference in the nature and quality of the repose of souls in Susupti and death and in Mahāpralaya does not help us out of this difficulty in finding reasonable ground for a doubt justifying the opening of the adhi from R's point of view [6]

6 Thibaut is evidently misreporting R as holding that The pranas bhutas etc of the Vidvan are finally merged in B—not merely in the way of con junction (samyoga) but completely —in his summary of R s interpretation of this adhi in the course of his Introduction to his translation of S s Sutra bhaṣya (SBE Vol. XXXIV, p lxxxi) However the f.n on the same page gives the correct picture When the Jiva has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of Brahman it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river Viraja There it divests itself of the subtle body and the latter is merged in B

aglow at the time of utkrānti and the Jñānin enters and departs thro' this nādi (led by the Lord and Mukhya Prāna following Him) by the power of his knowledge (*vidyāsāmarthyāt*) and with the help of the memory[5] (which forms part of his knowledge *and meditation*) *of the details* of the transit from the heart till reaching B beyond and above all with the grace of B (*hardānugrahitah*)

The Pūrvapakṣa, that if Jñāna should have this power of lighting up the top of the heart at the time of the Jñānin's last death, in his transmigratory career, and set aglow the entrance to the Brahmanāḍi (from the heart), why it should not do so on the very first occasion of his death after he had attained Jñāna, is answered by the words of the Sūtra Tacchesagatyanusmrtiyogāt'. This means it is *not* by the power of Jñāna alone that the Jñānin is privileged to have such a mode of departure from the body but also by the remembrance of the *details of* the transit—from the heart to reaching B beyond (gatismṛti)[6] which constitutes the subsidiary element of such Jñāna

This does not mean that the Jñānin's distinctive manner of exit from the body is *not* due to the power of Jñāna. While it is due mainly to the power of Jñāna, the remembrance of "gati" or the details of the transit to B at the time of (the last) death is a subsidiary requirement of Jñāna in this case (*tacchesa*) It is the *modus operandi* thro' which Jñāna acts and a *modus operandi* does not take away the power of the instrument to accomplish what it is competent to accomplish.[7]

The imperative need to remember the Supreme B at the time of impending death as well as the details of the transit (gati) from the heart to B beyond has been emphasized in the Śrutis and Smṛtis quoted by the Bhāṣyakāra.

य य वापि स्मरन् भाव त्यजत्यन्ते कलेवरम् ।
त तमेवैति कौन्तेय सदा तद्भावभावित ॥ (*Gitā* viii 6)
अन्तकाले च मामेव स्मरस्त्यक्त्वा (*Gitā* viii 5)
आचार्यस्तु ते गति वक्ता (*Chān Up* iv 14 1)

The term 'bhāva' includes besides the forms of the Lord to be meditated upon, *other things* and facts known from Śrutis and remembered, such as the details of the transit to B

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5 This 'remembrance' is of course based *on* the knowledge derived *from* the scriptural sources and the 'Upadesa' of Gurus—(tho not by *one's own* actual experience)

6 [illegible] (*TDP* iv 2 17)

7 [illegible] (*TP* iv 2 17)

भावमाकृतिविशेषं पदार्थं वा स्मरन् (*BD*)

That the "gati" referred to is the specific way leading to B. is clear from what *follows* the words 'Acāryastu te gatim vaktā' in *Chān. Up.* iv.14.1, viz.

स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति एष देवपथो ब्रह्मपथः एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते (*Op. cit.* iv.15.5)

The remembrance of gati is possible only when the Prārabdhakarmas are nearly exhausted and *not before*, as in the very first life in which the Jnāna is attained:

गत्यनुस्मृतिश्च कर्मावसानसमय एव, न मरणान्तरे (*TP*)

The remembrance of God is the most difficult thing to achieve when death is drawing near:

ज्ञानिनां कर्मयुक्तानां कायत्यागक्षणे यदा।
विष्णुमाया तदा तेषां मनो बाह्यं करोति हि॥ (Q .M. *GB.* II, 72)

It can come only thro' His grace without which remembrance of the Gati too will be out of the question. Hence the words 'hārdānugṛhītaḥ' in the Sūtra. As the ordinary mortal does neither remember God at the time of his death or the "gati" to B., his death cannot be the same as that of the Jnānin. Notwithstanding the vestige of Prārabdhakarma, the grace of God enables he Jnānin to depart thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi in the manner described in 'Tadokograjvalanam' and 'Tatprakāśitadvāraḥ.' The *STC* explains that thro' Prārabdhakarma, physically remains till the crossing of the Virajā, its potency gets reduced by enjoyment so much so that the remembrance of the Lord and of the transit are not impeded during the last moments, by the grace of B. This accounts for their remembrance of B. and the gati in spite of the continuance of their Prārabdhakarma.[8]

The next Sūtra meets another objection of the Pūrvapakṣin that the lighting up of the tip of the heart of the knower of B. at the time of his last death, cannot make any difference to the mode of his death from that of the ordinary mortal. For, it will have to be clarified if this reported illumination occurs only at the top of it or within the passage of the nāḍi too. It is clear that no illumination takes place inside the nāḍis which implies that inside the nāḍis it is all darkness, thro' which both the Jnānin and the ordinary mortal have to pass out—whch means

8 यद्यपि प्रारब्धकर्मणो ज्ञानोत्पत्तिक्षणमारभ्य विरजातरणपर्यन्त स्वरूपतोऽवस्थानमस्ति, तथापि न सर्वदा सवीर्यत्वम्। यथा यथा भोग. तथा तथा निर्वीर्यत्वम्। तथा च, चरमशरीरत्यागकाले भोगेन कर्मणो निर्वीर्यत्वसंपादनेन गत्यनुस्मृतिप्रतिबन्धकाभाव. (*STC*. iv 2 17)

there is no difference in their manner of exit.' Moreover, we hear of the sacrificial offerings welcoming the Karmins carrying them thro' the solar rays—which means the Ajñānin too has his way lighted up and that the Jnānin has no special advantage in this respect This is answered by pointing out that there is no darkness inside the nāḍi at the time of the Jñānin's exit, as there is in the case of the Ajñānin A *thousand* (and one) rays of the Sun going by the names of 'uttarāyana' and 'dakṣināyana' permeate the hundred and one nāḍis in the heart One of these uttarāyana rays—the white one called Suṣumnā, permeates the Brahmanāḍi[9] A set of five hundred rays known as 'dakṣināyana' and another set of five hundred known as 'uttarāyana' permeate the hundred nāḍis between themselves They are always present in them as long as the body lasts,—both day and night, irrespective of the Sun's having set or being in evidence in any part of the globe[10] Neither the ayana nor day or night makes any difference to the Jñānin The contact between the nāḍis and the solar rays known as uttarayana and dakṣiṇāyana rays last as long as the body lasts and it is thro' these rays, the Jnānin perceives his way thro' the nāḍi while making his exit Vādirāja (TPG p 174) points out that the Jnānin is able to separate the uttarāyana rays from the Dakṣināyana ones in the nāḍs by the power of his Aparokṣajnāna (like the poverbial swan separating water from milk) and makes his exit thro' the former[11]

The last Sūtra (21) clears up another interesting point that in the case of Jnānins no disadvantage attaches to death in the night or in the dark fortnight or in Dakṣināyana as the aforesaid rays permeate the nāḍis throughout life The eulogy of Bhiṣma's passing away in Uttarāyana is to show that for some Jnānins it brings added merit to make their exit in Uttarāyana. But for Jnānins of a still higher order (than Bhīṣma) all time and both the ayanas are equally propitious[11a]

उत्तर दक्षिणमिति तु त एव तु निगद्यते ।
न तु कालविशेषोऽस्ति ज्ञानिना नियमात् फलम् ।
ददाति कालेऽनुगुणे फल किञ्चिद्विशिष्यते
अयुक्तमाना केषाचिन्न विशेषोऽस्ति कालत. ॥
इति नारायणाध्यात्मे (M. *BSB*. iv 2 21)

9 सहस्रं वा आदित्यरश्मय आसु नाडीष्वाततः तत्र श्वेतः सुषुम्णा ब्रह्मयानः [illegible] निर्गच्छति (Pautrayana Śruti Q. M. *BSB* iv 2 18)
Cf. [illegible] (*Chān. Up* viii 6 2)
10 [illegible]
11 [illegible] (*TPG* p 174)
11a [illegible] (*TP* iv 2 21)

M points out further, in this connection, that Jnānins who pass out thro' the 'Uttarāyana-rays' go to Janaloka etc

महर्लोकादिगन्तारः उत्तरायणरश्मिभि ।
निर्गच्छन्ति * * * * * ॥

The expression 'Maharlokādi' in the above verse from *Nārāyanādhyātma* is to be construed, as pointed out by Jayatirtha, as an 'atadgunasamvijñānabahuvrihi' so as not to conflict with the other pronouncement आ जनान्न जनिर्भुवि in M S *G B* (viii 16) (For further details on this point see *BD* iv 2 21) For Jnānins (Pratīkālmbanas) eligible to reach Satyaloka and 'Apratikālambanas' eligible to attain 'amuktavaikunthasthāna', the exit is thro' Brahmanāḍi alone For others eligible to attain the worlds above Maharloka the exit is thro' (other) Uttarāyaṇa rays and they do not return to transmigration on earth

The rest who are eligible by their Sādhanas to attain Svarga and other lesser worlds—viz Karmins make their exit thro' the Daksināyaṇa rays only

The utkrānti of the human souls is, in point of time, considerably before Devalaya so as to allow their merger in the god Yama-Dharma as provided, and thro' him in Prāna Hiranyagarbha It is, however necessary for the human souls to meditate upon the mode of Laya of the gods as described, in so far as their own Laya, after Utkrānti, in the god Yama-Dharma is schematically connected with theirs and thro' *their* superiors thro' Hiranyagarbha in the Supreme B The indeclinable particle tad' in the opening Sūtra (*tad-oko' grajvalanam*) shows that the lighting up of the top of the heart of the Jnānin during Utkrānti *is the result of such meditation* (which ought then to be carried on) [11b]

Śamkara's Interpretation (iv 2 17)

To S and R this *adhi* consists of only one Sūtra S introduces it with these prefatory remarks, "The incidental inquiry about the higher Vidyā is over in the three preceding adhi s 6, 7 and 8 comprising Sūtras 12-16 We now turn to an inquiry covering the lower Vidyā" [12] It has

11(b) देवतानामुत्तरात्तरविलयध्यानपूर्वक तद्विलयपर्यवसानस्थानस्य परब्रह्मणो ध्यानमुत्क्रमिष्यत कर्तव्यमिति श्रुतिस्मृतिपर्यालोचनया गम्यते। गत्यनुस्मृतिवदेव गते पश्चात भाविनश्च मोक्षस्य स्वबिम्बभूतदेवता परपरापरस्परप्रवेशाविनाभूतत्वात। तच्च नित्य तत्प्रतिपत्त्यभ्यासवत एव सुकरतर भवतीति तदर्थोऽभ्यास कतव्य। तन्य तत्स्वरूपपरिज्ञानाय तद्विलयप्रकारपरीक्षा कतव्यति सा अत्र प्रकृता। अतो नैतदाशकनीय गने पश्चादभावित्वात प्रवेशस्य गति भोग चान्तरा वक्तव्य प्रवेश इति (*TP* iv 2 17)

12 समाप्ता प्रासगिकी परविद्यागता चिन्ता। सम्प्रति स्वपरविद्याविषयमेव चिन्तामनुवर्तयति (S *BSB* iv 2 17)

been stated already that up to the beginning of the way, the mode of exit is the same for both the knower of Apara-Vidyā and the ignorant man. Adverting to the entry of this way (common to the Vidvat and the Avidvat), the Śruti says—of the abode of the soul—viz, the heart, the top becomes lighted up and the soul departs from the eye or the skull or other places (*Brh Up* iv 4 2) The point at issue is whether this kind of exit is the same for the knower of the lower B and the ignorant man or if there is any distinction.

The Purvapakṣa is—as the Śruti records no difference, it is the same for both. The Siddhānta is only the Vidvat goes by the Suṣumnānāḍi and the Avidvat by the others This difference is due to the power of knowledge This is but proper; for, if the knower of B were to depart from any place in the body he would not be able to reach the most exalted sphere and all his knowledge would be in vain The exit thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi forms part of the Vidyā. He who knows it, being favored by B abiding in the heart on which he has meditated, thereby attains oneness of nature with it and departs from the hundred and first nāḍi

Criticism

The three preceding *adhis* according to S, deal with the knower of Paravidyā. To switch off that topic here and switch on the topic of Aparavidyā now is arbitrary and fanciful. The explanation that the knower of Paravidyā is exempt from Utkrānti and that as the present Sūtra talks of Utkrānti thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi, it must naturally refer to the knower of the Aparavidyā has already been refuted by pointing out that the negation of Utkrānti in some texts applies to particular orders of knowers of Parabrahman (such as the Ekagunopāsakas) and not to all (See Page 677, f.n. 27-28)

The Sutra speaks of three things—the lighting up of the heart, having the way illumined by it and exit thro' the hundred and first nāḍi. But S here dismisses the first two as being common to the knower of the Saguna-B and the ignorant man and holds only the exit thro' Susumnā to be distinctive of the Vidvān. But the wording of the Sūtra gives no indication in support of such a break up among the predications by the use of any qualifying or restrictive term such as "Yadyapi" (*even tho'*) We need to know only what is distinctive of the Vidvat in passing out. The Sūtrakāra then should have mentioned only this distinctive fact of the exit thro' Suṣumnā instead of indulging in a needless reference to what is not distinctive of the Vidvat This shows S's interpretation is off the mark.

Moreover, it is clear from *Brh. Up.* iv.4.2 that the lighting up of the heart is associated with the Vidvat only.[13] If it is to be dismissed as common to the Avidvat, by the same token the reference to the exit thro' the aperture in the skull (*murdhno vā*) in the same breath would also have to be made applicable to the Avidvat, like the lighting up of the heart. The right thing to do in deference to the principle of

अनुक्तमन्यतो ग्राह्यम्

is to supply the omission of the lighting up of the heart and the illumination of the door of egress in *Chan. Up.* viii.6.6 (Śatam caikā hrdayasya nāḍyaḥ * *) from other contexts in the Śruti where they have been mentioned and not to dismiss them as being common to the ignorant man also. The way in which the clear Theistic tenor of the words of the Sūtra 'hardānugṛhītaḥ' has been rendered by S. into "becoming of the same nature" (*tadbhāvam āpannaḥ*) due to being favored by B abiding in the heart on which he has meditated

हृदयालये ब्रह्मणा सूपासितेनानुगृहीतः तद्भावं समापन्नो विद्वान् (S. *BSB.* iv.2.17)

is far from sustainable. For, the "knower" here is, according to S., the knower of Saguṇa-B, who, we have been told, is eligible for exit thro' Brahmanāḍi. But "becoming of the same nature as B." (*tadbhāvasampatti*) is the fruit of nirguṇavidyā and *not* of Saguṇa-vidyā and has no relevance here.

It is not possible to contend that the exit thro' the skull referred to in *Brh. Up.* (iv.4.2) is for the Avidvat only in view of the reference there to "the self drawing itself together" and negotiating the transition to another body" like a caterpillar reaching out from one end of a blade of grass to another" (iv.4.3).[14]

If that be so, the exit thro' the skull (i.e. the Suṣumnanāḍi) should likewise have to be treated as referring only to the ignorant man destined to reembodiment and not to the Vidvān eligible for Kramamukti. There is no reason why the lighting up of the heart should *not* also be ascribed to the power of Vidyā.

It is not possible to construe *Brh. Up.* iv.4.3 as connected with the Avidvat or even with the knower of the Apara-vidyā. For, the text makes a pointed reference to the self's "having dispelled ignorance" (*avidyām gamayitvā*). The knower of the Saguṇa-B. (in S.'s sense)

13. तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते तेन प्रद्योतनेन एष आत्मा निष्क्रामति, चक्षुषो वा मूर्ध्नो वान्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः (*Brh Up.* iv 4 2)

14 तद्यथा तृणजलायुका तृणस्यान्तं गत्वान्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरति, एवमेवायमात्मा इदं शरीरं निहत्य, अविद्यां गमयित्वा, अन्यमाक्रममाक्रम्यात्मानमुपसंहरति (*Brh. Up* iv 4 3)

cannot be said to have "dispelled his Avidya" yet The reference to the knower "making for himself another newer and more beautiful shape" Brh Up iv 4 4) can very appropriately be understood in the sense of the Jñānin coming into his own pristine form (*svarūpadeha*)[15] alluded to in *Chān Up* (vii.12 3) and in *Katha Up* (i 2 22).

तस्यैव आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R this Sūtra considers whether there is any rule that the knower of B passes thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi alone and the ignorant man thro' other ways only The Pūrvapakṣa holds that as the arteries are so many and so minute it will not be possible to distinguish them The soul may, therefore, be making its exit casually thro' any artery. The Siddhānta is that the Jñānin who has true knowledge goes only thro' the hundred and first nāḍi There is no difficulty in distinguishing the particular nāḍi For by the power of its knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Lord and thro' the application of remembrance of the way which is part of that knowledge, the knower wins the favor of B in the heart and is assisted by B Owing to this, the heart which is the abode of the Jīva is illumined and thro' the grace of B. the soul has the door of the egress from the body lit up and is able to recognize the nādi and go thro' it

Criticism

Not only the exit thro' the Brahmanāḍi but also the lighting up of the top of the heart of the knower and his departure thro' the door of egress so lighted up have been referred to in the Śruti That being so, the question of rule ought to have been raised in respect of all of them and not as regards the exit thro' Brahmanādi alone The *Śrutaprakāśa*, however, agrees that *Brh Up* (iv.4 2) which refers to these facts also deserves to be taken into consideration here as Viṣyavākya[16]

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15 Cf एष आत्मा निष्क्रामतीति जीवाङ्गीकारे, 'शरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयित्वा [illegible] नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते' इत्यादिकमयुक्तं स्यात्। नहि जीवः शरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयति स्थानान्तरं वा करोति * *

इह शरीरं भूतेषु विनाशयति [illegible] ।
अविद्या चैव जीवस्य गमयेज्ज्ञानमञ्जसा ॥

मरणमात्रे चेत्प्राप्नोत्यस्य कल्याणतरमिति विशेषणं व्यर्थं स्यात्। मुक्तविषयत्वेन चैतत् प्रकरणं सूचयन्नाह भगवान्—उपाकोसलस्य [illegible] इत्यादिना (M. *Brh Up Bhāṣya* iv 4 4)

16 R. also admits as much when he says

परमपुरुषानुगृहीतः स्वनुपरत प्रकाशितद्वारो जीवः मूर्धन्यनाड्या निष्क्रामति

(*Vedāntasāra* iv 2 16)

It would be truer to hold that the heart is *primarily* the abode of the Lord (cf. the epithet 'guhāśaya)' rather than of the Jīvātman. The exit of the Jīva is in the wake of the exit of the Lord followed by Prāṇa:

एवमेवायं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सर्जन्याति, यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति
(*Brh. Up.* iv.3.35)

तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति (iv.4.2)

There is no difficulty in the Prājña-Lord distinguishing the nāḍis, however minute and carry the Jñāni thro' them. The exit thro' the eye and other places is not necessarily to be put down as pertaining to the Avidavat.[17] Jñānins who are eligible to go to the region of the Sun etc. go thro' other places. There is no need to assume that only ignorant persons make their exit thro' ways other than the skull. There is no harm if some Aparokṣajñānins eligible to go to Maharloka and other regions depart thro' these other places.

Śaṁkara's Raśmyadhikaraṇam (iv.2.18-19)

According to S. this *adhi.* consists of two Sūtras while for R. it consists of only one Sūtra.

The opening Sūtra affirms the Siddhānta that the knower of Saguṇa-B. after departure from the body along the Suṣumnā, follows the Sun's rays (*Chān. Up.* viii.6.2). It may be thought that as the Sun's rays are absent at night, such a departure by following the rays is open only to one who dies during day; but the Siddhānta is satisfied that there is no specific statement in the Śruti to the effect that only the knower who dies during day time departs following the Sun's rays. We are, therefore, free to hold that the following of the rays is possible in both the cases.

This is objected to by the first part of the next Sūtra. It is not possible for the knower who dies at night follow the rays of the Sun as the connection between the nāḍis and the rays is broken at night (*niśī neti cet*). The objection is overruled by pointing out that the connection is not cut off during night. It lasts all day and all night. This is seen from *Chān Up.* viii.6.2: "Spreading out of the Sun the rays enter the veins and spreading out of the veins they enter back into the Sun." The continuance of the Sun's rays during nights is also clear from atmospheric warmth on a summer night. Being fewer in number, they do not make themselves felt during the night in the cold season. By contact with the water surface of the moon they produce moonlight by reflection.

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17 Cf. मह्लोंकादिगन्तार उत्तरायणरश्मिभिः ।
निर्गच्छन्ति * * * (*Nārāyaṇādhyātma* Q. M. *BSB.* iv 2 21)

Criticism

It is difficult to see how the Pūrvapakṣa can arise in the face of clearly worded texts like—"Just as a great highway runs between two villages, the far and the near, so the rays of the Sun go to both the worlds this one and the above They start from the Sun and enter into these nāḍis They start from the nāḍis and enter the yonder sun" (*Chān Up* viii 6 2)[18] These texts affirm that the hundred and one nāḍis are all permeated by the Sun's rays This provides for the continuance of the connection between the nāḍis and the rays, inside the body even when the contact with the external rays may be broken As the Pūrvapakṣa cannot arise in the face of these clear evidences, Sutra 18 is best read as part of the previous Sūtra and the Tadoko'dhikāranam by way of answer to a pertinent objection that if there is only a lighting up of the top of the heart, there will still be darkness inside the nādis when the soul of the knower passes thro' them as in the case of the nāḍis of the ordinary mortal Moreover, if Sūtra 19 is to be explained in the way S has done it, the opening Sūtra (18) becomes redundant as the information conveyed by it is logically and materially presupposed by the objection contained in the first half of Sūtra

It will not carry us very far to assert that the Sun's rays exist during night and day, for the knower of Lower B to travel by them, unless it is established in the same breath that their connection with the nāḍis inside the body is *also constant* As this point is clearly established by *Chān Up* viii 6 2, the Pūrvapakṣa would be too weak and foolish to be entertained in the face of it

In so far as R follows the same line of interpretation, the above criticism applies also to his interpretation of the first Sūtra

Rāmānuja's Niśādhikaranam (iv 2 18)

R constitutes a separate adhi with Sūtra 18 and a slightly different line of Pūrvapakṣa from S's His Pūrvapakṣa is that as death during day time, the bright half of the month and Uttarāyana are held to be estimable in the Śāstras[19] and death at night, in the dark fortnight or in

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18 तद्यथा महापथ आतत उभौ ग्रामौ गच्छतीमं चामुं च, एवमेवैता आदित्यस्य रश्मय उभौ लोकौ गच्छन्तीमं चामुं च। अमुष्मादादित्यात्प्रतायन्ते ता आसु नाडीषु सृप्ता आभ्यो नाडीभ्यः प्रतायन्ते तेऽमुष्मिन्नादित्ये सृप्ता (*Chān Up* viii 6 2)
Read अहरहर्वा आदित्यस्य रश्मय आसु नाडीषु आतता तत्र तत्र सुषुम्ना ब्रह्मयान सुषुम्नायामानन तत्प्रकाशेनैव निर्गच्छति (*Pautrāyana Śruti* Q M *BSB* iv 2 18)

19 दिवा शुक्लपक्षश्च उत्तरायणमेव च।
मुमूर्षतां प्रशस्तानि विपरीतं तु गर्हितम्॥ (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 18)

Dakṣiṇāyana is very much deprecated, the knower of B. who has the misfortune to die in the night will *not* attain B.

The Siddhānta is that as, in the last analysis, is it only the association with Karma that prevents the attainment of B. and not the circumstance of dying at night or any such irrelevant thing and as the knower's association with Karma lasts only as long as his final body and as by the time he has come into his final body, all his Aprārabdhakarmas will have been destroyed by the power of knowledge and the subsequent Karmas will be unable to cling once Jñāna has been attained and as Prārabdharkarma ceases with the cessation of the last body, nothing can stand in the way of the knower of B. attaining B.—not certainly, the trivial circumstance of his dying at night or during the dark fortnight.[20] The praise of death during day time, the bright fortnight and Uttarāyaṇa is for the consumption of the ordinary mortals.

Criticism

The destruction of Anārabdhakarma by Jñāna and the non-clinging of the earlier and subsequent bad deeds as well as the exhaustion of Prārabdhakarmas thro' enjoyment have *all been elucidated in the previous Pāda.* Such Karmas are the only formidable obstacles to the attainment of B. When the Jñānin has come off with flying colors, after successfully overcoming these obstacles, it seems pathetic to attempt to hinder his attainment of B. by placing before him the puny hurdles of death at night time or in the dark fortnight and so forth.

The reason given by R. that the connection with Karma lasts only as long as the body exists and its intended implication that as this connection is to to be snapped at death,[21] there will no longer be any further difficulty in attaining B. due to the circumstance of death taking place at night or in Dakṣiṇāyana are *unproved.* For the Śāstras hold that the final destruction of Prārabdhakarma does not take place till the crossing of the river Virajā:

प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधिः [22]

It is, therefore, best to treat Sūtras 17-18 of R. as part of the Tadokodhi, itself and steer clear of a Pūrvapakṣa of dubious value.

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20 अनारब्धकार्याणामधोगतिहेतुभूतानां कर्मणां विद्यासम्बन्धेनैव विनाशात् उत्तरेषां चाश्लेषात् प्रारब्धकार्यस्य च चरमदेहावधित्वात् बन्धहेत्वभावात् विदुषो निशामृतस्यापि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः सिद्धैव (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 18)

21. निशि मरणमधोगतिहेतुत्वान्न ब्रह्मप्राप्तिहेतुरिति चेन्न । विदुषः कर्मसबन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात् (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 18)

22 Read: स आगच्छति विरजां नदी, तां मनसैवात्येति, तत्सुकृतदुष्कृते विधूनुते, तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयन्ति, अप्रिया दुष्कृतम् (*Kausītaki Up* i 4)
See also Thibaut's Tr. of S.'s BSB. Part I, Introd, p lxxxi, f.n. 1.

CHAPTER XCI

REMEMBRANCE OF 'GATI' AT DEATH ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL

10 *Yogyadhikaranam* (iv 2 22)

This *adhi* establishes the indispensability of the power of Vidyā and of remembering the way to be traversed by the Jñāni, after Utkrānti from the body in order to be able to attain B [1] Tho' this has been stated in "Vidyāsāmarthyāt taccheṣagatyanusmṛtiyogāt" in Sūtra 18 their indispensability has not been demonstrated with adequate reasons [2] This is done in this adhi, by reviewing the matter in the light of an objection brought up by an adhikāśaṃkā and disposing of it Tho' the indispensability of Vidya for the attainment of B has been established in the Vidyādhi (iii 3 48-49), that of harnessing 'Gatyanusmṛti' (remembering the way from the heart to Brahmaloka as described in the Srutis) to the power of Vidyā has not been established beyond dispute Hence the relevance of this *adhi*

The Pūrvapakṣa is—the interpretation put upon the text Yam yam yāpi smaran bhāvam * * * and the inference drawn from the statement 'Ācāryastu te gatim vaktā (*Chān Up* iv, 14,1) to the effect that the Jñānin will be able to attain B only when the recollection of the 'gati' is harnessed to the power of Vidyā and that the instruction about the nature of "gati" is imparted only with a view to its being harnessed to Vidyā by being remembered at the time of utkrānti in order that the

1 अत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तौ [illegible] (*TP* iv 2 22)

2 नहि [illegible] (*STC* iv 2 22)

goal may be attained are both of them gratuitous assumptions for which no support can be found in the normal transactions of our life. A farmer tilling his land reaps the harvest without having to remember that what is sown will yield its fruit at the proper time.

Moreover, Gita viii.24-26, says Devayāna is traversed by a knower of B. passing away in day time, in the Śuklapakṣa and in Uttarāyaṇa thro' the Brahmanāḍi and the Pitṛyāṇa by one who has not known B., going up to the moon's world when he dies in the night or in the dark fortnight or in Dakṣiṇāyana. This shows beyond doubt that the attainment of B. or the world of the moon, as the case may be, depends entirely on the time or period of one's death and not upon anything else.[3]

It cannot be said that the passage from the Gītā means that the way to B. as one's object of contemplation is attained by the dying man *only* as it *comes to be remembered* at the time of death and not simply on account of its having been known before. That would be an impossible condition to lay down and much more so to fulfil. For, it is practically impossible to remember the way to B. at one's dying moment when one is in the throes of mortal suffering. In the circumstances, the statement in question (*Gita* viii.24.26) has to be understood to say that the knower of B. should have a knowledge of the way to be traversed from the heart to B. gathered from the Śrutis. The inference based on the other statement 'Ācāryas tu te gatim vaktā' (*Chān. Up.* iv.14.1) should also be limited to the same sense. Only the time of death and not the remembering of the way (gatismṛti) at that time is, therefore, helpful in attaining B.[4]

The Siddhānta is that these two paths of Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa have been spoken of in the Smṛti (*Gītā* viii.24-26) with reference to Jñānayogins and Kāmyakarmayogins respectively as attainable only thro' their respective ways being actually remembered at the moment of death.

3 'अग्निर्ज्योतिरह शुक्ल' इति स्मृतौ 'धूमो रात्रि ' इति स्मृतौ च ब्रह्मप्राप्तिचन्द्रप्राप्तिगत्यो क्रमादहरादिरात्र्यादि-कालमृत्यधीनतावगमात् लोके फलानुस्मृति विनापि फलप्राप्तिदर्शनाच्च न गतिप्राप्त्यर्थं गतिस्मृति विद्या चापेक्षिता, किंत्वहरादिकालमृतिरेव (*Ny. Muktâvali* iv 2 22)
ब्रह्मचन्द्रगत्यो प्राप्तौ तत्तत्कालादिमरण विना अन्यत्कारण नोच्यते (TP. iv 2 22)

4 न च "यय वापि स्मरन्" इति स्मृतौ स्मृतिविषयस्यैव प्राप्यत्वोक्ते तद्वरोधितया 'आचार्यस्तु ते गति वक्ता' इति श्रुत्यर्थगत्युवितरुपलिंगविरोधश्चैव सति प्राप्नोतीति शक्यम् । देहत्यागक्षणे दुःखेन स्मरणायोगात् । शास्त्रादिना पूर्वं जानन्निति ज्ञानमात्रार्थत्वेन स्मरन् इत्यस्य नेयत्वात् । एतेन लिंगदर्शनमपि प्रत्युक्तम् । ज्ञानमात्रार्थतया तदुपदेशोपपत्ते (*Ny. Muktāvali*)

योगिन : प्रति स्मर्यंते[5] स्मार्ते[6] चैते[7]

M's interpretation of the words "Yogin" and "Smārte" in this Sūtra gives us a new insight into the purport of the Gītā passages referring Devayāna and Pitṛyāna by bringing out the fact that by applying to the Sādhakas going by the Devayāna and Pitṛyāna the epithets of "Brahmavid" and "Yogi" which denote a Jnanayogī and a Kāmyakarmayogi respectively, the author of the Gītā wants it to be understood that the attainment of these two goals depends only upon the consequent remembrance of their way from the heart to B in the one case and to Candraloka in the other and *not* upon the mere accident of their death at a particular time of the day or night or in this or that 'ayana' This leaves the importance of knowledge and works and the indispensability of the remembrance of the gati with respect to each goal, unaffected

Moreover the terms 'ahah suklah, ṣanmāsāh, dhūmah, rātrih, etc. denote their presiding deities It is, therefore, out of the question to suppose that any reference to death at a particular time of day or night or period is meant in these verses[8] As for the other verse (*Gītā* viii 6) its wording leaves no room for doubt that the goal is attained only if it is fully remembered at the moment of giving up one's life Hence, it is absolutely necessary to accept the need for clearly remembering the way (*gati*) to B from the heart, at the moment of dying[9] The difficulty of being overpowered by the throes of suffering at the time of death is not applicable to great souls eligible for mokṣa, as such persons hold the body in philosophical contempt and have no suffering at the moment of their death Even the ordinary mortals are oppressed by the fear of death and suffering only before death but not at the actual moment of dying

M.'s bhāṣya clears up another point also in this connection From what has been stated it would follow that the Jnānin who is not able to remember the way, as required, at the time of his death will not be able to attain B This in effect would place the power of Vidyā and gatismṛti

5 Note that M reads the verb in the dual so as to agree with its object the two Yanas (*ete srti*)

6 स्मार्ते स्मृतिरिव स्मार्ते गत्यनुस्मृतिमात्र एव स्मर्येते न वा विना भवत (*BD* iv 2 22)
स्मार्ते स्मरणनिमित्त ([illegible]) एव स्मर्येते (M. *BSB* iv 2 22) This way of construing has also the advantage of avoiding the pleonasm 'smarte smaryate'

7 ca=eva (*BD*)

8 न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] विवक्षित इति [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] (*TD* iv 2 22)

9 स स [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] स्मर्तव्यैव प्राप्यत्वात् गतिस्मृतिरावश्यकी (*Ny Muktāvali*)

on the same level and that would upset their relation of principal and subsidiary accepted by the Sūtrakāra (Cf *tacchesagatyanusmrti*)

M solves the difficulty by saying

गत्यनुस्मरणात् ब्रह्म चन्द्र वा गच्छति ध्रुवम् ।
अननुस्मरतः काले स्मरणं प्राप्य वै गति ॥

This means Even when the Brahmavid happens to be unable to remember the nature of the "gati" and contemplate it before the birth of knowledge, he will after attaining knowledge, gain such remembrance of "the way" by the grace of B at the time of utkrānti Jnāna thus holds the premier position and 'gatismrti' the subsidiary one They are not, therefore, of equal causal value (*samaprayojaka*)[10]

This explanation holds true for the attainment of Pitryāna also The Karmayogin who, for any reason, is not able to remember the 'gati' leading to Pitryāna, may by the grace of God be able to attain such remembrance in a future life and then attain his goal as the reward of his karma[11] In this way, the indispensability of 'gatyanusmaranam' referred to in *Gītā* viii 25-26, applies *with equal force to both types of Yogins*

The other objection that it is not always necessary to continue to remember the goal to be attained in order to attain it is inconclusive Even in the agricultural operations quoted by the Pūrvapaksin there is need to repeat them till the harvest is attained The effort involved in external operations till the fruit is attained and the mental effort in continuing the remembrance of "the way" to B (*gatismrti*) is the same The difference is that the one is physical and the other mental which is just an inter-difference which has no bearing on the point at issue[12]

The indispensability of vidyā and gatismrti, at the time of death, for the Jnānin's attainment of B thus remains indisputable This vindicates the position of Aparoksajnāna as a self-complete means of attaining B as stated in *BS* iii 4 1

सर्वेऽपि पुरुषार्थाः स्यु ज्ञानदेव न संशयः (M *Anubhāsya* iii, 6)

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Daksināyanādhi (iv 2 20 21)

In this adhi S and R debate whether the Jnānins who die during the months of the Sun's southern course (daksināyana) attain B or not

10 *TD* iv 2 22

11 *BD* iv 2 22

12 क्रियानुवृत्तिर्लौकिके साधन तु मनोऽनुवृत्ति वैदिके साधन स्यात ।
फल भवेत्मवथेत्येव तस्मात स्मरेत्सदा निश्चितत्वेन विद्वान ॥ (*NV* iv 2 22)

PĀDA III

MĀRGA AND GAMYA—THE ROUTE AND THE GOAL

INTRODUCTION

This Pāda deals with the route (*mārga*) to be taken by all those Jnānins who have had their Utkrānti from their bodies thro' Brahmanāḍi as well as other Uttarāyaṇa rays and their goal to be reached (gamya)—viz. the Supreme B, in the end.[1]

There is no substance in the objection that may be taken to the above statement of the Pādārtha that as the Pāda deals with these two distinct topics of Mārga and Gamya we should have a separate Pāda for each of them. The route can be conceived only in relation to its goal which thus comes within the meaning of the route At the same time, as the goal is the last to be reached by a part of the route it is also distinguished from the route and taken into account by itself[2] The *STC* brings the goal to be reached (B) under the comprehensive description of the Pādopādhi as "Mārga" by expanding the connotation of "mārga" so as to embrace the goal:

मार्गणीयत्वान्मार्गशब्देन गम्यमुच्यते

Just as 'Utkrānti' has been suitably construed to include 'dehalaya' which is distinctive of the gods, the term 'Gamya' may be viewed from the point of the routes of 'Arcirādi' and 'B' which is to be reached by them.

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1 मार्गो गम्य यस्मिन् पाद उच्यते (M. *BSB* iv 3 1)

2 न च गतिगम्ययो इहोत्क्रान्तौ पादभेदप्रसङ्ग । चरमगम्यं न गतिगम्यत्व मार्गत्वेन मार्गस्थैव मार्गत्वे ... गतिविषयतया गम्य चोच्यत इत्युक्त (Ragh *Ny Muktāvali* iv 3 1)

There are six adhi.s in this Pāda. The first five deal with the mārga—the routes of Arcirādi and constitute a unit (*peṭikā*). Of these the first three discuss three connected passages. The fourth and fifth discuss the identity of 'Vāyu' figuring in this series with the Ātivāhika-Vāyu and Mukhya-Prāṇa according to the distinctive contextual set-up of the Viṣayavākyas discussed. The last adhi. deals with that which is to be reached by the mārga. In this larger sense of utkrānti and mārga, the Devas also come to be accommodated within the fourfold concept of Mokṣa, comprising Karmakṣaya, Dehakṣaya, Gamya and Bhoga. The last adhi. of ten Sūtras is an 'antarbhedādhikaraṇa' elucidating the nature of the identity of the gamya as 'Hiraṇyagarbha' (*Kāryabrahman*) and/or the Supreme B. in the first instance with respect to the order of eligibility of Jnānins as 'Pratīkālambanas' or 'Apratīkālambanas'.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as death in Dakṣiṇāyana is censured and deprecated, the knower who dies then will not attain B The Siddhānta is that this disability is counteracted by the power of Vidyā

Criticism

It would be evident from what has been said about the supposed stigma attaching to death of the Jnānin at night, that the objection to the Jnānin's death in Daksināyana will naturally abort But S and R have tried to put life into it with the help of an 'adhikāsankā'[13] on the grounds of (i) the eulogy bestowed on death during uttarāyana, (ii) Bhīṣma's waiting for uttarāyana to begin, to give up his life and (iii) the reference in the Śrutis to persons dying in Dakṣināyana reaching the greatness of the Pitrs and union with the moon (*Mah N Up* 25) and their return again to the earth when this ceases, by the same way (*Brh Up* vi 2 6) and (iv) the reference 'From the bright half of the month they go to the six months when the sun goes north' (*Chān Up* iv 15 5) which concludes with the information that the knowers are led by a person not human to B—"that is the way of the gods, the way of Brahman whence there is no return to this human condition"

But it has already been shown (by R) in the preceding adhi that the text which praises the advantages of death in the day time, the bright half of the month and uttarāyaṇa are to be understood as referring to 'Avidvāns'[14]—a sentiment which is also echoed by S[15] The citation of a few additional texts does not alter the position or justify the opening of a fresh adhi to go into the question

Even the specific importance attached to the time of death leading to B and its counterpart leading to rebirth cannot justify the 'adhikāśankā' here and the opening of a fresh adhi to dispose of it. For, this doubt ought to have been met under the Sutra 'Nisi neti cet' where it is topical and pertinent, which would have saved the Sūtrakāra the necessity to go in for an 'atidesa' and his commentators the trouble of finding a suitable 'adhikāsankā' justifying the opening of a fresh adhi by way of atidesa

The difficulty raised by the reference to the specific value attached in the Gitā-Smṛti to the time and period of death leading to Mokṣa or rebirth has been explained by S as follows These specifications

13 [illegible] (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 19)

14 [illegible] (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 2 18)

15 [illegible] (S *BSB* iv 2 20)

are meant only for Sānkhya Yogins who take to meditation in terms of the Puruṣa as being Nirguṇa and isolated from Prakṛti and control the workings of the Citta. The Saguṇopāsanās to reach B., on the other hand, are based entirely on the authority of Śrutis and are *not* bound by the specifications of time of death in connection with the attainment of B. or getting back to rebirth stated in the Smṛtis. Having different spheres of application and a special kind of authority (the Smṛti), the statement in the *Gītā* does not contradict the position of the Śruti that the knower of B. attains B. irrespective of giving up the body at any time or season.

However, if the terms Agni, Jyoti, Uttarāyaṇa, etc., mentioned in the Smṛti are recognized to be a reference to the gods who conduct the Jīvas along the two paths of Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa (ātivāhikyo devatāḥ) there will be no room for any contradiction between the Śruti and Smṛti in regard to any specification of time of death leading to B. or to rebirth.

R., however, holds that this meditation of the Yogins is enjoined not with reference to any time factor but on the paths themselves whereof the conductor-gods have been referred to by the terms Agni, Jyoti, Uttarāyaṇa etc. The denial of reference to the time factor eliminates the disqualification supposed to be imposed on the knower of B. reaching B. if he dies in Dakṣiṇāyana. In view of this perfect correlation between Śruti and Smṛti the Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa described in the Śrutis and in the Gītā must be held to be identical in their sphere of application viz. to the followess of the Śrauta tradition only. We cannot accept the suggestion that the Gītā text applies to the meditators from the Sāṅkhya-Yoga standpoint and not from the Śrauta standpoint. That is why R.'s commentator explains that the term 'Yaginaḥ' in the Gītā is to be understood in the sense of the four kinds of devotees of God.[16]

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16. योगिन इति सौत्रयोगिशब्द. चतुर्विधभगवदुपासकसाधारण । भक्तियोगस्य तेषा साधारणत्वात्
(*Śrutaprakāśa* iv 2.20)

CHAPTER XCII

THE ROUTE OF DEVAYĀNA BEGINS WITH ARCIS ONLY

1. *Arcirādyadhikaraṇam* (iv 3.1)

This adhi establishes that all the departed Jñānins, after utkrānti go to B by the one and only route commencing with the region of the deity of light (arcis) Unless the route is correctly settled there cannot be any fruitful remembering of it at the time of utkrānti,[1] as commended and prescribed in Sūtra iv 2 17

The texts on this point present conflicting data, some placing Arcis at the beginning of the route and, therefore, as the first station to be reached and some others Vāyu as the first to be reached after utkrānti.[2]

The Pūrvapakṣa is—*Chān Up* v 10 1 begins the route with the deity of Arcis (light) and *Bṛh Up* (v 10 1) with Vāyu Since both Śrutis are forthright and neither admits of any other explanation, both should be accepted as the starting point of the route to be gone thro' each by a different group of Adhikārins While this may solve the contradiction between the texts, it will not facilitate the remembrance of

1 [illegible] । [illegible]
(*TP* iv 3 1)

2 As the motive behind the Purvapakṣa of this and of the following adhis, is not to deny the validity of the Śrutis with a view to undermining the Samanvaya of Śastra in B on account of their internal contradictions as in Pada 4 of the Avirodhadhyaya, but merely to establish the impossibility of fulfilling the condition of Gatismṛti because of the impossibility of settling the order of priority and serial order of the domains and deities to be reached en route, there is no reason to object that this discussion should have been raised in Adhy II Pada 4 and not here

the route one should take unless one knows beforehand which of them one is eligible to take This cannot be left to be communicated by the Niyataguru, for the Guru's upadesa itself on the point is imparted, according to the Sāstras, when the Adhikārin has already carried out continuous reflection (*manana*) of the correct position of the Śāstras on this matter, after his own study of them and such manana cannot be carried out meaningfully unless one knows beforehand which route is one's rightful one So long then as manana is beset with this difficulty there is no room for fulfilling the condition of Gatyanusmrti or remembering the details of the route one has to take, after utkrānti, as laid down in iv 2 17

The Sidddhānta puts an end to all these difficulties by leying down that there are no two routes open to Jnānins to travel by after utkrānti, but only one and that it is the one beginning with Arcis This is well-known (*prathiteh*) and universally recognized

द्वावेव मार्गौ प्रथितावर्चिरादिर्विपश्चिताम् ।
धूमादि कर्मिणा चैव सर्ववेदविनिर्णयात् ।।

(*Brahmatarka* Q M *BSB* iv 3 1)

This rules out the existence of another route with Vayu at its head

The BD clears up the point that it is the same Arciradimārga that has been described in the *Gita* (viii 24) as beginning with 'Agni', Jyoti and so on It is the same Arcis—the son of Agni that stations himself in his two forms of Agni and Jyotis on the path of Devayāna

अग्निर्ज्योतिरिति द्वेधैवार्चिष सम्प्रतिष्ठिति ।'
अग्निं गत्वा ज्योतिरिति प्रथम ब्रह्म स व्रजन् ।
एकस्मिंस्तु पुरे सस्थो द्विरूपोऽग्ने सुतो महान् ।। (M *BSB* iv 3 1)

Śamkara's and Rāmānuja's Arcirādyadhikaranam

According to S this Pāda deals with the path of the gods by which the knower of Saguna B has been stated to journey forth The question discussed in the first adhi is whether this path is the same or different as described in different Upanisads—as their descriptions vary The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that the roads described in different texts form part of different Vidyās (meditations) and are, therefore, different This is supported by the emphasis laid in the description of the route of the rays Etaireva rasmibhir ūrdhavam ākramate (*Chān Up* vii 6 5) The reference to the quickness in reaching the Sun (*ibid*) implies a shorter route than some others

The Siddhānta is that all the texts give different particulars of the same path which has been identified with the one beginning with light (arcis)—widely known as belonging to all knowers of (Saguna) B., whatever the Vidyās thro' which they have attained knowledge As some parts of the road are recognizable everywhere and as the goal is the same for all, the divergence of details and descriptions, here and there, have to be made good by suitable transference and combination as in the case of difference of particulars of the same Vidyā taught in different sources (See Upasamhārapāda) The reference to the speed with which the soul is said to travel refers to a particular destination—Brahmaloka, meaning that the time taken to reach it is far less than would be required in going to some *other* destination[3]

Criticism

So far as S's interpretation is concerned, the preoccupation in this Pāda with the details of the path of the knower of Saguna-B belies the hopes held out about the 'coming' discussion of the fruit of Nirguna-Vidyā, the unadulterated theme of the Brahmamīmāmsā-Śāstra according to S, in this Adhyāya[4] For, in point of actual fact, according to S's own commentary the three latter Pādas of this Adhyāya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies knowing the Saguna only and only two sections iv 2 12-14, and iv 4 1-7 have been spared to deal with what happens to the knower of the Nirguna-B Even there, there are strong indications that Sūtra iv 2 12 carries no sign of a new topic begun in favor of denial of Utkrānti to the knower of Nirguna-B The presence of the particle "hi" instead of "tu" in iv 2 12 fails to support S's interpretation The wording of iv 4 1-7 carries no indication that they are to be viewed as standing above and apart from the main stream of the discussions which have *gone before and are to follow* concerning the attainment of a B which is fully qualified by sovereign attributes The artificial nature of S's interpretation of this section is betrayed by the manner in which his position is undermined by the wording of Sūtra iv 4 7 which he tries to repair with his usual appeal to the exigencies of "Vyavahāra"[5]

After all that has been or can be said by S on this point, the fact remains that the topic of the fruits of Saguna-Vidyā, Utkrānti of the

3 As 'arcis' and others here refer only to the gods of those names, there is no propriety in bringing up the question of shortness of time or distance of the routes

4 अथेह चतुर्थे फलाश्रय (विचार:) आगमिष्यति (S BSB iv 1 1)

5 एवमपि पारमार्थिकचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया ब्राह्मस्य ऐश्वर्यरूपस्य अप्रत्याख्यानात् अविरोधं बादरायणो मन्यते (S BSB iv 4 7)

knower of the Saguṇa, the route taken by him and the manner of his enjoyment of the rewards of Saguṇa-Mokṣa fill the major part of the discourses in the last three Pādas, the first Pāda itself carrying on several special discussions connected with the means of knowledge, and concluding with the mode of destruction of the Jnānins' karmas of different categories,—which, however, holds true of the Saguṇa-Jnānin also and is nothing special to the knower of Nirguṇa-Jnānin socalled. When the Sūtra 'there is non-return, there is non-return according to Scripture' (iv.4.22) marks the denouement and the curtain drops after having exhibited *not* the lasting condition of him who has reached the highest state of S.'s conception *but* merely a stage on the way of a Jnānin who is still a pilgrim on the road to final release—a stage which, however, superior to any form of earthly life or to the transient rewards of karma is still but a part and parcel of what is essentially fictitious in its nature (*mithyābhūta*) we are at last face to face with the grim proof of the failure of S.'s undertaking:

यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः

(*Adhyāsabhāṣya*)

Coming to the details of S.'s interpretation of Sūtra iv.3.1, he has argued that there is only one road leading to B. possessing different attributes and qualified by one set of them in one place and by a different set in another—their relation of 'Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva' being established by the recognition of some part of the road in all the passages quoted. This suffers from the fallacy of interdependence in argument. Unless the Mārgas have been proved and established to be non-different, the proposed Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva cannot be predicated of them and unless such Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva is accepted as beyond dispute the oneness of the mārgas cannot be conceded.

We cannot dispose of the text—"They come to Vāyu" as conveying that the knowers of B. come to Vāyu after first reaching Arcis. It may as well be the other way about. This point can be resolved only by bringing forward a clearly-worded text fixing the order in which the knower of B. reaches Arcis and Vāyu. No such text has been cited by S. (as has been done by M. under iv.3.2).

The claim that one can recognize some part of the road given in the Arcirādi-text in all the passages quoted is far from true. There is no recognition of arcis, the bright fortnight, uttarāyaṇa, year and lightning in the text: 'They move upwards thro' those rays only', 'They come

to Vāyu'[6] Until the priorities are fixed as between Vāyu and Arcis, it would be premature to designate the route itself as "Arcirādi" and a decision of priorities is naturally to be expected to be given by the Sūtrakāra, all the more so, as the matter stands complicated by the reference in the Smrti (*Gita* viii.24) to 'Agni' as the first stage of the route and 'Arcis' (Jyotis) as the second

In so far as R also agrees with the general drift of S's interpretation, the criticisms apply to him *mutatis mutandis*

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6 वायुस्त्वर्चिरादौ वर्त्मनि न श्रुत (S *BSB* iv 3 2)

CHAPTER XCIII

ĀTIVĀHIKA-VĀYU IS THE SECOND STAGE

2. *Vāyugatyadhikaraṇam* (iv.3.2)

This adhi. is concerned with the identity of the deity whose domain is the second to be reached on the route to B. Here the claims of Vāyu and of the deity of Ahan for the second place call for settlement. The apparent conflict of claims is presented by the Śrutis 'Sa vāyum āgacchati" (*Bṛh. Up.* v.10.1) and 'Arciso ahaḥ (*Chān. Up.* v.10.1). The doubt arises here, if these are two different ways which admit of Vāyu and Ahan both being reached as the second place (after Arciḥ) on the route to B., independently.

The Pūrvapaksa is that unlike in the case of Arciḥ which has been accepted as the first place to be reached in the only route open to all Jnānins to reach B., there is no difficulty in allowing Vāyu and the Ahan to have the second place depending on the internal divergence in the route as regards the second place.

The Siddhānta is that tho' the first place has been denied to Vāyu in the previous adhi., for lack of wide acceptance (*prathiti*) which is available in respect of Arciḥ and in conformity with the principle that there is not more than one single route to B. (after utkrānti), there is nothing to disturb the claim of Vāyu to hold the second place on the route. While, therefore, Vāyu's claim to the *first place* is barred by the fact of its not being backed by anything more than a general statement (aviśeṣa-vacana), his claim to hold the *second place* is supported by a specific (viśeṣa-vacana) quoted in M.'s bhāṣya:

स इतो गतो द्वितीया गतिं वायुमागच्छति वायोरहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षम्
(Unidentified *Śruti*)

"Departing hence, he reaches Vāyu[1] as the second stage of the route, from Vāyu he goes to the day, thence to the waxing half of the month"

Saṁkara's Vāyvadhikaranam (iv 3 2)

S considers under this adhi, where exactly the deity Vāyu is to be placed in the Arcirādimārga and R whether 'Vāyu' and 'Devaloka' mentioned separately in Brh Up constitute one and the same goal in the Arcirādimārga Both commentators read 'Vāyum abdāt' instead of 'Vāyusabdāt' as does M

The Pūrvapakṣa, drawing support from the *Kausitaki Up* (i 3) Having entered the path of the gods, the knower comes to the world of Agni, then to the world of Vāyu, then to that of Varuna, then to that of Indra, then to that of Prajāpati and then to the world of Brahma[2] holds that Vāyu should be given the *second place,* therein

However, as there is no mention of Vayu in the Arcirādi text of *Chān Up* (v 10 1-2),[3] we have to look the light from elsewhere to solve the difficulty The passage from the Brh Up (v 10 1) "When a person departs from this world, he goes to Vayu Vāyu opens out to him like the hole of a chariot wheel By it he goes upwards He goes to the Sun", helps us to locate Vāyu's place immediately *after* "Samvatsara" (of the Chāndogya) and *before* the Sun—i e to say as the sixth one in the Arcirādimārga The reason for coming to such a conclusion is that in some of the texts where Vāyu is mentioned, there is only a bare mention of the knower's approach to his abode without any reference to the order (of succession) of this movement to and from Vāyu The text quoted from the *Brh Up* (v 10 1) on the other hand gives us a definite clue to determine the order in which the Jnāni reaches the Sun in the Arcirādimārga As Vayu is said to push up the knower to reach the Sun it would follow that the movement is from Vāyu to the Sun Tho' we have a somewhat different account in *Kauṣ Up* (i 3) to the effect that having reached the path of Devayāna the Jnānin comes to the world of Agni Vayu Varuna and so forth these are bare statements of facts without reference to their order of succes-

1 This is Pravaha Vayu and not Mukhya Vayu (See adhi 4)

2 स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमापद्याग्निलोकमागच्छति स वायुलोकं स वरुणलोकं * * * स ब्रह्मलोकम्।

3 ते अर्चिषमभिसंभवन्ति अर्चिषोऽहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान् षडुदङ्ङेति मासांस्तान् मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं संवत्सरादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवयानः पन्था इति

sion The immediate progression from Vāyu to Āditya being thus settled with the help of the clue given by the *Brh Up* text, we are now in a position to get over the omission of Vāyu in the Arcirādi text of *Chān Up* by accommodating him between Samvatsara and Āditya (Sun) The Arcirādimārga described in *Brh Yo* (vi 2.15) likewise omits to make mention of Vāyu on the road and places "the world of the gods" (*devaloka*) as the goal or stage reached *immediately after* the six "months" and *before* Āditya We have, therefore, to tally these accounts by supplying the omission of "Samvatsara" after months and of Vāyu after Devaloka in Brh Up and of Vāyu after Samvatsara in *Chān Up* (v 10 1-2)[4]

The final picture of the Arcirādimārga to emerge after these emendations by way of supplying the omissions and reconciling differences will be Arcis, ahas, suklapaksa, uttarāyana, samvatsara, devaloka, Vāyu and Āditya The wording of the Sūtra "Vayum abdāt" (He goes from 'abda' (year samvatsara) to Vāyu, is out of deference to the statement in *Chān Up* (v 10 1-2) मासेभ्य. सवत्सर सवत्सरादादित्यम् ।

Criticism

As there is obvious conflict between the opening statement in the Chāndogya and the Kauṣītaki which mention arcis and Agni respectively as the first place to be reached by the Jnānin, one would expect the inquiry to be directed to this problem, in the first place, instead of trying to find room for Vāyu in between Samvatsara and Āditya which represent much later stages on the route

We cannot admit the explanation that the world of Agni means the same as the world of light (arcis) as both the terms denote burning and that, therefore, there is no room for any controversy over them For, we find in Gita (viii 24) that Jyotis which is a synonym of acris has been separately mentioned in addition to Agni as constituting the Arcirādimārga There seems moreover to be greater propriety in raising a Pūrvapakṣa on account of the doubt whether Vāyu is to be placed first or second in the Mārga in view of texts favoring either position from the Brh Up and the Kaus Up before taking up the *sixth place for inquiry* The Jnānin's being helped to go upwards to the Sun by the hole made in Vāyuloka by Vāyu is not sufficient to assign Vāyu to the sixth place immediately before Āditya It is not inconceivable that

4 छान्दोग्यवाजसनेयकयोस्तु एकत्र देवलोको न विद्यते, परत्र सवत्सर । तत्र श्रुतिद्वयप्रत्ययादुभावप्युभयत्र प्रयितव्यौ। तत्रापि माससबन्धात् सवत्सर पूर्वं पश्चिमो देवलोक (देवलोकाद्वायु वायोरादित्य) इति विवेक्तव्यम (S BSB iv 3 2)

from a second place itself Vāyu may well be in a position to exercise sufficient power to lead the Jnānin right up to the Ādityamandala It is not necessary to assume that Vāyu cannot pierce a hole thro' Vāyu-loka unless he stands close below Āditya instead of being far away from him in the second place

Brh Up. (vi 2 15) omits 'Samvatsara' while mentioning only the 'months' and thereafter 'Devaloka' while there is omission of Devaloka and mention of Samvatsara after the months in Chāndogya These omissions and deviations naturally call for an inquiry as to which is the place to be reached after the 'months' To ignore this and to take up the inquiry with reference to what lies beyond Samvatsara is far from justifiable

S has tried to tally the accounts of Chāndogya and Brh Up by suggesting that in the text 'Samvatsarād ādityam' (*Chān Up* v 10 2) we have to insert Devaloka after 'Samvatsara' and 'Vayu' thereafter and take it that the Jñānin goes to Āditya Consistent with this emendation, we should expect the Sūtra to be worded 'Devalokam abdāt' rather than 'Vāyum abdāt'—which, while treating Devaloka and Vāyu-loka as separate entities does an injustice to Devaloka in *making it appear* that the Jnānin goes from Samvatsara direct to Vāyu (as the words Vāyum abdāt would literally convey) to which S himself does not subscribe as being the true or correct position.

The explanation offered by S and his commentator that the wording of the Sūtra 'Vāyum abdāt' is out of deference to the Chāndogya text (as suitably emended) results in making an invidious distinction as between the Chāndogya version and the Brhadāranyaka version, both of which are entitled to equal regard By wording the Sūtra as 'Abdād vāyum' while fully recognizing with S that the passage is really from Devaloka to Vāyu (and not from abda to Vāyu) the Sūtrakāra is withheld from giving an unequivocal and forthright ruling on a disputed point as behoves the author of a Nirnāyaka Śastra We owe it to him to rescue him from such a predicament[5]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also locates his Pūrvapaksa in the divergence of the accounts noticed at the point of the transition from Samvatsara to Āditya—one of them introducing Devaloka as the stage between the months (Samvatsara) and Āditya and another introducing Vāyu as the stage between Samvatsara and Āditya The Pūrvapakṣa seeks to make this interposi-

5 Cf [illegible] (*Srutaprakāsa*)

tion of Devaloka and Vāyu in the different accounts optional to the route of the Jnānin The Siddhānta rejects the option and overcomes the disagreement of testimony by treating Devaloka and Vāyuloka as identical in meaning and concluding that it will, therefore, be quite sufficient to include Vāyu alone *after* Samvatsara and *before* Āditya[6]

Criticism

R 's discussing the question of the place of Vāyu in the route at the same point as S is open to the same objections as applies to him—of setting at defiance the statement of the Kausītaki which gives the second place to Vāyu R relies like S on *Brh Up* v 10 1 to establish closer connection of Vāyu with Āditya We have already seen that the arguments adduced in this direction are not conclusive In trying to find a less devious interpretation of the wording of the Sūtra 'Vāyum abdāt' than S , he proposes the identity of (sense between) Devaloka and Vāyu, on the strength of a Śruti text 'Yoyam pavate eṣa eva devānām gṛhah' This overlooks the fact that another Śruti text 'Samvatsarah khalu vai devānām pūh' shows that "Devaloka" (in *Brh. Up* vi 2 15) should signify only "Samvatsara" of *Chan Up* (v 10 1-2) in which case R 's Siddhānta here loses its point, that Vāyu=(Devaloka) should be placed after Samvatsara and before Āditya The explanation that the identification of Devaloka with Samvatsara is pure eulogy while Vayu's identification with Devaloka is a statement of facts,[7] is clearly onesided As a matter of fact, even the statement Vāyu is the world of the gods has to be interpreted only figuratively

The sum and substance of R 's interpretation of the phrase 'aviśeṣaviśeṣābhyām' in the Sūtra is that the expression 'Devaloka' in the upaniṣadic text under reference signifies Vāyu in the general sense of his being the 'house' of the gods, whereas the other term 'Vāyu' in 'Sa vāyum āgacchati' signifies Vāyu in the particular sense The two terms in other words bear a 'Sāmānyaviśesa' relation This fact could have been expressed in simpler, more common and less cumbersome form than 'aviśesaviśeṣābhyām' as explained by R or even by a single word 'viśeṣāt' instead of the compound-word Connotatively "aviśeṣa" would presuppose "viśeṣa" which being a word with one syllable less than "aviśeṣa" would be entitled to precedence over "aviśeṣa" in compounding

6 तत्र संवत्सरादित्ययोर्मध्ये देवलोको वायुश्च श्रुतो श्रुत्यन्तरे । द्वयोः प्रकरणयोः किं देवलोकः वायुश्चार्थान्तरभूतो उत वायुरेव एवेति संशय । अर्थान्तरत्वे सति * * यथेष्टक्रमेण निवेशयितव्यौ । सूत्रार्थस्तु (वायुरेव देवलोकशब्देन निर्दिष्ट इति) अब्दादूर्ध्वमादित्यात्पूर्वं वायुमेव मेव निवेशयत् । देवलोकवायुशब्दाभ्यां अविशेषविशेषाभ्यां वायोरेकस्यैव निर्दिष्टत्वात (*Vedāntadīpa* iv 3 2)

7 संवत्सरस्य देवपुरलोकत्वे स्तुतिमात्रत्वात् वायोर्देवगृहत्वस्य वास्तवत्वात् (*Śrutaprakāśa* iv 3 2)

CHAPTER XCIV

AFTER LIGHTNING VARUNA IS THE NEXT STAGE

3 *Tadidadhikaranam* (iv 3 3)

In connection with the Mahāvākya in *Chān Up* (v 10, 1-2) which reads "Those who know this go to light, from light to the day, from the day to the bright half of the month from there to those months when the Sun moves northward, from there to the year (Samvatsara), from Samvatsara to the moon, from the moon to lightning Then the Super-human Person (Son of God Manu) leads them on to the Supreme B"[1] The first and the second stages to be attained on the route about which there was need for a discussion have been settled in the first and the second adhis About the further stages of the route, there is no room for difference of opinion till we come to the stage of Samvatsara. Hence there is no discussion of these intermediate stages in the Sūtras But after passing Samvatsara till one goes to the world of Prajāpati there is again room for discussion whether the Jñānin has to reach the worlds of both lightning and Varuna by different routes or by the same route,— by reaching the world of lightning first and then that of Varuna

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1 चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषो मानवः स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति (*Chan Up* v 10.2)

S., R. and others read Puruṣo amanavah' and construe "then there is a person who is non human He leads them to B" In the Brh Up version (vi 2 15) the reading of S., R and others is 'Tan Puruṣo Manasah' construed as "consisting or born of mind—a person living in the world of Brahma sent forth, created by Brahma (Radhakrishnan, *Principal Upanisads* p 314) M's reading in both the Upaniṣads is 'manavah'—meaning son of 'Manu' the Supreme Being. This Son of God is identified by him as Mukhya Prana—the highest of Adhikaris among the Jivas (see *BS* iii 3 35) It is not without significance that the preceding Brahmana here (*Brh Up* vi 1 1 14) deals with the greatness of Mukhya prana as the "Sreṣtha" See P 730 fn 12

Here we come across different reports in the Śrutis The Kauṇḍinya Śruti reads "From the months to the Samvatsara, from Samvatsara to the world of Varuna, from Varunaloka to the world of Prajāpati" The Gaupavana Śruti, on the other hand, reports "From Samvatsara he goes to lightning, from lightning to the world of Prajāpati"

As there will be the same difficulty in making sure of one's route for purposes of manana to serve in good stead at the time of utkrānti as required by the terms of Sūtra iv 2 17, it is bound to throw serious doubts upon the practicability of 'gatismrti'

The Siddhānta is that it is not necessary to assume that from Samvatsara one may go either way to the world of lightning or of Varuna, as alternative approaches to get to the world of Prajāpati There are no such alternatives The way to Prajāpatiloka from Samvatsara is invariably the same from the world of lightning to Varunaloka This is because we have a definite statement to that effect with a supporting reason "The world of Varuna is supported by (ūhyate) the world of lightning There is the world of Varuna the King who is studded with pearls, holding court, and judging right and wrong" (Unidentified Śruti) [2]

Since it will be palpably contradictory to recognize that the worlds of lightning and of Varuna are both simultaneously reached first after Samvatsara, there is no way out but to agree that they are reached one after the other—the world of lightning first and then the world of Varuna, for reasons already given

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

The *Kausitaki Up* reads On the Devayāna, he (the departing Jñānin) goes to Vāyu, the worlds of Varuna, Āditya, Indra, Prajāpati and Brahmaloka (i 3) The *Chāndogya* version as we have seen gives the order as (Vāyu) Āditya, the moon and lightning and thence to Brahman led by 'Tatpuruṣo mānavah'

S and R consider, here, whether Varuna, Āditya, Indra and Prajāpati are to be placed on the route as given in the *Kauṣitaki Up* or

2 तडिता ह्युह्यते वरुणलोक तटिदुपरि मुक्तामयो राजते । तत्रासौ वरुणो राजा सत्यानृते विविचयति

(M *BSB* iv 3 3)

The expression 'muktāmaya has been rendered variously J splits it into 'mukta-amaya His commentators are not agreed as to whether the word used by him as its equivalent should be read as Vītaroga' or Vitaraga' Vādiraja and Ragh adopt the first one and Raghuttama prefers the second—as the dispensation of justice needs absolute impartiality and freedom from passion and prejudice The rendering 'studded with pearls' would be appropriate to Varuna s regal splendor (cf *rajate*)

after "lightning", as stated in *Chāndogya* and *Brh Ups* (v.10.1-2, vi.2.15).

The Pūrvapaksa is that Varuna and others cannot be accommodated according to the text-order after Vāyu, for the *Chāndogya* and *Brh Up* (vi.2.15) texts clearly favor the movement from Vāyu=(Devaloka) to Āditya There is no decisive textual authority fixing the order for Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati as we have in respect of Vāyu (*vis a vis* Āditya) These are, therefore, interlopers (*āgantuka*) who cannot be included in the Arcirādimārga as recognized in the *Chāndogya* and *Brh Ups*[3] The route described in the *Kauṣ Up* must, therefore, be deemed to be a different one[4] The position taken in the Siddhānta that the Arcirādi is one and uniform throughout is, therefore, untenable

The Siddhānta is—The Arcirādimārga is known to terminate with Tadit-vidyut (lightning) Tho' Varuna and others of the *Kauṣ Up* are not mentioned in the *Chāndogya* and *Brh Up* versions, the fact remains that Varuna is the Lord of the waters and there is intimate connection between Taḍit and Varuṇa thro' the waters The broad lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds to the rumblings of thunder and the waers flow in torrents We have the Śruti "It lightens, thunders and rains" (Chān Up vii 11 1) And the Śruti and Smrti recognize Varuna as the Lord of the waters This justifies the accommodation of the new comers led by Varuṇa serially *after Vidyut* A ruling given in the Pūrvamīmāmsā Sūtras (v 2 19), with reference to the Nāriṣṭahomas, justifies the accommodation of the newcomers after vidyut, as they have not been allotted a special place in the Arcirādi but cannot at the same time be placed outside the scope of the Arcirādimārga as the Kauṣitaki Śruti has accorded it its recognition—notwithstanding the fact that there is only one route of Devayāna and of necessity within its framework.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. and his commentator add in support of the above Pūrvapakṣa that it has been declared that the Vidyut-Puruṣa leads to B If the worlds of Varuna, Indra and Prajapati are not squeezed in somewhere in the series of Arcirādi, their enumeration in the Kauṣitaki text would be rendered purposeless (*upadesavaiyarthyam*) One has, therefore, to break thro' the series somewhere to accommodate them The most

3 [illegible] (*Kalpataru*)

4 [illegible] (*Kalpataru-Parimala* iv.3.3)

suitable and propitious place to do so would be after Vāyu in the series of the *Chāndogya* and *Brh Ups* as already emended As the order between Vāyu (Devaloka) and Āditya will have thus been broken at one point, there will be wisdom in accommodating Indra and Prajāpati also in the same breach instead of making a second breach at another point in the series [5]

In elucidating the Siddhānta, R says the connection between Vāyu and lightning is made clear by the fact that lightning is in the womb of the clouds which are a condensation of water whose Lord is Varuna Lightning is vividly seen in the cloud while the waters in the womb of the clouds are not seen—which means they remain above the lightning The same spatial relation holds true between their Abhimānidevatas also By making room for Varuna after Vidyut in the series, the superiority of the sense-order to the text-order stands acceped in principle It follows as a corollary from this first step that the Puruṣa-Amānava from lightning leading the Jñānin to B will similarly be subject to two other intervening stages after Vdyut—viz Indra and Prājapati on the route to B Placing newcomers (like Indra and Prajāpati) at the end of a given series has the sanction of the Pūrva Mimāmsā Śāstra The final order inclusive of the newcomers from *Kausitaki* will be

अर्चिरह् सितपक्षानुदगयनाब्दमरुदर्केन्दून् ।
अपि वैद्युतवरुणेन्द्रप्रजापतीनातिवाहिकानाहु ॥

Criticism

The main difficulty in accepting S's and R's placing Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati after Vidyut is that it snaps the tie between the person who leads the Jñānin to B and Vidyut as "*her* man" (*tatpurusah*) Even if we do not agree with the manner in which the words "tatpuruso mānavah" has been construed by M, we cannot get away from the fact that the Sūtrakāra makes it a point to refer to this person as "Vaidyutah" (belonging to Vidyut, related to Vidyut) in Sūtra iv 3 5 This act of delivering the Jñānin into the hands of B must indeed be one that takes place at the journey's *end and not at some intermediate stage on the way* The interposition of Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati after Vidyut would naturally undermine the high status of this Vidyut-Puruṣa and cut his direct link with B Does it satisfy that the Jñānin who has been taken by the "Puruso mānavah" under his wings at the

5 वरुणे वाय्वनन्तरे सति इन्द्रप्रजापत्योरन्यत्र निवेशे क्रमद्वयभङ्ग । तस्मादेकत्रभङ्गेन तयोरपि क्रमिणो सावकाशत्व युक्तमिति भाव (*Srutaprakasa* iv 3 3)

stage of reaching Vidyut is kept back and is still to be made to traverse three more worlds and their gods before being ushered into B.'s presense? The existence of both lightning and water in the cloud does not necessarily determine that Varuṇa is to be reached after Vidyut The clear visibility of lightning is due to its lustrous form and not to its being below the waters. As there is divergence of views as to whether the Jñāni reaches Varuṇa or Taḍit first from Samvatsara, that point deserves to be taken up for discussion before coming to Varuṇa and Vidyut.[6] Indra and Prajāpati cannot be turned away as "newcomers" as they are actually mentioned in the Kauṣitaki text and their presence must be deemed to serve some purpose in the series like that of Varuṇa himself. If Varuṇa is entitled to come in as an insider because of his connection with Vidyut and water, Vāyu and Aditya too being as much connected with the production of rain by vaporization of the sea water, will have to be placed above Taḍit.

6 Vide Śrutis quoted under iv 3 3 by M in his C

CHAPTER XCV

VĀYU MENTIONED IN THE SECOND PLACE IS ĀTIVĀHIKA-VĀYU—*NOT* MUKHYA-PRĀṆA

4. *Ātivāhikādhikaraṇam* (iv.3.4-5)

This *adhi.* establishes the identity of 'Vāyu' who has been mentioned as the first to be reached after Arcis in *adhi.* 2, with the 'Ātivāhika-Vāyu',[1] after setting aside the possibility of his identification with Mukhya-Vāyu or Mukhya-Prāṇa, in order to maintain the latter's pre-eminent position as the last and the highest deity to be reached by the Jñānin *en route* to B. (*Cf. sa enān brahma gamayati*).

Tho' it may be felt that this *adhi.* should accordingly have followed *adhi.* 2, the texts relating to reaching Taḍit and Varuṇa have been taken up for discussion in the wake of adhi. 2 as the Taḍit and Varuṇa texts form part of the same passage taken up for discussion from the opening *adhi.* and, therefore, more intimately connected with it than the question of the personal identity of one of the deities mentioned there viz. Vāyu which can afford to await its turn.[2]

1 Ativaha is Mukhya-Prāna himself as he holds the strings of the cosmos in his hands without depending on any other but the Supreme B.:

भगवदितरानपेक्षेण जगत्प्रवृत्तिं वहतीत्यतिवहो मुख्यवायु. (*STC*). See *Brh Up* iii 7 2

Ativaha's son 'Pravaha' is Ātivāhika. He is not, therefore, of the same status as the Chief Vāyu and, therefore, not the one to be reached last of all *en route* to B. For Pravaha and six other zones of atmospheric pressure see *Śākuntala* vii 6 and c. of Abhirāma thereon.

2. ननु तर्ह्यस्य वायुशब्दादित्येतदानन्तर्यमेव स्यात् इति चेत्; सत्यम्। एकवाक्यपठिततटिद्वरुणविचारस्य अन्तरङ्गत्वेन तदानन्तर्यमेवास्य युक्तम् (Raghu. *TPB.* iv.3.4)

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the deity referred to in the text *'sa ito gato dvitiyām gatim vāyum āgacchati'*, under Sūtra iv.3,2, is the Mukhya Vāyu as the term 'Vāyu' primarily denotes him and he too is one of the deities to be reached by the route and there is no difficulty, so far as we can see, in identifying this Vāyu with Mukhya-Prāṇa. Since Mukhya-Prāṇa is thus the deity to be reached next to Arcis he cannot be given the preeminence that has been given to him as the last and the highest of the deities the 'Puruṣo Mānavaḥ' leading the souls to B. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.2).

The Siddhānta is that the deity mentioned as the second one to be reached is only the Ātivāhika-Vāyu and *not* the chief. For it is only a minor deity which can be fit to be reached in the *earlier stages* of the route.[3].

The next Sūtra anticipates another objection to this and refutes it : उभयव्यामोहात् तत्सिद्धेः (iv.3.5)

The objection anticipated is—"if the Chief Vāyu is *not* the one to be reached after Arcis, there will be no chance to reach him at all. If there is another Vāyu to be reached further on, the same difficulty of establishing his identify with Ātıvāhıka or Mukhya-Vāyu will persist as to whether the Vāyu first mentioned is the Ātivāhika[4] or not, just as it may be wondered if the 'Vāyu' subsequently referred to is to be identified with the Ātivāhika or the Chief. This objection is refuted by the Sūtra iv.2.5.

Two ways of construing this as embodying the Siddhāntin's refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa have been indicated—one by Jayatirtha and the other by Vādirāja. Accordıng to the former, the phrase '(ubhaya) vyāmohāt' is to be construed in the locative sense.[4a] The words 'yathā and tathā' are to be added for purposes of syntactic connection. The term 'tat' (in *tatsiddheḥ*) ıs to be repeated (by *tantrāvṛtti*) and taken to signify 'ātivāhikatvam' once and Vıdyutpatitvam the second time. 'Tat' is thus a reference to the point at ıssue: the reachıng to Vāyu (*Vāyugamanam*). The idea of the first and the subsequent mention of Vāyu (prathamagamanam and uttaragamanam) ıs derived by the denotative capacity of 'ubhaya'. The reason for the Siddhānta to resolve the doubt raised and settle the matter in favor of the first mentioned Vāyu being

3 पूर्वोक्तस्त्वातिवाहिको वायुः । पूर्वगमनलिङ्गात् (M BSB. iv 3 4)
• तदपमुख्यस्यैव भवेत् न तु मुख्यस्येति भाव (TP)

4 Note that 'Atıvāhika' is read by M. in the *singular* and *not in the plural as by S., R. and others.*

4a. पूर्वोक्त आतिवाहिक परो वेति व्यामोहे (M BSB. iv.3.5)

Atıvāhıka ıs supported by the force of 'tat' ın 'tatsıddheh' which embodies the reason explained ın the Bhāṣya to ıdentıfy the subsequently mentioned Vāyu with the Chief and by ımplication the first mentioned Vāyu with the Atıvāhıka

This reason ıs that the subsequently mentioned Vāyu has been hailed ın the Śrutı as 'Vıdyutpatı'—'Vıdyut' being ıdentified with 'dyaus' whose esoteric sense ıs the deity Bhāratı the spouse of Mukhya Prāṇa This attribute of 'Vıdyutpatıtvam' rules out the possibility of the first mentioned (Atıvāhıka)-Vāyu being equated with Mukhya Prāna [5]

Vādırāja prefers to understand the ablative (*ubhayavyāmohāt*) as an elliptical ablative "after removing the perplexity" and 'tatsıddheh' as meaning that the establishment of ıdentity of the first mentioned Vāyu with Atıvāhıka on the strengh of the mark of the subsequently mentioned Vāyu being the Vıdyutpatı (lord of vıdyut, or dyaus vız Bhāratı)[6] shatters the perplexity and settles the matter

Vādırāja accordingly says that ın the text of M's bhāsya "Vyāmoha uttare", the word 'Vyāmoha' should be read as a nominative to be syntactically connected with the negative particle (nañ) to be understood by way of adhyāhāra [7]

The Pūrvapakṣa may still contend that the same Mukhya-Vāyu may be recognized to be the deity reached both at the second stage ın one of his forms and at the final stage ın another of his forms just as the deity of Arcıs has been admitted to present itself ın his twin forms as Agnı and Jyotı (See under Sutra ıv 3 1) But this ıs unsustainable as there ıs no evidence to show that Mukhya Vāyu has two forms as ın the case of Arcıs He cannot, therefore, be the deity that ıs reached both at the second stage of the route and at the final stage If then, he ıs to be reached at the second stage his status as Vıdyutpatı will have to be surrendered and he will then have to be reduced to that of the Atıvā hıka only, which would take away his established eminence as the highest ın the cadre of Adhıkārıns (Vıde Iyadāmananādhı *BS*

5 (यया) स वायुमागच्छति इति प्रथममुच्यते (तया) उत्क्रान्तो विद्वान परमभिगच्छन विद्युतमेवान्तत उपगच्छति द्यौर्वाव विद्युत त ्नति वायुमुपगम्य तेनैव ब्रह्म गच्छति इत्यन्तेऽपि वायुगमनश्रुत पूर्वोक्त आतिवाहिक परो वेति व्यामोहे उत्तरे दिवस्पतिरिति विशेषणात पूर्वत्रातिवाहिक (त्व) स्यैव सिद्ध (*M BSB* ıv 3 5)

6 Note that ın M s interpretation of the Arcıradı there are *two Vayus* and *two Vıdyuts* to be reached The first Vayu ıs the Atıvahıka and the second Mukhya Prana The first Vıdyut ıs (the goddess of) lightning and the second dyaus—Bharatı the consort of Mukhya-Prana

7 उभयव्यामोहात तत्सिद्ध रिति सूत्र ल्यब्लोपनिमित्तपचमीमादाय विद्युत्पतित्वलिंगन उत्तरस्य मुख्यवायुत्व सिद्धावुभयव्यामोह निराकृत्य तत्सिद्ध पूर्वस्यातिवाहिकत्वसिद्धरित्यर्थो द्रष्टव्य अत एव उभयव्यामोह इति भाष्य नति नञध्याहारेण योजना (Vadıraja *TPG* p 175)

iii 3 35)—not to speak of his august role as the 'Puruṣo mānavah' in leading all souls to B

In conclusion the broad outlines of the route as set forth in the *Brahmatarka* are quoted by M ·—

उत्क्रान्तस्तु शरीरात् स्वाद्गच्छत्यर्चिषमेव तु ।
ततो हि वायो. पुत्रं च योऽसौ नाम्नातिवाहिक· ।
ततोऽह. पूर्वपक्षं चाप्युदक् सवत्सरं तथा
तडितं वरुणं चैव प्रजाप सूर्यमेव च
सोमं वैश्वानर चेन्द्र ध्रुवं देवीं दिवं तथा ।
ततो वायु पर प्राप्य तेनैति पुरुषोत्तमम् ॥

Interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja

According to S and R[8] this adhi establishes that light, day, months, year, etc mentioned in the Śruti in connection with the Jñānin's journey along the Devayāna are to be understood as divinities conducting them along their path to B and not as mere landmarks indicating the road or places of enjoyment

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as light, day, month, etc are inanimate they should be regarded as mere landmarks or places of sojourn.

The Siddhānta is that Arcis etc are not inanimate things or mere landmarks or places of enjoyment but divinities or Abhimānidevatās of light etc conducting the Jñānin's thro' different stages—'ātivāhikas' This is deducible from the reference to the 'Puruṣa-Amānava' the superman who is said to descend to lightning and lead the souls from there to B—(Candramaso vidyutam Tat Puruṣo amānavas sa enān brahma gamayati (*Chān Up* v 10 2) The adjective 'amānava' (not human) establishes *two* things by implication (i) that there are other conductors in respect of the earlier mentioned arcis, ahan, etc upto Vidyut and (ii) that they are all human while from Vidyut to B only there is a superhuman conductor

The next Sūtra explains that there is something more than a mere indication to show that the earlier conductors are human (intelligent) The travelling Jñānins and the arcis etc, are both benumbed (unconscious) on the route As the organs of the souls are withdrawn into the mind they cannot guide themselves Light, day, etc being devoid of intelligence, cannot guide the soul Hence, intelligent deities have

8 According to S this adhi. consists of three Sutras (iv 3 4-6) R does not read the middle one· 'Ubhayavyamohat tatsiddheh'

to be admitted as guiding and conducting the Jñānins along the path of Brahmaloka

The last Sūtra is introduced to answer the question as to how the said conductorship (ātivāhikatva) can apply to Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati who have been admitted to the list and placed *above* Vidyut, as the Śruti 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' appears to limit the Amānava Puruṣa's conductorship, *from Vidyut to B alone* The answer is that the same Amānava-Puruṣa leads the Jñānins to B from Vidyut thro' worlds of Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati However, tho' not actual conductors like the Amānava Puruṣa, Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati favor the Jñānins either by not obstructing their way or by assisting them in some ways[9]

Criticism

S and others draw the inference that Arcis, day and the rest are carriers or conductors (Ātivāhikas) of the souls to B because the leading text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' represents the Amānava-Puruṣa as an Ātivāhika But the text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' does not use the expression ātivāhika with reference to the Amānava-Puruṣa who is said to *lead* (*gamayati*) the Jñānin to B A blind man may be led to his destination by a man with good vision But that does not make the one who so leads the other (netā) an Ātivāhika ('carrier') As the souls are supposed by S to be in a sort of stupor (*vyāmoha*) owing to their senses having been withdrawn into the mind and the subtle body, their transportation along the Devayāna would seem to require some kind of bodily lifting and carrying along the route Such a predicament is not in keeping with the buoyancy of mind and spirit with which the Aparokṣajñānin has been stated in Sūtra iv 2 16, to make his exit thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi—his path illumined by the grace of B and his being welcomed on the way by several divinities (*Brh Up* iv 3 38) When the King's private secretary is said to conduct a visitor to the king's presence, the statement simply means that he takes him by the hand or leads him past the guards at important points on the way without being stopped by them This is the sense of conducting the souls even with reference to such texts[10] as *Mund Up* i 2 6 Otherwise, the same sense of the gods carrying the Souls semi-physically along the path of Pitryāṇa will have to be ascribed to statements like 'He goes

9 वरुणादयस्तु तस्यैवाप्रतिबन्धकरणेन साहाय्यानुष्ठानेन वा कयाचिदनुग्राहका इत्यवगन्तव्यम्
(S *BSB* iv 3 6)

10 The radiant offerings invite the Karmin with the words 'come come' and carry the sacrificer by the rays of the Sun, honoring him and saluting him with pleasing words—this is your holy world of B won by your good works"

to smoke, from the smoke to the cloud' (*Chān. Up.* v 10.5)—in which case, the Siddhānta intepretation of 'Dhūmo bhūtvā abhram bhavati' etc. as 'entering into similarity of being with them' (*sābhāvyāpatti*) according to S would be unsustainable

According to S the departed Jñānins have to be conducted to B by intelligent deities because their organs have been wrapped up in their subtle bodies at the time of death and they are, therefore, incapable of free movement

But we find from the evidence of Śrutis that even the Karmins manage to sport in heavenly regions with bodies of light by the power of their good works The power of Aparokṣajnāna needs must be far greater than those of Karma It cannot therefore, be that the Aparokṣajñānin who goes to meet his supreme Lord and Bimba thro' brahmanāḍi and has his way illuminated by the grace of that supreme B should be in a worse plight than Karmins going to Svarga and be reduced to the pathetic condition of a person in a coma, to be 'carried' by others thro' the journey!

We have already seen that the Jñānins last death is on a different footing from that of the Ajñānin or the Karmin [11] He passes from stage to stage with a full sense of his growing fulfilment receiving help and guidance from the Abhimānidevatās of Arcis etc and is finally taken in hand by the Lord of Vidyut—the 'Puruṣo mānavah—the supremely enlightened Person There is no need to go in for the reading 'amānavah' to make room for intelligent divinities in the earlier stages of the Mārga to conduct the Jñānin That the Arcirādis are divinities and not (merely) insentient principles would follow from the Abhimāninyāya of the Sūtras (ii 1 6) without our having to be obliged to infer it analogically from Puruṣo amānavah gamayati' to establish their humanity as contradistinguished from the 'amānavatva' of the Vidyut-Puruṣa

As the Vidyut-Puruṣa is in charge of the highest responsibility of leading the Aparokṣajñānins to the supreme B, it must be in the nature and fitness of things that this chosen leader of the Jñānins to take them to B must be one who should himself be an immaculate Jñānin Would it not be more appropriate to designate this Person as 'Mānava'—the Logos (from √ man to think) which will be in full accord with its variant 'mānasa' in the *Bṛh Up* pointing in the same direction ?[12]

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11 *See* Tadoko'dhikaranam (iv 2 17 21)

12 Cf [illegible] मानव [illegible] *(STC)*

It seems pointless to tag on the Sūtra 'Vaidyutenaiva tatas tacchruteh' (iv 3 6) to the present adhi This pronouncement in Sūtra iv 3 6 that after having come to lightning, the Jñānins are led by 'him only who belongs to Vidyut' has nothing to do with the main thesis of the *adhi* that arcis and the rest are to be regarded as conductors and not as landmarks or places of enjoyment

The explanation offered by S and R is that this Sūtra is necessary to provide an answer to the doubt which is bound to arise in consequence of the interpretation of the first Sūtra—viz as to how Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati also can be included among Ātivāhiktas since they happen to be placed *beyond Vidyut* and the Śruti tells us that beyond Vidyut it is the Puruṣo'manavah from Vidyut who leads the Jñānins to B

The question or the doubt is no doubt pertinent But the Sūtra embodies no reasons which can set them at rest What it actually says just leaves the question where it stands As the words 'tallingāt' in Sūtra iv 3 4, are sufficient to point to the Śruti which says it is the Amānava-Puruṣa who leads to B in support of the intended argument here, the use of the additional words 'tacchruteh' again in Sūtra iv 3 6 is redundant

The explanation offered by S, R and others that Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati take part in the work of the Amānava-Puruṣa only in so far as they may assist him or do not hinder the souls is 'utsūtra'—is not contained in the wording of the Sūtra while without the explanation Sūtra 6 becomes futile It is far from clear how even their explanation can confer conductorship *(ātivāhikatva)* on Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati—'the newcomers'—since admittedly they *do not conduct* the Jñānins to B and only the Amānava-Puruṣa from Vidyut does so By merely creating favorable conditions enabling the Amānava Puruṣa to conduct the Jñānins to B they (Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati) do not surely become entitled to be recognized as conductors (Ātivāhikas) in the real sense of the term in which Arcis and others have been recognized to be Ātivāhikas

If mere helping in the act by not obstructing the movement of the souls is enough to make Varuna, Indra and Prajāpati Ātivāhikas, the Vidyut Puruṣa also may be considered to be an 'Ātivāhika' *only* in this sense of helping the Jñānins to take their strides by their own effort—in which case the special significance attached to the Puruṣo' mānavah coming all the way to lead the Jñānins to B will cease to have any point or purpose

CHAPTER XCVI

MUKHYA-PRĀNA (PURUṢO MĀNAVAH) LEADS SOULS TO BRAHMAN

5 *Vaidyutādhikaranam* ((iv 3 6)

This *adhi* shows that Mukhya-Prāna is the deity to be reached at the concluding stage of the Jñānin's route to B after Utkrānti[1] The Pūrvapaksa is that in spite of Vāyu's occupying the highest position in the cadre of Adhikārins among Devas, he need not be the last deity to be reached by the Jñānins going thro' the Arcirādimārga The Pūrvapakṣa makes a clever use of the fact admitted in the Siddhānta, that the order of reaching some of these deities has no relation to their hierarchic order For it is on record that Agni and Dhruva who are inferior in status to Soma and Indra are reached subsequent to the latter

सोमं वैश्वानरं चेंद्रं ध्रुवम् * * *

Q from *Brahmatarka* M *BSB* iv 3 5

Similarly it can as well be that there is some other deity to be reached on the route *after* Mukhya Prāṇa and that he is *not* the last to be reached on the road to B

It cannot be argued says the Purvapakṣin that the Śruti which says 'the departing Jñāni on his way to B finally goes only to Vidyut. Vid-

1 अत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिमार्गे मुख्यवायोरनन्तरमवसानादस्ति शास्त्रान्तिमगति (*TP* iv 3 6)
प्रकारान्तरेण तत्र तत्राभ्यमानत्वान् वायोरपि परतः ब्रह्मगार्वाक् गन्तव्यान्तरमस्ति नाशङ्कनीयम्
(M. *BSB* iv 3 6)

yut is indeed Dyaus (Bhāratī) Then he goes to her Lord Vāyu Only by him he reaches B—" clearly represents only Vāyu as the last deity that is to be reached, by the use of the emphatic particle 'eva' Tenaiva Brahma gacchati' For, the particle 'eva' has many meanings It may convey inseparable association with Vāyu in the sense that the Jñāni is never separated from Vāyu while going further *(ayogavyavaccheda)* If 'eva' should have the sense of excluding any other deity to be reached after Mukhya Vāyu, it would create a difficulty when it comes to the other stage of reaching 'Vidyut only' (Vidyutam eva antata upagacchati dyaur vāva vidyut* *) in the same text—which would mean the Jñānin does not go beyond Vidyut, which is *not* a fact It cannot be that the passage 'Sa vidyutam eva upagacchati' admits of another explanation consistent with what follows—viz that from Vidyut he reaches the chief Vāyu (Vidyutpati) Even then, it would be a mere assumption that there is no one else to be reached after Mukhya-Vāyu, except B The Pūrvapaksa also points to another text from *Brh Up* v 10 1, wherein, after the initial statement "He goes to Vāyu," we are told "He reaches the moon It opens out to him like the hole of a drum Thro' it he moves up to the world free from grief and snow and there lives for eternal years"[2] In this text, we see that the Jñānin after reaching Vāyu goes further beyond to the world of the moon and from there he goes to rest in B the world of light and joy It cannot be said here that there is still a possibility of going to Vāyu after reaching the moon Why should the passage ending with the Jñānin's reaching the moon be forced into a different meaning instead of being left as it is and taken at its face value? We may, therefore, as well accept the position that some Jñānins reach the moon as the last stage and go to B, while some others reach Vāyu and then go to B led by him Thus from the point of view different Adhikārins, the moon and Vāyu may both be accepted as the last stages to be reached by different Jñānins There is thus no substance in the contention (of the Siddhāntin) that the Chief Vāyu is alone the last stage to be reached by all Jñānins The unqualified preeminence of Vāyu based on this consideration is, therefore, unacceptable

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Mukhya Prāna is indeed the last stage to be reached by all on the road to B *Chān Up* iv 15 5 (Sa enān brahma gamayati) gives him the unique honor and privilege of being the only

2 यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात प्रैति, स वायुमागच्छति * * आदित्यमागच्छति * * स चन्द्रमस तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा दुन्दुभ ख तेन स उर्ध्व आक्रमते स लोकमागच्छति अशोकमहिम तस्मिन वसति शाश्वती समा (*Brh Up* v 10 1)

one who leads the souls to B in the end If there should be some other deity than Vāyu who is to be accepted as doing that, it may be argued that he too may be led by another and that one by another and so on *ad infinitum* Such a clear and specific statement in favor of Vāyu is competent to overrule the counter claims advanced on behalf of the moon being the last stage For, there is no mention in *Brh Up* v 10.1 5 of any one leading the souls to B , as we have in *Chān Up* iv 15 5

Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that one who is closest to B will alone be competent to lead others to B [3] The Śrutis and Smṛtis leave no room for doubt that Mukhya Prāna is the most beloved of B and supreme among the gods (See *Prasna Up* ii,13 ab) He is the one inpregnable against the onslaughts of the Asuras and who retains his Prātibhajñāna even in Mahāpralaya [4] (See Vol II pp 145, fn 18, p 328 fn 3) No one but he among the gods can have the power to lead to B

विद्युत्पतिर्वायुरेव नयेद् ब्रह्म न चापरः।
कुतोऽन्यस्य भवेच्छक्ति तमृते प्राणनायकम् ? (*Brhattantra*)

While any minor officer may lead one nearer and nearer to the king's presence, it is his minister who is privileged to conduct one directly to the king

The Pūrvapakṣa has made a point of it that reaching the different stages of the route and their deities does not seem to be strictly in ac cordance with their gradation which is known to be disregarded in at least a few cases like those of Agni and Dhruva on the Siddhāntin's own showing

The Siddhāntin's answer to this point is that while there may be some anomaly here and there in the intermediary stages of the route, the *final stage of the route* has to be of the highest of the gods competent and accredited to fulfil the august responsibility

मार्गे तु अवरस्यापि यथामार्गं पश्चात् प्राप्तिर्भवति लोकवत्। नहि राजानं यःकश्चित् प्रापयति, क्लृप्तमतिप्रियं चापहाय (M NV iv 3 adhi 5)

3 "न ह्यन्या ब्रह्म गमयति। प्रिया ह्येनं गमयति न ह्यन्य प्रिया ब्रह्मण इति श्रुतेः (M NV iv 3 adhi 6)

4 See P 730 f.n 12

CHAPTER XCVII

THE GOAL OF JÑĀNINS

6 *Kāryādhikaraṇam* (iv 3 7-16)

This last adhi discusses the goal to be reached *(gamyam)* by (i) the gods who have shed their gross bodies in those of their superiors in the manner described in Pāda 2 and (ii) by *other* Jñānins[1] who after being (nearly) freed from their Karmas have made their exit from their last bodies thro' the Brahmanāḍi and completed their journey thro' Devayānamārga in the manner described in the preceding *adhi.s*[2]

To render its internal ramifications clear, the subject is treated with reference to two orders of Jñānins eligible to reach the goal viz the Supreme B —the Pratikālambanas and the Apratikālambanas In keeping with the fitness of the two orders of Jñānins, the Pūrvapakṣa is presented from three different angles The Siddhānta subsumes the immediate goal of the former in that of the latter and integrates the ramifications into a coordinated system The two main Pūrvapaksas are vicariously attributed to Bādari and Jaimini, for the sake of technical effect,—there being no real conflict of views between them, on this or any other point[3]

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1 Including some among Apratikalambanas viz Rsis Gandharvas and Emperors *other than* those specially counted among

* * * ऋषीणां शतमेव च।
राज्ञां च शतमुद्दिष्टं गन्धर्वादिशतं तथा।
एतेऽधिकारिणो व्याप्तदर्शनेऽन्ये न तु क्वचित्॥ (M *BSB* iv 3 15)

2 (अत्राधिकरणे) ये कर्मणो देहाच्च विमुक्ताः तेषां सर्वेषामपि गम्यं निरूप्यते (*NS* p 652)

3 Refer Vol I p 1 fn 1 P 297-98

The first Pūrvapakṣa attributed to Bādari (Śuka) is that "B" represented as the goal to which Mukhya Prāna has been stated to *lead* Jñānins is Hiraṇyagarbha, otherwise known as "Kārya-B" Tho' the term "B" primarily denotes the Supreme B, such a meaning will *not suit* the present context The bondage of souls due to their involvement in Prakṛti is known to continue till Hiraṇyagarbha gets his release merging his own gross body in the Supreme B at the end of his hundred years of tenure of office The Jñānins who will, therefore, be still in Prākṛtic bonds till then, can hardly be expected to go beyond him to the Supreme B as their goal[4] For this reason, their goal has to be restricted logically to the Kārya-B (*gatyupapatteh*) This is supported by a special statement in the Śruti too "Tho' he may see the supreme B the Jñānin (other than a Deva) reaches only the four-faced B (during the period of cosmic bondage)" The general statement of the Śruti "the knower of B attains the Supreme (*Taitt Up* ii 1) has, therefore, to be understood in the sense that ere long after attaining the Kārya-B (first) the Jñānin will be going to the supreme B For it is but reasonable to understand the general statement in a restricted sense in the light of a more specific statement quoted above from the *Kausārava Śruti* The general statement need not, therefore, be taken to imply that there is no reaching of the Kārya-Brahman at all by the Jñānin or that only the supreme B is reached first

It may, however, be objected that the explanation "ere long after" is delightfully vague and hides a difficulty Would 'ere long' be after Mahāpralaya or during Mahāpralaya? If after, the Jñānins being yet in the bonds of Prakṛti cannot hope to reach the supreme B For it is only after the complete snapping of all bonds of Prakṛti that one can dream of attaining the Supreme B However, if the Jñānins could do so in spite of their being still in the bonds of Prakṛti they could very well have done so much earlier without waiting till Kāryalaya If the Jñānins are to be taken to reach the supreme B soon after reaching the Kārya-B during the time of laya of Kārya-B himself, one may ask what specific evidence there is to think so To these objections, the Pūrvapakṣin comes forward with a suitable reply in Sūtra 10 —

'The Jñānin goes to the supreme B, (*Param*) during Mahāpralaya (*kāryātyaye*) when the entire world of effects is refunded into its cause, along with the erstwhile lord of the world of effects (*tadadhyakṣena saha*)—viz the Kārya B himself, and thro' him (*atah*)"

The expression 'tadadhyakṣeṇa' in the Sūtra indicates that as Hiraṇyagarbha holds his high office of being 'Kāryādhyakṣa' at the pleasure

4 [illegible] नियम (*NV* iv 4 adhi 6)

of the Supreme B.,[5] his own goal after the cessation of his cosmic responsibility is the Supreme B. itself and that, therefore, he would naturally take the Jñānins, who have in the meantime come up to him, to their highest goal.

The difficulty pointed out earlier that as the Jñānins would still be subject to the bonds of Prakṛti till Brahmalaya[6] and will not, therefore, be free to move up to the Supreme B. will not arise now for the Jñānins become completely rid of their Prākṛtic bonds at the time of Mahāpralaya, thro' the liquidation of their Liṅgaśarīras—when they cross the Virajā river. This dispensation has the authority of the Smṛti:

> ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे।
> परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ॥

The second Pūrvapakṣa is ascribed to Jaimini, according to which the Jñānin is led by Mukhya-Prāṇa directly to the Supreme B. For the expression "B" in the promissory statement 'Brahmavid āpnoti param' primarily denotes the Supreme B. The difficulties raised against this position in the first Pūrvapakṣa are brushed aside in this view as of no account because of the prime and fundamental fact that it is the supreme B. that has been the chief objective of the entire discipline of arduous Sādhanas like sravana, manana, nididhyāsana and Guṇopasaṃhāra, undertaken by the Jñānin from the very beginning and the context of the Aparokṣajñāna attained by him, as it has been defined earlier (Sūtra 13), and also because so far as the Kārya-B. is concerned, there has been, on the Jñānin's part, no such protracted Upāsanā *(pratipatti)* of Him nor any burning desire or special motive *(abhisandhi)* to attain Him.

The second Pūrvapakṣa is thus totally hostile to the tradition which looks upon (some of) the Aparokṣajñānins going in the first place to Hiraṇyagarbha as a stepping stone to their reaching the Supreme B. as their ultimate goal—a tradition which finds clear acceptance in some of the Upaniṣads and the Smṛtis and is not so untenable as it has been sought to be made out by the second Pūrvapakṣa.

The third Pūrvapakṣa tries to dismiss as equally untenable the attempt at finding a synthesis between the positions of Bādari and Jaimini. It argues: Since one and the same Jñānin cannot possibly be taken to go to the Kārya-B. and the Supreme B. at the same time, the only possible way out would be to hold that some Jñānins go to the Kārya-

5 निमित्तमात्रमीशस्य विश्वसर्गनिरोधयोः । हिरण्यगर्भः शर्वश्च कालाख्यारूपिणस्तव (*Bhāg.* x. 71. 8)

6 प्रारब्धकर्मशेषस्तु विरजातरणावधि. For 'Virajā' see *Kauṣ. Up.* i. 4.

B. and some others to the Supreme B. *in the first place.* But the difficulty in holding such a view would be in explaining whether there is any definite order (*krama*) in reaching both or whether it takes place at random. If there is an orderly attainment of both it will have to be clarified if the order is governed by the fitness of the Jñānins or is left to their convenience or fancy.[7] As all Jñānins are on the same par, there is no question of any difference of fitness among them. At the same time, the attainment of the summum bonum of life cannot be left to one's fancy or convenience. It must be regulated by some law.

Siddhānta

Bādarāyaṇa's own view is given Sūtra 15. It resolves the apparent conflict between the views of Bādari and Jaimini by offering a rational and authentic solution of the problem:

अप्रतीकालंबनान् नयतीति बादरायणः उभयथा च दोषात् तत्क्रतुश्च[8] (iv.3.15)

by making use of the distinction of Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas among Jñānins for purposes of orderly attainment of the goal. It points out that an acceptance of both the alternatives, that all Jñānins go to the Kārya-B. *or* the Supreme B. *in the first instance* is exposed to the defects to which each, taken singly, is open. The best way to avoid this is to admit a well-ordered distinction of Jñānins into Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas. Pratikālambanas are those who attain Aparokṣajnāna of B. only in their bodies by meditation on the Lord's forms (Avatars and manifestations)or Pratīkas or symbols selected for meditation such as the mind, and other senses or external symbols like 'nāma', as defined in iv.1.4 as seats of divine presence.[9] Apratīkālambanas are those who are in a position to envision B. in its pervasive aspect (*vyāptadṛṣṭayaḥ*). They do not require the help of any medium or symbols in their meditation or envisioning. Their number is limited to a hundred among the gods, a hundred of Ṛṣis, Gandharvas and Kings. All these are invested with special offices in cosmic government.[10] The

7. तृतीयपक्षेऽपि एकस्योभयप्राप्त्यसंभवात् कश्चित् कार्यं कश्चित् परमित्ययं स्यात् । तत्र किं केनचित् क्रमेणोभयप्राप्तिरुत क्रम विनव, क्रमेऽपि कश्चिद्योग्यतास्य तदन्यो वेति संदेह (*TP.* iv 3 7)

8 The expression 'tatkratuh' refers to *Brh Up* iv 4 5. It answers the Pūrvapakṣa contention that the Jnanin may go either to Kārya-B. or the Supreme B. according to his desire or convenience and not on account of "fitness" (*yogyata*). See fn. 12.

9 प्रतीक देह उद्दिष्ट येषां तत्रैव दर्शनम् । न तु व्याप्ततया क्वापि प्रतीकालम्बनास्तु ते ॥

fn. 10 on p. 739

10. अप्रतीका देवतानां ऋषीणां शतमेव हि । राज्ञां च शतमुद्दिष्ट गन्धर्वादिगत तथा ॥
एतेऽधिकारिणो व्याप्तदर्शनेऽन्ये न तु क्वचित् ॥ (M. *BSB* iv 3 15)
अन्तःप्रकाशा बहिःप्रकाशा सर्वप्रकाशाः । देवा वाव सर्वप्रकाशा ऋषयोऽन्तःप्रकाशा. मनुष्याश्च बहिःप्रकाशा
(*Caturvedaśikhā* Q. M. *BSB.* iv 3 16)

Pratikālambanas having attained Aparokṣa in their bodies, as explained above, making their exist thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi and travelling along Devayāna are led to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha by the Vaidyuta-Puruṣa (*B. S.* iv.3.6). There they tarry continuing their Upāsanā and enriching their knowledge and depleting their Prārabdhakarma till the beginning of Mahāpralaya. When Mahāpralaya begins, all of them dip in the Virajā river along with Hiraṇyagarbha who has already relinquished his gross body in the Supreme. *With their Liṅgaśarīras* dissolved in the Virajā river, in company with Hiraṇyagarbha they enter the Supreme B. in the Muktaloka and remain there till the end of Mahāpralaya, in meditation and at the beginning of cosmic creation again they emerge in the fulness of their enjoyment of Svarūpānanda moving about in company with other released souls at their pleasure and in blissful communion with the Supreme B. wherever they choose to be.

The Apratīkālambanas go directly to the presence of the Supreme B. in the Amuktavaikuṇṭha region.[11] They remain there till the beginning of Mahāpralaya. During Mahāpralaya they get their Liṅgaśarīras dissolved in the Virajā river along with Hiraṇyagarbha and the Pratīkālambanas and go up to the Supreme Being and enter it remaining in a state of meditation till the end of Mahāpralaya. At the beginning of Cosmic creation again they emerge in all the glory and fulness of their released state, sporting themselves in the company of fellow Muktas and moving about unfettered as they please.

This way of explaining both the Pratīkālambanas and the Apratīkālambanas reaching both Hiraṇyagarbha and the Supreme B. avoids *the difficulties arising from an exclusive acceptance of either of the* two Pūrvapakṣas as final. The point is that there is no authority to hold that no Jñānin goes to Hiraṇyagarbha at all in the first instance or that all Jñānins go only to Hiraṇyagarbha in the first instance. The objection that these Jñānins are still in the bonds of Prakṛti, however tenuous such bondage, and that, therefore, they are not entitled to go to the Supreme B. has to be disallowed in the case of Apratīkālambanas, in the light of special evidence recognizing their sojourn in the Amuktavaikuṇṭha region in the presence of the Supreme B. itself till they have their Liṅgaśarīras dissolved during Mahāpralaya in the Virajā river along with the Pratīkālambanas who have sojourned in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, till then.

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11 King Parīkṣit, the Mahābhāgavata, is cited as an example of an eminent Apratīkālambana-Jnānin going up directly to Amuktavaikunṭhasthāna:

स वै महाभागवत. परीक्षित्येनापवर्गाख्यमदभ्रबुद्धिः ।
ज्ञानेन वैयासकिशब्दितेन भेजे खगेन्द्रध्वजपादमूलम् ॥ (*Bhāg.* i 18 17)

As the term 'Brahman' has to be accommodated in a secondary sense (of Hiranyagarbha) when there is need for it, there is no difficulty in understanding the text 'Sa enān brahma gamayati', accordingly so far as the Pratīkālambanas are concerned Those who go to Hiranyagarbha in the first instance, it should be remembered, have indeed carried out earnest Upāsanā of him, also as directed in the Angāvabaddhādhikaraṇam (iii 3 57-58)

The views of Bādari and Jaimini are not really in conflict if understood in the light of their resolution from the point of 'adhikārabheda' in terms of Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas formulated by Bādarāyana in his synthesis embodied in Sūtra iv 3 15 Viewed in the light of Bādarāyana's resolution of their apparent conflict of views, both the orders of Jñānins will be seen to intersect at the point of Hiranyagarbha in their progress to B in one sense and both meet again at the final point of the Supreme B The attainment of the Kārya-B or the Supreme B in the first instance is thus based on their Yogyatā and is not left to their convenience or fancy (as contended by the Pūrvapakṣa) The Śrutis make it clear that it is their Yogyatā as expressed thro' the Upāsanās and Karma that governs their reaching the Kārya-B or the Supreme B in the first place as indicated above[12]

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to include Sūtras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikarana as has been done by M and R Without including Sūtras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikarana and as embodying the Siddhānta, the views attributed to Bādari and Jaimini would, to all intents and purposes, be at daggers drawn—each holding its own ground with its own set of arguments and not yielding an inch of the ground to the other To terminate the *adhi.* with Sūtra 14 as has been done by S—would thus lead to a "draw" and a deadlock which would be highly inconsistent with the role of the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as a 'Nirṇāyakaśāstra"

Śamkara's Interpretation

S splits Sūtras iv.3 7-16 into two adhi s—the Kāryādhi (iv.3 7-14) and the Apratīkālambanādhi (iv 3 15-16) R, M and Baladeva treat all the ten Sūtras as one adhi Apart from this, S turns the last three Sūtras (12-14) into Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtras and the first five (7-11) into Siddhānta because it is inconvenient for him to follow the estab-

12. न च 'यत्रास्तुमभिवाञ्छति तत्राप्नोति' इति वचनात् इच्छानुसारेण प्राप्तिः न तु क्रमणेति वाच्यम्। 'स [illegible] भवति' इति श्रुतौ [illegible] । न [illegible] (TP iv 3 15)

lished practice of the Sūtrakāra to give the objector's view first and then state the Siddhānta view demolishing the Pūrvapakṣa This arbitrary changing of the usual, normal and established order of the places of the Pūrvapaksa and Siddhānta Sūtras is dictated by his desire to find confirmation in the Sūtrakāra's system, for the distinction introduced by him between the socalled higher and lower knowledge and Vidyās—the Saguna and Nirguna—the knower of the Saguna Vidyā being ineligible to attain the Supreme B has to be put down as attaining the Kārya-B or Hiraryagarbha This underlines another important fact that the whole scheme of Utkrānti and Devayāna dealt with in Pādas 2 and 3 applies only to the knower of Saguna-B who is not entitled to attain the Nirguna-B

It is of course impossible for S to agree with the view of Jaimini as stated in Sutras 12-14 and firmly placed *after* concluding the arguments in favor of Bādari's view and at the vantage point as spelling out the Siddhānta, in accordance with the usual and established practice, that *the knower of Saguna-B* who has had his exit thro' Suṣumnānādi-and completed his journey thro' Devayāna *attains Para-B* To accept such a position of Jaimini here as the Siddhānta of this adhi would shatter to its foundations, the entire edifice of distinction between the higher and lower Vidyās so assiduously built up by S at such pains, so far He has, therefore, taken the only course open to him of cutting the Gordian knot by *refusing to be bound by the established procedure* of accepting the preceding Sūtras as representing the Pūrvapakṣa and the following ones (12-14) as the Siddhānta This reminds us of another instance of the Ānandamayādhi (i 1 12-19) where he has set aside the actual position of the Sūtrakāra proclaiming B to be Ānandamaya as it runs counter to his own conception of B as Nirguna and Nirviśeṣa But what passes understanding is why the knower of Saguna-B of S's conception, should be despatched to the world of Kārya B or Hiraṇya garbha who is by no means the same as the Saguna-B but much below it in philosophical status No modern scholar seems to have paid adequate attention to this point in dealing with S's interpretation This shows that the bifurcation of B into Saguna and Nirguna has no *locus standi* in the Sūtrakāra's system in which there is place only for the theological concept of Hiranyagarbha as bridging the gulf between Samsāra and Mokṣa—i e embodied life and deliverance from it thro' the grace of B

While transposing the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta Sūtras, S observes that "following the convention that the preceding Sūtras represent the Pūrvapaksa and the following ones the Siddhānta, *other commentators* have interpreted the scriptural texts relating to the exit and

journey of the Jnānin as referring only to the attainment of the highest B This is not reasonable"[13] This confirms it that all Pre-Śamkara commentators on the Sūtras had adhered to the existing order of the Sūtras in respect of the situation of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhanta here, and that S's innovation was unknown to any of them However that may be, the question remains unanswerable as to why, if the Sūtrakāra did really believe in the two-Vidyā theory of S, he did not take the initiative of placing the five Sūtras representing Bādari's view where they ought to have been placed—*after* Sūtras 12-14, instead of leaving it to S. or anybody else to make the emendation! The fact that he did not do so himself is sufficient proof that the rearrangement suggested by S is his own *tour de force* which cannot claim the acquiescence of the Sūtrakāra

Śamkara's Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa, according to S, argues that the Śruti 'Sa enān brahma gamayati' speaks of the Jiva's being led to Para-B itself and not to the Kārya-B as it is the Para-B that is denoted by the primary sense of the term "B" The use of the term "B" in the neuter confirms this as the Kārya-B is denoted by the use of masculine gender of the word. The attainment of immortality mentioned in the texts is not consistent with the attainment of Kārya-B who himself is subject to Laya The passages like 'I enter the hall of Prajāpati the house' (*Chan Up.* viii 14 1) cannot have the Kārya-B for its object as the immediately preceding sentence—'that within which these names and forms are is B the immortal, the self' is contextually connected with Para-B The plural "brahmalokeṣu" can be explained as resting on grammatical usage without prejudice to the attainment of Para-B and the term brahmaloka itself can be figuratively understood as in 'Brahmaiva lokah'.

Śamkara's Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is—It is only prior to having had the intuitive perception of the purport of 'Tat tvam asi' that it is possible to speak of the Jnānin limited by the adjuncts of Avidyā, Karma and Vāsanas tho' in truth unlimited, and looking upon himself as different from the worlds around tho' not really different from them, as going thro' the worlds of arcis etc, which are deemed to be different from him and journeying thro' them But for one who has had the intuitive experi-

13 केचित् पुन पूर्वाणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्ति उत्तराणि सिद्धान्तसूत्राणीति व्यवस्थामनुरुध्यमाना परविषया एव गतिश्रुती प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति, तदनुपपन्नम्। (S *BSB* iv 3 14)

ence of the non-dual B. and from whom the delusive appearance of the world of multiplicity has fled, there is no question of going anywhere, no movement nor any one leading him towards any other place or object. Then all talk of going, goal and leading forth to such a goal subsides and ceases to be meaningful. Therefore, in conformity with the several identity texts cited in the Bhāṣya and for sound reasons against the very possibility of any coming or going to B., the term B. being incapable of denoting the Para-B. in its primary sense as the object or goal to be reached by the journey thro' Devayāna, has to be understood in the figurative sense of the lower one which is in proximity to the higher one (*samīpyāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ*). The plural 'brahmalokeṣu' can readily be explained with reference to the Kārya-B. whose domains have many parts, while Para-B. being partless, the plural cannot be properly accounted for. The word "loka" being current in the sense of *territories like the continent of Ilāvṛta where one could enjoy life* cannot be construed in the sense of "light" identified with Para-B. For these reasons, it follows that the *venerable* Bādari is right and *Jaimini has gone wrong.*[14]

Criticism

Utkrānti and gati have already been negatived of the knower of Para-B. in the Pratiṣedhādhikaraṇam (iv.2.12-14) according to S.'s interpretation. It is, therefore, redundant to negative it over again with great flourish with reference to the attainment of Para-B. in almost identical terms.[15]

The views put forward in the preceding Sūtras of an adhi. cannot be treated as Siddhānta as it is against the accepted principle that the Pūrvapakṣa comes first and the Siddhānta follows. Even where an adhi. begins with the pronouncement of the Siddhānta, as it may sometimes do, it is always concluded with the affirmation or reinforcement of the Siddhānta and is never terminated with the Pūrvapakṣa views holding the field.[16]

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14 अद्वैतब्रह्मतत्वसाक्षात्कारवतस्तु विगलितनिखिलप्रपचावभासविभ्रमस्य न गन्तव्य, न गति न गमयितार इति किं केन सगतम् ? तस्मादुपन्यस्तबहुश्रुत्यनुरोधादुपपत्तेश्च ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽसभवन्मुख्यवृत्ति· ब्रह्मसामीप्यादपरब्रह्मणि लक्षणया नेतव्य । तथा च लोकेष्विति बहुवचनोपपत्ति कार्यब्रह्मलोकस्य । परस्य त्वनवयवतया तद्वारेणाप्यनुपपत्ति । लोकत्व चेलावृतादिवत् भोगभूमौ निरूढ न कथचित् योगेन प्रकाशे व्याख्यात भवति । तस्मात् साधुदर्शी भगवान् बादरिः, असाधुदर्शी जैमिनिः इति सिद्धम् (*Bhāmatī* iv 3 8-14)

15 न च ब्रह्मविद सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकामकर्मण उत्क्रान्ति गतिर्वोपपद्यते । निमित्ताभावात् (S) अद्वैतपरिभावनाभुवः प्रसख्यानेन निर्मृष्टनिखिलप्रपचावभासजातस्य गन्तव्याभावादेव नास्ति गतिरित्याह (*Bhāmatī* iv 2 14)

16 See Phalādhikaranam (iii 2 38-41) and Liṅgabhūyastvādhi (iii 3 44-52) of S

The reference to Bādari is no proof of his views being the Siddhānta for there is also a reference to Jaimini by name in the same adhi Why should we not accept the latter's view as the Siddhānta particularly when it is in consonance with the principle of arrangement of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta in an adhi? It is arbitrary to denigrate Jaimini as wanting in judgment and belaud Bādari as a knower of the truth (see f n. 14) S has brought up several antinomies against the possibility of 'gati' in respect of Para-B "Nothing can go to Para-B as it is omnipresent and eternal like ether, the self of everything and it is altogether impossible that it should ever be the goal of any going How can we go to what is already reached? Experience tells us that a person can go to something different from himself As B is without parts and states of being, it cannot be attained in the sense in which a boy attains manhood To be able to go to B he who goes—the Jīvātman—must be either different from B or be a part of it or its effect No going can take place if the two are identical. The part is already in the whole and there is no need for it to go to it The relation of part and whole is also inapplicable to B and Jīva For the same reason, Jīva cannot be an effect of B as the cause is also already reached and contained in the effect As B is unchanging, the entering into Samsāra cannot be accounted for if the soul is a part or an effect of B If different, the soul should either be atomic in size or infinite or of some intermediate magnitude If the last, it will be impermanent. If infinite, it cannot go anywhere If atomic it cannot experience sensations from all over the body If the soul is different from B the 'Tattvam asi' text will be falsified The difficulties pointed out cannot be got over by holding that the part and the effect are not different from the whole or the causal stuff That sort of oneness cannot be true oneness On all the three points of view, it will turn out that the Soul will never be able to attain final Mokṣa For, its state of bondage will never come to an end. If it does come to an end, it will entail the loss of the Soul's very being, in so far as it is not admitted that the Para-B itself constitutes the self or essence of the Jīvātman"

The question of giving a Lākṣaṇikārtha to "B" in "Sa enān brahma gamayati" as referring to Kārya-B will arise only after it is conclusively established that the knower of (Saguna)-B goes only to the Kārya-B and *not* to the Para-B in any circumstance Tho' B is doubtless present everywhere, the Śruti says the Jnānin frees himself from Avidyā only on having gone to some particular place Just as the origination of true knowledge depends on the fulfilment of certain propitious conditions of birth, āsrama, religious duty, ceremonial purity, time, place and so on, the final realization of the highest knowledge

which implies the destruction of Avidyā may likewise depend on the Jnānin's going to some particular place If, as the Śruti has it, the Jnānin has to wait for some time after attaining Jnāna (*Chān. Up* vi 14 2) it is not unreasonable to expect him to be bound by a similar condition in regard to place The destruction of Lingaśarīra is a necessary step in the unfoldment of one's Svarūpa after Aparoksa *That* the Śrutis tell us is brought about only at a definite stage and plane of existence One has, therefore, to submit to these conditions which are part of the cosmic order The wording of *Mund Up* iii 2 6 leaves no room for doubt that ascetics of the highest order who have ascertained the purport of the Vedānta and have purified themselves by complete renunciation of the three yearnings go to dwell in the world of Hiranyagarbha and then become immortal when all are liberated

The antinomies with which "gati" has been shown to be riddled will have to be faced and overcome even if such Gati is restricted to the sphere of Apara Vidyā For the Saguna B is also, by hypothesis, all-pervasive (p 671) It will, therefore, be self-contradictory to single out Gati in respect of Para-Vidyā for such criticism It will be of no use to defend Gati in the case of Aparavidyā on the plea that such Gati would after all be unreal (*mithyā*) The all-pervasiveness of Ātman or the Saguna-B would still come in the way of Gati It will not help to take shelter under the argument that only real movement (gati) will be inconsistent with the Ātman's vibhutva and not unreal gati The ascertainment of logical concomitance between a not-all-pervasive entity and real movement cannot be verified in the absence of a proper illustration No such illustration will be available to the Mithyātvavādin to whom all movement is illusory The antinomy in regard to the Jīvātman's atomicity is subject to the same limitations of reasoning See also Vol II p 228

The plural 'brahmalokesu' can suitably be explained in relation to the Supreme B also as many regions of Muktilokas have been referred to in the Śāstras The text 'Prajāpates sabhām vesma prapadye' (*Chān Up* viii 14 1) cannot be explained as referring to the world of Hiranyagarbha because it reports the Jnānin's *intuitive experience of* the attainment of Sarvātmabhāva and eradication of all Avidyā which in S's Siddhānta must be connected with the attainment of Para-B alone Moreover, in the section immediately preceding this reference to 'Prajāpates sabhām vesma prapadye' we have a clear reference to Brahmaloka as the uncreated world *akrtam*) and the Jnānin's reach-

ing it after shaking off all evil like a horse his hairs and his body like the moon freeing itself from the jaws of Rāhu [17]

Since certain logical objections have been raised against the acceptance of either of the positions of Bādari and Jaimini in the course of the Sūtras themselves, one would expect both of them to be rejected as equally untenable, if the conflict of views cannot be otherwise reconciled If there is a reconciliation, it needs must be placed at the end of the statement of the two rival positions and counted as part of the same adhi—which S has *not* chosen to do To take sides with the one as against the other when both are deficient in some respects is not a correct procedure If Sutra 15-16 are read as part of this adhi the way to a suitable reconciliation can be found. To detach Sūtras 15-16 from the previous adhi on the ground that while the subject matter of dispute between Bādari and Jaimini is the identity of the "B" to be reached (*gantavya*), Sutras 15-16 deal with the question of the gantṛ (goer) is rather artificial. For the order of disposition of the Sutras representing the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta (according to S) being highly unconventional and against the norm and the Sūtrakāra's preference is being left to be understood from the obiter dicta of the commentator alone—which is again most extraordinary, in a Nirnāyaka Śāstra—logical consistency requires us to look for the much-desired resolution of the conflict of views in what follows—viz. Sūtras 15-16 When the views of Bādari and Jaimini have been placed on equally firm ground as it appears from their Guṇa-Sūtras, the inquiry has by the sheer force of its inner dialectic to be treated as a three-faced one Looked at from the right perspective, Sutra 15 which tells us which of the Adhikārins are led to which of the two Brahmans (Kārya and Para) as their goal (*gantavya*) would seem to be the natural consummation of the inquiry into gantavya and gantṛ taken together Moreover, when Sūtra 15 tells us that 'Puruṣo mānavah' "leads" Apratīkālambanas, the reference is not merely to the gantṛ but to the goal (*gantavya*), for without making clear where the Apratīkālambanas are led, they will be left in doubt and in the lurch. As the words 'apratīkālambanām nayati' of Sutra 15, follow 'Param Jaiminih' by two removes and immediately after 'Na kārye pratipattyabhisandhih', it can be seen without difficulty that the object of the sentence 'Apratīkālambanām nayati' is Param-Brahma. In consequence, the others—the Pratīkālambanas will have to be understood to go to Kārya-B in the first instance as provided in the Srutis Thus, the ten Sūtras taken together can be

17 अश्व इव रोमाणि विधूय पापं चन्द्र इव राहोर्मुखात् प्रमुच्य ।
धूत्वा शरीरमकृतं कृतात्मा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्भवामि (*Chān. Up* viii 13 1)

devoted to an exhaustive discussion of the triple Pūrvapakṣa as explained by M and coordinated into a single antarbhedādhikarana properly synthesized in terms of the gradation of Jnānins into Pratīkālambanas and Apratīkālambanas.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

Between R and M. there is agreement only in so far as both are in favor of including Sutras 15-16 as part of the Kāryādhikaraṇam R, however, dismisses the Pratīkālambanas as *not* entitled to be led to Para-B whereas M holds that while the Apratīkālambanas are led in the first instance to Para-B the Pratīkālambanas are in the first instance led by the 'Puruṣo mānavah' to Hiraṇyagarbha, whence subsequently they go to Para B as provided The difference between R and M. turns upon the interpretation of "Pratīkālambanas". We have seen what the term means to M. (p. 738)

According to R. the question discussed in this adhi. is whether the Ativāhikas lead to Para B., only those who have meditated upon the Kārya-B (Hiraṇyagarbha); or only those who have meditated on Para-B or both those who have meditated on Para-B. *and others who have meditated on the Jīvātman as having Para-B for its self and as different from Prakrti* This is he Triśiraskvicāra referred to by the *Śrutaprakāśa.*

The Siddhānta is that only Apratikālambanas are led by the Ātivāhikas thro' Devayāna The term Apratīkālambana has been defined by R. in such a way as would include (i) those who meditate only on Para-B and (ii) those who meditate on the Jīvātman *also* as different from Prakrti and as having Para-B for its true self or ruler (*ātmā*) [18] "Pratīkālambanas as defined by him are those who meditate on the intelligent self (*cidvastu*) or Jīvātman, either as mixed up with Acit (insentient matter) or on pure Acit under the aspect of "B" (*brahmadrsṭyā*) or as separated from B altogether [19]

Criticism

It is difficult to see how the meditation on Hiranyagarbha can be brought under the terms of the above definition of 'Pratīkālambanas'

18 अप्रतीकालवना सर्वज्ञ सवकारण सत्यसक्ल्प निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीक अनवधिकातिशयानन्दस्वरूप ब्रह्मोपासते ये ते । ये च, आत्मान भूतसूक्ष्मै सपरिष्वक्त सर्वत्र वर्तमान भूतसूक्ष्मव्यतिरिक्त ज्ञानैकस्वरूप नित्य निर्विकार, 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिनावगतब्रह्मात्मभाव पचाग्निविद्योदितमुपासते (*Vedantadipa* iv 3 14)

19 प्रतीकालवनास्तु–अचिन्मिश्र केवलमचिद्वस्तु च 'सिहो देवदत्त' इतिवत् ब्रह्मदृष्टया, स्वरूपेण वा तद्वस्तु य उपासते ते (*ibid*)

and consequently denied being led to Para-B on that account Under the terms of Sūtra 8 (of R) it is clear that those who meditate on Hiranyagarbha do so with the full awareness of his being the "first born" of B and, therefore, "Parabrahmātmaka" or having Para-B as his (Hiranyagarbha's) ruling self Such meditation of Hiranyagarbha cannot, therefore, be consigned to the category of Pratīkopāsanā or as an Abrahmātmaka type of upāsanā as defined by R

In deference to *Brh Up* vi 2 15 the Pañcāgnividyopāsakas also have to be admitted to be led to Para-B by the Ātivāhikas thro' Devayāna R , therefore, brings them under the category of Apratīkālambanas by placing them in it as meditators on Jivātman as distinct from the material essences of the bhūtasūkṣmas (tejo'banna) and has having Para B as their ruling self He explains that Pañcāgnividyā implies the acceptance of these distinctions and details[20] S on the other hand allows the Pañcāgnividah to be led thro' Devayāna to Para-B on the exclusive authority of the Śruti as a special case[21]

R has subdivided Apratikalambanas into two categories, those who meditate on Para B and those who meditate on Jivātman as different from Prakrti and as having Para-B as his own self or ruler This overlooks the fact that no such abstraction of "Para B" as such from its bodies or prakāras of cit and acit is theoretically or practically possible in R's concept of ever ' Visiṣṭa Brahman"

S and R are both agreed on defining Pratīkālambanas as those who meditate on name, vāk, manas āditya and other symbols (*pratīkas*) as B and denying them the right to exit thro' Brahmanādi and of being led by the Ātivāhikas thro Devayāna, to Para B

This summary disposal of Pratīkopāsakas as unfit to go to Para B is based on a misconception of the true nature of Pratikopāsana as taught and recognised in the Śrutis In the opinion of S and R Pratikopāsanas taught in the Upaniṣads are all grounded in superimposition of B or the idea of B on the inanimate symbols like nāma, vāk, manas

20 अप्रतीकालम्बनाः प्रत्यगात्मानं भूतसूक्ष्मव्यतिरिक्तं य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् इत्यादिनावगतब्रह्मात्मभावं पञ्चाग्निविद्यानिष्ठमुपासते (R *Vedāntadīpa*)
While the distinction of Jiva from bhutasukṣamas may be taken to be implicit in the Pancagnividya passage (*Brh Up* vi 2 13 14) his Brahmatmakatva in R s sense cannot be traced in them That is why R himself relies here on *Brh Up* iii 7 23 (*Madhyandina*) for it

21 न च ब्रह्मक्रतुरपि ब्रह्म गच्छतीति श्रूयते यथा पञ्चाग्निविद्यायां स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयतीति। भवतु यत्रैवमाहत्यवाद उपलभ्यते। तदभावे त्वौत्सर्गिकेण ब्रह्मक्रतूनामेव तत्प्राप्तिर्नेतरेषामिति गम्यते (S *BSB* iv 3 15)
भवतु पञ्चाग्निविद्यायामब्रह्मक्रतूनामपि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिर्वचनात्। किमिव हि वचनं न कुर्यात्? नास्ति वचनस्यातिभारः। इह तु तदभावान्नामादिविषयवचनाभावान्नेत्युच्यते (*Bhamati* iv 3 15)

āditya and so on This is doing poor justice to the spiritual insights of the Ṛṣis who have given these vidyās to posterity Pratīkopāsanas as understood by the Ṛsis is intuiting the presence of Para-B in every object chosen for meditation according to one's mental calibre We have this conception articulated in thrilling terms in such ageless utterances as

> एत ह्येव बहृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते, एतमग्नावध्वर्यव एत महाव्रते छन्दोगा एतमस्यामेत दिवि एत वायौ एतमाकाशे, एतमप्सु एतमोषधीषु * * सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते (*AA* iii 2 3)

> य. पृथिव्या तिष्ठन् पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति यो अप्सु * यस्तेजसि, यो वायौ, य आकाशे यो दिवि, य आदित्ये, यो दिक्षु यश्चन्द्रतारके, यस्तमसि य सर्वेषु भूतेषु य प्राणे यो वाचि, यश्चक्षुषि यो मनसि, यस्त्वचि, यो विज्ञाने, य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् * * एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्यामी
> (*Brh Up* iii 7)

It would be a travesty of the truth to reduce such upāsanās to deliberate superimpositions of the aspect of B on some lifeless symbols We have already dwelt on the inward significance of Pratīkopāsana acceptable to the Śrutisiddhānta in the Na pratīkādhikaranam (iv 1 4)

The objection that in propositions like 'Nāma brahmetyupāste' the prominence goes to the symbol and not to B and that, therefore, such upāsanās cease to be "tatkratus" has already been answered by explaining that the appositional form of the predication is to be understood in the light of the grammatical idiom of mystic utterances (saptasu prathamā) It is also open to us to keep in tact the prominence of B in such Vidhis by reversing the order of the subject and predicate as we do in respect of the mahavākya 'Aham brahma asmi' in S's parlance

It is worthwhile to consider where is the need to resort to a superimposition of B or the idea of B in the Pratīka chosen for meditation when as a matter of fact and in reality Para-B is factually present in everything including the Pratika! The purpose of upāsanā is to be able to realize this truth by personal experience and not merely by intellectual conviction If the upāsanās of the entities like nāma, vāk, manas mentioned in the 'Nāmadi-prānānta' series are *not* 'Brahmopāsanās' in point of fact understood in its essteric sense of 'Upāsanārahasya',

the Upanisads would not have cared to propagate them in all seriousness and would have censured them as they have censured the performance of Kāmya Karmas. As the Pratīkopāsaka meditates only on B. thro' the medium of Pratīkas there should be no difficulty whatever in allowing him to go along Devayāna.

Moreover, we see from the *Kausītaki Up.* that the world of Kārya-B. (Hiranyagarbha) also is reached by going thro' Devayāna, guided by the 'Ātivāhikas':

स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमापद्याग्निलोकमागच्छति, स वायुलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स इन्द्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोकं स ब्रह्मलोकम् (1.3)

The Brahmaloka which is the last to be reached in this series, thro' Devayāna, is indubitably that of Hiraṇyagarbha or the Kārya-B. This should be clear not only from the mention of the river Virajā in this context[22] but also from the reference to "Brahmā" in the masculine gender[23] which is inapplicable to Para-B. The evidence of *Kaus. Up* (1.3) clinches the issue that those who go to the world of Kārya-B. or Hiraṇyagarbha have as much right to go by Devayānamārga (conducted by S's Ātivāhikas) as others who go to Para-B. Looking to the position of Pañcāgnividyāvidah, the contention of R thus falls to the ground that the journey thro' Devayāna conducted by the Ātivāhikas is reserved only for Apratīkālambanas who are led only to Para-B.

A correct appraisal of Pratīkopāsanā in its pristine form will clear all misunderstandings about its competence to lead the upāsaka to Para-B in the end thro' Devayāna

However, as Sūtra 15 holds that only Apratīkālambanas are led directly to Para-B it follows as its corollary that Pratīkālambanas in the first instance are led to Kārya-B—as the Kārya and Para Brahmanas are the two goals with which the present discussion is concerned. As the two Pūrvapakṣas contend for primacy of attainment to each of them to the exclusion of the other and a third one to either of them optionally, it stands to reason that Bādarāyana has given his ruling in such a way as would fully meet and satisfy the claims of both as recognized by the Śrutis without prejudice to the ultimate goal be-

22. तस्य ह वा एतस्य मास्यारो ह्रदो मुहूर्ता येष्टिहा विरजा नदी इल्या वृक्ष (*Kaus Up* 1 3)

23 न ह्येवंविदमच्छन्ति न ब्रह्मा ह्यभिधावत मम यशसा विरजां नदीं प्रापत् न वाय जरयिष्यतीति (*ibid*)

ing Para-B This can not be done except by defining the terms Pratīkālambana and Apratikālambana from the point of view of the quality and range of the Brahmasākṣātkāra of the different categories of Upāsakas—the Bahirdṛṣtayah and Vyāptadṛṣṭayah according to their fitness

A bird's eye view of the Sūtras in general goes to show beyond doubt that wherever 'Bādarāyaṇa' has been separately mentioned in them it is done invariably with reference to some point of distinction in which his own view marks an advance on or a reconciliation of others' views *in the same adhi* This confirms the position that Sūtras 15-16 here ought to form part of the Kāryādhi itself and should *not* be put into a separate adhi

IV. BHOGA-PĀDA

INTRODUCTION

This last Pāda of the last Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras deals with the subject of enjoyment of the final fruit of Jijñāsā and Aparokṣajñāna of B.—viz. the innate bliss of selfhood by the different orders of Jnānins (Devas and others) who have reached Para-B. in the manner described in the second and third Pādas and who, after remaining in a state of pure contemplation of B. during Mahāpralaya, emerge from it at the time of cosmic creation to an active experience of the fullest measure of their Svarūpānanda which gets full scope then to manifest itself in all its richness and possibilities thro' appropriate means of expression.

If the fruit of Aparokṣajnāna and Mokṣa is the fullest manifestation of one's Svarūpānanda—as it should be—such ānanda must indeed be realized actively and consciously by those who have attained mokṣa. Otherwise, mokṣa will cease to be a 'Puruṣārtha'. For the only proof of the reality of one's knowledge and blissfulness lies in their amenability to be known and experienced as such, by the self.[1]

The concept of bliss (*sukha*) and its experience in mokṣa distinguishes the Vedānta system from all other schools of Indian philosophy like the Sānkhya, Nyāya-Vaiseṣika, Śūnyavāda and absolutism. It is easy enough to see that Nirvāṇa or extinction of personal consciousness as the goal of life fails to offer any satisfactory motive force for Sādhanas. No thoughtful person would wish to extinguish the essence of his self. Even when an utterly frustrated person seeks to end his life,

1 Cf. न ह्यात्मनस्त्वानमद्भावे विविच्यमानम् । सुखादेः ज्ञातैकसत्त्वात्

it is the escape from the bodily life that he is attempting to secure by suicide If such persons are supposed to have no clear notion of the distinction of the body and the soul, it would mean a person who knows their distinction thro' philosophy will never accept the extinction of self as the price of his mokṣa It is *not*, therefore, possible to accept Nairātmyavāda or the doctrine that there is no such thing as the self, soul or Ātman

The intuitive experience of self implicated in the experience of the happy repose of Susupti offers sufficient evidence of the existence of the self which is uncontradicted and uncontradictable To contradict it will need a contradictor and evidence of his existence apart from the body,—leading to a regress

Nor can mokṣa be conceived as the sublation of all (illusory) predications made from the standpoint of illusory experience If the predications are themselves illusory, their sublation will not require any serious programme of Sādhanas to bring it about If an indescribable nescience produces indescribable predications and their appearance, and it is the sublation of these predications that is mokṣa, the question will have to be answered whom the said nescience *affects* If it affects '*an indescribable someone*', that someone too will have to go out of existence, when true knowledge dawns If it affects a real being, the existence and continuation of such a being will have to be accepted If the experience of moksa is to be conceived in terms of "I am without any distinction, character or essence", "I am void", no negation of character to the subject (of which such a negation is predicated) will be possible as some characterization has already entered into the experience and the judgment pronounced about it Nor can it be held that tho' being Nirvisesa or of the essence of void, *there is no experience of its suchness* on the part of the socalled self For, the Absolutist philosopher is rather fond of claiming that the self as pure consciousness—whatever he may mean by it, is ever "self-shining" (*svayambhāta*)

It has, therefore, to be accepted as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta that moksa is not a characterless state of a non-enduring being If being is momentary, it will die a natural death every moment and there is no need to work for it thro' Sādhanas Nor can mokṣa be posited of the aggregation of these momentaries Their aggregation is itself a superimposed idea as the momentaries cannot aggregate to form a unity The Nyāya conception of moksa as the bare cessation of all misery has also to be rejected as lacking in a positive content offering adequate incentive to dynamic effort towards achieving such a goal

We are thus finally led to conceive of mokṣa as a state of positive experience of his own innate blissfulness by the Jivātman, when he rises to the fulness of his spiritual stature and realization of the inner content of his personality, after ridding himself of his Prākṛtic bonds, by the grace of Paramātman. (See M.'s discussion of *'Na pretya samjñā asti'* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv. 5. 13) in his VTN and J. on it).

As 'bhoga' or experience of this state is personal and incommunicable, it is *sui generis* and not uniform. It is *not*, therefore, possible to penetrate into its details. What the Sūtrakāra, therefore, considers it sufficient and necessary in this Pāda is to set forth the evidence of the *presence of such bliss and its experience by the selves*, in the state of mokṣa. The reference to "Bhoga" in the Sūtra 'Bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgācca' (iv. 4. 22) is an *indisputable proof of "bhoga" being the subject matter of this Pāda.*

The question of Muktabhoga does not figure prominently in the discussion of the contents of this Pāda in the commentaries of S., R. and others. It will be seen that Sutras 4-6 which have been understood by M. to discuss the nature and constitution of the bodies with which the released souls may be expected to enjoy the bhogas open to them in mokṣa, have been explained by these commentators as dealing with the essential nature and characteristics with which the souls emerge in release. But even these commentators have been *forced to recognize* that Sutras 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 deal with the question of how the Muktas fulfil their desires with or without the possession of 'bodies' and senses. A little reflection will show that this question so seriously discussed by the Sutrakāra even according to S., R. and others will lose its point and purpose unless the possession of such bodies and senses is deemed to subserve enjoyment of some sort open to them in the state of mokṣa. Without relation to any such *purpose* the discussion whether Muktas have any bodies and senses or not would be reduced to a matter of idle curiosity of which we cannot convict the author of a Nirnāyakaśāstra.

The first question which arises for consideration in regard to Mokṣa will of course be as to why it should be conceived as a state of blissfulness and not as an utter void or extinction of being. This question has been more than answered by what has been said in the Introduction and by the exposition of the Sūtrakāra's system in the preceding Adhyāyas and Pādas and need not detain us here.[2] The next relevant ques-

2 In this connection attention is also invited to Chapters LV and LVI of my *'Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya'*.

tion will be whether there is any basis for the assumption that there is going to be a full manifestation of the soul's innate character of blissfulness in that state to come This question too has been answered by the Sūtrakāra in the Pumstvādhikaranam (ii 3 31-32) by showing how the fullest expression of this blissful nature of the Jīva remains obstructed in the state of Samsāra by Bhāvarūpājñāna and how its removal has to be achieved by the grace of Paramātman What remains now to be considered are such questions as whether the Muktas have appropriate instruments to experience this blissfulness, such as a body and sense organs and if so the nature of composition of these instruments, whether the experience of such 'bhoga' involves much effort, and dependence on means or is spontaneous and effortless,—whether other enjoyments open to the Muktas are independent of B's, whether Muktabhoga is uniform or subject to fluctuations of measure and also Tāratamya according to the Svarūpayogyatā of Muktas, whether they enjoy absolute and unlimited sovereignty of powers including powers of cosmic creation and dispensation or have to acknowledge some established authority or authorities over them and whether,, as in the case of heaven, there is a possibility of their return to Samsāra from Mokṣa *These are dealt with in this Pāda* It is his personal realization of this state of blissfulness and beatitude of Mokṣa by each Mukta-Jīva, that is termed 'bhoga' in this context To translate it by the English word 'enjoyment' fails to do justice to the concept Muktabhoga as it is meant and makes it appear commonplace and hedonic The serious student of the philosophy of religion will not vulgarize supraphenomenal values by evaluating them in the light of ordinary categories of thought and understanding It deserves to be kept in mind that "bhoga" is used here in terms of the doctrine of "analogical senses" It should also be noted that "bhoga" derived from √bhuj to experience, with the suffix 'ghañ' is employed here in its twin senses of an object of experience (karmani ghañanta) and in the radical (bhāve ghañanta) according to the exigencies of the subject matter of the adhikaranas

CHAPTER XCVIII

NO GOING BEYOND BRAHMAN

1 *Sampadyādhikaranam* (iv 4 1)

The first adhi considers whether the Mukta Jīva has his experience of Svarūpānanda and other forms of Bhoga[1] by going beyond B as he has gone beyond the Arcirādidevas and mārga, or by remaining in close vicinity to B[2]

As Para-B has been established to be the final goal of the Muktas, whatever enjoyments they have will have to be realized in close association with their goal and never beyond But there is the Śruti text "This Ātman is the bridge After crossing that bridge, the blind regains his sight, the afflicted ceases to be afflicted" (*Chān Up.* viii 4 1-2).[3] As crossing means going over and beyond, it would appear that Mokṣa which consists in the manifestation of the Soul's innate bliss comes to be experienced only after the Jivātman has crossed over B and gone beyond it[4] That, if true, will de-recognize the fact established in the previous adhi that Para-B is the final goal (*gamyam*) and resting place

1 It may be noted that while the words 'Svena rupena abhinispadyate' in *Chan. Up* refers to the Mukta's enjoyment of Svarūpananda, the latter part of the same Śruti 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamānaḥ' clearly refer to his other forms of sport and enjoyment

2 मुक्तः किं ब्रह्मातिक्रम्य भोगान् भुङ्क्ते, उत समीपे भवति सन्देह । अर्चिरादिवदतिक्रमाभावे [illegible] [illegible] (*TP* iv 4 1)

3 तस्माद्वा एतं सेतुं तीर्त्वा अन्धः सन् अनन्धो भवति, उपतापी सन्ननुपतापी भवति

4 एतं सेतुं तीर्त्वा सन् अनन्धो भवतीति परमात्मातिक्रमानन्तरमेव स्वरूपाविर्भावस्य [illegible] (*TP* iv 1 1)

of all Muktas without a beyond[4a] In the interest of upholding that conclusion established in the Kāryādhi (iv 3 7-16) this difficulty has to be overcome The Sūtrakāra, therefore, makes it clear that the Mukta Jiva does *not* go beyond or cross over B, in order to be able to attain realization of his innate bliss in its fullest measure He has it indeed in the closest vicinity to B and never by leaving B (*avihāya*) to go anywhere else to any other place or goal to find fulfilment of his Svarūpa[5] The Siddhānta points out that it is not correct to conclude *on the basis of 'Etam setum tīrtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' (Chān Up* viii 4 2) that the Jivātman does not become a full-fledged Mukta until and unless he has crossed over and gone beyond Para-B to some higher state or place For, we have the pronouncement in *Chān Up* viii 12 3 that the individual soul emerges in his own true nature and pristine form (svena rūpena abhinispadyate) *only after reaching Para-B* —the Supreme Light (param jyotih)[6] Moreover, the other Śruti 'Etam setum tirtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' does not make sense taken literally, *as it stands* For, it is hardly possible that *after* crossing the bridge, any blindness or illness should occur *to be cured*[7] If to get over this difficulty in interpretation, we should supplement the text by adding that after crossing the bridge of B *one who had been ill (suffering) till then* becomes cured of his disabilities, one may as well interpret it in conformity with another Śruti text which makes it clear that the *crossing is not of B but of the river of Samsāra*

> इमा घोरामशिवा नदीं तीर्त्वा, एत सेतु प्राप्य एतेनैव सेतुना मोदते प्रमोदते, आनन्दीभवति[8] (*Maudgalya Śruti*)

It cannot be said that as both are Śruti *texts, there is no reason to go* by the verdict of this latter one cited above instead of *Chān Up*[9] viii 4 2 For *Chan Up* viii 4 2 does not say anything about the Jīvātman going to any particular place "after crossing this bridge" The *Maudgalya Śruti, on the other hand makes a specific statement that the*

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4 (a) अतो मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मातिक्रमनियमात् न तत गम्यमिति (ibid)

5 स य एव विदेव म चान एव पश्यन आत्मानमभिसपद्य एतेनात्मना यथाकाम सर्वान कामाननुभवति (*Sauparna Śruti* Q M *BSB* iv 4 1)

एतेना मना यथाकाम इति भोगार्थं प्राप्या तराश्रवणात । आ मनति तृतीयया तद्धानाभावस्यैव श्रवणात (*STC*)

6 परज्योतिरुपसवद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यत

7 सेतु तीर्वा ध सन् अन धो भवतीत्यनुपपत्तिश्च नहि सेतुतरणान तर अ धत्व भवति (*STC* iv 4 1)

8 *Having crossed this horrible inauspicious river (of bondage)* and having reached the haven (of the Lord) with it only he finds pleasure rejoicing and blessedness

9 द्वयोरपि श्रुति वाविशपात वैपरीत्य कुतो नत्यतो न्यायविवरणोक्तदिशा ता पयमाह (Ragh *TPB* iv 4 1)

Jnānin, after "crossing this river of transmigration, and coming to this haven of safety (B)" finds complete rest, happiness and bliss in it This specific and definite statement is, therefore, entitled to greater weight than the general statement Accordingly, the statement in *Chān Up* (viii 4 2) about "crossing this bridge" has to be construed in terms of "crossing *some other obstacles*"—viz "the terrible unholy river" of births and deaths, *"in order to reach the haven of safety—viz*[10] *B"*

तत्र तरणं नाम तत्प्राप्तयेऽन्यतरणमेव[11] (M *BSB* iv 4 1)

Thus the conclusion established in the Kāryādhi (iv 3 7-16) that Para-B is the final goal of Jnānins and Muktas remains unshaken Was there a view lurking in some quarters conceiving the highest *state of* the Soul to be one transcending even unison with B which is refuted here by the Sūtrakāra?

Śamkara's Interpretation

Sampadyādhikaranam (iv 4 1-3)

According to S the first Pāda of this Adhyāya describes the destruction of bondage of souls as *part of the fruit* if Nirgunavidyā, the second utkrānti *and absence of utkrānti as subsidiary to the* attainment of the fruits of Saguna and Nirguṇavidyās respectively and the third the path, the goal and the goer in relation to the fruits of Sagunavidyā. The last Pāda deals with the *remaining part* of the fruit of Nirguna vidyā viz, the manifestation of the soul's Brahmanhood *and* the attainment of the fruits of Sagunavidyā consisting in the enjoyment of bhogas and excellences equal to those of the Supreme Lord of all[12]

We read in *Chān Up* viii 12 3, "the serene being having risen out of this body and attained the Param Jyoti (supreme Light) emerges in its own nature" The doubt arises if this means that the self emerges with some adventitious character as does the knower of the Saguna B at a suitable time and place or then and there in its own true form The Purvapakṣa is—what has not been before can be brought into being

10 तरन्ति सामान्यवचनात् ब्रह्म ज्ञात्वा इदं गच्छन्ति विशेषानुक्तेः इमां ग्रामविशेषां नदीं तीर्त्वा ब्रह्म गच्छन्ति इति विशेषोक्तेश्च तत्र सेतुं प्रति अयनात्वा इत्यन्वयात् (M *NV* iv 4 1)

11 This requires the sentence to be split into two and adhyahara of two words etam setum (*gantum anyat*) tirtva, which is justified by reference to the Maudgalya Śruti.

12 आद्ये पादे निर्गुणविद्याफलैकदेशो बन्धनिवृत्तिर्निरूपिता। द्वितीये सगुणनिर्गुणफलप्राप्तिशेषत्वेन तद्विदामुत्क्रान्त्यनुत्क्रान्ती चिन्तिते। तृतीये च सगुणविद्याफलप्राप्तये गतिगन्तव्यगन्तृविशेषा विचारिताः। इह चतुर्थे पादे निर्गुणविद्याफलैकदेशान्तरं ब्रह्मभावाविर्भावः सगुणविद्याफलं च सर्वेश्वरतुल्यभोगभागित्वं समर्थनीयम्

(*Kalpataru* iv 4 1)

never that which is out and out existent like space or the utterly non-existent like the sky-flower. If Mukti is the state of being in one's nature, it cannot be *brought into being* as it is there already. It cannot be said that the negation of bondage is attained thro' Mukti. If such negation is to be brought about by Mokṣa, as a product, bondage will lose its essential character of being fictitious (*tuccha*) such as it is in reality. But as Mokṣa has been recognized to be the fruit of Jñāna and since what is not brought into being cannot be treated as the fruit of anything, it has to be admitted that it is produced in some adventitious form. As this adventitious form also belongs to the same self, it is, by way of a restatement of facts, spoken of as one's "own form" (*svarūpeṇa*).[13]

The Siddhānta is—Mukti is the essential nature of the self freed from all bondage. This cessation of bondage is brought into being. This is established by perception in the same way as the absence of a jar is established by Pratyakṣa. That the existent or the non-existent cannot be produced in the true sense and that all talk of such production is ultimately undemonstrable remains true all the same. The attaiment of Mukti cannot, therefore, be treated as acquisition of any new or adventitious character by the self. From any other point of view the qualification conveyed by the expression "own" form (*svena rūpeṇa*) will have no meaning. It cannot be explained as indicating that the adventitious character which has been acquired is that which manifests itself. For, it will be needless to state it as whatever form it manifests itself in, will naturally be its own form. It will make sense only as denoting the very self thro' whose nature the said manifestation itself takes place and not thro' any other adventitious character.[14].

Criticism

The destruction of Karma which forms part of bondage, discussed in the first Pāda cannot be properly treated as "part" of the fruit of Nirguṇavidyā. From the Advaita point of view, it is not possible to treat the cessation of bondage as taking place part by part. A Vidyā which depends on the destruction of Prārabdhakarma for accomplishing

13 अभूतस्य घटादेर्भवन न पुनरत्यन्तसतोऽसतो वा। न जातु गगनतत्कुसुमे निष्पद्येते। स्वरूपावस्थान चेदात्मनो मुक्ति. न सा निष्पद्येत, तस्य गगनवदत्यन्तमत प्रागसत्वापातात्। न चास्य बन्धाभावो निष्पद्यते। तस्य तुच्छ-स्वभावस्य कार्यत्वेनातुच्छत्वप्रसगात्। फलत्वप्रसिद्धेश्च मोक्षस्यावार्यस्य फलत्वानवकल्पनादागन्तुना रूपेण केनचिदुत्पत्तौ स्वेनेति प्राप्तमनूद्यत इति (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 1)

14 अनधिगतावबोधन हि प्रमाण शाब्दमगत्या क्यचित् अनुवादतया वर्ण्यते। सकलमासारिकधर्मर्पित तु प्रसन्नमात्म-रूपमप्रमन्नात् तस्मादेव रूपात् व्यावृत्तमनधिगतमवबोधयन् नानुवादो युज्यते। न चास्य निष्परयसभव, सत इव घटादे. साव्यवहारिकेण प्रमाणेन बन्धविगमस्यापि निष्पत्तेर्लोकसिद्धत्वात्। विचारामहत्वमिद्धिर-भयत्रापि तुल्या (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 1)

its fruit can hardly be spoken of as Nirgunavidyā A fruit which is adventitious cannot be treated as the fruit of Nirgunavidyā [15]

According to S the first Pāda itself is connected with setting forth part of the fruit of Nirguna Vidyā The Jñānin's coming to be manifested in his true form of Brahmanhood should also have been set forth thereafter instead of being held over till Pāda 4 and letting Pāda 2 discuss the fruit of Sagunavidyā and its subsidiaries of Utkrānti If such matters irrelevant to Nirgunavidyā are to be discussed in Pāda 2, we should expect the fruits of Karma and the 'way of Smoke' (dhūmamārga) also to be discussed in Pāda 2 If it would be irrelevant to discuss the fruits of Karma viz Dhūmamārga in Pāda 2, on account of its inherent incompatibility with Nirgunavidyā, the Sagunavidyā and its fruits of Utkrānti being the home ground of tightening the chains of Samsāra and multiplicity will be equally incompatible with Nirgunavidyā and should not also be discussed in Pāda 2

Pada 3 which in S's interpretation is entirely inconsistent with Nirgunavidyā is also irrelevant to the theme of Phala

The accommodation of Padas 2 and 3 by way of Kramamukti cannot carry any weight or conviction to serious students of Vedānta in so far as Kramamukti (gradual release) is but a fiction of Advaita thought without an actual existence (*vastusattva*) however impermanent such an intermediary stage it may otherwise be deemed to be For S's philosophy can have no truck with any such arrangement where Kramamukti will have an unexpurgated reality of its own, side by side with Sadyomukti if it comes to that This is where the bubble of Kramamukti bursts at the first breath of serious assessment

Granting for argument's sake that Saguṇavidyā may somehow be schematically connected with Nirgunavidya, we should in all fairness and good faith expect to find the great treatise of Bādarāyana on Brahmamimāmsā to be concluded with the supreme fruit of Nirguna realization if that were his Siddhānta Bathetically enough for S we find the great treatise closing with a description of the knower of the Saguna B and the Kramamukta enjoying the excellences and bhogas of the eternally perfect Lord and remaining debarred from the cosmic activities (jagadvyāpāra) of that Lord (iv 4 17)!

Moreover, if mukti, as the cessation of bondage which is to bring into manifestation the self's own form, is to be accomplished by Jñāna

15 Read [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ (*Samkṣepaśārīraka* iv 6)

it will affect its eternal character of not being produced by any set of causes (*asādhya*) as S insists upon having it If that state is thus not caused by Jñāna or other means, it cannot be spoken of as the final fruit of Jñāna in any straight sense of the term If manifestation of the self's own nature is identical with B's essense of being, it would always be self-luminous and there should be no need for any Sādhanas to help its manifestation The cessation of bondage being negative in character cannot be identical with B's essence of being which must be positive If it is not the essence of B it would be unreal If its unreality is acceptable to the Siddhāntin in so far as it is produced by phenomenal means of proof (*sāmvyavahārikapramāṇajanya*), no earnest seeker of truth can be persuaded to feel inclined to pursue a shadow If the cessation of bondage is identical with B's own essence, it will become a reality in addition to B The latter being 'nirviśeṣa' there is no possibility of its being regarded as *identical* in one aspect and *not so* from another aspect,—so long as the Advaita-B, by hypothesis, admits of no internal Viśeṣas If cessation of bondage is other than B's essence, it will turn out to be non-existent like the sky-flower and can no longer be described as the fruit of Nirgunavidyā

Moreover, to prevent the cessation of bondage from being dismissed as unreal, it will have to be equated with the essence of B itself The nature and essence of B being ever-established (*nityasiddha*) the Śrutis which describe the state of mukti will lose their originative character and become mere restatement of a fact (anuvādaka) already established by the self-evidence of B—a consequence which the *Bhāmatī* is at pains to avoid [16]

The as yet unmanifested elimination of phenomenal characteristics from the nature of self, being of the essence of what shines forth of the nature of B, and as this latter is self-luminous in its nature, the so-called elimination of phenomenal character from the self (which is Moksa in Advaita) cannot successfully be shown to remain unrevealed unless it is made manifest by suitable means of Jñāna and other Sādhanas and, therefore, recognized as produced by knowledge or other Sādhanas [17]

S does not look upon Mokṣa as a state of bliss to be attained in the hereafter on reaching B in some special plane of existence, according to each one's fitness and enjoyed with the help of each one's body

16 सकलसांसारिकधर्मरहित तु ब्रह्मस्वरूपमप्रमाणात् तस्मादब्रूपात् व्यावृत्तमनधिगतमवबोधयन् नानुवादो युज्यते (*Bhamati* iv 4 1)

17 अप्रसन्नसांसारिकधर्मव्यावृत्तेरपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वेन, तस्य च स्वप्रकाशत्वेनानधिगतत्वाभावात् (*STC*)

and senses constituted of the essence of knowledge and bliss This makes it difficult for him to explain the wording of the Śruti *"after having reached"* the supreme light of B (paramjyotih), "the Mukta emerges in his true form"[18] The difficulty in S's position is that there cannot be any manifestation of one's form *following (after)* the manifestation of one's Brahmanhood, as that would introduce an element of difference between the two It cannot be held that the words "having attained the Paramjyotis" are *not* to be construed as having attained Brahmanhood—as that would be synonymous with the other pronouncement that "he comes into his own form" but in the sense of having gone to the Paramjyoti For the difficulty is that all movement (gati) towards B the Paramjyoti has been denied, according to S, to the knower of Nirgunavidyā in the Pratiṣedhādhikaranam (iv 2 12-14) Nor can S afford to take 'Paramjyotis' in the sense of Saguna-B to get over this difficulty, for the adjective 'param' prefixed to Jyotih will not allow it[19]

The *Bhāmatī* tries to get over the difficulty created by the presence of the words "after having attained the Paramjyoti" with the following explanation The Jñānin's attainment of Brahmanhood is no doubt the same as his emerging in his true form The use of the adverbial infinitive (*tvāpratyaya*) in 'upasampadya' is purely a matter of form as in 'mukham vyādāya svapiti'—he sleeps with his mouth open—i e after keeping the mouth open[20]

The explanation is not satisfactory Grammar prescribes the use of the adverbial infinitive *tvā* when the same person performs two different actions one following the other as in 'snātvā bhunkte' (he takes his meal after bathing) There is no such sequence of actions in respect of 'Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhiniṣpadyate' as that text has been interpreted by S As for the example cited by the *Bhāmatī*, suffice it to say that it involves two distinct and different actions of sleeping and keeping the mouth wide open They are not the same We do not say a man is sleeping, when in the waking state he may keep his mouth open

As the text 'Etam setum tirtvā andhas san anandho bhavati' (*Chān Up* viii 4 2) raises a natural presumption that the knower of B goes beyond B described as the "bridge", just as he goes beyond Vāyu or other stations on the Arcirādimārga, it would be pertinent to

18 परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते (*Chān Up* viii 12 3)

19 परं ज्योतिरिति हि परत्वमर्मविशेषणात् परब्रह्म ज्ञानगम्यं ब्रह्मैव प्रवक्त (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 3)

20 यद 'उपसंपद्य निष्पद्यते' इति तत् 'मुखं व्यादाय स्वपिति' इतिवत् (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 3)

let the entire statement of the Śruti 'Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhinispadyate' refute such a presumption and make it clear that the Jñānin reaches self-fulfilment when he reaches the Paramjyoti-B and that there is nowhere beyond B for him to go Instead of harnessing the opening Sūtra 'Sampadya avihāya'[1] svena sabdāt' to this end, it is definitely otiose to utilize a number of Sūtras beginning with 'Sampadyāvihaya' to establish the point on which there cannot but be consensus that Moksa is the condition in which the Jñānin comes into his *own true form* This criticism applies also to R's interpretation of Sūtra iv 4 1

The trouble taken by S to utilize the Sūtra 'Ātmā prakaranāt' (iv 4 3) for refuting an incidental objection that the Paramjyoti spoken of in *Chān Up* viii 12 3, is some physical light *(bhautikam jyotih)* is a waste of effort For, the very same text of *Chān Up* viii 12 3 has figured as S's Visayavākya in *B S* i 3 40, where according to his own interpretation it has been conclusively established that Param Jyotih is B and not any physical light, for an identical reason given (according to him) in iv 4 3—viz of B's being the subject matter of the whole section *(prakarana)* There is no adhikāsankā justifying the reopening of the issue here Nor has S given any The Sutra 'Ātmā prakaranāt' therefore, deserves to be utilized for a better purpose constituting a different adhikarana

21 S R and others read avirbhavah An avirbhava is what comes into being which goes against S s position here

CHAPTER XCIX

THE FULL-FLEDGED MUKTA IS THE ENJOYER OF BHOGAS

2 *Muktādhikaraṇam* (iv 4 2)[1]

This adhi disposes of an adhikāsankā against the conclusion of the previous *adhi* and endorses the position that it is the Mukta-Jiva who has the manifestation of his Svarupānanda and other forms of enjoyment in the vicinity of B The objection raised is that the soul referred to in *Chān Up* viii 12 3, is *not* the Mukta-Jiva but one who has yet to attain the highest state of Mokṣa For, the latter part of the same Śruti refers to this Soul's "moving about, laughing, sporting and rejoicing with women, chariots and relations" The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, argues that such a description is incompatible with real Mukti which is a state of complete fulfilment (*kṛtakṛtyatā*). There cannot be any activities on the part of the Mukta after attaining fulfilment nor any necessity for them It cannot be said that the presence of activity in Mokṣa has already been established in the Sūtra *Vihāropadeśāt* (ii 3 34) The present objection challenges that conclusion as well. It cannot also be contended in support of the Siddhānta that such enjoyments are not available to non-Muktas and must, therefore, be ascribed only to the Muktas Tho' it may be so at other times, it is quite possible to attain them as fruits of Sagunopāsanā by those who are not yet com-

1 The *TD* alone seems to be inclined to take Sutras iv 4 1-3 as one adhi But M's *NV* and *AV* are clearly in favor of making room for eleven adhi in all in this Pada No comments have been offered by later commentators on the *TD*'s difference in approach

pletely released and are, therefore, eligible for Kramamukti (gradual release). It is, therefore, proper and necessary to break up the paragraph into two parts as in the case of the Nivids and Sāmidhenis,— the first part ending with the statement: Even so, the Samprasāda (blessed self) rising from his final body and having approached the highest light (B) is restored to his own form. He is the Supreme Person" (viii.12.3)[2] and the second part comprising the rest : There, he moves about, laughing, playing, rejoicing" (viii.12.3). The first part describing the Jñānin as emerging in his own form is to be understood as referring to the Nirguṇopāsaka who attains his true form of identity with B. and the second part to the upāsaka of the Dahara-Vidyā (which is a Saguṇa-Vidyā) with which Chap. viii. of *Chān. Up.* begins. Thus, as the soul referred to in 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ (*Chān. Up.* viii.12.3) is only a Saguṇopāsaka and not a full-fledged Mukta, it is not possible to ascribe any "bhoga" to the Mukta (in the vicinity of B. his goal as contended by the Siddhāntin in iv.4.1.)

The Siddhānta is that the celestial bhogas referred to in *Chān. Up.* (viii.12.3) are by nature beyond the reach of any but real Muktas. This is evident from the *Bṛhacchruti* which says : Every day during deep sleep the Jīva enters into and reaches B. but he finds no pleasure, rejoicing or enjoyment of desired things as he is then in a state of bondage still. When he is released and enters into B. then, he has all the pleasure, rejoicing and enjoyment".[3] The terms of the above Śruti make it clear that the bhogas referred to in *Chān. Up.* (viii.12.3) are of a heavenly character *not* open to unreleased souls. This does not, however, affect the Jīvātman's experiencing the bare fringes of Svarūpasukha in Suṣupti and afterwards recollecting it thro' Sauṣuptikānusmṛti. That the Mukta Jīva is active in Mokṣa is shown by the reference to his entering into B. and having various forms of heavenly enjoyments.

That he is then a full-fledged Mukta is conclusively established by the reference to his "attaining his own form". There is no substance in the Pūrvapakṣin's contention that there is divergence of context and subject-matter between the earlier and latter parts of the passage from Chāndogya viii.12.3 and that for reasons given by him, the latter part

2 The words 'Sa uttamah Purusah' do not refer to the Mukta-Jīva but to the supreme B on reaching whom the Jīvātman is restored to his own form
Read: M.'s bhāsya on B S i 3, 18-21:
य प्राप्य स्वरूपेण जीवो निष्पद्यते, स एष आत्मेति परमार्थश्च परामर्श ।
This applies to स उत्तम पुरुष also.

3 'अहरहरेनमनुप्रविशत्युपसङ्गमे च । न तत्र मोदते न प्रमोदते न कामाननुभवति, बद्धो ह्येष तदा भवति । अथ यदैनं मुक्तोऽनुप्रविशति मोदते च प्रमोदते च कामांश्चैवानुभवति ' इति बृहच्छ्रुतौ प्रतिज्ञानात्
(M. *BSB.* iv 4 2)

of the text referring to Bhoga has to be disconnected from the Nirgunopāsaka and connected with the Sagunopāsaka (Daharavidyopāsaka) who is not yet a Mukta in the real sense of the term The contextual unity between the two texts 'Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhiniṣ padyate' and 'Sa tatra paryeti jakṣan krīḍan ramamānah' is implicit in the use of the relative pronoun 'Sah' (viii 12 3) which points as its natural antecedent to the self which has just attained "its true form" It would be extremely far-fetched to travel as far back as the Daharavidyā-prakarana (*Chān Up* viii 1-3) and pitch upon the Daharopāsaka as its antecedent[4] There is no propriety in connecting 'Param Jyotir upasampadya svena rūpena abhiniṣpadyate' with Nirgunamukti For admittedly the chapter commences with Saguna-Vidyā or Daharavidyā which should have as its fruit only Sagunamukti socalled In spite of this, if Nirgunavidyā is somehow to be brought in and its fruit of Nirgunamukti is also to be referred to, the reference to Sagunamukti and bhoga *again* in the concluding part would be most incongrous, as it would go against the grain of the context and the principle of proximity For it would be extremely artificial to have in a single self-complete statement a description of Sagunamukti at the beginning, Nirgunamukti in the middle *and again Sagunamukti at the end* Moreover, it would follow by the force of the preposition 'upa' prefixed to the verbal form 'sam-padya' in 'Paramjyotir upasampadya' that the bhogas spoken of in 'Sa tatra paryeti' arise in consequence of the Jñānin's personal contact with the 'Paramjyoti' Experience shows that bhoga arises when one has the company of his near and dear ones The contention that Muktas must be without activity is not valid, for we do hear of their activities in Mokṣa in such texts as 'Reaching that Self which consists of bliss, he goes up and down these worlds, eating food he desires, assuming many forms as he likes and sits chanting the Sāman 'hā, vu hā vu hā vu' (*Taitt Up.* iii 5)

The very basis of distinction between Saguna and Nirgunavidyās is unsatisfactory 'Guna' cannot be taken in its technical sense of the Nyāya system as it would make it impossible to consider satyakāmatva satyasankalpatva etc cited in the Śrutis as gunas If guna' means a

4 By way of Pratibandi (counter argument) M. has argued that at this rate there will be nothing to prevent us from similarly breaking up the unity of 'akhandartha' predicated of the proposition Satyam jnanam anantam brahma' by re-aligning the terms in apposition with annam manah etc in the following explanatory passage which will make it a Kosavidya instead of an Akhandartha-Brahmavidya dear to the monist

[illegible]
[illegible] इति प्रमाणात्

(*NV* iv 4 adhi 2)

characteristic *(dharma)*, as such, then the description of B. as 'aśabdam', 'asparśam' has to be taken to predicate such characteristics of B. If negative attributes are not to be considered as characteristics there is no reason why positive ones alone should be treated otherwise. If negation is identical with the locus of its presentation, it should be possible to have a perception of the negation even when the counter-correlate is there on the ground. Anyway, what is termed as Nirguṇopāsanā has to be conceived as a continuous flow of Nirguṇa-awareness. But the difficulty is that in monistic theory, pure consciousness cannot be presented in such a train of consciousness as an object of awareness for fear of violating the principle of Kartṛkarmavirodha. At the same time, it cannot be said that Upāsanā is something different from Jñāna. For under the Sūtra: Sarvavedāntapratyayam (iii.3.1) the term 'pratyaya' doing duty for Upāsanā (for purposes of Guṇopasamhāra) has been understood in the sense of 'vijñānam' by the Nirguṇavādin.

CHAPTER C

PARAÑJYOTI ATTAINED BY MUKTA IS THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

3 *Ātmādhikaraṇam* (iv 4 3)

This adhi establishes the identity of (Param) jyotis referred to as attained by the Mukta with the Supreme B The Pūrvapaksa contends that this Jyotis must be identical with the Sun as there is a parallel passage in the Prasna Up, Sa tejasi Sūrye sampannah (v 5), which makes it clear that the Jñānin is freed from his Prārabdhakarma on reaching the Sun and attains Mukti That shows the Mukta does not have his bhoga, as established in Sūtra iv 4 1, in B's vicinity but near Āditya The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, contends that tho' the term Jyotis is applicable both to Āditya as in

देव देवत्रा सूर्यमगन्म ज्योतिरुत्तमम् *(RV* i, 50, 10)

and to B as in Jyotis caranābhidhānāt (BS i 1 24), still the present parallel text which connects the Mukta's attaining the Sun with the liquidation of his Prārabdhakarmas[1] may be taken to override the context (*prakarana*) of B (in Paramjyotir upasampadya) which may be treated as incidental—the Samākhyā (parallel text) not admitting of any other explanation (niravakāśa)

1 'This can be seen from the further statement there "Even as a snake is freed from its sluff so as to be freed from the sins"
यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः (ibid)

The Siddhānta is that as the words Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā * * * * (*Chān. Up.* viii.7.1) with which the mahāvākya opens[2] of which Paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate (vii.12.3) is the tail end, are indisputably connected with the Supreme B. contextually and according to rules of interpretation, the context (*prakaraṇa*) is of greater weight than the parallel text from elsewhere, in favor of Āditya. Moreover, the parallel text from *Praśna Up.* (v.5) can be explained without contradiction to the Siddhānta view that Paramjyotis referred to in *Chān. Up.* viii.12.3 is the Supreme B. in whose vicinity alone the Mukta has his bhoga. For as has been pointed out before there are different phases of Mokṣa of which karmakṣaya (destruction of sañcita and other Karmas) is the first one, to be followed by Utkrānti, mārga and liṅgabhaṅga leading to Brahmaprāpti and bhoga. The Jñānin's journey to Āditya as described in *Praśna. Up.* (v.5) marks the first phase which takes place *en route* his being conducted by the Mānava Puruṣa and his finally reaching the Supreme B. Moreover, the term 'Ātmā' in the upakramavākya (Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā) refers unmistakably to Para-B. as has been established in the Dyubhvādyadhi. (*BS*.1.3.1-4) and Samākhyā is weaker than prakaraṇa. Tho' in some cases, Samākhyā may set aside the prakaraṇa, it happens only where the Samākhyā does not admit of being otherwise explained (*niravakāśa*). In the present case, it is not so, as has been shown. We have also the authority of the Smṛti that words like Paramjyoti, ātmā and Para-B. primarily denote only the Supreme B:

परंज्योतिः परंब्रह्म परमात्मादिका गिरः ।
सर्वत्र हरिमेवैकं ब्रूयुर्नान्यं कथंचन ॥

(*Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* Q.M.*BSB* iv.4.3)

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2 Read:
य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्यु विशोको विजिघत्सो ऽपिपास सत्यकाम सत्यसंकल्प सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्य स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान् यस्तमात्मानमनुविद्य विजानाति इति ह प्रजापतिरुवाच * * * य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतमभयमेतत् ब्रह्म ।

CHAPTER CI

ALL BHOGAS ENJOYED IN SĀYUJYA ARE AN IOTA OF BRAHMAN'S

4 *Avibhāgādhikaraṇam* (iv 4 4)

This *adhi* and the next deal mainly with the bhoga of Sāyujya-Muktas and incidentally with that of others also [1] The Pūrvapakṣa in this *adhi* is that the position taken in *adhi* 1, that Muktas have their bhoga in the vicinity of B is unsustainable For the question is whether these Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B or only those not enjoyed by B Being fresh arrivals in Mokṣa, how could they enjoy all the bhogas which have been enjoyed by B? Moreover B being Purṇānanda may not sometimes feel inclined to have any fresh bhogas, at which time the Sayujya Muktas, if they feel inclined to have fresh bhogas are sure to be frustrated If these Muktas do enjoy bhogas other than those of B, the conclusion established in the *Guhādhi* (1 2 12) that B is the enjoyer of the subtle essence of the bhogas of all Jīvas will be affected It will also go against the finding of Sūtra iv 2 16 that the wishes and enjoyments of Muktas are attuned to those of B always It will also come into conflict with the observation in the Caturvedaśikhā "Only those which I hear, see or smell these Jīvas rising from their bodies, do enjoy' For these reasons it is impossible to visualize the possibility of Muktas ever having any enjoyment either way

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1 [illegible] (STC) This applies to adhi. 7 also

The Siddhānta is that Sāyujya Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B. The fact that these Jīvas have attained the highest form of Mukti viz. Sāyujya does not give them any right to enjoy bhagas *not* enjoyed by B. The high status of Sāyujyamukti is consistent also with the position that such Muktas enjoy only those bhogas which are enjoyed by B. There is, however, no fear of their forgoing all bhogas if and when B. is not inclined to go in for such external bhogas. For, by hypothesis "Muktas" are "Pūrṇa" in respect of their Svarūpānanda apart from their having or not having any external bhogas.[2] However, the question whether such Muktas enjoy the entirety of bhogas enjoyed by B. or only a part of it can be answered without falling between the horns of a dilemma. For, it is possible to hold that Sāyujyamuktas do *not* enjoy any bhogas other than those enjoyed by B. for B. is by hypothesis Sarvabhoktṛ (enjoyer of all bhogas).[3] There is however, no difficulty in holding that Sāyujyamuktas enjoy only a little of the bhogas enjoyed by B. according to their deserts—just as the king's ministers or friends enjoy concerts, dances and parties enjoyed by the king himself but have no share in his private and personal enjoyments elsewhere with his family. If Muktas are to be allowed separate bhogas, it will shut out B. from them and that will make B.'s bhogas deficient in pūrṇatva.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S., this adhi. considers whether the released soul exists as separate from B. or in a state of non-division from it. The Pūrvapakṣa is that it exists apart from B. because in passages like "He moves about there" (*Chān. Up.* viii.12.3) a distinction is made between the abode and one abiding therein and in 'Paramjyotir upasampadya' a similar distinction is made between the agent and the object. The Siddhānta is that the released soul remains non-separate from B. because there are texts like 'Tat tvam asi', 'I am B.', 'Where there is then no second, nothing else different that he could see' (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.23). That such is the intention of other passages too which are *worded as if there is a real difference* between them may be seen from passages like "Pure water poured into impure water remains the same" (*Kaṭha.* ii.1.15), comparisons of the soul entering B. to rivers falling

2 स्वरूपानन्दव्यतिरेकेण बहिर्भोगाश्च सन्ति मुक्तानामित्युक्तम् (*TD.* iv 4 4)

3 Cf. सर्वकर्मा सर्वगन्ध (*Chān. Up.* iii, 14 2) ऋत पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके (*Kaṭha.* 1, 3, 1) अह हि सर्वयज्ञाना भोक्ता (*Gitā.* ix 24)

into the sea and those like "In what does the Supreme B abide, in its own majesty" (*Chān Up* vii 24.1)[4]

Criticism

The relation of non-division between Jiva and B has been well-established according to S in the Ārambhanādhi (ii 1.14) itself and no further doubt can arise on the point to be considered afresh Texts like 'Tattvam asi' have already been shown to admit of very satisfactory interpretation favoring the dependence of Jīva on B while no satisfactory explanation has been offered for not accepting the expressed sense of difference between Jīva and B implicit in the terms of reference to them as abider and abode, subject and object, etc as in 'Sa tatra paryeti', 'Paramjyotir upasampadya' References to B's abiding in its own glory, and finding bliss in its own self can be satisfactorily explained in the light of Svarūpaviśeṣas in a Saviśesa-B admitted by the Sūtrakāra It would be impossible to explain them from the point of view of S's Nirviśeṣa-B[5] There is no need to imagine a difference "as it were" *(upacaritabheda)* where real difference is well-established, as between the Mukta-Jīva and Paramjyoti On the analogy of rivers and the Sea *See* Vol I p 360 and *Bhāmati* i 4 22

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. raises the question if the released soul views itself as separate from B or as non-separate from it as its mode Pūrvapakṣa favors the former position The Siddhānta is that in Moksa the Jīva sees himself as he is in reality viz. inseparable from B in so far as he is only a mode (prakāra) of B and coordinate with B thro' such a relationship

Criticism

This is mere play with words like modality and coordination without substance. What one wants to know is the fact of the matter Does the Jīvātman, differ from B in Mokṣa or not? If he does, he cannot see himself as non-different from B, as the Mukta is *not* subject to any illusions What R. means by the Jīvātman seeing himself as non-

4. 'यथोदकं शुद्धे' इत्येवमादीनि मुक्तस्वरूपनिरूपणपराणि वाक्यान्यविभागमेव दर्शयन्ति नदीसमुद्रादिनिदर्शनानि च भेदनिर्देशस्त्वभेदेऽप्युपचर्यते 'स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति स्वे महिम्नि' इति चैवमादिनिर्देशात् (S BSB iv 4 4)

5. ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानपवादितत्वात् (S *BSB* ii 1 14)

different from B. in release is that he sees B. as the self of his self in which character he has been enjoined to meditate on B. and realize it. The Srutis which proclaim his sameness of attributes with B. (sādharmya) mean that as constituting B.'s body he has likewise the attributes of freedom from sin etc. But the fact that the Muktajiva is able to experience that he is B.'s body and that B. is his soul or the owner of such a body can hardly make him actually identical with B. any more than the body can become identical with the Soul.

CHAPTER CII

HOW MUKTAS ENJOY SĀYUJYA-MUKTI

5 *Brāhmādhikaraṇam* (iv 4 5 7)

This adhi establishes the prseence of bhoga in Sāyujyamukti by disposing of a fresh objection The Purvapakṣa argues that no bhoga by not going beyond B but always remaining in B's vicinity and enjoying just a fraction of B's bhoga is at all possible in Sāyujyamukti For having gone beyond transmigratory life once for all, Muktas have now no bodies gross or subtle with which to enjoy their bhogas If they should still have bodies, they cannot be Muktas To ascribe bhoga to them thro' B's body will not help, for they have no such enjoyment when they are lodged in B's own body in the state of Pralaya

The Siddhānta is given from the points of view of Jaimini and Auḍulomi which are coordinated with Bādarāyana's approval, in the last Sūtra Jaimini's view is that tho' not any longer having any physical bodies, gross or subtle the Sāyujyamuktas enjoy their bhogas along with B with their ciddehas, which in Sāyujyamukti abide in the body of B itself[1] For the *Mādhyandināyana Śruti* says "The knower of B having liquidated his mortal body (both gross and subtle) and reached B sees thro' B hears thro' B and enjoys his bhogas thro' B" The *Bṛhattantra* assures that thro' the power of Upāsanā (*smaraṇam*) carried out in the state of Samsāra, that he is performing all his activities

1 [illegible] (Vadiraja *TPG* p 176)

thro' the corresponding limbs of B seated in his own body, the Jñānin eligible for Sāyujyamukti is vouchsafed such bhoga to be enjoyed with his Svarūpadeha composed of pure intelligence abiding in the body of B itself[2]

Auḍulomi on the other hand holds that the Sāyujyamuktas have some external bhogas too, *sometimes,* which they enjoy with their own Ciddeha and also that in other forms of mukti like Sālokya and Sāmīpya they enjoy the bhogas thro' their Svarūpa (cid)-deha itself which is composed of pure intelligence[3] There is thus no fear of their lapsing into Samsāra on account of having a body

The last Sūtra extends Bādarāyana's approval to both the views For in both the views, the Mukta remains without a physical body gross or subtle The difference is that in the former view the Sāyujyamukta has his bhogas with his ciddeha abiding in B's own body The latter holds that the Sāyujyamukta has external bhogas too, sometimes which he enjoys with his ciddeha alone[4]

According to Bādarāyana the Sāyujyamukta receives sacremental blessing so to say from the body and limbs of B in order to be able to enjoy his small bit of bhoga enjoyed by B with his own ciddeha[5]

The term upanyāsa in the first Sūtra refers to the authority of Śruti in respect of Jaimini's position Its repetition again in the last Sūtra is to refer to a similar authority in favor of Auḍulomi's views also as the fact has not been referred to in Sūtra 6 As the enjoyment of a small bit of bhogas of B with his own ciddeha abiding in the body of B itself is particularly yearned for by souls eligible for Sāyujyamukti in their Upāsanās, in the state of Samsāra, and as such bhoga is intrinsically more important and exceeds in measure other kinds of occasional bhogas of an external kind, enjoyed with the aid of one's Ciddeha alone by the Sāyujyamukta, precedence has been given to Jaimini's view embodying it[6]

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2 गच्छामि विष्णुपादाभ्या विष्णुदष्टयाच दशनम ।
इत्यादि पूवस्मरणात मुक्तस्यैतत विशपणम ।। इति वहत्तन्त्रोक्तश्च (M *BSB* iv 4 5)

3 वहिरपि चिन्मात्रदेहेन भोगोऽस्तीति औडुलोमिमतमिति विशपसदभावात (Vādiraja *TPG* p 176)

4 न चैव परस्परविरोध शक्य । जैमिनिमतस्य सायुज्यदशाकालीनभोगविषयत्वात । औडुलोमिमतस्य च सायुज्यभाजामेव कादाचित्कवहिर्भोगविषयत्वात । सालोक्यादि मुक्तिविषयत्वाच्च न विरोध
(Vadiraja *TPG* p 176)

5 स्वदेहेन ब्रह्मदेहेन च साहित्यन भोगाविराध भगवान वादरायणो मन्यते । साहित्यमनुग्राह्यानुग्राहकभावेन
(*TD* iv 4 7)

6 सायुज्यभाजा भगवत्प्रवेशन भागस्य गच्छामि हरिपादाभ्याम ' इति स्मयुक्तरीत्या तदाशासितत्वेन तथा भोगस्य वहिर्भोगापेक्षया प्राथम्यप्राधान्यवाहुल्यादिना चाभ्यर्हितत्वेनाद्य सूत्र तत्र प्रमाणोक्ति
(Raghu *TPB* p 549)

Śaṃkara's Interpretation

According to S this adhi inquires into the specific character of the released soul's own form (svarūpa) which it attains according to Sūtra iv 4 1 Two different views on the subject are presented as Pūrvapakṣas attributed to Jaimini and Auḍulomi Bādarāyana's own view is given separately as 'reconciling' the two in Sūtra 7

The doubt arises whether the released soul emerges only as pure intelligence which is the form of B or with freedom from evil and decay and with omniscience, satyakāmatva and other characteristics of B enumerated in *Chān Up* viii 7 1, or with both the sets of characteristics

Jaimini's view is that the Mukta emerges with all these existent (pāramārthika) attributes, *both* positive and negative of the Supreme Lord[7] which are his own, in as much as he himself is identical with that B[8] This cannot be objected to on the ground that the self's essence being of pure intelligence, it will shatter the principle of monism to admit attributes of a negative character such as freedom from evil and decay as well as positive attributes like satyakāmatva, satyasankalpatva etc (*Chān Up* viii 7 1) For, the negative attributes being *non est* will not in any way undermine Advaita.[9] As far positive attributes, they cannot be deemed to be different from the entity (dharmi) possessing them and if the relation of entity and its attributes (dharmadharmibhāva) cannot properly be made out between identicals as between absolute distincts like chalk and cheese, let it be so[10]

Auḍulomi holds that the released soul emerges as pure intelligence which is indescribable and transcends all phenomena Its qualification in terms of being free from evil and being satyasankalpa etc , is, however, *without any real content of meaning* For, it is logically impossible to predicate any attributes positive or negative of the Ātman[11]

'अनेकाकारतैक्यस्य नैकत्वान्निष्कना भवेत्,
परस्परविरोधेन न भेदाभेदसम्भव ॥'

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7 [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ (*Bhāmati* iv 4 5)

8 [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iv 4 5)

9 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iv 4 5)

10 [illegible] (*Bhāmati* iv 4 5)

11 [illegible] । (*Bhāmati* iv 4 6)

Being one, Ātman cannot be invested with a multiplicity of attributes. For, if these attributes should differ from Ātman, it will disrupt his oneness and violate the spirit of the Advaita Śrutis. If they differ *not* from Ātman, they will not be different from one another also,—being all of them non-different from the one self—just as the self's own form is not different from it. Otherwise, the Ātmic essence itself will by exposed to differentiation, as it will then be identical with the differing attributes. It would be inconsistent to hold that these attributes differ only among themselves but not from the Ātman (the subject). Their identity with one another will have to follow from their identity with the subject *(dharmi)*. If they should differ from one another, the subject in its turn will have to differ with each different attribute. Nor can the subject and the attributes be conceived to stand in the relation of both identity and difference as it will be self-contradictory.[12]

Turning to negative attributes like freedom from evil, tho' they may not be disruptive of non-dualism, yet, in so far as the attributes of freedom from evil etc. are purely imaginary the negative characterization of Ātman which is to be established thro' the predication of such (imaginary) attributes, cannot but be imaginary in its turn. By the same token, we have to put down the positive attributes of satyakāmatva, etc., also as purely adventitious and not intrinsic *(svābhāvika or tāttvika.)*[13] For all these reasons, the Muktāman can only be taken to emerge in his barest essence of intelligence *(cititanmātra)* without any adjuncts or attributes, positive or negative, real or imaginary.

Bādarāyaṇa, while accepting Auḍulomi's view, in principle, brooks not his reckless abstraction.[14] His position is less rigid in that while holding the self to be of the essence of undifferenced and undifferentiable intelligence and bliss alone, the attributes of freedom from evil and satyakāmatva etc. tho' not absolutely real but only due to the play of adjuncts (upādhi) and made known thro' provisional means of proof and accepted by the world of men, cannot altogether be rejected as ut-

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12 न ह्येकस्यात्मन पारमार्थिकानेकधर्मसभव । ते चेदात्मनो भिद्यन्ते द्वैतापत्तेरद्वैतश्रुतयो व्यावर्तेरन् । अथ न भिद्यन्ते तत एकस्यात्मनोऽभेदात् मिथोऽपि न भिद्येरन् । आत्मरूपवन् नीलपीतरूपवत् । न च धर्मिण आत्मनो न भिद्यन्ते मिथस्तु भिद्यन्त इति साप्रतम् । धर्म्यभेदेन तदनन्यत्वेन तेषामप्यभेदप्रसगात् । भेदे वा धर्मिणोऽपि भेदप्रसगात् इत्युक्तम् । भेदाभेदौ च परस्परविरोधादेकत्राभावान्न सभवत इत्युपपादितम् *(Bhāmati iv 4 6)*

13 अभावरूपाणामद्वैताविहन्तृत्वेऽपि तस्य पाप्मादे. काल्पनिकतया तदधीननिरूपणतया तेषामपि काल्पनिकत्वमिति न तात्त्विकी तद्धर्मता श्लिष्यते । एतेन सत्यकामसर्वज्ञसर्वेश्वरत्वादयोऽप्यौपाधिका व्याख्याता
(Bhāmati iv 4 6)

14 तदेतदतिशौण्डीर्यमौडुलोमेर्न मृष्यते ।
बादरायण आचार्यो मृष्यन्नपि हि तन्मतम् ।। *(Bhāmati iv 4 7)*

terly non-existent or the specific references to them in our routine ways of speaking dismissed as verbal figments like 'Rāhu's head'[15]

Criticism

When it is said that the Mukta emerges in B's nature (*brāhmena rūpena*) in Sūtra 5, it is difficult to appreciate how the doubt can arise as to whether he emerges solely as pure intelligence or as omniscient omnipotent, satyakāma, satyasankalpa, etc For, in S's philosophy B cannot be deemed to be "all-knowing" as the "all" itself is unreal (mithyā) and to attribute all-knowingness to B will be against the concept of its akhaṇḍatva (undifferenced being)

There is a lurking fallacy in the first Pūrvapakṣa that positive and negative attributes are both compatible with the monistic B For it will certainly be detrimental to the singular essence (*ekarasatva*) of B to suggest its possessing attributes both positive and negative within the framework of a monism The refutation of the first Pūrvapakṣa favoring acceptance of the reason of possession of negative attributes like freedom from evil by the Mukta on the ground that such negative characteristics have to be dismissed as imaginary in so far as they depend on the presumption of countercorrelates which are, themselves imaginary[16] will be against S's own position that B stands really differenced from utter non-existence (*asadvilaksana*) tho' utter non-existence (*tuccha*) is without any specific essence (*nissvarūpa*) and its negation in B will have to depend on the conception of the totally non-existent[17] If the attributes of apahatapāpmatva, etc, are to be dismissed as imaginary, such descriptions will go without content and invalidate the Śruti's predicating such attributes of B The plea that 'apahatapāpmatva' and others are *not* non-existent attributes but are established by Vyāvahārika-Pramāṇa and attested by worldly usage is equally untenable If 'their being recognized by the world' (lokasiddhatva) means they are real, where is the harm in recognizing that Ātman who possesses real intelligence and bliss also possesses real freedom from evil, and satyasankalpatva, etc Why should the Siddhāntin be so particular to dismiss apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva, etc, as purely adventitious (*aupādhika*) and unreal?

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15 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 7)

16 [illegible] (*Kalpataru-Parimala* iv 4.6)

17 [illegible] (*STC*)

If the Muktas should, however, emerge in fact with Vyāvahārika freedom from evil, vyāvahārika-satyasankalpatva, etc how can such emergence be described as emergence *in one's own pristine form?* To avoid this predicament it will have to be agreed that the Mukta emerges solely as pure intelligence In that case, the position of Auḍulomi which says so will cease to be a Pūrvapakṣa—as it stands presented

The possession of bliss and intelligence as part of the real Svarūpa of the released soul is open to the same line of criticism as has been directed against satyasankalpatva etc in the *Bhāmatī* Are pure intelligence and bliss different from B or are the same as B? If they are different, they will disrupt Advaita If identical with B how can B which is of singular essence *(ekarasa)* and indivisible be identified with these two different attributes? Nor can ānanda be differentiated from pure intelligence As each of them is identical with B they must also be mutually identical If they are different from each other, the subject they qualify will also have to be different with each differing attribute The relation of identity and difference *(bhedābheda)* will be open to self-contradiction

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R the question discussed is whether the the nature of the soul in release consists of the eight attributes of apahatapāpmatva etc. given in the Prajāpativākya in *Chān Up* (viii 1 5) or solely of intelligence or both.[18]

The first Pūrvapaksa is the soul manifests itself in release in its Brāhmic characteristics of freedom from sin, satyakāmatva, etc enumerated in *Chān Up.* (viii 1 5)

The second Pūrvapakṣa is that it manifests itself solely as pure intelligence For we read in *Brh Up* (iv 4 13) "as a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is all a mass of taste, so also is the self a mass of intelligence" He is, therefore, of that nature only

The Siddhānta is—Even tho' the Śruti declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential nature, the previously mentioned attributes of freedom from sin, satyakāmatva etc are also known to exist in it. There cannot be any contradiction between the distinct attributes of the self made known by the authority of different Śrutis of equal strength which cannot be made to refute each other The fact of the self being,

१८ किं जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं रूपमपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणकं उत चैतन्यमात्रम्, उतोभयमिति संशयः
(Vedāntadīpa iv 4 5)

CHAPTER CIII

MUKTAS' ENJOYMENTS ARE EFFORTLESS

6 *Sankalpādhikaraṇam* (iv 4 8)

This adhi establishes that the enjoyment of bhoga in Mukti does not depend on putting forth appropriate effort and adopting necessary means, at the time, for its realization. It is realized at will (sankalpād eva)

The Pūrvapakṣa, however, contends that as Muktas realize their bhogas while having their abode in B , the realization depends on the employment of effort and means, in the same way as persons residing in other abodes as on earth realize their enjoyments only thro' appropriate means and effort[1] As the efforts are thus unavoidable on the part of Muktas, they may sometimes become unsuccessful and lead to frustration, sorrow and disappointment and make their freedom not worth its name

The Siddhānta is that Muktas realize their bhogas at will without making or having to make any special effort and adopt appropriate means, at the time for the purpose[2] They realize whatever bhogas

1 [illegible] (*N V* iv 4 adhi 6)

2 [illegible] (Ragh. *TPB* iv 4 8)
Raghavendra further points out that this applies only to efforts to be made and means to be employed at the time It does not apply to such bhogas of the ebb and overflow of ānanda in the released state which have been ascribed to the carrying out of Niṣkama karma *after* Aparokṣa and before the attainment of mokṣa: [illegible] (ibid)

they want to have as soon as they wish. This is established on the authority of the Śruti : "As soon as they wish to see[3] the "fathers" (of their last final body)[4] they appear before them". The abode of B. being quite unique and unlike any other terrestrial abode, the requirement of effort and means for the realization of bhoga applicable to other planes of life does not apply to the transcendental abode of B.[5]

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3. लोकृ दर्शन इति धातो पितृलोक. पितृणा दर्शनमित्यर्थः (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 176)
4 अत्र पित्रादय. स्वरूपपित्रादय. । ते च चरमशरीरपित्रादय एव। 'चरमे तु यथानिजम्' इति वचनात्। ते च योग्या एवेति संप्रदायविदः (*BD.* iv 4 8)
5 निर्दोषत्वात् तदोकसो मुक्तस्य च सक्ल्पादेवेति श्रुत्यनुसारेणोपपत्ते (*NV.* iv 4 adhi 6)

in its entirety, a mass of intelligence is in no way conflicting with the fact of its freedom from sin, etc which also inhere in it as the subject of those qualities—no more than the fact of a lump of salt being taste all thro' conflicts with the fact of its possessing several other qualities like color, hardness of touch and so on known thro' visual and other evidences

Criticism

As the "Brāhmic" attributes of apahatapāpmatva etc., cannot be regarded as the 'svarūpa' of the Jīvātman, R.'s first Pūrvapakṣa is untenable These attributes are not conceived by R. to be merely 'Vyāvahārika' as by S, so that as products of Avidyā they can be posited of or projected on the Jīvātman also Nor can mere difference of loci make any difference to the nature of 'abhāva' as such. If they do differ the freedom from evil possessed by the Mukta cannot be designated as "Brāhma" (belonging to B) in the Sūtra (iv 4 5) If the expression "Brāhma" in Sūtra 5, means the soul's nature is *"akin to B's"*, it would be going in for a metaphorical sense only

As regards the second Pūrvapakṣa, a clarification is needed whether it is put forward holding the released soul to be of the essence of intelligence, or *solely* of intelligence and of no other property

(of *that* nature) as *'tanmātrātmakatvāt'* (of that nautre alone) will be taking an unauthorized liberty.

It is evident from the wording of Sūtra 7 as interpreted by R. that Auḍulomi's position that the Mukta emerges as pure consciousness alone is approved by him. 'Tadātmaka' then should be construed as 'solely of the nature of cit' (*tāvanmātrātmaka*). Consequently, it will admit of no other attributes like apahatapāpmatva, satyakāmatva, etc., under the category of essential ones (*tadātmaka*). The reconciliation attempted by the Sūtrakāra by not excluding the previously stated (pūrvabhāvād upanyāsāt) attributes will become unsustainable. For, if 'cinmātrātmaka' is understood literally as excluding the rest, it will necessitate the exclusion of apahatapāpmatva, satyasankalpatva etc. as well. No reconciliation of the presence and compatibility of the two (pure intelligence and apahatapāpmatva) on a footing of absolute equality as pāramārthika-attributes will then be feasible as so earnestly desired by R.[19]

These difficulties should show that the reading 'cititanmātreṇa' is inappropriate and that the interpretation of the Sūtras too should be connected with the subject of means of bhoga in Mokṣa rather than with the nature of the svarūpa with which the Mukta emerges—whether in his own or in Brahman's.

19 कृत्स्नोऽप्यात्मा जडव्यावृत्तप्रकाश, नान्यायत्तप्रकाश. स्वल्पोऽपि प्रदेशोऽस्तीत्ययमर्थो वाक्यादेव सुव्यक्त.। न चैव प्रत्यगात्मनो धर्मिस्वरूपस्य कृत्स्नस्य विज्ञानघनत्वेऽप्यपहतपाप्मत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादिधर्मसबन्धो वाक्यान्तरावगतो विरुद्धयते। यथा सैन्धवघनस्य कृत्स्नस्य रसघनत्वे रसनेन्द्रियावगते चक्षुराद्यवगता रूपकाठिन्यादयो न विरुद्धयन्ते तद्वत् (*Śrībhāṣya* iv 4 7)

CHAPTER CIV

HAVE MUKTAS ANY MASTERS IN RELEASE ?

7 *Ananyādhipatyadhikaraṇam* (iv 4 9)

After having established the existence of bhoga in Mukti, how and by what means it is enjoyed, the Sūtrakāra goes on to pinpoint another distinctive characteristic of life in Mokṣa which differs from life in Samsāra, where one is often subject to one's inferiors. The Muktas do not suffer from this disability or limitation. They are "Ananyādhipatis" S and others have left us with an utterly misleading interpretation of this term which they have rendered as "being without a master" or "being without another ruler" Such a meaning is in obvious contradiction with Sūtra iv 4 17 where the Sūtrakāra debars the Mukta from all rights of exercising the cosmic functions of Para-B one of which is the redemption of souls from bondage (*BS* iii 2 5)[1] These two Sūtras clearly show that Muktas are *not independent of Para-B and are subject to His overlordship* How can we fly in the face of this internal evidence of the Sūtras and hail the Muktajīva as being without a master or another ruler—i e as "master of himself"?

Keeping this important datum in mind, M.'s Bhāṣya elicits from "ananyādhipati", its true meaning that Muktas are not dependent on or subject to the control of their inferiors in gradation, as souls usually

1 Cf also [illegible] (*P V* x.90.2)

are in their state of Samsāra They are subject only to the control of Para-B and their superiors in the hierarchy.[2]

The Pūrvapaksa argues that as (sāyujya)-muktas are lodged in another's abode, and as when one is in another's abode there is a possibility of things happening there which may not be to one's liking, these Muktas may also find themselves under subjection to their inferiors in status—which will reduce moksa to the same unfair state as Samsāra

The Siddhānta is that Muktas being Satyakāmas with power to realise whatever they wish for and being persons of sound judgment (preksāvat) will not wish for anything to happen which will be compromising to their status—such as placing themselves under the control of their inferiors They are, therefore, subject only to the Supreme Being *and* to their recognized superiors in the hierarchic order from whom they receive guidance and blessing

Śamkara's Interpretation

Samkalpādhikaranam (iv 4 8-9)

S and R[3] read Sūtras 8 and 9 as one adhi, and consider whether in the state of release the soul realizes his enjoyments (*Chān Up* viii.12 3) by its mere will or by means of special effort added to their will or desire The Visayavākya is 'If he becomes desirous of the world of his fathers, they arise by his mere will or thought" (*Chān Up* vii 2 1) The Siddhānta is that by mere will the result comes to be realized, for the Śruti declares so The will of the released is different from ours and has the power of producing results without additional effort or other operative causes The next Sūtra says that owing to this fact of his will not being fettered or barren, the Mukta has no other Lord over himself, for no one while forming a will, would wish to be subject to another master *if he can help it*[4]

Criticism

After the emergence of the released soul in his own form of pure intelligence, and rising once for all above the world of 'kriyākārakaphala',

2 अत एव मुक्तत्वमिहादितस्त्वमस्य भृत्यत्वनिवारणाय (AV iv 4 9)
परमोऽधिपतिस्तस्य विष्णुरेव न संशयः । ब्रह्मादीनामनुक्तानां सर्वेषामविशेषतः ॥
तत प्राणादिनामानां सर्वेऽपि पतयः स्मृताः । आचार्यश्चैव सर्वेषां यैर्ज्ञानं सुप्रतिष्ठितम् ॥
एतेभ्योऽन्य पतिर्नैव मुक्तानां नात्र संशयः । (*Varaha* Q M. BSB iv 4 9)

3 R reads 'Sankalpad eva tacchruteh' omitting the 'ca' S construes the 'ca' as 'tu'

4 नास्य अन्याधिपतिर्भवतीत्यर्थः । नहि प्राकृतोऽपि संकल्पयन् अन्यस्वामिकत्वमात्मनः सत्यां गतौ संकल्पयति (S *BSB* iv 4 9)

there is hardly any scope for holding an inquiry whether the world of fathers and mothers arises at the mere will of the Mukta or will backed by adequate effort, as in this world.

Anticipating this objection, the *Kalpataru* has put in that from this adhi., onwards till the end of this Pāda, there is only an elucidation of the fruits of Sagunavidyā[5] and that, therefore, the present topic is relevant. But this could have been taken up in the previous Pāda itself which deals, as we have seen, wholly with the fruits of Sagunavidyā. There is no point in breaking the continuity of thought with Nirgunavidyā in the first three *adhis* and turning to the fruits of Sagunavidyā, *over again*.

The incompatibility of enjoyments with the goal of Nirgunavidyā is not a sufficient reason to change the theme from Nirgunavidyā to Saguna, after the third *adhi*. As in the case of the attributes of apahatapāpmatva and the activities of sport of the Muktas being treated as Vyāvahārika —and read as running on with Nirgunavidyā, the enjoyments in the company of Pitrs etc. can also be treated as Vyāvahārikabhogas in keeping with the context of Nirgunavidyā. There is no reason why the attributes of apahatapāpmatva and the sports and music etc., should alone have been dealt with from a different angle instead of their being treated as fruits of Sagunavidyā, breaking the context. The bifurcation of the adhis of this Pāda into the fruits of Nirgunavidyā and Sagunavidyā and the assignment of the first three adhis alone to the elucidation of the fruits of Nirgunavidyā and the remaining four adhis, at the upasamhara-end to the fruits of Sagunavidyā leads to a very awkward and anomalous position as has already been pointed out.

Bhāratītīrtha of the Śamkara school has attempted to explain this anomaly saying that after discussing Videhamukti in the first three *adhis* the Sūtrakāra now turns to the subject of lower Mukti in the world of Brahmā and its fruits and ancillaries.

But then as between Videhamukti and the attainment of Brahmaloka, the latter is obviously a secondary affair and it would, therefore, be proper to treat it as introductory to the more elaborate elucidation of Nirgunamukti. Consistent with its primacy and importance, Nirgunamukti and its fruits ought to have been made the crowing point of the Śāstra.

5. [illegible] (*Kalpataru* iv. 4. 8)
This naturally places the two Sūtras [illegible] and [illegible] under the scope of the Sagunavidyaphala.

The question whether the Mukta needs anything more than his merest will *(sankalpa)* to realize the objects of his desire and enjoyment in Mokṣa depends entirely upon whether he is provided with appropriate means for such enjoyment in the form a body and senses without which there cannot be any bhoga It is, therefore, incumbent on the Sūtrakāra to endow him with such means of enjoyment (bhogasādhanas) in the previous adhi (the Brāhmādhi) before coming to take up the next question whether these bhogas are realizable by mere will or will combined with serious effort We have seen that S and R have *not made this the theme of the Brāhmādhi* but something else—the specific character of the "own form" in which the Mukta emerges in Moksa—whether it consists in pure intelligence alone or combines with it the attributes of apahatapāpmatva and others as well

S 's interpretation of the next Sutra 'Ata eva ca ananyādhipatih' is altogether indefensible It may be true from the point of view of his Nirgunamukti But this is only a gunasūtra of the adhi whose main Sūtra dealing with the sankalpa of the Mukta can have nothing to do with the Nirguna state His commentators have already cut the ground from under his feet by making it clear that *this adhi and the others following are all connected with Sagunamukti*

इत उपरि सगुणविद्याफलप्रपञ्च (*Kalpataru* iv 4 8)

This creates an insurmountable difficulty Sagunamukti has to reckon with the Saguna-B or Isvara as the Supreme Ruler and Master A superior Jiva like the 'Puruṣomānavaḥ' may also wield authority over the Sagunamukta It is therefore, impossible to assert that *the Sagunamukta has no master or lord above him* The Sūtra 'Jagadvyāpāra varjam' (iv 4 17) will *not* allow us to get away with any such thoughtless interpretation of the term 'ananyādhipati'

Commenting on this Sutra, R D Ranade has tried to give his own finishing touches to the absolutist conception of Mokṣa on the basis of this Sutra, by introducing a comparison between Bādarāyana's ideal of ananyādhipatitva in Moksa and Plato's ideal of the Philosopher-King applied to moksa The Professor deduces that "Bādarāyana holds the ideal of the Philosopher-King in a much more intensified form than Plato "[6] "If Plato's ideal of a Philosopher-King ever comes true, there would be the contingency of many Philosopher-Kings each ruling over his own republic Such a multiplicity of Philosopher-Kings might not lead to concord and harmony It would be well-nigh impossible to determine the *primus inter pares* in this multitude who may establish

6 *Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought* p 214

harmony But in the ideal of Bādarāyaṇa, the overlord of all suffers no compeer (ananyādhipati) and has omniscience, omnipotence and bliss" (*Op cit.* p 177) We fail to see how Ranade can talk of the Mukta Jiva's omnipotence in the face of Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtra Jagadvyāpāra-varjam (iv 4 17)!

It is indeed a poor compliment to the Platonic ideal that Philosopher-Kings would end up by quarelling among themselves for the position of *primus inter pares* or a dictatorship It is sad to contemplate that in the learned Professor's estimation, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as Philosopher-Kings will grow jealous of one another and start quarrelling! See also P 358 *ante*

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R's interpretation of 'ananyādhipati' is *apparently* the same as S's and would be open to the same objection and difficulty in a more pronounced form, for he is a Theist and not a Monist like S Therefore, while explaining 'anyanyādhipati' as being "without a ruler"[7] he takes care to add "in the sense of *not* being subject to injunctions and prohibitions",[8] or the rule of karma[9] which can be denied of the Mukta. But this evades the point that the term 'adhipati' or master applies by consensus to a sentient being and not to an inanimate principle like Karma or injunctions and prohibitions Apart from it, the Muktajīva *has already liquidated his karmas* at the time of his surrendering his final body in transmigration before attaining B and "emerging in his true form" There is thus no possibility of karmas butting in again during the stage of his Muktibhoga which is now engaging our attention in this part of the Phalādhyāya and in this adhi as may be seen from the wording of the Sutra 'Sankalpādeva tacchruteh' R's explanation is therefore clearly inadequate, if not evasive

The *Śrutaprakāśa* puts an end to any ambiguity which may be felt in the meaning of the term by coming forward with a frank statement here that the purport of ananyādhipati is that the "Mukta Jīva has no master *other than* the Supreme Being who is his eternal Śeṣin" (principal)[10] As usual, M. has come *straight to the point*

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7 मुक्तानन्याधिपतित्व (*Vedāntadīpa* iv 4 9)

8 अनन्याधिपतित्वं हि विधिनिषेधायोग्यत्वम् । विधिनिषेधयोग्यत्वं हि प्रशासितव्यत्वं भवति (*Śrībhaṣya* iv 4 9)

9 अनन्याधिपतित्वं कर्मानधीनत्वम (*Vedāntadīpa*)

10 अत्रानन्याधिपतिरित्यनेन स्वेन नाधिपतिरिति । अत्रायमभिप्राय:—स्वशेषिणा परमपुरुषादन्यो नाधिपतिरस्यति (*Śrutaprakāśa* iv 4 9)

It deserves to be noted in this connection that besides the supreme Being R.'s system recognizes the Śrītattva (goddess Lakṣmī) also to be the "Śeṣi" of the Muktas besides Viṣvaksena and other "Nityasūris". This necessitates the acceptance of a well-established order of Niyāmakas (masters) over the Jīvas attaining Mokṣa. It is for this reason that M. has deemed it proper ot interpret "ananyādhipati" applied to the Mukta Jīva *not* as having no ruler or master (above him) but as having *no masters other than the established ones* (Klptapatibhyo adhipatyantaraśūnyaḥ).[11]

11. इह सूत्रे मुक्तस्य अनन्याधिपतिरिति यदनन्यभृत्यत्वमुक्तं तत्तद्भिन्नेभ्यो य यस्य मुक्तस्याधिपतित्वेनोदिता' शास्त्रे, तेभ्योऽन्यस्य भृत्यो न भवतीति प्रतिपादनाय। न तु सर्वथा अधिपतिनिवारणाय। कुत.? अन्यपदप्रयोगात्। अन्यथा 'अपतिः' इत्यवक्ष्यत (*NS.* p. 653)

CHAPTER CVI

MUKTA BHOGA WITH OR WITHOUT BODIES

8 *Ubhayavıdhabhogādhıkaranam* (ıv 4 10-16)

Thıs adhı arıses by way of dısposıng of a supervenıng objectıon agaınst the conclusıon establıshed ın ıv 4 6 that Muktas are able to enjoy theır bhogas wıth theır 'cıddehas' even tho' they have no physıcal bodıes The objectıon ıs thıs In Suṣuptı there ıs no evıdence of bhoga for the Jıvātman, even tho' he has hıs cıddeha but ıs wıthout any attachment to hıs physıcal body How then can he have any bhoga ın Muktı at wıll where he wıll be left wıth only a cıddeha and wıthout a materıal body? Thıs questıon ıs taken up ın thıs adhı[1] Its contınuıty of thought wıth adhıs 5 6, remaıns unbroken by adhı 7 because the questıon raısed ın ıt whether the Muktas are subject to the control of theır ınferıors has been answered by analogıcally extendıng to ıt the applıcatıon of the reason gıven ın adhı 6 (ıv 4 8) whıch makes ıt thus an ıncıdental topıc[2]

Purvapakṣa

The Purvapakṣa flowıng from the adhıkasankā ıs as follows If Muktas are deemed to have bodıes there wıll be the adverse consequence of theır becomıng lıable to paın, sufferıng and mısery, whıch are assocıated wıth embodıment They cannot, therefore, be held to enjoy only unalloyed blıss wıthout any sufferıng If they have no bodıes there wıll

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1 यद्यपि चिन्मात्रेण [illegible] तथापि सुप्तौ बाह्यदेहाभिमानाभावे चिन्मात्रदेहेनापि [illegible] मुक्तावपि कथं चिन्मात्रदेहेन [illegible] * * अधिकरणम् (Vādırāja *TPG* ıv 4 10)

2 अत्र [illegible] मुक्तानां भोगा न युज्यन्ते [illegible] इति चिन्ता (Ragh. *Ny Muktāvali*)

be no possibility of enjoyment at all It cannot be said that having a ciddeha of their own, lodged in the body of B, they can have no difficulty in enjoyment Tho' it may be so for Sāyujyamuktas, how will it be with the other Muktas? Even in the case of Sāyujyamuktas, the enjoyment of certain external bhogas attributed to them cannot be explained without the acceptance of bodies other than the ciddeha or the Brāhmadeha The ciddeha is not going to help them as we see that in spite of having it in Suṣupti one has no bhoga in that state All this shows that bhoga of Muktas cannot be satisfactorily explained with or without the ascription of a body to them

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the fact of Muktabhoga can be satisfactorily explained both on the acceptance of a body for him and holding that he has no body After giving the views of Bādari and Jaimini on the point, Bādarāyaṇa gives his own view in Sūtra 12, bringing theirs also under the purview of his own position Bādari's view is that the statements in the Śrutis to the effect that Muktas have no bodies really mean that they have *no bodies other than their ciddehas*[3] referred to in Sūtra 6[4a] Jaimini, on the other hand, holds on the authority of the (Uddālaka)-Śruti that in addition to their ciddeha some higher orders of Muktas have the power to take material bodies of the luminous essence of "Śuddhasattva",[4b] not originated by karma and that in respect of enjoyment with the help of such bodies, the ciddeha of the Muktas remains the substratum of the Śuddhasattva-bodies[5]

Bādarāyaṇa approves of both these views, holding that just as the Dvādasāha sacrifice partakes of the character of both a Sattra and an Ahīna type, the enjoyment of Muktas can be thro' external bodies constituted of luminous Śuddhasattva[6] or their Svarupa-(cid)-dehas or

3 चिन्मात्र विनान्यो देहस्तेषा न विद्यत इति बादरि (*M BSB* iv 4 10)
प्रकृतत्वात चिन्मात्रस्यैव प्रतियोगित्वमिति (*BD*)

4 (a) स वा एष एतेन दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान्कामान्पश्यन्रमते ... परमभिपश्यत्यभिश्रृणोति ज्योतिर्वै रूपेण चिता वा अचिता वा नित्येन वा अनित्येन ना अथानन्दी ह्येवैष भवति नानानन्द कचिदुपस्पृशति (*M BSB* iv 4 11)
अचिता शुद्धसत्त्वात्मकप्राकृतकर्मानारब्धजडात्मकेन वा प्रकाशमानेन रूपेण शरीरेणैव दर्शनश्रवणोपलक्षितसर्वानुभववान (*BD* iv 4 11)

4b For authority regarding existence of Śuddhasattva *see* सत्त्व च मिश्र न च कालविक्रम (*Bhag* ii 9 10)

5 चिन्मात्रदेहेन भोगे बाह्यदेहापेक्षा नास्ति। बाह्यदेहेन भोगे तु चिदात्मकदेहोऽधिष्ठानत्वेनापेक्षित (*BD* iv 4 12)

6 ज्योतिर्मयेषु देहेषु स्वेच्छया विश्वमोक्षिण । भुञ्जते सुसुखान्येव न दुःखादीन कदाचन ॥
तीर्णा हि सर्वशोकास्ते पुण्यपापादिवर्जिता । निवृत्तसर्वदोषास्त गुणमात्रस्वरूपिण ॥
(*Brahmavaivarta* Q *M BSB* iv 4 16)
The *BD* points out that according to some commentators only such Jivas as go thro all the four phases of mukti (sarvamokṣinah) enjoy bhogas with the help of luminous bodies of Śuddhasattva For further details see *BD* and Ragh *TPB* (iv 4 16)

spiritual bodies, as the case may be The absence of enjoyment of bhoga in Suṣupti even tho' the ciddeha is there is due to the overpowering influence of Bhāvarūpājñāna then As this is destroyed in Mokṣa, there is no difficulty in the enjoyment of bhoga thro' the Svarūpadeha then

The Sūtrakāra refutes the objection that if Muktas should have bodies, they will be exposed to the natural consequences of embodiment viz pain and suffering also, which will be inconsistent with their freedom from imperfections He points out that it is only the unreleased souls who are obliged to forgo all enjoyments if they have no body or suffer pain and misery consequent on their being embodied Muktas are completely free from both these disabilities They are Satyasan kalpas—i e have the power to realize whatever they will and avoid whatever they wish to avoid[7]

Sūtra iv 4 13 explains how Muktas are able to enjoy their bhogas even in the absence of a body as one does in his dreams,[8] where notwithstanding the physical existence of the gross body, the dreaming self is without any pronounced attachment to it as in the waking state *Such absence of attachment to the body is practically equivalent to having no body*[9]

Sūtra 14 explains that Muktas have their spiritual bodies (ciddeha) with which they can enjoy their bhogas If they wish it, they can also take on a luminous body of suddhasattva as envisaged by Jaimini In either case, there is no difficulty of bhoga with these bodies, as in the waking state (*bhāve jāgradvat*) The point of analogy with the waking state here is only with regard to the fact of bhoga and not with liability to pain and suffering associated with the enjoyments in waking life[10] As has already been pointed out, the attachment of Muktas to such bodies taken at will does not go beyond the limit of looking upon them as theirs for the nonce and not involving them in any intensive clinging to such bodies as being indispensable to their life or happiness

7 शरीराभावाच्च भावाच्च निर्दोषत्वं च दुःखिनाम् । यान्त्यमुक्ता नामयं च मुक्तानां वशिता यतः ॥
इति श्रुत्यैव विरोधक्लृप्तः (NV iv 4 *adhi* 8)

8 तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्तेः (iv 4 13) This Sutra corroborates what has been said in the Sandhyadhikarana (iii 2 1-4) about the reality of dreams and experiences therein See PP 8 19 ante Also Preface

9 अनभिमानस्याभावसाम्यात् (*TP* iv 4 13)

10 भावे जाग्रद्वत्—भोगमात्रे दृष्टान्तः । अतो न दुःखाद्यनुषङ्ग आपतनीयः (*TP* iv 4 14)

(as is the case with our attachment to our physical bodies in Samsāra)[11] This is precisely what distinguishes Mokṣa from the state of Samsāra

The affirmation of bhoga with the help of a body in Sūtra 14, is to prepare the ground for the clarification to be given in the next Sūtra as to how in spite of enjoyment of bhoga with a material body, the Mukta remains not exposed to pain and suffering associated with an embodied condition[12]

Sūtra 15, accordingly clarifies the position as follows Whatever the nature of the body (cit or śuddhasattva) the Mukta always enjoys what is good, agreeable and pleasant By entering into (*āvesa*) a body of Śuddhasattva, if he so chooses he enjoys his bhogas just as the flame of an oil-lamp spreading thro' the wick feeds only on the oil in the container in which the wick is soaked but not on its dregs or the soot produced in the process of burning[13]

The words 'Tathā hi darsayati' in Sūtra 15 emphasizes the point that it is in keeping with the character of mukti that the released souls enjoy pure bliss without any accretion of pain or suffering in the process or in consequence of taking on a body for the purpose of such enjoyment For, it is established on the authority of the Śrutis that the Mukta 'completely passes over all sorrows of the heart"[14] (*Bṛh Up* iv 3 22) and that "in the heavenly world there is no misery"[15] (*Katha Up* i 12)

The last Sutra (16) disposes of another objection that the above statements of the Śrutis have no reference to the ultimate state of mokṣa, but only to the heavenly world (Svarga) The Sūtra Svāpya

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11 कदाचित स्वेच्छया शरीरग्रहेऽपि तस्मिन परमानुग्रहकृतात स्वातन्त्र्यात अनभिमानाच्च । (*TD* iv 4 14)
मिथ्याभिनिवेशरूपाभिमानाभावेऽपि स्वकीय वज्ञानमात्ररूपाभिमानस्यापि भावात सुतरा भोगोपपत्ति (*TD* iv 4 14)

12 देहसदभावपक्षम प्रस्तुत्य तत्करण तस्यैतद्विषयत्व न ज्ञायत । अत प्रस्तावार्थमिद सूत्रम (Raghu *TPB* iv 4 14)

13 यथा प्रदीपो दीपिकासु प्रविष्ट तत्स्थ तैलाद्येव भुङक्ते न तु कार्ष्ण्यादि (M *BSB* iv 4 15)
Ragh (*TDP*) points out that the analogy of the flame serves a double purpose of indicating that besides enjoying only the blissful experiences but nothing painful the Mukta illumines the material body itself with which he enjoys without allowing himself to be corrupted by its inherent defects
मुक्तोऽपि जडदेह प्रकाशयन्नेव सुख भक्ते न तु तद्धमसस्पृष्ट इति च द्योतनाय प्रदीपदृष्टान्तोक्ति ।

14 अत्र पिता अपिता भवति माता अमाता * * अनन्वागत पुण्यनानन्वागत पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वान शोकान हृदयस्य भवति '

15 स्वर्गे लोके न भय किंच नास्ति न तत्र त्व न जरया बिभति । (*Katha Up* i 1 12)

yasampattyor anyatarāpekṣam āviṣkṛtam hi (iv 4 16) clarifies that it is only in the *two* (*anyatara*) states of Suṣupti (*sampatti*) and mokṣa (*svapyaya*) that the Jivātman is really free from pain and misery—not being 'followed by his (aniṣta)-punyam and his sins (pāpam) For, the description given in *Brh Up* iv 3 22 will not at all fit in with the state of Svarga For the merits of one who has gone to Svarga are not entirely cut off from him or from his subsisting relationship to the near and dear ones whom he has left behind on earth until he has dissolved his Lingasārīra in Pralaya His not being followed by his punya is thus patently irreconcilable with his attainment of Svarga which is the fruit of his good deeds and it has been established in *B S* iii 1 8, that after sojourning in Svarga and other worlds, the Istādikārins return to this world with a residue of their karma [16]

According to M's commentary 'anyatara' in Sutra iv 4 16 is to be understood in the sense of both" the states of Suṣupti and Mokṣa and not in the sense of 'either of them' (alternatively) For in both the states, the Jīva is untouched by aniṣtapunya and sins The *AC* and *BD* have clearly explained why Bādarayana has chosen to use the expression 'anyatara' here and in what sense he wishes it to be construed and how no other way of phrasing the Sutra would reflect the sense *intended* by him adequately without giving rise to any misconception [17]

Interpretations of Śamkara and Ramānuja

Abhāvadhikaranam (iv 4 10-14)

According to S this adhi consists of five Sūtras only R extends it to two more The general trend of interpretation is the same The *question raised is whether the Mukta Jiva has a body and organs for* enjoyment of bhogas or not For in the previous adhi it was shown that the rising of Pitṛs etc is due entirely to his will and needs no auxiliaries The views of Badari and Jaimini are presented as Purva

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16 अपिनृत्वादिपुण्यपापासंसर्गवादिनिर्गमश्रवणाच्च सुषुप्त्यादिविषयत्वं स्फुटं प्रतीयते। स्वर्गस्थस्य श्राद्धादिभाक्त्वात्तु तदसम्भवात् (*TP* iv 4 16)

17 Read श्रुतस्यान्यद्वयम्—एकस्यां योजनायां स्वाप्ययपरत्वं योजनान्तरे तु संपत्तिपरत्वमित्यन्यतरापेक्षमिति भावः। एतेन संपत्तिपरत्वस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वात् अन्यतरापेक्षमिति संदिग्धवचनमयुक्तमिति परास्तम्

(*AC* iv 4 16)

न चान्यतरग्रहणात्तु सूत्रकारस्य तौ हि इति वाक्यस्यैकार्थविवक्षास्तीति वाच्यम्। यद्यनयोरन्यतर एवार्थो विवक्षितः तर्हि स्वाप्ययापेक्षमिति वा संपत्त्यपेक्षमिति वा ब्रूयात्। न तु विकल्पवाचकान्यतरपदप्रयोगः वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगात्। न च सूत्रकृतान्यतरवाच्य इति निश्चयाभावाच्च प्रयोगः। सर्वज्ञस्य संशयायोगात्। अन्यथा तन्त्रस्य सूत्रस्य हानिः। ननु सर्वत्र पञ्चम्यादि स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरित्येव कुतो न कृतम्? उच्यते— अनेकार्थस्य तौ हि इति वाक्यस्य एकार्थव्याख्यानं दृढीकरणेव व्याख्यातुं प्रमाणं न तु मुख्यामुख्यताविवक्षार्थमिति सूचयितुं अन्यतरापेक्षमिति (*BD* iv 4 16)

pakṣas and Bādarāyana's view (Sūtra 12) accepts both as plausible, elaborating how they are so in Sūtras 13 and 14 R introduces Sūtra 15 as answering an incidental objection as to how the soul being atomic in size can connect itself with many bodies at the same time [18] Sūtra 16 similarly is explained as replying to another objection as to how the Muktajīva can be said to know things when it appears from *Brh Up* iv 3 21 that when he reaches B all his inner and outer knowledge is stopped This is answered by pointing out that this Śruti refers either to the condition of deep sleep or the time of death (*sampattih*)

Bādari's view is—the Mukta Jīva is without a body For, it is said in the Śruti "His Pitrs rise up by his mere wish (*Chān Up* viii 2 1) and that "seeing these wishes with the mind, he rejoices (*Chān Up* viii 12 5) Here, the specification "he sees with the mind" (*manasā paśyan*) rules out other auxiliaries (*anyayogavyavaccheda*) and is to be construed emphatically that he sees with the mind alone (*manasaiva*), without requiring a body and other organs The statement elsewhere that "he becomes onefold, threefold" etc (*Chān Up* vii 26 2) need not be taken to recognize the existence or the assumption of bodies as well It is enough to refer it to the manifoldness brought about by multiplicity of minds without bodies, assumed by the power of Yoga (Vide *Kalpataru* iv 4 10)

Jaimini's view is that without assuming bodies, the self cannot be said to achieve manifoldness in all its variety and richness This may be seen from the story of Saubhari in the Purānas The suggestion that the statement regarding the self's manifolding itself may be taken as purely eulogistic cannot be accepted when there is no difficulty in ac cepting it in its actual sense For, tho' the statement itself occurs in the Nirgunavidyā of Bhūman, it can be connected with the preceding Saguna-vidyā of the Sūtratman (Prāna) and its fruits and construed as eulogizing the Nirgunavidyā with the excellences attributed to the Sūtrātmavidyā The specification 'manasā pasyan' need not be understood as ruling out the possibility of a body A specification is acceptable even in the sense of invariable association as in "Caitra carries a bow' which does not imply that he carries no other weapon like sword [19]

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18 This point has been covered in *B S* ii 3 24 and 26

19 नहि मनोमात्रमदे स्फुटतरोऽन्वयाभावो यथा शरीरेन्द्रियमदे। अत एव सौभरेरभिविनिर्मितविविधदेहस्या पर्यायेण विहार स्मयते। न चाथसभवे स्तुतिमात्रमनर्थकमवक्ल्पत। यद्यपि निगुणायामिद भौमविद्याया पठ्यत तथापि तस्या पुरस्तादनन सगुणावस्थागतन ऐश्वर्येण निर्गुणविद्या स्तूयते। अयोगव्यवच्छदेनापि विशेषणात यथा चैत्रो धनुधर (*Bhamati* iv 4 11)

Bādarāyana accepts both the possibilities holding that it will not be proper to insist upon the invariable presence of the body or its absence in the enjoyment of the Muktas For, as no enjoyment is possible in the absence of the mind, insistence upon its presence by way of specification being superfluous should not be pressed to the exclusion of any other auxiliaries but understood only as excluding one of the alternatives which can be simultaneously adopted[20]

Criticism

As willing is dependent on possessing a mind and as the mind is admittedly dependent on the body and organs,[21] there is no possibility of entertaining any doubt whether the Mukta who "sees these, wishes with the mind and enjoys" them does so with or without a body Nor is there any room for any supervening doubt in regard to the existence of the body For, the reference to the mind as the means of enjoyment in "Manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate (*Chān Up* viii 12 5) does not negate the body as a means of such enjoyment as the mind itself cannot exist and function as a means of perception or enjoyment without a body Tho' a specification may exclude association of others in the act, such exclusion would apply to what may be inconsistent with or contradictory to the given data Otherwise, we may have to exclude the Mukta's selfhood too, from his act of seeing with the mind. The presence of the body together with the mind is corroborated by the Śruti 'he becomes one, he becomes three' Tho' this text is not read in the context of the Sagunavidyā of Prāna but in that of the Bhūmavidyā there is no difficulty in transplacing it to the context of the 'Nirgunavidyā,' as permitted in the shifting of the mantra consecrating Pūṣan found in the Darsapūrnamāsaprakarana.[22] Otherwise, manifold existence being incompatible with Nirgunavidyā, its very mention in that context will be exposed to invalidity Its presence cannot be explained as a eulogy on the basis of manifold existence being a fruit of Saguṇa (Prāna) Vidyā. For, even a eulogy has to be made on the basis of existing facts and not on imaginary ones The arthavāda of Prajāpati's pulling out his own entrails need not be dismissed as a fiction as such a feat is possible in a powerful deity like Prajāpati The first Pūrvapakṣa is, therefore, untenable

20 [illegible] नियमवादी पूर्वपक्ष न सहते द्विविधस्यापि उपपत्तेः । [illegible] हि [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 12)

21 [illegible] इति श्रुत [illegible]

22 Vide [illegible] न स्यात् (*P M S* iii, 2, 1-2)

'[illegible]' इति मन्त्रा हि [illegible] (*Kutūhala-Vṛtti*)

The second is in the same boat For to admit a body is to fly in the face of the Śruti 'when he is free of the body, neither pleasure nor pain touches him (*Chan Up* viii 12 1) which shows the Mukta is bodiless The passage "He becomes one, he becomes three" can stand where it is in the Bhūmavidyā itself and need not be disturbed There is no incompatibility in associating the excellence of becoming manifold, with 'Nirgunavidyā' It cannot be said that the attainment of 'Nisprapañcatā' (worldlessness) being the coveted Puruṣārtha, it will be incompatible with this aim to get into manifold existence In that case, the state of swoon will have to be looked upon as a Purusārtha If it is part of embodied existence, the other state of Suṣupti also will have to be placed in the same category of "Saprapañca" and there will remain no means of conceiving of what the Niṣprapañca state will be like If manifold existence is not a Puruṣārtha, how can it be used to eulogize the Nirgunavidyā? How can Nirgunavidyā which is the highest Purusārtha be eulogized by manifold existence (*anekadhābhāva*), if it is to be a negation of Puruṣārtha? The purpose of eulogy can be served only when an inferior is complimented by being compared with something superior, as when one praises his patron by saying that he is like the king and not the other way about—that the king is like the beggar But to have a body or to get into manifold existence (*anekadhābhāva*) cannot be considered to be a desirable attainment from S's point of view, as it will amount to a denigration of Nirgunavidyā

Hence, the Siddhānta investing the Mukta with a body will be equally untenable as it will involve the attendant consequences of pain and misery and prevent untrammelled enjoyment It cannot be said that this can be avoided by investing the Mukta with only a mind and with no body and organs It has already been shown that it is not possible to do so as acceptance of the mind involves the acceptance of the body and organs

Śamkara's Pradipādhikaranam (iv 4 15-16)

S considers in this adhi whether the many bodies which the Mukta Jiva has been said to be able to create for his simultaneous enjoyment in Sūtra 11, are animated by souls like the bodies of men or are without souls like puppets manipulated by a showman

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as neither the mind nor the self can be divided, the bodies created by the self must be without souls and organs The self which has become finitised by delimitation of beginningless original antahkarana, cannot manifest the same ego sense correlated with itself in other bodies by getting delimited by fresh antahkaranas

Bādarāyana accepts both the possibilities holding that it will not be proper to insist upon the invariable presence of the body or its absence in the enjoyment of the Muktas For, as no enjoyment is possible in the absence of the mind, insistence upon its presence by way of specification being superfluous should not be pressed to the exclusion of any other auxiliaries but understood only as excluding one of the alternatives which can be simultaneously adopted.[20]

Criticism

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20 [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 12)

21 [illegible] इति सूत्र [illegible] (S BSB iv 4 10)

22 Vide [illegible] (P M S iii, 2, 1 2)

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created for the purpose Nor can the self create new selves to animate the bodies For one thing, a self cannot be created Such a creation will also be futile as the self would not go about creating new selves in vain but only for its own enjoyment of bhogas If the new bodies are to be occupied by other selves how can the self derive any personal enjoyment out of the enjoyments of *other selves thro' other bodies?* These other bodies then must be soulless

The Siddhānta is that the text which speaks of the Mukta's assuming several bodies at the same time for enjoyment can only be explained on the assumption that these bodies are animated by his own self dividing itself thro' the division of its limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) There is no comparison with the showman's puppets in this For the showman who manipulates different puppets at the same time to his whims is not referred to as having assumed many bodies A body is the seat of personal enjoyment This does not apply to the puppets We have, therefore, to conclude that being Satyakāma, the Mukta creates bodies with senses and minds by his own power, enters into them at the same time and sports thro' them. The next Sūtra answers the objection as to how such power of enjoyment can be admitted when the Srutis tell us that in the state of Mokṣa the soul has no specific cognitions (*Brh Up* ii 4 14, iv 3 30, 32) The answer is that these statements about absence of cognitions refer to the condition of deep sleep or to *final release*—the understanding being that the assumption of several bodies pertains to a lower form of mukti

Criticism

The question whether bodies created or assumed by the Mukta Jiva are with or without souls has no relevance here as this Pāda is concerned with the Mukta's 'bhogas' and not with whether the bodies he assumes have souls as well The *Kalpataru* has put forward an 'ākṣepasangati' justifying such an inquiry that if such bodies should be soul less there can be no possibility of bhoga But then, what is called the individual self (Pratyagātman) is Advaita philosophy is consciousness delimited by Avidyā. Avidyā being all pervasive, the Pratyagātman, limited by it, being yet identical with the all-pervasive B , can afford to be in connection with all the bodies The objection, therefore, that the created bodies may be soulless cannot arise from S 's point of view The *Bhāmatī* has argued that tho' in reality identical with the all-pervasive Paramātman, the conscious self which has been finitised by beginningless Avidyā and delimited by particularised antahkarana into an indi-

vidual cannot enter simultaneously with his individualised antaḥkaraṇa into other bodies tho' created by himself.[23]

This is bound to lead to complications. For, if the conscious self delimited by antaḥkaraṇa were to be regarded as Jīvātman, he cannot be held to be pervasive as made out in the Utkrāntyadhi. according to S. Moreover, the difficulty of enjoyment thro' several bodies at the same time for one individual is similar to the one answered in ii.3.25 and need not be reconsidered here.

It requires to be clarified if the Siddhānta here that the bodies are Sātmaka (with souls) accepts the position that the self in question is 'vibhu' (pervasive) or akhaṇḍa (impartible). In the former case, we cannot talk of the Jīva as the being delimited by antaḥkaraṇa. If Ātman is held to be vibhu, it should be possible for a pervasive being to be present not only in the bodies created by the Mukta Jīva but in every one of the bodies in Samsāra, to enjoy the bhogas contributed by them as his own. Tho' in the Samasāra state, the bhogas of each individual may be delimited by the distinctive nature of the antaḥkaraṇa manifesting such bhogas thro' the ego-sense of appropriation as one's own, *after the scales of Avidyā have fallen off from the Mukta in the state of Mokṣa, with which we are concerned here,* the Mukta Jīva will not be bound by the barriers of particularised antaḥkaraṇas of Samsāra and should be in a position to appropriate these bhogas also as his own with a full sense of their ownership. *The point of this objection has been fully conceded by the Bhāmatī*[24] *and cannot be parried.*

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23 वस्तुत· परमात्मनोऽभिन्नोऽप्यय विज्ञानात्मा अनाद्यविद्याकल्पितप्रादेशिकान्त करणावच्छेदेनानादिजीवभाव-मापन्न प्रादेशिक सन् न देहान्तराणि स्वभावनिर्मितान्यपि नानाप्रदेशवर्तीनि सान्त करणो युगपदावेष्टुमर्हति (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 15)

24 न च सर्वगतस्य वस्तुतो विगलितप्रायाविद्यस्य विदुष पृथक्जनस्येव औपाधिकान्त करणवश्यता येन तदौत्पत्तिक-मन्त करणमागन्तुकान्त करणान्तरसबन्धमस्य वारयेत (*Bhāmatī* iv 4 15)

CHAPTER XCVII

LIMITATION OF POWERS OF MUKTAS

9 *Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam* (vi 4 17-20)

In the previous adhikaranas, the factual reality of Bhoga in mokṣa and the means by which the released souls enjoy such bhoga have been established after refuting objections that may be brought up against the position. The Sūtrakāra now goes into the question of the bounds of freedom and power of the Jīvas to enjoy such bhogas at will [1] If the freedom of the Muktas to create for themselves such bhogas at will and enjoy them is unrestricted, it will impose a limitation on the freedom and independence of Para-B —which has been recognized as the one supreme reality of Vedānta philosophy For, there cannot be two independent Satyasankalpas [2]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Muktas have unlimited power and freedom including the freedom to accomplish the cosmic functions of the creation, sustenation, dissolution, control, enlightenment and liberation of the world For, the *A Ā* says One who knows this, on departure after the dissolution of the body and having obtained all desires there in heaven, becomes immortal[3] (ii 5), The cosmic dispensations are also fit to be brought within the ambit of the Mukta Jiva's will There is no reason to limit the scope of the words of the Śruti "he attains all his

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1 एवं भोगेऽनुपपत्तिनिरासेन समर्थिते, स यत्र तदियत्ताचिन्तनमवसरप्राप्तम् (Ragh *TPB* iv 4 17)

2 निरङ्कुशत्वे भगवतः सर्वोत्तमत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् (ibid)

3 स एवं विद्वानस्माच्छरीरभेदादूर्ध्वं उत्क्रम्य अमुष्मिन् स्वर्गे लोके सर्वान् कामानाप्त्वामृतः समभवत् समभवत् (*Op cit*)

desires" to certain wishes only and exclude the cosmic dispensations from coming within their scope as being fit to be realized by it. Moreover, the *Taittirīya Up* (i 5) tells us that in moksa all the gods offer tribute to him (the released soul[4])—which shows he becomes all-powerful then. Tho' in the mundane world the Jiva has no such power of the creation, sustenation, etc of the world, he may very well come into such powers in Moksa where his satyasankalpatva is made manifest, and all obscuring forces which have till then been holding him down and preventing the fullest expression of his nature and latent powers are removed.[5]

The Siddhānta is that Muktas can realize at will only *other* lordly powers *than* the power of activity relating to the creation etc, of the world. The reference in the *A A* (ii 5) to their realizing all their desires has to be restrictively understood to exclude 'Jagadvyāpāra' or the activities relating to the eightfold dispensation of the cosmos which is Para B.'s prerogative, as established in BS i 1 2. The Sarvakāmaśruti (*AĀ* ii 5) quoted for the Pūrvapaksa has, therefore, to be understood in a restricted sense. For, this Śruti refers expressly to the Jivatman and is contextually connected with him as we see from the reference to his "rising from the body" (asmāc charirabhedād utkramya). Jīvas as such have no power to create, preserve, dissolve, guide and liberate the cosmos. The broad general statement "he attains all his desires" has, therefore, to be taken in a restricted sense. The expression 'asannihitatvāt' in the Sūtra conveys, with grim humour, the truth that it is a far cry from the Jivas' limited powers to the unimaginable powers of B.'s cosmic dispensation. This natural drift of the Sūtra 'Jagadvyāpāravarjam' is forcefully brought out by M.

(सर्वान् कामानाप्त्वा' इति श्रुते) जीवप्रकरणत्वात्, जीवाना तादृक्सामर्थ्यविदूरत्वाच्च सृष्ट्यादिभ्योऽन्यान् व्यापारान् आप्नोति (इति श्रुत्यर्थ)

P M Modi, in his 'Critique of Brahmasūtra' Vol I, p 448, has given a curious and novel interpretation of (Jagad)-"vyāpāra" which is not only redundant in the light of the last Sūtra (iv 4 23) but is also at variance with the sense of 'vyāpāra' as used by the Sutrakāra himself in 'tadvyāpārād' (iii 1 16).

Tho' the Jivas are 'Satyakāmas' i e capable of realizing what they will, their 'Satyakāmatva' as has already been made clear, is completely attuned to the will of B. (*See* under Avibhāgādhi iv 2 16). The

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4 ता यो वेद स वेद ब्रह्म सर्वेऽस्मै देवा बलिमावहन्ति (*Op cit*)

5 कामक्रोधादिमालिन्ययुक्तस्य भवत्वशक्तिः मुक्तस्य तु परिशुद्धत्वात् भवतु शक्तिः । न ह्यावरणदशायां यद्यपानुभूयते तन्निवृत्तस्यावरणे तथैवेति नियमः (*STC*)

Muktas, therefore, are thus incapable of entertaining any wishes which will be contrary to the Divine Will and cosmic order which is an expression of that will The "ca" *in the Sūtra is to be understood to* refer to relevant authorities to the effect from the Smrtis

> स्वाधिकानन्दसंप्राप्तौ सृष्ट्याद्व्यापृतिष्वपि ।
> मुक्ताना नैव काम स्यादन्यान्कामास्तु भुजते ॥
> तद्योग्यता नैव तेषा कदाचित् क्वापि विद्यते ।
> न चायोग्य द्विमुक्तोऽपि प्राप्नुयान् नैव कामयेत्[6] ॥ (M *BSB* iv 4 18)

The Pūrvapaksin's plea that on the removal of obscuring forces, Muktas may emerge into all-powerfulness so as to sport themselves with cosmic creation etc if they will to do so, overlooks the fact that the intrinsic powers and properties of things is unalterable The intrinsic property of gold cannot be transferred to fire and *vice versa*.[7] It is equally far fetched to argue that Para B himself who is all-powerful may endow the Mukta with absolute powers to accomplish whatever he wills including cosmic creation and dispensation Such thoughtless action on the part of B would confront us with two independent all-powerful principles which will be a philosophical monstrosity Such wild and irresponsible arguments can take us nowhere The power of God is not to be called in to account for impossibles[8] Nor will Muktas entertain desires beyond their deserts This is what is meant by describ ing them as the Satyakāmas See p 686

The next Sūtra (iv 4 19) disposes of the other argument of the Purvapakṣa that *Taitt Up* (i 5 5) invests the Mukta Jiva with absolute powers and overlordship of all The Sūtra points out that it *is a misconception to think so The passage in question has nothing* to do with the ordinary Jivas It refers to Mukta-Hiraṇyagarbha the Lord of the circle of Ādhikārikas—i e the gods who have been entrusted with the duties of guiding and controlling their inferiors in the gradation.[9] Hiraṇyagarbha is the controlling head of this circle (ādhikārika-mandalasthah) It is of him that the *Taitt Up* speaks when it says "all the other gods pay tribute to him" (i 5 5) in virtue of his being the head of the Ādhikārikamanḍala and not because he enjoys absolute so-

6 'Muktas will never wish to obtain more of bliss than is commensurate with their fitness or aspire to have the powers of cosmic dispensation. Even tho he has obtained release the Mukta-Jiva will not get anything beyond his fitness or entertain any vain desire for such things

7 नहि स्वर्णं शुद्धमपि वह्नित्वापादकं भवेत् । [illegible] ॥

8 नहि कश्चित् मुक्तोऽपि [illegible] । न च काम [illegible] तत्स्यात् सत्यकामता ॥

(M. *NV* iv 4 adhi 9)

9 अधिकारे नियुक्ता आधिकारिकाः तत्र नियुक्त' इति टीका (*TDP* iv 4 19)

vereignity. The use of 'ādhikārikamaṇḍala' instead of the shorter form 'devamaṇḍala' in the Sūtra is to bring out the idea that Mukta-devas also in their turn guide and control their inferiors in the hierarchy, in the state of Mokṣa. *See* BS. iv.4.9.

M.'s commentary on the *Taitt. Up.* explains that Hiraṇyagarbha is lauded there as the knower of the *Māhācamasavidyā* and as specially entitled to its Upāsanā. This Vidyā is the contemplation of Para-B. as being manifested in His fourfold Vyūha forms in each of the four Vyāhṛtis (bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, suvaḥ and mahaḥ).[10] Hiraṇyagarbha accordingly has been called 'Māhācamasyaḥ in *Taitt. Up.* (i.5.1)—the knower of the Lord who is 'Māhācamasa.'[11]

M.'s bhāṣya takes the opportunity provided by the expression 'ukteḥ' *in Sūtra iv.4.19 to give a complete account of the different regions in* which different orders of Muktas will stay after attaining different levels of Mokṣa appropriate to their Yogyatā. The account includes the Ekaguṇopāsakas and the four levels of Mokṣa viz., sālokya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya. The details are :

"The Ekaguṇopāsakas[12] who meditate on only one of the four fundamental attributes of 'ātmatva' and who attain their Mokṣa after exhausing *their Prārabdhakarma but without Utkrānti thro' Brahmanāḍi* or any other and enjoy their Svarūpānanda remain in any of the four regions of bhūh bhuvah suvaḥ and mahaḥ and do not go further up to any of the higher regions of Mukti.[13]"

"Some other Muktas from among human souls reside in the Antarikṣaloka (outer space), some in Svarga, some in Maharloka, others in Janaloka, others in Tapoloka and others in Satyaloka."[14]

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10 भूर्भुव सुवर्मह इति चतस्रो व्याहृतय तच्छब्दवाच्या लोकज्योति प्राणवेदेषु स्थिता अनिरुद्धादिभगवद्रूप विशेषा प्रत्येकमनिरुद्धादिभेदेन चतुर्धा भवन्ति। ते तु, अनिरुद्धानिरुद्ध–अनिरुद्ध–प्रद्युम्नो–अनिरुद्ध–सङ्कर्षणो ऽनिरुद्धवासुदेव इत्यादिरूपा ता एव चतस्र चतस्र षोडशमूर्तय । यथोक्त तैत्तिरीय भाष्ये–
लोकज्योति प्राणवेदेष्वेक स पुरुषोत्तम ।
प्रत्येकश चातुरात्म्यात् षोडशात्मा प्रकीर्तित ।

11 माहाचमसनामासौ यस्मादतिचमत्कृति ।
माहाचमस्य तज्ज्ञानी ब्रह्मा सपरिकीर्तित ।। (M. *Taitt. Up. Bhāsya*)

12 For further information regarding Ekagunopāsakas *See*—PP. 252, 270 and 677

13 गारुडे च–
आत्मेत्येव पर देवमुपास्य हरिमव्ययम् । केचिदत्रैव मुच्यन्ते नोत्क्रामन्ति कदाचन ।।

14 अत्रैव च स्थितिस्तेषामन्तरिक्षे तु केचन। केचित् स्वर्गे महर्लोके जने तपसि चापरे ।।
केचित् मर्ये * * * * * * *

"Others of exceedingly great wisdom who belong to the order of Apratīkālambanas go to the heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa and others on the coast of Ksirasagara and remain there"[15]

"Even among denizens of the three heavenly regions of Śvetadvīpa etc, there is gradation of Muktas in the attainment of Sālokya and other forms of mukti[16]

"There is gradation of Muktas among all orders of souls, human and divine, the latter including Ciras, Ājānajas, Karmajas, Tattvābhimānins and Indra, Rudra and Hiranyagarbha as regards their Svarūpānanda and their enjoyment of other bhogas, and their knowledge, powers and other excellences"[17]

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15 * * * * महाज्ञाना गच्छन्ति क्षीरसागरम् ।
तत्रापि तमयोगेन ज्ञानाधिक्यात् समीपगाः । सालोक्यं च सरूपत्वं सामीप्यं योग एव च ।
इमामारभ्य सर्वत्र यावत्तु क्षीरसागरे । पुरुषोऽनन्तशयनः श्रीमान्नारायणाभिधः ॥
Commentators explain that in view of the statement quoted in M's *GB* (ii 50)
* * * * यावत् श्वेतं न गच्छन्ति । ज्ञानी तावन्न मुक्तः स्यादिति शास्त्रस्य निर्णयः ॥
'No Jnanin can become truly released until he has gone to Śvetadvīpa', the Ekagunopasakas must be deemed to go up there once after Lingabhanga and return to their allotted abodes in the worlds of bhuh, bhuvah, suvah and mahah, for permanent residence

16 Different explanations have, however, been given of the promise of Salokya and other forms of Mokṣa held out in the verse
इमामारभ्य सर्वत्र यावत्तु क्षीरसागरे । पुरुषोऽनन्तशयनः श्रीमान्नारायणाभिधः ॥
(तावत्तु) सालोक्यं च सरूपत्वं सामीप्यं योग एव च (M *BSB* iv 4 19)
(Prof S Subbarao in his translation of M s Bhaṣya (1936, p 293) has wrongly construed the line इमामारभ्य सर्वत्र यावत्तु क्षीरसागरे । concurrently with the next verse beginning with the words "Manuṣa varnabhedena" introducing a fresh topic)

According to some commentators, this is to be taken literally as promising Salokya etc to all Muktas wherever they may reside according to their fitness

Vādirāja feels that as Salokya and other forms of mukti are accessible only in the three heavenly regions of Kṣīrasagara as it appears from

अक्षण्वन्तः कर्णवन्तः सखायो मनोजवेष्वसमा बभूवुः ।
आदघ्नास उपकक्षास उ त्वे ह्रदा इव स्नात्वा उ त्वे ददृश्रे ॥ (*RV* x 71 7)

the quotation given in the Sutrabhāṣya has to be taken to promise only a semblance of Salokya etc (to all those who are not denizens of Śvetadvīpa etc) in view of the presence of the Divine form in all the worlds—provided that in their primary sense Salokya and other forms of Mukti are to be enjoyed only in the three heavenly worlds of Kṣīrasāgara (Vadiraja *TPG* p 177)

BD however, explains that when top-ranking souls like Hiranyagarbha come down from Śvetadvipa etc to the muktasthanas in the other worlds of bhūh bhuvah, etc, they continue to enjoy Sayujya and other forms of mukti in those worlds also with the Divine forms present in those worlds (BD iv 4 19 p 115 1965 Edn)

17 मानुषा वर्णभेदेन त्वैवमाश्रमभेदतः । क्षितिपा मनुष्यगन्धर्वा देवाश्च पितरश्चिराः ।
आजानजाः कर्मजाश्च तात्त्विकाश्च प्रकीर्तिताः
स्वाश्चेति क्रमशः तेषु धेयास्तारोत्तम्यतः । चितानन्दे च भोगे च ज्ञानैश्वर्यगुणेषु च ॥
सर्वे शतगुणोऽधिकाः पूर्वस्मादुत्तरोत्तरम् ॥ (*Gāruda* Q M *BSB* iv 4 19)

The last Sūtra provides the information that the controlling power of Mukta-Devas in the Ādhikārikamaṇḍala are strictly confined to their inferiors in the released state only and does not extend to others in Samsāra:[18]

(आधिकारिकमण्डलस्थानां मुक्तानां) च न विकारावर्तिव्यापारो विद्यते।

(M. *BSB*.iv.4.20)

The reason is not far to seek Having fully carried out the responsibilities allotted to them as controlling powers in cosmic administration, for so long, it is reasonable that they should now be relieved of further responsibility in the matter, now that they have attained their own Moksa and it should be left to their appointed successors in the Ādhikārikamaṇḍala in Samsāra to carry on those functions.

The "ca" in Sūtra 20 is intended to suggest the syntactic coordination of the predicate (of Sūtra 20) with the negative particle (na) following by 'anuvrtti' from the previous Sūtra[19]

"Vikāra" is the multiform Samsāra,[20] or the Jīvas in Samsāra so full of attachment to their physical body and senses formed out of the modifications (vikāra) of Prakrti[21] The act (vyāpāra or vyāparaṇam) of ceaselessly rotating (*āvartana*) of this wheel of Samsāra is what is referred to in the words of the Sūtra as Vikārāvarti—the neuter noun signifying the activity involved in keeping the wheel of Samsāra in rotation.

The words "Tathā hi darśayati" in the Sūtra refer to the authority of Śruti (*Chān Up* iv 15 6) and of *Varāha* on the point·

विकारावर्तिव्यापारो मुक्ताना न विद्यते–इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्त' इति श्रुतिः।

वाराहे च—

न विकाराधिकारस्तु मुक्तानामन्य एव तु

विकाराधिकृता ज्ञेया ये नियुक्तास्तु विष्णुना ॥

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18 न विकाराधिकारस्तु मुक्तानामन्य एव तु। विकाराधिकृता ज्ञेया ये नियुक्तास्तु विष्णुना ॥ (*Varāha* Q M *BSB* iv 4 20)

19 The AC explains how the use of 'ca' is also necessary in this Sūtra besides the taking over of 'na' from the previous Sutra by anuvṛtti instead of being satisfied with the anuvrtti of the negative particle alone which may dispense with the ca without detriment to brevity of expression *Read*
कि चकार प्रयुज्य तेन नकारानुवर्पणेन? नकार एव कि न प्रयुज्यते? * * चकारप्रयोगे उत्तरसूत्रेष्वनुवृत्त्यभावो विज्ञायत

20 विविधाकारत्वान् मनोविकारदु खमूलत्वात् वा विकारशब्दित ससार (*BD* iv 4 20)

21 यद्वा–विकारपद प्रकृतिविकारशरीराभिमानिससारिपरम्। (*नमावर्तयतीति विकारावर्ति व्यापरण मुक्तानां न विद्यते*) (*BD* iv 4 20)

Tho' the expressed contextual meaning of *Chān Up.* iv 15.6, is only this that Jñānins led up to Para-B by the Mānava-Puruṣa from Vidyut, do not return to the rotational cycle of Samsāra (*mānavam āvartam*), it follows from it that Mukta Jivas have no further interest in the affairs of the world of Samsāra they have left behind, once for all. This applies to the Ādhikārika-Devas also who have attained Mokṣa M. has, therefore, drawn the necessary corollary from the original sense of the Śruti (Imam mānavam āvartam nāvartante) by interpreting the indicative verb *(na) āvartante* in its underlying casual sense *(antarnītanijanta)* of *'na āvartayanti'* to suit the requirements of the point established in this Sūtra according to his interpretation of it This point has not been noticed by any of the commentators on M The reference to the passage from Varāha is probably to cite direct unambiguous evidence on the same point

CHAPTER CVII

QUANTUM OF SVARŪPĀNANDA OF MUKTAS REMAINS CONSTANT

10 *Ekarūpasthityadhikaraṇam* (iv 4 21-22)

The bounds of power of Muktas and of their freedom to realize whatever they want at will have been defined in the previous *adhi* The present one goes on to establish that the quantum of their Svarūpānanda remains constant and intact without increasing by the continuation of Upāsanā or seeking fresh ways of bhoga in Moksa or getting diminished by suspension of further Upāsanās or bhoga [1] It is very necessary to establish this point in formulating a sound doctrine of Moksa For, this is one of the characteristics which distinguishes Mukti from the state of Samsāra Its establishment is, therefore, necessary to make *Mukti* worth striving for and worth attaining as a Purusārtha [2]

The contingency of increase or diminution of Svarūpānanda thro' bhoga and Upāsanā or their suspension is alike repugnant to the Siddhānta If there should be *any increase of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa*, thro' further Upāsanā or exploring new and newer avenues of bhoga, one who belongs to a lower order of Muktas in the hierarchy of beings may chance to excel and supersede those above him in status who may not be inclined to further Upāsanā or bhoga, by adding to the sum of his bliss by intensive Upāsanā or exploring newer avenues of bhoga

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1 पूर्ववन्न विषयभोगैयत्तोक्ताविह तदभिव्यक्तस्वरूपानन्दस्य यथास्थितिरूपयत्तानिरूपणात् पूर्वसंगतिः (Ragh *TPB* iv 4 21)

2 फलं तु संसारसमानधर्मत्वापत्त्या मुक्तेरपुरुषार्थत्वाक्षेपसमाधिः (Ragh. *Ny Muktavali* iv 4 21)

That will abrogate the principle established by the Sūtrakāra earlier that Muktas belonging to a lower order are under the control and guidance of their superiors in the order If the Svarūpānanda is susceptible to diminution due to suspension of Upāsanā or bhoga it may go on diminishing by such default until it reduces the state of Mokṣa to the hapless condition of Samsāra For these reasons, it is necessary to take up this question here

The Pūrvapakṣa is—there needs must be increase or diminution of svarūpānanda of Muktas, for the Śruti speaks of their carrying on different forms of Upāsanās then The *Taitt Up* (iii.10 5) refers to Muktas singing sāmans in praise of the Supreme B by way of Upāsanā[3] There is no need for any such singing unless it is intended by way of Upāsanā

Moreover, Muktas being in a position to realize whatever they want at will, are sure to want an ever-increasing measure of their blissfulness Bliss is in itself the most desirable value and no one will be averse to having more of it, when he can have it at his merest wish

Apart from Upāsanā, we learn from the *Chān Up* (viii 12 3) that Muktas take to various forms of self-enjoyment These must bring them additional pleasure The more of such diversions, the greater must be the bliss derived. It stands to reason then that the bliss of Mokṣa must be subject to increment or diminution as in the case of similar happiness in the state of Samsāra This places Mukti on a level with Samsāra It is not, therefore, worth striving for

The Siddhānta is—tho' Muktas do meditate on B, their Upāsanā is the continuous envisioning of B with their Svarūpajñāna which is a constant factor This is confirmed by the Jābāla Śruti which runs "The Jīvātman who has attained B in this state of Mokṣa is free from bodily death and birth He neither shrinks in his bliss nor grows enlarged in bliss It remains constant Tho' he meditates on B as the infinite being, as his Lord and master (*ātman*) there is neither increment nor diminution of his bliss as he goes on meditating like this" This Śruti makes it clear in the same breath that there is no increase or decrease (of bliss) on any account[4] These statements of the Śruti are corrobo-

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3 That this passage pertains to the realized state is clear from the Jnanin's reaching the Anandamaya B *after departing from this world* (*Taitt Up* iii 10 5) अस्माल्लोकात् प्रेत्य एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामति।

4 मुक्तानामानन्दवृद्धिह्रासौ न विद्येते। [illegible] —
'स एष एतस्मिन् [illegible] न म्रियते न [illegible] न वर्धते [illegible]
[illegible] (*Jābāla Śruti* Q M *BSB* iv 4 21)

rated by the experience (*pratyakṣa*) of wise ones recorded in the Smṛti

यत्र गत्वा न म्रियते यत्र गत्वा न जायते ।
न ह्रीयते यत्र गत्वा यत्र गत्वा न वर्धते ॥
(*Mbh* XII *Mokṣadharma*, 233, 12)

and by inference (*anumāna*) based on the absence of valid grounds to admit the possibility of increase or decrease

The next Sūtra refutes a very crucial objection that there is every reason to hold that increase and decrease in the bliss of Muktas must be accepted as an inescapable fact The Śruti refers to different kinds of bhogas enjoyed by Mukta-Jivas such as the company of women, riding chariots, meeting relatives, singing hymns, performing sacrifices, sporting in the waters of Kṣīrasāgara and so on These varied and different kinds of bhogas cannot be placed on the same par Some of them must be held to be superior to the others, or more elevated, some hedonic, some intellectual and some mystic in their character The bliss derived from such bhogas of different orders and types cannot be uniform. There must be a corresponding difference of quality and measure, etc , in the bliss derived from such heterogeneous enjoyments To admit it is to reduce Mokṣa to the level of Samsāra

The Sūtra "Bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgāc ca" (iv 4 22) answers this objection It points out that notwithstanding the fact that there are differences among the bhogas, some being of a higher type or order and others of a comparatively lower order, we hear from the Śruti ·

एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमनुविश्य न जायते न म्रियते, न ह्रसते, न वर्धते, यथाकामं चरति, यथाकाम पिबति, यथाकाम रमते यथाकाममुपरमते[5] ।

that the Mukta remains singularly free from increment or diminution of his bliss amidst these varying orders of bhogas as well as when he is *not* enjoying them—without any visible impact, either way, upon his sense of uniform blissfulness in and outside these pleasures In other words, he maintains the same blissful state of being when he goes thro' these enjoyments as well as when he goes *without* them[6]

5 "Having entered the Ānandamaya B he has no birth again, no death, no decrease or increase He eats what he likes, sports as he pleases or ceases to do anything" (unidentified Śruti)

6 The *BD* explains how the Sutra is to be construed
मात्रशब्दात् परो विशेषशब्दोऽध्याहृत्य योजनीय । भोगमात्रविशेषसाम्यलिंगात' भोगमात्रस्य (रमणाद्य नेकविशेषयुक्तभोगमात्रस्य) रमते उपरमत इति विषयभोगभावाभावोक्त्या सूचित भोगविशेष, तदभाव च सत्यपि, यन्मुक्तस्वरूपानन्दादे (न ह्रसते न वर्धत इत्युक्त) वृद्ध्यादिशून्यत्वरूप साम्य, एतस्मादेव लिंगात भोगमात्रविशेषस्य भोक्त्रानन्दवृद्ध्याद्यकारणत्वज्ञापकात * * न भोगविशेषो वृद्ध्यादिकारणम
(*BD* iv 4 22)

If Upāsanās do not add to his blissfulness in Moksa what is his incentive to continue them—asks the Pūrvapaksin The answer is that all Upāsanās carried out in the state of Mukti are altruistic and spontaneous[7] *They are not undertaken as means to an end They are ends in themselves*

हरेरुपासना चात्र सदैव सुखरूपिणी ।
न तु साधनभूता सा सिद्धिरेवात्र सा यतः ॥

(*Brahmavaivarta* Q M. *BSB* iv 4 21)

There cannot be a more sublime conception of the Mukta-Jivas' spontaneous Upāsanā of B. in the state of Mokṣa as well It deserves to be noted that in no other school of Vedānta do we find such a position stated by the original founder of the school itself in such clear terms

The other objection that as the Mukta can realize whatever he wants at will, there is possibility of increase of bliss (tho' not of decrease) if so desired by him is easily met If the increase in measure of bliss desired is within the competence of the Mukta he would already be in possession of it—without wishing If it is beyond his competence, he will *not* entertain any desire for it

न चायोग्य विमुक्तोऽपि नाप्नुयान्नैव कामयेत् ।

In no circumstance then, can Mukti become reduced to the level of Samsāra by admitting the existence of bhoga there

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7 अभ्यासप्राप्त्वात् [illegible] वाऽनुपासना ।
भक्तिरत्र सुखरूपैव मुक्तानां न तु साधनम् । (*NV* iv 4 adhi 10)

CHAPTER CVIII

JOURNEY'S END—THE LAND OF NO-RETURN

11 *Anāvrttyadhikaranam* (iv 4 23)

It was established in the previous *adhi*, that the bliss of Muktas is constant and knows no diminution The present *adhi*. establishes that this experience of the blissful condition of Mukti *lasts for ever afterwards* and knows no end[1]

To establish this point it is necessary to consider if Muktas *are liable to return to* Samsāra *and go thro' the cycle of births and deaths over* again as in the case of other Jivas who have attained Svarga or other worlds *To settle this point it has to be considered if like the immense periods of time of* Yugas, *Manvantaras and eons having an end the life of Muktas too* '*for all time*" *may come to a similar end*

The Pūrvapaksa contends that the Muktas too are liable to return to Samsāra[2] like those who have gone up to Svarga Tho' the released soul may live on 'for all time", the entirety of time itself may come to an end some time when they will have to revert to Samsāra It cannot be said that as time is endless there is no possibility of the entirety of time coming to an end, some time We have, a reference

1 पूवत्र मुक्तानन्दस्य वृद्ध्यादि नत्युक्तम । अत्र तु तदनुभवस्यान्तो नास्तीत्युच्यत इति सगति

(*Ragh Ny Muktavali* iv 4 23)

2 While all Vedantic schools and almost all religious teachers of the world are agreed that there is no return of souls after salvation the founder of Arya Samaj in modern Hinduism stands severely alone in holding that they return to cosmic life after a vast stretch of time See *Satyartha Prakash* Chapter IX p 155 (21st Edn Vaidik Yantralaya Ajmer 1932)

in the Mahābhārata to amāvāsyā-tithi falling prematurely on a trayodaśī-tithi, portending the fall of Duryodhana in the battle of Kurukṣetra

> चतुर्दशीं पञ्चदशीं भूतपूर्वां तु षोडशीम् ।
> इमां तु नाभिजानामि अमावास्यां त्रयोदशीम् ॥ (*Mhb* vi.3,28)

The Siddhānta is that there is no return of Muktas to Samsāra The end of time is inconceivable and is a contradiction in terms The life of denizens of Svarga and other worlds is limited to a Manvantara or such other periods of time, at the end of which they have to return to rebirth The Muktas on the other hand are assured of eternal life in Mokṣa by the Śrutis and Smṛtis[3] They are also competent to realize their wishes at will and as 'no-return' cannot but be whole-heartedly desired by every Mukta, there is absolutely no difficulty in concluding that Muktas remain in their state of blessedness in communion with the Supreme B and in fellowship with other blessed ones, in the fullest enjoyment of their Svarūpānanda, for ever

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

(*Jagadvyāpārādhikaraṇam* iv 4 17-22)

This *adhi* consists of six Sūtras according to S and R S here discusses whether the meditators of Saguna B who get the state of Sāyujya with Hiranyagarbha gain absolute or limited lordship The Pūrvapakṣa holds that they acquire unlimited divine power as the Śrutis tell us that they attain self-lordship (*svārājya*) and freedom in all the worlds and that all the gods bring them offerings The Siddhānta is that their lordship is limited—such as to reducing themselves to atomic size at will and so on They do not have the power to create, sustain and destroy the universe For the world-business belongs only to the everlasting perfect Lord,[4] who is the subject matter of all the texts dealing with creation etc The liberated souls are not mentioned in that context If they were to have such powers, it will lead to many Īśvaras That will lead to complications of conflicting wills with regard to creation, destruction, etc at the same time[5] It is, therefore, granted that the released soul may be equal to the Lord in point of enjoyment only and not in power (Sūtra iv 4 21) The last Sūtra answers the objection that if the power

3 सर्वान् कामानाप्त्वा अमृतः समभवत् समभवत् (*A A* ii 5 1 15)
न च पुनरावर्तते न च पुनरावर्तते (*Chān Up* viii 15 1) इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते (iv 15 6)
तेषां न पुनरावृत्तिः (*Bṛh Up* vi 2 5) मामुपेत्य पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते (*Gita* viii 16)
अनन्ते स्वर्गे लोके ज्येये प्रतितिष्ठति प्रतितिष्ठति (*Prasna Up* iv 9)

4 जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैव ईश्वरस्य (S)

5 समप्रधानानां हि न नियमवदैकमत्यं दृष्टमिति यदैक सिसृक्षति तदैवान्यः संजिहीर्षति इत्येवमादि विरोधोऽपि स्यात् (*Bhāmati* iv 4 17)

of the released soul is not unlimited, it will have to come to an end which will necessitate a return from the world of B The answer is—those who following the path of the gods reach the world of B as described in the Śruti (*Chān. Up* viii 5 3) and set forth in the mantras, arthavādas, etc, do not return like those who have gone to the world of the moon and other places The non-return or release in successive stages in spite of the perishable nature of their glory and power has been set forth under iv 3 14 It is no wonder those who have removed the darkness of their ignorance by the light of Brahmānubhava have already attained it

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. connects the *adhi* with the knower of the Supreme B as such and *not* of the Saguna-B of S's conception—which to R has no actual existence He has, therefore, no difficulty in holding against his Pūrvapaksin that the released soul freed from all that hides its true nature possesses the power of intuitively beholding the Supreme B but does *not* possess the power of ruling and guiding different forms of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate nature There is, however, equality with respect to enjoyment The doubt that if the powers of the Mukta are limited, he may have to return to the world is cleared in the last Sūtra The Lord pleased with the faithful worship of the Bhakta frees him from the influence of Avidyā and accumulated Karmas and permits him to enjoy supreme bliss of direct experience of his own true nature He does not turn them back into the world

Criticism

Looking to the natural significance of the Sutra Sankalpādeva ca tacchruteh (iv 4 8) as interpreted by S himself, it appears the Mukta has freedom from effort and is absolutely independent of everything else but his will, in creating minds and bodies for his enjoyment in Moksa If the same freedom from effort and independence of everything else is claimed for him in creating and sustaining the world (Jagadvyāpāra), it cannot be rebutted unless the Muktajīva's will itself is shown to stand subordinated and attuned to the Divine Will—as has been done by M under *B S* iv 2 16

मुक्ताना सत्यकामत्व सामर्थ्यं च, परस्य तु ।
कामानुकूलकामत्व नान्यत्तेषा विधीयते ॥

Such a proviso has *not* been made by S in his commentary That is where the difficulty arises for him

The *Kalpataru*, however, has it that this adhi, puts up an exception to the absolute freedom of the Muktas in creating minds and bodies for their enjoyment from being extended to the creation, sustenance, etc of the world at large

मन·शरीरसर्गादावैश्वर्यं यदुपासितु ।
जगत्सर्गं तदुत्सृष्टमिह् मानादपोद्यते ॥

But it appears from the statement of the Siddhānta in the Sankalpādhikarana that in the creation of the mind and bodies by the mere will of the Muktas, only complete freedom from effort and independence of everything else has been made the governing principle *(utsarga)*[6] *No reference has been made there to the Mukta's agency (kartṛtva) as such* which could be made the ground of the Pūrvapaksa in the present adhi, by way of analogical extension in support of agency in the creation, sustenance, etc, of the world at large—to be refuted by the Sūtra Jagadvyāpāravarjam As the agency *(kartṛtva)* as such of the Mukta has not been made to figure in 'Manassarirasrti' in the 'Sankalpādhi' it is not permissible to treat it as 'utsṛṣṭa' or having been given there in that context as the general principle at issue behind the creation of manas, śarira, etc for purposes of the Mukta's enjoyment and extend it to world creation, by way of Pūrvapakṣa, here[7] *The sequence of thought in respect of this adhi, is not, therefore, tenable*

The texts cited by S such as He obtains self lordship (TS i 6 2) All the gods bring him offerings *(Taitt Up* i, 5, 3) For him there is freedom in all the worlds (*Chān Up* viii 1 6) are of a general nature and do not commit us to the acceptance of Jagadvyāpāra or creation, sustenance, etc of the world on the part of Muktas The Pūrvapaksa based on such texts is too *inadequate to be considered seriously* That is why R has wisely ignored such props and based his Pūrvapakṣa on the Paramasāmya Śruti (*Mund* Up iii 1 1) and the Mukta's Satyasankalpatva, arguing that these two conditions will *not* be fulfilled unless the soul possesses the special powers of B with regard to the creation and government etc, of the world

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6 This can be seen from the direction of the Purvapakṣa of the Sankalpadhi in S s *bhāṣya* the *Bhāmati* and the *Kalpataru*
सकल्प एव केवल पित्रादिसमुत्थाने हेतुर्न निमित्तान्तरमस्ति इति सशय (S *BSB* iv 4 8)
यत्नान्तरेण सहत्या नात्र वस्तुप्रसाधनं ।
न दृष्टं शास्त्रं यत्नस्य साधनान्यधारित ॥ (*Bhāmati* iv 4 8)
[illegible] विरोधात [illegible] श्रुत लौकिका
दनुमानात् बाध इति पूर्वपक्षयति (*Kalpataru* iv 4 8)
7 तत्र ज्ञानयोगेन [illegible] यत्र जगत्सृष्ट्यादौ तदभावेन (*STC*)

But even the Paramasāmyaśruti which says "Free from stain, he reaches the highest equality with the Supreme Person" is not sufficient to suggest any such Pūrvapaksa For 'Paramasāmya' can be accommodated in terms of spotless intelligence and bliss as well Absolute equality in the primary sense of the term and in all respects suggested by the adjective "highest" (equality) is bound to remain unrealizable between two beings like Jiva and B who are admittedly intrinsically different according to R

The Siddhānta tentatively accepted by S *for purposes of this adhi* is that in as much as the world-business belongs to the "eternal Lord", (nityasiddhesvara) only other lordly powers or Siddhis like 'animā' can be conceded to the Mukta It is difficult to see how S can describe his "Isvara" as "nitya" (eternal)—seeing that Isvara, in his system, is delimited by Māyā The proposition that what is beginningless and of a positive character must be eternal cannot be pressed too far by S who has to make room for a Bhāvarūpājñāna in his system, which tho' by definition is beginningless and positive in character is not, however, eternal (nitya) but is subject to liquidation by Vijñana Moreover, if Īsvara is admitted to be 'anādinitya', He will have to be recognized as real *in the sense of being uncontradicted for all time (traikālikanise-*dhāpratiyogi) which will upset 'monism'—by making room for two realities B the Nirguna and Isvara the creator of the world

The *Bhāmati* has argued that cosmic creation etc can really be accomplished in the last analysis only by a Being which is solely of the nature of a cause and not by one like the Jivātman who is of the twin nature *of being both a cause and an effect*[8] *But the difficulty is that* if Isvara should be only of the nature of a cause and *not* 'kāryakārana-svabhāva' as contended by the *Bhāmati*, He will cease to be 'mithyā' within *the meaning of what partakes of the character of Avidyā or its* effects (*avidyātatkāryayoranyataratvam*)—for, being delimited by Avidyā "Isvara" cannot be regarded as real and eternal

Moreover, if the Mukta can create bodies and minds for his enjoyment, he can also be credited with the power to create and sustain the world for the same purpose We hear of superhuman powers of Agastya *drinking the ocean at a draught* It cannot be objected that this will make Jiva an all-powerful and independent being like God The contingency is equally to be feared in allowing him the power to

8 जगज्जन्म हि कार्यं कारणैकस्वभावस्यैव किं भवतु आहो कार्यकारणस्वभावस्य ? स्वात्मनस्वभावस्य स्वात्मनो मस्कारणत्वेनस्य पूर्वसिद्ध परमेश्वर एव कारणमस्यैतस्य इति सर्वैकान्तु अन्यतरस्य
(*Bhāmati* iv 4 17)

create minds and bodies for his enjoyment If such powers exercised by him are dependent on B, the power to create the world may also be taken to be similarly dependent on B The right way of meeting such an objection is to be invoke and impose a statutory limitation, at the very source, on the powers of the Mukta [9]

The *Bhāmatī* has also argued that if the Mukta Jivas should have the power to create the world, it would make them equals of B and that will lead to the acceptance of many Īśvaras which may give rise to a conflict of wills bringing everything to a standstill as one free soul may decide to create the world and another or Isvara may decide to destroy it at the same time

The argument is not conclusive It is not always true that equals invariably disagree with one another Whatever may be the case with equals in our world, there may be nothing but harmony of wills in the state of Mokṣa Otherwise, the Trimūrtis Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva who are supposed by Advaita theologians to be Avatars of the same B may not be working smoothly with their respective work of creation, sustention and dissolution If they are all one and the same Being and, therefore, there is no difficulty in their harmoniously working together, the Mukta Jivas too should have no difference of views with Īsvara For, the Jivacit in S 's system is in essence the same as Īsvaracit

The *Bhāmati* has put forward another argument that the powers and excellences of the Mukta Jivas must be inferior to those of Īsvara because the Śrutis tell us that Muktas owe theirs to Īsvara and have gained them thro' their searching for and striving to know the Lord The argument is clearly inadequate Pupils who have received their learning from their teacher are seen to outshine their master in attainments Vassals of a King who have been given principalities by him are known to have become independent of their lord and his equals at the earliest opportunity

S understands the Sūtra 'Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca' (iv 4 21) as purporting to say that the released soul enjoys the same illimitable superexcellence of bliss as B This would make the Mukta Jīvas and B equals (samapradhāna)—a conclusion which both S and R are anxious to avoid [11] From parity in bliss to parity in independence is not a far cry and such a position would defeat the very purpose of this adhi

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9 Cf [illegible] ॥
(M *BSB* iv 4 18)

10 See *Bhāmati* iv 4 17 and R iv 4 20

Actually, R has construed the suffix 'mātra' in 'Bhogamātrasāmya' as *restricting the equality of bhoga to the experience of B's true nature* as such (ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवरूपभोगमात्रे मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मसाम्यप्रतिपादनात्) does not authorize us to conclude that such enjoyment of the Jīva extends to the entire gamut of B's bliss expressed thro' so many other aspects of its being such as its metaphysical independence (*svātantrya*), *its Jagadvyāpāra and its Śeṣitva in respect of Śrītattva, the Nityasūris*, and other Muktas It is thus difficult to enlist this Sūtra as it has been interpreted by R in support of the absolute parity of bhoga of Jiva with B in all its range and entirety of aspects For further discussion of arguments for and against the doctrine of 'Ānandasāmya' between Jīva and B in Moksa associated with Visistādvaitic belief see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya*, pp 348-55

The absence of "ca" *in the last Sūtra 'Anāvrttiś sabdāt'* (iv 4 22) clearly indicates it to be a fresh adhi S realizes that the topic of the preceding Sūtra Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca' as interpreted by him is inconsistent with the tenor of the last Sūtra promising 'no return' from that state—which to him is one of Sagunamukti He is, therefore, obliged to put in an explanation to get over this difficulty, saying that it has been shown under Sūtra iv 3 10 how the finiteness and perishability of their lordly powers do not entail a return to the life of Samsāra It is too far-fetched to connect iv *4 22 with iv 3 10 whose title to be re*garded as a Siddhānta Sūtra is, as we have seen, open to question

CONCLUSION

It will be seen from this study of the Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries that M and his commentators have adopted a fresh perspective towards the entire range of the source books of Vedānta and found in them a philosophy of Theism with its chief accent on Bhakti based on right understanding of the majesty of Brahman and unalloyed devotion to it evoked by such understanding and conceived both as a means and an end in itself The essence of this new approach is that "All Vedantic texts without exception converge on the majesty of Brahman as the abode of infinite auspicious attributes and as free from all *imperfections Some of these texts represent B as en*dowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner control of matter and souls, munificence, beauty and so on Others represent it as free from all such limitations as sin, misery, liability *to* physical embodiment etc Yet others describe it as being beyond the reach of mind and speech in order to bring home to us its mysterious nature

as being incomprehensible to empirical means of understanding Others depict it as the Only One that exists, in order that it may be sought to the exclusion of all other values Yet others represent it as the 'self of all' that it may be understood as the bestower of all existence, knowability and activity on all finite reality But weak minds failing to take note of the unitary essence of Vedic teaching thro' all their richness and multiplicity of approach to Divine majesty, introduce artificial distinctions of "Saviśeṣa" and Nirviseṣa", "Saguna and "Nirguna", "Vyāvahārika" and "Pāramārthika" levels of thinking in the interpretation of the message of the Śrutis" (*NS* p 124)

They have shown how these notes in the symphony of Vedāntic Theism find full-throated expression in the body of the Brahmasūtras Their achievements by way of analysis and assessment of the Sūtra-interpretations of their own school and those of S and R., especially those of Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC* with reference to the first two Adhyāyas of the Sūtras and of his successor Raghunātha Tīrtha in his *STC* with reference to the remaining two Adhyāyas, upon which I have based my study of the subject in these three volumes are indeed a great landmark in the development of critical and expository literature on the subject of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras and remain unexcelled

The results achieved by Thibaut and a few other modern scholars thro' their critical and comparative study and assessment of the Sūtra-interpretations of S R and others cannot bear comparison with the weight and volume of work done and the results achieved in the same direction, centuries earlier by Vyāsatīrtha and Raghunātha Tīrtha with special reference to the Sūtra-interpretations of the three principal living schools of Vedānta

Dasgupta is the only modern scholar and historian of Indian philosophy to devote prominent attention in the fourth Volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy* to the contributions of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha to M.'s philosophy But his chapter on 'Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahmasūtras" (pp 102-149) devotes more space to Sūtras i 1, 1-4, followed by a rapid "general review of other important topics of the Sūtras". This leaves no room for a detailed examination of all the adhikarana-Śarīras of the Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita interpretations of the Sūtras as carried out by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC* Dasgupta has confined his attention to only a few points raised by the *TC* and its review of a few adhi s such as i, 2, 9-10, 18-20, 21, 24, i, 2 13, i, 4 15-18, ii, 1 13, 14, 20 *He has completely passed over Vyāsatīrtha's review of the Sūtra-interpretations of the Rāmānuja school* Such a detailed survey of Vyāsatīrtha's *TC* was evidently outside the intended scope

of Dasgupta's work covering several schools of Indian philosophy within a limited space.

The major portion of the *Śeṣatātparyacandrikā* (*STC*) is still in manuscripts. No wonder it has remained untouched by any modern scholar so far. There are also no English translations of the *TC* and the *STC*. This places modern scholars and students of Indian philosophy not having a deep knowledge of Sanskrit at a disadvantage in getting at their contents.

It has been my ambition to clear the way for modern scholars of Indian philosophy to have easy access to the contents of the great classics of the Dvaita school in the best interests of the advancement of Indian philosophical studies. The systematic study and incorporation of valuable material from the two masterpieces of the Dvaita school on the interpretation of the Brahmasutras viz., the *TC* and the *STC* along with connected data from other sources like M.'s own *AV.* and *NV.*, Trivikrama's *TD.*, J.'s *TP.* and *NS.* and subsequent commentaries of Raghūttama, Vādirāja, Rāghavendra, Satyanātha and Jagannātha of the Dvaita school and equally systematic study of the adhikaraṇa-Śarīras of the Sūtras according to the S. and R. schools based not only on their Bhāṣyas but also on their untranslated and unexplored commentaries such as the *Bhāmatī*, the *Kalpataru* and the *Śrutaprakāśa* and the review of their interpretations carried out in the light of the two above-mentioned classics of the Dvaita school *for the first time* in these Volumes should now put an end to the difficulties which have so far stood in the way of modern scholars and students paying greater attention to the Sūtra-interpretations of the Dvaita school on account of paucity of materials available in English for a proper study, understanding and appreciation of the architectonic features of its interpretation of the Sūtras Bādarāyaṇa in relation to those of the S. and R. schools. With this obstacle now swept away, there should be no further difficulty for modern scholarship to accord complete parity of attention and treatment to M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras with those of the other two schools which have so far been receiving almost exclusive attention in academic circles.

The entire gamut of the Sūtra-interpretation of the Dvaita school can now be studied in depth, in its own authentic mileu and original perspective, with the full complement of critical and expository apparatus, and in relation to those of the two other principal schools whose findings on the thought and interpretation of the Sūtras it has contested vigorously from the days of M.

So long as the study in depth of the Sūtra-interpretations of this important school of Vedānta which has done so much for the development of a new *genré* of critical literature on the subject of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras remains neglected, it is futile to expect any real progress or meaningful advance to be made in our attempts at finding out where the Sūtras of Bādarāyana are intended to lead us

I earnestly hope that modern scholarship in Indian philosophy and Vedanta will come forward to profit by the new insights which the masterminds of the Dvaita school have given us into the Sūtras of Bādarāyana as the 'Para-Vidyā" and "Nirnāyaka-Śāstra" and the immense contribution they have made to the intensive study, deeper understanding and finer appreciation of the language, thought and subject matter of the Sūtras and move on the road to the discovery of the heart of the illustrious Sūtrakāra

I thank the U G C for having given me the initial opportunity to take up this massive research project and work upon it and the Management of the Ruparel College, Bombay for extending to me the fullest facilities to use the College Library even after my retirement

परविद्याकृते तस्मै बादरायणमूर्तये । ज्ञानकार्याय हरये कृतिरेषा समर्प्यते ॥
"विद्वांसो यदि मम दोषमुद्गिरेयुर्यद्वा ते गुणगणमेव कीर्तयेयु ।
तुल्य तद्वत बहुमनुते मनो मदीय कष्ट तद्वत मनुते यदाह मन्द ॥"

श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥

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